In recent decades, we have witnessed the "revival" of the idea of civil society, its manifestations in countries and regions that were previously outside the sphere of progressive political, economic and ideological processes. The experience of Turkey - "the most westernized state in the Middle East" - allows us to trace the formation and functioning of the "non-European model" of civil society, to determine the main trends and determinants of its development.

Since the late 1980s, the Western model of democracy and its associated ideas and concepts-civil society, non-governmental organizations, etc. - have begun their victorious march across the non-Western world. Assessing the scale of this phenomenon, S. Huntington even called it "third-wave democratization" (Huntington, 2003: 23-37). The formulas of the basic concepts of liberalism were on the lips of almost all politicians and public figures. As a result, their inadequate understanding and simplification were also established.

One of these simplifications is the desire to reduce the normative content of the concept of civil society to a set of minimum parameters focused on such concepts as competition, accountability, the right to form voluntary associations, formalized legality, pluralism, publicity, freedom of entrepreneurship, etc. And the presence of trade unions and non-governmental public organizations (NGOs) began to be considered as an indicator of the degree of freedom of the "democraticity" of a particular society [Democracy..., 1997, p.1-15]. At the same time, the logic of capitalist private property and the market often comes into conflict with the principles of pluralism and freedom of association, while the logic of bureaucratization often comes into conflict with the logic of parliamentary formation of a common will, and the principles of representative lawmaking often come into conflict with new forms of marginalization and domination [Cohen and Arato, 2003, p.12]. In addition, in view of the structural changes that have taken place over the last century, any attempts to identify "state" with "political society" or "civil society" with "private" seem anachronistic [Civil Society: Challenging..., 2000; Seligman, 1992]. Another consequence of the simplified interpretation of the concept of civil society is the absolutization of its "anti-political model" [Cohen and Arato, 2003, p. 587], which states categorical opposition, opposition between the state and society. Meanwhile, in modern societies, especially in countries that do not belong either geographically or ideologically to the West and are faced in their development with the dilemma of choosing between economic liberalism and the interventionism of the "welfare state", one can observe various forms of their communication and cooperation through political parties, public organizations, trade unions, associations and a whole range of other forms of cooperation. other institutions. Moreover, the link between the state and civil society is so strong that there is no open binary opposition "society-state" to speak of

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it is necessary, but the approach itself turns out to be inadequate for understanding and analyzing the situation under study [Beller-Hann, Hann, 2001, p. 32].

Another common mistake is the interpretation of civil society as a single homogeneous organism. However, it would be more correct to speak of a complex set of social strata that exist and operate within the same system, or of a heterogeneous institution that unites heterogeneous social groups that have different interests and reflect different political attitudes and views. After all, civil society, if we follow modern social theories , is an autonomous and self-regulating space of social relations, where political and socio-economic motivations, individualizing and emancipating the individual, have replaced or are replacing "pre-industrial" models of behavior. That is why its institutional foundations are social movements, political parties, trade unions and other public organizations, in other words, institutions and structures that ensure the self-expression of the individual, collective and mass communities [Cohen and Arato, 2003, p. 7; Volodin, 2008, p. 35-36].

In Turkey, we face almost all of these distortions in the perception of civil society. Against the background of constant talk about it, its actual and hypothetical contribution to the development of democracy in the country, it remains completely unclear what is behind this concept in public discourse. Some see the definition of "civilian" as an opposition to "state", while others have in mind a counterbalance to the "influence of the army". For some, civil society simply means the presence of public organizations; for others, it is important whether they are NGOs (liberal, Islamic, or secular). In the context of different political ideologies and platforms, civil society has become identified with literally everything-from the multiparty system and civil rights to individual freedom [Seligman, 2001, p. 203]. Meanwhile, the traditional interpretation of this concept, which was developed by the Scottish Enlightenment as a kind of counterbalance to a strong state and a source of civic education, allows us to consider this phenomenon more adequately in the Turkish context. These two characteristics are important because they reflect on civil society within the framework of the concept of pluralism and citizenship, which puts voluntary associations at the service of democracy (since they contribute to the strengthening of values such as trust, tolerance, and willingness to compromise - that is, everything that in the 1990s acquired the main features of the theory of democratic consolidation [Schmitter, 1996, pp. 16-27]).

The history of the formation and development of civil society in Turkey can be counted in different ways. If the latter is understood as the possibility of relatively free association outside the strict borders outlined by the state, then we can talk about almost a century and a half of experience of civil society in the country. After all, the socio-political weight of social movements and organizations in the period of the "late" Ottoman Empire (1850-1923) was very significant (this is clearly seen in the example of the activities of waqfs - charitable institutions that created social solidarity networks that were completely independent of the central government [Shlykov, 2006, p.67-100]). Already after the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey as a modern nation-state, various organizations appeared that operate outside politics, but in close cooperation with the state. In other words, civil society as a" sphere of free association " developed in parallel with the formation of present-day Turkey, and was an integral part of modernization and the formation of a democratic political system. However, if we take a broader interpretation and perceive civil society as an opportunity and mechanism for public influence on the process of democratization and the formation of state policy, then we will come to the conclusion that the state is not a state institution.-

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It can be stated that such features of the Turkish society begin to acquire only in the late 1980s [Keyman, 2003; Diamond, 1994, p. 4-17; Toros, 2007, p. 395 - 415].

Perhaps one of the main factors that at least inhibit the transformation of amorphous associations and disparate social groups into larger associations involved in the active political life of the country, creating the basis for" participatory democracy", is the special" centralized " nature of political and economic modernization in Turkey. During the formation of the nation-state (1923-1945) and the formation of a multi - party system and parliamentarism (1945-1980), the central government retained the role of the main and most influential subject of political, socio - economic and cultural relations. Thus, civil society institutions (various associations, movements, NGOs, etc.) also fell under indirect and sometimes direct state control. After all, the very scheme of "centralized" modernization, modernization "from above" is based on the idea of a strong unity of society and the state (state and nation), presupposes the existence of "independent" associations acting on the principles of serving the authorities and their needs, and not according to the laws of social relations based on personal preferences and economic interests [Pope N., Pope H., 1997].

The dominance of the state, its control over the public sphere and public life, which steadily increased during the years of military coups (1960, 1971, 1980), remained even after 1945, even despite the emergence of large trade and industrial unions, chambers, etc. [Kireev, 2007, pp. 289-300; Ozbudun, 2000, p. 87]. Ethno-religious conflicts also strongly influenced the process of bringing Turkish society closer to civil status: the aggravation of the Kurdish issue and the problems of Islamic identity, their politicization in the 1980s and 1990s served to form appropriate approaches to civil society and its institutions, dictated by the principles of national security and expressed in debugging legal mechanisms of pressure and control over NGOs.

However, since the 1980s, the country has developed a number of factors that favor the development of civil relations and reduce the influence of the state in public life. The transition to a market economy and the policy of limiting statism, combined with the global trend of deepening "globalization processes" - all this contributed to increasing the importance of civil society as an autonomous self-regulating social space. The organization of economic life within the framework of the free market not only led to serious criticism of state intervention in the economy and its policy of total interventionism, but also formed in public opinion more liberal approaches to understanding individualism, the boundaries of individual rights and freedoms, which, ultimately, could not but affect the relationship between society and the state (in particular, the development of in particular, on increasing the social and political responsibility of the latter, as well as on reducing the degree of its dominance in various spheres of public life) [Keyman, 2001; Keyman and Icduygu, 2003, p. 219-234]. In turn, the events of the 1990s. We have clearly set a number of imperatives for civil society: the need to overcome the polarization and fragmentation of its institutional foundations, as well as to take on a more active role in the social sphere. The latter situation became particularly acute after the largest Istanbul earthquake in 1999, which killed 20 thousand people. State bodies have shown little effectiveness in organizing assistance to victims (carrying out work to eliminate the consequences of a natural disaster, providing temporary housing and food to victims, etc.), while Turkish non-governmental organizations, on the contrary, despite all the spontaneity and disorganization of their actions, are unable to consolidate-

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These efforts have proven to have significant potential [Kubicek, 2002, pp. 761-778].

Soon, civil society received another strong impetus for development, now at the political level. Having achieved the status of a candidate for full membership of the European Union, Turkey undertook to implement comprehensive reforms in the country in order to meet the "Copenhagen Criteria" (2002)1, i.e. the principles of democracy in the EU format. As a result of the reforms of 2002-2004 and the adoption of laws on freedom of assembly and association, the field of NGO activity significantly expanded, which was severely limited in previous decades (under the 1982 Constitution), and conditions were created for public dialogue on key issues of social policy. While the Mejlis passed laws on reforms spelled out in the Copenhagen Criteria, the EU began to work closely with both governmental and non-governmental public organizations, helping them to rise to the "European" level. NGOs such as the Association for the Protection of Human Rights (Insan Haklary Derney), Helsinki Citizens ' Assembly (Helsinki Yurttashlar Derney), Waqf for Economic Development (Iktisadi Kalkinma Waqfs), Turkish Historical Waqf (Turk Tarikh Waqfs), etc.They are developing their programs in close cooperation with the EU structures [Wedel, 1997; Simsek, Summer 2004, p. 111-139].

In recent years, the number of independent publications, magazines, newspapers, private radio and TV channels, commercial and professional organizations, sports clubs and societies has significantly increased in Turkey. A notable event was the appearance in the 1990s of the first open public-political program Siyasepg Meydany ("Political Field"), which became a platform for well-known experts and public figures in the country, along with which"non-professionals" also spoke. All these debates had no tangible consequences, did not result in concrete social initiatives, but they successfully formed the "atmosphere of discussion" in Turkey, at least its appearance.

In Turkey, as in other countries of the world, in the 1980s and 1990s. Many NGOs have emerged. Before the military coup of September 12, 1980, there were 38,354 of them. And despite the fact that the military junta closed about 20 thousand NGOs, now their number exceeds 90 thousand [Sabah, 2004]2. More than a third of them are located in the largest cities of the country - Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir [Civil Society in the Grip..., 2000, p. 478]. However, a significant number of such organizations and related statistics can easily be misleading. Indeed, the number of professional associations, unions, chambers, etc. seems quite adequate for Turkey (although not enough compared to European countries [Sabah, 2004]), but the contribution of all these NGOs to the public sphere and the degree of their influence are extremely small [Beller-Hann, Hann, 2001, p. 92 - 93]. And here we are faced with a fundamental discrepancy and difference between the Western and" non-Western " models of civil society. In the first case, we are faced with a system of mutual formalized relations, obligations and agreements between individuals, in the second - the dominance of informal ties, the spread of various forms of"reciprocal relations". Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate civil society in Turkey on the basis of other, non-quantitative indicators. Moreover, the inability of numerous NGOs and diverse social movements that are clearly visible in the public sphere, on TV screens, in the media, etc.

1 The EU Summit in Copenhagen in 2002 set out a number of political, economic and legislative requirements that Turkey must meet in order to qualify for EU membership.

2 According to a large-scale study conducted by the International Alliance for Civic Participation (CIVICUS), in 2006 there were 108 associations and 6 foundations (waqfs) per 100,000 citizens in Turkey [Civil Society in Turkey, 2006, p. 35].

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Kubicek argued that "civil society in Turkey exists more as a slogan, but not as a reality" (Kubicek, 2001, p.4). The ability to influence the decisions and policies of the government in print media or at events such as the UN Conference on the Environment allowed Kubicek to argue that "civil society in Turkey exists more as a slogan, but not as a reality" (Kubicek, 2001, p. 4).

Through the cover of new technologies and catchy slogans, the same paternalistic attitude of the authorities can be seen [Bauman, 1987], forcing voluntary organizations to focus exclusively on their statutory goals, not allowing them to participate in political activities and power institutions. More than 95% of all NGOs in Turkey operate under the Law on Associations (Dernekler Kanunu), which prohibits public organizations from being active in the country's political life and cooperating with political parties. Similarly, civil servants are prohibited from participating in politics and joining the ranks of any party. All these limitations make civil society organizations weak and ineffective.

* * *

One of the indispensable conditions for the progressive development and "effectiveness" of civil society is a certain independence of the economic sphere, its "remoteness" from the state and power structures [Democracy..., 1997, p. 73-74]. For Turkey, the issue of economic liberalization has always been quite painful. Despite some efforts to remove economic life from the control and oppression of the state machine (in the 1980s and 1990s), in particular through the privatization of "state economic organizations" (GEO), little has changed in the country [Kireev, 2000, pp. 292-299; Civil Society in the Grip... , 2000, p. 188-189]. Until now, the state remains the most important owner of financial institutions, economic objects, enterprises, etc. [Kireev, 2007, p. 373]. Historically, this situation is quite understandable: the structure and organizational principles of the Turkish economy were laid down in 1923 at the famous Izmir Economic Congress as a state project. At that time, there was little or no "class" of independent entrepreneurs in the country, so it was hardly possible to revive the economy by other means and methods.

The high degree of dependence of private business and industrial companies in Turkey on the state as the main distributor of contracts and an active "lawmaker", the "subordination" of the bureaucracy and the government as institutions that control and determine the limits of economic activity, can sometimes be excessive, since in addition to formal levers, it also has hidden tools of influence. The state has a number of mechanisms for influencing the economic sphere: tax and legal preferences for large GEOS, and direct influence on the management of leading enterprises (including government officials). Therefore, the relationship between business and the state, their relations can easily take the form of clientelism and patronage [Civil Society in the Grip..., 2000, p. 188 - 189]. In addition, since the executive branch in Turkey actually controls the legislative and judicial system (after all, the party or coalition that wins the election gets almost all the levers of state control), influential businessmen, as well as other prominent players in the public sphere, are more likely to compromise with the authorities than to aggravate relations and open confrontation.

The well-known sociologist N. Manso, in his research on the transformation of Turkish society, tried to highlight the not always obvious connection between public organizations and the state. Using the example of celebrating the 75th anniversary of the Republic, Manso showed how NGOs that participated in organizing the celebrations,

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they tried to separate their structures from the state, but this turned out to be impossible for a number of reasons. First, the current activities of NGOs are aimed at building a privileged relationship with them; secondly, the search for financial support-sometimes not so much for development, but simply for survival, as in the case of the Turkish Historical Waqf (Turk Tarikh Waqf), leads many NGOs to cooperate with state structures and state support; Finally, the team of managers and administrators of most NGOs is a combination of former politicians and officials, slightly diluted by representatives of medium and large businesses [Civil Society in the Grip..., 2000, p. 299].

The mass media (the" fourth power " of Western democracies) are also not completely free from state "tutelage". Most national TV channels and newspapers in Turkey are directly owned or supported by large holdings. In other words, the country's leading media outlets are subsidiaries of corporations, not independent entities. Taking into account the multi-level relations and the system of obligations between big business and the government, at first glance, autonomous mass media are seriously dependent on the state. Add to this the issue of distributing advertising orders to an impressive number of state corporations and many socio-cultural organizations (something that, in fact, brings the main income to electronic and print media), and the ephemeral independence of the" fourth power " in Turkey will become obvious. Under these conditions, a publisher or a "free" journalist has virtually no opportunity to pursue "their own" line, which runs counter to the official ideology3.

* * *

The subordination of the economic sphere to the state overlaps with another important problem of civil society in Turkey - a high degree of its disintegration, comparable to the fragmentation of the political spectrum. The best proof of this is the situation around chambers of commerce and business unions, which, in theory, should act according to the logic of economic rationality to a greater extent than political preferences. Meanwhile, these institutions successfully serve the interests of political parties from the radical right to the ultra-left. Thus, the Union of Turkish Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (TUSIAD) focuses on the center-right. Among the left is the Association of Republican Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (JUSIAD) founded by Alevi businessmen [Milliyet, 11/06/1997, Oztiirk, 1997], while the Association of National Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (USIAD) serves the interests of the Kemalist left [Cumhuriyet, 04/06/1998, Hiirriyet, 06/02/2000]. On the right , the Alevi-founded Association of Democratic Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (DEMSIAD) and the Association of Nationalist Industrialists and Entrepreneurs(MISIAD), ideologically close to the Nationalist Action Party (MHP). The Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen (MUSIAD) represents the interests of religious-minded and conservative entrepreneurs. Along with them is the Presidential Council of Turkish Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (TÜBISAK), designed to coordinate the actions of all these associations [Civil Society in the Grip..., 2000, p. 105-145]. Thus, we can agree with K.'s opinion. Voorhoff on the economic sphere in the country "...It is divided along the lines of culture and ideology, which does not allow Turkish industrialists and entrepreneurs to act as a united front in the confrontation.-

3 In early 2007, the liberal magazine Nocta published a secret "white" and "black" list of media and journalists prepared by the Turkish General Staff, after which the publication itself was soon closed [Today's Zaman, 09/03/2007; 21/04/2007].

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the state and the government as a united influential "pressure group", which could be considered civil society" [ibid., p. 185].

The situation is similar among Turkish trade unions, which, following sociologist T. Bohr, can be divided into two categories: the right, which unites "people of capital", entrepreneurs, etc., and the left, which includes the scientific intelligentsia and highly qualified workers (two groups that practically do not intersect with each other) [Civil Society in the Grip..., 2000, p. 140]. "Right-wing" trade unions support the official state ideology based on nationalism and center-right values. Their relations with the state can be called "healthy cooperation": the authorities do not touch these organizations, unless they openly support Islamic fundamentalists or other illegal movements. Left-wing trade unions, in turn, are critical of state ideology and politics. In a sense, these organizations act as extra-parliamentary opposition to the existing regime. Disintegration and polarization are also characteristic of other elements of civil society in Turkey. Professional associations of lawyers, doctors, engineers, architects, veterinarians, pharmacists, writers and artists are probably even more divided by political and ideological interests and preferences.

The political fragmentation of civil society is evident even among human rights organizations. Only the largest of these organizations, the Association for Human Rights (IHD) and the associated Turkish Waqf for Human Rights (TIHR), include representatives of different ideological platforms. Others, such as the Association for Assistance to Families of Prisoners and Convicts (TAAAD), on the contrary, serve exclusively the interests of ultra-left forces. In turn, the right has its own foundation-the Waqf of Social Security and Education (SGEV), the "moderate" Islamists - the Association for the Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (Ozgur-Der), the radicals - the Association for the Protection of Human Rights and Solidarity with the Oppressed (Mazlum-Der). As practice shows, with close cooperation between various organizations for the protection of human rights, differences in political preferences and views are clearly manifested and become an insurmountable obstacle to the development of joint projects, actions, etc. [Civil Society in the Grip..., 2000, p. 471]. This is confirmed by the experience of feminist organizations and other NGOs at the United Nations conferences on human rights in Beijing (1995) and Istanbul (1996), where attempts to cooperate with NGOs with generally similar statutory goals led to conflicts.

The low level of tolerance and respect for opposing views is still a distinctive feature of the political culture of the Turkish state elite and civil society. The primacy of" one opinion "- this is how you can define the principles of behavior of different groups within the Turkish society: when the" strong", i.e. a more representative social group, asserts the indisputability of its cultural and political platform and imposes it on the" weak " -a social group that has less resources in this situation. This practice, along with the deep disintegration of society, leads to the fact that ethnic, religious and political differences and "dissimilarities" easily turn into violent conflicts. Turkish society is generally characterized by" fractures " along the lines of religious, cultural and political identity. The most serious of them, if we look at the last thirty years, are the opposition of Turks and Kurds, Sunnis and Alevis, Islamists and Kemalists. Moreover, these communities have their own "lines of tension", such as the confrontation between Islamist and" Kemalist " feminists, Alevi Kurds and Sunni Kurds, etc.

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No matter which of the existing cultural and ideological groups became stronger, more influential, it certainly sought to suppress, limit or at least ignore others. For example, Islamists who have traditionally complained of oppression from the Kemalists and the state that condemned and banned their activities, for their part, in the presence of favorable political conditions, behaved in a similar way towards their ideological opponents. There are many examples of students, where the number of young people who were religiously inclined was significant, who were undecided and sympathetic, quickly joined the Islamists. This was especially noticeable before the" February 28 trial " (1997), when there were no strict rules on wearing religious clothing in public places: In one academic year, the number of people wearing a hijab or a distinctive mustache and beard significantly increased (Simsek, Autumn 2004, p. 48).

As for tolerance in the relations of opposite social groups, its level is well illustrated by one journalistic investigation. Two employees of an influential Istanbul newspaper first went in miniskirts to a movie theater located in the Fatih district, known for its conservative views of its residents, and then came to a popular nightclub in hijabs. In both cases, they were simply forced to "leave in a good way" (Civil Society in the Middle East, 1995-1996, II, p. 111).

Meanwhile, the existence of universally recognized values and a well-established system of law is an integral part of any concept of civil society. "In the absence of agreement, even if not clearly articulated, about the general boundaries of action (whether political, economic or otherwise)... there will be no cohesion in society, " writes sociologist A. Norton [Civil Society in the Middle East, 1995-1996,1, p. 11]. At one time, E. Durkheim introduced the concept of anomie to determine this degree of dissociation of society - the prevailing indifference to the laws due to the loss of respect and trust in them on the part of the majority (and as a result - either their non-compliance or malicious violation). The scale of the anomie is not related to legislative activity: there may be a lot of laws, including good and strict ones, but this does not change anything. The strictness of laws in such cases is compensated by the non-necessity of their implementation.

In Turkey, the common occurrence of violations of the rules and norms of the law in any area of formal and informal relations-whether it is traffic rules, norms of behavior in public places or articles of the Constitution - is one of the biggest problems of civil society and democracy. Free interpretation of laws and regulations has actually become a general principle of behavior of the state and civil society in Turkey, where official bodies often turn a blind eye to violations of the law. Let us recall the problem of illegal development in suburban and peripheral areas of the largest megacities-Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir-the so-called gejekondu, which has long become a social phenomenon in Turkey. Local authorities and politicians cannot (or do not seek) to resolve this urgent issue. Their actions are limited to the adoption of a traditional "amnesty" (gejekondu affa) on the eve of elections, legalizing illegally built huts and removing responsibility for wrongdoing from their owners.4 In public discourse, the selectivity of subordination to normative attitudes and rules has long been recorded in various sayings and popular maxims: "The law is written for ordinary people, but not beys", "Rules exist to break them". Not surprisingly, at one time

4 This tactic is explained by the electoral potential of many residents of Gejekondu districts (Karpat, 2004).

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President Turgut Ozal, responding to a journalist's comment on the TV program Ijraatyn Ichinden about the incomplete compliance of one of the presidential decrees with the current Constitution, said that "there is nothing wrong with violating the Basic Law once" [Simsek, 2004, p.65].

However, all these inconsistencies in slogans and realities should not mislead about the reasons for such a disordered existence of civil society in Turkey. The current situation is not caused by national peculiarities or a lack of certain human qualities. The problem seems to be the indirect consequences of the profound social transformation that Turkey experienced in the second half of the 20th century. The transition from traditional social ties (within the village) to a modern urban system of social communication and cohabitation (Giddens, 1990) inevitably led to the loss of life orientations, the growth of social instability, and the formation of an alternative system of ethical values. In a sense, established traditional behavioral patterns are intertwined with the principles of "modern" ethics (often in a distorted interpretation). As a result of this "confusion" and lack of clear attitudes, the phenomenon of disordered life arose, which took little account of laws and norms.

* * *

The concept of civil society is based on the principles of free association. They are one of the main forms of interaction between independent individuals and arise when they move away from the practice of pressure and coercion, which stifles any initiative. Society needs a certain level of" individual " culture, through which its individual members can not only form their own identity (regardless of family, social group or community), but also develop the ability to independently assess themselves, the surrounding reality, the political situation and politicians. It is typical for Turks to create a kind of "cult" around leading political figures. For example, most party leaders leave office, usually either in the event of death or because of a ban on political activities5. Over the past twenty years, the first political leader to voluntarily leave politics was Erdal Ineniu (in 1993, he left the post of chairman of the Social Democratic People's Party, which he headed for ten years). Later, after the defeat of their respective parties in the 2002 parliamentary elections, Tansu Chiller (Right Path Party) and Mesut Yilmaz (Fatherland Party) resigned. The situation around the post of president is even more revealing. So, if not for his sudden death, Turgut Ozal probably would have tried to pass through parliament changes to the Constitution that would allow him to remain in office for a second term, as Suleiman Demirel, who succeeded him, then tried to do.

Since the 1980s, the cultural preferences and attitudes of Turkish society have undergone major changes, moving from traditional and collectivist values to individualistic ones. However, this value transformation is more characterized by an increase in consumerism and mercantilism, rather than an increase in the social, political and intellectual level of society's development. Although, of course, new generations of Turks are much more willing to participate in public life, join associations, and try to follow the principles of personal independence and critical thinking. In other words, modern means of communication, progress in the development of the education system and an increased level of professionalism have increased the degree of " vzsa-

5 An example of the permanent - for 30 years-leader of Turkish Islamists Necmettin Erbakan.

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and the "substitutability" of individuals (their "modularity", to use the terminology of E. Gellner [Gellner, 1995, pp. 105-111]), which naturally increased both the degree of integration of society and the level of interaction and mutual influence of individuals.

Many Turkish sociologists highly assess the degree of constructive interaction within Turkish society. Meanwhile, in reality, everything is rather ambiguous [Civil Society in the Middle East, 1995-1996, II, p. 37]. Under certain conditions, positive changes are really noticeable; in other cases, the relationship between "antagonistic" groups significantly deteriorates. As a rule, the picture observed in the absence of social tension and cataclysms is quite deceptive. The appearance of constructive discussion and dialogue, and sometimes even cooperation between certain groups of civil society, which newspapers and TV commentators are so fond of writing about, can easily mislead. However, in a critical situation, the inability to coordinate their efforts even at the lowest level becomes quite obvious [Kubicek, 2001, p. 4].

The results of a survey conducted among Turkish NGOs in 2006 - 2007 are illustrative. According to him, more than 85% of active members of these organizations consider the degree of public participation in their work insufficient, 67% are sure that existing NGOs do not reflect the interests of all groups of Turkish society, and about 90% believe that the majority of the population is not inclined to show civic activity at all. The same number (91%) speak about serious financial difficulties faced by NGOs, 66% are convinced that voluntary organizations are not able to adequately represent the interests of a number of important social groups, in particular ethnic minorities, women, and workers. In addition, 67.1% say that NGOs with their current organization cannot work effectively throughout the country [Toros, 2007, p. 405]. Thus, the institutional foundations of civil society in Turkey, even from the point of view of its most active part, are not strong enough and mature enough to influence such processes as the consolidation of democracy, etc. One of the reasons for this is the determining influence of traditions and political culture on the formation and development of civil society. We can agree with the Turkish author A. Y. Sarbay that a political culture that approves of the unlimited power of any one of the subjects of the political system hinders the emergence of social institutions differentiated by their programs and goals (Sanbay, 1997). At the same time, the society itself, which reproduces the model of submissive and obedient behavior, tends to withdraw itself from social problems, leaving their solution to the state.

The weak activity of civil society in Turkey is also confirmed by the results of a study by the authoritative World Values Surveys service, which annually conducts opinion polls in different countries (in Asia, America and Europe). According to one of the latest World Values Surveys, 92% of Turkish citizens do not belong to any of the voluntary organizations, 81% are sure that if possible, people will not hesitate to deceive each other, 60% consider democracy a political system that is not able to work out the right and correct solutions and suffers from ambiguity, and more 40% do not see "tolerance" and "respect for others" as values that should be instilled in their children [World..., 2007]. In other words, the current level of development of political culture in Turkey is not quite suitable for the formation of an active civil society, which is indirectly opposed by the state itself, hindering its development [Aksit, Tabakoglu, Serdar, 2003, s. 85-90]. The central government, taking upon itself the identification and resolution of any social problems, uses a variety of psychological tools to prevent people from uniting in public organizations, closes the WHO-

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possible channels of cooperation within civil society, creates financial difficulties for NGOs 6.

* * *

Theoretical approaches that define the concept of civil society allow us to answer the question of its existence in Turkey in the affirmative. Although it lacks certain qualities, primarily contributing to the deepening of democratization, it really is. Moreover, according to some indicators: the number of NGOs, the influence of individual culture, etc. - it can even be considered quite mature, "developed". However, from the point of view of "autonomy", independence from the government and the army, participation in state decision-making, the degree of integration, in other words, on the basis of non-statistical, "qualitative" characteristics, the level of its development can hardly be considered high.

The comparative weakness of civil society in Turkey can be explained, in addition to the peculiarities of historical development, by two sets of reasons: the peculiarities of the state ideology, which asserts the values of a single nation-state, which denies the existence of different identities and subcultures within one society, and the continuing control of the army over politics and civil society through a number of institutions, such also the informal influence of the military elite. Under these conditions, the rights and obligations of citizens become a function of the state, and not vice versa, i.e. they are based not on a "social contract", but on obligations and duties established "from above".

Lack of autonomy and independence from State authorities, deep political fragmentation and lack of tolerance are the roots of most of the problems that civil society in Turkey faces and without which it cannot serve to consolidate democracy in the country. The further development and improvement of civil society is closely linked to the need for a radical revision of the political system and principles of the state structure of Turkey, accompanied by the transformation of the army into a more democratic and liberal institution. Moving in this direction, the main players in the economic sphere should be freed from state control and interference (by privatizing them and turning them into autonomous structures), and the National Security Service should really become only an advisory body. It is difficult to imagine how soon Turkey will be able to implement the program of extensive democratization. Such large-scale social transformations can hardly be realized in one or two decades, even if there is external influence or pressure (for example, in the face of the European Union) that coincides with internal needs.7
The dynamics of democratic processes in Turkey are also largely determined by the relations between civil society and the state, which still need liberalization. In conditions where State power is not strictly limited, and the autonomy of civil society is not ensured, the maintenance of democratic order is hardly possible. Therefore, the desire to deepen the process of democratization in Turkey without real economic and political liberalization can lead to the creation of an unstable democracy.

6 According to a survey of NGO members, more than 77% believe that, in fact, there is no freedom of the press in Turkey, 60% say that public organizations cannot openly criticize the government, 72% state that there are difficulties with the implementation of basic political freedoms, about 60% indicate that the authorities hinder the activities of the media. international public organizations [Toros, 2007, p. 407].

7 However, the freezing of the European integration process does not inspire optimism on this issue.

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Getting rid of the ideological fragmentation of civil society, replacing it with interaction and solidarity - those features of political culture that are even more difficult to acquire than transforming the system of power - will require a change of several generations, not to mention the corresponding state policy.

Finally, the legal framework of civil society is also an extremely important issue for Turkey. Certain steps have been taken to improve the legal culture. However, the liberalization of the regime often goes in parallel with the opposite process - relapses of a return to undemocratic measures (such as the closure of the pro-Islamic Virtue Party in 2001 or the attempt by the Constitutional Court to dissolve the now-ruling Justice and Development Party in 2008). However, a qualitative change in public life and civil society has never been easy or quick.

It can be stated that Turkey continues to be in a state of transition from an authoritarian Kemalist regime to a pluralistic democracy. Starting after the Second World War, this process was first marked by a transition to multiparty system, but now it is focused on reducing the role of the army elite and abandoning the practice of regular military coups. All the major transformations that Turkey has experienced over the past century and a half (from the Tanzi reforms of the 19th century to the draft of a new Constitution that has been under development since 2007) have been carried out under strong external influence. First it was England and France, then the United States, and now the European Union and its "Copenhagen criteria".

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