The name of Reza Shah Pahlavi, the monarch of Iran (1925-1941), is undeservedly forgotten by Russian historians. Of course, this statesman cannot be put on a par with such great reformers of the past as Peter I or Napoleon Bonaparte. However, it was Reza Shah's reforms in the first half of the twentieth century that led to changes in many aspects of Iranian life, and only for several decades he was called "the great "in Iran.

In the early 20s of the last century, Iran was a dismal sight. The economy was in decline, with virtually no industry. The vast majority of the population was illiterate, and poverty and poor health care contributed to high mortality. The peasantry, which lived in constant need, was crushed by numerous extortions from the feudal lords. The separatist leaders of the Bakhtiars, Qashqais, Lurs, Shahsevans and other tribes did not recognize the authority of the government over themselves, and Ahmed Shah, the last Qajar monarch, did not feel like the master of his own state.

Russian influence was felt in the north of the country. In the south, the dominant position was occupied by the British, who owned Iranian oil - the main national wealth of Iran. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APNK, since 1935 - AINK)1-a symbol of British imperialism and foreign domination in Iran-had the right of extraterritoriality and in the form of concession payments deducted insignificant amounts from its income to the Iranian government.

The situation began to change after the coup d'etat that took place in Iran in February 1921, as a result of which a nationally oriented government came to power. The main role in it was played by the head of the Persian Cossack units, Reza Khan. After receiving the post of Minister of War, Reza Khan first defeated the separatist khans, thereby recreating a centralized state. In December 1925, when Reza Khan was proclaimed Shah of Iran, he began a broad modernization of Iranian society. Having conceived a number of important reforms, the new ruler of Iran began to pursue a policy of state capitalism: a monopoly of foreign trade, an autonomous customs tariff were introduced, and high duties were imposed on goods imported from abroad. The National Bank was established, actively lending to economic projects.

The Government has begun to implement plans for industrial development, primarily the creation of import-substituting sectors of the economy. Textile factories, sugar mills, cement plants, cotton gins, and power plants were built. Roads were built, irrigation works were carried out, and measures were taken

1 Persia is the ancient name of a country that has been officially called Iran since 1935. Previously, both names were used, and today in journalism the name "Persia" is still used when it comes to Iran.

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to expand cotton crops. Industrial development programs also included reorganizing the army and providing it with modern weapons [AMVES, F. Eastern Directorate, op. 3620, d. 20, l. 21; Hershlag, 1964, p. 194-196; Keddie, 1980, p. 214]. As N. M. Mammadova rightly points out, "a distinctive feature of state intervention in the economic life of the country has become the direct participation of the state in business activities. It is the state that has assumed the role of the main factor in the country's modernization, realizing this role through participation in the creation of the credit and banking structure, economic and social infrastructure, and factory industry" [Mammadova, 1997, p.16].

Reforms in the field of education and culture have become an important element of the modernization of society. During the reign of Reza Shah, secular schools were established, a law on compulsory primary education was adopted, and numerous secondary educational institutions and universities were opened. The legal system has undergone profound changes. Within a few years, the Criminal Code, the Civil Code, the commercial code of laws, and the law on land ownership registration were adopted.

It is only natural that such large-scale plans could not be implemented in a short period of time without foreign assistance. Therefore, the Iranian government has begun to actively establish contacts with countries that are ready to send engineers, technicians, teachers and other highly qualified specialists to Iran. It should be noted right away: it was not about attracting foreign capital - the Iranians saw the perniciousness of this path in the example of AINK-but about the desire to use the technical assistance of states that did not compromise themselves with colonial conquests. Reza Shah saw Germany as such a country. Seeking to achieve economic independence as soon as possible from powerful neighbors, primarily the British Empire, Reza Shah saw Germany as an ally with which to weaken the positions of Iran's traditional opponents in the country.

Reza Shah believed that only Germany could become a reliable counterweight to Great Britain and the USSR, a kind of" third force " opposing other European powers. Germany's attractiveness was enhanced by the fact that it was not a colonial power and skillfully concealed its true intentions with anti-imperialist slogans [Adli, 1960, p. 49]. Therefore, assistance from the Third Reich seemed more preferable for the Iranian monarch than from Great Britain and the USSR.

Reza Shah's well-known hostility to the ideals of socialism and various forms of bourgeois democracy played a role. If the British and French democracies were quite rightly associated with colonialism by the ruler, then the distrust of the Stalinist regime was explained by the fact that in Iran they did not forget how the Bolsheviks in the early 1920s tried to realize their plans for a world revolution when they sent Red Army units to support the revolutionary movement in Gilan.

A proponent of modernizing his country, Reza Shah was essentially a typical Eastern ruler who did not accept democracy. In the 1930s, even the very word "democracy" was removed from use. He saw the success of the planned reforms in the presence of a strong central government in the country and strict implementation of its orders. Determination and strong will were the hallmarks of Reza Shah's character. Being a strict and demanding person, he did not give discounts to anyone. Reza Shah spent almost all his time in solving state affairs and demanded that officials give their full strength and abilities. A staunch supporter of authoritarianism, in 1935, in one of his personal conversations, he told the German envoy in Tehran, W. Blucher: "An authoritarian form of government is currently the only possible one. Otherwise, the peoples will sink into communism. Previous German governments did not satisfy the legitimate Persian desires. Because of this, our relationship suffered. But the present German government understands the interests of Persia" (Blucher, 1949, p. 331).

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Berlin paid great attention to Iran and closely followed what was happening in this country. This was explained by the fact that it was assigned not the last role in Hitler's plans to conquer world domination. Having an advantageous geopolitical position, Iran was not only a convenient springboard for the invasion of Iraq and British India, but also bordered the USSR, which created prospects for using its territory to organize subversive actions against the republics of Soviet Central Asia and Transcaucasia. The establishment of close cooperation with Iran allowed Hitler to hope that it would become a reliable ally in a future war.

First of all, Germany took an active part in such an important area of Iran's modernization as industrialization. This participation consisted in the supply of modern industrial equipment. The first German company to show interest in Iran was Bransburg Ahtkulag, whose management sent a letter to the Iranian General Directorate of Trade with an offer to supply equipment. Not limited to this, the company promised to send highly qualified specialists to install the equipment [WUA RF, f. 94, op. 19, p. 48, d. 26, l. 39]. The German companies AEG, Bosch, Deutzmotoren, Krupp, Lenz, Max Genest, Max Guttenberg, Menus, Otto Wolf, Siemens, Shark, and Junkere were also engaged in the supply of industrial equipment to Iran. separate offices, warehouses, and stores. All other firms operating in Iran were merged into the "Union of German Machine-Building Plants". It was a German trade representative office that carried out deliveries on behalf of the German government [RGAE, f. 413, op. 13, d. 1390, l. 25; TSKIDK, f. 1458, op. 30, d. 4, l. 16, 32].

Thanks to the activity of German companies in a number of cities in Iran, light industry enterprises were equipped with equipment from the Third Reich: in Ashref-a textile mill, Isfahan-four textile factories, one paper factory, Izd-a textile factory, Kashan-a textile factory, Kerman-a textile factory, Rasht-a jute factory, Semnan-a textile factory, Tabriz - textile factory and tannery, Shahi-textile factory, Shushter - textile factory. In total, 351 factory stamps of Germany, 285 of England, 177 of the USA, 143 of the USSR, and 118 of France were registered in Iran by 1937 (Danzig, 1937, p.96).

Assessing the development of German-Iranian economic ties, S. L. Agaev wrote that "German monopolies did everything possible to disrupt the construction of heavy industry enterprises" (Agaev, 1969, p.60). However, documents from Russian archives allow us to draw other conclusions. "Fascist Germany pays special attention to the military and metallurgical industries of Iran (emphasis added). - A. O.), construction of docks, ports, aviation workshops, construction of airfields, etc., for which Iran is provided with long-term loans on preferential terms, "- noted in the reference "USSR and Iran", compiled in April 1941 by one of the employees of the Soviet Foreign Ministry [WUA RF, f. 94, op. 26, p. 69a, d. 35, l. 42]. Since the second half of the 1930s, Germany has consistently ranked first in the supply of metal products to Iran. Most of them were used in the creation of heavy industry enterprises. With the assistance of German companies, a copper smelter was built in Ganiabad, and the construction of the Karaj Iron Plant and Anarek Non-ferrous Metallurgy Plant began [WUA RF, f. 94, op. 22, p. 60, d. 25, l. 235; Rabizade, 1970, p. 59].

By pursuing a similar policy, Germany tried to get its hands on Iran's natural resources. The German concern Ferrochtal has signed an agreement with the Iranians on the construction of the Aminabad iron and Steel Works on the terms of a long-term loan with repayment of the cost of supplying its products. The concern also signed a similar agreement on the construction of the Anarek plant. It was assumed that the long-term loan would be repaid by the supply of nickel, lead and copper [TSKIDK, f. 1458, op. 30, d. 25, l. 1-92, 104]. The German military industry was in dire need of them. However, later

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It turned out that the ore deposits were not as significant as expected, and the work was curtailed [Ivanov, 1952, p.319].

In addition to the fact that the Third Reich was the main exporter of chemical products to Iran, German firms took part in the construction of a factory near Tehran for the production of gunpowder (Danzig, 1937, p.84). In 1937, with the active participation of German firms, a tobacco factory was built in Tehran itself (Kochwasser, 1961, p. 159). From 1934 to 1938, Germany fulfilled an order for the supply of equipment for cement plants in Tehran, Mashhad, Shiraz, Tabriz and Dizful [RGAE, f. 413, op. 13, d. 1394, l. 33; TSAMO, f. 389, op. 4690, d. 508, l. 13]. The Third Reich held leading positions in the supply of medicines, paints and paper to Iran. With the assistance of the Germans, the construction of the Hamadan match factory was underway. "...Equipment for industrial enterprises and railway transport is mainly purchased in Germany. In various trades, the Germans get advantages, which is quite openly published when announcing the auction for the construction of the Keredzh Metallurgical plant... And if we also take into account the fact that the Skoda company, which occupies a significant share in the construction of various enterprises, has become a German company in connection with recent events, then it becomes quite clear how much the economic, hence political, positions of the Germans in Iran have strengthened, " one of the authors noted in 1940. reports of Soviet intelligence from Iran [RGVA, f. 25895, op. 1, d. 945, l. 58].

Thus, German capital objectively contributed to the development of various industries in Iran. As a result, by 1937, Germany ranked second after the USSR in Iran's foreign trade. This was an unmistakable success, as in the two decades following the end of World War I, Germany was only ranked fourth. Analyzing the reasons for the successful participation of Germany in the industrialization of Iran, Russian historians did not pay attention to the factors that explain these achievements.

First, the high quality of German goods and equipment. German newsprint was not inferior in quality to Soviet writing paper, and technical paper was generally out of competition. German machines were also of higher quality than similar samples from England and the USSR [RGAE, f. 413, op. 13, d. 2554, l. 19, 47]. In addition, Germany offered Iran a diverse range of products, meeting almost all its import needs. At the same time, the Germans were buying up local goods, the list of which was unusually wide. According to the Iranian customs report, Germany ranked first in terms of the number of items of Iran's export and import goods.

Secondly, a skillful organization of trade. The Germans not only imported equipment, but also assembled it on site. Any delivered product was accompanied by a brief instruction written on top-grade paper. The Soviet documentation attached to the goods, as a rule, was carelessly drawn up, it often contained typos, erasures and other defects. Moreover, equipment from the USSR was sometimes brought in broken form, which could not be said about equipment coming from Germany.

Third, well-organized advertising. In large numbers, the Germans distributed catalogues, specialized technical and commercial magazines that promoted the achievements of German technology. Fountain pens, lighters, combs, and other small items that the Germans handed over to Iranian officials and merchants as souvenirs were always marked with advertisements for some German company. At the same time, the Germans were engaged in compromising their competitors. They spread rumors that the Soviet Union did not have its own industry and, apart from iron beams and nails, the Russians could not do anything else, and the equipment they supplied was outdated German, which was repainted in the USSR and sent to Iran under the Soviet brand [RGVA, f. 25895, op. 1, d. 934, l. 80].

Fourth, we will not only supply Iran with modern German equipment, but also send highly qualified specialists to install it. Berlin use-

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There was any reason to send its voyageurs, technicians, engineers and ordinary workers to the Middle East [TSKIDK, f. 1458, op. 30, d. 7, l. 89-90]. In 1936 alone, 800 German citizens were sent to Iran [RGAE, f. 413, op. 13, d. 1390, l. 26]. They worked in the construction of industrial facilities, in the construction of new roads, and held responsible positions in Iranian institutions. Even the German Wilhelm Weber was appointed director of the printing house of the Mejlis. 94, op. 22, p. 60, d. 25, l. 85]. Many German specialists also worked in Iran's agriculture. Dozens of agronomists, veterinarians, animal breeders, and animal technicians arrived in Iran. The Soviet Iranist M. S. Ivanov, negatively assessing the work of German specialists, wrote that "German fascist agents, with the connivance of Reza Shah, wreckingly designed the construction of industrial enterprises" [Ivanov, 1952, p.319]. At the same time, he avoided the fact that German engineers had a strong reputation for being among the best in the world, and the German government, as it seemed to the Iranian rulers, was ready to provide technical assistance without demanding large political concessions in return. It made no sense for the Germans to" harm " Reza Shah in his plans to create a modern industry. On the contrary, they took all measures to strengthen the economic potential of their possible ally. Sympathy for specialists from the Third Reich was also explained by the fact that they agreed to lower rates than engineers from other countries. In addition, the lack of its own highly qualified personnel forced the Iranian government to resort to the help of German engineers. In Russian historiography, only Yu. L. Kuznets recognizes the fact of high professionalism of German specialists. "They deserve it with their competence and conscientiousness," he pointed out in one of his works [Kuznets, 1996, p. 32].

Fifth, unlike the specialists from the Soviet Union, the Germans responded promptly to all requests from the Iranian side. "...We have always shown unacceptable clumsiness, we do not provide goods quickly with increased demand and high prices on the market, and the Germans always use the moments of good market conditions with great efficiency, " stated one of the reports of the Soviet trade mission in Iran [RGVA, f. 25895, op. 1, d. 940, l. 19].

Germany has played a leading role in modernizing the transport system in Iran. The Germans took part in the construction of the northern branch of the Trans-Iranian Railway, connecting the port of Bandar Shah on the Caspian Sea with the port of Bandar Shahpur on the Persian Gulf coast. Reza Shah himself paid serious attention to railway construction, as the German press repeatedly wrote about. According to V. Blucher, "The Trans-Iranian railway was the favorite brainchild of the Shah, who directed all his energy to ensure that this grandiose project would have been implemented during his lifetime" [Blucher, 1949, p. 221]. Having conceived the idea of turning Iran into an advanced power in the East, the monarch carefully followed the achievements of world engineering. Convinced of the high professionalism of German engineers, he began sending young Iranians to Germany to train in railway engineering. As a result, by the beginning of World War II, Iran's railways were mostly staffed by Germans and Iranian railway specialists trained in Germany. Only 115 German citizens worked in the company "Hoh-Tiev" on the Tabriz railway [ASVRR, d. 25097, vol. 2, l. 601]. So great was the confidence in German train drivers that their salaries were four times higher than those of their Iranian counterparts, and the management of passenger trains, as a job requiring the highest qualifications, was entrusted exclusively to drivers from the Third Reich [RGVA, f. 25895, op. 1, d.940, l. 99]. An undoubted success of the Germans was the appointment of engineer Zapf to the post of director for the construction of railway structures in the Ministry of Railways, who used his position to conduct fascist propaganda among railway workers and organize intelligence work in favor of Germany [ASVRR, d.25097, vol. 5, l. 11-12].

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With the help of German firms, strategic highways and bridges were built. This was mainly done by the company "Khokhtiev", headed by Max Muller [TSKIDK, f. 1458, op. 30, d. 43, l. 4]. As a result, by the beginning of World War II, Iran had 20,000 km of newly built and improved highways. There are no areas left in the country where it would be impossible to drive by car. Soon the elegant cars themselves appeared. In addition to British buses, cars of the German Mercedes-Benz and Fomag brands could be seen on Iranian roads. By special order of the Ministry of War, only in 1936, the Germans delivered 220 cars to Iran [RGAE, f. 413, op. 13, d. 1390, l. 65]. No less popular in Iran were the famous German motorcycles. If in 1936 Germany's share of motorcycle supplies to Iran was only 2.3 %, then by the beginning of World War II, German firms occupied a monopoly position in this area. In monetary terms, the volume of their supplies in the 1930s increased 20 times [RGAE, f. 413, op. 13, d. 2554, l. 50]. In 1939-1940, out of 326 motorcycles imported by Iran, 321 came from Germany and only five from the UK.

An important direction in the modernization of Iran was the establishment of air traffic in this country. And not the least role in this was played by the Germans. In 1938, Hitler's Germany offered to organize a Berlin-Istanbul-Teheran-Kabul airline for all interested governments. If the Turkish government rejected the German proposal to open air traffic, the governments of Iran and Afghanistan immediately accepted it, as a result of which the German company Lufthansa opened the Berlin-Athens-Rhodes Island-Damascus-Tehran-Mashhad-Kabul air line on April 1, 1938. In July 1939, the company opened a route to Bangkok, passing over the Iranian coast of the Persian Gulf. By this time, modern airfields had been built in Tehran, Kermanshah and Mashhad. Soviet Iranian M. V. Popov, assessing the importance of creating an airline, noted that "Iran, having very weak aviation, did not need such airfields" [Popov, 1953, p.29]. One can hardly agree with this. For Iran, the organization of airlines was of no small importance - it became a hub of air lines in Asia and received a highly developed air service infrastructure. The opening of the Berlin-Kabul airline did not pursue commercial goals, as it could not pay for itself economically. "Germany in this line pursues purely military-strategic goals related to the preparation of air bases on Iranian territory for an attack on the USSR, and in particular for an air attack on the most important sources of our oil base - Baku," summed up one of the reports of the secretary of the Soviet military attache in Iran [RGVA, f. 25895, op. 1, d. 945, l. 37].

The Third Reich also took part in the modernization of Iran's maritime communications. The German companies Julius Berger, Schihau, Lan and Sifitex built shipbuilding and ship repair yards, dry docks in the ports of Alinabad, Pahlavi, Nowshahr on the Caspian Sea and a new port in Leng in the Persian Gulf [ASPRR, d. 25097, vol. 2, l. 602; Elwell-Satton, 1942, p. 166; Agaev, 1969, p. 60].

An important element of Iran's modernization was the reorganization of the armed forces. Reza Shah already at the beginning of his reign began to create an army on the basis of universal military service. Cossack units, gendarmerie and other units were transformed into the Iranian National Army, whose life was regulated by a military charter drawn up in the manner of similar European documents. A whole network of officer schools and colleges was created in the country, where access was open to people from almost all social strata.

Reza Shah hoped that with the help of Nazi Germany, he would be able to significantly increase the combat potential of his country's armed forces. I must say that in the mid-1930s, the Iranian army did not represent any real force. It consisted of nine infantry divisions, five mixed brigades, three separate infantry regiments, three separate infantry battalions, and a separate mechanized brigade,

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four separate anti-aircraft divisions, four separate artillery regiments, and a separate chemical battalion. The total number of the army was 5860 officers and 160-162 thousand non-commissioned officers and privates, many of whom had no idea about tanks and armored personnel carriers [RGVA, f. 25895, op. 1, d.945, l. 192]. The life of the Iranian military was appalling. The general lice of Iranian soldiers often caused the local population to create proverbs and sayings. None of the Iranian divisions had full ammunition. Only the soldiers of the Tehran garrison were more or less highly alert. The Air Force, as of January 1, 1938, consisted of 130-140 combat-ready aircraft, including 60-65 reconnaissance aircraft, 50-60 fighters, and 7-8 bombers [RGVA, f. 25895, op. 1, d. 945, l. 24]. The Navy consisted of small flotillas in the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf; Iran did not have large ships or submarines (Rudnykh, 1940, p.151).

German-Iranian military cooperation began in 1937. In the first days of October this year, negotiations began in Tehran on Iran's purchase of a batch of aircraft from Germany, during which a German twin-engine bomber, demonstrating its combat qualities, made a test bombing in the vicinity of the Iranian capital. Apparently, Reza Shah, who was personally present at the shooting, was satisfied with the German equipment, since the Iranian government decided to purchase 20 bombers from Germany [RGVA, f. 25895, op. 1, d. 932, l. 114-115]. In September 1938, Germany offered Iran a batch of modern weapons and even expressed a desire to provide submarines [WUA RF, f. 94, op. 22, p. 60, d. 25, l. 152]. Having considered the proposal of the German side, in the spring of 1939, the Iranian government turned to the German envoy in Tehran, E. Ettel, with a request for arms supplies. Berlin immediately responded to this request. In April-June of the same year, 3 thousand machine guns and cannons of various systems and a large amount of ammunition arrived in Iran from Germany [Melzig, 1936, p. 27].

Germany has provided assistance to the country not only by supplying weapons, but also by sending military specialists here. So, 56 specialists arrived from the Third Reich to work at Iranian military factories. German advisers infiltrated the Iranian post office, telegraph, telephone, and gained a presence in all the weapons factories. In the Soltenatabad arsenal, 11 military specialists from Germany worked, among whom Bethke, Kolb and Appelt were particularly distinguished, who performed tasks for the fascist special services [ASVRR, d. 25097, vol. 5, l. 12]. The only military enterprise - the Shahbaz aircraft assembly plant ("Shah's Falcon"), previously headed by the British, was transferred by the Iranian government to the management of German specialists. The German authorities not only sent their own advisers and instructors to Iran, but also organized training for Iranian military personnel in Germany. A group of Iranian pilots were trained in the Third Reich. In 1939, 40 Iranians were sent to Germany to continue their studies at German military schools [ASVRR, d. 25097, vol. 2, l. 601].

Having established themselves in the army, in military enterprises and in state institutions, Hitler's military advisers launched active propaganda. This activity was explained by the fact that German intelligence considered people working in such organizations to be the most promising for subsequent recruitment and operational use. In order to expand their influence over certain groups of officers and soldiers, the Germans persistently instilled in them the idea of their Aryan origin. Admittedly, these ideas resonated in the hearts of many military personnel.

As is known, Reza Shah, who himself had only a primary education, paid close attention to the creation of a secular education system in Iran. Therefore, Germany, which took an active part in the opening of educational institutions in Iran, could not but arouse sympathy from the Iranian monarch. Even before the First World War, a German college was opened in Tehran, and mission schools were opened in Urmia and Khoy [Genin, 1939, p. 35]. Since the foundation of the University of Tehran, eight teachers have worked there.-

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tsev [ASVRR, d. 25097, vol. 2, l. 601]. By the end of the 1930s, Iranian educational institutions were completely controlled by German teachers who came to the country at the invitation of the government. In 1939 alone, more than a dozen German teachers came to Iran. Germans headed departments in almost all educational institutions of the country. They supervised the educational process at vocational schools in Tabriz, Mashhad, Isfahan, and Shiraz, and gave lectures at agricultural and veterinary institutes [Hinz, 1938, p. 125]. Professor Koch of the University of Tehran and technical directors of vocational schools in Isfahan and Mashhad - Ghnai and Genel - were particularly active in instilling the image of a prosperous Germany among young Iranians [ASVRR, d.25097, vol. 5, l. 11-12].

The activity of German teachers has yielded results. Under their influence, programs in Iranian schools began to be built on German models. Special attention was paid to the study of the German language. During the lessons, teachers from the Third Reich inspired students with ideas about the superiority of the Aryan race, about the" eternal friendship " of Germany and Iran. German propagandists paid serious attention to instilling Nazi ideology among Iranian youth. This was facilitated by Reza Shah himself, who had a special weakness for paramilitary youth Scout organizations and cultivated nationalistic feelings in his country. In June 1935, following his instructions, the Ministry of Education of Iran sent a circular letter to local departments, which set out to form boy Scout organizations throughout the country [WUA of the Russian Federation, f. 94, op. 19, p. 48, d. 26, l. 102].

In December 1937, the leader of the Hitler Youth, Baldur von Schirach, arrived in Iran. For the German guest, in the presence of the Minister of Education of Iran, solemn reviews of Iranian boy Scouts, schoolchildren and students were organized. Iranian youth even marched in a military march with a Nazi salute. During his stay in Iran, B. von Schirach not only managed to meet informally with members of the Iranian government, but was also received by the Shah. On the day of the Hitler Youth leader's departure from Iran, an article was published in local newspapers under the headline "West and East", the author of which claimed that " The West needs to be revived on the model of modern Iran, and the East needs the West, and that Imperial Germany is the personification of the West, and Iran is the cradle of the Aryan race, respectively Germany" [RGVA, f. 25895, op. 1, d. 932, l. 103].

Since 1939, Boy scout groups created on the German model became mandatory organizations in schools, and Crown Prince Mohammed Reza was appointed their supreme leader [Doroshenko, 1959, p. 40]. The Boy Scouts annually conducted military training in summer camps, participated in parades during national holidays. By the beginning of World War II, their detachments had become paramilitary groups of Iranian youth, whose ideal was the Third Reich.

Meeting Berlin's understanding, the Iranian government began sending students to Germany. Most of the Iranian doctors were educated in Germany. This was not surprising, since at that time it was the main supplier of medical equipment to Iran [WUA RF, op. 13, d. 1390, l. 19]. Moreover, a German doctor was assigned to run the Mashhad hospital, then the largest in Asia. Only in 1936, 39 students were sent to the Third Reich to continue their studies by the Iranian government at the expense of the budget, and another 27 people went to Germany at their own expense [WUA RF, f. 94, op. 20a, p. 121, d. 3, l. 124, 133]. Iranians, who had been fed German propaganda since they were young, became "agents of influence" on their return to their homeland, ready to cooperate with the Fascist special services on a gratuitous basis - out of so-called ideological motives.

Well-known journalists, artists, and technical personnel of industrial enterprises were invited to visit Germany by the Germans themselves. To those who agreed to such a tempting offer, they issued official business trips or sent

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to the Third Reich privately. As a result, one or another Iranian went to Germany, where the Nazi special services tried to process him in the Nazi spirit. Doctor of Natural Sciences Asadullah Khan Dariush studied in Germany, and upon his arrival in his homeland, he was appointed Professor at the Faculty of Technology of the University of Tehran [WUA of the Russian Federation, f. 94, op. 19, p. 48, d. 26, l. 150]. For several years, the famous Iranian musician Mustafa Evtekhar studied in Berlin [AVPRF, f. 94, op. 20a, p. 121, d. 2, l. 144].

German universities awarded academic degrees and titles to some representatives of the Iranian intelligentsia. The son of the Gilan governor, the historian Abdul Fatemi, defended his doctoral dissertation at the University of Heidelberg [RGASPI, f. 532, op. 4, d. 349, l. 2]. Another Iranian, Abdollahu Malekpour, was awarded a doctorate in history at the University of Berlin. S. Parvizi, H. Pirnahad, H. Ramazani and other Iranians also defended their doctoral theses in the humanities in Nazi Germany (Tehrani, 1943, p. 94). Following the policy of attracting prominent representatives of the Iranian intelligentsia to its side, in August 1935, at the International Congress on Criminal law held in Berlin, the Prussian Academy of Sciences elected Matin, the head of the Iranian delegation, as its honorary member [Vostrov, 1936, p.239].

Having made such vigorous efforts, Berlin naturally hoped that they had found a reliable ally in Reza Shah. However, the monarch was in no hurry to transfer cooperation with the Third Reich from the economic to the political sphere. The Iranian government, in particular, refused Germany's proposal to convert its diplomatic mission in Tehran into an embassy. The ruler of Iran has banned youth demonstrations organized by pro-German circles in honor of the first successes of fascism in the international arena. Moreover, in the autumn of 1939, the Iranian police arrested a number of individuals suspected of attempting to organize a coup d'etat. Among those arrested were cadets of the officer school, public and political figures associated with the Germans since the First World War [Aliev, 2004, p. 198].

In the tense situation of the late 1930s, when Hitler's aggressive plans began to be clearly outlined, the Iranian leader began to think about creating a system of regional security. It is precisely such thoughts that can explain his activity in creating the Saadabad Pact - a military-political bloc, the appearance of which in the political arena of the East contradicted the plans of the most aggressive powers, such as Germany, Italy and Japan at that time. Reza Shah was deeply concerned about the results of the Munich Security Conference. Iranian newspapers, which usually rarely responded to topics related to foreign policy, devoted editorials to the Munich conference, in which they strongly agreed with the results of the decisions taken in Munich. Meanwhile, one of the secret bulletins of TASS noted that "Iranian figures express concerns about the results of the Munich Conference, emphasizing that this collusion is a lesson and a warning for all small states" [WUA RF, f. 94, op. 22, p. 60, d. 25]. This reaction of the Iranian authorities was explained by the fact that Tehran saw the danger of a new world war, but preferred to refrain from publicly criticizing the foreign policy of both fascist states and Western democracies.

Based on the above, one cannot agree with the prevailing thesis in Soviet historiography that Iran was completely in the wake of the policy of the Third Reich. Being a Germanophile at heart, Reza Shah tried to make most decisions from the standpoint of a pragmatist. Even a few months before the outbreak of World War II, when German influence in Iran reached its peak, the policy of rapprochement with Germany was seen by him only as an orientation towards a "third force" that could weaken the positions of Great Britain and the USSR in Iran. At the same time, he expected to stay on the sidelines in the event of a global conflict.

An advantageous strategic position objectively required Iran's participation in World War II as a transshipment base for Soviet military supplies under lend-lease

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from other members of the anti-Hitler coalition. Taking a position of neutrality, the Iranian rulers stubbornly refused to comply with the demands of Britain and the USSR. As a result, Soviet and British troops entered Iran in August 1941, and in September of the same year Reza Shah abdicated. Fearing to lose the results of the reforms carried out by him in all previous years, the Iranian monarch even refused to organize effective resistance to the allied armies.

Reza Shah really wanted the best for his homeland and tried only to use the technical assistance of Germany, which it "favorably" offered to his country. Reza Shah felt that he was acting in the interests of Iran's development. It is worth recalling that it was not only the Shah of Iran who failed to recognize Hitlerism as a threat to humanity in time. But unlike many European politicians, he never fawned over the German Fuhrer. Not once did Reza Shah publicly express his admiration for the strength of German weapons. After abdicating the throne, Reza Shah placed his hopes for continuing the modernization of the country on his son Mohammad Reza and thus laid the foundations for its successful completion.

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