On November 11, 2015, the Iran Sector of the Center for Near and Middle East Studies held the Russian-Iranian scientific conference "Iran in the Second Decade of the XXI Century: Challenges and Prospects". The meeting was attended by Iranian experts from Moscow, Iranian Ambassador to Russia Mehdi Sanaei, Minister of Communications and Communication Technologies and Head of the Permanent Russian-Iranian Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Cooperation (from the Iranian side). Mahmoud Vaezi, staff of the Iranian Embassy.

The conference was opened by V. Ya. Belokrenitsky, Deputy Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Head of the Center for Near and Middle Eastern Studies. He noted that conferences devoted to the study of Iran, which have become a tradition, always attract the attention of the scientific community. Mehdi Sanaei stressed the importance of the topic chosen for discussion, including for building Iranian-Russian relations. Relations between the two countries are developing in all areas, in which the Presidents of Iran and Russia are interested. Mehdi Sanaei drew the attention of the audience to the success of Iranian diplomacy in reaching an atomic agreement, and the decision of the Ministries of Justice of Iran and Russia to soften the visa regime for citizens of the two countries.

Mahmoud Vaezi stressed that Iran and Russia have accumulated considerable experience in consultations and negotiations on regional issues - on the Syrian issue, as well as negotiations with Afghanistan. Iran-Russia cooperation can contribute to the establishment of stability in the region and further development of relations between the two countries in the field of culture and preservation of historical heritage. He stressed that relations between the two countries are now stronger than at any other time in the past. Hassan Rouhani and Vladimir Putin have met six times in the past two years. According to M. Vaezi, the results of the 12th meeting of the Permanent Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Cooperation were important, during which M. Vaezi proposed to consider bilateral relations in three aspects: short-term (one-year), medium-term (five-year) and long-term (25-year), so that there are no episodic political upheavals, interference of third countries and the change of governments could not change their strategic nature. The Minister also drew attention to the possibility of Iran's participation in the SCO and readiness to start negotiations with the Eurasian Economic Union.

A number of conference reports were devoted to the problems of Iran's economic development in the second decade of the XXI century. N. M. Mammadova (IB RAS) noted that the most important directions of Iran's foreign and domestic political life in the middle of the first and first half of the second decade of the XXI century. These factors were mainly determined by economic factors, primarily oil prices and the sanctions regime that was gradually forming around Iran. At the same time, the effect of these factors was multidirectional. The rise in global oil prices allowed Iran not only not to change its economic strategy, but also to expand its nuclear program. The growth of the Iranian economy has often exceeded the average annual growth rate of global GDP. Even the global crisis of 2008-2009 did not change the positive dynamics with a decrease in growth rates. But in 2010, with the introduction of EU and US sanctions on Iran, the economic situation changed dramatically, as Iranian banks were disconnected from the SWIFT system and the EU imposed a ban on the import of Iranian oil. As a result, by November 2015, according to various estimates, the volume of Iranian assets frozen in foreign banks amounted to at least $ 100 billion. At the same time, Iran's GDP has been falling since 2012, despite an increase in oil prices until 2014 and even a jump in oil prices in 2013. To prevent the crisis, Iran began to use different directions of economic policy, in particular, strengthening the role of the state in the economy, which did not solve the problem of filling the domestic consumer and production markets, as well as food security. The implementation of market-based reforms, primarily the reduction of subsidies for a number of goods, large-scale privatization, and the emphasis on militarization of the economy, was aimed at preventing the economic crisis, and the latter factor gave rise to new imbalances in the structure and quality of production.-

Marina Samuilovna KAMENEVA-Candidate of Philological Sciences, Senior Researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, kamenevamarina@mail.ru.

consumer and production markets. The forced reduction of the nuclear program in exchange for the easing and lifting of sanctions helped boost business and change the dynamics of GDP in a positive direction. According to Mammadova, Iran's economic policy will continue to accelerate market reforms, especially if the position of reformist forces is strengthened in the parliamentary and Expert Council elections in February-March 2016. The privatization process will continue, which will lead to an improvement in the investment climate in the country, activation of domestic business, and reduction of monetary compensation for foreign investments. elimination of subsidies, restoration of positions in the oil market and increase of presence in the gas market. At the same time, according to the speaker, due to ideological reasons, Iran will not abandon the course of forming a social policy focused on supporting the poor, increasing emphasis will be placed on creating conditions for the development of small and medium-sized businesses, reducing the high level of uneven development of certain regions of the country.

A. N. Obukhova (IB RAS) gave a speech on the analysis of Iran's import and export potential. The goal of the Iranian government until 2025 is to reduce the share of crude oil in the country's exports in favor of exports of other goods. In 2013 and the first half of 2015, the country continued its economic strategy of development under sanctions - the "economy of resistance", which provided for reliance on the domestic market while reducing dependence on oil exports. At the same time, oil remains the main export commodity of Iran, while China, India, South Korea, Japan and Turkey are the main importers of Iranian hydrocarbons. After the start of negotiations with the "six" in 2014, oil exports increased to almost $ 96 billion compared to 2013, although with the average annual OPEC quota for Iran's exports of 2.3-2.5 million barrels per day in 2013, exports more than halved. As for Iran's imports, its main items are components for industry, equipment, military-technical products, and the key importers are the same exporting countries, and 2/3 of imports (many goods of European and American origin) go through the UAE.

The report analyzed the export-import potential of non-oil sectors of the Iranian economy. As for modern technologies (IT), according to the country's development plan for the 20-year period (2005-2025), Iran should become a regional leader in this field by 2025, directing the maximum possible national potential to information, aerospace, nuclear, bio - and nanotechnologies. In the field of telecommunications, Iran cooperates with foreign partners - the introduction of LTE networks, the construction of the Trans-Caspian cable, the construction of WiFi networks, the laying of VOC over power lines, and the import of network equipment. At the same time, Iran is the largest automotive market in the region, accounting for 10% of GDP. This is the second largest industry after oil, where 4% of the country's population is employed. A. N. Obukhova, considering the state of the Iranian aviation market, stressed that the difficult state of passenger and cargo air transportation is explained by international sanctions against Iran. Russia is negotiating the supply of Sukhoi Superjet 100 aircraft to the country. Finally, an analysis of the potential of metallurgy and equipment imports suggests a significant increase in the capacity of Iranian metallurgical enterprises for steelmaking by 2025, the beginning of development of copper deposits, and the construction of complexes for the production of copper concentrate.

A.V. Ivin (MGIMO University) Russian Foreign Ministry) reviewed relations between Russia and Iran in the energy sector. He stressed that Iran ranks first in the world in terms of gas production - about 172 billion cubic meters, of which only about 8 billion cubic meters. m per year is exported, and the rest of the gas is used for domestic consumption, which has been actively developing since the introduction of sanctions. If earlier the emphasis was placed on the domestic market, now Iran can increase its export potential through the introduction of R & D. Iran and Russia are potential competitors largely because of their similar export structure and consumers of energy resources produced in these countries, since both countries have consumers in both Europe and Asia. Russia is interested in Iranian gas flowing in the Indo-Pakistani direction, which is the opposite of the western direction, which is strategically important for Russia. This would preserve not only the market, but also the level of energy prices, as Europe seeks to reduce prices for the Russian gas it needs by attracting energy resources from other directions. Iran will not be able to become a supplier of gas to the European market in the short term, but by coordinating their actions in this market, Russia and Iran can get much more benefits. The geographical remoteness of Russian and Iranian fields, the interest of both countries in expanding their participation in oil and gas supplies to world markets, the interest of Iran in gas sales markets, and Russia in gas sources for supplies to Southern Europe and Asia create objective conditions

to coordinate activities and dialogue in this area. Iran is also interested in transit of energy resources from the former Soviet republics through its territory to both Europe and Asia.

Thus, Iran and the Russian Federation are more competitors than allies in energy policy due to the peculiarities of filling the budget and the overall export structure of the countries. However, by allocating markets, this conflict of interest can be mitigated. The main competition front for gas suppliers from Iran and Russia will be Europe, which traditionally supports projects to build pipelines bypassing Russia. At the same time, in order to return a previously lost market segment, Iran may go to lower gas prices and dumping measures, which will cause significant harm to the Russian Federation.

V. I. Sazhin (Institute of Physics and Technology of the Russian Academy of Sciences) devoted his report to the Iranian nuclear program, the probability and prospects of implementing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to address it. According to the speaker, the July 14, 2015 nuclear agreement marked a turning point for Iran and for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Speaking about the significance of the JCPOA, it should be noted that this document goes beyond the scope of the Iranian nuclear issue, since, first, for the first time in 45 years of operation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the international community adopted a document limiting the nuclear ambitions of a signatory country. Secondly, it demonstrates the effectiveness of the "5+1 Group" and initiates the use of this format to solve other important problems. The most important thing is that it prevented the conflict with Tehran from sliding into a hot, armed form and created the basis for Iran's return to the international financial and trade and economic market. The speaker concluded that Iran will implement the requirements of the agreement, since the reaction of its opponents, including Israel, to violations by Iran will be much more serious than before the conclusion of the "nuclear deal" (primarily in the field of economics). Compliance with the JCPOA gives Iran a chance to make a breakthrough in this area, which will be facilitated by a number of factors. These include the use of frozen assets (-107 billion dollars), the savings of the foreign Iranian diaspora (=2 trillion dollars), and an increase in oil production (by 0.6 million barrels). per day) and, accordingly, an increase in oil exports, a reduction in financial transaction costs after the return to the global SWIFT banking system, the restoration of access to banking investments and advanced world technologies, a high degree of interest of international business in expanding and deepening business and trade and economic ties with Iran.

Two presentations were devoted to the problems of the socio-cultural life of today's Iran. E. V. Dunaeva (Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences) considered the realities of the political and socio - cultural life of Iranian society from the perspective of the struggle between two trends-traditionalism and modernization, alternative Westernization, which follows its own model, built on the basis of national cultural tradition. Profound economic and social changes in Iran inevitably lead to shifts in the mentality of the population, which is expressed in the politicization of public consciousness and secularization. However, sometimes the inability to accept innovation leads to traditionalization and protest against the achievements of modern civilization. Analysis of the situation in Iran indicates an increase in the politicization of the population (participation in election campaigns, the formation of new parties, the growth in the number of NGOs). Polarization within society is gradually increasing. The long - standing opposition between conservatives and reformers has been replaced by a confrontation between ultraconservatives and liberals, which is becoming the main driving force of political processes.

A new reality in Iran's political life is the changing role of women in society: active promotion of them to elected bodies, the possibility of being elected to the Council of Experts, and some theologians are positive about this. However, women's emancipation entails many problems, among which divorce is recognized as one of the most acute. Iranians ' view of everyday life and family is changing, intra-family ties are weakening, and nuclear families are dominating. The issue of hijab has become a subject of public discussion. The agenda includes issues of revising the norms of civil legislation based on Sharia, primarily on citizenship, inheritance, and subordination to the husband. However, there are still two approaches to the problem of women in the country's public opinion and in government structures: the realization of civil rights on an equal basis with men (according to the constitution) or the restriction of the role of women to the family and household sphere.

As for the socio-cultural realities of today's Iran, E. V. Dunayeva noted the emergence of new approaches to solving ethno-confessional issues and the recognition of the cultural diversity of ethnic groups. In the sphere of culture and everyday life, new traditions are emerging - the celebration of Valentine's Day and New Year, and there is a change in attitudes towards mourning events in Moharram. Examples of cultural and domestic innovations include the proliferation of Western-style fast food chains, women's pool competitions, and the growing popularity of beauty salons,

social networks, western movies. Some Islamic theologians and philosophers are ready to follow the path of social, political and cultural innovations, the principles of liberalism and democracy, preserving traditional values and structures that promote social development, and relying on religion as the value-semantic core of their culture.

M. S. Kameneva (Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences) touched upon the cultural aspect of relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and international organizations. During the existence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iranian culture has undergone a significant transformation from a Muslim culture based solely on the traditions of Islam to an Islamic Iranian culture. One of the directions of Iran's cultural policy is its cooperation with the UN represented by UNESCO, the Organization for Economic Cooperation( ECO or ECO), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Organization for Cultural Cooperation of Persian-Speaking Peoples and others, of which Iran is a member. Iran's cooperation with the ECO is realized in the functioning of the Institute of Culture with a central office in Tehran, as well as with representative offices in Shiraz and Isfahan, whose main tasks are cultural exchanges between ECO member countries, organization of exhibitions, international conferences, participation in the International Book Exhibition in Tehran, publication of printed products. Iran's cooperation with UNESCO, which has its own office in Tehran, is developing fruitfully, and its status is increasing due to the expansion of the geography of its activities to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkmenistan.

The World Cultural Heritage Committee has a special place in UNESCO's activities in Iran. The List of Cultural Heritage sites includes 17 names belonging to Iran, and 9 of them are recognized as masterpieces, and 49 are candidate objects. Five literary works by Iranian authors, such as the works of Saadi, Rumi and Nasir Khosrow, are candidates for inclusion in the UNESCO List of Bibliographic Publications and Archival Documents of World Significance. Speaking about the Organization for Cultural Cooperation of Persian-Speaking Countries, established in May 2013 on the initiative of Iran, its activities cannot be called successful, which is due to political and partly religious contradictions. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation actively participates in the implementation of projects of the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, which is part of it, with one of the six regional offices in Tehran. In the future, it will probably be possible to talk about Iran's participation as a SCO observer country in the implementation of its cultural programs, as well as cultural cooperation with the Alliance of Civilizations.

The second half of the conference was opened with a report by Irina Fedorova (Institute of International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences) on the situation in Iran's foreign policy after the Vienna Agreement, primarily in terms of Iran's relations with the United States and Europe. The conclusion of the Vienna Agreement has already brought Iran political dividends - it has become a participant in the negotiation process on Syria, and in the future it will create a new political and economic base for increasing its role in solving international problems. As for the challenges and prospects of Iran's foreign policy after the conclusion of the nuclear agreement, there are more challenges than prospects in relations between the United States and Iran. Despite the fact that there is a trend in the process of lifting sanctions against Iran, there is no unity in the American establishment regarding the possibility of developing relations with it. The main issues on which differences remain are Iran's position on the Syrian issue, its support for the terrorist organizations Hamas and Hezbollah, and the violation of human rights in the country. In Iran, despite the conclusion of the Vienna Agreement, this issue is at the center of the internal political struggle between supporters of the reform camp and conservatives. At the same time, the public distancing of the country's spiritual leader Ayatollah Khamenei from the United States and joining the hardliners may be tactical in nature. At the same time, we should not expect a sharp improvement in relations between Iran and the United States in the near future. As for the development of Iran's economic and political relations with the countries of the European Union, this direction is much more promising.

S. B. Druzhilovsky (MGIMO University) The Russian Foreign Ministry) addressed the issue of Iran's role in the creation of the Shiite crescent, that is, an arc in which Iran as the leader, Yemen, Bahrain, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon-countries with a predominantly or significant share of the Shiite population-should become participants. Today, the Persian Gulf region is characterized by social divisions, the strengthening of radical Islamist groups calling for the overthrow of the ruling regimes, as well as Sunni-Shiite contradictions, which, according to some analysts, are the main regional problem. It is believed that the starting point for the Sunni-Shiite confrontation was the Islamic Revolution in Iran, whose leadership took a course to export the Islamic revolution, which was one of the reasons that began in 1980. The Iran-Iraq War. And only after its inglorious end, the Iranian authorities removed the thesis of exporting the Islamic revolution from the agenda. However the Arab countries in response to the claims of Iran created the Cooperation Council for Arab States Per-

The Gulf Arab States have begun to discriminate against Iran in ensuring security in the region, and Iran has become their main irritant. Questions of Iran's incorrect behavior towards neighboring Arab countries are not as relevant for them as its desire to create a Shiite crescent hostile to Sunni states. At the same time, according to the speaker, there is no such task in the strategic plans of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Arab countries are wasting their forces and resources to combat a non-existent threat. Nor is there any Shiite unity in the Muslim world. The latter also applies to the fundamental principle of Iranian statehood "Velayat-e Faqih" and the hierarchy of Shiite shrines. Iraqi Shiites are sensitive to Iran's attempts to position itself as the leader of the Islamic world, Yemeni Houthis and Syrian Alawites also profess their own version of Shiism, and the ruling regimes of Bahrain with the support of Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries look quite strong. At the same time, Iran's financial capabilities for large-scale support of its allies are very limited, so the idea of creating an anti-Sunni Shiite crescent led by Iran looks unrealistic.

A. I. Polishchuk (Institute of Information Technology of the Russian Academy of Sciences) addressed the problems of Iran's security in a regional context and spoke about its multidimensional nature - political security, the territory and the country as a whole, as well as food, energy, transport, medical and others, while emphasizing ideological or religious-ideological security. According to the speaker, the Iranian leadership considers one of the ways to strengthen the country's security to be the creation of strong economic ties, mutual linking of economies, which makes it impossible to undermine the security of a neighbor as economically unprofitable. However, the predominance of political motives in the form of sanctions in recent events in relations between countries undermines the security of the countries to which they are applied. In this regard, Iran has long put forward the thesis of self-reliance, as well as the idea of "economic resistance" - reducing the level of dependence on external factors.

To ensure its security, Iran adheres to the concept of projecting its cultural, political and economic influence on neighboring regions, which was facilitated by the aggressive policies of the United States and Western countries. The elimination of the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the support of the Syrian opposition helped strengthen Iran's position in the region, and the latter helped to gain allies in the face of Russia and, to a certain extent, China. The forecast of possible scenarios of threats to Iran's security from neighboring countries may look like this: Turkey, a NATO member, a supporter of the Syrian opposition, an opponent of the Kurds, has long-standing religious and ethnic differences with Iran, has repeatedly fought with it in the past, but is unlikely to go to direct aggression against Iran; Iran and Azerbaijan are going to a dispute over coastal oil and gas fields in the Caspian Sea, relations are quite tense, but the likelihood of conflict is low; Armenia is a natural ally due to strained relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey; Georgia is neutral, but if it joins NATO, it can pose a threat as a springboard for an attack on Iran; Turkmenistan in the current situation is a natural ally. Pakistan is safe for Iran; Afghanistan is dangerous as a source of infiltration by Taliban supporters, drugs, refugees and separatists; and Pakistan and Iran have strained relations due to religious and ethnic differences and support for the Taliban and the GCC. Thus, in the face of the growing threat of a military clash, one of the most important factors for ensuring security for Iran remains the strengthening of its own armed forces and building up its defensive potential.

A number of reports were devoted to Iran's relations with neighboring states. V. V. Evseev (Institute of CIS Countries) analyzed Russian-Iranian cooperation in resolving the Syrian crisis. Examining the current military situation in the Syrian Arab Republic and the fighting of the Syrian national army with the support of Russian aviation, its successes and failures, the speaker concluded that, despite the support of Russia and Iran, the Syrian national army is not yet able to control the situation at the front and simultaneously carry out large-scale offensives in various directions, not only because of the so-called fatigue of the Syrian army, which is waging a war against radical Islamists for the fifth year, but also because of the insufficiently high combat capability of the Iranian units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Due to a number of reasons, in particular due to the crash of a Russian plane over the Sinai Peninsula, Russia and Iran were forced to consider strengthening their military presence in Syria, using long-range aviation of the aerospace forces and warships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and possibly providing artillery support in the future.

At the same time, the Vienna format for the settlement of the Syrian crisis is developing, in which Iran is present precisely at the insistence of Russia, whose position has long been ignored by the West and the United States.

the monarchies of the Persian Gulf. However, according to the speaker, progress in the negotiations on the Syrian problem and the rejection of harsh ultimatum rhetoric of the parties are possible only if a serious military defeat is inflicted on the Islamist radicals. With the mediation of the Sultanate of Oman, such compromises are being worked out as holding presidential elections in Syria without Bashar al-Assad's participation, developing guarantees from international justice bodies and individual countries on judicial amnesty for representatives of the Syrian ruling power, transferring a significant part of power from the president to the future elected prime minister, and maintaining the military presence of Russia and Iran in Syria for the medium term.

The result of the rather successful second multilateral meeting on Syria in Vienna in October 2015 was an agreement to start immediate negotiations with Syrian opposition groups to form a transitional government in the next six months and to prepare a new constitution, as well as to hold parliamentary elections in the country within 18 months, with close Russian-Iranian cooperation. Thus, Russia initiated the Vienna process, insisted on Tehran's participation in it, and outlined the terms of forming a transitional government and holding parliamentary elections in Syria. By the end of this period, Russia and Iran should basically stop the armed confrontation and start restoring the country's economy.

The report of D. B. Malysheva (IB RAS) considered the problem of interaction between Russia and Iran in the post-Soviet space. The speaker noted that the positions of Russia and Iran on a number of issues - the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts, relations with Israel, the monarchies of the Persian Gulf, the Afghan crisis do not coincide in everything. Russian-Iranian cooperation in the post-Soviet space is characterized by positive dynamics, where the priority task of both states remains to build good-neighborly relations. For Iran in this region, such factors as the possibility of using the territory of the Caspian littoral states, the South Caucasus and Central Asia (Turkmenistan) for the transportation of oil and gas products from Iran to Asia (India, Pakistan, Afghanistan) and Europe; the prospect of connecting to the north - south transport corridor with access through Georgia to the Black Sea are of priority. Iran-Europe trade relations; access to necessary goods and technologies and export of its own services; maintaining regional security; countering ethnic separatism, religious extremism and transnational terrorism. At the same time, the interests of Iran and Russia coincide on a number of parameters, both states strive to maintain the status quo here and prevent the establishment of non-regional forces (the United States/NATO), whose activities are often considered by Moscow and Tehran as threatening their interests and undermining the security of regional states.

As for Iran's policy towards the South Caucasus, until recently it was content with the role of an outside observer and took a very modest part in the events taking place north of its borders. However, the agreement on the Iranian nuclear program makes it possible for Iran to get out of isolation, get closer to the West and, as a result, change its policy, in particular in active proselytizing activities in areas of traditional Muslim residence. However, according to D. B. Malysheva, there are a number of objective factors in Iran's relations with the states of the South Caucasus in the political and religious spheres. First, the Turkic-speaking peoples of this region are more wary of Iran than Turkey, which declares its commitment to a secular model. Secondly, it is the presence of other states that want to strengthen their influence in such an important geopolitical space. Finally, Iran has little economic potential to increase its economic influence in the South Caucasus region. Since the political situation in the former Soviet Union is undergoing an important stage of redistribution of forces and balances, the events developing here in dynamics can be adjusted depending on certain actions of Iran.

Irina Ivanova (Institute of International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences) focused on the Turkish-Iranian relations, which, in her opinion, for many years serve as an example of a combination of bilateral cooperation and competition for regional leadership, which has been quite clearly manifested in the last decade. An important issue in relations between Ankara and Tehran was the Iranian nuclear program. Turkey has always adhered to the principle of a diplomatic settlement of the problem with an emphasis on excluding the military option, which has been repeatedly voiced by representatives of the top Turkish leadership. Turkey, taking advantage of its position as an interim member of the UN Security Council, voted against the introduction of international sanctions against Iran in June 2010, which played a positive role in strengthening relations with Tehran. At the same time, the events of the Arab Spring, which began in 2011, have led to serious changes in the status quo in the Middle East, which has become the object of conflict.-

Turkey-Iran trade routes. At the same time, Iran began to support the Syrian regime, and Turkey - the Syrian anti-government forces, betting on the regime change of Bashar al-Assad. The lifting of sanctions on Iran and its economic strengthening make it an important trading partner for Turkey in the future, and in political terms it can be considered as a means of rapprochement with Tehran. However, certain difficulties and obstacles remain in the relations between the two countries. Iran claims to be a regional power and continues its policy towards Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Thus, the views of Iran and Turkey, which also claims to be a regional power, differ on many issues, primarily on Syria.

N. A. Zamaraeva (Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences) gave a speech on the problem of Pakistan-Iran relations. Over the past 15 years, Pakistan-Iran relations have been developing unsteadily, the amplitude of their activity and a sharp slowdown depending on many factors: the political situation on the world stage, regional events, as well as the positions and personal initiatives of the heads of both states. When President X came to power in 2013. Rouhani Iran has stepped up relations with Pakistan, and the signing of the Vienna Agreements in July 2015 gave an additional impetus to the acceleration of economic cooperation. It should be noted that Pakistan joined the international economic sanctions against Iran in 2013, and subsequently ignored all foreign policy agreements, first of all the signing of the gas agreement between the two countries in March 2013. As a result of Pakistan's response, the trade turnover has fallen sharply in the last two years from $ 2 billion in 2013 to $ 300 million in 2014-2015.

The purpose of the two visits of Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif to Pakistan (April and August 2015) was to discuss the status of energy and hydrocarbon projects, including the construction of a power transmission line to supply the port of Gwadar. In April 2015, Iran and Pakistan began developing a "Five-Year strategic Plan" that includes increasing trade in border areas, upgrading road and rail networks, etc. Pakistan, taking advantage of the revival of economic ties, appealed to Iran to lift the ban on rice imports. The Pakistan-Iran gas pipeline project remains a priority for the two countries, but so far none of the points of the agreement has been implemented. At the same time, Iran considers Pakistan as one of the three options for its connection to the Chinese market. The political component of Zarif's visits to Pakistan was the search for ways to achieve unity in the Muslim world by resolving regional conflicts, the fight against ISIS, as well as cooperation to curb drug smuggling and trafficking. Spring 2015 Pakistan has confirmed that it will not join the anti-Iranian coalition, nor will it take sides in the situation in the Middle East.

The topic proposed for discussion at the conference, as well as the reports heard, aroused great interest of those present and became the subject of discussion, during which individual thoughts on the issues considered were expressed. E. B. Boev (Lobachevsky State University of Nizhny Novgorod) presented Iran's position on the prospects of Russian-Iranian cooperation in the Middle East in modern conditions. The potential of bilateral cooperation in this region, according to the Iranian side, includes a wide range of areas of interaction, which is primarily due to the balanced foreign policy strategy of the two countries, based on protecting their own state interests and striving to maintain stability and security in the region. Z. A. Arabajyan (Gazprom) drew the attention of the audience to the fact that at the present stage humanity has reached the threshold of a major war, which is caused by both political and economic reasons. In his opinion, it can start with a strike on Israel by Iran, which has a political and ideological basis for such an act, modern weapons and delivery systems. Of course, a strike on Israel is fraught with retaliatory destructive actions for Iran. However, E. L. Zhigun (Institute of Middle East Studies), speaking about Israel's position in the Syrian conflict, noted that the Israeli leadership would like to establish relations with Iran, but Iran cannot abandon its doctrine regarding Israel. A think tank in the United States conducted a study in 2008 on what would happen if a war broke out between Iran and Israel, and concluded that Israel would lose a great deal, and Iran would disappear from the face of the earth altogether. But at present, an Israeli military operation against Iran is impossible, because the United States objects to it. Yu. I. concluded the discussion. Ilina (Institute of Islamic Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences) analyzed the concept of the "Islamic State", which is the core of the Iranian state ideology, showing its role in increasing Iran's influence on religious and political processes in the Middle East (the Syrian conflict, the fight against ISIS), which suggests an increase in the popularity and significance of the Islamic state of Iran in the future.

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