D. V. ZHIGULSKAYA

Postgraduate student of the Institute of Information Technology of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Turkey Keywords:, Alevism, Alevites

The Alevis of Turkey are often identified with the Nusayrites (Arab Alawites) in Syria. Despite some similarities between these Islamic movements, their comparison is still erroneous. The reader is offered a brief historical summary that reveals the main differences between Turkish Alevism and Arab Nusayrism.

ALEVIS AND NUSAYRITES: WHAT ARE THEIR SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES?

Turkish Alevism is a syncretic teaching within Islam that combines elements of Christianity, Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, Buddhism and some other beliefs.

Alevism is based on the worship of the Prophet Ali and his family. Alevism is characterized by the belief in a gradual transition, the transmigration of the soul-tenesuh.

However, it is worth noting that among the Nusayrites, the belief in reincarnation is much more pronounced. Also, the Alevite doctrine is based on the concept of the manifestation of God in human form, the so-called "incarnation", the indwelling of the divine spirit or light in a person. The Alevis call this the "unity of being" - vahdet - i vucut.

The rejection of the external ritualism of Islam is one of the remarkable features of Alevism: Alevis, as a rule, do not fast during Ramadan, do not perform the daily five-fold prayer and do not visit mosques.

One of the most important elements of Alevism is the musahiplik twinning institute. It involves "kinship in both worlds," i.e., a kind of brotherhood beyond the grave. Alevism is characterized by equality between men and women. This may explain the combined presence of men and women at religious services. The cult of venerating saints and visiting their tombs is widespread in Alevism.

The term " Alevism "is quite new, it became widespread only in the XX century, replacing and then completely replacing the term" kyzylbashestvo "(which had a touch of contempt - "redheads", in the sense of"heretics"). These terms have historically been understood as the same social, cultural and religious phenomenon, the formation of which took place in several stages on the territory of Asia Minor. Thus, the XI-XII centuries can be considered its prehistory - these centuries were marked by the arrival of some Turkic (Oghuz, etc.) tribes in Asia Minor, and the XV-XVI centuries. they became the apotheosis of the anti-Ottoman Shiite struggle in Asia Minor and Azerbaijan. It was between these two milestones that Alevism took shape, but as an independent phenomenon it was formed only by the XVI century.

According to various estimates, Alevis in Turkey make up between 10 and 20% of the country's population1 (with a population of 75.6 million at the end of 2012.2).

As for Nusayrism, this trend within Islam was finally formed in the X-XI centuries and is named after its alleged founder-the Iraqi theologian Ibn Nusayr (Abu Shuayb bin Nusayr an-Numayri al-Basri), who lived in the second half of the IX century. He defended the eleventh Shiite Imam Abu Muhammad al-Hasan al-Askari (d. 874). Later, the current was localized in northwestern Syria.

Nusayrism is an eclectic mix of elements of ancient Arabian cults, Judaism, Christianity and some other beliefs. It is worth noting that the Christian tradition in Nusayrism is very strong. For example, it is characterized by the veneration of Jesus as the incarnation of God, as well as the veneration of the apostles, a number of Christian saints, martyrs, and holidays (Christmas, Easter, etc.).

Nusayrites believe in metempsychosis, i.e. the successive reincarnation of the soul after death. This tradition is extremely strong in Nusairism. The Nusairite community is divided into the dedicated Hassa (ar.) and the uninitiated 'amma (ar.). The initiates have their own sacred books, and they are not opened to the uninitiated. The cult goes over the graves of saints or in special secluded rooms. The service is somewhat similar to the Christian liturgy, with Nusayrites receiving communion with wine and bread.

A relic of ancient Eastern cults can be considered the veneration of heights, some religious rites occur on the tops of hills. Women do not participate in religious rites.

It is worth noting the specific cosmogony of Nusayrism. Islamic beliefs here fade into the background, and pre-Islamic beliefs become the leading element of cosmogonic representations. According to the Nusayrites, their souls were once stars that were located next to Ali, the Sun. In this state, they were sinless. Then Ali-God created the earth, and the souls of the Nusayrites were placed in the physical shells of people.

According to the Nusayrites, God is the undivided unity of three hypostases, called Ma'na (ar. "meaning"), Ism (ar. "name") and Bab (ar. "gate"). Their last incarnation coincided with the founding of Islam: the trinity was reincarnated in Ali, Muhammad, and Salman al-Farisi (a contemporary and close associate of Muhammad, who shortly after Muhammad's death advocated Ali's succession and the preservation of supreme power in the "family of the Prophet"). Thus, Ma'na-the divine emanation-indicates that God is the reality of all things

and it is revealed to the people only through Ism, in turn, the Bab is a means of entering the sphere of knowledge and comprehension of Ma'na and Ism. In the triad - Ali, Muhammad and Salman al-Farisi - Ali appears as Ma'na. Ali created Muhammad out of his light, turning "meaning" into reality. Salman al-Farisi revealed the "gateway" to" meaning " through the name of Muhammad.

According to various estimates, Nusayrites (Alawites) make up about 12% of ^the population of modern Syria3, which as of July 2013 amounted to 22.5 million people.⁴ There are also small communities of Nusayrites in Lebanon and Turkey (about 350 thousand people) - mainly in the south of the country, in such areas as Hatay, Adana, Mersin.

From the point of view of geography and time of origin, Turkish Alevism and Nusayrism (Arabic Alawism) are two distinct trends. The doctrine, cult, and cosmogony of both movements are far from identical. What unites them is the deification of Imam Ali, for a long time both of them led a closed lifestyle, staying far away from the epicenter of events in the political and public life of their country. The principle of taqiyyah - concealing one's faith (religious disguise) was widely used by representatives of both movements.

Today, both the Alevis of Turkey and the Nusayrites of Syria play an important role in the life of their region, having gone beyond the exclusively confessional community.

To understand the processes that Alevism is going through in Turkey today, let's turn to the social aspect of its history and the place of Alevis in the public life of the state in different periods.

During the Ottoman period, the Alevis of Turkey led a closed lifestyle and were subjected to various kinds of harassment by the authorities. The establishment of the Republic (October 29, 1923) was greeted with enthusiasm and they had high hopes for the new regime. However, the Republican government of Turkey did not meet the expectations of the Alevis. The State and religious aspects of public life were officially separated from each other, and Islam was placed under State control. In the daily life of Alevis, Sunni Islam of the Hanafi school continued to occupy a dominant position.

Significant changes in Alevi society take place in the early 1950s.The first Alevi organization, the Ojak Keiyu Development Association, was founded in Ankara in 1955, followed by the Divriyya Cultural Association in Istanbul in 1957. In 1963, the Association of Culture, Development and Assistance to Them was founded. Haji Bektasha", which published the first monthly Alevi magazine "Karahoyuk". In 1964, the "Association of Tourism and Culture named after him" was founded in Ankara. Haji Bektash". The first issue of Hunkar magazine was published in April 1965, the first weekly Alevi newspaper Ehlibeyt Yolu was published in March 1966, and Gem magazine was published in July 1966.

Finally, in 1966, the Turkish Unity Party (TPE, Turkiye Birlik Partisi) emerged - the first Alevi political organization. Having existed for just over 10 years, it was dissolved after a crushing defeat in the 1977 parliamentary elections, in which it received only 0.39% of the vote.⁶

With the emergence of associations, Alevis become a social force that claims to play a role in the political life of the country. It is here that a deep contradiction arises between the centuries-old traditions of Alevi culture and the desire to express themselves to society. Alevites

they find themselves in new conditions-adapting to these conditions, preserving traditions, joining communities, feeling like a force-all this contributes to the beginning of a long and difficult process of modernization of Alevism.

In this article, we will focus on the period from 1980 to the present day. It is during this period that the problem of modernization and self-identification for Alevis becomes most acute and relevant.

This period is not outlined by chance. On September 12, 1980, a military coup took place in Turkey, which initiated a process of economic and social changes that partly influenced the emergence of the concept of Turkish-Islamic synthesis (Turk-Yslam Sentezi)⁷. The 1980s and especially the 1990s were marked by a significant strengthening of the position of political Islam8. These developments could not fail to provoke reactions among Alevi circles and the liberal-minded part of Turkish society.

THE ALEVI MANIFESTO

The end of the 1980s was characterized by an increase in polemics on the Alevi theme. On May 15, 1990, in the newspaper Jumhuriyet, representatives of the Sunni and Alevi intelligentsia expressed their ideas about Alevism. This is how the "Alevi Manifesto" (Alevilik Bildirgesi) was born. On the one hand, the document called on Sunnis to renounce prejudice and denigration of Alevis, on the other hand, the intelligentsia was called upon to take the path of protecting Alevis in the context of protecting human rights.

Excerpts from the "Alevi Manifesto" ⁹ (for the first time in Russian, in the author's translation) are given below.

"The manifesto is aimed at making public the problems of Alevism, which is one of the trends of Islam in Turkey*, and the demands of the Alevites...

Turkey is home to 20 million * * Alevis...

The knowledge of the Sunni part of our people about Alevism is insufficient. Sunni Muslims, who make up the majority of our country's population, know almost nothing about Alevism. The views of this part of the population regarding Alevism are formed entirely out of prejudice... The slander launched against the Alevis in Ottoman times is still perceived by some people as the truth. However, no one has the right to allow the Ottoman mentality to live in our time...

The Office of Religious Affairs represents only the Sunni branch of Islam. The existence of Alevis is not recognized***. State officials in their statements try to present the entire population of Turkey as Sunnis. We must not forget that if Alevism disappears, the situation will be in the hands of those who think in the Ottoman way (Osmanly kafalylara kalacaktyr)...

Freedom of religion and speech are human rights. Let the official pressure on the Alevis come to an end in our country with the proclamation of the Republic; social, psychological and political pressure from the past continues to exist. Because of this pressure, Alevis are unable to exercise their freedoms of " conscience, religion and belief." Alevis are still forced to hide their identity.

Alevis have always supported Ataturk's reforms. The Alevis are one of the main forces involved in the creation of the Republic. The Alevis have always stood alongside Ataturk's reforms and secular forces. However, their hardships did not end during the Republic.

Despite the fact that Christians, Jews and Syrians in Turkey have their own places of worship, the Alevis were deprived of this...

The Manifesto goes on to set out demands, including calls to recognize that pressure is being exerted on Alevis. Alevis should be able to freely declare that "I am an Alevi". Sunni families should change their views on Alevism, and intellectuals should protect the existence of Alevis in the context of human rights. The Turkish press should allocate space for coverage of Alevi culture in its issues.

Among other things, an important place in the Manifesto is occupied by the demand to abandon the construction of mosques in Alevi villages: "In recent years, the Department of Religious Affairs has further increased ineffective pressure by building mosques in Alevi villages and sending imams there. We hope that the state will not be an instrument in the hands of this mentality, which recognizes only its own existence and does not tolerate anything else. These initiatives should be stopped immediately. Alevis do not want mosques to be built in their villages, but jem-evi (cultural centers) and schools..."

The manifesto also addresses the issue of Alevi spiritual leaders - the so-called Dede. For centuries, dedes have performed educational, religious functions, as well as acting as judges. They passed on the Alevi culture from generation to generation. They, dede, should be given the opportunity to develop and train cadres: "The Dede Institute should be rebuilt in accordance with modern realities."

The Manifesto contains a number of important statements on the issue of secularism in Turkey: "Today, the existence of Alevis is a guarantee that a secular state will be protected in case of attempts to establish a Sharia state... Democratic, secular, and pluralist forces should make sure that the existence of Alevis becomes clear," as well as the degree of correlation with Iranian Shiism: "There is nothing in common between Alevism and today's Iranian Shiism... There is no similarity in philosophy or ritual (uygulama) between Anatolian Alevism and Iranian Shiism."

At the end of the Manifesto, it is emphasized: "Turkish society consists not of one, but of different cultures. This circumstance is a wealth for our country... The Alevi culture, which is based on love for people and peace, is not at all popular today.

* This characterization of Alevism is extremely important, because for a long time there has been and continues to be a debate about whether Alevism is a current within Islam, a separate religion outside Islam, or a cultural form.

** We think this figure is too high (see above).

*** We find this statement overly emotional. The Department of Religious Affairs of Turkey does not deny the existence of Alevis, on the contrary, it claims that Islam in the country is not a monolithic structure, it is diverse.

supported. In order to preserve this culture and develop it, it is necessary for the Government to cooperate with the intelligentsia. We hope that the statements of politicians that "it is necessary to eliminate pressure on freedom of faith and belief" are not unfounded. In this regard, as a democratic intelligentsia, we expect support from the entire Turkish people..."

Among those who signed the Manifesto are well - known public figures, writers, historians, intellectuals and artists: Yashar Kemal, Aziz Nesin, Taryk Akan, Zulfyu Livaneli, Ataol Behramoglu, Lutfyu Kaleli, Riza Zeilut and others. These names had and still have a great weight in the public life of Turkey.

When reading the text of the Manifesto, the question arises: what was actually done after 20 years?

Fundamental changes in relations with the state have not occurred: Alevis are still not represented in the Department of Religious Affairs; Jem-evi function, as mentioned above, as cultural centers. Some changes were made to the school curriculum: sections on Alevism appeared in religious textbooks. However, there is no need to talk about the education of Alevi religious cadres, as before.

A significant change can be considered a large number of published literature on Alevi topics, as well as the presence of Alevi television channels, radio programs, and the organization of various festivals of Alevi culture. At the same time, it is necessary to make a reservation here: in this way, the authorities are trying to give Alevism a cultural coloring and thereby shift the emphasis from the religious aspect of this phenomenon.

However, returning to the "Alevi Manifesto", it is necessary to note its social significance - it was the first open appeal of Alevis to society and the authorities.

ALEVIS IN THE 1990s

In the 1990s, the Alevis continued to search for their "own self" and defend their place in public life. The contradictions between Sunnis and Alevis considerably worsened during this period. So, these years are overshadowed by several bloody clashes between representatives of different groups of Turkish society. One of them is the Sivas massacre, the other is the bloody events in Istanbul's Gazi district.

The Sivas events took place on 2 July 1993 and claimed the lives of 37 people. In Turkey, these events are known as the Sivas Katliamy massacre: a group of Islamists attacked and set fire to the Madymak Hotel, which temporarily housed Alevi writers, poets, musicians, and educators who came to Sivas to participate in the annual festival dedicated to Pir Sultan Abdul*.

It is important to note that the inaction and connivance of the authorities caused outrage among broad public circles. As an illustration, we can cite the words of Shukru Gunbulut, an eyewitness to the events, a representative of the Alevi intelligentsia, who managed to escape. So, he writes: "The crowd, exceeding 10 thousand people, was outside. Feeling the support of the government and not wanting to get a single scratch, I looked for ways to kill 80 artists in the hotel... if the government, in order to prevent the massacre, had shown even a drop of desire, even a little movement , it would have dispersed this gang of criminals. 10

About two years later, similar events occurred on March 12, 1995 in Istanbul's Gazi district. A group of unknown assailants attacked 4 coffee shops and a pastry shop in the town of Gaziosmanpasha in the Gazi district, 2 people were killed and many were injured. Approximately 3,000 people went to the Gazi police station. The police opened fire in the air, and the protesters retreated and headed for Jem-evi. On March 13, in the morning, the people gathered again-at the building of the Cultural Association named after him. Haji Bektash Was Being Led. Shouting "police murderers", "state murderers"," police murderers " (these slogans can be interpreted as a reaction to the event that took place the day before - an Alevi street vendor was tortured and died in the police station), they headed towards the police station. Their number was about 20 thousand people. They were met by the military, who opened fire in the air. The people, including the elderly and children, did not disperse. The police cordoned off people and demanded that they disperse. One of the protestors threw a rock at the police, in which

* Pir Sultan Abdal , one of the greatest Sufi poets in Turkey in the 16th century, participated in the Qizilbash revolt against the Ottoman government. It is revered by Alevis.

answer shooting started - 17 people were killed ¹¹.

The events in Sivas and Ghazi marked a turning point in the formation of Alevi identity: they sharpened the sense of alienation of the Alevis, which led to an active dynamic of their unification in the organization. Most of them were associations and foundations.

On September 1, 1996, former MP Ali Haidar Veziroglu founded the Democratic Peace Movement (DMD, Demokratik Baryp Hareketi), whose motto is "Our name is different, our surname is Turkey" (Adymyz farldy, soyadymyz Turkiye). DMD has opened its representative offices in 79 out of 81 ilas (il is an administrative division in Turkey). After submitting an application to the Turkish Interior Ministry on October 1, 1996, about a year later the movement acquired the status of a party-the Peace Party (Baryp Partisi). However, it failed to achieve any success in the parliamentary elections in April 1999, and it was decided to dissolve it.¹²

Thus, the second attempt to create an Alevi political party, as well as the first (in 1966-1977), was not crowned with success.

The situation that emerged in the late 1990s has, in our opinion, its logical continuation today. Alevis are going through an acute period of self-determination: they have declared themselves, even made certain demands, but they do not yet feel strong enough to present a united front in the face of their opponents. The main weakness of Alevism is its internal heterogeneity. This circumstance makes it possible to speak not about one, but about many modifications of alevisms.

TURKISH ALEVISM TODAY

The conditions in which the Alevis find themselves have forced them to face a number of new, specific difficulties, which are often devastating. Thus, in modern Turkish society, the question of the typology of Alevism is increasingly raised - traditional or modern Alevism. In fact, Alevis today have realized the need to reevaluate their life preferences between tradition and modernity.

Today it is difficult to talk about a single and comprehensive type of Alevism, rather it is appropriate to talk about its various manifestations.

Among the most serious problems of Alevism can be identified issues related to faith and ritual. Alevism has ceased to be a "secret". Along with the discovery of Alevism, the world needs to pay attention to important changes in the organization of Alevite social life: whether Alevism can overcome the contradictions caused by the desire to preserve traditions, while simultaneously experiencing the process of modernization.

One interesting question is how the Alevis, with their traditional beliefs and practices, will be able to balance with the reality of today's Turkey. An important factor can be considered the increased communication with the Sunni population, which followed intensive urbanization. First of all, it concerns the lifting of many prohibitions related to marriage. To such an extent that today it is difficult to find a family in which any of its members would not have married a Sunni. Of course, the transformation process is not limited to this.

As a result, in the process of modernization, the traditional image of Alevism and its teachings are undergoing serious changes. Due to the intense search for its place and role in modern life, Alevism has been drawn into a new world that contradicts its teachings and long-established concepts.

Traditional authorities have been shaken, and others have begun to take their place, more appropriate to the new perception.¹³ So, for example, today the role played by the Dedes has been assumed, but in a different format, by the Alevi intelligentsia. It seems almost impossible for the Alevi dads to continue to play the same role as they do today. Dede's answers to some of the questions that modern life asks are insufficient and do not satisfy anyone ¹⁴.

* * *

Summing up, we can probably say that today the Turkish state faces the "Alevi question" of a new format. The Alevi society is on the verge of making a choice. The real challenges associated with tradition and the perception of modernity, relations with the authorities and the principle of secularism, which they primarily defend, begin today.

Let us quote the words of the modern Turkish sociologist Necdet Subashi. In our opinion, he accurately describes the state of Alevism in Turkey today: "In the face of modernization, the old, "archaic" Alevism is moving away from modern Alevism day by day. As a result, the ideology of modern Alevism changes its borders, and various kinds of Alevisms and various ideologies that contradict each other appear on the map."¹⁵

The further development and internal balance of Turkish society partly depends on the path that Alevism chooses for itself.

^{Onder Ali Tayyar.} 1 Turkiye'nin Etnik Yapisi. Halkimizin Kokenleri ve Ger(;ekler. Ankara, 2011, s. 121.

² Website of the Turkish Statistical Organization - http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBtiltenleri.do?id=13425

³ Website of the Center for Afro-Eurasian Strategic Studies - http://afasam.org/tr/featured/suriyeniri-demografik-etnik-yapisi-ve-esed-sonrasinda-suriye/; Feuersloss Isabette. Guerre civile en Syrie: le retour du refoule // Politique etrangere, 3/2012, p. 609.

⁴ CIA website - http://www.cia.gov/libra-ry/publications/t he-world-factbook/geos/sy.html

^{Onder Ali Tayyar.} 5 Op. cit., s. 120.

^{Sarac N.} 6 Alevilerin Siyasal Tarihi. Kitap 1 (1300-1971) (Political history of the Alevis. Book 1 (1300-1971). Istanbul, 2011. s. 474.

^{Irat A.M.} 7 Aleviliflin ABC'si. Tarih-Sosyoloji-Siyaset (АБВ алевизма. History-Sociology-Politics). Istanbul, 2013, s. 154.

⁸ Ibid., s. 149.

⁹ http://www.cumhuriyetarsivi.com

^{Bayrak M.} 10 Bir siyaset tarzi olarak Alevi Katliamlari (Alevi pogroms as a form of politics). Ankara, 2011, s. 283.

^{Irat A.M.} 11 Op. cit., s. 198.

¹² Ibid., s. 200 - 201.

^{Subapi N.} 13 Alevi Modemle[jmesi. Syrry Fan Eylemek (Alevi modernization. Disclosure of the secret). Istanbul, 2010, s. 137 - 138.

¹⁴ Ibid., s. 215.

¹⁵ Ibid., s. 285.

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