Moscow: Rossiyskaya Gazeta Publ., 2006, 384 p., ill.

There is such a thing as a desktop book. In most cases, this is a collection of poems, a novel, a monograph, a professional reference book, a dictionary, a manual, i.e. something that may be needed at any moment - for information, for the soul, for reflection. This is the category of books I would refer to the monograph of Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov. This is a reference book for the Arabist, Orientalist, politician, historian, diplomat, and anyone who thinks about past historical events and their own actions.

Evgeny Maksimovich, as he himself admits, "has long harbored the idea of writing a book about the Middle East" (p. 5). This monograph is part of his hard-working life, filled with a relentless movement to learn the truth, to understand the essence and nature of the driving forces - economic, political, and human-that underlie the formation of the process of historical development international communication. It is written with the mind and heart.

In this kind of literature, the author does not always manage to avoid putting his participation in the events described in the foreground, which is quite natural. This book is an exception in this respect. The author seems to be in the background all the time, although it is obvious to the reader that he is most often not just an observer or correspondent reporting on events, but also an active participant, a leading figure, an emissary who performs the most responsible, sometimes dangerous missions that required extensive and thorough knowledge, a subtle and deep understanding of the situation and interlocutors, of extreme delicacy. This was also a natural modesty, certainly inherent in E. M. Primakov, and a rare combination of genuine human dignity, a deep philosophical mindset, life experience and benevolence. (Let me remind you of E. M.'s track record here. Primakova: correspondent of the newspaper Pravda; director at different times of two research centers of the USSR Academy of Sciences - the Institute of Oriental Studies and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations; Head of the Foreign Intelligence Service; Minister of Foreign Affairs; Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation; Deputy of the State Duma.)

Now it is fashionable to stick to everything that was in the era of the Soviet Union, all sorts of derogatory definitions: despotism, total police regime, a terrible ideological mistake, etc. The author passed the exam before the chief judge-history: the presentation in the book is accompanied by thorough confirmation of references to specific sources, documents, facts. The true, convex picture of events in their diversity appears. E. M. Primakov only frames it with time frames, setting off, but not distorting certain events, adding unknown, very curious, sometimes funny episodes that were previously intentionally or unknowingly silent. The integrity of a historian is the most important quality before the truth. Many well-known (and some little-known) facts are presented in a broader format, from a distance of several decades, colored by personal impressions, observations, details, and details. This makes it possible not only to define their place in history more clearly, but also to better understand the present day with their help.

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The monograph covers the events of the second half of the XX - beginning of the XXI century and, moving from one stage to another, from one leading political figure to another, allows you to see not a flash of events, but a historical panorama and the role of the individual in shaping history.

Now materials are used in a simplified way, in one black color (either for the sake of conjuncture, or for other reasons) describing the stages of the formation of relations with the Arab countries that have won independence, the nature of the development of ties with the Arab communist movement. For example, the communist parties, in particular in Arab countries, are portrayed as a creation of Moscow, and the regimes that existed at different stages of the last third of the XX century in Syria, Egypt, Iraq, South Yemen and other countries-as rotating in the orbit of the USSR. In reality, these relations were never simple, but were characterized by a lot of nuances, many of which, of course, were not known to the general public due to a number of factors, including restrictions that restrained journalists, although this is now a lot of exaggeration.

At that time, all Arab countries were concerned about the growing influence of Communist parties. For example, as E. M. Primakov notes (p. 56), it was anxiety about the growing influence of the Syrian communists (and not the desire for Arab unity) that was the main motive that brought the Syrian delegation consisting of President Kuatli and Prime Minister Azmi to Cairo in 1958. They told H. A. Nasser that only full political unification with Egypt would save Syria from the "communist danger" and chaos.

The author considered it necessary, and it seems very appropriate, to mention separately the now, perhaps not very well-known or forgotten theoretical research that found expression in the concept of" socialist orientation "or"non-capitalist path of development". This was a theoretical innovation introduced in the 1960s. With reference to V. I. Lenin, a theory was developed according to which countries freed from colonial dependence can at the first stage go to socialism not through the "traditional" dictatorship of the proletariat. Such a theory was not identical to"Arab socialism." Recognizing the possibility of non-capitalist development, it did not remove the question of class struggle. The main motivation for creating this theory was the desire to strengthen radical regimes, to remove them from the sight of local communist parties. In this case, E. M. Primakov notes, "ideology once again manifested itself in practical terms as a 'servant' of politics " (p. 69).

It is difficult to single out any chapter or even a single page of the monograph, because it is so interesting and fascinating. Nevertheless, I will allow myself to highlight some sections.

Chapter 8 is devoted to the six-day war of 1967, which, as E. M. Primakov writes, can be considered a turning point in the history of the entire Arab world and around which there is a lot of alluvial information, gossip, and falsifications. The book tells, among other things, about episodes known to this day only to a small circle of people, meetings that shed light on the actual course of events, both immediately at the beginning of the war, and during its development, as well as in the subsequent period. (It is no coincidence that the title of the book emphasizes confidential.) Nasser, the author is convinced of this and confirms it with concrete facts, did not want to initiate military operations on his own initiative. "Egypt did not think about a pre-emptive strike, but..... mistakenly exaggerating the capabilities of his armed forces, he assumed that he would be able to counteract Israel even if it started first" (p. 114). The assessment of the commander of the Warsaw Pact forces, Marshal A. A. Grechko, who was in Cairo a few months before the start of the war, certainly contributed to the formation of this opinion. In a conversation with Nasser, he said: "Your army can perform any task in this theater ." 114). This may also have influenced the key decision to mobilise part of the Egyptian forces on the eastern front in Sinai on May 16. The chief of staff of the Egyptian army, General Mohammed Fawzi, informed the commander of the UN forces, Indian General Rikhi, explaining that this was done in order to "be ready to take action if Israel launches aggression against any Arab state" (meaning Syria), and asked for the security of UN troops to withdraw them from the Syrian Arab Republic. control points. "This was a step, perhaps a kind of impromptu move, aimed again at intimidating Israel, and not really striking at it," E. M. Primakov believes (p. 115). He had been in Cairo all this time, following the developments without missing a single detail.

The subsequent closure of the Strait of Tirana to Israeli shipping after the withdrawal of UN troops only served to restore the situation to the state before the attack on Egypt in 1956.

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Nasser wanted to avoid a military clash with Israel. Twice, on May 27 and 29, he made speeches in which he repeated:: "We are not going to shoot first, we are not going to make an attack" (p. 116). This was confirmed by numerous data collected by Soviet intelligence. Along with this, the foreign intelligence station had material on the preparation of Israeli troops for an attack (on Syria). By that time, Israel was firmly convinced of the need to end the activity of Palestinians who were supported by Syria, and prevent the possibility of creating Palestinian camps in the territory bordering Israel. At the same time, the Soviet Government took active steps to prevent the outbreak of hostilities on the part of Israel. In this situation, the author believes, it is also important that at that time, despite the obvious fact that the Soviet Union and the United States supported different sides... both superpowers tried to prevent this war from escalating into a global clash" (p. 121). Prime Minister A. N. Kosygin used the hotline for the first time on June 5, and later it was used more than once during the war. However, the development of events followed a certain logic of denial. There is such a political saying: "The Middle East settlement is a history of missed opportunities." The essence of this statement becomes clearer when you read the book by Evgeny Maksimovich, who not only saw these events from the inside, in all the details, but also passed them through himself.

A chapter about the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, who played a historic role in the formation of the Palestinian community, leaves a strong impression. This material is extremely important at the moment when the situation in the Middle East region is so tense, in particular, because the Palestinian Resistance Movement is experiencing an acute crisis. It is reasonable to assume that if Arafat had lived, the situation in the PYD would not have reached such a critical point: he felt and was able to extinguish the heat of passion, and his authority and the strength of spirit and aspiration that really emanated from him helped defuse even the most difficult situations.

It is impossible not to agree with the author that in the numerous materials written about Arafat, there are many who proceed in their writings from a hodgepodge of facts, rumors, and speculation, purposefully showing the image of the Palestinian leader in an unsightly light. Evgeny Maksimovich has every reason to say that he knew Ya quite well. Arafat. "All his life," writes Primakov, " he remained a Palestinian, a Palestinian nationalist, a patriot. I am sure that these two concepts can coincide. The only difference is that the nationalist, who undoubtedly also loves his homeland, his people, contrasts it with other, in his opinion, less worthy peoples and countries. When this takes on particularly irreconcilable features, the nationalist goes beyond patriotism. This did not happen with Arafat" (p. 224).

There are not many people who, thanks to personal and - not only rare, but exceptional - confidential contacts, can trace and appreciate the process of becoming Arafat's personality. The Palestinian leader, writes Primakov, " has come a long, hard way... rejecting ideas that have not survived contact with life and at the same time maintaining dedication to the cause to which he devoted himself entirely" (p.225). Primakov's meeting with Arafat in Damascus on June 27, 1971, is very significant. This was a difficult time for the PDS-after the "Black September" of 1970 and the defeat of the Palestinians in Jordan. At the end of this conversation, Arafat said firmly: "The Palestinians see the path to a political settlement through the establishment of a Palestinian State, not through the implementation of Security Council resolution 242" (p.235). This was in the summer of 1971, 20 years before Arafat publicly declared that the destruction of Israel was not the goal of the Palestinian movement. Arafat's contribution is that he overcame the resistance of those forces inside and outside the PLO who held extremely negative positions regarding UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 (they were recognized at the 19th session of the National Council of Palestine in 1988), and also that he was able to link this with the agreement The United States and Israel agreed to establish a Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This alignment was achieved through both the December 1987 intifada and King Hussein's decision to relinquish control of the West Bank, which effectively led to the recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.

Yevgeny Primakov emphasizes that Arafat "learned to show political flexibility, firmly knew what its limits were, perfectly understood the balance of power in the PDS, and had a keen sense of the situation."

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He was also adept at using arguments in favor of the Palestinian agreement." Arafat certainly had his faults. For example, he was sharply reproached for supporting Saddam Hussein when he occupied Kuwait. This assessment, according to the author, is a bit simplistic. The situation at that time was much more complicated. His conversations and contacts indicate that Arafat actually sought to push the Iraqi leader to decide to withdraw troops from Kuwait. The subject of criticism was Arafat's position during the period when Barak was prime Minister in Israel. The Palestinian leader is accused of unjustified belligerence and intransigence. But there was also no willingness on the part of Israel to compromise. And it wasn't Arafat who disrupted the negotiations. It is unlikely that anyone will deny that the second "intifada" was the result of a provocative visit by Sharon to the Temple Mount, where one of the Muslim shrines, the Al - Aqsa Mosque, is located.

There is a version that Arafat was poisoned. "If this is so, and if it was done by those who believed that he was an obstacle to the settlement of the Palestinians with Israel, then this is not only a malicious crime, but also a gross miscalculation," the author believes. - Arafat wanted a settlement and did everything possible to ensure that it led to a viable Palestinian state. Arafat understood that this was the only way to completely block terrorist attacks. Finally, Arafat, with his unquestionable authority, was better able than anyone else to counteract those Palestinian groups that are trying to disrupt the peace process in the Middle East... Arafat's death has already changed and will continue to change the political situation in the Palestinian authority, and will certainly affect the prospects and nature of the settlement with Israel." One cannot but agree with Yevgeny Maksimovich's conclusion: "It will be remembered more than once with bitterness that Arafat is no longer there, and not only the Palestinians" (p. 225).

E. M. Primakov's book is very relevant. By giving a detailed account and analysis of events in the region as a whole and in individual countries during that time period, it highlights more clearly and in many ways clarifies and makes clearer the current situation, for example, events in Iraq, and US goals in the Middle East.

As you know, after the overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq in a coup in 1958, the United States and Britain were extremely concerned about the likelihood of the collapse of the Baghdad Pact and a chain reaction throughout the Arab world. "On July 15, 1958," the author reminds us, " the landing of American Marines in Lebanon began, and soon their number reached 20 thousand. At the same time, 6 thousand British soldiers were transferred to Jordan. This was already a solid military group, which, in terms of its size and equipment, left little doubt that its purpose was not to defend Lebanon and Jordan from a hypothetical Iraqi threat, but to see the danger of an armed invasion of American - British troops in Iraq... President Eisenhower expected to use Qasem... But as soon as Qasem withdrew from the Baghdad Pact, he began buying weapons from the USSR... Then-CIA Director Alain Dulles publicly declared Iraq "one of the most dangerous parts of the world" (pp. 51-52). How familiar those words are! History repeats itself.

The monograph provides a key to understanding the most pressing issue today - terrorism. "Paradoxically, especially after September 11, 2001, when President Bush declared a war on international terrorism, directing its sharp edge against aggressive Islamism, the United States itself made extensive use of Islamist extremist organizations, especially at the time when the Soviet army entered Afghanistan.

Many believed, and continue to believe, that the United States supported and armed the Mujahideen under the banner of Islam in order to force the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan. Such support, they say, served a good cause. This is a clear misconception. None other than Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former national security adviser, in an interview published in Le Nouvel Observer in 1998, admitted that he had sent a note to President Carter before the Soviet military contingent entered Afghanistan, in which he suggested providing weapons to the Mujahideen in order to push the USSR to...interventions to preserve the pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan. "We deliberately increased the possibility that the Soviet Union would send troops to Afghanistan," Brzezinski said. According to him, "the secret operation was a great idea," because it created the possibility that " the USSR will get its Vietnam War."..

By the way, no one can accuse the Soviet Union of relying on, or simply using, Islamic methods to fight the United States during the Cold War.

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extremist organizations. The USSR did not work with white gloves, but it was well aware of the dangers of promoting Islamic extremism" (pp. 99-100).

And in conclusion, the author - a prominent scientist and well-known politician-sums up and outlines the future. "Since the beginning of the second half of the 20th century, the Arab world has undergone a serious evolution ... Postcolonial revolutionary Romanticism also gradually declined. Purged of it, Arab nationalism has essentially abandoned revolutionary social transformation. In addition, "country nationalism" finally won over the idea of pan-Arab unity. All this, plus the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict, contributes to the activation of extremist Islamic forces in the Arab world. Nationalist regimes do not intend to give up their positions to them. However, if the Arab-Israeli settlement process is disrupted and the United States continues its policy of forcefully exporting the American model of democracy to the Greater Middle East, it is possible that Islamists will push out nationalist regimes in a number of Arab countries. Much will depend on how the Iranian nuclear issue is resolved, whether the occupation authorities will be able to use local forces to stabilize the situation in Iraq, and whether the road map and the mediation quartet dealing with the settlement of the Middle East conflict will remain in place.. The events of recent years show Moscow's focus on more active participation in solving Middle Eastern problems. There are good reasons for the success of such a line... The increased role of Russia is welcomed by all countries in the region, including Israel " (pp. 375-377).

The advantage of the monograph, in my opinion, is that it honestly speaks about many of our compatriots-civil servants, diplomats, party officials, scientists, orientalists, journalists, who conscientiously and faithfully served the country and made a significant contribution to the common great cause in the name of the Fatherland and universal peace. - D. T. Shepilov, I. P. Belyaev, V. V. Posuvalyuk, S. B. Arakelyan and many others.

And more about photos. There are not so many of them selected from, no doubt, a huge personal archive. These are not just illustrations to the material presented, they are a living, fluttering fabric of events. You can look at them and look at them, and think about the bizarre corners and mazes that history has taken us into over the past 50 years, and what a firm path the author has taken along the road suggested to him by his conscience, never changing anyone and never betraying anyone - neither himself nor others.

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