Regarding enormous changes in Eurasia and Turkey's central location in this region¹ it is clear that different attitudes of research to Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP) are useful. In this perspective, this paper attempts to examine Turkey's foreign policy attitude by using an interdisciplinary method; namely, Miles and Snow's organizational culture typology [Miles, Snow, 1978] in business studies assuming that several Turkish foreign policy institutions behave as one organization. The time period of the study is from the establishment of the new Turkish state in 1923 to the beginning of the 21st century. Its aim is to define TFP rather than to measure performance or to put merely an emphasis on certain activities.

Thus, to define the reaction of Turkish foreign policy makers to the developments in its region as well as in the world, this study seeks to answer the two questions: how can we identify Turkey's foreign policy by examining different strategies to different foreign policy events? What are the reasons that determine Turkish foreign policy?

1. Strategy Type

This study will use Miles and Snow's organizational culture typology to evaluate TFP. The reason for this is the following: Examining a state's foreign policy orientation means exploring what governments seek to do - the purposes and objectives that states have - and the strategies they employ to achieve them [Holsti, 1992, p. 83]. Furthermore, "a nation's general strategy or orientation is seldom revealed in any one decision, but results from a series of cumulative decisions made in an effort to adjust objectives, values, and interests to conditions and characteristics of the domestic and external environments" [Holsti, 1977, p. 109].

What is an organization? Organizations are social entities that are goal oriented, are designed as deliberately structured and coordinated activity systems, and are linked to external environment. Foreign policy structure of a country is also taken by "social entities that are goal oriented, are designed as deliberately structured and coordinated activity systems, and are linked to external environment" [Treacy, Wiersema, 1995, p. 88 - 89].

What is strategy? A strategy is a plan for interacting with the competitive environment to achieve organizational goals. Goals define where the organization wants to go and strategy how the organization will get there just as foreign policy strategies do aim. Therefore, the primary responsibility of top management of organizations, just like foreign policy makers, is to determine an organization's goals, strategy, and therein adapting the organization to a changing environment.

Considering various strategy alternatives of an organization according to Jauch and Glueck [Jauch, Glueck, 1988, p. 219 - 241], it is convenient to think of the following dimensions: in-

¹ Its geopolitical location enables Turkey include all the characteristics of Europe; the Middle East, the Balkans, Caucasian, Mediterranean and the Black Sea regions. One observer termed it as "probably the most geostrategically important piece of real estate in the world".

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temal and external, related and unrelated, horizontal and vertical (backward, forward), active and passive. In each case, the dimension refers to various approaches for carrying out a generic strategy. In this paper, in order to explain TFP, the active and passive dimension is adopted. The reason for this is that while the first three approaches refer to the expansion of the "management's-foreign policy makers" in our study - attitude and timing with regard to pursuing its strategy alternatives [Jauch, Glueck, 1988, p. 238].

According to these dimensions an active or offensive strategy is one in which strategists act before they are forced to react to environmental threats or opportunities. A passive or defensive strategy is one whose major characteristics are that strategists react to environmental pressures only when forced to do so by circumstances.

The best-known typology of "organizations" developed around the active-passive dimension is the Miles and Snow's framework [Miles, Snow, 1978]. Miles and Snow suggest that historically, organizations have had four strategic categories: prospectors, analyzers, defenders and reactors. It has been used extensively in empirical research [Snow, Hrebiniak, 1980, p. 317 - 336; Hambrick, 1983, p. 5 - 26], which will be defined in the next section.

Effective responsive foreign policy making requires, like an organization, a fit among internal characteristics of a country and strategy, and the external environment to adapt fast to rapid and unpredictable changes in the way that foreign policy decisions fit best to the country's interest. Thus, the primary responsibility of foreign policy makers is to determine its country's goals, strategy and design, therein adapting foreign policy to the changing environment.

To reiterate, in this paper, assuming that there is a strong similarity between business strategies and foreign policy strategies, I base my thoughts on the adaptation model proposed by Miles and Snow in business. The possibility of using Miles and Snow's Typology as a basis for understanding TFP strategy was first raised in this study. Thus, this paper hopes to contribute to TFP explanations, rather than presenting a planning model. Before moving to the presentation of Miles and Snow's organizational culture typology, it is worth bearing in mind that a country rarely chooses its foreign policy decision in analytical, conscious fashion. Rather, the foreign policy decisions are taken by such internal and external conditions that govern how decisions are made and strategies are set.

2. Miles and Snow's Organizational Culture Typology

Miles and Snow proposed that organizations in general develop relatively stable patterns of strategic behavior in order to accomplish a good alignment with the perceived environment conditions.

Miles and Snow's strategy is based on the idea that managers seek to formulate strategies that will be congruent with the external environment. Organizations strive for a fit among internal organizational characteristics, strategy and the external environment. Their typology involves four strategic types: prospectors, analyzers, defenders, reactors.

The authors have described them as follows:

1) defenders are organizations, which have narrow product-market domains. Top managers in this type of organization are highly expert in their organization's limited area of operation but do not tend to search outside of their domains for new opportunities. As a result of this narrow focus, these organizations seldom need to make major adjustments in their technology, structure, or methods of operation. Instead they devote primary attention to improving the efficiency of their existing operations;

2) prospectors are organizations that almost continually search for market opportunities, and they regularly experiment with potential responses to emerging environmental trends. Thus, these organizations often are the creators of change and uncertainty to which their competitors must respond. However, because of their strong concern for product and market innovation, these organizations usually are not completely efficient;

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3) analyzers are organizations that operate in two types of product-market domains, one relatively stable, the other changing. In their stable areas, these organizations operate routinely and efficiently through use of formalized structures and processes. In their more turbulent areas, top managers watch their competitors closely for new ideas, and then they rapidly adopt those that appear to be the most promising;

4) reactors are organizations in which top managers frequently perceive change and uncertainty occurring in their organizational environments but are unable to respond effectively. Because this type of organization lacks a consistent strategy-structure relationship, it seldom makes adjustment of any sort until forced to do so by environmental pressures [Miles, Snow, 1978, p. 29].

3. Adapting Miles and Snow's Typology into TFP

Defender foreign policy:

1) has a narrow foreign policy mission definition;

2) foreign policy makers in this type of foreign policy environment are highly expert in their limited area of operation,

3) but do not tend to search outside their narrow domains for new opportunities.

Basic strategy set:

* aggressively maintain prominence within its chosen area of expertise;

* ignore developments outside of this domain;

* penetrate deeper into current agendas;

* normally, foreign policy application occurs cautiously. Characteristics & behavior:

* traditional thinking and application of foreign policy, updates modern way of foreign policy to maintain efficiency;

* stable structure and process;

* dominant coalitions are finance and production;

* planning is intensive, not extensive;

* promote from within;

* functional structure;

* extensive division of labor and high degree of formalization;

* centralized control;

* vertical information flows;

* simple and inexpensive coordination;

* performance evaluated on efficiency versus the past. Prospector foreign policy:

1) almost continually searches for new opportunities;

2) and it regularly experiments with potential responses to emerging environmental trends;

3) thus, top policy makers often are the creators of change and uncertainty to which their competitors must respond.

Basic strategy set:

* broad domain, in a continuous state of development;

* monitor a wide range of environmental conditions, trends, and events;

* creator of change in their international environment;

* Gains power from new foreign policy activities. Characteristics & behavior:

* not efficient;

* changing structure and methods;

* frequent attempts to extend power, multiple methods;

* make investment in people not in machines;

* key executives as likely to come from outside as inside;

* executive tenure is shorter than defender's;

* planning is broad, not intensive;

* mission based structure;

* less division of labour, low formalization;

* control is results-oriented;

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* info flow to decentralized decision-makers;

* complex and expensive coordination;

* conflict directly confronted and resolved. Analyzer foreign policy:

1) operates in two types of areas, one relatively stable, the other changing;

2) in its stable area, this foreign policy operates routinely and efficiently through use of formalized structures and processes;

3) in is more turbulent area, top policy makers watch internal and external environment closely for new ideas, and then rapidly adopt those that appear to be the most promising.

Basic strategy set:

* a mixture of strategies, some stable, others changing;

* successful change of behavior through extensive surveillance;

* avid follower of change;

* power gain normally occurs through an active penetration/inclusion into international developments;

* power gain may also occur through new and efficient activities. Characteristics & behavior:

* dual foreign policy strategy, moderate efficiency;

* planning is both intensive and comprehensive;

* structure is matrix, functional and product;

* control difficult; must be able to trade off efficiency and effectiveness;

* coordination is both simple and complex;

* performance is dual efficiency versus past, effectiveness versus similar organizations. Reactor foreign policy:

1) in which top policy makers frequently perceive change and uncertainty occurring in their organizational environments;

2) but is unable to respond effectively;

3) because this type of foreign policy (organization) lacks a consistent strategy-structure relationship, it seldom makes adjustments of any sort until forced to do so by environmental pressures.

Basic strategy set:

* foreign policy makers fail to articulate a viable foreign policy strategy;

* top foreign policy makers articulates an appropriate strategy, but quantity and quality of personnel, structure, and process are not linked to strategy appropriately;

* thus policy makers adhere to a particular strategy-structure relationship that is not relevant to the environment.

For instance, defenders ignore sudden conjuncture changes; instead focus their effort on existing strategies, most commonly by emphasizing operational efficiencies. Given that defenders tend to place emphasis on improving processes, it is reasonable to expect that such foreign policy applications focus primarily in creating operational efficiencies through improving administrative mechanisms. By contrast, prospectors focus on new foreign policy opportunities and developing new ideas, and respond rapidly to early signals in these domains.

In order to define TFP by using Miles and Snow's typology, in the next section of the paper, first I will give a brief summary of TFP.

4. Summary of TFP Since Its Establishment

4.1.1923 - 1945: from neutrality to NATO membership. TFP from 1923 to the end of the

Second World War in 1945 has been described as "cautious, realistic and generally aimed at the preservation of the status quo and the hard won victory of 1923" [Zurcher, 1993, p. 138]. The leaders of the new Turkey believed that independence and territorial integrity could only be achieved if Turkey maintained a policy of neutrality in international disputes. During this time, therefore, Ankara became involved only in a few disputes left from the Treaty of Lausanne. Turkey's foreign policy strategy during the Second World War was staying out of the

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war. During this time, Ankara worked single-mindedly to achieve the maintenance of national security. Foreign affairs were not open to debate.

4.2.1945 - 1960: Western alliance. After the World War II radical changes occurred in the structure of international affairs. The United States had emerged from the war as the strongest power, and the Soviet Union soon became its enemy. Moreover, Stalin's claims to the Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan, and control over the Turkish Straits caused Ankara to make major strategy changes to maintain Turkey's national security. As a result, it concluded that Washington should become its most important ally. Subsequently, Turkey became a member of NATO in 1952. Turkey's desire for westernization also led to its inclusion in the Marshall Plan (1947) and Council of Europe (1949). Its role during the cold war contributed significantly to determining other aspects of the country's foreign policy, having, for example, distant relations with the Arab world and with its Balkan neighbours [Celik, 1999, p. 36 - 37].

4.3.1960 - 1980: fluctuations with the West. Although maintaining national security and territorial integrity remained Turkey's foremost foreign policy objective during the rest of the cold war period, there were several shifts in the strategies Ankara pursued to achieve this goal. The period between 1960 and 1980 was one of significant change for Turkish foreign policy behavior. In less than two decades Turkey had gone from being an exclusively pro-American country to one that not only worked on diversifying its foreign policy but also defied the wishes of the Americans when its own interests were at stake. Several things contributed to this change in Turkish behavior. One factor was the relaxation of cold war tensions after the successful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The detente set the stage for increased independence in the making of Turkish foreign policy actions and decisions. A second factor was the US's confrontational attitude during the first Cyprus crisis. The so-called Johnson Letter and America's imposition of an arms embargo contributed to the worsening of Turkish-American relations. A third factor contributing to the shift of TFP was the domestic situation in Turkey in the 1960s. The military intervention of 1960 and the subsequent constitution created a suitable environment to openly criticize government actions for the first time in Turkish Republic's history. In short, during this time, Turkey ventured beyond merely following the United States in the conduct of its foreign policy, attempted to diversify its foreign policy patterns, and even improved relations with the Soviets [Celik, 1999, p. 44 - 46].

4.4. TFP between 1980 - 1990. By 1980, hostilities between the US and the Soviet Union had re-emerged. As a result, a deteriorating sense of security led Turkey to draw Turkish foreign policy into alignment with the US interests once again. There were also developments within Turkey that contributed to improving relations with the US. The 1980 military coup d'etat had ended the "experimental phase in the conduct of Turkish foreign policy" that had defined in the previous decade. The mid- to late 1980s, however, saw some significant changes in the structure of international system. "New Thinking" of foreign policy of the Gorbachov leadership led again to a new relaxation in East-West relations. As a result, Turkish-Soviet relations proceeded to improve. Another parameter of the 1980s was Turkey's strained relations with its European allies. The European Community alienated many politicians as well as the Turkish public by focusing on the country's adverse human rights record. Despite this, Turkey applied for membership in April 1987, but was rejected in 1989. Meanwhile, relations with the Middle East and Balkan countries remained quite tense during the 1980's [Celik, 1999, p. 61 - 73].

4.5. TFP Since 1990. The end of the 1980's saw major changes in the structure of the international system. The cold war's end and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 forced a major reassessment of Turkey's geostrategic role, as a result its external policy. In this new era, Turkish policy makers were no longer able to define their environment according to the role Turkey had played in the cold war. In the new situation Turkey had to question and alter some of its foreign policy strategies. As a result, they questioned what role, if any, their country would play in the post-cold war international order [Sayari, 1992, p. 9 - 21].

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Many of these brought a significant degree of uncertainty, unpredictability, and instability to TFP-characteristics that were not associated with it in previous periods.

In summary, the Turkish Republic established by Ataturk in the 1920s was very much a frontier state and was preoccupied with its national security and territorial integrity. Thus, TFP attitude was strongly conservative or defensive. The Western policy orientation adopted by Turkey in the aftermath of World War II had remained stable for much of the cold war. Although there were some fluctuations in TFP behavior toward the US, these basic parameters of Turkey's foreign policy remained constant during the cold war. With its end in 1990, however, the Soviet threat had waned and new threats and new opportunities emerged in Turkey's near environment. As a result "during the 1990s Turkey, as never before during the Cold War, found itself with both the will and the opportunity to take an active approach beyond its borders" [Kut, 2001, p. 6].

The next section will attempt to explain the reasons for the inactivity and the continuity of TFP until the 1990s, and activity and change after the end of the cold war.

5. Explanation of Continuity

If the factors that have shaped TFP are known, then the past and the present of TFP could be seen objectively. This is also important to assess TFP according to Miles and Snow's typology by measuring how far it has departed from traditional lines of foreign policy after 1990.

The continuity of TFP from 1923 to 1990 can be explained by three factors: fundamental lines of TFP; state identity and TFP; and powerful decision making institutions that support this continuity.

5.1. Fundamental lines of TFP. From its beginning, Republican TFP has faced with two basic problems. "One is readjustment to secondary power status from an Imperial past. Decrepit and war-worn as the latter day the Ottoman Empire was, it was still one of the Great Powers if only by courtesy. The Turkish Republic, although harbouring the makings of a much more robust compact state, was (and is) clearly far from the centre of world politics" [Deringil, 1989, p. 1]. Another consistent problem which shaped decision making from the late 1920s was the desire to be part of the "western" scheme of things [ibid.].

Thus, the foreign policy objectives of this new state were very much coloured by the experiences and the hardships that the Ottoman Empire had faced. The fact that the Turkish homeland was nearly lost during World War I led the rulers of the new republic to be very clear in identifying and defining their most important foreign policy goal - maintaining independence and territorial integrity [Celik, 1999, p. 29].

In general, as far as the foreign policy-making of a country is concerned, the perception of decision makers about themselves, their country and other countries, is the most important factor to take into account [Snyder, Bruck, Sapin, 1961, p. 189 - 190, cited in: Ayudin, 1999, p. 157]. In Turkey's case there are three main traditional inputs of TFP: 1) the Ottoman experience and its long-lasting legacy² ; 2) the geopolitical realities of Turkey; 3) the ideological foundations defined under Ataturk's leadership [Aydin, 1999, p. 157].

It should be stressed, however, that although experiences and memories of the Ottoman past, together with its geostrategic location, served as a foundation for and influenced the subsequent foreign relations of Turkey, "it is Ataturk's theory and practice of foreign policy that has been the most important factor in shaping TFP. He not only completely controlled TFP in

² Turkey was reacting to the dramatic decline and fall of its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire. The entanglement in Europe's great power politics and attempt to preserve an extended empire led to disaster in World War I. Not only the empire lost but the country itself was devastated, and came to close to being partitioned by other European Empires. Turkey had to distinguish itself clearly from the Ottoman Empire to assure neighbours that was not threatening them by trying to revive old boundaries.

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his lifetime, but also put forward an ideological framework by which the pursuit of TFP could be achieved" [ibid., p. 170].

Ataturk's new directions for TFP were thus enormously important. His foreign policy objectives reflected a deliberate break with the expansionist ideology of the Ottoman Empire, being genuinely concerned with independence and sovereignty. Accordingly, it was no surprise that his motto became "peace at home, peace in the world". Ataturk's foreign policy break with the past meant the renunciation of three strains that had been important during Ottoman times: "the imperial-Ottomanism, pan-Islamism, and pan-Turanism. Incidentally, policies that could break these strains coincided with the three of his political principles; Republicanism, Secularism and Nationalism respectively" [ibid., p. 157]. Kemalist principles in TFP have been so deep and so influential that "[...] practically all Turkish governments regardless of their differences complied fully with" [ibid.] them and "[...] there are at times intimations, and often warnings, that anything other than his principles would be disloyal to him and to the country in general" [ibid.].

In short, Turkey's foreign policy has been influenced by the following goals and principles laid down by Ataturk: establishment and preservation of a national state with complete independence, conditioned by modern Turkish nationalism; promotion of Turkey to the level of contemporary civilization by means of Kemalist principles; and attachment to realistic and peaceful means in foreign policy actions.

5.2. Turkish state identity and TFP. Second factor that determines continuity in TFP between 1923 and 1990 is the identity of the Turkish state.

Before examining the second factor, it should be mentioned that when the main argument of this study - TFP, which was inactive and defender until 1990, since the end of the cold war has become more active and assertive - is explained, a majority of analysts (particularly western) question the search for a new identity for Turkey³ . They maintain that western oriented modern Turkish foreign policy has been in a deep crisis of identity, because all traditional, religious, cultural and political elements of creating Turkish national identity have been facing a new evaluation/interpretation particularly since the collapse of cold war.

Saban Calis, however, rejects this explanation, and argues that a distinction between national identity and state identity should be made, and the focus should be on "state identity" in explaining TFP. "Without considering the role and identity of modern Turkish state and the weight of the state's in necessary correlation between nation and policy making, and national identity and foreign policy" [Calis, p. 97], we cannot fully understand TFP dynamics. He argues that so long as the state structure does not change its identification with Kemalism its western oriented foreign policy would hardly change [ibid., p. 99]. In this study Calis's approach is adopted which emphasizes on the identity of the Turkish state rather than on the Turkish national identity as a determining force of Turkish foreign policy.

Indeed, Turkey has a powerful state tradition and therefore a powerful, well-defined state identity that since 1923 has played a strong role in determining modern foreign policy. In other words, traditional patterns of modern Turkish foreign policy have not been determined by ethnic, religious and cultural considerations.

Calis in his work argues that what determines modern Turkish foreign policy is not the Turkish nation, but the Turkish state itself. And he then argues that the identity of modern Turkish foreign policy is a reflection of the state's identity in international politics. Although, he argues, just like any country Turkey has from time to time experienced some adjustment problems because of the changing structure of the internal and external environment, the basis

³ As Jen Laber of The Washington Post has noted, "Turkey comes to terms with its future and its tortured past." [The Washington Post, 9.02.1992]. P. Millar of The European advised that "Turkey must look to its Mongol heritage" [The European, 25 - 27.10.1991]. In addition, it has implicity or explicity been argued that in Turkey pan-Islamist and pan-Turkist aspirations which once determined Turkish/Ottoman policy are on the march, in the face of Turkey's growing interest in the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Central Asia [Copher, 1992].

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of foreign policy has remained essentially unchanged since the establishment of the Turkish state. This is mainly because the Turkish Republic has successfully retained its original characteristics. In short, the national goals, put forward by Ataturk, together with the effects of imperial history and the geostrategic location, are the traditional inputs that have long governed TFP.

5.3. Powerful decision-making institutions behind this continuity. In order to explain the rather constant direction of TFP, it would be insufficient to consider only the role of the traditional inputs of TFP and the state and its identity. It should also be noted that behind this continuity there are powerful decision making units, which have identified themselves with the values, ideas and symbols of the Turkish state. To be more certain, it is worth examining how influential institutions such as the Ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) and the Turkish Armed forces, both of which are organizations devoted to Kemalist ideals, making foreign policy. In this respect, the place of MFA and the military are of exceptional importance, because their involvement in foreign policy very much related to the state's identity and its image and role in international politics.

The military, which has demonstrated noticeable interest in foreign relations as well, has always participated in foreign policy decision-making process since the establishment of the Republic, because Turkish military leaders have attached great importance to the pursuit of a pro-western policy. This is indeed an understandable subject, since they have perceived such a policy as an imperative of the state's Westernist identity and Kemalist modernization movement [Calis, p. 106]. As the cold war and Turkey's membership in NATO raised the degree of the military's involvement in foreign policy, military interventions further justified the military participation in the direct formation of foreign policy. After the end of the cold war, it was expected that the role of the military would diminish, but nothing has so far changed is this respect. Instead, modern Turkish foreign policy has become more and more militarized as the power of the army in social and political life has further increased since the end of the cold war [Oran, 2001, p. 54 - 93]. It should be noted that the Turkish National Assembly accepted the 7^th Reform Package for the accession to the EU in July 2000. According to this reform package the NSC's role will gradually be decreased from the Turkish political life, as well as from TFP. For example, head of the NSC will no longer be from the military in a year's time. [Hurriyet, 30.07.2003].

As another influential state organization, the MFA had represented, as much as today, the westernization of Turkey for decades. In the establishment of modern Turkey, the ministry played one of the most important roles by adapting itself to the world of Kemalist revaluations. It was the MFA, which had demonstrated the country's new face and identity to the world successfully [Karpat, 1958, p. 188 - 189]. In this respect, the personnel of the Ministry have also a special position within Turkish administration and they are very well aware of the situation [Oran, 2001, p. 54 - 93]. According to Baskin Oran, "the foreign service personnel represented a group of the best educated and the most westernized people, but also the most aristocratic and farthest removed from the country's realities among the civil service" [ibid., p. 57 - 61]. Similarly, Vali notes that [they] feel more than anyone else the compelling urge to proceed toward the fundamental goals of national policy; they are fully dedicated to this ideal [of westernization] [Vali, 1971, p. 75]. The MFA's role has been so important that this led a senior diplomat to declare: "Unless the ministry's prior consent is obtained for it, any policy in foreign affairs could not be anything but an expression of short term intentions, because, it could be simply neglected at best or openly shelved by the Ministry in the stage of its implementation" [Calis, p. 107].

As such, it is established that when some government appoint, revisionist ministers, the chance of those ministers' to stay in the post of the ministry is very limited. This can be seen in many examples like the case of Mumtaz Soysal. It is generally recognized that a new minister never really means a new foreign policy in Turkey. Even more, it is also a fact that the

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fundamental lines of foreign policy are so strong that "they had remarkable staying power no matter what the nature of government in Ankara might be" [Harris, 1985, p. 175]. In this respect, the case of Turkey's relations with the EU can be taken as an example, in addition to many others. It is indeed a very remarkable example that many politicians seemed to be against these relations at least in appearance. However, when they come to the power, they prefer not to remember what they said about the EU. From the pro-Islamist Erbakan to the social democrat Ecevit as leaders, all politicians were unable to act on position they had held in opposition. Instead, the MFA has been able to continue Turkey's relations with the EU as usual.

6. Explanation of Change in TFP

The collapse of the cold war system brought some predictions that Turkey's place in the world, which had been defined by NATO membership and alliance with the US, had lost its strategic importance [Kut, 2001, p. 5]. Consequently, Turkey felt a need to diversify its strategic options. During the cold war, a strategic consensus - against the enemy of Communism under the NATO umbrella had been evolved. However, after the end of the Cold War, the options of Turkey have been varied.

Thus, this section argues that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey was faced with several opportunities and threats. In order to profit from these opportunities and to overcome these threats, it has shifted its foreign policy towards the Middle East, Eurasia and Balkans. As a result, Turkey's foreign and security policies have become more active and complex since the collapse of the communism.

Indeed, the continuity and consensus that characterized TFP during the cold war time were no longer its defining characteristics in the post-cold war period. The changes in the international system opened up new opportunities and brought to the forefront new threats for TFP, making it necessary for Turkey to search for a change in its foreign policy that takes these new parameters into account.

6.1 Opportunities and threats. A new foreign policy agenda for the new era quickly became a vital issue for TFP. It sparked unprecedented debate among policymakers and the Turkish public. As a result, the country's policy horizons have expanded, with recognition of new risks and new opportunities. In this situation, TFP required a new strategy and set of goals.

On the one side, the demise of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia has opened new opportunities and strategic possibilities for Turkey. There have been realized traditional affinities between Turkey and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. On the other side, however, though the Soviet security threat had waned, new threats emerged in Turkey's near environment.

As for the opportunities, in the post-cold war era, the Central Asian Turkic Republics gained their independence and Turkish minorities in the Balkans have slipped away from Communist governments. The historical and cultural legacies of Turks have been revived and gained a new vitality. Vast new areas of influence and potential cooperation emerged for Turkey. Turkey was supposed to be a regional power with the opening of large areas of influence [Fuller, p. 161 - 175].

Turkey's rediscovery of a larger Turkic world in the Caucasus and Central Asia has had a significant effect on Turkey's perception of its national interests. It has also been a vehicle for more active involvement officially and by the Turkish private sector. Though initial expectations about the scope of Turkey's role in this newly independent "Eurasian" region have proven to be inflated, the opening of former Soviet areas that "[...] had been off-limits, intellectually, politically, and in practical terms, has had enduring consequences for Turkish foreign policy" [Lesser, Larrabee, 2003, p. 192].

Energy requirements have also emerged as an important factor in Turkey's regional diplomacy. Turkey's growing energy needs have given Turkey a strong interest in developing ties with Russia, Central Asia, Iran, and Iraq. Turkey's strong support for the development of the

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Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, efforts for economic cooperation with Iran in the energy field despite strong US objections, and eagerness to revive energy cooperation with Iraq and see the sanctions regime against Baghdad lifted have been examples of influence of political economy on TFP in this era. Indeed, with the development of new oil and gas routes to bring Caspian and Middle East supplies to world markets, Turkey is emerging as a key country [see: Kek, 1999]. On a strategic level, too, Turkey's new role as a key player in the energy transportation network provides an opportunity to strengthen Turkey's influence and prestige at the expense of Russia and, to a lesser extent, Iran.

Last but not least, it should be mentioned that opportunities in Eurasia have not replaced Turkey's more pressing interests in the West, but they have placed these and the other interests in a different perspective. In other words, in externalizing its policy, Turkey hardly ever turned to irredentism or expansionism, but rather played a role of intermediary and role-model for the newly independent countries.

As for the threats to Turkey's security, they emanated from its unfriendly neighbours in the southeast: Iran, Iraq, and Syria. The danger from this area was also somewhat reduced in the post-cold war period because Iraq and Syria were facing troubled economies and internal problems at this time.

It is important to note that despite the decreased threats to security emanating from abroad, there was considerable internal threat to Turkey's territorial integrity coming from the secessionist Kurdish terrorist activities of PKK.

As a result, Turkey experienced a decrease in international military threats resulting from the end of the cold war. As such, the expectation was that it could now direct its resources to concentrate on enhancing its economic well being and on achieving such economic objectives as growth and development.

6.2. Shifts in Turkish foreign policy. Since the end of the cold war, Turkey has emerged as a more active and important actor on the international stage. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey discovered a world of interests and affinities stretching "from the Balkans to Western China" - areas that had not been on the agenda of TFP debate since the foundation of the Turkish Republic.

This activism has been evident largely in traditional areas of interest such as the Middle East, Transcaucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans.

Firstly, the growing involvement in Middle Eastern affairs represents an important shift in Turkish policy. Under Ataturk - and for several decades after his death - Turkey refrained from involvement in the Middle East, but since the very beginning of 1990s, Turkey has been heavily engaged in the region. This more active policy contrasts markedly with the more passive approach that characterized Turkish policy before the Gulf War in 1990. [Lesser, Larrabee, 2003, p. XI-XII].

TFP towards the Middle East has been a stable policy that proved to be able to resist pressures to change. But the first Gulf crisis did reveal Turkey's new policy supporting multilateralism and internationally sanctioned military intervention in conflicts where Turkey was not directly involved.

In fact, the threat construction from the Middle East has become so immense that Turkey had to give up its traditional non- or minimum involvement in the Middle Eastern politics for its own sake [Makovsky, 1999]. For Turkey's part, the main threatening environment was not the Gulf crisis itself but the environment of instability and uncertainty that remained afterwards. As a result, the Turkish military broke its traditional approach of caution, crossed the Iraqi border to carry out operations against the PKK to make the region safe from terrorism shelter.

As a result, during the Gulf crisis of 1990 Turkey took a high profile on behalf of the Western coalition against Iraq. Turgut Ozal, the prime minister at the time, closed the Iraqi oil pipeline that was the primary means of transporting Iraqi oil to the world. Turkey deployed its for-

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ces on the Iraqi border, permitted its military bases to be used for air operations against Iraq and joined the economic embargo against Iraq.

This active involvement has created repercussions in domestic politics. State elites had accused Ozal of diverting Turkey's traditional diplomacy by pursuing an adventurous policy that would be harmful for Turkey's interests. That also resulted in the resignation of Foreign minister, Ah Bozer and General Chief of Staff, Necip Torumtay.

The new emphasis on combating terrorism in the wake of the 11 September attacks on the US has complicated TFP, especially in the Middle East and Central Asia. As a Muslim country, "Turkey wants to ensure that the war on terrorism does not become a "civilizational" struggle between Islam and the West. Ankara also has to weigh the interest in supporting US-led actions against terrorism with its own national interests in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf" [Lesser, Larrabee, 2003, p. 194].

Secondly, the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed Turkey to establish close relations with the "forgotten brothers" of Eurasia with whom Turks of the Turkish Republic shared strong ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic ties. Although Turkey has been cautious about exploiting these possibilities, the emergence of the Caucasus and Central Asia has given a new dimension to Turkish policy. Turkey now has had interests in the region that it did not have during the cold war. Thus, Turkish foreign policy makers searched for new foreign policy partners in Eurasia. Ankara focused on forming close economic and political ties with the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Turkey's interest and involvement in the Caucasus and Central Asia have complicated relations with Russia and given new impetus to the historical rivalry between the two countries. Increasingly, Russia has come to see Turkey as a major rival for influence in the region and has sought to stem Turkey's efforts to establish a geostrategic foothold there. But Russia also remains an increasingly important trade partner. This gives Turkey a strong incentive to maintain good relations with Russia. Indeed, the growing economic interaction between Russia and Turkey is one of the most important developments in Turkish policy toward Eurasia and could have a significant effect on Turkey's relations with Moscow over the long run.

In the Balkans, too, Turkish policy has been more active compared to the cold war era. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey effectively withdrew from the Balkans. But the end of cold war has witnessed renewed Turkish interest in the region. Turkey's relations with Albania, Macedonia, and Bulgaria have visibly improved. Turkey has actively participated in peacekeeping and stabilization operations in Bosnia and Kosovo and would likely contribute to any Western peacekeeping operation in Macedonia. But Turkey's sympathy for the Muslims in Bosnia and elsewhere worries many Europeans - especially Greeks - who fear that at some point Turkey might be tempted "to play the Muslim card".

However, it should be mentioned that in the Balkans Turkish intervention has been moderate and multilateral, with the government resisting the pressure of some groups for unilateral action. In the end Turkey's policy enhanced its international reputation and alliances.

In general we can say that, despite failures to achieve some of its goals, or at least maximal objectives, in this newly independent "Eurasian" area, Turkey's efforts were generally quite successful. Ankara quickly recognized newly independent states from Central Asia to the Balkans; developed diplomatic, economic, and aid relations with ex-communist states. The June 1992 establishment of Turkey's first active foreign policy initiative, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) project, did not attract the attention it deserved because the focus was perhaps on cooperation rather than on managing a conflict [see: Sule, 1995, p. 93 - 105]. But this step was an important sign both of Turkey's new activism and its involvement in additional regions. Furthermore, Turkey participated in international efforts to solve conflicts from Nagorno-Karabakh to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Turkish troops served simultaneously in peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Albania and Afghanistan. Turkey became a foreign aid

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donor, too, helping states in transition and contributing to multiple reconstruction efforts in war-torn areas.

Last but not least, these shifts in TFP strategies in the Balkans, Black Sea, Caucasus, and Central Asian areas, although rather significant, did not signify a change in the country's foreign policy orientation. This new type of activity was not seen as an alternative to engagement with the West. On the contrary, Ankara carefully stressed that its special relations with former Soviet and Yugoslav republics would in fact prove Turkey to be more valuable to the West. Furthermore, during this time successive governments stressed the importance of the EU and asserted Turkey's strong desire to become its full member. In other words, Turkey was diversifying its foreign policy to complement, not supersede, its relations with the West⁴ .

6.3 Reasons of the shift in Turkish foreign policy. The active involvement of Turkey in regional politics has been shaped by several internal and external factors.

One of the important external factors that led Turkey to attempt to search for new partners and a more active policy in its "near abroad" was the EU's decision in December 1997 in Luxembourg to exclude Turkey from the next round of accession negotiations. The European response provoked considerable resentment among the Turkish public and reinforced a sense that Turkey had to look after its own interests more vigorously.

At its December 1999 Helsinki summit, however, the EU decided to accept Turkey as a candidate for membership, after years of keeping it at arm's length. Since then, Turkey has undertaken a number of important reforms designed to meet the EU's Copenhagen criteria, including abolition of the death penalty and an easing of restrictions on the use of the ethnic languages [Ozgurel, 2003]. Therefore, the dynamics of change are no longer limited to those who have been present in the traditional debate. Thus, the 1999 summit in Helsinki gave Turkey a strategic objective, and introduced a new terminology into the Turkish discourse. The EU's "Copenhagen criteria", setting standards for democracy, the rule of law, human rights, the market economy, and the "protection of minorities", have become a focal point for Kurds, liberals, Islamists and others seeking reform in Turkey. The participants in Turkish politics now position themselves according to where they stand on these criteria.

The second external factor that led to an active foreign policy was Turkey's relations with the United States. Ankara's relations with the US have been much more at ease than those with the EU. The relations with the former have witnessed important changes. Turkey's increasing involvement in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East have increased Turkey's strategic importance in Washington's eyes. The United States has come to see Turkey as a key strategic ally and a more capable actor in these regions. In addition, the war on terrorism, and the U.S. desire to bolster moderate voices in the Muslim world, have reinforced Turkey's strategic importance to the United States [Lesser, Larrabee, p. XII].

But U.S. -Turkish perspectives differ on many issues, especially in the Gulf. Turkey has strong reservations about U.S. policy toward Iraq, which it fears will lead to the creation of a separate Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. The U.S. invasion of Iraq put new strains on U.S.Turkish relations. Ankara also does not share Washington's view about the need to isolate Iran, which is an important trading partner and a source of natural gas for Turkey. These differences hinder the development of a true "strategic partnership" between Turkey and the United States.

Internal factors have also been influential in Turkey's foreign policy. Indeed, changes in the international arena are occurring at a time when the Turkish domestic scene is also experiencing important changes, many of which are having an effect on Turkey's foreign and security policy.

Traditionally, the Ministry of foreign affairs has always been a critical actor in TFP making process; depending on the issue at hand, various other government bureaucracies also participated. Recently, however, civil society groups have gained some influence.

⁴ Establishment of Customs union with EU was realized in 1995.

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In the last decade, many of the key tenets of Ataturkism-Westernization, statism, secularism, and non-intervention - have come under increasing assault. The democratization of Turkish society has created space for a variety of new groups and forces that have challenged the power of the Kemalist state. These challenges, including challenges from Turkey's secular reformists to the traditionally strong state apparatus, will be a key force shaping Turkish society and policy over the next decades [ibid., p. XIV-XV].

As in all parliamentary democracies, Turkey's foreign and security policy decisions are made by the PM and cabinet members, who are responsible to the national legislature. But these leadership bodies are supplemented, advised, and influenced by other forces. There has been a great deal of continuity in TFP making, but there have also been shifts in degrees of involvement and power among these factors and institutions [Ozcan, 2001, p. 13 - 26].

The most important change in shaping foreign and security policy during the 1990s was the increased and assertive role of the Turkish military. One reason for this development was the fact that the end of the cold war left Turkey in a decreased but much more complex external and internal security environment. While the threat of a military attack by the Soviet Union seemed to have ceased, Kurdish separatism and Islamic fundamentalism gained greater importance, and that has had both domestic and external security dimensions. "The active involvement of some neighbouring countries in support of separatist and religious fundamentalist groups threatened Turkey's stability. These developments pushed the military to the forefront of decision making, often in a manner that undermined the authority of civilian institutions" [ibid., p. 16]. Gencer Ozcan defines this situation: "This does not mean that the MFA has ceased to retain significant influence over the formulation and implementation of foreign policy decisions. However, the military's role has become more perceptible, and in some cases uncomfortably coexists with the role of the elected government and the MFA" [ibid.].

It is one of the ironies of Turkey's politics that military increased its influence during a period in which the sources of foreign policy became diversified and policymaking became more pluralistic. Indeed, political parties were also becoming more active, establishing special commissions, working groups, and institutional links with think tanks or foundations in Turkey and abroad.

Equally, the decade witnessed the gradual formation of a distinct civil society that displayed unprecedented activity on behalf of citizens' diplomacy. Furthermore, trade unions, business associations, a vast spectrum of civic organizations tried to be involved in the foreign policy process.

Institutions such as Association of Turkish industrialists and businessmen, Board of foreign economic relations, and Foundation for economic development tried to influence the government regarding relations with, among others, Greece, Armenia, the Russian Federation, and the EU. Pluralism also involved participation by ethno-religious organizations mobilizing religious and ethnic affiliations in support of Palestinian, Bosnian, and Chechen causes. These organizations successfully organized protest rallies, massive fund-raising campaigns, and related activities.

Another important trend has been the growing influence of the independent media, especially television. The media played an important role in the crisis over Imia/Kardak, which brought Turkey and Greece to the brink of war in January 1996, as well as in the first Chechnya crisis. Moreover, Islamist and other political groups now have their own television stations, giving them unprecedented access to a much broader cross section of the Turkish public. Public opinion and the media are now far more important factors in Turkish external policy than ever before.

At the same time, the growth of a dynamic private sector has served to weaken the role of the "strong state" and strengthen the power of civil society. The business community, in particular, has emerged as an important political force in Turkey. The Turkish industrialists' and businessmen's association and other institutions have emerged as outspoken advocates for re-

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form and have proposed new policy initiatives on a broad range of social, economic, and political issues, including the Kurdish issue. Turkish entrepreneurs have also played a leading role in the expansion of economic ties to the Russia, Central Asia, and the Middle East and have been at the forefront of the recent rapprochement with Greece. Together with the changing role of the military in Turkish society, the landscape for debate and policymaking on a range of issues, including foreign and security policy, is changing rapidly, with new actors operating alongside traditional elites.

The reassertion of Turkish nationalism is arguably a far more important influence on foreign policy than religious politics in Turkey. Although nationalism has been a key component of Turkish foreign policy going back to Ataturk, the Gulf War gave it new impetus. Many Turks felt that Turkey paid too high an economic and political price for its support of the United States in the Gulf War. Moreover, these sacrifices did not bring the expected rewards, namely, membership in the European Union. Events in Bosnia and Chechnya, where Turkish affinities are engaged, reinforced this nationalist inclination. In a very different fashion, Turkey's current economic crisis - and resentment over the role of international financial institutions -has also been a spur to nationalist sentiment.

Lastly, the financial crisis of November 2000, much more severe crisis of February 2001, and political turmoil have interrupted active Turkish debate about foreign policy and a more active set of external policies. Policymakers and the public are intensely focused on resolving the country's internal problems.

In summary, we can say that, as Turkey is becoming a more open society, one can clearly see that TFP has become more complex than ever. TFP has gradually become multi-faceted and multi-dimensional. The improvement in Turkey's democratic structure created a multidimensional foreign policy.

Conclusion

This study aimed to attempt to examine Turkey's foreign policy attitude by using Miles and Snow's organizational culture typology in business studies assuming that several Turkish foreign policy institutions behave as one organization.

Miles and Snow suggest that historically, organizations have had four strategic categories: prospectors, analyzers, defenders, reactors. Adapting Miles and Snow's typology into foreign policy, this study assumed that defender foreign policy is one which has a narrow foreign policy mission definition; prospector foreign policy is one which almost continually searches for new opportunities; analyzer foreign policy is one which operates in two types of areas, one relatively stable, the other changing; reactor foreign policy is one in which top policy makers frequently perceive change and uncertainty occurring in their organizational environments.

In order to define the reaction of Turkish foreign policy makers to the developments in the region as well as in the world by using Miles and Snow's typology, first a brief summary is given. It has been seen that, from the very beginning of its establishment in 1923, Turkey has been preoccupied with the issues of national security and territorial integrity. This necessarily dictated a conservative or defensive approach to foreign policy that led Turkey to avoid activities beyond Turkish territories. This was at the same time a confirmation of the current study's first argument. Kemalism, the character of the Turkish state and strong decision-making units that supports TFP have had a strong effect to execute such a defensive foreign policy. In Miles and Snow's terms this attitude can be termed as mainly defender, time-to-time reactor in character.

Of course, since the late 1940s, an era that also coincided with a domestic transition to political pluralism, Turkey has not remained strictly isolationist. Most notably, it joined NATO and became a partisan in the cold war. There was a brief foray into the Middle East in the 1950s, a deep involvement in the Cyprus issue since the 1960s, and an effort to integrate with

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Europe intensifying in the 1980s. Yet as significant as these developments were, each had to be accepted and justified, as an exception to the overall Turkish strategy and self-image. The alignment with the United States and NATO for example, was a defensive reaction to an unprecedented Soviet threat. It could also be argued that NATO membership was a strategy portion of the long-term plan to join Europe and the West.

The Turkish military expedition in Cyprus, unlike any other act of the republic in the first half-century, was also triggered by external forces. Still, despite the gravity of the conflict with Greece, this rivalry was largely restricted to a rhetorical level, even though Turkey knew itself to be by far the stronger country. Turkey's effort to be included in the various projects for European integration was not so much an innovation as it was an integral continuation of Ataturk's program of socio-economic development, Western patterned modernization, and becoming part of Europe. To reiterate, TFP until the 1990s has shown defender/reactor characteristics.

Indeed, even after the end of the cold war, the traditional line of TFP was rather hesitant to adapt their policies in the face of profound change in the external environment. Turkey preferred to wait until late 1989 when, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it became clear that the developments were irreversible. Even after 1989, Turkey refrained from making any changes in its foreign policy although the Soviet Union, whose threat has been one of the major determinants of Turkish foreign policy, had completely changed its policies.

One explanation that can be put forward is that by then Turkey shared with the United States a strong interest in the preservation of existing structures and relationships. Thus, Turkey refrained from taking the initiative for a foreign policy change, and preferred to wait (defender/reactor). This attitude might also have stemmed from Turkey's being relatively a "small power", which by definition implies that she was in the position of responding to what happens in the external environment rather than shaping that environment. The Turkish foreign policy makers, to go one step further, are even hesitant to respond to what happens in the external environment if it seems to require any change in the traditional policy, a salient issue in Turkish domestic politics. In fact, Turkish foreign policy has been characterized by its consistency and continuity. This is partly because nearly every foreign policy action that the succeeding governments undertook since the establishment of the Republic has been considered within the broad framework of the so-called "traditional Turkish foreign policy" regardless of changes in the external environment, as experienced in the crisis in the Persian Gulf (1990 - 1991). When there has been any change, it has been slow/deliberate, carefully elaborated, and gradually developed by these governments.

It is this nature of Turkish foreign policy that leads the analyses of Turkish foreign policy to conclude that forces of continuity/stability prevailed over the forces of change. The small numbers of analyses that make up the literature on Turkish foreign policy have usually concentrated on the continuity of Turkish foreign policy. This not only stemmed from the fact that the policy itself has been very consistent and proved to be a continuation of the past policies, but also from the negative meaning attached the word "change", which has usually been identified with the foreign policy of the Menderes era. In this sense, the words "change" and "deviation" have usually been attributed, similar meanings in that change is not perceived to be something good, while continuity is praised.

However, the term "continuity" can also easily be equated with the term "stability", which has a rather negative connotation, especially in the eyes of those who vie for "dynamism" in foreign policy. It is argued here that both continuity and change are neither good nor bad in themselves. The meaning one attributes to these terms usually depends on whether s/he is for or against change in foreign policy. To give an example, continuity in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East has endowed Turkish policy with a degree of predictability and also consistency, both of which are praised. The very same continuity in policy, however, caused

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drawbacks for Turkey when changes took place in the external environment to which Turkey failed to react swiftly, or adapt to changing circumstances, i.e. Cyprus problem.

A similar argument may be put forward on those very few analyses on Turkish foreign policy that presented continuity in arguing for the continuity in Turkish foreign policy. The reason why such analyses usually concentrated on continuity rather than change is probably that the word "change" has been given a negative connotation, i.e., deviation from Kemalist foreign policy principles. However, when it became clear by 1989 that lack of change can be as bad as change itself, the need for a better analysis of the forces of continuity in Turkish foreign policy made itself felt. The Gulf Crisis erupted at a time when Turkey was beginning to reconsider its policies and had decided to reassert itself as an important factor for European security. Although President Ozal intended Turkish foreign policy towards the Gulf Crisis to be a deviation from the stagnant policies of the past, and he took during the crisis a "proactive" stance, the result did not disturb the pattern of continuity in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. This pro-active and assertive foreign policy attitude has also been seen in the Transcaucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans. Thus, from the end of the cold war, TFP in Miles and Snow's terms, has tried be more analyzer, even prospector in PM Erbakan's time, in character.

What should be remembered is that the argument, here, is not that Turkey should adopt a more active policy, and that it should enforce its strategic importance to the West and in the region alike. On the contrary, it is argued that there seems to be a limit in economic, political and military terms with the Eurasian states, as Turkey's past experience of relations with the region also proves.

As argued before, change is neither good nor bad in itself. The same may be said for stability in foreign policy. Thus, an active (prospector/analyze) or a passive (defender/reactor) foreign policy is neither good nor bad.

The second argument of this paper was that isolationism in active foreign policy strategy no longer sufficed for Turkey in 1990s. After the cold war, Turkey became more assertive and independent in defining and seeking to fulfill its interests, in the Middle East, Balkans, and Caucasus, and Ankara has been willing to confront Arab or Iranian or Russian criticism. There has been a greater readiness not only to take risks - albeit relatively small ones - but also to project Turkish influence. Thus in Miles and Snow's typology terms TFP after the cold war has become more assertive and active. That is, it has showed mainly analyzer, time-to-time prospector characteristics.

Last but not least, it should be stressed that it is misleading to see Turkey's activism in the post-cold war era as a transition to a genuinely active foreign policy. Turkey has no ambition to lead a Muslim or Turkic bloc in surrounding areas or to establish a neo-Ottoman zone of influence. It seeks merely to ensure its own national and internal security through regional stability. Indeed, the notable rise of the armed forces' influence in the policymaking process is based on this very self-conscious defensive aspect of Turkish strategic thinking. In short, the fundamental approach of TFP has not changed.

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