At the turn of the XX-XXI centuries, the problems of energy once again became relevant. Changes in the global economic and geopolitical systems have had a significant impact on the oil market, increasing competition for a "place in the sun" both among OPEC members and outsiders.

What are the features of the oil market in the last quarter of the last century? Probably, they should include, first of all, its sharply increased instability, both in the sphere of supply and demand, and in the field of pricing. Among the reasons for this are military and political conflicts, the recession in the United States - the largest importer of crude oil, the fall in prices for" black gold " after the events of September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington, and OPEC's decision to reduce production by 1.5 million barrels per day since the beginning of 2002 supported by Russia, Mexico, Norway, etc.

First of all, attention is drawn to the tightening of competition in the global oil market, partly caused by the energy crises of the last three decades of the last century. Scientific approaches developed to study the problem of competitive dynamics of the market under consideration are interesting. The most effective methods include the G. Hotelling method, as well as the political and cost approaches. At the same time, they reduce the complexity of the phenomenon of the above - mentioned dynamics of the oil market exclusively to economic or socio-political aspects. Although the physical irreplaceability of fuel resources was noted as early as the 19th century1, it was only in 1931 that G. Hotelling 2 determined their economic importance. His article argued that optimizing prices for non-renewable natural resources will inevitably lead to their growth, although the process of depletion of these resources is much slower in a monopoly than in a competitive environment.

However, this method does not take into account production costs in oil production. This problem was studied by M. A. Adelman, K. Fourgeau, and B. Lenkluh through statistical analysis 3, which significantly supplemented Hotelling's conclusions. Their developments suggested that if the reserves of energy resources cannot be clearly identified, then their effective use requires - at the current stage of technological development-an indefinite amount of investment. Nevertheless, the contested non-renewable nature of crude oil undoubtedly reduces the significance of this approach.

In contrast to the adherents of this point of view, the proponents of the political approach deny the importance of the competitive nature of the oil market and rely solely on geopolitical factors, considering that the market situation (and the process of development of the oil market) is not a problem.

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pricing, including) the essence is a reflection of the balance of power between its participants. R. Ayyub, T. Rifai and some others shared a similar point of view4 .

Proponents of the economic (or cost) approach to analyzing the competitive dynamics of the oil market adhere to two different methodologies. The first one belongs to M. A. Adelman5, who, based on the concept of long-term market equilibrium, concluded that it is production costs that determine the price trend. However, this methodology does not take into account political factors that play an extremely important role in the pricing process. The second methodology is based on the theory of rent and the theory of oil surpluses developed by J. M. Chevalier6 . Both approaches are similar in that they recognize the importance of production costs in crude oil production for the distribution of the balance of power in the market. Chevalier suggests that the relationships of market participants are determined by income from the sale of"black gold". In addition, he notes that it is the evolution of the cost structure (as the transition from a simpler stage of production to a more complex one) that determines the functioning of the oil market.

Having considered the problem of competitive dynamics of the oil market as its characteristic feature in the last quarter of the XX century, it is advisable to address the question of the role of the state in this process.

Currently, there is a differentiation between producing and consuming countries on the level of their status (whether private foreign firms or state-owned companies), goals (whether profit maximization for some or stable incomes for others), behavior (whether it is conflicting, rational or irrational), as well as within the country specifics (level of economic and social development, technological innovations, accumulation of knowledge and experience, quality of human capital). Thus, the issue of national sovereignty and the degree of influence of the state (producer or consumer) is an important strategic parameter that is taken into account in a comprehensive analysis of structural changes in the oil market.

With regard to Russia, as the second largest oil exporter in the world, this issue is of fundamental importance from the point of view of interaction between the state and private oil companies. Some of them are pushing hard (at least in the last few years) get out of the state's export control. If this goal is achieved, Russia's position in the increasingly intense struggle for a share in the international redistribution of oil flows in the Caspian Sea and Central Asia may be very unfavorable. Currently, the government has such levers of control as export duties, quotas for oil export, and a monopoly on its transportation through the main pipelines of the state-owned company Transneft. Obviously, until effective ways are found to coordinate the interests of the latter and oil companies, government control over the export of "black gold" should be maintained, and at times, perhaps, even strengthened.

If we attempt to analyze the pricing process in the global oil market, it should be noted that this process is not solely the result of the functioning of the competition mechanism. Price changes are determined by differences in the interests and goals of market participants. However, the fundamental reason for the increased instability of the oil market is that competing interests and projects constantly collide within the global energy system, crisis phenomena are perceived differently, etc. However, both oil exporters and importers are vulnerable to each other's actions.

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each other, with unpredictable consequences that can, in turn, change the direction of the price trend in the most unexpected way.

Thus, the dynamics of the price of benchmark Brent oil for the period from 1984 to 2001 is of interest. It can be stated that the average price level in the period under consideration was $ 20.61 per barrel, ranging from $ 8.82 in 1986 to $ 41.65 during the Kuwait crisis of the early 1990s and $ 30 in early 2001 7 , by the end of which it again approached $ 20. The specified time period can be divided into four periods.

The first marks the end of the era of OPEC's administrative prices and the 1986 energy crisis. This proves once again how low prices can fall without strict discipline in the production sector controlled by the cartel, and how high they can rise with strict compliance with established quotas. This was followed by a period of recovery that lasted until Iraq's occupation of Kuwait in 1990 and was characterized by OPEC's market-oriented pricing policy: OPEC members were aware of the danger of increased competition. This is what made them consider the interests of other manufacturers. Subsequently, there were two long periods of relatively high prices caused by extraordinary events in other markets. An example is the shortage of gasoline in the United States in the early summer of 1989 and heating oil in the very cold winter of 1989-1900.

If we draw an analogy with the current situation, we can conclude that although the price of oil in 2001 is much higher than the level of February 1999.8, it is still close to the average values of the 90s of the XX century. Thus, over the past 25 years, there have been four sharp increases in oil prices - in 1973, 1978, 1991 and 1999.

Without claiming to make accurate forecasts or projections of the current situation for the future, we can note the following fact: in 1994, the Forum on Energy Market Forecasting9 developed eight forecasting models; according to six of them, oil prices should increase sharply by 2005 (up to $ 40 per barrel). Assumptions about their potential growth have two main explanations.

The first is due to the inevitable depletion of oil resources. Experts of the International Energy Workshop also came to this conclusion 10 for the period 1981-1991. The second explanation lies in the relatively superficial nature of the analysis of the oil market: the last 25 years of the last century can hardly be considered sufficient for research and obtaining representative results. It is during this period of the oil market's history that several energy crises occurred, which makes it difficult to identify stable trends in price behavior.

The question arises: who or what really determines the price of crude oil? And if it is not possible to establish them reliably, then is it not possible, at least, to foresee the emergence of crisis situations in the market that can have a detrimental impact on the world economy as a whole?

The above questions identified the problem of setting the boundaries of the price corridor. In the absence of the latter, the excess supply that occurs in the oil market due to the use of additional production capacity would cause prices to decline, and sharply increased demand, on the contrary, would lead to another "shock" situation in the event of an extremely low level of liquid fuel production. It is hard not to agree that there is no foreseeable limit to the upper limit of the cost corridor. As for its lower limit, in the short term, it may not be due to

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only the availability of commercially significant alternative energy sources, and in the long run - not only the degree of consolidation of producing countries.

For most OPEC members, the optimal price for crude oil is $ 25 per barrel, since this level, in their opinion, satisfies both producers and consumers. However, a fluctuation in the price of "black gold" between $ 22 and $ 28 is also quite acceptable. 11

OPEC's efforts to establish price corridor boundaries until the end of the 1990s can hardly be considered effective. There were reasons to argue that the cartel is not able to exercise strict control over the limits of oil production or maintain pricing policy. In fact, OPEC's ability to significantly raise oil prices was mainly due to military-political events.

However, by the end of 1999, compliance with the quotas adopted at the 107th cartel Conference exceeded 90% .12 The leading OPEC producers, faced with a serious problem of budget deficits as a result of a sharp drop in prices at the end of 1998, observed extremely strict discipline, not allowing themselves to repeat the mistakes of the past. As a result, business circles are once again talking about restoring the cartel's former influence on the global oil market13 .

In this analysis of the role of OPEC in the international energy market, it is worth noting that Saudi Arabia is the cartel's policy-maker, both in the field of production and pricing. In the late 90s of the XX century. The question of whether there will be another State capable of effectively controlling prices has become particularly relevant. The first candidate is Iraq. As the UN sanctions ease, it may start to operate large volumes of oil, and quite quickly at that. It is not so unimaginable that Iraq's production capacity will reach 5-6 million barrels per day. As of June 2001, Iraq's crude oil production is estimated at 2.4 million barrels per day14 . In these circumstances, OPEC will have to reduce its production level in order to adapt to the consequences of the return of this producer state to the oil market.

The discreteness of oil demand should also be considered an extremely important factor influencing the establishment of price corridor boundaries. Its occurrence may be due to a number of reasons.

Thus, oil has an advantage over alternative fuels due to the ease of processing and transportation, as well as higher energy intensity. Therefore, in the primary stages of industrialization, oil is undoubtedly preferable. However, energy supply systems such as electricity or gas are obviously more accessible when the bar for infrastructure development is raised higher. It is likely that the combined impact of these factors may lead to a reduction in oil demand in some sectors of the economy.

The second reason for the change in the level of demand is the fiscal policy of the governments of the market participants. Petroleum products represent a very attractive source of tax revenue. Their total amount is quite large, if we take into account the high level of taxation.

Probably, the third potential source of discreteness in demand is the problem of environmental protection. Attempts to predict how this will affect demand are unlikely to succeed because the implementation of any policy in this area is directly determined by the opinion of the world community, which is extremely variable. As an example, we can cite the decision taken on 01.06.2000 on the use of a new one-third of the territory of the United States.

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environmentally friendly gasoline with a high degree of purification, which led to its rise in price, and, consequently, contributed to an increase in demand for crude oil.

However, even taking into account the slowdown in economic growth in the United States - the largest consumer of crude oil - it is impossible to exclude the possibility of an increase in demand for it, if prices show a downward trend. So, in the 1960s, demand increased not because of low prices, but because of the established assumption that they would remain at this level or fall even further. This situation may well happen again. As for forecasts, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), a steady increase in oil demand is expected for the period 2005-2010, which, however, will be restrained by the development of energy-saving technologies and stricter environmental regulations .15

It should also be noted that expectations, which often determine the direction of the price trend and the boundaries of the cost corridor, play a special role in the crude oil market. Expectations are formulated by economic and political factors that affect the volume of supply, as well as the level of oil production. Information that determines expectations (both on the part of consumers and on the part of producers) in the short term (from three to five months) can be classified as follows::

- political instability in producing countries;

- intentions to increase prices or reduce production;

- low estimates of reliable reserves;

- sudden production cuts (caused by natural disasters, strikes, etc.).

Information that can reverse the price trend in the opposite direction includes::

- exceeding the established production quotas or a sharp increase in the level of reserves;

- reduced demand for crude oil and petroleum products.

However, military conflicts have the strongest impact on the global oil market, and in comparison with this, the significance of all other events decreases. It is characteristic that the expectations mentioned above are hardly rational: they are rather irrational in their essence.

In the late 90s of the XX century. The issue of possible increased dependence of the world economy on oil supplied from the Persian Gulf region has become increasingly discussed. Does this fact actually take place? The answer to this question requires a comprehensive analysis.

Due to certain circumstances, the situation with Arab oil has always been special, and first of all, due to the large volume of its reserves .16 This became evident by 1945, when exploration for new deposits increased significantly, 17 and the region's share in world reserves began to increase rapidly (Figure ).

Second, the proximity of the coastal zone, as well as the size of the oil fields and their geology, provided lower production costs compared to other regions of the world, as shown in Figure 2.

Despite the fact that the probability of a certain increase in the world economy's dependence on Arab oil supplies is still not excluded in the next few years, outside of the specified time frame, the role of oil supplied by the member countries of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Persian Gulf may gradually decrease. It is possible that the policy of moderate prices pursued by Saudi Arabia since 1986 was aimed at maintaining the dependence of the world economic system on Arab oil. Still su-

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Source: Petroleum Economist. London. V. 11, 1996.

Figure 1. World estimated oil reserves.

There is a view that the Middle East is unlikely to provide most of its oil production in the future and, therefore, it will not be able to influence pricing policies to the same extent as before. Perhaps this indicates a redistribution of political influence in the oil market.

Although the pace of exploration of new fields worldwide is increasing due to rather high oil prices, which are 2.5-3 times higher than the average production costs (and it is considered profitable at world oil prices of $ 12 per barrel and above), it is impossible to guarantee the stability of such a situation. In this case, we are talking about six countries-members of the Gulf Cooperation Council - Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates - which in 1995 possessed 46% of the world's oil reserves (according to the results of annual research by British Petroleum). In addition, it was the argument about the inevitable depletion of oil reserves that was included in the forecasts of the famous Club of Rome a quarter of a century ago. However, these forecasts, in our opinion, are unlikely to be justified in the next 10-15 years, which is due to a number of purely economic reasons:

- first, as long as limited reserves do not have a deterrent effect on production, incentives to expand it remain. If such a threat occurs, then it makes sense to increase resources either by developing new deposits (as, for example, in Latin America), or by increasing the reproducibility coefficient (as in the North Sea). But this is only possible if new oil fields are operated on a commercial scale and the technology is constantly being improved. Outside of the Middle East region, there are hardly any signs that these trends are likely to reverse in the near future. Moreover, the modern recovery technology used in the North Sea has only just begun to be used in oil - producing countries such as Mexico, Brazil, China, Venezuela and Russia, as well as in the Persian Gulf states.;

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Source: Middle East Economic Survey. January 1993.

Figure 2. Costs of crude oil production.

- second, although the geographical distribution of resources will change over time, the same will happen in the energy market, where demand is affected by climatic conditions;

- third, producers in the Middle East region have good reasons to increase oil production. Leading exporters have different volumes of oil resources and are forced to meet different needs for cash receipts due to the growing population and undiversified structure of the economy. Analyzing the dynamics of demand for Middle Eastern oil (in 2000 , the demand for its supply by OPEC countries decreased by 100 thousand barrels per day) 18, the division between those countries that can make additional profits by increasing production (Saudi Arabia and Iraq) and those that can achieve this only by establishing a new level of production is becoming more and more obvious. high price levels.

OPEC has shown a firm intention to protect the global oil market from their collapse, having decided to reduce oil production by 1.5 million barrels per day since January 2002, provided that the largest producers outside the Organization-Russia, Mexico and Norway-collectively reduce that by 500 thousand barrels (and for the share of Russia it accounts for 150 thousand barrels, which is 7% of the total production level of the Russian Federation).

However, if OPEC can be sure of the stated intentions of Mexico and Norway to reduce production, then with regard to Russia, the cartel has reason to doubt the strict observance of its obligations. The reason for this was the overstocking of the domestic energy market (which, in turn, led to a drop in prices for both crude oil and petroleum products), the lifting of restrictions on the export of fuel oil, as well as the reduction of export duties.

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Nevertheless, Russia's position is quite understandable: if we make concessions to the insistent demands of OPEC to reduce the volume of crude oil exports (according to experts, by 10 million tons), then there will be a problem of freezing significant funds invested in this industry. In addition, it is possible to escalate the struggle for the redistribution of export quotas, which will at least make it difficult or even call into question the creation of conditions for equal access to export pipelines for all Russian oil companies.

Thus, Russia can hardly quickly regulate such significant volumes of" black gold " supplied to the foreign market, and, consequently, it is not able to adapt to changes in its market conditions as required by OPEC.

Analysts, remembering the intransigence and obvious reluctance with which Russian oil companies were still forced to meet the Organization halfway, obviously fearing the outbreak of a" price war " and, as a result, a sharp collapse in prices, believed that a second round of confrontation between the cartel and Russia was inevitable. Nevertheless, in the context of growing oil production (many Russian companies have already announced plans to increase production in 2002, which range from 2% for LUKOIL to 24% for YUKOS and even 26% for Sibneft). Russia not only confirmed its loyalty to the promises made by OPEC to reduce production from January 1, 2002, but also showed loyalty to the cartel's policy by deciding to extend the current quotas for the second quarter of this year. However, due to the fact that oil prices have recently shown an upward trend, reaching $ 26 per barrel (which does not violate the $ 22-28 corridor set by OPEC), Russia denies any possibility of extending the agreement on reducing oil production and exports in the near future.

It should be noted that the rise in oil prices in April 2002 was largely due to political reasons, primarily the aggravation of the situation in the Middle East. In this regard, it is symbolic, but at the same time disturbing, that Iraq's call (which was actually implemented for a thirty-day period and did not receive the support of other states, which subsequently made up for the lack of Iraqi oil) was made to impose an embargo on the supply of "black gold" to countries that support and assist Israel. So the question of the probability of using oil by producing countries as an economic weapon is still on the agenda? Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, emphasizing the solidarity of Arab countries on the escalation of the conflict in the Middle East, during talks with US President John Kerry. Bush said that friendly relations between the Kingdom and the United States could end if the latter did not reduce the scale of aid provided to Israel.

The future of the energy market remains highly uncertain. Thus, there were three unforeseen energy crises; the results of the nationalization of the oil industry in the mid-1970s are still affecting; the possibility of an accident at a nuclear power plant similar to Chernobyl can hardly be discounted, which makes us think again about the problem of using alternative energy sources; in addition, it could not but affect the level of demand for oil development of gas production technologies and" detection " of global warming. All previous forecasts of oil prices were mostly not justified, partly because they ignored these factors.

If the countries of the Persian Gulf rely on huge oil reserves, then it is they who should meet the possible growth in demand for this energy carrier. In the event that the above-mentioned states develop resources unilaterally, without the participation of international oil companies, the latter will

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they can take similar actions in other regions, creating a competition problem that is so undesirable for OPEC members in general, and Arab producers in the first place.

Thus, the increased urgency of problems in the energy sector at the turn of the millennium is due not only to economic factors, but also (perhaps even to a greater extent) to geopolitical ones. In this regard, a distinctive feature of the global crude oil market is the sharply increased instability, which has had a significant impact on the balance of supply and demand, as well as the pricing process, significantly complicating it. The problem of the emergence of competitive dynamics of the oil market made it possible to predict the price trend, and only the price trend.

As for setting the boundaries of the cost corridor, OPEC still plays a dominant role in this, among whose members Saudi Arabia remains the most powerful, but the possibility of Iraq regaining its lost influence on the market is increasingly mentioned. This, in turn, contributes to the aggravation of the important issue of the likely strengthening of the world economy's dependence on oil supplied from the Persian Gulf region. This assumption is not unfounded, but, nevertheless, it may turn out to be nothing more than a myth if the increasing demand for oil is met by other producers.

What determines to a greater extent the price shocks that have become practically the norm on the world oil market in the last quarter of the 20th century-economics or politics? Will humanity be able to abandon crude oil as one of the most efficient energy sources, or will it continue to be rightfully considered "black gold", symbolizing its irreplaceability and value? At present, the global economic system, despite everything, still links its energy future with OPEC and, in particular, with its three most powerful members-Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran .19 Obviously, as the gap between supply and demand increases, the cartel will play a crucial role in the oil market. Nevertheless, in order for the significant reserves of this energy carrier to turn into available production capacity, it is necessary to: :

- careful planning;

- rational management in the field of oil production;

- modern technologies;

- long-term investments.

Nevertheless, it is impossible not to pay attention to the strengthening of the role of non - OPEC producers in the oil market-Mexico, Norway and Russia. The position of the latter, which occupies the second place in the world in terms of production and export of this energy carrier, has significantly strengthened. Russia forced the cartel not only to consider its own interests, but also, despite the concessions made (an agreement to reduce production by 150 thousand barrels per day from January 2002 for a period of two quarters), emphasized the increased degree of influence on the oil market.

However, despite the changes that have taken place in it over the past 25 years of the last century, Middle Eastern producers are once again attracting attention as owners of the largest reserves of "black gold". Are they completely exhausted? Perhaps the ex-Minister of Saudi Arabia, Yaki al-Zamani, was right when he suggested that over time only the mining industry will disappear, and oil will remain forever in the bowels of the Earth? I wonder what predictions the Club of Rome could offer at the present time?

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notes

1 W. S. Jevons (Jevons W. S. The Principle of Economics. Washington, bonder, 1905. P. 88) foresaw the end of the industrial revolution in Great Britain in connection with hydrocarbon raw materials. A. Marshall showed that the specifics of mineral resources require differentiated methods of management and price formation with correlation with other types of fuel and energy materials ( Marshall A. Principles d'economicpolitique. Moscou, T. 1. 1983. P. 124).

Hotelling Harold. 2 The Economics of Exhaustible Resources, L., 1931.

Adelman Morris Albert. 3 The World Petroleum Market. Baltimore. London. John-Hopkins University Press for Resources for the Future, inc. Cop. 1972; Fourgeaud Claud, Lenclud Bernard. Econometric. Paris. Press University de France, 1978.

Ayoub Raymond. 4 An Introduction to the Analytic Theory of Numbers. Providence, American Mathematical Society, 1963; Rifai Taki. The Pricing of Crude Oil. Economic and Strategic Guidelines for an Internal Energy Policy. N.Y.: Praeger Publ., 1975.

Adelman Morris Albert. 5 Op. cit. P. 33.

Chevalier Jean Merie. 6 Le nouvel enjeu petrolier. Paris. Celmann-Levy, 1973. P. 15.

7 Calculated from: ORES Monthly Market Report. February 2001 (www.opec.com).

8 At that time, the average price of the "OPEC oil basket" was about $ 9 per barrel (according to the OPEC Monthly Market Report. March 1999).

9 Energy Modeling Forum.

10 The International Energy Workshop team annually conducts extensive surveys of a large number of administrators, businesspeople, and academics regarding the oil market situation; its headquarters are located in Vienna.

11 According to the informal agreement on the market regulation mechanism reached by OPEC in June 2000, if the price of the" basket of oils " exceeds the upper limit of the established corridor - $ 22-28 per barrel - for 20 consecutive trading days or violates the lower limit for 10 days, the production level is automatically adjusted by 500 thousand barrels per day.

The OPEC basket includes the following types of oil::

- Algeria's Saharan Blend,

- Indonesia's Minas,

- Nigeria's Bonny Light,

- Saudi Arabia Light,

- Dubai of the UAE,

- Venezuela's Tia Juana,

- Mexico's Isthmus.

12 ОРЕС Monthly Market Report. December 1999.

13 At the end of 2001, the discussion about "fair" prices for "black gold"received a wide response among politicians and economists, as well as directly among oil market participants themselves. And if, as already noted, they can be considered fair from the OPEC point of view in the range between $ 22 and $ 28 per barrel, then, according to Russian experts, the boundaries of the cost corridor should be $ 20-25. This statement is based on Russia's desire to adhere to an independent pricing policy that would objectively assess market fluctuations based on its own forecasts, as well as taking into account the position of OPEC. In this context, the conclusions made by the US Department of Energy suggest that the price of crude oil will reach $ 25.54 per barrel by the end of 2002. The reasons for the growth, according to experts, lie in the cartel's policies and in the increase in demand for it as the US economy emerges from the depression. And if the price level of $ 25.54 per barrel is more than optimistic for Russia, then for OPEC it will probably become not only fair, but also long-desired.

However, global oil prices should be set not only through producer countries ' agreements on changes in production and export volumes, but also taking into account the interests of consumers. It can hardly be considered illegal to impose a taboo on producing countries in the form of applying antitrust and anti-dumping protection tools (if necessary) in order to preserve the price corridor operating on the basis of a common agreement.

14 Oil & Gas Journal. June 2001. P. 12.

15 Journal of Petroleum Technology. October 1999. P. 14.

16 The chronology of the discovery of crude oil deposits in the Middle East is as follows:

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Discovered oil fields in the Middle East

State

Year of oil discovery

The first deposit

Iran

1908

Masjid-1 Sulaiman

Iraq

1927

Kirkuk

Bahrain

1932

Avali

Saudi Arabia

1936

Damman

Kuwait

1938

Burgan

Qatar

1939

Dukhan

United Arab Emirates

1958

Murban

Oman

1962

Yabal

Source: Oil & Gas Journal. 09.07.2001. P. 23.

17 A mission led by E. L. De Goyler, assessing oil resources in the Persian Gulf region, reported to the U.S. Government in 1944: "The focus of global oil production is shifting from the Caribbean to the Middle East - the Persian Gulf... and this will last until its final approval in the specified region." (Quoted from: Yergin. Istanbul, 1991. P. 393).

18 Oil & Gas Journal. 3.06.2000. P. 13.

19 According to C. D. Campbell, the world's estimated oil reserves amount to 216 trillion barrels; Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran account for approximately 71 trillion barrels, or 1/3 of the total resources ( Campbell CJ. The Golden Century of Oil 1950- 2050, Kluwer Academic publication, 1991. P. 35).

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