Scientific life. Congresses, conferences, and symposia

Presidential elections were held in Iran in June 2005. The struggle was so serious that for the first time the elections were held in two rounds. The situation in Iran on the eve of the presidential election was very tense. Last year's elections to the Mejlis were won by the Conservatives. One of the reasons for this was the use of election technologies such as the selection of candidates by the Conservative Supervisory Board. In protest, young people actually ignored the elections. The opposition and foreign press started talking about election fraud.

On the eve of the presidential elections, both reformers and conservatives were interested in their legitimacy. And legitimacy could be ensured not only by a sufficiently high voter turnout, but also by the admission of representatives of different political trends as candidates. The election of a representative of the conservative forces as president actually "put an end" to the prospects for the development of the reform movement in the format in which it was formed during the presidency of M. Khatami. It was with M. Khatami, one of the leaders of the reform movement in Iran, that many hopes were associated for the revival of the country, the expansion of civil rights and freedoms. The defeat of the reformers in the 2004 parliamentary elections showed that these hopes were not fully realized.

Although the president is not the main figure in the political structure, much certainly depends on his views, ability to influence the country's leader (Rahbar) Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and ability to negotiate with the Majlis. The President is not only the head of the executive branch, but also represents Iran in the international arena. In the election campaign, the Conservatives made extensive use of the powers of the Supervisory Board, which at first effectively excluded all reformers from the candidates, leaving only Khojat-ol-eslam Mehdi Karroubi, the former chairman of the previous Mejlis. However, the secular reformist candidate, former Minister of Higher Education M. Moin, was initially excluded from the list of candidates. Student performances began. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei intervened, and the Supervisory Board nominated him. By doing so, the conservatives demonstrated not only the strength of their power, but also the "democracy" of Islamic rule and their willingness to compromise. Voter turnout as a result of the extension of the work of polling stations was also quite high - 60%.

The fact that Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, head of the Expediency Council, who served two terms as the country's president before M. Khatami, will come out on top in terms of the number of votes, is not very clear.-

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I was angry. And he did get 21.6%. The results of his main opponent, Mostafa Moin, are much more modest - 14.2%. Mehdi Karroubi came second after Rafsanjani, but after the final vote count, he lost second place to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the mayor of Tehran, who was almost never expected to win. Apparently, a significant administrative resource was involved in recent hours, since M. Ahmadinejad is a supporter of the Abadgaran party, which won the majority of seats in the Mejlis, and its leader worked with him in the Tehran Council before being elected speaker of the seventh Mejlis. Ahmadinejad belongs to the so-called neoconservatives who are ready for economic modernization, but within the existing political system, while maintaining the political leadership of the Shiite clergy. Although Mehdi Karroubi is also part of the religious political elite, he is the leader of the Assembly of Struggling Ulema, the main center of the reform movement among the Iranian clergy (after the presidential election, M. Khatami was elected chairman of its Supreme Council), and the main opponent of the core of conservative forces - the Society of Struggling Clergy. And of course, he was the least acceptable candidate for the Conservatives. After the elections, Karroubi criticized the election process, said about the pressure of the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) and the Basij (militia) in the person of Hejazi.

The election campaign was mainly conducted not so much around the candidates ' programs as around the candidates themselves. The programs didn't differ much from each other.

On June 26, 2005, Ahmadinejad won a landslide victory over Rafsanjani in the second round. This meant that not only the reformers were defeated, but also the centrist wing of the conservative bloc, grouped around Rafsanjani.

On October 31, 2005, the Iranian sector held a round table to discuss the country's post-election development prospects. Scientists from the Institute of Physics and Technology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, MGIMO(U)took part in its work Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, ISAA at Moscow State University, DA of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, RSUH, students of Moscow universities.

Zav opened the conference. Iran's private sector N. M. Mammadova . She noted that the statements of the new Iranian President M. Ahmadinejad regarding the State of Israel, anti-American rhetoric, the change in Iran's position on resolving the conflict related to the Iranian nuclear program, i.e. the refusal to sign the Additional Protocol, the resumption of work on creating a full fuel cycle, have brought many problems to Iran's relations with individual countries and international organizations. The crisis in Iran's relations with Israel, as well as with the United States, has reached such an intensity that it cannot but affect the interests of many countries, including Russia. The reason for the aggravation of contradictions was the nuclear program, which has been discussed for several years. N. M. Mammadova believes that this is due to changes in the country's leadership, or rather, to the regrouping of political forces that took place in the last year and a half, especially after the election of a new president.

Despite stable economic growth, the Khatami Government has accumulated many unresolved problems during its tenure. Nevertheless, the conditions for attracting foreign and domestic investors to the country have improved, budget allocations for government guarantees for foreign investments have been increased, Iran has become a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency of the World Bank, and it has accepted the conditions of the IMF (Article 8 of the Charter) for free conversion of the rial for current operations. In terms of investment attractiveness, Iran has moved from 135th to 69th place over the past decade (estimated by UNCTAD). Despite the opposition of the United States, the World Bank allocated an investment loan to Iran. And although the loan amount is small (only $ 2 million), this fact was of fundamental importance for Iran, since this was recognized as a successful course of Iran's economic liberalization. The reformers managed to show that the Islamic state is ready to defend its interests without going beyond the generally accepted norms of world politics. However, the public expected more noticeable changes from the reformist government.

After the 2005 presidential election, all branches of government in Iran were in the hands of conservatives. The judiciary was virtually entirely in the hands of the conservative clergy for 26 years. The Mejlis of the seventh convocation has a majority of conservatives, and all committees of the Mejlis are headed by them. In addition to the judicial, executive and legislative powers, the state form of government of the country has another branch - in the form of a rahbar (leader), which embodies not so much religious power as the highest state power. Rahbar Ali Khamenei holds conservative views. The formation of the new government by the president was carried out not so much by professional qualities, but by

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the principle of proximity to the conservative clergy. In the history of Iran, it is difficult to find a period when all the centers of power were so united in their views. Therefore, we can speak about the uniqueness of the current political situation. On the one hand, of course, this is a boon for the Islamic regime, since it is possible to pass any laws and make decisions that meet the views of conservatives on the further development of Iran. But it is also a big source of danger. Previously, a kind of "two-party system" "worked", and the balance was maintained or adjusted by Rahbar, and the system in this mode lasted for more than a quarter of a century. Now it is less stable, because it is responsible for all the mistakes and mistakes, if the situation worsens, the blame will not be on conservatives or reformers, but on the entire system of Islamic government, unless, of course, it comes out with initiatives on the political arena, for example, with an assessment of the president's activities, Rahbar.

According to Mammadova, reformers who are "excluded" by conservatives from the ideas of the revolution, from the ideas of Khomeinism, can consolidate their forces and, more importantly, radicalize their views. Both are predictable, as it became obvious that in the format in which the reform movement developed as a liberal one, it was unable to radically change the entire Islamic system of power.

In these circumstances, the speaker notes, the new leadership will probably go to curtail market reforms, to return to the social policy that was practiced earlier, especially since oil prices still contribute to this. In addition, the capital intensity of the economy (the rate of capital investment has exceeded 30% in the last three years) will also provide some growth, even with a slight decline in oil prices. In recent years, Iran has become one of the few sustainable developing countries in the region. The average annual growth rate of GDP in 2000-2004 was 6.2%. GNI per capita in 2004 reached $ 2,300. (at the exchange rate), at PPP - $ 7550. (the corresponding figures for Turkey, which uses multibillion-dollar loans from international financial institutions, are $ 3,750 and $ 7,680.) If in Turkey the share of the population living on less than one dollar a day (according to PPP) is (as of 2002) 4.8%, in Iran (even as of the crisis of 1998) - less than 2%. Iran's external debt does not exceed 10% of GDP and is not as burdensome as, for example, for Turkey (over 80%). Continued high oil prices will allow the Ahmadinejad government to maintain its economic growth rate (estimated at 6.5 - 7.5%). To strengthen its position, the new government even plans to increase the amount of subsidy payments, first of all, subsidizing the prices of bread and fuel (now subsidies reach 20% of budget expenditures), also using funds created in 2001. The Stabilization Oil Fund. (Previously, the fund's funds were mainly used to finance investment projects.) The Government also intends to implement reforms in the banking sector, which is unlikely in the context of high prices. The Mejlis rejected a draft law on the privatization of some state-owned banks and insurance companies. The law on the budget for 2005/06 adopted a decision to freeze prices for gasoline, liquid fuel, gas, and electricity. In addition, bank rates on both deposits and loans were reduced.

Of course, these measures can be regarded as an element accompanying the election campaign, but at the same time they indicate a return to a state-regulated economy. Due to the position of the Mejlis, which initiated discussions on the compliance of privatization with constitutional norms, the privatization program was actually suspended. However, according to N. M. Mammadova, before the adoption of the special law, only the fall in world oil prices, as well as the gradual decrease in the positive effect of the increase in the capital investment rate to 35-37% achieved by the Khatami government, can once again make the issue of accelerating the introduction of market mechanisms relevant.

An important aspect of Ahmadinejad's policy, Mammadova believes, is an attempt to consolidate society by searching for a common enemy. For a long time, anti-Americanism was used as such a factor. But it has been used for too long and is currently inefficient. In recent years, the mood of Iranian society has changed in favor of establishing ties with the United States. The administration of the Iranian President and the Mejlis managed to give anti-Americanism a new color. They linked the anti-Americanism factor to the nuclear program, focusing not so much on its peaceful nature (as during Khatami's presidency), but on Iran's right to work on creating a full fuel cycle. The Iranian leadership accuses the United States of seeking to violate Iran's legitimate rights as a member of the NPT by applying policies to it

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double standards. At the same time, Iran's legal position is impeccable. However, the West, and especially the United States, are certainly interested in obtaining additional guarantees of the peaceful nature of the nuclear program from the Iranian leadership at a time when the level of danger from Islamic extremist organizations is high. And the nuclear issue itself has become a factor that can unite society and reduce the importance of serious political processes in the country.

Speaking about the domestic policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mammadova noted two points. Of course, the expected strengthening of authoritarian tendencies can most likely lead not only to an increase in the influence of secular political forces, i.e. those who advocate a sharp reduction in religious authorities, but also to a revision of the views of the clergy themselves on the concept of Islamic power. It is not without reason that the leadership of the Assembly of Struggling Ulema has declared its activities to be a priority in "the fight against heretical, reactionary and ossified thinking that passes for Islam." This may indicate an intention to "revise" certain Islamic principles.

It is impossible not to mention Rafsanjani as a continuing and completely independent center of power. Although he is still formally part of the leadership of the conservative Society of Struggling Clergy, he has always acted as part of their pragmatic wing. It would seem that after the defeat in the elections, his position came to naught. However, this is not the case. Not only did he remain at the head of the Expediency Council, but the Council itself was given additional supervisory functions. It cannot be ruled out that such a compromise was reached between Khamenei and Rafsanjani on the eve of the second round, since, according to unofficial data, Rafsanjani announced that Ahmadinejad would become president the day before the election. It is unlikely that Rafsanjani will remain in the shadow of his official associates for long. Most likely, he will start distancing himself from them as the new government's miscalculations increase. And the November mass purge of personnel clearly showed this. They caused a negative reaction not only to M. Khatami, who said that the new president's actions go beyond his authority, former Secretary of the National Security Council Hassan Rouhani, but also Rafsanjani, who as head of the Expediency Council has constitutional rights to determine the main directions of the country's policy together with Rahbar. Rafsanjani said that mass dismissals of officials of various ranks, appointing like-minded people who do not have the appropriate qualifications to their places, pose a threat to the authorities. It is precisely this wording that can lead to the impeachment of the president, whose position the Mejlis is already beginning to disagree with (for example, in the question of a candidate for the post of oil minister). It is noteworthy that dissatisfaction with Ahmadinejad's actions in the field of personnel changes apparently reached such a level that it required the intervention of Rahbar. Ali Khamenei said it was necessary to end the government's disarray.

As for foreign policy, its priorities, according to the statement of Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki (in the government of M. Khatami, he was Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs), will remain the same. Of course, it will not cease to be pragmatic, but, most likely, it will be less compromise and tougher in defending Iranian interests in order to " maximize the available opportunity to raise the national dignity of the Islamic Republic in the world."

According to Mammadova, the Kurdish problem is also important for Iran, which became particularly relevant with the adoption of the constitution in Iraq and the recognition of the right to create independent autonomies not only in Kurdistan, but also in Shiite areas. By openly supporting Shiite autonomy, Iran could provoke a crisis in its Kurdish regions. The development of the Kurdish movement in Iran is quite realistic, and its scope largely depends on the extent to which Iran will support Shiite autonomy in Iraq. Otherwise, it is difficult for Iran to avoid accusations of double standards, which it accuses the United States of.

The threat of an opposition movement in Iran like a "color revolution" supported from the outside, which threatens to change the green color of the Islamic revolution, also exists at the expense of the development of other national movements. The American Institute Direction to AEI, in a report submitted to the White House in October 2005, noting that there are now more Azerbaijanis in Iran than Persians, recommended that the United States " rely on non-Persian people living in the country for regime change in Iran." US starts construction of two new buildings in Azerbaijan

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radar stations, one of which is located in Astara, a city bordering Iran. The same thing is happening in Armenia.

In its foreign policy, the new government began to actively use the advantage of its membership in the SCO as an observer country (adopted on July 5, 2005). Iran's anti-Americanism, along with its oil and gas reserves, apparently played a role in this decision of the SCO. It is possible that China and Russia may use the anti-American position of the new Iranian government to counter the active penetration of the United States into Central Asia. Russia and China, as members of the SCO, have made great efforts to ensure that the "Iranian dossier" was not handed over to the UN Security Council. The same position was taken even by Pakistan, which received observer status in the SCO at the same time as Iran. However, the lack of balanced decisions on the part of Iran to overcome the crisis in relations with the United States and, most importantly, the recent harsh statements of the country's president may complicate the situation in the SCO's cooperation with Iran.

The coming to power of the conservatives, although it led to the consolidation of the ruling elite, revealed new problems. The main one is the responsibility of the authorities, especially the Islamic one, for increasing tensions in foreign relations, for possible reduction of foreign economic ties, as well as for fulfilling promises to raise the standard of living of the population, eliminate unemployment, and ensure constitutional rights.

Sergey Druzhilovsky (MGIMO) noted that M. Ahmadinejad's speech calling for" wiping Israel off the face of the earth " is neither an accident nor a reservation. Iran, apparently, is deliberately escalating the situation, seeing a split in the international community regarding its nuclear program and knowing that today no international commissions will find traces of nuclear weapons in this country. Iran's confidence in its impunity is reinforced by the insignificant results of American policy in occupied Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the growing protest in the Muslim world and the world community against the aggressive foreign policy of the United States.

Undoubtedly, Iran counts on the support of those countries that successfully cooperate with Iran in the economic field. These are not only China and Russia, but also some influential European countries, such as Italy. Thus, at an international conference held in Jerusalem in June 2005 on the issue of "nuclear Iran", which the speaker participated in, the Italian delegates unequivocally expressed their disagreement with the possible introduction of sanctions against Iran. At the same time, they referred to the fact that the Europeans had repeatedly tried to impose sanctions on this country, recalled their ambassadors and curtailed trade ties, and then they themselves were forced to find plausible pretexts for resuming normal relations with it.

Sergey Druzhilovsky believes that Russia should continue cooperation with Iran, and not only in the field of nuclear energy, given the prospects of the Iranian market and Iran's readiness to provide Russia with extensive opportunities for its development. At the same time, it is implied that the military option of interfering in the internal affairs of Iran today really looks unlikely, and the introduction of an oil embargo against this country will cause a significant blow, first of all, to the economies of Western countries themselves.

L. M. Kulagina (IB RAS) focused on possible changes in Iran's foreign policy. In her opinion, in the context of US foreign policy aggression in the Middle East region, the conservative wing of the Iranian clergy did everything possible to get a leader close to them into the presidency. The fact that Ahmadinejad, a radical conservative and active participant in the 1979 revolution, was elected president means that Iran is returning to a more active and tough foreign policy of the Imam Khomeini period. The new president gives priority to relations with Muslim countries and neighbors in the region, based on the possibility of using them in the fight against the United States and Israel. A manifestation of the President's tough foreign policy was his statement on October 27, 2005, which led to an international scandal. This could slow down the progress of Iran's nuclear program, embarrass states that support Iran, especially Russia and China, and lead to the imposition of sanctions against Iran.

The international community's attitude to the Iranian nuclear program is evidenced by the tough resolution adopted on September 24, 2005 at the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, which opens the way for the transfer of the "Iranian case" to the Security Council with the prospect of introducing international sanctions.

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sanctions against Iran. In response, the Mejlis of the Islamic Republic of Iran called for a review of Iran's foreign policy ties with those states that supported this resolution. At the same time, Iran is trying to reach an agreement with a number of non - European States, primarily with the countries that are members of the IAEA Board of Governors and members of the Non-Aligned Movement on issues related to its nuclear program. The practical implementation of this tactic was the visits of Iranian high-ranking officials to the capitals of the region's nuclear-armed states-China, India, Pakistan and Russia. In addition, at a meeting with the Turkish Prime Minister, Ahmadinejad expressed Iran's intention to export peaceful nuclear technologies to other countries of the Islamic community, which caused a negative reaction from representatives of the EU and especially the United States.

Iran is actively developing relations with China. In 8 months of 2005, the trade turnover between Iran and China increased 1.5 times. In turn, Russia and China are trying to persuade Iran to take a more balanced position on the nuclear issue. Russia is interested in developing economic relations with Iran. In addition, Russia supplies Iran with military equipment and weapons and would not want to lose this lucrative market. Russia fears that the situation in Central Asia, and especially in the Caucasus, will become more complicated due to the destabilization of the Iranian regime and the possible creation of nuclear weapons by Iran. According to Kulagina, Iran is extremely concerned about the situation in the region. It is surrounded by pro-American countries or States where American troops or bases are located. At present, the military power of Iran is not enough to adequately counter its potential opponents-the United States and Israel. All this is what determines Tehran's desire to acquire nuclear weapons.

Speaking about the foreign policy aspect of the new government's policy, E. V. Dunayeva noted that the deepening of the crisis in Iran's relations with European states was facilitated by the president's statements about the readiness to transfer nuclear technologies to Islamic states, anti-Israeli statements and, undoubtedly, the expansion of assistance to Shiite groups in southern Iraq (which led to repeated accusations). British leadership of Iran in the supply of Iranian weapons). Certain changes in Iran's foreign policy are evidenced by a departure from the Westward orientation that prevailed during Khatami's presidency, and a shift in emphasis on developing relations with Russia and Eastern countries, primarily Islamic ones. However, according to E. V. Dunayeva, the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran is not united in determining the main foreign policy line. This is indicated by such facts as Rafsanjani's public speeches, advocating for the expansion of diplomatic negotiations with the West, an abrupt change of ambassadors, etc. At the same time, supporters of confrontation with the West are preparing to give a "worthy response" in the event of sanctions being imposed on Iran and are conducting broad nationalist propaganda in the media.

The new Government also faced certain difficulties in the region. Although, it should be noted that on the main issue - Iraq, it took a rather balanced and pragmatic position, supporting the draft Constitution of Iraq, which officially recognizes the Kurdish autonomous state and provides for future autonomy for Shiites. However, Tehran's repeated statements about its desire to play a greater role in the settlement process inside Iraq caused discontent among Arab countries, primarily Saudi Arabia, and practically nullified all previous steps taken by Iran to strengthen regional unity and develop a common position on the future status of Iraq. The Iranian President's statements against Israel have deepened the negative attitude towards Iran in the region, as a threat was made to the Islamic states that have established relations with Israel. The deterioration of Iran's image in the world plays into the hands of radical elements, on the one hand, in the United States and Israel, and, on the other, in Iran itself. Certain circles of Iran are aware of the complexity of the country's current position in the international arena and rely on Russia and the Central Asian states.

In his speech, Aliyev focused mainly on Ah-Madinejad's statement that Iran is ready to supply Muslim countries with technologies in the field of nuclear program. According to SM. Indeed, this statement, which expresses the strategic aspirations of the entire Iranian leadership, shows that "playing with fire" was chosen by the Iranian president as a serious step in the fight against the American threat. The President's statement is also connected with the desire of the Iranian leadership to improve its relations with such Muslim states as Malaysia, Indonesia, Sudan, Syria, Algeria, etc. An invitation to receive nuclear technology can facilitate this. At the same time, these actions of Iran may indicate its desire to take leadership positions in the Muslim world.

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It is impossible not to take into account the objective moments that allowed Ahmadinejad to enter into a confrontation with the West and the United States. First of all, the fact that the aggressive aspirations of the United States have become unpopular in the West and Iraq's position on the world oil market has strengthened. Currently, 60-65% of China's oil imports come from the Persian Gulf countries, while Iran accounts for 14%. In addition, the strengthening of the military power of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including through cooperation with Russia, has become of considerable importance. Relations with Russia, from the point of view of Iran, will prevent the" return " of the United States to Iran and at the same time, in the opinion of SM. To promote the preservation of the current Iranian regime. The withdrawal of Shiite clerics from the forefront is likely to lead to the return of the big bourgeoisie to power in Iran. Russia's position cannot be explained solely by financial gain. It may have largely removed the Iranian threat from itself, given that the revolution in Iran had a more than serious impact on the strengthening of the Islamic movement in the territories of the former USSR. This threat, thanks to friendly relations with Iran, has been reduced in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Moreover, Russia used cooperation with Iran to end the civil war in Tajikistan. It is characteristic that, like the Shah's regime, the Iranian clerics consider military power as the main element of preserving their dictatorship.

I. E. Fedorova (IB RAS) highlighted the problem of relations between Iran and the United States. She noted that the current state of Iranian-American relations continues to be influenced by the ongoing occupation of Iraq by coalition forces and the resulting consequences for American foreign policy, on the one hand, and the rise to power in Iran after the 2005 presidential elections of more conservative and nationalist leaders, on the other.

Irina Fyodorova noted that the main aspects on which there are still differences between Iran and the United States are: Iran's nuclear program, its desire to possess technologies that may lead to the creation of nuclear weapons in the future, support for the terrorist movements Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as sharp and often contradictory statements. according to the norms of international law, the position on the Middle East settlement and threats against the State of Israel. At the same time, the collective image of the enemy in the face of the United States and Israel remains a unifying factor for Iranian society and is used by new leaders to implement unpopular domestic political decisions.

The presence of such a center of power, which is not controlled by the United States, cannot but cause a desire to limit its influence. But due to the limited military resources involved in Iraq and Afghanistan, the complexity of the military operation in Iran (the territory is four times larger than in Iraq, and the human resources are three times larger), as well as as a result of the unpopularity of military operations abroad in the United States itself and the policy of the Bush administration in general, the United States They focused their influence on non-military actions against Iran. Among them are efforts by international organizations to transfer Iran's "nuclear dossier" to the UN Security Council, support for pro-Western groups both inside and outside Iran, and support for national ethnic groups: Kurds and Azerbaijanis opposed to the Iranian government.

In connection with the above, Irina Fedorova believes that a sharp aggravation of Iranian-American relations is unlikely to lead to US military actions against Iran. Easing the tension in this area of international relations is also unlikely.

Economic issues have become the focus of attention in Russia . P. Tsukanova (IB RAS). He noted that the reformist government of former President M. Khatami, who headed the executive branch for the previous eight years, failed to solve the main task of liberalizing the country's political life - to weaken the theocratic component in the structure of the state structure of Iran. In the management of political processes in the country, the religious-ideological approach remained a priority over the secular-pragmatic approach. In the economic sphere, however, Khatami's liberal policies were more successful. These include the reform of the state budget structure transformed in accordance with international standards; the adoption of laws allowing the private sector to operate in basic sectors of the economy, in banking and insurance; attracting foreign capital in the form of direct investment; the introduction of direct taxes aimed at encouraging investment activities, and the abolition of the central bank's monopoly on domestic currency exchange operations; exemption of import of many goods from the need to obtain licenses.

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The principles of liberalizing the country's foreign economic relations and market relations are the basis for the current Fourth Five-Year Socio-Economic Development Plan (2005/06-2009/10) and the long-term development program of Iran until 2025. All this shows that the process of reforming the economy has gained a very strong inertia, which the new Iranian president of a radical conservative sense is not able to overcome without putting the country in danger of a serious socio-political crisis.

Olga Zhigalina (IB RAS) drew attention to the participation of the population of the north-western provinces of Iran (West Azerbaijan and Kurdistan) in the presidential elections. Analyzing the election campaign data, she noted a weak turnout (less than 20%) at the polling stations of Sunnis who consider themselves disadvantaged, since a Sunni cannot become the country's president. She stressed the unpopularity of Ahmadinejad among Kurds, as they associate with his personality the completion of the" Kurdish " policy of the reformist cabinet. According to O. I. Zhigalina, the neoconservatives who came to power resumed the policy of solving the Kurdish issue by force both at the country (in Iran proper) and at the regional level. They are trying to weaken the influence of the Kurds of Iraq on the political processes in Iranian Kurdistan, so they are making efforts to weaken the Kurdish lobby in the Iraqi parliament, and also encourage forces seeking to complicate the situation in the Kurdish autonomy. According to O. I. Zhigalina, the actions of the new Iranian cabinet in the Kurdish issue are aimed at resuming Khomeini's policy aimed at resolving the Kurdish issue by force.

The discussion that unfolded at the conference was dominated by negative assessments of the President's recent statements, which may disrupt the current balance of power in the system of world relations. Russia finds itself in a difficult situation, for which maintaining good relations with Iran as a neighboring state is an objective necessity, but whose leadership is ready to put Russia before the choice to maintain this cooperation at the cost of weakening its relations with the United States. Although most of the participants in the round table considered the possibility of pre-emptive strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities minimal, however, in the opinion of some, it remains. In general, more severe radicalism in foreign policy and a slowdown in market reforms are predicted. If all the branches of government are concentrated in the hands of one group, special responsibility will fall on the Government and its head, the President. Any weakening of the state's position both in the international arena and within the country, which threatens to lose the legitimacy of the Islamic government itself, can lead to an early regrouping of political forces, not excluding early elections. In 2006 Elections to the Council of Experts, which elects Rahbar and introduces amendments to the constitution, as well as to local authorities, are coming up. The results of the upcoming elections will, to a certain extent, provide an opportunity to judge the results of the stay in power of firm supporters of Khomeini's ideas, about Islamic rule as the most appropriate to the aspirations of the "destitute".

Participants of the conference filled out questionnaires with a list of questions about possible development scenarios. The results of surveys (14) generally give a fairly uniform picture, and there is no significant variation in opinions. 65% of experts believe that it is most likely (more than 50%) that Iran will accept conditions that allow a peaceful solution to the "nuclear problem". Everyone considered regime change unlikely as a result of the imposition of economic sanctions on Iran, and the probability of its change as a result of limited military intervention was also quite low (40%). Experts were also almost unanimous in their assessment of the probability of normalization of relations between Iran and the United States in the next five years, provided that the regime remains in place (85%). Unexpectedly high (30% of respondents) was the percentage of experts who assessed the feasibility of closer cooperation between Russia and Iran. However, of these 80%, only 30% rated cooperation in the military-political sphere as the most likely. The results of assessing the probability of developing a secular-radical component in the reform movement turned out to be very interesting. 35% of experts rated it as more than 50% likely. 20% of experts considered the possibility of impeachment of the new president of Iran at the initiative of Rahbar and the Majlis to be quite high. In addition, a similar survey was conducted among students studying Iran (MGIMO, Diplomatic Academy, Eastern University). Trends in student assessments are in the same parameters as those of experts, with the exception of the first point. More than half of the students considered it likely that Iran would refuse to accept all the conditions that would allow for a peaceful solution to the Iranian nuclear problem.

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