IDEAS ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE KHAN AND THE NATURE OF SUPREME POWER AMONG THE MONGOLS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE XIII CENTURY.1

The formation of the Mongol Empire in the early 13th century. - the phenomenon is multidimensional. The phenomenon of the rapid rise of a divided tribe, its victories over stronger and more cohesive opponents, the charismatic personality of the creator of the state Genghis Khan - all this has repeatedly become the object of research by many scientists. An important topic is the correlation of such concepts as power, ruler, and state in the minds of the Mongols of the first half of the 13th century. Without claiming to be an exhaustive explanation, I will try to summarize the information available in a number of major sources for this period, and find out against what background the power of Genghis Khan was formed.

Key words: Mongols, great Khan, state, charisma, supreme power.

REPRESENTATIONS OF THE GREAT KHAN'S ROLE AND OF THE SUPREME POWER AMONG THE MONGOLS IN THE EARLY THIRTEENTH CENTURY

The article investigates traditional views of the thirteenth century Mongols concerning role and significance of the Great Khan, nature of the supreme power and administrative institutions, as well as their qualitative changes during the genesis of the Empire of Genghis Khan.

Keywords: Mongols, the Great Khan, the state, charisma, the supreme power.

On the eve of the great conquests, the Mongols did not yet have a common leader [Juveini, 2004, p.17]. "And they remained in poverty, privation and misery, until the banner of Genghis Khan's good fortune was raised "[ibid.]. There was a constant struggle between the tribes, about which an unknown author of "Yuan-chao bi-shi" wrote: "The starry sky was turning - there was a national feud. They didn't go to bed - they all took each other's loot. The entire surface of the earth shook as the world-wide battle raged. Do not lie down under your own blanket - before that there was a general enmity" [The hidden legend..., 1941, p. 185]. However, at the same time, there were very clear ideas about the supreme power among the Mongols. True, they were significantly different from the ideas of settled peoples.

NESTEROVA Elena Rostislavovna, Candidate of the Faculty of History of Lomonosov Moscow State University, nesterowa-elena@yandex.ru.

Elena NESTEROVA, PhD Candidate (in History), Historical Faculty, Moscow State University, nesterowa-elena@yandex.ru.

1 The study was prepared as part of the project "The Black Sea Region and the Mediterranean World in the System of Relations between Russia, East and West in the Middle Ages", supported by the Russian Science Foundation (Agreement No. 14-28-00213 of August 15, 2014 between the Russian Science Foundation and Lomonosov Moscow State University).

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The discussion about power and statehood among the Mongols continues to this day. Some researchers, for example, E. I. Kychanov [Kychanov, 1997, p. 182], Sh. Sandag [Sandag, 1970, p. 26], were inclined to see in the Mongolian society of that time signs of the formation of the state. N. Ts. Munkuev suggested that the state association first appeared in the Mongolian steppe with the coming to power of Genghis Khan [Munkuev, 1977, p.379]. The same opinion was shared by G. E. Markov [Markov, 1976, p. 49]. N. N. Kradin wrote that the socio-political organization of the Mongols should be defined as a "pre-class structure" [Kradin, 1995, p. 54], applying the term "chiefdom" to it, since it is "a social organism consisting of from a group of communal groups; they are hierarchically subordinate to the central, usually the largest of them, in which the ruler (leader) lives; relying on rudimentary authorities, the leader organizes economic, redistributive, judicial-mediation, and religious-cult activities of the society" [Kradin and Skrynnikova, 2006, p.107]. A sign of the chiefdom that distinguishes it from the state is "the absence of a legitimate authority that has a monopoly on the use of force" [ibid., p. 108]. Admittedly, this could not be more applicable to Mongolian society at the turn of the 12th and 13th centuries.

There were leaders among the Mongols. Yesugei, Temujin's father, led several clans, had the nickname "bagatur" - "hero", Rashid ad-Din called him "the ruler and head of all the tribes that were subordinate to the generations that preceded him" [Collection of Chronicles, 1952, book 2, p. 74]. However, the Tatars treacherously poisoned their old enemy during the festival. As soon as Yesugei died, the Taijiuts, who belonged "to the number of his cousins and relatives of his ancestors "[ibid., p. 75], immediately migrated, leaving his widow Hoelun and her children, the eldest of whom was only nine years old, to their fate [Hidden Legend..., 1941, p. 87]. The power of the leader among the Mongols existed only as long as the leader himself was alive.

At the dawn of Genghis Khan's greatness, several tribes thought of joining him voluntarily, because " this Prince Temujin takes off his clothes and gives them up, gets off the horse on which he is sitting and gives it up. He is the person who could take care of the region, take care of the army and maintain the ulus well" [Sbornik letopis, 1952, book 2, p. 90]. It is not only Rashid al-Din who mentions this episode. In the "Ancient Mongolian legend of Genghis Khan" there is a similar passage: "The prince dresses people with his own clothes, lets them ride on their horses. This man will certainly calm the people and establish the kingdom" [Old Mongolian Legend, 1877, pp. 155-156]. Generosity was considered one of the main virtues of the ruler. It was thanks to his generosity that he was able to keep his subordinates around him. And there is no question of any legitimate coercion. "The power of a leader is maintained only as long as various internal parties and large social groups see it as a benefit for themselves" (Kradin and Skrynnikova, 2006, p. 285). As long as Yesugei was beneficial to the Taijiut, they roamed under his leadership, but as soon as he died, the association collapsed.

From the above, it follows that any power structures among nomads could arise only on mutually beneficial terms. At the same time, not only generosity was required from the leader. B. Y. Vladimirtsov wrote:: "The steppe aristocracy was important and needed order within its nomads, and raids and wars with external enemies were very profitable, from which it was possible to take prey" [Vladimirtsov, 2002, p.381]. The leader must be able to win a victory in the campaign, to conclude a profitable peace treaty with settled neighbors. Such contracts made it possible to receive the goods of an agricultural civilization as gifts and were usually concluded under threat of attack. This was the so-called strategy of the external border: periodic raids to intimidate, not accompanied by the occupation of territories with a settled population

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even after victories, receiving tributes or gifts (the essence of these compensation payments did not change from the change in the name), the opening of border markets for the sale of nomadic products [Kradin, 1992, p.60-61; Barfield, 2009, p. 303-307; Drobyshev, 2012, p. 275-278]. Without this, any tribal support was out of the question (Lane, 2006, p. 21).

The ruler was "the only intermediary between agricultural civilizations and the steppe", but in the internal life of a political association (be it a nomadic empire or a union of tribes), decisions were made by the tribal leaders themselves [Kradin and Skrynnikova, 2006, pp. 283-284], this was "a variant of the system of relations called in political anthropology mutual exchange of services" [Kradin, 1995, p. 51]. The khan was chosen from among the most well-born [Sandag, 1977, p. 28]. The first election of Temujin should be considered rather as a deviation from the rules, since among those who elected him were representatives of much more noble families, which, by the way, was recognized by Genghis himself [Hidden Legend..., 1941, p. 137].

V. V. Barthold clearly formulated the rights and duties of the khan: the khan "leads his companions to victories, commands them in campaigns and on general hunting, and for this gets the best part of the prey" [Barthold, 1968, p. 258]. There are direct references to this in the sources. The Yuan-chao bi-shi describes the process of Temujin's first election as Khan and provides the text of a peculiar oath of loyalty given to him by representatives of nomadic nobility ("we will bring you beautiful maidens and wives... when hunting down a mountain animal, we will give you half of it" (Innermost Legend..., 1941, p. 108). And Rashid al-Din quotes Genghis's speech, in which he describes himself as Khan:

"I believe that since I have become a sovereign and the leader of the army of many regions, I need to take care of those who are subordinate to me. I have taken many herds and herds, camps, wives and children from the people and given them to you. For you, I arranged steppe fuses for steppe game and drove mountain game in your direction" [Collection of Chronicles, 1952, book 2, p. 129].

However, even at the initial stage of steppe unification, Temujin made it clear that he did not intend to be content with the role of supreme commander during the raid. He began to build a rigid military-hierarchical structure, and the society moved from a " communal-nomadic "state to a" military-nomadic " one [Kradin, 1995, p. 56]. S. G. Klyashtorny formulated a list of the rights and functions of the great khan, markedly different from the list of V. V. Barthold (in this case, we are already talking about the khan-the head of state, which Genghis became when he began his conquests): the khan had the supreme right of ownership of all the lands of the state, the right to decide on issues of war and peace, negotiate with foreign states, make laws and order the life and death of his subjects; at the same time, the khan was obliged to protect the borders of the state from external enemies, lead the army, determine the country's foreign policy, maintain [Klyashtorny and Sultanov, 2004, p. 198]. The heirs of the founder of the empire had all these rights not only at the time of its unity, but also after the separation of four states - the Yuan Empire, the Ilkhanov (Hulaguid) state, the Chagatai ulus, and the Jochi ulus [Klyashtorny and Sultanov, 2004, p. 186; Trepavlov, 1993, p. 97]

In the conquered territories, the Mongols created their own administrative-territorial division into uluss2. This division was based on the idea of the state as "the property of the entire family of the person who created the state" (Vladimirtsov, 2002, p.395). Even during his lifetime, Genghis Khan allocated such destinies to his relatives, considering his empire from the point of view of ancestral property, from which each of them was dependent.

Ulus -2 is a hereditary lot of large Mongolian feudal lords. When defining a ulus, the territory and population that fell under the jurisdiction of the feudal lord were important.

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a representative of the ruling Golden family is entitled to a ulus (dependent population), a yurt (territorial possession), and an inju (income corresponding to the needs of the court and the army) [Barthold, 1968, p.627; Klyashtorny and Sultanov, 2004, p. 211]. It was this approach that largely led to the rapid further division of the unified empire into several virtually independent states. The allocation of uluses, in which the owners acted as absolute masters, was already regarded as a threat to the central power of the great khan under Ogedei. This was strongly opposed by the khan's adviser Yelyu Chutsai 3, who urged Ogedei to show love and respect for the princes by means of gold and silk, and not by granting fiefs. Ogedei did not follow this advice [Munkuev, 1965, p.79]. The distribution of uluses was considered one of the duties of the khan, who could even select them if he had sufficient military strength. But the system was multi-stage: "tsarevichs, descendants of the first owners of ulus, received in turn allotments, becoming vassals of vassals" [Vladimirtsov, 2002, p. 396]. In fact, about half of the country's population remained under the khan's control: out of the 1,830,000 families counted in the 1233 and 1236 censuses, approximately 900,000 belonged to the Mongol nobility and thus fell out of Khan's control [Munkuev, 1965, p.119].

Many researchers [Trepavlov, 1993, p. 62-67; Skrynnikova, 1997; Kychanov, 1997, p. 184-185; Vasyutin, 2004, p. 275; Khazanov, 2004, p. 386; Kollmar-Paulentz, 2004, p. 449; Pochekaev, 2004, p. 539] note another characteristic feature of the power of the Mongol khan - the presence of charisma - "a special substance that ensures the well-being of the entire social organism" [Kychanov, 1997, p. 184]. Charisma was considered by the Mongols as a prerequisite for the successful performance of their functions by the khan, and it was associated not just with a specific clan, but with the eldest in the clan. The Khan became such by the will of Heaven, which the Mongols worshipped. The Yuan-chao bi-shi says: "Heaven and earth conspired to name Temujin the King of the kingdom" (Innermost Legend..., 1941, p. 107). Through charisma, power was sacralized, and special priestly functions were assigned to the khan (Skrynnikova, 2002, p. 216).

In the sources there are several references to how Genghis prayed to the Great Sky. Having avoided danger during the Merkitov attack, the future great Khan "turned his face to the sun, tied his belt around his neck like a rosary, hung his cap on his arm by the braid, and, baring his chest, bowed to the sun nine times" [Innermost Legend..., 1941, p.98]. Before going to Khorezm, he "climbed alone to the top of a hill, threw a belt around his neck, bared his head and crouched down to the ground. For three days he prayed and wept" [Sbornik letopisei, 1952, kn. 2, p. 189]. A similar rite was performed before the first campaign against the Jurchens (Tabakat-i-Nasiri, 1881, p. 954). And after defeating the Taijiut, Genghis said: "Let us bow down to the Supreme Heaven, our father!" Having ascended a high hillock, Vladyka spread out his sweaty vest, hung his belt around his neck and said a prayer" [Altan Tobchi, 1973, p. 123]. These episodes show the special connection that the Mongols saw between the Khan and the Sky. Over time, this idea was reflected in the general Mongolian cult of Genghis Khan as the founder of the ruling family and the owner of the benevolence of Heaven [Kradin and Skrynnikova, 2002, p. 300]. Plano Carpini [Plano Carpini, 1957, p.29] and C. de Bridia [Materials of the Franciscan Mission, 2002, p. 116] write about the worship of Genghis. Through Genghis, the heavenly grace passed to his heirs, who also worshipped the Sky [Sbornik letopis, 1960, p. 213] and thereby confirmed the sacred nature of their power. The Chinese author Li Zhichang also notes the participation of Heaven in the fate of Khan. In Si-yu chi, he describes a case where Genghis Khan fell from his horse while hunting, but the boar did not touch him. The Taoist sage Chang Chun, whose disciple Li Zhichang was, interpreted this episode as follows:

3 For details on Yelyu Chutsai's personality and activities, see Munkuev, 1965, pp. 11-29; 185-202; Prawdin, 1941, p. 233-247; Rossabi, 1988, p. 9-11.

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thus: "now the holy summer is already advanced; it is necessary to hunt less; a fall from a horse is an indication of Heaven; and the fact that the boar did not dare to move forward is a sign of the patronage of Heaven" [Xi-yu ji, 1866, p.335]. As can be seen from sources, power and Heaven in the eyes of the Mongols were inextricably linked.

After the creation of the empire, the supreme power was assigned to representatives of the Golden Family-descendants of Genghis from his main wife Borte. At the same time, as already mentioned, at the dawn of Mongol greatness, the ruler was elected among representatives of several clans. The election of Genghis is described in the "Hidden Legend": "Altan, Khuchar, Sacha-beki and all the others consulted among themselves and said to Temujin:' We have decided to make you khan '" [Hidden Legend..., 1941, p.108]. Similarly, Jamukha was chosen khan - an unknown author of the "Hidden Legend" lists Salzhiuts, Tatars, Ungirats, Taijiuts and many others who gathered together and agreed to raise him to khans [Hidden Legend..., 1941, p. 116]. At the same time, the source also describes an episode when Genghis reproaches Altan and Khuchar who betrayed him and recalls that he offered them both to become khans instead of himself:

"You, Khuchar, as the son of Nekun-taijia, we offered to be khan, but you yourself refused. And to you, Altai, we offered: "Khutula Khan ruled over all of us. Be a khan, too, and be in charge of all, just like your father!" we talked. But you also refused. Nor could I command others of higher birth, " Be ye khans, Sacha and Taichu, like the sons of Bartan-Baatur." So, not being able to raise you to khans, I was named khan by you " [The Hidden legend..., 1941, p. 137].

From this it follows that the nobility of origin was considered one of the most important factors influencing the choice of a leader.

However, the very fact that Khan is elected should not be considered a manifestation of democracy. The common people fall out of the field of view of the authors of the sources. V. V. Barthold proposed his concept of power distribution. Genghis Khan was chosen by the steppe aristocracy, who sought the glory and wealth that Genghis could provide them with his victories. The common people, "looking for a day's food, rallied around another person, namely Jamukha" (Barthold, 1968, p. 258).

Jamuha is no less a bright personality than Temujin himself. The struggle of the twin cities is one of the most impressive episodes of The Hidden Legend. In this struggle, V. V. Barthold saw not only the opposition of the ambitions of two gifted leaders, but also the clash of two strata of society. The aristocracy - "tending horses", the common people - "tending sheep and lambs". Jamukha said to Temujin: "Let's spend the night near the mountains - the hut is ready for our herders. Let's spend the night near the river - food is ready for our shepherds" [Innermost legend..., 1941, p. 106]. Temujin did not understand these words, but chose to move away from his sister city of Anda. It was from this moment that an open rivalry began between them. According to V. V. Barthold, Jamukha took the side of the common people, was proclaimed Gur Khan by them, and then "the democratic movement was suppressed, and its leader began to lead the life of an adventurer" [Barthold, 1968, p. 259].

S. A. Kozin does not subscribe to the theory of V. V. Barthold regarding the opposition of aristocracy and democracy, but in his research Jamukha looks no less attractive. S. A. Kozin equates Jamukha and Genghis as "remarkable", "the most gifted people of their tribe" [Innermost legend..., 1941, p. 39]. And" only perseverance in achieving goals and the ability to maintain and strengthen what was achieved " [ibid.] allowed Genghis to gain the upper hand in this long and stubborn struggle. S. A. Kozin interprets the mysterious saying that V. V. Barthold interprets so interestingly in his own way: Jamukha was bored with the hospitality of the too practical and reasonable Genghis family, so he "emphatically shows deep respect for the Russian people."-

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the blind indifference and indifference of a bored person even in such a burning issue in the steppe life of their friends as the choice of a common nomad, while they are expected to have a friendly initiative, at least at least an interest in a common cause, in a common life " [ibid., p. 40]. That is, it takes the text literally, without looking for hidden meanings.

The twin cities look very similar, they are elected supreme khans almost simultaneously, and according to S. A. Kozin, they are elected by representatives of the same circle - the steppe aristocracy. In fact, Genghis and Jamukha find themselves in exactly the same conditions, having been chosen not for their gentility, but for their giftedness [ibid.]. But that's where the similarities end. The management techniques used by the twin cities seem to S. A. Kozin to be the main difference and, in essence, harbingers of the outcome of the struggle. Here we are not talking about democracy or oligarchy, as V. V. Barthold imagined, but about the specific methods by which Genghis gathered his subjects.

S. A. Kozin also mentions the word "democracy" next to the name of Jamukha [ibid., p. 41], but this democracy had to be formed among the princes. Jamukha was supposed to be the first among equals, the same khan as any other-a successful military leader, ensuring successful campaigns. Genghis, on the other hand," step by step strengthens only his single power " [ibid.], and there can be no question of any special rights for those who elected him. This was also noted by V. V. Barthold - representatives of noble families who voluntarily put Temujin over them in the expectation of nominal primacy, "felt deceived in their expectations; such a person as Temujin could not rule otherwise than autocratically and had to demand unconditional submission even from the most noble of their subjects" [Barthold,1968, p. 4]. p. 259].

An example is one of the campaigns of Genghis against the Tatars (in the "Hidden Legend" there is no date, but in the" Collection of Chronicles " there is a contradiction: in one place the year 1182 is named [Collection of Chronicles, 1952, book 2, p. 120], in another - 1202 [ibid., p. 251], it is not yet possible to establish the truth). Genghis ordered not to linger at the prey, " because after the final defeat of the enemy, this prey will not leave us. We'll probably be able to share it. In the event of a retreat, all of us are obliged to immediately return to the ranks and take our former place" [Innermost Legend..., 1941, p. 123]. Three people disobeyed: Altan, the son of Khutula Khan, Khuchar, the son of Nekun Taishi, and Yesugei's brother Daritai otchigin. Genghis Khan ordered the captured goods to be taken away from them. Harboring a grudge against the excessively unauthorized khan, these three left him, taking their people away and significantly weakening Genghis [Sbornik letopis, 1952, kn. 2, p. 251]. But in the end, all of them suffered death [ibid., p. 121] - Genghis did not forgive treason. Only Daritai-otchigin remained alive, and the closest associates of Genghis - Boorchu, Mukhali and Shigi-Hutukhu-asked for mercy.: "Wouldn't that be quenching your own hearth or destroying your own home? After all, he is your only uncle and the cherished memory of your blessed parent... forgive the foolish one" [The Hidden Legend..., 1941, p. 176].

Jamuha leaned on the nobles. Genghis brought all gifted people closer to him, without distinction of origin or social status. "This was the supposed 'opposite' of their political and social views "[Innermost Legend..., 1941, p. 41].

At the end of the confrontation, Jamukha, who has already been handed over to Genghis Khan by his own people, delivers a long poetic monologue in which he explains the reasons for his defeat in his own way. They are interesting because they characterize the system that Genghis created. "I didn't meet any loyal friends. That's why I'm defeated by Anda... I was lonely from birth" [also, pp. 156-157]. Jamukha saw the strength of Genghis in his friends - in those whom he brought closer to him, who were loyal to him in all the vicissitudes of life. Jamukha, proud of his ancestry, had no such friends.

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He found himself alone while Genghis gathered his retinue. "Seventy-three orluks on horses 4 serve in your squad" [ibid., p. 156].

The next feature of Genghis Khan as a ruler was noted by T. Barfield. This is an extreme distrust of relatives [Barfield, 2009, p. 297]. The reasons for this are to be found in Temujin's early childhood, when Taijiuts left his family, and his uncle Daritai-otchigin did not provide any support to his relatives. The subsequent conflict over the capture of Tatar loot was only an open display of hostility. Even in his youth, Temujin killed his half-brother Bekter only because he took away from him first a lark, then a brilliant fish [The Hidden Legend..., 1941, p. 90] (The Collection of Chronicles, being an essay written at the court of a direct descendant of Genghis Khan, is silent about this episode.) for the first time as supreme Khan, Altan, Khuchar, and Sacha-Beki were distant relatives of his, but they betrayed him without hesitation.

All this left a certain imprint on the worldview of the future great khan. Therefore, throughout his reign, he did not allow his relatives to power. His relatives did not receive key posts either in the army or in the empire - for example, Genghis entrusted the command of the guard not to his sons, uncles or brothers, but to people who fought with him, who came from different tribes [Innermost Legend..., 1941, pp. 169-170]. Military units that were still entrusted to relatives were necessarily manned by thousands of people who proved their loyalty to Genghis [Innermost Legend..., 1941, pp. 175-176].

The Great Khan stopped looking for the support of his power in tribal associations. On the contrary, having won the final victory over the Merkits, Genghis "ordered to distribute all these Merkits to a single one in different directions" [Innermost legend..., 1941, p. 152]. And the right to restore the unity of the tribe was considered as a special favor. One of Genghis 'associates, while he was rewarding his entourage, asked:" Would it be a favor for me to gather together my brothers, the Negus tribe?" [ibid., p. 165], another asked for permission to collect the Bayauts, who are "scattered and scattered in all directions" [ibid., p. 164]. Genghis Khan relied primarily on those who were personally chosen by him and personally devoted to him. According to T. Barfield, the military units of the Mongol army "consisted of representatives of different tribes. An exception was made for those tribes and clans whose leaders have consistently supported Temujin since his first election as Khan" (Barfield, 2009, p. 296).

The cornerstone of Genghis ' governance structure was personal loyalty. Kinship relations did not give any privileges [ibid., p. 297]. According to T. Barfield's calculations, the number of relatives that Genghis killed or threatened to kill reaches a dozen - "these were almost all his male relatives who had the right to power" [ibid., p. 298]. When distributing troops among his generals, Genghis gave his family members less than half: 44,500 out of 95,000 soldiers. And over time, this number was also reduced to 28,000, while the total number of the army increased to 129,000 people [ibid., p. 300]. Genghis Khan feared for his power and jealously guarded it from any encroachments, and relatives were just the ones who could pose a threat in this regard.

It was the Nukers 5, who went with him all the way to the creation of the empire and never tainted themselves with treachery, who became for Genghis a counterweight to the traditional Khan's environment (relatives, tribal elite). It was a kind of squad [of the Kra-

Orluk-4 honorary nickname "hero, knight".

5 For more information about nucers, see [Vladimirtsov, 2002, pp. 382-406].

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din, 1995, p. 53]. He called his first comrades - in-arms, Boorcha and Mukhali, his most trusted people [Innermost Legend..., 1941, p.190]. The adventurers close to Genghis turned out to be not only loyal companions, but also gifted military leaders. Loyalty and bravery were qualities that Khan valued in those around him, even in his enemies. For examples, refer to the "Hidden Legend". In one of the battles with the Taijiuts near Genghis Khan, a horse was killed. After some time, having won the victory, Genghis asked who fired the shot. The archer came out and said: "I was the one who shot from the mountain. If the Khan orders me to be executed, I will be left with only a wet spot in the palm of my hand" [ibid., p. 119]. Genghis liked the answer. "Not only does he not shut himself up in his murder and enmity, but he also gives himself away with his head. He deserves to be a comrade" [ibid.]. Zhebe later became one of the four great generals of Genghis Khan (along with Zhelme, Subodei, and Kublai).

Another innovation of Genghis Khan concerns the principle of transfer of power. Traditionally, in Mongolian society, inherited property was distributed among sons. The eldest received their share and were allocated to separate farms, the eldest inherited the social status of his father, and the youngest remained with his parents and then received all the property left after his father [Kychanov, 1997, p. 204]. This custom greatly surprised European travelers who found themselves among the Mongols in the middle of the XIII century. [Guillaume Roubruk, 1957, p. 101].

The youngest of the sons had a special title - otchigin [Collection of Chronicles, 1952, book 2, p. 193]. B. Ya. Vladimirtsov interpreted it as "prince of fire" [Vladimirtsov, 2002, p. 344], since the hearth, which he was the guardian of, was the center of life at home [Zhukovskaya, 2002, p. 344]. 18-21; Materials of the Franciscan Mission, 2002, p. 117]. Among Genghis Khan's relatives, three otchigins are mentioned: Yesugei's younger brother Daritai-otchigin, Temujin's younger brother Temuge-otchigin, and Genghis Khan's younger son Tului. At the same time, Temuge is sometimes called simply Otchigin-noyon [The Hidden legend..., 1941, p. 143; Collection of Chronicles, 1952, book 2, p. 147]. An illustration of the traditionally closer relationship with the parents of the youngest son can serve as an episode from the "Hidden Legend", in which Genghis Khan gives his entourage lots and gives 10,000 yurts to the mother "together with the Otchigin" [Hidden legend..., 1941, p. 176]. Otchigin's name is not specified, but there is every reason to believe that Temuge is meant, since Tului (he was given 5000 yurts) and Daritai (Genghis wanted to execute him for treason)are mentioned below [ibid.]. This is just in line with the traditional distribution, when the youngest son stays by the mother's side.

Tului, as the youngest son of Genghis Khan himself, eventually had to inherit the troops subordinate to Genghis [Collection of Chronicles, 1952, book 2, pp. 266, 274]. In the distribution of his appanages, he inherited Mongolia [ibid., pp. 70, 274]as a native yurt. Rashid ad-Din wrote about Tului: "he knew everything" [ibid., p. 278], and after his death, the troops and yurts under his control passed under the jurisdiction of his wise wife Sorkuktani-begi [ibid., 1960, p. 111-113].

However, one important point should be noted: the ruler of the Mongols after the death of Genghis was not the eldest or youngest, but the third son of the founder of the empire - Ogedei 6. Rashid ad-Din writes about this:

"Since Genghis Khan had experienced his sons in business and knew what each of them was good for, he hesitated about transferring the throne and khanate: sometimes he thought of Ogedei-kaan, and sometimes he thought of the younger son Tului-kaan, because the Mongols from ancient times custom and rule are such that the native yurt and house should be built in the same way. the father was in charge of the younger son. Then he said:

6 Mikhail Pravdin [Prawdin, 1941, p. 236-238] claimed that Ogedei was elected great Khan with the assistance of Yelyu Chutsai, who persuaded Chagatai and Tului to cede the khan's throne to their brother. This version is not based on sources, since both the "Hidden Legend" [p.191] and the "Collection of Chronicles" [vol. 1, p. 232; vol. 2, p. 8] state that Ogedei was appointed as his successor by Genghis Khan himself.

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"The matter of the throne and the kingdom is a difficult matter, let Ogedei be in charge of it, and let Tului be in charge of everything that makes up the yurt, the house, the property, the treasury and the army that I have gathered" [Collection of Chronicles, 1960, p. 8].

The Yuan-chao bi-shi cites a conversation between Genghis Khan and his sons, from which Genghis understood that Ogedei, who was distinguished among his brothers by his gentleness of character and generosity, was the most suitable candidate, since not everyone recognizes Jochi as his son, and Chagatai is too ferocious in temperament [Innermost Legend..., 1941, pp. 184-186]. Juzdjani also wrote about the cruelty and intransigence of Chagatai, who suggested, in particular, that Genghis poisoned his eldest son Jochi at the instigation of Chagatai [Tabaqat-i-Nasiri, 1881, p. 1145-1147].

This was the beginning of a new principle of succession to the throne - the khan could name any prince as his successor. The new khan was to be approved by the Great Kurultai, which was attended by all members of the Golden Family [Innermost Legend..., 1941, p. 191]. The Kurultai at which Ogedei was proclaimed Khan is described by Rashid ad-Din: all the princes feasted for three days, then discussed the affairs of the state and named Ogedei Khan, and he began to refuse in favor of his brothers and uncles and only after much persuasion agreed, after which the older brothers and uncle sat him on the throne and proclaimed toast [Collection of Chronicles, 1960, p. 19].

T. Barfield notes in Ogedei's pre-accession speech that all the legal principles of succession that somehow existed in Mongolian society were mentioned: the transfer of power from the elder brother to the younger, from father to eldest son, from father to youngest son, and from the khan to any successor appointed by him (Barfield, 2009, p. 325).. The lack of clarity on this vital issue for the empire, along with other reasons, contributed to the division of the empire. Given that the khans had several wives, the number of princes who had birth rights to the throne increased very quickly. According to Marco Polo, Kublai "had twenty-two sons by four wives" (Marco Polo, 1990, p. 95). Juveini writes that "the number of children and grandchildren of Genghis Khan is more than ten thousand" (Juveini, 2004, p. 30). Altan Tobchi indicates that Jochi had seven sons, Chagatai had four or five, and Tului had at least four (Altan Tobchi, 1973, p. 243-244). Although some scientists doubt the absolute reliability of this information, for example, N. P. Shastin [Altan Tobchi, 1973, p. 374], the order of values is quite clear.

The empire remained united under two more rulers - Ogedei's son Guyuk (1246-1248) and Tului's son Mongke (Mengu) (1251-1259). The Great Kurultai was only a form of final approval of the choice already made by the Genghisids, but victory always required more than just approval. After Ogedei, all the great khans relied on military strength during their reign. Rashid al-din gives another example: after Kublai's death in 1294, a dispute arose between his grandsons over the throne, which was resolved in favor of the more eloquent Timur Khan, because those present at the Kurultai saw that he " knows better and expounds more beautifully the biliki (Genghis Khan - E. N.) and that he deserves the crown and the throne" [Sbornik letopis, 1960, p. 206].

The significance of the Kurultai gradually faded away, one of the indicators of which can be called the episode with the accession of Mongke. The princes of the Ogedei and Chagatai families did not come to Kurultai, but Batu, the senior representative of the Golden Family at that time, ordered Munke to be put on the throne, and "anyone who violates the yasu should lose his head" [Sbornik letopis, 1960, p. 131]. The next khan, Mongke's brother Kublai, dispensed with the Mongolian Kurultai altogether.

Every reign since Ogedei has always been accompanied by internal upheaval and military strife. Rashid al-Din wrote about one of these feuds: "Since Kublai Khan was located in the Nangas region, and Hulagu Khan was located in the west in the Tazik regions, and the distance from them to the capital was long, Arig-Buka, when he heard

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the news of his brother's death, he coveted the throne and the kingdom" [ibid., p. 148]. From the tone of the narrative, it is clear that he considers these claims unfounded. In addition to the traditional struggle for power, the brothers ' confrontation reflected the contradictions that have torn apart the empire since its foundation: the contradictions of the steppe and sedentary lifestyle. Previous khans ruled from Karakoram 7, located on the banks of the Orkhon River in the territory of modern Mongolia [Sbornik letopis, 1960, p. 40]. Rashid ad-Din writes that at the behest of Ogedei Khan, "five hundred wagons loaded with food and beverages arrived there every day from the regions" [ibid., p. 41], from which it can be concluded that the city was unable to provide itself with food on its own. This is confirmed by another passage in the "Collection of Chronicles", which deals with military operations between Kublai and Arig-Buka, which occupied Karakorum: Kublai blocked the supply of food from China, and" severe famine and high cost began in the city " [ibid., p. 161]. It was Kublai who moved his capital from the steppe, marking the beginning of the separation of parts of the Mongol Empire and the separation of four independent states. The capital of his Yuan dynasty was first Kaifeng (a city 550 km north of Beijing), and then Daidu (modern Beijing) [ibid., p. 175].

Summing up, we can draw the following conclusions. In the Mongol environment of the 12th century, there were signs of state formation, such as social differentiation and the separation of the ruling elite. However, the main functions of state power were finally formed only under Genghis Khan. Before the reign of Genghis Khan was chosen by the aristocracy to perform the duties of the supreme commander, who should give the opportunity to capture rich loot. Military luck determined the fullness of power. The Khan did not interfere in internal affairs. Jamukha would probably be such a khan. Genghis Khan radically changed this system, severely suppressing any attempts on the part of representatives of the nobility (including his relatives) to participate in government and impose their opinions on him. Another innovation for the steppe under Genghis Khan was the admission to the service of any capable and loyal person, regardless of his origin, with simultaneous restriction of rights and control over the actions of blood relatives, which was supposed to help rally and strengthen the state. However, the decision of Genghis to choose an heir contrary to the existing principles of power transfer, along with another feature of the Mongol approach to the conquered possessions - considering them as the personal property of the ruler, was one of the reasons for the subsequent weakening of the empire as the number of legitimate claimants to the throne from among the representatives of the Golden Family increased.

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