Dino Abazovic

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Rethinking the Relationship between Confessional, Ethnic and National Identities (Focus on Bosniaks/Muslims)

Dino Abazovic - Professor at the Department of Sociology, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina). abazovicd@fpn.unsa.ba

This paper offers an analysis of the actual relations between religion and politics, that is, ethno-political use of the confessional identities in the contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina. The special focus is on Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) with their special identity acquired through long historical developments. The most recent social and political processes were dominated by the institutionalisation of ethno-confessional identities. The global trend of revitalised role of religion in public domain has been also felt in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although it was expressed in a special local way, in relation to historical determinants.

The article was sent to the editor by the author. Some parts of this work are published in the author's monograph: Abazovic, D. (2012) Bosanskohercegovacki muslimani izmedu sekularizacije i desekularizacije. Zagreb-Sarajevo: SYNOPSIS.

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Keywords: confessions, religious identity, ethnicity, nationality, ethno-politics, Muslims, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

ACADEMIC publications pay special attention to the peculiarities of the historical periods that Bosnia and Herzegovina has passed through. In these studies, the confessional nature of the population appears to be an invariable characteristic, regardless of the author's scientific approach and the disciplinary orientation of the text. This is not surprising, given the role played, first, by confessional consciousness and, second, by religious institutions in the process of national differentiation of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, the development of political forces in different historical periods made diferencia specified inevitable within Bosnian-Herzegovina society and, through various mechanisms of institutionalization, contributed to the consolidation of these differences.

The fact that the special course of the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina, unlike, for example, the neighboring states (Serbia, Croatia and Montenegro), did not lead to the coincidence of territorial and national borders, but rather assumed national pluralism, of course, does not raise doubts 1. The analysis of this phenomenon allows for two methodological approaches. The first approach, while objectifying confessional groups, treats the ethnic groups of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a thing-in-itself.2 The second approach is to reject the theoretical framework according to which ethno-confessional mobilization is a key mechanism for political legitimation and de-legitimation.

The further analysis offered in this paper is a repeated attempt to examine the relations between confessional, ethnic and national identities, singling out Bosniaks or Bosniaks as their subject.-

1. Faith is something that externally unites Bosnia and Herzegovina, but internally divides it. This is the basis for the late breeding of cultural and social characteristics as markers of ethnic group differences in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Suljevic, К. (1981) Nacionalnost muslimana: Izmedu teorije ipolitike. Rijeka: Otokar Kersovani

2. Brubaker, R. (2002) "Ethnicity without Groups", Archives Europenes de Sociologie, XLIII 2: 163 - 189.

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Herzegovina Muslims. The analysis is accompanied by a brief overview of the confessional and national identity of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period from the Ottoman colonization of Bosnia, and then in the successive periods of Austro-Hungarian rule, the rule of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Brief historical overview

The first mention of Bosnia and Herzegovina in early written sources dates back to the middle of the X century and is contained in the document De administrando imperio of the Byzantine ruler Constantine Porphyrogenitus, where it appears as a possession mainly in the upper reaches of the Bosna River. In the political context, Bosnia at that time was subordinate to the neighboring principalities of Raski, Duklje and Croatia. Prince Stefan (viceroy of Dukljansky Prince Bodin; c. 1081-1088) is, according to well-known sources, the first ruler of Bosnia. The following century is considered the period of the formation of a state independent of Byzantine and Hungarian rule, beginning, as is believed, with the reign of Ban Kulin (1180-1204).

Despite the theoretical contradictions and taking into account the relevant arguments, as well as the historical documents presented, J. A. W. Fine is correct when he believes that there was a model of religious pluralism in pre-Ottoman Bosnia with no deep-rooted religious beliefs.3
The pluralism of religious life was preserved even after the Ottoman conquests, in the context of the active Islamization of the local Slavic population. The general opinion of most competent authors is that the conversion to Islam was not violent in nature. The Ottoman model of governing the occupied territories provided for a general division of the population based on the confessional affiliation of subjects (the millet system). At the same time, despite the fact that in the first period of Ottoman rule (more precisely, in the first two centuries after

3. См. Fine, J.V.A. Jr. (2005) Bosanska crkva: novo tumacenje, pp. 27 - 30. Sarajevo: Bosanski kulturni centar.

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after the fall of the Kingdom of Bosnia in 1463), the religious affiliation of the population almost completely coincided with its subsequent and still preserved ethnic structure, this was not necessarily reflected in the differentiation of social statuses: the military and feudal elites, as well as subjects, especially the common people, at an early stage included both Christians and Muslims. 4
Only in the later period of Ottoman rule will the majority of large landowners be Muslims, while dependent peasants will be Christians (Orthodox and Catholic) by confessional affiliation. At the same time, it is important to emphasize here that the millet system was primarily associated not with the territorial distribution of the population, but with the socio-economic structure (primarily in connection with the tax collection system). In the political aspect, the religious affiliation of the population becomes an important criterion starting from the second half of the Ottoman rule, in response to what is happening outside the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina - the formation of national consciousness among Serbs and Croats. 5
The Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina at that time called themselves "Bosniaks", which was accepted by the Ottoman administration; however, this designation was also used in relation to other residents of the area. In the unofficial language, the lexeme "Turk and Turchanka" was used (in the sense of people of the "Turkish faith", that is, Islam).6.

During the period of Austro-Hungarian rule, there is a shift in political relations based on confessional identities inherited from the previous period. Thus, after the annexation of 1908, the Habsburg Monarchy adopted the first Constitution (modeled on the so-called Moravian Agreement), which introduced a system of proportional representation of the "three main powers" in the political life of the province.

4. Bougarel, X. (2004) Bosna: anatomija rata. Beograd: Fabrika knjiga.

5. Malcolm, N. (1994) Bosnia: a Short History. London: Mac Millan London Limited; Ramet, S. P. (1996) Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War. Colorado: Westview Press; Allcock, J. B. (2000) Explaining Yugoslavia. London: Hurst & Company; Bougarel, X.Bosna: anatomija rata.

6. At that time, Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina denied ethnic identification with Turks from Turkey, including at the level of names used. Thus, people from Turkey were called Turkushs (Turkusi).

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confessions" (31 seats in the parliament are given to Orthodox deputies, 24-to Muslims, 7 and 16-to Catholics).

Thus, it is extremely important to note that now confessional identities are used not only for the purpose of recognizing (and possibly ensuring) religious rights, but also as principles for the implementation of collective rights as such (primarily ethnic). The collective rights of other minorities (with the exception of Jews) are not recognized, since they are not based on religious affiliation. 8
However, relations between communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina often depended on very specific issues and precedents. For example, we can recall the landmark Orthodox-Muslim coalition formed in connection with the issue of cultural (educational) and religious autonomy, or the Catholic-Muslim coalition on the issue of agrarian reform.

In the future, the need to solve the so-called "national question" comes to the fore more and more clearly, which, despite Benjamin Callai9's attempt to form a single national identity of the population, regardless of religious affiliation (Boshism as an inter-religious designation for all residents of the state), will remain open. The national idea, which already had a real political significance for Croatia and Serbia, has been developing in Bosnia only since the middle of the XIX century. There is an increasing identification of Catholic and Orthodox populations with Croats and Serbs from Croatia and Serbia. This was the result of political interference in connection with the development of ethno-confessional identity, which began during the Ottoman rule. This process was not relevant for the Muslim population during this period, primarily because this community did not (unlike Catholics and Orthodox Christians)have a single population. "own" national center outside the country. At that time

7. During the period of Austro-Hungarian rule, the term Mukhamedans (mukhamedovtsy) is used in the official language - a translation of the German lexeme Muhammedaner. The local population opposed the use of such a word, as they considered it incorrect and offensive, and therefore it was replaced by the concept of Muslim, which took root relatively quickly.

8. For example, minorities following folk customs (for example, Ukrainians, Gypsies).

9. Benjamin von Kallai-Austro-Hungarian diplomat and politician. In 1882, he became Minister of Finance in the Government and at the same time was proclaimed Governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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As the idea of Western (secular) nationalism is increasingly spreading among the Orthodox / Serbian and Catholic/Croatian populations, Muslim leaders are mostly preoccupied with religious autonomy issues.10
After the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918), and later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the legal status of Christian denominations will not change significantly, while followers of "Mohammedanism" in the new configuration will acquire the status of a national minority, but with broad autonomy in regulating internal relations (including the application of Sharia). At that time, the process of forming the ethnic consciousness of Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina was generally (politically) completed, while the term "Muslims" was increasingly used in everyday speech both to denote ethnic identity (in its secular meaning) and as an ethnonym in relation to the Muslim community. to the Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

However, we should not ignore the fact that at that time religious institutions, being large landowners, were often perceived as associates of oppressive and exploitative elites, and thus church hierarchs were extremely unpopular among the peasants and the urban poor. Moreover, the religious elite had little in common with the new urban middle class, whose nationalism was often inspired by Western ideas, especially European secular nationalism. In this context, there is a noticeable difference between the everyday religious feeling associated with religious tradition (especially in rural areas) and the extent to which religious authorities were perceived as leaders in national relations.11 Among political parties

10. All this is not surprising when you consider that the arrival of Austria-Hungary represented a significant paradigm shift in comparison with the Ottoman principle of government. For more details on the various dilemmas faced by the Muslim population, see Karcic, F. (1990) Drustveno-pravni aspekt islamskog reformizma. Sarajevo: Islamski teoloski fakultet.

11. Allcock, J. B. Explaining Yugoslavia. Apart from the greater or lesser differences between the three religious communities, the situation is accurately illustrated by a quote from a book by Noel Malcolm, who refers to Chedomil Mijatovic, a prominent Serbian diplomat and historian of the early 20th century: "The religious feelings of Serbs are not deep and not fervent. Their churches are usually empty, except on major church and political holidays. In our time, the Church for

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There were also strong anti-clerical sentiments, 12 as well as open tensions between the clergy and the authorities.13
Be that as it may, even though confessional self-determination was generally nominally recognized and indifference to ritual practice was proclaimed, the whole structure of religious life was an important cultural platform, which acquired special significance whenever the question of giving a certain appearance to ethnicity arose. 14
Thus, religious consciousness was deeply rooted in Bosnia and Herzegovina , as opposed to other components of the collective organization, and this phenomenon, we believe, has been preserved as an important characteristic of society.

It should be noted that democracy and civil society, or, more precisely, civil issues that might have emerged due to the community-based model of governance, were not developed in all the indicated periods of the formation of society in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Instrumental, deliberate "secularization of the nation" served as an obstacle to a broad public discussion with the participation of all interested forces on the role and place of religion and religious communities in Bosnian-Herzegovina society, on determining the actual political boundaries of their role (or their removal), solely based on public opinion.15
In the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), the national question regarding Muslims was formally resolved in 1971, when this issue was followed by the following cases:

The Serbs are a political institution that is somehow mystically linked to the veneration of the nation. They do not allow anyone to attack it, but at the same time, when it is safe, they forget about it" (Malcolm, N. (2007) Kosovo: kratka povijest, p. 61. Sarajevo: DANI).

12. Examples: socialists led by Svetozar Markovic; members of the Radical Union (Radical Party); circles close to the Croatian Agrarian Party; or even the Macedonian VMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization).

13. As in the case of a conflict between the authorities and the Serbian Orthodox Church over the signing of a concordat with the Vatican. For more information, see Repsa, V. (2002) Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in the Yugoslav States. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

14. Lovrenovic, I. (2002) "Pitanje iz vjere, pitanje iz zivota", u Bremer, Th. (ur.) (2002) Religija, Drustvo, Politika. Kontroverzna tumacenja ipriblizavanja, p. 329. (Projekte - Wissenshaftliche Arbeitsgruppe fur weltkirchliche Aufgaben der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz, Berlin, 2002).

15. For more information, see Abazovic, D. (2006) Za naciju i Water: Sociolosko odredenje religijskog nacionalizma. Magistrat -CIPS, Sarajevo.

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A population group - whose native language was Serbo - Croatian (Bosnian), and whose cultural and family tradition was Muslim-was assigned the status of a" people " within Yugoslavia. Until then, the population censuses included various options for self-determination, and this was especially true for the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the 1948 census, the phrase "Muslim - without a national definition"was proposed. The next census, which took place in 1952, proposed a new, nationally neutral wording "Yugoslav-without a national definition" for those who did not want to declare their national identity for any reason - to designate themselves as a Serb, Croat, Albanian, Macedonian, etc. In the 1961 census, Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina could designate themselves as ethnic groups ("Muslims in the sense of ethnicity"), and in the 1971 census, they were finally given the opportunity to enter the phrase "Muslims" in the column"people" ("nationality").

The last changes were caused by important decisions of the leadership of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1968: especially the decisions of the XVII and XX meetings of the Central Committee of the Union of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina regarding the recognition of the nationality of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Based on an analysis of available statistical indicators, T. Bringa illustrates the situation of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the second half of the last century as follows::

When Muslims gained the right to identify themselves as a nation, the total number of those who identified themselves as Yugoslavs in the 1971 census drastically decreased: from 275,883, according to the 1961 census, to 43,247, while the number of "Muslims" increased from 842,000 to 1,482,430, respectively. [ ... ] the growth of the number of Muslims in the period from 1961 to 1971 was not possible at the demographic level, so this phenomenon can only reflect the proposed new alternative-self-determination as part of the Muslim nation16.

16. Bringa, Т. (1997) Biti musliman па bosanski nacin, p. 43- Sarajevo: Biblioteka DANI.

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It is interesting to move to the local level and consider the population structure depending on nationality in local communities of the pre-war period.

H. Bugaryov identifies three models of interethnic relations: "hegemony "(if in a particular community this people made up more than 80% of the population); "bipolarity" (if the given people comprised less than 80% and were adjacent to some other people or minority, which, in turn, had twice the number of representatives of the third people) and "heterogeneity" (if in a similar situation the third people made up more than 50% of the other people in terms of population this community)17. Thus, the distribution of the three main communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina within the model of the ratio of national communities at the local level in 1948-1991 in the case of Muslims was as follows (see table 1).18
Table 1

Years

1948

1971

1991

Muslims

%

%

%

Hegemony

6.4 (2 communities)

7.3 (3 communities)

8.1 (3 communities)

Bipolarity (with Serbs)

40.9 (35 communities)

53.0 (59 communities)

58.6 (66 communities)

Bipolarity (with Croats)

9.8 (13 communities)

11.5 (25 communities)

11.7 (26 communities)

Heterogeneity (with Serbs and Croats)

43.3 (16 communities)

28.2 (19 communities)

21.6 (14 communities)

Based on the table data, it is obvious that more than 8% of the Muslim population after the Second World War

17. Bougarel, X.Bosna: anatomija rata.

18. These tables are taken from the work of Bugarey: Ibid., p. 198.

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Until 1929, the population lived under two dominant models: "bipolar" (in the neighborhood of the Serbian community) and "heterogeneous" (in the neighborhood of the Serbian and Croatian communities). In this regard, the consequences of the territorial division of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war (D99 1 - 1 995) should have had a detrimental effect on its population.

Comparison of ethnic maps of Bosnia and Herzegovina corresponding to 199 1 year 19 and the post-war period with modern indicators clearly demonstrates the devastating consequences of military operations and ethnic "cleansing" of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At present, and this is a direct consequence of the war, at the local level, the distribution of the main national communities is subject to the model of"hegemony".

Religion and ethnicity: on the historical and socio-political conditionality of the inseparability of the categories "boshnyak" and "Muslim"

The formation and development of significant forms of collective consciousness (confessional affiliation and ethnicity) of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina is conditioned by the adoption and confession of Islam, as well as by historical processes

19. "Statistical Bulletin" N233 (October 1993) - The Bureau of Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, based on the results of the 1993 census, provides the following data on the religious affiliation of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina (population: 4 77° 033) (data are given as a percentage) [In translation, we did not change the grammatical form of phrases in order to, so as not to distort the original value. In the Russian language, such formulations are incorrect in the context of expressing confessional identity, but they become meaningful if the question of religious affiliation is posed as follows:"What faith do you follow?" or "What is your religion?" - Note. perev.]: Muslim-42.77%; Orthodox-29.39%; Roman Catholics -13.56%; Catholic -3.31%; Serbian -0.69%; Greek Catholic-0.071%; Croatian-o, o66%; Protestant-0.041%;

Muslim-Catholic-0.011%; followers of Eastern cults-0.0098%; Jews -0.0052%; Old Catholics-0.0028%; Bosnian Roman Catholics-0.0024%; Orthodox Serbs-0.0023%; Free Catholics-0.0017%; Orthodox-Catholic-0.0010%; Catholic-Orthodox - 0.0006%; Orthodox-Muslim-0.0005% ; Macedonian-0.0004%; Muslim community -0.0004%; Romanian-0.0003%; ZIDRA (Community of Muslim Sufi Brotherhoods of Ali) - 0.0002%; Roman Catholic Muslims-0.0002%; other faiths-0.0245 - % The corresponding tables and diagrams, as well as ethnic maps are provided by the Center for the Study of Refugees and Migrants [http:// cesi.fpn.unsa.ba/? page_id=6oi, accessed on 13.06.2014].

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and the socio-political structure both in the country itself and in neighboring lands.

Without delving into the analysis and possible additional problematization of scientific reviews, studies and discussions on the process of Islamization, especially of the local population of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the arrival of the Ottomans (these topics are beyond the scope of this article), it is important to highlight several main processes that influenced the formation of initially confessional, and then ethnic consciousness. First of all, in this context, it is necessary to indicate the correlation between the significance and role of the ideas of Islamic modernist reformism on the transition from Eastern Islamic to Western European culture, and the traditionalist response to these ideas that followed during the time frame that coincides with the beginning of Austro-Hungarian rule and the end of World War II.20
It is interesting to note that in the post-Ottoman period, other confessional communities (Orthodox and Catholic), which were previously in a subordinate position, relatively quickly adopted certain ideological and cultural processes of development in modern Europe, while at the same time the very rich and, as many authors believe, very progressive Muslim community was more inclined to protect its interests and to traditionalism. The ideas of Islamic reformism of the modernist trend arose with the intention of preserving the Muslim faith. At its core, the demands and activities of the modernists were aimed at the cultural revival of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the intensive introduction of reformist and educational methods in order to transform Muslims in opposition to the aspirations of the conservative Ulema.

Thus, the social life of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina was dominated by two different positions, especially regarding the understanding of the social function of the teaching and the practical side of Islam: the so-called modernist one

20. Among the works on this issue, I first refer to the landmark study of Fikret Karcic " The Socio-legal aspect of Islamic Reformism "(Karcic, F. (1990) Drustveno-pravni aspekt islamskog reformizma. Sarajevo: Islamski teoloski fakultet), as well as Enes Karic " Additions to the History of Muslim Thought in Bosnia and Herzegovina XX centuries. Book I" (Karic, E. (2004) Prilozi za povijest islamskog mislenja XX stoljeca and Bosni I Herzegovini. Knjiga 1. Sarajevo: El-Kalem).

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and traditionalist. Fikret Karcic has shown in his research that the development of reformist ideas falls into two stages. 21 The first period, ending in 1918, was marked by the spread of literacy in the native language, attempts to reform education in traditional Islamic schools, reform in the management of the Islamic religious community and waqfs, as well as changes in the interpretation of Sharia regulations concerning financial activities. At the next stage, which lasted until 1946, the divergence between the "intelligentsia" (secular intellectuals) and the Ilm (representatives of religious knowledge) deepened, and the difference was also found on a wide range of social issues (the position of a Muslim woman in society, clothing and ethics, financial activities and waqfs) and religious and legal issues (reform and codification of the current Sharia law). Throughout this period, the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina had ideas about religious, as well as cultural and political identity and identity, but at the same time, ethnic (national) consciousness was not developed. Also, very little was done in the field of national awakening (awareness) of Muslims in Yugoslavia (as can be seen from the topics of key discussions and differences of opinion). It is natural that in the conditions of poorly developed national identity, the confessional consciousness is further strengthened. It also implements certain compensatory functions, and therefore it is not surprising that they behave as a religious, rather than a national community, and feel like one. They appear under the generic name "Muslims", not"Bosniaks"... And they found all forms of association - from reading rooms, charity organizations, youth communities to political parties - under the name "Muslim", not "Bosnian". Such naming is a matter of personal choice, which was not imposed by anyone. Thus, in 1908, according to one of the official registers, 124 organizations and associations were registered among the Bosniaks, each of which was called "Muslim", and not "Bosnian".22
21. Karcic, F. (1990) Drustveno-pravni aspekt islamskog reformizma.

22. Filandra, S. (1998) Bosnjacka politika и XX stolecu, p. 5. Sarajevo: Sejtarija.

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The political parties that united the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina (including the primary ones - from the Muslim People's Organization to the South Slavic Muslim Organization) deliberately did not consider the national issue.

On the other hand, Serbian and Croatian political parties did their best to persuade Muslims to seek national self-determination as Serbs of the "Islamic faith" or Croats of the "Islamic faith". However, it is important to emphasize that the majority of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not agree with this form of national self-determination and preferred a situation of some national uncertainty.

At the same time, the idea and concept of "South Slavic Muslims"are being completely abandoned in the course of developing a policy towards Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina (primarily through the policy of the JMO - Yugoslav Muslim Organization), but also in connection with protecting their position in a specific socio-political climate. First, they include Muslims of Slavic origin who speak Slavic languages (thus excluding Albanians living in Kosovo), and later exclusively Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina. This concept did not apply to the Muslim Religious Association of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.23
Despite the practice of national identification of Muslims as Serbs or Croats, which Muslims - both in private and public discourses - proclaim as politically pro-Serb and pro-Croatian, the difference in the use of the term "Muslims" as a designation of either religious affiliation or ethnicity is gradually increasing in Bosnian society. This is evident both in the press, letters, and in journalism, where there are disputes about the possible ethnic identity of this part of the population. In the end, the key policy issues and, therefore, directly or indirectly -

23. The Muslim Religious Association of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (Islamska ujerska zajednica and Kraljeuini Jugoslauiji) is the spiritual administration of the Muslims of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which, according to the Charter of the Muslim Association (1930), includes religious organizations of the lands belonging to the Kingdom, and the representation of the Supreme Mufti first in Belgrade, and then (1936) in Sarajevo.

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Questions regarding Muslims are primarily related to the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In this sense, the Muslim movement for the autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina (as a reaction to the Tsvetkovic-Macek Agreement of 1939), although politically unsuccessful, can be interpreted as an authentic expression of both national (Muslim) and State (Bosnian-Herzegovina) interests.

During the Second World War, members of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPJ) held the position that Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina have their own ethnicity and should be treated equally with Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as with all the peoples of Yugoslavia. 24 Atif Purivatra revealed this position in his work based on the analysis of a large number of ethnic groups. the number of decisions of the CPY, its departments and organizations, some representatives of the People's Liberation Movement (PLM), as well as based on various materials and statements of the party leadership and representatives of the PLM25. As a kind of culmination, we can mention the joint decision of the Central Committee of the CPY, the Regional Committee of the CPY of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Supreme Headquarters of the NOD and the General Staff of the NOD of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 1942, in which Serbs, Croats and Muslims are called to stand up for their homes, families and the nation; and the statement of the Executive Committee of the Anti-Fascist Veche of People's Liberation Yugoslavia (AVENUE) "To the Peoples of Yugoslavia" from 1943, in which Muslims are mentioned along with Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins and Macedonians.

At the same time, the recognition of Muslims as one of the triad peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina directly depended on the ideas and decisions of the Communists on the future status of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was to be determined at the second meeting of the ABNOYU (November 1943). Prior to this, three proposals were submitted on the future status of Bosnia and Herzegovina: an autonomous region within Serbia and Croatia; an autonomous unit, but with fewer rights than other future federal units (which will be populated mainly by one dominant ethnic group); and a status equal to the rest of the republics. In the final result

24. Filandra, S. Bosnjacka politika u XX stolecu, p.153.

25. Purivatra, A. (1969) Nacionalni i politicki razvitak muslimana. Sarajevo: Svjetlost.

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as a result, Bosnia and Herzegovina became an equal federal unit26.

Immediately after the end of the war, the political agenda returns to the problem of the "national definition" of Muslims and does not recognize their national autonomy until the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the corresponding request for a full-fledged national identity was already clearly formulated. Respect for national status and nominally equal status suspended the policy of so-called "appropriation" of Muslims by the Serbian and Croatian ruling circles, but at the same time did not imply the formation of various independent national institutions. Thus, the new provision additionally affected the overall development of the national consciousness of Muslims. In other words, the issue of national institutions was emphasized in a special way soon after the recognition of the national identity of Muslims: public discussions were held on whether the full, free and equal development and formation of a nation is possible in the absence of its own institutions.27 These questions will become open again in the late 1980s and early 1990s, albeit in a very new social and political environment.28
It is important to point out here that "when a religion cannot fully establish itself, it tends to lean on the nation and hide behind the national idea." 29 Thus, in the post-recognition period

26. The prevailing idea among the Communist Party representatives was that Muslims constitute a separate community, but unlike Serbs and Croats, the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have a national identity.

27. In one of the most important works of that period, M. Filipovic gave a justification, from which it follows that national institutions are not a significant and integral sign of the historical existence of a nation; moreover, " it is characteristic of Bosnia and Herzegovina that all three nations together sought to create and created some public institutions, which in the end it led to the formation of their common state." In this sense, the formation of separate institutions would lead to division and thus, in cultural terms, to a slowdown in the development of each nation, to the emergence of rivalry and a sense of exclusivity (Filipovic, M. (1971)" Smisao zajednistva - nacionalni razvoj, ravnopravnost i posebne nacionalne institucije", Odjek 12, 13-14: 2 - 4).

28.The activities of the Muslim Cultural Association "Vozrozhdenie" (Preporod) resumed in 199°; in 1991,1 the Bosniak Cultural Association called Matica Bosnjaka was founded; finally, in 1992,2 the Council of the Congress of Bosnian Muslim Intellectuals was formed.

29. Cimic, E. (2005) Iskusenja zajednistva, p. 22. Sarajevo: DID.

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as a Muslim nation, contrary to the expectations of the political elite, in the absence of a network of separate national institutions, religion wrapped in a national idea becomes an even more important factor in the national self-determination of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina.30
The ethnic identity of Muslims, as well as Serbs and Croats, is undoubtedly determined by religious affiliation (although religious teachings themselves do not contain this idea). However, unlike the Christian clergy (Orthodox and Catholic priests), representatives of the Muslim clergy (khojas, imams) and ulema were not characterized by permanent reverence for their medieval rulers, saints, shrines, territory and ethnic motives. The Muslims had no myths of their own - they were wanderers in the land from which they came. In comparison with the hierarchical, ethno-national organization of churches, religious nationalism was poorly rooted or practically absent in Muslim communities. In this regard, the "Slavic" Muslims in Yugoslavia (who use the Serbo-Croatian language in everyday communication) were unequal partners in religious-nationalist rivalry.31
The apparent collapse of the prevailing communist ideology ensured a brief period of multiparty relations and a fictitious attempt to democratize the South Slavic space. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the first multiparty elections were held in 1990.A few months earlier, a group of Muslim intellectuals and part of the Ulema supported Aliya Izetbegovic in his bid to found a political party that would represent Muslims. Thus, the Democratic Action Party was founded, which was known among its founders as the Muslim Cultural and Historical Circle party.32 In the same year was

30. Bozo, H. (1970) "Islam i musliman", Glasnik Vrhovnog islamskog starjesinstva и SFRJ. XXXIII (5 - 6): 205 - 206.

31. Perica, V. Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States, pp. 74 - 75.

32. Izetbegovic, A. (2001) Sjecanja: Autobiografski zapis, pp. 67 - 68. Sarajevo: TDK Sahinpasic.

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The work of the Muslim Cultural Society "Vozrozhdenie" (Preporod) has been resumed, with Muhzin Rizvich as its first president.

Just before the breakup of Yugoslavia and the beginning of aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 1991, a group of Muslim intellectuals publicly released the text of the Resolution at a press conference; as Filandra notes, the theses of the Resolution, known as" Resolution 84", at that stage became " the basis of political activity of the Bosniaks. They contained the initial positions in the idea of regulating political, economic, cultural and social issues arising in Yugoslavia, forming the core of the well-established political and ethical position of the Bosniaks. " 33 Shortly after signing, the text of the Resolution was supported by a much larger number of Muslim intellectuals representing not only Bosnia and Herzegovina than the initial number of supporters.

Tarik Haveric, critically analyzing the whole text of the Resolution, shows why the theses presented in it were important for the future course of events, especially taking into account that they reflected the thinking of a certain part of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and also contributed to its implementation 34. its political goal-ideologically and politically ensuring the future settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina-led to the domination of the ethnocracy, both immediately before the war and after it ended.

It should be borne in mind that the revival of nationalism in the former Yugoslavia in the 1980s and especially in the 1990s did not pass by the Muslim community of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The rise of Serbian and Croatian nationalism and increasingly open claims to Bosnia and Herzegovina have found a response in ideologized confessionalism as a form of national ideology. This was all the more possible considering that

33. Filandra, S. (1998) Bosnjacka politika and XX stolecu. Sarajevo: Sejtarija.

34. Haveric, T. (2006) Ethnos i demokratija: slucaj Bosne i Hercegovine, pp. 41 - 48, 53. Sarajevo: Rabic.

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[ ... ] it has never been possible to determine exactly to what extent faith is a matter of personal, individual experience and the spiritual need of a relationship with the sacred, with God, with the transcendent, and when it becomes the object and means of a collective identity that is always in active and very close connection with politics and ideology, constantly subject to manipulation and instrumentalization, which leads to horrific consequences 35.

A significant number of authors who have studied the place and role of religion and religious communities during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina have come to a general conclusion about close cooperation between religious and political elites, about the politicization of religion and the confessionalization of politics, which led to the homogenization of religious communities and the inevitable confrontation.36
During the war in besieged Sarajevo in September 1993, at the Second Congress of all Bosniaks, it was decided to change the ethnonym: during the general vote of those present at the congress, the ethnonym "bosniak"was adopted. In all the analytical works dealing with this topic, it is indicated that one of the main intentions of the participants of the congress was to return to the use of the former popular designation of Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the end, the use of the ethnonym "boshnyak" was confirmed and legalized by the resolution of the Constitutional Law on amendments and additions to the Constitution of the Republic.

35. Lovrenovic, I. "Pitanje iz vjere, pitanje iz zivota", p.330.

36. Mojzes, P. (ed.) (1998) Religion and the War in Bosnia. Oxford University Press; Vrcan, S. (2001) Vjera and vrtlozima tranzicije. Daklmatinska akcija, Split; Sells, Michael A. (2002) Iznjeverno most: Religija i genocid и Bosni, ITD Sedam, Sarajevo; Velikonja, M. (2003) Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Texas A&M University Press; Cvitkovic, I. (2004) Konfesija и ratu: Sarajevo-Zagreb, Sarajevo: Svjetlo rijeci, Interreligijska sluzba Oci и Oci. Without equating the role and significance, as well as the responsibility for many negative events during the war, of all three confessional associations (Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim), we note that, according to the Mitiya Velikonya, they are equally characterized by the following actions: the use of traditional religious symbols, speech formulas and greetings, the interpretation of political events using religious terminology, demonization of the enemy, destruction of enemy sacred objects, and eloquent silence (which also expresses the position of a religious association on certain issues and at the same time is used in interpretations by one or another power group). Velikonja, Moscow (2001) "In Hoc Signo Vinces: Religious Symbolism in the Balkan Wars 1991 - 1995", Religion in Eastern Europe XXI (5): 8 - 25.

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Bosnia and Herzegovina, article 7 of which states that "... as in all other forms of usage, the expression 'Muslims' is replaced by the term 'Bosniaks'". This nomination is subsequently approved by the current Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is Annex IV of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement.

Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Dayton Agreement

If the Constitution of one state (due to political and military intervention from outside) is accepted as the result of a violent and bloody division of society, and it should not particularly clearly contradict the current policy of internal actors who act as parties to the treaty, then a compromise should be based and built solely on the recognition of the culture and political history of this society including models of the constitutional and legal system that are typical of the recent past.

This is the current Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its key content elements are the recognition of collective rights, and hence proportional representation as the main principle in the political decision-making process, while respecting the principle of rotation, as well as ensuring the legal and effective indivisibility of the previous State - the independent Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, recognized by the international community in 1992.

Although Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Dayton Agreement is, as Nerzuk Churak observes, a "postmodern pun 38 of the geopolitical genius" of the Democratic Action Party (Stranka Demokratske Akcije - SDA), this constitutional and legal system is not an American invention, but an Austrian one (and was approved during the Austro-Hungarian monarchy). And all other constitutional and legal systems were distinguished by the priority of collective and collective rights over individual rights. But even with regard to collective rights, there are still unresolved issues, despite the fact that

37. For more information, see Curak, N. (2002) Geopolitika kao sudbina. Sarajevo: Fakultet politickih nauka.

38. Dosjetka (slaughterhouse) -literally, a joke.

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The current constitutional system is based on such categories as"State-forming people "39, simply" people"," ethnic groups"," national minorities "or"others".

In general, it became clear that the distribution of power and power by institutionalizing ethnic differences does not lead to the desired results - at least in the field of state functioning and creating a favorable climate for economic growth and reconstruction of a country destroyed and devastated by war. At the State level, there is a situation in which the concept of power-sharing, especially in large coalitions, does not "work" in institutions based on (proportional) ethnic representation. A positive cooperative agreement, which, according to Lidgefart, is a key element in the successful functioning of a consociative form of government, where power is shared among several ruling groups, could renew institutions.40 Instead, the most developed negative interaction is manifested in the systematic blocking of making necessary decisions that could serve as a starting point for transformation.

Religious communities (and religion) were the most important sources of resistance to the former socialist regime and influenced almost all social structures-institutionally and cognitively. Thus, there was no other force of similar scale and influence that would serve, among other things, as a platform for preserving and transmitting national cultures and their inherent values.41
It is important to point out again that the early post-socialist period in Bosnia and Herzegovina (before the 1991-1995 war)

39. It should be recalled that the concept of "State-forming" people has only recently emerged. Unlike the terms "denomination", "people" and "nationality"," ethnic communities "and" national minorities", which are found in the previous texts of the Constitution, the concept of "state-forming people" is introduced only in the text of the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 1993 (the result of the Washington Agreement), in order to be later fixed in the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. the current Constitution.

40. Lijphart, A. (1977) Democracy in Plural Societies: a Comparative Explanation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

41. All other forms of political opposition, small and closed intellectual circles belonging to the humanities and social sciences, and even political dissidents were not as important and influential as religious associations.

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It was a time of active "ethnization of the sacred" and "sacralization of the ethnic". In an effort to establish a new ruling establishment, national ideologies sought (and found) support in the teachings of all three major religious associations of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Islamic, Catholic and Orthodox). Such interrelation ("ethno-confessional interweaving") of new power structures and the highest clergy (leadership) of religious associations has led to the fact that answers to" religious questions " are sought mainly in the political sphere, and religious institutions acquire a central position in society.

Ethnopolitical figures in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while reifying confessional groups, treat ethnic groups as substantial things-in-the-world.42
The revival of religion in the political sphere, not only in post-socialist countries, but also in the "West", has long been a hot topic in special and scientific research, especially after the September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington (and later the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London).

If Martin Marty's postulate that researchers will never come to a common understanding and definition of "religion" is correct, then it is not surprising that his attempt to show the deep intertwining of religion and politics actually refutes any theoretical grounds that separate one area from another.43 Moreover, according to the recognized point of view, ethnic identity is not only a natural community of origin, but always a political construct, especially if it is based (as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina) on religion. Boshnyaki (how to

42. This process is analyzed in detail in the work of R. Brubaker: "...we must remember that the explanations of participants-especially specialists in ethnicity, such as businessmen in the field of entopolitics, who, unlike non-professionals, can live not only " for " ethnicity, but also "with" ethnicity-are often, in the words of Pierre Bourdieu, performative nature. When they talk about groups, they want to bring them to life, to mobilize them. [...] By reifying groups, treating them as substantial things-in-the-world, ethnopolitical figures can, as Bourdieu observes, "contribute to the production of what they describe or proclaim" (Brubaker, R. A.). (2002) "Ethnicity without Groups", Archives Europeennes de Sociologie, XIII 2: 163-189 [Brubaker R. Ethnicity without Groups, Moscow: Publishing House of Higher School of Economics, 2012, p. 27]).

43- Marty, M. (2000) Politics, Religion and the Common Good. San Francisco: Josey Bass.

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both Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina) show by their example that identity based on confessional affiliation is possible in modern developing societies, but only as an ethno-political communitarianism. In this political framework, the civic principle cannot be deduced from the communitarian principle perceived in this way, especially since both the public and private spheres are understood primarily in terms of politics. As before, the category of supranational is now formulated in such a way that, acting as a corresponding political postulate, it is read in an anti-national key.

The traditionalist framework of thinking allows us to consider religion as the only binding social factor. At the same time, you can see changes in the role of politicians and religious leaders. Reshid Hafizovich points out that

[ ... ] in wartime and post - war Bosnia, the practice of reviving sacred topos-places of pilgrimage and ritual gatherings in which politicians play a major role-has clearly become more frequent. Against the background of the passive presence of religious authorities, politicians themselves explain to the faithful what truth and truth, beauty and virtue, bliss and happiness consist of, while the clergy are left to nod their approval with a learned and pious air.44
The use of traditional religious symbols in the "iconography" of political parties can serve as an additional illustration of the above and as the most striking public example.: It is well represented on official flags, coats of arms, or other signs of local political associations. The pre-election rallies and public speeches of most political figures in Bosnia and Herzegovina are also particularly significant. Pre-election campaigns in the country include frequent (evil) use of religion and religious symbols-from the ringing of bells in television commercials, to the public mention of a fundamental treaty with the Vatican in a candidate's campaign

44. Hafizovic, R. (2005) "Domestifikacija nicejskog sindroma - 'svadbenog veza' drzave i crkve", Zenicke sveske 1: 149.

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members of the Presidium on the part of the Croatian community and before the struggle for votes in the media speeches of leaders of political parties on the compliance of their programs with the fundamental requirements of the Muslim Spiritual Administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina. During pre-election meetings of parties that are popularly called "national" (or "nationalist"), sympathizers and supporters usually use religious symbols (most often flags with religious symbols or inscriptions, special items of clothing, the performance of religious songs and the use of religious vocabulary).

When the issue of religious institutions is raised, it is noticeable that their representatives, who serve in local communities and represent the lowest level in the organizational structure of the Spiritual Administration (jemaat, Catholic or Orthodox parish), do not necessarily act in accordance with the official positions of the leadership or with the public statements of religious authorities of the highest rank. Often, they openly join certain political parties and movements, as well as use religious rites and objects for the purpose of political agitation and propaganda of certain political movements.

M. Babich showed that at this stage, Bosnia and Herzegovina is characterized by instrumentalization of religion: it is politicized and nationalized 45. Ethno-confessional politics really implies the use of ritual space and religious ritual practices in the political context as a means of mobilization. As a result, in practice, the relationship between a nation and a denomination is expressed in the idea that any change of national identity is considered (exclusively)a religious one. The fact that religions are universal in their nature and teaching and thus do not amount to individual differences between believers is a disastrous factor for the nation.

The presence of religious nationalism leads to a persistent intertwining of the political and religious, to the nationalization of the denomination, followed by the confessionalization of politics, which is a return to the pre-political era, when religious institutions were called upon to govern the state, since

45. Babic, M. (2005) "Krivotvorenje autenticne vjere", Zenicke sveske 1: 172.

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religion itself was an important (or crucial) element in its formation.46
Ethnopolitics is in constant contradiction with the processes that are expressed in political theory by the concept of "civil nationalism". Ethnopolitics is a system in which it is impossible to build a supranational identity that internally connects different communities. "Islam" (in the ethno-political sense) as a political phenomenon, the identity of Bosniaks (especially Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina) is still sufficiently expressed at present, which prevents modern Bosniaks (within the framework of nationality) from being what they want to be (believers, agnostics, atheists, indifferent...).

One of the possible ways out of this situation is to abandon the national suppression of individual freedom, to individualize culture and the political sphere. Therefore, A. Mujkic is right when he believes that the weakening of the " we "- identification (including within the framework of the depolarization of the ethno-religious) and the expansion of the variable boundaries of this "we"is a prerequisite for building a democratic identity for every citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 47
Translated from Bosnian by Ksenia Trofimova

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