In September 1978, at the Camp David country residence of the American presidents located near Washington, the leaders of Egypt and Israel, with the mediation of then-US President James Carter, signed the agreement "Framework for Peace in the Middle East", which opened the way for the conclusion of the first peace treaty between an Arab state and Israel. On the eve of the twenty-fifth anniversary of this historic summit, documents were released in the United States that significantly expand the understanding of how the negotiations were prepared, how the text of the agreement was developed and agreed upon. This collection contains a variety of materials from the White House archive and from the personal archive of J. R. R. Tolkien. It is dated 1977-1979 and includes official correspondence, memoranda, reports on meetings between the head of the White House and the Israeli Prime , texts of speeches, and working papers of the American president. These documents are available in scanned form on the website of the J. R. R. Tolkien Memorial Library. Part of the National Archives of the United States.

¹ Reports of Jimmy Carter's meetings with ARE President Anwar Sadat are not available.

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JIMMY CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT

First of all, I would like to mention President Carter's letter to Anwar Sadat, written on October 21, 1977, during the most serious crisis of the peace process2 . It shows how close the cooperation between the two leaders was and confirms the trusting nature of their relationship. Then the American president turned to his Egyptian counterpart with a request for support not just as a head of state, but as a friend and like-minded person: "When we met at the White House, I was deeply impressed... Your promise that at a critical moment, if our joint quest for peace in the Middle East faces obstacles, I can count on your support. The moment has come and I need your help" [Carter, 1995, p. 302.] This message had an effect, and a month later, President Sadat made an extremely bold political move: he was the first Arab leader to travel to Jerusalem, where he launched a new peace initiative.

The American vision of the current situation and the conditions under which the Middle East settlement should be implemented was reflected in a memorandum prepared for the President by National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski on the eve of the next meeting of the US Secretary of State John Kerry. Carter's meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Begin on May 1, 1978. This document contains recommendations for the president on how to handle the upcoming conversation and what issues to focus on. The following points are of particular interest:

1) The United States ' commitment to Israel's security remains unchanged. We believe that practical security measures can be developed during negotiations. Sadat most recently justified his call for the withdrawal of Israeli troops by the willingness of the Arabs to negotiate with Israel on acceptable security arrangements.

2) Sadat has told us that he remains committed to the search for peace and is ready to help work out an interim agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. But he insists that to make further progress, he needs guarantees of Israel's readiness to liberate the occupied territories in exchange for peace, official recognition and security.

3) The idea of a five-year interim agreement on the West Bank and Gaza is becoming acceptable, and many elements of the self-government proposal can be incorporated into such an agreement.

(4) Further elaboration is needed on the means of resolving the sovereignty problem after the end of the five-year period. Our idea of holding a referendum was criticized... Can Israel promise to negotiate a final agreement on the West Bank and Gaza after signing an interim five-year agreement based on the principles of resolution 242 ³, such as peace in exchange for the liberation of territories? [www.jimmycarter-library.org 26.09.2003].

² At that time, President Carter's attempts to get the Geneva peace Conference to resume had failed, and all parties to the conflict had taken an extremely tough and uncompromising stance towards each other.

³ This resolution was adopted by the UN Security Council on November 22, 1967 and became one of the fundamental documents of the Arab-Israeli settlement. It stresses the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by war and demands the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East based on the following principles: the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from the territories occupied during the 1967 war; the cessation of all claims and states of war; and respect for and recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized borders, free from threats or use of force.

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This text shows how wide a range of issues needed to be agreed upon and what efforts to find a peaceful solution needed to be made by the US administration and the president personally, who had to act as a mediator between Sadat and Begin long before the Camp David meeting. Having listed the main components of the American approach, Brzezinski again speaks about what the president needs to do as a mediator between Sadat and the Israeli Prime Minister: "You should not expect Begin to answer these questions, but it will be important for him and his colleagues to know that we consider it necessary to clarify positions on these areas. You should strike a balance between your assertions in favor of Israel's security and the need to make tough decisions about the West Bank in order to make progress in negotiations with Egypt" [ibid.]. It is quite remarkable that Brzezinski talks about the need to achieve concessions on the part of Israel, which indicates a greater balance of the American approach compared to the position Washington in the first half of the 1970s. This reflects the desire of the Carter administration to develop relations not only with Israel, but also with the Arabs, seeking a settlement that would take into account the interests of both sides of the conflict.

The study of the submitted documents shows that the US Congress had a significant influence on the US policy regarding the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, making its own adjustments to the actions of the executive branch. An example of such interference is the message sent to President Carter by nine influential members of the Senate on June 28, 1977.

This message begins with a significant disclaimer that explicitly states the role of the Senate in the affairs of the State and in shaping foreign policy: "We are writing to you because the Senate will soon play a leading role in making decisions regarding the Middle East, and you, like any President, will need serious support for your efforts in the service of the cause peace in the Middle East".

Then the position of American lawmakers on the Middle East settlement is clearly stated, and the principles that the president should follow in his attempts to reconcile the warring parties are listed point by point.:

"We believe that the key elements of your approach, which we believe is in line with UN Security Council Resolution No. 242, supported by all interested States, are the following::

1) No change in our historical commitment to Israel's security, while at the same time not allowing our military assistance to be used as a means of putting pressure on Israel.

2) The desire for a comprehensive and genuine peace, including concrete measures to normalize relations between the States of the region.

3) Establishing mutually acceptable and secure borders that are recognized by all stakeholders.

(4) A just and final solution to the Palestinian problem that would contribute to the establishment of lasting peace" [www.jimmycarterlibrary.org 10.10.2003].

It is not difficult to see that the conditions set out in this message limit President Carter's ability to use the special ties of the United States with Israel to exert pressure on him as one of the key participants in the peace process. This position of the Congress seriously complicated the search for a compromise, since it allowed the Israeli leadership to be intractable, seeking concessions from the United States and Arab opponents. However, if you look at the document as a whole, you can say that it is somewhat balanced, since it also took into account the interests of the Arab side, as evidenced by the presence in the list

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on the adoption of measures to normalize relations between the countries of the region and the need to find a just solution to the Palestinian question. The significance of this document also lies in the fact that it not only reveals the approach of American congressmen to the peace process in the Middle East, but also clearly demonstrates the desire of the legislative branch to accelerate the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

CARTER'S INITIATIVE TO HOLD TALKS BETWEEN THE LEADERS OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL

Special mention should be made of President Carter's declassified handwritten messages sent on August 3, 1978 to Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and ARE President Anwar Sadat, as they most clearly reflect the American vision of the current situation. Then, realizing that the peace process was at an impasse, the American president took a rather bold step in the political sense, asking the heads of the two warring states to come to Camp David for direct negotiations and meet in private to work out the terms of the settlement.

President Carter himself believed that the situation in the region at that time was favorable for achieving peace between Egypt and Israel, and that such a chance should not be missed. Here, for example, are the arguments in favor of direct negotiations that Carter makes in his message to the Israeli Prime Minister: "Although the recent discussions have yielded minimal results, there is still agreement on a wide range of issues. If we do not seize this opportunity now, those of us who are currently the leaders of our nations may no longer have the chance to advance the cause of peace in the Middle East." Then the American president develops his idea as follows: "After many hours of detailed discussions with you and President Sadat, either privately or as part of delegations, I became convinced of your mutual desire for peace. This aspiration is clearly shared by the peoples of both countries."

Carter encourages President Sadat with the following words:: "You exercise firm control over the government, enjoy the loyalty of your associates and the well-deserved trust of the people, and command the admiration of the entire world. There is no doubt that every effort must be made to realize this unprecedented opportunity and conclude a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, thereby laying the foundations for a comprehensive and lasting peace agreement for the entire region. The consequences of disrupting this process can be very serious." Addressing the Egyptian President, Jimmy Carter made no secret of his concern about the difficulties faced by the peace process, and stressed that only the united efforts of the top officials of the states, their determination and political will will break the impasse: "If we do not act boldly and constructively now, we may no longer have such a situation." a chance to bring peace to the peoples of your region ... It is time to make new efforts at the highest level and with maximum determination ... I would like to meet personally with you and Prime Minister Begin to find additional ways to peace... " [ibid.].

Rightly fearing that a negative public reaction to reports of the start of direct negotiations could make the leaders of Egypt and Israel less accommodating and hinder the search for a compromise, the American president placed considerable emphasis on the need to keep information about the planned summit secret. This was due to the fact that in Israel, at that time, the majority in parliament belonged to the right, which advocated a tough course towards Arab countries, while in Egypt public opinion was still extremely hostile-

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similarly, the Jewish state. In view of these circumstances, in a message to President Sadat, Carter made the following reservation:: "It is important to keep this proposal completely secret, so as not to create excessive expectations in society, and that the preparation, carried out discreetly and in an atmosphere of mutual cooperation, lays the foundation for a successful meeting" [ibid.].

MEDIATION EFFORTS OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT

However, the negotiations at Camp David were seriously complicated by the reluctance of both sides to make concessions. In this context, of particular interest is the handwritten draft of the peace agreement "Framework for a settlement in Sinai", personally drawn up and submitted for consideration by President Carter on September 12, 1978, which made it possible to avoid the breakdown of negotiations and then formed the basis of the final document signed by their participants.

In the preamble to his draft peace agreement, President Carter states that " all the principles of Resolution 242 will be applied in resolving the conflict between Israel and Egypt." Then there is another reference to the UN resolutions, which say that "for the establishment of peaceful relations... Future negotiations between Israel and any of its neighbors willing to negotiate peace and security with it should aim to implement all the provisions and principles of resolutions 242 and 338."⁴

Thus, the American side attached great importance to the UN Security Council resolutions and considered them as the basis for concluding peace between the Jewish state and the Arabs. In this aspect, the American approach to the peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict coincided with the Soviet approach, which also took resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for possible reconciliation.

In his draft, the American leader proposed delaying the entry into force of the agreement for two to three years. This was quite justified, since each of the warring parties needed to carry out a significant amount of preliminary work before starting to implement the terms of the agreement, including preparing the public opinion of their countries. Such a decision actually meant abandoning the approach that the USSR and its Arab allies had long insisted on. Its essence was the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories as a prerequisite for the start of peace negotiations. This position, in turn, was absolutely unacceptable for Israel, whose leadership has repeatedly stated the need to secure its own borders from a sudden invasion. The lack of willingness to compromise on this issue on both the Arab and Israeli sides has made any negotiations between them impossible for many years.

According to the American president, the peace agreement was bound to address the following range of issues::

1) Restoration of full sovereignty of Egypt over the territories that were part of it within the internationally recognized borders between Egypt and mandatory Palestine;

2) Determining the timing of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai Peninsula;

⁴ UN Security Council Resolution No. 338, adopted on October 21-22, 1973, confirmed the need for immediate implementation of the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution No. 242. It also called on the parties to the conflict to immediately start peace talks under appropriate auspices. It should be noted that resolutions 242 and 338 are still the internationally recognized basis for a settlement in the Middle East [www.jimmycarterlibrary.org 26.09.2003].

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3) Use of airfields in El-Arish, Rafah, Ras al-Naghba and Sharm el-Sheikh exclusively for civilian purposes;

4) Ensuring the right of unhindered passage of Israeli vessels, as well as vessels of other nations, through the Strait of Tirana, the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal;

5) Construction of an international highway from the Sinai Peninsula to Jordan, which should pass not far from the Israeli port of Eilat;

6) Deployment of the parties ' armed forces in the Sinai Peninsula and in the Suez Canal area [www.jimmycarterlibrary.org 26.09.2003].

An analysis of this list of issues shows the desire of the US administration to achieve a peace agreement based on a balance of interests between Israel and Egypt. There are also provisions that meet the interests of both the Egyptian and Israeli sides. At the same time, the content of this list makes it possible to understand what, in the opinion of the then US leadership, was the essence of the differences between Egypt and Israel.

For Egypt, the liberation of its territory from Israeli occupation was undoubtedly of paramount importance, as mentioned in the first two paragraphs. Separately, the document raised the question of the need to build an international highway that would provide a connection between Egypt and Jordan by land. On the other hand, the United States sought to guarantee Israel's military security and respect for its interests in the use of maritime communications in the region through the conclusion of the agreement, to which the third and fourth points of the list given here are devoted. The issue of the deployment of troops was important for both sides, but its solution, apparently, depended on the agreements reached on the previous points.

It should also be noted that these points were included in the text of the 1978 Camp David agreement "Framework for Peace" in the section "Framework for the conclusion of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel", in the same order and with almost no changes.

It is a curious fact that President Carter's draft calls for the restoration of Egypt's sovereignty over territories "up to the internationally recognized borders between Egypt and mandatory Palestine" [ibid. This provision reflects the American approach to the interpretation of the text of UN Security Council Resolution No. 242: Israel must withdraw its troops from the occupied territories, but which ones will be decided in the process of negotiations between the parties to the conflict. In confirmation, we can refer to the comment made at a press conference in June 1977 by an official representative of the US State Department: "In accordance with the terms of resolution No. 242, Israel, in exchange for peace, should undoubtedly withdraw from the occupied territories. We believe that this resolution calls for the withdrawal of troops on all three fronts-in Sinai, the Golan, the West Bank and Gaza. The exact boundaries and security measures should be agreed upon during negotiations " [Department of State spokesman.. , 1977, p. 617 - 188].

Further reading of the draft text gives an idea of the importance that the United States attached to the security of Israel, its strategic ally in the region. When considering the deployment of troops of the opposing sides, the document does not set any conditions for the deployment of Israeli armed forces on the border with Egypt. This issue is not even addressed, except for the mention of the interim withdrawal of Israeli troops, which will be discussed later. The proposed draft document stipulates only the deployment of units of the Egyptian army: "Within approximately 50 km east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal, there will be no more than one Egyptian mechanized or military installation.

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an infantry division." If we recall the pace of the Israeli offensive in Sinai during the military campaigns of 1967 and 1973, it becomes obvious that such a disposition actually put Egypt in an extremely vulnerable position.

The only concession to Egypt can be considered a clause stipulating the conditions for an interim withdrawal of Israeli troops: "Within three to nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli forces will be withdrawn to the east of the El-Arish - Ras-Muhammad line; the exact passage of this line must be determined by mutual agreement."

The draft itself does not explicitly indicate that the UN will be involved in any way in the peace settlement between Egypt and Israel, however, when describing the future deployment of Egyptian armed forces and formations, Carter makes a reservation: "Only UN forces and civilian police equipped with light weapons for performing normal police functions will be involved in the implementation of the agreement." According to the proposed text of the document, it was also planned to deploy UN forces in the Sharm el-Sheikh area to ensure freedom of navigation in the Strait of Tirana. Moreover, as stated in the document, the withdrawal of UN forces could only be carried out with the approval of the UN Security Council. Thus, at the stage of implementing the future peace agreement, the United States could not do without relying on the international authority of the UN and without its direct assistance.

In the future, the text of the "Framework for Peace" agreement explains the role of the UN in the future settlement in the Middle East. Paragraph 6 of article " C " reads as follows: "The UN Security Council will be asked to approve peace treaties and guarantee compliance with their provisions" [www.mfa.gov.eg 4.11.2003].

The goal of a peaceful settlement in the draft is the normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel, including full mutual recognition, an end to the economic boycott, and the protection of the rights of citizens of both states.

In total, during the negotiations between the Egyptian and Israeli sides, mediated by the US President and his closest aides, twenty-three options for a future agreement were considered. Serious discussions were needed to agree on language that would suit both sides of the conflict. This controversy is reflected in President Carter's personal notes (also included in the compilation of documents), where he describes the final stage of negotiations and the difficulties encountered in finalizing the text: "Finally, we agreed on the exact wording in the part concerning settlements, and agreed that the relevant paragraph will be deleted from the part concerning settlements. West Bank and Gaza, and included in a letter from Begin to me. I told him that it could not be a secret letter, and the Prime Minister replied that the text would be made public." Here it should be clarified that for Israelis, some topics, in particular, the problem of the occupation of the Palestinian territories and the future fate of Jerusalem, were extremely painful, and in order to avoid the collapse of negotiations, President Carter proposed not to include them in the main text of the agreements, but to present them in the form of letters from the parties to each other in order to prepare public opinion in Israel. As a result, on September 17, 1978, the American delegation came up with a project that satisfied both Arabs and Israelis.

POST-CAMP DAVID POLICIES OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION

Separately, this compilation illustrates the actions of the US administration to implement the agreements signed in September 1978. In particular, it includes for this purpose a memorandum prepared by Zbigniew Brzezinski for the American President on November 21, 1978, before the meeting

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with the Israeli Prime Minister. In the above-mentioned memorandum, Brzezinski insists on the need to determine the directions of further US mediation efforts and continue negotiations on the fate of the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip:" There is another important issue that needs to be resolved - the commitment of the parties to negotiate on the problem of the West Bank and Gaza " [www.jimmycarterlibrary.org 10.10.2003]. This indicates the intentions of the American leadership not to stop at what has been achieved and continue to search for ways of a universal settlement in the Middle East.

The suggestion that President Carter was trying to substitute a separate peace between Israel and Egypt for a comprehensive settlement seems wrong in this regard. Archival documents show that the American leader was aware of the insufficiency of the efforts made and openly recognized the need for further progress. On his way to Egypt and Israel on March 7, 1979, to participate in negotiations on the fate of the peace treaty, J. Carter stated:: "Real peace will not come after signing one treaty - even such an important one as the one to come. But the treaty between Egypt and Israel is an absolutely necessary step towards the broader and more comprehensive peace that we all seek" [ibid.].

An excerpt from his speech on the occasion of the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty on March 26, 1979, may support this assumption: "There is still the rest of the Arab world, whose support and participation in the peace process are necessary and sincerely welcome. I am convinced that the Arabs need peace and want it, but some leaders are not yet ready to meet these needs and desires. We must now demonstrate the benefits of peace and make its fruits available to all those who have suffered in the Middle East "[ibid.].

J. Carter was firmly convinced that a lasting peace in the Middle East was in the interests of the United States, and the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement was only the foundation for strengthening it. Thus, speaking on March 7, 1979, he stressed :" As friends of Egypt and Israel, we will do everything in our power to help them achieve peace, for which they have repeatedly paid in blood. By doing so-by seeking to lay the foundation for stability and peace in the Middle East - we will also serve our most important national interests and the interests of all humanity. " [www.jimmycarterlibrary.org 10.10.2003].

Subsequently, the agreements signed at Camp David were sharply criticized as contrary to the interests of the Arabs and hindering the development of the peace process. To this day, there are accusations against the US administration and President Carter, who is suspected of lobbying for Israel's interests and seeking to destroy Arab unity. However, the study of the American president's papers rather indicates that for him Camp David was the first step towards the final reconciliation of Israel with neighboring states, a precedent that sooner or later other Arab countries had to follow.

list of literature

Carter J. Keeping Faith. Arkansas, 1995.

Department of State spokesman, news conference. June 27, 1977, American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1977 - 1980.

www.jimmycarterlibrary.org 26.09.2003.

www.jimmycarterlibrary.org 26.09.2003.

www.jimmycarterlibrary.org 26.09.2003.

www.jimmycarterlibrary.org 10.10.2003.

www.mfa.gov.eg, 04.11.2003.

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