U. K. IMANALIEV

Graduate student

Institute of History and Cultural Heritage of the National Academy of Sciences of the Kyrgyz Republic

Keywords: pan-Turkism, geopolitics, "soft power", Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, USA, Russia

Turkey uses the ideology of pan-Turkism and actively applies the policy of "soft power"in order to implement its foreign policy objectives in relation to the Turkic-speaking peoples. At the same time, some Western actors see pan-Turkism as a geopolitical tool for deterring Russia and China. In this regard, Kyrgyzstan is increasingly becoming a zone of intersection of interests of Russia and Turkey.

One of the manifestations of the change in the geopolitical picture of the world caused by the collapse of the USSR is a new stage in the implementation of the doctrine of pan-Turkism. The idea of pan-Turkism, based on the idea of consolidating all the Turkic peoples in one state with Turkey playing a leading role, was developed and established in the Ottoman Empire. This idea was actively supported by the British, German and Austrian ruling circles and their special services, which aimed to turn the direction of Turkish expansion opportunities away from Europe towards the Russian Empire, where the bulk of the Turkic peoples lived.¹

The logic of pan-Turkism was based on two postulates. First, Turkey, eager for revenge after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, no longer threatened Europe. Second, it directed its gaze to Russian territories, and as a result of the clash, the European powers won.

In 1916, during the uprising of a number of Central Asian peoples of the Russian Empire against the Russian authorities, Turkish agents called on the local population to ghazavat - a " holy war "against the" infidels", i.e. Russians. Turkey's powerful influence in the region was also reflected in its support for the Basmachi people during the Civil War. It saw the 1916 uprising and the Basma movement as a means of weakening Russia.²

ACTIVATING THE IDEOLOGY OF PAN-TURKISM

The collapse of the USSR in many ways intensified the implementation of the ideas of pan-Turkism. At the same time, the United States is trying to use Turkey as a vehicle for its policy, since the Turkic - speaking states of Central Asia are located between Russia, China and the Islamic world-the most important geostrategic rivals of the United States. In American foreign policy circles, a strategy was put forward to ensure Turkish influence in the region, which would give the United States the opportunity to indirectly control socio-political movements in post-Soviet countries.³

Turkey was the first to recognize the independence of the former Soviet republics, 5 of which are Turkic-speaking. At the XII World Economic Forum held in Davos in 1992, Turkish Prime Minister S. Demirel met with the leaders of these CIS republics and stated that after the collapse of the USSR "...from the Adriatic to the Wall of China, a great Turkic world has emerged", over which Ankara assumes custody.

On February 11 of the same year, at a meeting with the President of the United States, J. R. R. TolkienDemirel announced Turkey's readiness to take part in the development of new Turkic states, offering them a modern model of Islam as an alternative to Iranian fundamentalism. ⁴ US Secretary of State John Kerry said that Turkey is ready to take part in the development of new Turkic states, offering them a modern model of Islam as an alternative to Iranian fundamentalism.Baker, who visited the Central Asian republics immediately after their declaration of independence, urged their leaders to "... embrace the Turkish model of secularism, liberal democracy,and market economy. " ⁵

Russian researcher R. Terekhov, analyzing the implementation of pan-Turkic ideas in the post-Soviet space, notes that in the 1990s, Turkey's actions were aimed at forming a common Turkic economic and cultural space. ⁶

The Turkish model, which is a synthesis of traditional values of Islam and Western democratic culture-

For some time, it was considered as one of the possible ways of development of Kyrgyzstan, as evidenced by the active political dialogue between the leaders of the two countries. A. Akayev, President of the Kyrgyz Republic (KR) in 1990-2005, made 6 working and official visits to Turkey in 10 years. In 1997, the two countries signed the "Treaty of Eternal Friendship and Cooperation" ⁷.

However, the pan-Turkist theme was not relevant enough for the new Turkic-speaking countries, since they were primarily concerned with building national states. Moreover, having become independent and trying to establish relations with different states, these countries do not want to be limited to the dominance of only one of them. Already at the first summit of the leaders of the Turkic-speaking states (1992, Ankara), the leaders of the new countries gently rejected the multilateral agreements proposed by Turkey, while expressing their readiness to sign them on a bilateral basis. ⁸

Ankara has realized the need to review political approaches to the Central Asian countries. R.'s personal account Erdogan (2003-2014) initiated a rethinking of the country's foreign policy. The new doctrine, laid out by Davutoglu, who was then Foreign minister, called for using Turkey's geostrategic position in the center of Eurasia, its historical Ottoman ties, and proximity to Islam to give the country "strategic depth" and ensure its broad influence. Behind these broad ideas is a serious bid for regional leadership, particularly in Central Asia.⁹

On November 17, 2006, the 8th Summit of the leaders of the Turkic countries was held in the Turkish city of Antalya, which resumed regular meetings of the top leaders of these states. On November 17-19, 2007, at the XI Congress of the Organization of Friendship, Brotherhood and Cooperation of Turkic-Speaking Countries and Communities in Baku, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan initiated the creation of a political union of Turkic-speaking states to coordinate efforts in important foreign policy areas.¹⁰

In 2008, the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-Speaking Countries (TurkPA) was established. In 2009, at the IX Summit of the Heads of Turkic-speaking states in the city of Nakhichevan (Azerbaijan), the Council for Cooperation of Turkic Countries (Turkic Council)was established - an international intergovernmental organization for the maintenance of peace and security in the region and the development of relations between countries.

It is noteworthy that after the signing ceremony of the treaty on the establishment of the Turkic Council, Turkish President A. Gul expressed confidence that the summit in Nakhichevan will be a turning point in the integration of Turkic states, which will end with the creation of the Commonwealth of Turkic Nations.¹¹

SOFT POWER POLICY

The concept of Turkey's economic and humanitarian expansion, which is being implemented with the aim of consolidating the Turkic states, is divided into two stages by some experts: 1) 1992-1997-the period of active expansionist policy of the Republic of Turkey; 2)1997 and up to the present - awareness of the limited material resources of the Turkish elite; restoration of the economic and political potential of the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet region12.

At the same time, Turkey is increasing cooperation with the former Soviet Union republics. At the same time, priority is given to cultural and educational programs, which allows us to speak about the use of a "soft power" policy, largely due to the ideology of pan-Turkism.

A distinctive feature of Turkey's soft power policy is that its implementation involves not only national institutions, but also the desire to create interstate associations.¹³ Thus, in 1993, the Government of Turkey initiated the creation of the International Organization of Turkic Culture (TURKSOY) in order to preserve and disseminate the Turkic cultural heritage.

Among the key departments and institutions of this country involved in the implementation of the "soft power" policy are the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Tourism and Culture, public Diplomacy, as well as the Turkish Agency for International Cooperation and Development (TIKA), the Yunus Emre Foundation and the General Directorate of the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT).

TIKA, founded in 1992 to coordinate and enhance Turkey's contacts with the Turkic-speaking countries of the CIS, is particularly active. The Agency was established as a subordinate organization under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and performs the tasks of developing and implementing targeted projects and programs in the economic, trade, technical, social, cultural and educational spheres ¹⁴.

Due to the expansion of the geography of its activities, the agency was reassigned to the Office of the Prime Minister in 1999. Currently, 23 TIKA offices operate in 20 countries, including Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Balkans, and the Black and Mediterranean Seas.

Within the framework of the" Protocol on Cooperation " signed on April 8, 1993 between the Foreign Ministries of Turkey and Kyrgyzstan, the Bishkek office of TIKA was opened in September of the same year. From 1993 to 2007 in Kyrgyzstan

A number of TIKA projects worth more than $16 million were implemented, including the opening of a computer lab and training courses for employees of the Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, cultural centers and libraries in universities, as well as support for educational institutions and some media outlets.¹⁵

At the initiative of TIKA, a meeting of representatives of Turkic-speaking communities from the CIS countries was held in Paris in August 1993, which was attended by representatives of NATO, the US State Department and the CIA. By the way, the current head of Turkish Intelligence (MIT), H. Fidan, headed TIKA¹⁶ from 2003 to 2007. At the same time, the IIT plays a major role in creating various intergovernmental and governmental bodies, committees, both in Turkey and abroad for the implementation of pan-Turkist ideas.¹⁷

An example of the success of Turkey's soft power policy in Kyrgyzstan is the Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University, established in Bishkek in 1995 with Turkish funds amounting to $289 million.¹⁸ Students from 16 countries are also funded by Turkey in 32 areas of study and bachelor's degree programs.

An important component of this policy is the development of a student exchange project in 1992 to attract students from Central Asia to Turkish universities with the long - term prospect of creating a pro-Turkish political elite in this region.¹⁹ Within the framework of the Intergovernmental Agreement on Student Exchange, about 1.7 thousand Kyrgyz boys and girls study at universities in Turkey, and more than a thousand Turkish students study at universities in Kyrgyzstan.²⁰

Kyrgyz-Turkish women's Lyceum "Anadolu"operates²¹. All expenses for training, accommodation and providing scholarships for lyceum students are financed by the Turkish Ministry of Education. Graduates who wish to continue their studies in Turkey are provided with places in the budget departments of technological universities in Turkey ²².

NETWORK OF SCHOOLS OF THE HIZMET MOVEMENT

Special attention should be paid to the activities of the Sebat network of Turkish educational institutions, which has been operating in the republic since 1992. Within the framework of the cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Education and Science of the Kyrgyz Republic and the International Educational Association, 22 educational institutions of the Sebat Association operate on the territory of Kyrgyzstan, including, in addition to lyceums, the Silk Road school and the private Ataturk University-Ala-Too " ²³.

These educational institutions are closely associated with the Hizmet movement, which is headed by the well-known Turkish public and religious figure Fethullah Gulen, whose activities are evaluated ambiguously.²⁴

Hizmet takes its ideological origin from the teachings of the Turkish theologian of Kurdish origin Said Nursi (1878-1960), who preached the establishment of Sharia rule in Turkey and founded the Nurcular religious sect after the First World War. ²⁵ S. Nursi's teachings are reflected in his works Risale-i-Nur. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the secular government of Kemal Ataturk came to power in the 1920s, the activities of religious orders, including the Nurjular sect, were banned.

However, in the 1950s, the Turkish Parliament passed a resolution on the rehabilitation of S. Nursi's literary heritage. One of his followers, the imam of a mosque in Izmir, F. Gulen, began to actively preach ideas about the establishment of Sharia law in 1970, for which he was sentenced to 3 years in 1971. On the basis of the Risale-i-Nur teaching, he created a new teaching, whose adherents in Turkey are called "Fethullachilar", and the adherents themselves call themselves" Hizmet " (service). Further development of the movement in conditions of semi-underground work and pressure from the state led to the formation of a secret organization.

Researchers note that the movement is focused on influencing 3 areas of society: education, media, and finance and business26. In the 1970s and 1990s, a nationwide network of schools, colleges, and other educational institutions was created in Turkey with the financial support of Gulen's businessmen, including Fatih University in Istanbul, as well as a number of hospitals and charitable foundations.

Today, the movement's network of educational institutions consists of 500 schools in 150 countries. Hizmet has also created a powerful media group that includes Samanyolu TV, Ebru TV, Mehtap TV, Ihlas Haber Ajansi (IHA) news agency, Turkiye, Zaman, Zafer, Hurriyet newspapers and other Turkish media outlets, as well as a number of financial institutions with a combined capital of more than $50 billion.

In total, in Turkey, the movement's followers control 203 of the 385 major Islamic corporations, as well as 100 foundations in different countries that support their social and educational projects.²⁷ Experts note that almost all Turkish businesses represented in the former Soviet Union are affiliated with the Hizmet movement.

Hizmet pays special attention to the promotion of Islamic and pan-Turkic ideas. Its educational activities are based on the concept of the Nesil Act ("Golden Generation"), according to which adherents of the sect help to form elites loyal to Hizmet and through

they seek to influence the socio-political process. Officially, lyceums are not considered religious schools. However, they practice the "mentor institute" (belletmen), which selects a small group of students and secretly gives them a basic Islamic education.²⁸

Students are encouraged to adhere to Islamic values and Turkish culture. Out of the total number of lyceum students, the most capable and promising ones are identified, and more thorough work is carried out with them. Students selected as a result of such" selection "and subjected to pan-Turkist processing are provided with conditions for admission to educational institutions in Turkey at the expense of funds and firms controlled by Hizmet29.

The movement relies on the formation of the future elite of the Central Asian states, which may continue to ensure a loyal policy towards Turkey in ^the region30. Moreover, graduates of Turkish schools already work in the highest authorities of Kyrgyzstan, which does not go unnoticed and causes quite reasonable interest among some experts.³¹

The movement promotes the idea that freedom is an integral part of faith, that Islam and democracy do not contradict each other, and that democracy and freedom are indispensable conditions for building a just society. Many public organizations are connected to the movement in one way or another. These include the Dialog Eurasia Platform, an international non-governmental organization active in a number of Eurasian countries and engaged in educational and cultural projects.³²

Thus, the Gulen doctrine, which was born in the west of Turkey, in Izmir, in the 1970s of the last century as a small circle designed to meet the need of local Muslim communities for religious knowledge, eventually turned into a powerful transnational Islamic movement. According to rough estimates, the number of his followers in the world reaches 6 million ³³. Members of the movement are known to support each other in business and other professional spheres. ³⁴

GEOPOLITICS AND GULEN

Given the hidden proselytism, secret hierarchy and strict control over the activities of its adherents, the Hizmet movement can be classified as a sectarian organization. At the same time, the broad network of organizations he created in many countries, his active economic activity and focus on the elite, speaks to the political ambitions of the movement's leaders.³⁵

It is believed that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey was created by a coalition of moderate Islamic movements that united to eliminate the secular regime of the military through democratic reforms. In particular, the party of R. Erdogan in the parliamentary elections three times (the last time in 2011) received support from the Naqshbandi tariqa, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Hizmet movement. However, the AKP-Hizmet partnership was temporary, until the military was removed from politics, after which their paths diverged.

So, if Erdogan prefers a more traditional version of Islam, then Gulen is perceived as a supporter of combining the Muslim faith with the achievements of Western civilization, the so-called Euro-Islam.³⁶ In particular, Gulen advocates religious tolerance, competing with ultra-radical Islamist groups for influence over Muslims in Central Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and even Africa, where the movement's emissaries also operate.

In 2013-2014, a political crisis emerged in Turkey, which manifested itself in a public conflict between the leader of the Hizmet movement, F. Gulen, and Prime Minister R. Erdogan. So, as part of the investigation of corruption cases, 52 people were detained, including officials from the Cabinet of Ministers close to Erdogan. In response, Erdogan launched a reform of the Interior Ministry and the Prosecutor's Office, where he removed thousands of high-ranking officials suspected of loyalty to Hizmet.

Moreover, supporters of the movement were accused of treason and attempted coup. So, among those arrested were the editor-in-chief of the Zaman newspaper, the general director of Samanyolu TV, as well as police officers and the former head of the Istanbul Police Department for combating Terrorism T. Ergyder.

The US State Department has condemned the arrest of the above ³⁷ individuals. To avoid arrest, Gulen left for the United States in 1999 after being accused of trying to change the secular system of the Republic of Turkey. In 2008, amid the closure of a criminal case in Turkey, he was selected as the world's most influential intellectual by Prospect and Foreign Policy magazines, and Time magazine regularly lists him among the "100 most influential people in the world"^.38 In 2012, Prime Minister Erdogan invited Gulen to return to Turkey, but he refrained from doing so. instead, justifying the refusal with veiled arguments ³⁹.

Nevertheless, the political crisis in Turkey in 2013-2014, which manifested itself in the public conflict between the leader of the Hizmet movement F. Gulen and Prime Minister R. Erdogan, demonstrates the Gulenist structure as a serious political force.

The confrontation continues to this day. Since April 18, 2016, Turkish police have arrested more than a hundred citizens suspected of having ties to a U.S. resident. Gulen. A Turkish court issued three arrest warrants against him.

M. Perincek, an employee of the Atatürk Institute of Principles and the History of the Turkish Revolution at Istanbul University, said that the "Gulen sect" is a conductor of American geopolitics in Turkey, Central Asia, the Middle East, the Caucasus, as well as in the Chinese Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. America has its own interests. Moreover, a book by N. Veren, a former adviser to Gulen who later broke with the sect, shows that Gulen allegedly receives money from the CIA, and that CIA personnel agents work in the schools of his international educational network.⁴⁰

In addition, the book "Witness to Anarchy and Revolutions" by a retired Turkish intelligence officer O. Gundesh was published in Turkey, which states that the network of Turkish lyceums in Russia and Central Asia has long served as a cover for the American special services. Thus, in the 1990s, ¹³⁰ CIA officers, who were listed as English language teachers, worked undercover at the Nurdzhular lyceums in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan alone. In the context of the above, the question naturally arises about the destructive role of the Hizmet movement.

According to the Russian Federal Security Service, the Turkish religious-nationalist sect Nurcular operated in Russia through the companies Serhat, Eflyak, Toros, Tolerance and Ufuk funds created by it, solving a wide range of tasks in the interests of American intelligence. She collected information about the political processes taking place in the North Caucasus, simultaneously conducted pan-Turkist and pan-Islamic training of young people, and conducted propaganda campaigns. Candidates for recruitment to form a pro-Turkish lobby in local government structures, infiltrate law enforcement agencies and public associations were studied. In this connection, on 10 April 2008, the Supreme Court of Russia recognized Nurdzhular as an extremist organization and banned its activities on the territory of the Russian Federation.⁴²

* * *

In Turkey's policy towards the Turkic-speaking countries of the post-Soviet space, the doctrine of pan-Turkism occupies a significant place, in the implementation of which the policy of "soft power"is of key importance. A set of forms of implementation of "soft power" has been developed, which have proved their effectiveness. At the same time, Turkey's pan-Turkic activity declined largely due to the fact that Ankara could not withstand competition in the region in economic and security issues with Russia and China.

Turkish influence in Kyrgyzstan is now seen as moderate, although in the long run political scenarios similar to the confrontation between official Ankara and supporters of the Hizmet movement are possible. ⁴³ In addition, Turkey's soft power policy, initially supported by the ideas of pan-Turkism, can become a noticeable geopolitical tool in certain conditions.

Today, the Middle East is undergoing a peculiar transformation, the apogee of which, perhaps, is the Syrian crisis. At the same time, Turkey plays the role of a kind of conductor of Western interests, which inevitably leads to a complication of relations with Russia. The Russian SU-24 shot down by the Turkish Air Force in November 2015 can be considered a point of no return. President of the Kyrgyz Republic A. Atambayev noted that Turkey's decision to shoot down the Russian Su-24 in Syria was a mistake.⁴⁴

Turkey's policy on the Syrian crisis cannot but have an impact on its relations with Central Asian states. In the expert community of the Kyrgyz Republic, there are certain concerns about a large stratum of graduates of Turkish educational institutions, which may have an impact on the split in society.⁴⁵

Russia's anti-terrorist operation in Syria meets the interests of the Central Asian countries, whose citizens "safely" joined the IS terrorists through Turkey. In this regard, the leaders of the region's states will certainly treat the penetration of various forms of Turkish organizations in the region with at least more caution and consideration. Moreover, against the background of the fight against international terrorism, where individual States directly or indirectly support terrorist organizations, the countries of Central Asia should certainly adopt an unambiguous position.

^{Babayan D.} 1 Artsakhskaya problema i ideologiya panturkizma // 21-i vek. 2011. N 4 (20), pp. 68-99. (Babayan D. 2011. Artsakhskaya problema i ideologiya panturkizma / / 21 - i vek) (in Russian)

^{Vakhimova G.} 2 Interaction of Central Asian countries with the Republic of Turkey (early 1990s-2009). Bishkek. 2011, с. 141. (Vakhitova G. 2011. Vzaimodeystvie stran Tsentralnoi Azii s Turetskoi Respublikoi. Bishkek) (in Russian)

^{Hovsepyan L.} 3 The Turkish model and the conditionality of Ankara's foreign policy in the countries of Central Asia by the strategic interests of the West / / Central Asia

and the Caucasus. 2009, N 2 (62), p. 133. (Ovsepyan L. 2009. Turetskaya model i obuslovlennost vneshney politiki Ankary v stranah Tsentralnoi Azii... // Tsentralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz. N 2) (in Russian)

^{Ivanova N.} 4 Overdue "medicine from Russian communism" / / Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 24.02.2016 http://www.ng.ru

⁵ Cit. Urazova E. Tendentsii razvitiya ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva turkskimi gosudarstvami [Trends in the development of economic cooperation between Turkey and the post-Soviet Turkic States]. 2001, N 5 (17), p. 137 (Urazova E. 2001. Tendentsii razvitiya ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva Turtsii s postsovetskimi tyurkskimi gosudarstvami // Tsentralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz. N 5) (in Russian)

⁶ Terekhov R. S. Vliyanie ideologii panturkizma na vneshnuyu politike Osmanskoy Imperii i Turk'skoy Respubliki v XX veke [The influence of the ideology of Pan-Turkism on the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic in the XX century]. 2011, p. 23.

^{Mamasheva N. K.} 7 the Relationship of Kyrgyzstan with the Islamic world // the Dialogue of cultures and religions - a guarantee of peace and stability: materials of the round table. Bishkek. 2002.

^{Mkhitaryan N.} 8 Consolidation of the Turkic world in the ideology and political practice of official Ankara. 21.02.2016 - http://www.ca-c.org

^{Mirzekhanov V.} 9 Russia's perception of Turkey's policy in Central Asia and prospects for Russian-Turkish cooperation in the region. 21.02.2016 http://mirnas.ru

^{Parubochaya E.} 10 Summits of the Turkic States (2006-2010): a real platform for bringing countries closer together // Bulletin. Volgogr. GU. Series 4, History. 2011. N 2 (20).

^{Svistunova I.} 11 On Turkey's participation in the Ninth Summit of the Heads of the Turkic States / / Institute of the Middle East, 21.02.2016 - http://iimes.ru

^{Terekhov R.} 12 Politicheskie doktoriny MFA Turk'skoy Respubliki v 1990-e gody [Political doctrines of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey in the 1990s]. Series 4, History. 2010. N 2 (18). P. 115.

^{Safonkina E. A.} 13 Turtsiya kak novyi actor politiki "myagkoi sily" // Vestnik mezdunarodnykh organizatsyi. Vol. 9, N 2 (2014) p. 146. (Safonkina E. A. 2014. Turtsiya kak novyi actor politiki "myagkoi sily" / / Vestnik mezdunarodnykh organizatsyi. Vol. 9, N 2) (in Russian)

^{Terekhov R.} 14 Activities of Turkish non-governmental organizations: ideology, structure, technology // Proceedings of the International scientific conference "Actual problems of studying modern Turkey", N. Novgorod-Istanbul, 2011, p. 159.

¹⁵ TIKA in the Kyrgyz Republic, 21.02.2016 -http://donors.kg

^{Avatkov V. A., Badranov A. Sh} 16 "Soft power" of Turkey in the internal policy of Russia / / Law and Management. XXI. 2013, N 2 (27). P. 5 (Avatkov V. A., Badranov A.Sh 2013. "Myagkaya sila" Turtsii vo vnutrenney politike Rossii / / Pravo i upravlenie. XXI. N 2 (27)) (in Russian)

^{Terekhov R.} 17 Vliyanie ideologii panturkizma [The influence of the ideology of Pan-Turkism], p. 24.

^{Tynayeva N.} 18 Turkey spent $289 million on Kyrgyz-Turkish University "Manas" 21.02.2016 -http://knews.kg

^{Urmanov D. R.} 19 The Central Asian factor in Turkey's foreign Policy // Proceedings of the International Conference "Turkey: new realities in Domestic policy and participation in regional geopolitical processes". Moscow, 2.04.2014, p. 223.

²⁰ 20 years of diplomatic relations between Kyrgyzstan and Turkey / / KNIA "Kabar". 21.02.2016 - http://www.kabar.kg

Transformations in the system of primary vocational education in Kyrgyzstan (1991-2000s). Abstract of the dissertation ... Candidate of Historical Sciences Bishkek. 2004, p. 15.

²² Kyrgyz-Turkish women's Professional Lyceum "Anadolu". 21.02.2016 - http://dbase.caep-project.org

^{Shepelenko A.} 23 "Sebat" - 20 years in Kyrgyzstan. 21.02.2016 - http://slovo.kg

^{Asanov B.} 24 Turkish figure Gulen strengthens influence on Kyrgyzstan / / Radio Azattyk. 21.02.2016 - http://rus.azattyk.org

^{Kislov D.} 25 Interview with B. Balji. Said Nursi and Fethullah Gulen in Central Asia: The Impact on Religion and Education after the Collapse of the USSR.<url>". 21.02.2016 - http://www.fergananews.com

^{Baranov A. S.} 26 On the structure and the system of Turkish religious Hizmet movement // proceedings of the international. Conf. "Turkey: the new realities in domestic politics and participation in regional geopolitical processes". M., 2014, p. 18.

^{Guly E.N.} 27 The Gulen Phenomenon: A Neo-Sufi Challenge to Turkey's Rival Elite? // Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies. 16(1). 2007, p. 44.

^{Badranov A. Sh} 28 Decree. op.

^{Davydov N.} 29 Activity of the Turkish religious sect "Nurjular". 24.02.2016 - http://www.iimes.ru

^{Esenamanova N. S.} 30 Turk'skoe religioznoe vliyanie v KR [Turkish religious influence in the Kyrgyz Republic]. 2015, N 3 (5), Bishkek, p. 130. (Esenamanova N. S. 2015. Turetskoe religioznoe vliyanie v KR // Strategiya, N 3 (5). Bishkek) (in Russian)

^{Kislov D.} 31 Decree. Op.

^{Yarosh O.} 32 Mezhdunarodnye missional'skie dvizheniya sufiskogo tolka: ideologiya, organizatsionnye printsipy, osnovnye napravleniya deyatel'nosti [International missionary movements of the Sufi persuasion: ideology, organizational principles, main directions of activity]. N 1 (55). Kiev, 2015, p. 137.

³³ Overview: Fetullah Gulen Movement // The American Foreign Policy Council's World Almanac of Islamism. 15.03.2016 - http://almanac.afpc.org/fetullah-g%C3%BClen-movement*

^{Ebaugh H.R.} 34 The Gulen Movement. A Sociological Analysis of a Civic Movement Rooted in Moderate Islam. Springer. 2010, p. 134.

^{Badranov A. Sh} 35 Decree. op.

^{Avatkov V.} 36 Gulen, Erdogan and the Future of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey 21.02.2016 - http://www.foreignpolicy.ru

³⁷ The US State Department condemns the arrests of journalists in Turkey / / RIA Novosti. 21.02.2016 - http://ria.ru

^{Borzyakov S.} 38 Turkey struck a blow to the fifth column / / Vzglyad. 21.02.2016 - http://vz.ru

³⁹ Official website of Fethullah Gulen. 21.02.2016 - http://fgulen.com

^{40. Melnikov A.} 40 "Maidan" dlya Ankary ["Maidan" for Ankara]. Nezavisimaya gazeta. 21.02.2016 - http://www.ng.ru

^{Bulavin V.} 41 Sectarians spied on Russia // Izvestia. 21.02.2016 - http://izvestia.ru

⁴² The Supreme Court imposed a ban on the activities of the Turkish "Nurcular" / / Izvestiya. 21.02.2016 -http://izvestia.ru

^{Esenamanova N. S.} 43 Decree. op.

⁴⁴ President of Kyrgyzstan: Turkey should apologize for the downed Su-24 / / RIA, 21.03.2016 - http://ria.ru

⁴⁵ Turkey is our friend, but the truth is dearer. 21.03.2016 - http://delo.kg/

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