On April 10, 2006, the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences hosted a scientific conference "Iran's Place and Role in the region", which was attended by representatives of Moscow research centers, educational institutions, and employees of the Iranian Embassy in Russia. 20 reports were presented on various aspects of Iran's regional policy.

M. Imanipour (Iran) noted that regional policy has been and remains a priority for Iran. He drew attention to the fact that recently Iran's relations with its neighbors have been greatly influenced by the United States and Israel. Speaking about the Israeli-Palestinian issue, he explained the official point of view of Iran. E. Y. Satanovsky (Institute of Middle East Studies) also focused on the relations between Iran and Israel in the light of Iran's nuclear program. Noting the objective commonality of mutual interests, both geopolitical and economic, he expressed confidence that the establishment of Iranian-Israeli relations could also contribute to the optimal solution of Iran's nuclear program.

In her report "Iran and the SCO", N. M. Mammadova (Institute of Strategic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences) identified four stages in the regional policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran:

1. This stage can be defined as an ideological one. Iran counted on the spread of the Islamic revolution in new Muslim states and assigned a significant role to Muslim countries in its policy.

2. By the mid-1990s, the economic factor was becoming the main factor, so as economic interests were perceived as national, priorities began to change towards contacts with developed countries and Russia.

3. Strengthening the position of Russia and especially the United States in the region.

4. With the neoconservatives coming to power in Iran, the most pressing issue in Iran's relations with the United States and Europe has become nuclear. Iran has stepped up its activities in regional organizations and taken a special interest in the SCO.

Participation in the SCO meets the goals of Iran's regional policy. According to the drafters of the new state program "Twenty-Year Perspective", Iran in 20 years should take the first place in the region in terms of economic, scientific and cultural development. Iran's national interests now include the nuclear program as an indicator of its economic and scientific potential. Does this policy really reflect real national interests? There is no doubt that it is advisable to increase the country's economic potential and turn it into an energy and transport center of the region. Iran has natural resources, especially energy resources, and has experienced the transition of the economy to a market basis while maintaining social protection of the population. More dubious is the promotion of the nuclear program as a national task. Of course, the implementation of a nuclear program increases credibility in the region, but it also increases Iran's vulnerability.

It is obvious that the main goal of the United States in relation to Iran is not the nuclear program itself, but the change of the existing regime, Mammadova said. Disagreements with the United States make it possible to move the chain of "color revolutions" to the territory of Iran. The implementation of this project is facilitated not only by the fact that there is an opposition in the country, but also by the ethnic structure of the population. This increases the danger of the development of separatist movements, and it is now that ethnic opposition movements are particularly active. Encouraging such movements from outside can lead not only to regime change, but also to the collapse of the country. It is Russia and China, which are the "heavyweights" of the SCO, who do not yet agree with the adoption of force measures by the Security Council against

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Iran. The only regional organization of which Iran is a member, the Organization for Economic Cooperation (ECO), is virtually inactive and has not expressed its opinion on resolving the conflict over Iran's nuclear program.

In its policy, Iran began to pay more and more attention to the Chinese direction. For China, Iran is primarily a source of energy raw materials (second only to Saudi Arabia in terms of oil supplies to China). At the end of 2004, a 25-year contract was signed with Iran, which provides for the supply of liquefied natural gas from the South Pars field. China is involved in the development of the Zavare Kashan oil field, and negotiations are underway on its participation in the development of the South Pars, North Azadegan, and Yadavaran fields. Chinese companies are firmly established in the Iranian market. In 2004, the trade turnover between the PRC and the Islamic Republic of Iran amounted to $ 5.5 billion, with $ 3.2 billion in total. It is accounted for by Iranian exports. China has received a contract for the construction of an aluminum plant with a capacity of 300 thousand tons per year, and is participating in the construction of a copper smelter in Ostan (Kerman province). A joint multi-purpose communications satellite launch project is under development. A $ 600 million project to complete the Isfahan-Shiraz railway line (503 km) is being financed by China. The strengthening of China's economic position in Iran reduces the likelihood of the latter supporting Islamic groups in Xinjiang. Iran views China (as well as Russia) as a deterrent to US influence in the region. According to Mammadova, its participation in the SCO can have the most diverse consequences. Economic cooperation with it is beneficial for the members of this organization, since it is a source of energy resources and has a developed transport system. Since the early 1990s, Iran has been developing its economy on a market-based basis and pursuing a policy of attracting foreign investment. And from an economic point of view, Iranian participation can contribute to the creation of a common market within both the SCO and Central Asian countries.

At the same time, Iran's participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, even as an observer, can strengthen the anti-American orientation of the organization, give an element of confrontationalism in its relations with both individual countries and international organizations. But the Iranian involvement, in turn, can be used by the SCO countries to put pressure on the United States. Apparently, it would be best to keep Iran as an observer of the organization, since this would not impose on it responsibility for Iran's actions, which could significantly harm the already established relations between Russia, China, and India with the United States. Moreover, the SCO can also be useful for the United States as a means of exerting some influence on Iran. In addition, despite the confrontation with the United States, Iran has played (at certain stages) and may play in the future a deterrent role to separatist movements in Afghanistan and Iraq. One should not lose sight of the fact that Iran's presence in the SCO strengthens its Islamic component and may in the long term become to some extent a factor in curbing Chinese expansion in the Eurasian space.

Iran hopes that joining the SCO will contribute to the development of its cooperation in the region, as well as reduce the negative impact of US sanctions that restrict the flow of foreign investment.

V. I. Sazhin (Voice of Russia Radio) in his speech " Is Iran a regional Superpower?" He noted that the leadership of Iran considers the transformation of the country into a regional superpower as its historical mission. The speaker asked the question: why exactly is it necessary for the radical conservative clerical Iranian elite to radicalize politics and return to the propaganda rhetoric of the first years of the Islamic revolution? V. I. Sazhin believes that as a result of the policy of economic liberalization carried out since 1990, the country has become stronger and has become one of the leading countries in the Middle East. However, despite all the socio-economic advantages of the reforms, they objectively led the society further and further away from the general line of Khomeism. The majority of the conservative Iranian clergy could not allow this and therefore supported M. Ahmadinejad. Although he is a secular man, he sincerely considers himself a soldier and a direct messenger of the 12th hidden Imam Mahdi.

The main concern of the international community is the sharp radicalization of the country's foreign policy. M. Ahmadinejad feels the support of powerful structures within the country. First of all, these are radical groups of the clergy, in particular, associates of Ahmadinejad's spiritual mentor, Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, who heads a major theological center.

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the Qom center, as well as Islamic foundations, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its subordinate Basij resistance forces. The ruling elite, represented by the new president, has come to the conclusion that it is time to declare Iran as the world center of Islamic civilization, an unwavering fighter for the ideals of Islam, uniting all Muslims against "global Zionism and American imperialism", as a superpower in the region.

Ahmadinejad seeks to rally disparate radical conservative groups around him. Toughness and persistence in the nuclear issue add to his popularity, as all layers of Iranian society want to see Iran as a nuclear power. V. I. Sazhin noted that by fomenting the Middle East conflict, Tehran provides assistance to various kinds of extremist forces.

The negotiation process on Iran's nuclear program, which has been going on for several years, has reached an impasse. In parallel with its implementation, the country is being militarized. According to various sources, the total number of regular Iranian armed forces, including the army, the IRGC, the Basij resistance forces, and the Kode special forces, is up to 1 million people (for comparison, Russia has a little more). Iran views missile weapons as an important part of its program to develop unconventional weapons (i.e., weapons that fall under international restrictive laws). The implementation of this program will allow it to create a threat to its existing and potential opponents. With the appearance of the Shihab-3 missiles with a range of 1300 - 1500 km or more, which are now on combat duty, Iran has become a missile power. New generations of Shihab-4, -5, -6, which are capable of hitting a target at a distance of 1800 (Shihab-4) to 6400 km (Shihab-6), are in the stage of design improvements and testing.

Ayatollah Khomeini's multi-layered strategic, doctrinal vision of making Iran the center of the Muslim world and a regional superpower has once again become the cornerstone of Iranian politics.

The question cannot help but arise: why is Iran so eager for hegemony? V. I. Sazhin believes that this is the result of several fundamental factors:

1. The geopolitical factor. Iran really plays one of the dominant roles in the most important region of the planet - West Asia. It is worth reminding that Iran has huge reserves of hydrocarbon natural resources and its territory is convenient for transporting oil and gas products by sea and land. Iran has created one of the most numerous armies in the world, and is objectively a decisive factor in regional politics;

2. Military-political factor. Today, Iran is surrounded, if not by enemies, then at least by enemies or even potential opponents. Its main opponent, the United States - the "big Satan" - has concentrated its military power on almost three sides - from the west in Iraq, from the east in Afghanistan, and from the south in the Persian and Oman Gulfs. NATO's Turkey, as well as Azerbaijan and Georgia, are focused primarily on Washington. On the other side of the Persian Gulf , Sunni Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are very wary of their powerful Shiite neighbor and, of course, do not consider Iran as an ally. And finally, in the Middle East, the role of Israel is essential - this, in Iranian terminology," little Satan", which Iran denies the right to exist at all.

3. National psychological factor. In spiritual and religious terms, Iran has been the center of world Shiism for almost six centuries. At present, Iranian psychology, which is a fusion of great-power imperial nationalism and Shiite electability, has become a political factor. Here, it seems, lies the main reason for Tehran's ambition and "nuclear stubbornness".

Iran is making a strong case not only regionally, but also globally. In April 2006, according to a radio report, the IRGC commander-in-chief, Division General Yahya Rahim-Safavi, demanded that the United States and European countries "recognize Iran as a great regional power."

Thus, a new regional center of forces is being formed in the Middle East - the Islamic Republic of Iran. Its potential is nuclear technologies for the production of an atomic bomb.

Speaking with comments M. Imanipour noted that M. Ahmadinejad did not make any statements about the arrival of Mahdi mentioned in V. I. Sazhin's report. As for the president's statement that "Israel should be erased from the political map", which all the media reported as

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"wiped off the face of the earth," which means the physical destruction of the Jewish people, is something Iran will never allow. He also outlined Tehran's official position on the nuclear program, focusing on Iran's rights as a member of the NPT.

A. K. Lukoyanov (IB RAS) devoted his report to the problem of the survival of the IRI regime. He noted that Iran has been in a specific state in recent years, which can be described as a state of protecting its state system from an external factor that threatens not only the Iranian regime, but even the integrity of this country. The United States acts as this external factor. As a result of the 1979 revolution, America lost its military bases in Iran, which, of course, weakened its military and political presence in the Middle East. Over time, the Iranian leadership has actually gradually returned to the realization of the same goals in the region that the Shah's government set for itself - to become the strongest regional power. Iran has managed to create a combat-ready armed force to protect its national interests, equipped with modern weapons that the Shah could only dream of. After the US invasion of Iraq and the destruction of the former Iraqi statehood, with the help of the Americans, it became possible to expand the sphere of Iran's most active influence on Iraq and regional problems.

Iran, therefore, becomes an extremely dangerous competitor for the Americans in the region, which they see as a zone of exclusively their national interests. Today, the Iranian regime is actually forced to fight for its own survival by all means available to it. Moreover, he believes that he has the right to resort to the same methods and means of protection that are used by the so-called civilized world and great powers to ensure their interests. A. K. Lukoyanov drew attention to the fact that the media controlled by the United States are trying to discredit the existing regime in Iran, which is invariably considered almost non-existent. as a threat to all of humanity. Under the current circumstances, Lukoyanov said, Iran is trying to survive virtually alone, since it does not have a single reliable political partner.

Speaking about relations with Russia, the speaker noted that Russia should not have any illusions about Iran. Its production and economic base is so seriously undermined that it is unable to independently ensure even the fulfillment of those contracts that can be obtained on the Iranian market. In addition, we must not forget about the specifics of US-Iranian relations after the revolution, when in fact the Iranians objectively played along with the United States, inciting anti-Russian and anti-Russian sentiments in the CIS. Bosnia was supplied with weapons from Iran in violation of UN regulations, but with the consent of the United States. Russia opposes the current US policy towards Iran solely because it is unproductive and dangerous, as it provokes further activation of Islamist extremism and the development of a latent confrontation into an open conflict that will not be beneficial to us.

Sergey Druzhilovsky (MGIMO University of the Russian Foreign Ministry) devoted his report to the problems of relations between Iran and Israel. Along with his personal assessment of the nature and specifics of Iran-Israel relations, he analyzed some of the speeches of Israeli and foreign experts at an international conference held at the J. Shash Institute in Jerusalem in May 2005, which discussed Iran-Israel relations in the light of the activation of the Iranian nuclear program. This seems strange at first glance, given that unlike the Arabs, the Persians never fought with the Jews. This is confirmed by the fact that before the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Iran-Israel relations developed in a friendly way, and the development of the Iranian nuclear program, initiated by the Shah of Iran with the consent of the United States, did not cause Israel any objections, just as the Iranian Shah was quite calm about the development of the Israeli nuclear program.

The situation changed after Ayatollah Khomeini came to power in Iran, who, while proclaiming the new foreign policy concepts of "Exporting the Islamic Revolution" and "Neither East nor West", pointed to Israel as one of the main obstacles to their implementation. At the same time, R. Khomeini has repeatedly stressed that we are talking about the State of Israel and its Zionist and pro-American essence, and not about Jews in general, including those living in Iran. The aggravation of Iran-Israel relations at the present time, according to S. B. Druzhilovsky, is connected with the desire of the Islamic Republic of Iran to turn into a regional power and rally all neighboring Muslim states around it. At the same time, the choice of time had an impact-

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This is quite successful for Tehran, given that the irrational and generally unsuccessful actions of the United States in the region are forcing the peoples living here to pay more and more attention to the dynamically developing Iran with its "Islamic model" of development. The ongoing nuclear program, designed to further strengthen the position of Iran in the region, cannot but alarm Israel, which prefers not to have strong competitors in the region. Thus, the United States and Israel view the Iranian nuclear issue from the point of view of whether Iran will become an influential regional power that will ultimately be able to create an unacceptable Muslim anti-Western pole for these countries. At the same time, in the current international situation, a military solution by Israel to the Iranian problem is unlikely.

Irina Svistunova (MGIMO), analyzing the relations between Iran and Turkey, which claim to be leaders in the region, noted that in recent years the development of Turkish-Iranian relations has been significantly influenced by the Iraqi factor and the Iranian nuclear issue. The current situation in northern Iraq, where a de facto Kurdish state exists, forces both Turkey and Iran to come to terms with the federal structure of Iraq, which they strongly opposed earlier, and actively search for a new political line in relation to the Iraqi Kurds.

It is worth noting that the Turkish-Iranian rapprochement was not limited to joint political declarations, but was also reflected in other areas of cooperation. The trade turnover between the two countries began to grow, the mutual reduction of customs duties contributed to the development of cross-border trade, and a joint duty-free trade center was established in the Turkish village of Kapikey near the border with Iran. In May 2004, Turkey and Iran signed an agreement on cross-border issues, which provided for joint border security measures and regular consultations of border services. In 2004. Iran has announced its intention to fight the Kongra-Gel (new name - PKK) militants. It is noteworthy that the positive dynamics in the development of Turkish-Iranian relations come at a time when the United States increased pressure on the international community to isolate Iran, accusing its leadership of developing nuclear weapons. Turkey recognizes Iran's right to develop peaceful nuclear energy and at the same time calls on the Iranian leadership not to abandon a constructive dialogue with Western countries.

The coming to power of President Ahmadinejad in Iran, who took a confrontational position in international negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program, made it necessary for the Turkish leadership to develop a clear line on the "nuclear problem", not limited to general statements. The possibility of an embargo against Iran raises fears of serious economic damage, and if the worst-case scenario is realized and the United States attacks Iran, Turkey will find itself in a very difficult situation, when it will again have to choose between its regional interests and relations with the United States. At the same time, the possibility of Iran becoming a nuclear power means an unprecedented increase in its military power, and therefore its regional influence, which does not suit Turkey at all. Despite the fact that the Turkish leadership denies the possibility of a "nuclear competition" in official statements, Turkey has significantly stepped up research in the field of developing nuclear energy that can meet the country's growing energy needs. In turn, Iran invited Turkish specialists to join the nuclear project. In general, the Iranian nuclear issue has raised the importance of Turkish-Iranian relations to an international level. Currently, there are prerequisites for further development and deepening of Turkish-Iranian cooperation in a range of areas that meet the long-term interests of each of the parties.

E. S. Melkumyan (ISAA at Moscow State University) in the report " Iran in the Persian Gulf region. Security concerns" pointed out that Iran's position in the region depends on relations with neighboring Arab states. The Persian Gulf region has traditionally been a battleground for the three leading regional powers-Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. After the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, neighboring Arab countries-members of the regional organization Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) - became the object of Iran's course aimed at "exporting the Islamic revolution". The situation was further aggravated during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), when some GCC member countries (Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) We have provided great financial and political support to Iraq. However, the States of the Cooperation Council sought to end the war, which was a source of regional tension.-

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in the context of regional instability, and took mediation steps. Iran's condemnation of the aggression committed by Iraq against Kuwait in 1990 helped normalize the situation in the region and resolve a number of contradictions that existed between Iran and Saudi Arabia, as well as members of the GCC led by it.

A fundamentally new situation emerged after the military operation of the US-led coalition forces in Iraq and the fall of the S-400 regime. Hussein. Although both Iran and the Gulf Arab countries supported regime change, their attitudes toward the actions of the coalition forces were different. Iran's anti-American policy was at the heart of its more critical attitude on this issue, although the positions of Iran and the GCC member States on the future development of Iraq coincided. Both sides supported the return of Iraq's independence and sovereignty and the restoration of its active role as a participant in regional relations. For all the Gulf States, the issue of preserving the unity of Iraq is of fundamental importance. They are aware that the danger of its disintegration will lead to an aggravation of the situation in this region. The creation of new independent States in Iraq will mean not only a change in the regional balance of power, but also an opportunity for separatist forces in other countries to follow suit.

The GCC countries are also extremely concerned about Iran's development of its nuclear program. Contradictions between Iran and the countries of the Cooperation Council are also caused by the problem of ensuring regional security. The GCC collective security system largely depends on security relations with leading Western States. The Arab States of the Gulf support the idea that the security of the region, which is of paramount importance for the state of the world economy, should be the responsibility of the leading world Powers. After the settlement of the situation in Iraq and its active involvement in resolving regional issues, it can be assumed that Iran's position in the region will be weakened, since Iraq is likely to stand in solidarity with other Arab States on all regional issues. However, given its difficult international situation, it is extremely important for Iran to establish strong contacts with the States of the region and develop cooperation with them in various fields, not exacerbating existing contradictions, but trying to find ways to resolve them.

E. V. Dunayeva (IB RAS) in her report "Iran and the problem of the Iraqi settlement" noted that political analysts in Tehran consider the Iraqi crisis to be the most significant international event and assess it not only as a regional crisis. They understand that the situation in Iraq after the overthrow of the regime of Saddam Hussein, in addition to the presence of foreign troops on the borders, is characterized by the presence of factors that can also lead to the disintegration of Iraq and serious destabilization of the situation in the region. Iran is particularly concerned about the Kurdish factor. Over the past three years, there has been a certain deterioration in the situation in the neighboring Kurdish regions of Iran, which was a consequence of the political processes taking place in Iraqi Kurdistan. Given the rather tense military and political situation in Iraq and the search for ways to meet the interests of both ethnic and religious groups, the Islamic Republic of Iran is making active efforts to protect its interests in this country. It supports the preservation of Iraq within its political and geographical borders and strongly protests against the federal structure of the country on an ethnic basis. The leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran demands an early withdrawal of all foreign military contingents from the territory of Iraq, as it sees their presence as the cause of instability both inside Iraq and in its border territories. According to E. V. Dunayeva, the Shiite factor remains the main one in Tehran's Iraqi policy and is used both to strengthen the position of Shiite Iraqi groups and to restrain the national ambitions of Kurdish organizations.

However, recently there has been a desire of Tehran to smooth out the Sunni-Shiite contradictions, especially in the context of the deteriorating situation in Iraq. The Iranian leadership fears that fueling these contradictions may lead to a deterioration of Tehran's relations with most Arab countries, and, accordingly, to a weakening of its regional positions. E. V. Dunayeva believes that Tehran has a significant influence on the development of the situation in Iraq, which is based on religious and family ties. This influence also explains Iran's proposal to hold direct talks with the United States on the issue of the Iraqi settlement. Statement by the Head of the Supreme National Security Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran, A. Larijani

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On 24.03.06, the announcement of Iran's consent to negotiations and confirmation of the possibility of holding them by the country's religious leader A. Khamenei was completely unexpected. It should be noted that these decisions coincided with the transfer of the Iranian nuclear dossier to the UN Security Council, and were accompanied by increased pressure on Iran by throwing information about the upcoming military operation against Iran and Iran's destabilizing role in Iraq. The topic of possible negotiations caused a mixed reaction within the country and even revealed contradictions in the camp of radicals in power.

L. M. Kulagina and V. M. Akhmedov (both from the Institute of Foreign Policy of the Russian Academy of Sciences) presented a general report "Iran's Foreign Policy in the Arab East", which focused on Iran's relations with Syria and Lebanon. It was noted that despite the internal political transformations in Iran and Syria and the changing situation around them, relations between Damascus and Tehran have acquired a partnership character. The Syrian-Iranian cooperation is based on common regional interests and similar positions on key issues in the Middle East. A powerful impetus to cooperation between the two countries was given during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988 and the Israeli aggression in Lebanon in 1982. Events in Lebanon led to the creation of the Hezbollah organization in this country. The organization is quite strongly connected with Damascus and Tehran. Through the prism of the attitude towards Hezbollah, the policy of Syria and Iran towards Lebanon is largely determined. At the moment, the situation in Lebanon is in the scale of priorities of Syrian and Iranian strategic interests in the region. With Iran's support, Syria hopes to ease international pressure on Damascus over Lebanon. At the same time, Syria hopes to preserve the its influence on the processes taking place in this country in the context of the withdrawal of Syrian troops from there. In turn, Iran hopes for the support of the Lebanese Hezbollah. Syria and Iran consider "Hezbollah" and other organizations of political Islam ("Hamas", "Jihad Islamiy") as a serious factor in countering Israel's attempts to strengthen its position in the Levant to the detriment of Syrian-Iranian interests in the region. According to the authors of the report, Ahmadinejad's visit to Damascus in late January 2006 was noteworthy in this regard.One of the important tasks of this visit was to coordinate the positions of the two countries in response to the US attempts to isolate them in the international arena. According to some reports, special agreements were concluded in case of international sanctions against Iran (nuclear program) and the SAR (investigation of the assassination of R. Hariri). Tehran expressed its readiness to expand the scope of military-technical cooperation with Damascus, as well as to provide the necessary financial and investment support to Syria in order to overcome the negative consequences of US economic pressure. At the same time, the emphasis, according to V. M. Akhmedov and L. M. Kulagina, is placed on joint development in the field of defense research and military-technical projects. Damascus is particularly interested in modernizing and strengthening its missile armament. Ahmadinejad and Bashar al-Assad issued a joint statement on their readiness to promote national accord and stability in Iraq.

This alignment of approaches between Damascus and Tehran on Iraq proved particularly unpleasant for the United States, which itself contributed to the strengthening of Iranian influence in Iraq. In 2005, the United States allowed two important agreements to be signed between Iran and Iraq. One concerned the exchange of intelligence to ensure security and maintain stability. Other issues related to the development of bilateral trade and economic cooperation and the expansion of Iranian exports to Iraq.

Nevertheless, the approaches of Tehran and Damascus to the problem of settlement in Iraq cannot be considered as absolutely identical. Iran's position on Iraq, voiced by Ahmadinejad during his visit to Damascus, boils down to the fact that the establishment of popular-patriotic power in Iraq is the only way to solve the problem. Damascus seeks to build its relations with Baghdad on the basis of the ideology of Arab nationalism and the principles of pan-Arab solidarity. The construction of a future Iraqi independent state is seen in Damascus more on the Syrian model than on the Lebanese one. However, under the current circumstances, Syria and Iran understand that the problem of their own security must be considered comprehensively, based on common interests.

Iran and Syria demonstrate a similar approach to Lebanon and Palestine. However, according to the authors of the report, unlike Damascus, Tehran has much more extensive geopolitical ambitions in the region. The latter circumstance is the subject of growing concern of the leading States of the Arab East with a predominantly Sunni population.

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Egypt and Saudi Arabia are concerned about the growing influence of Iran in the region, especially against the background of Tehran's openly demonstrated military power and plans to develop a nuclear program. In this regard, Cairo and Riyadh have recently taken active steps to prevent the strengthening of Iranian influence in the region. To this end, during bilateral contacts with the Syrian leadership, they are trying to convince Damascus of the futility of long-term cooperation with Iran in the face of Tehran's growing international isolation and the continued likelihood of a missile and bomb attack on Iranian territory by the United States and Israel. At the same time, Egypt and Saudi Arabia are making it clear to Damascus that they can, on the one hand, contribute to the resumption of Syria's dialogue with the United States, and on the other, ensure Damascus ' interests in Lebanon. A particularly active position is taken by Saudi Arabia, which seeks to limit Iran's role in Lebanon in every possible way in order to establish itself as a regional leader in the Arab East and in the Islamic world. That is why Saudi leaders have taken several important steps towards Syria in the past few months.

But Cairo and Riyadh have so far failed to convince Damascus of their ability to secure Syrian interests in Lebanon. But the alliance with Tehran allows Damascus to implement its main idea - to maintain control over Lebanon in order to ensure its own security. The need to establish closer cooperation with Tehran on Iraq, and in particular on the Kurdish issue, is also indicated in a closed report prepared recently by the International Center for Strategic Studies of Turkey. The report also expresses concern that if Israel launches a missile and bomb attack on Iran, the possibility of a direct military confrontation between Syria and Israel cannot be ruled out. Thus, Damascus and Tehran are now acting as allies and skillfully taking advantage of such an alliance in protecting their interests in the region. The strength of the Damascus-Tehran axis is greatly complicated by the attempts of the United States and Israel to implement their scenario of building a new political configuration in the region, primarily in Iraq and Lebanon. At the same time, the allied relations between Damascus and Tehran have borders, especially in the long term. Ultimately, Iran is concerned about the possible weakening of Syria precisely from the point of view of securing its strategic positions in the region. Tehran also cannot ignore the importance of Arab, mainly Saudi, pressure on Syria in relations with Iran, primarily on the issue of Lebanon. That is why Iran seeks to strengthen the position of the Shiite community in Lebanon (it is allocated $ 500 million a year, according to the Lebanese opposition), as well as establish direct contacts with the Lebanese government and Shiite leaders in Beirut. Syria, as a junior partner in an alliance with Iran, also has reason to fear for its future. If Tehran manages to pass the American "test" in Iraq and reach an agreement with the West on the nuclear program, then Damascus may find itself in a very difficult position.

M. R. Arunova (Institute of Internal Affairs of the Russian Academy of Sciences) in her report "On some directions of the Iranian policy in the region" noted that 2005 was the time of completion of an undoubtedly important stage in the development of Iran - the five - year plan (2000-2005) was implemented, parliamentary and presidential elections were held. Tehran is paying close attention to the difficult situation in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan. We are interested in stability in Iraq. As for its attitude to the situation in Afghanistan, Tehran is serious about developing political, trade and economic relations with Kabul in the long term. In January 2005, during the visit of the Afghan President to Iran, an agreement was signed on opening the Doragun-Herat road, supplying power to Afghan cities from Iran (construction of power lines), and setting up and equipping 25 border posts along the Afghan border by the Iranian side. In 2006, at an international conference in London, Tehran announced the provision of $ 100 million to Afghanistan. to restore the economy. Iran ranks 4th in the list of countries that invest in the Afghan economy. For the effective use of these funds, a special mechanism has been created - the headquarters for Afghanistan. The issue of establishing an Iran-Afghanistan Interstate Industrial Commission on economic issues, establishing cooperation in the transport sector with the participation of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is being resolved. An agreement was signed between Iran, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan on the development of transport links that should connect Central Asia with the Persian Gulf states. Work is being completed on the 60-kilometer Herat-Maimala section, which will become part of the communications connecting Iran through Afghan territory with the Central Asian states.

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A serious constraint on the development of Iranian-Afghan relations is the policy of the United States, which almost disrupted two visits of X. Karzai is moving to Tehran and increasing its presence in the Afghan border province of Herat. Nevertheless, it is not without reason that Kabul believes that Tehran intends to continue to cooperate even more with Afghanistan, as much as possible in the current conditions.

R. M. Mukimjanova (Institute of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Academy of Sciences), referring to the relations between Iran and Pakistan, noted that cooperation with Iran is traditionally one of the priority directions of Pakistan's foreign policy. Stability on the western borders has been and remains an important factor in strengthening the geopolitical position of this state, especially since the process of normalization of Pakistan-India relations is proceeding extremely slowly. The settlement of the foreign policy situation in neighboring Afghanistan has also been delayed, and relations between Islamabad and Kabul are often complicated. Pakistan and Iran have mutual economic interests, and communications run through the territory and along the sea coast of Iran, connecting Pakistan with a number of countries. Iran and Pakistan are members of the OIC and ECO. It is also important that Islamabad is distancing itself from the Iranian-Arab contradictions. According to R. M. Mukimjanova, the presence of an influential Shiite community in Pakistan has an ambiguous impact on Pakistani-Iranian cooperation. Shiites make up about 20% of the country's population and have considerable political and economic weight. Iran cannot but be concerned about the actions of members of extremist Sunni organizations in Pakistan directed against Shiites. At the same time, Tehran is not interested in complicating relations with Islamabad, which, in turn, is making efforts to prevent anti-Shiite actions.

At the present stage, the most difficult problem in the Iran - US - Pakistan triangle is the Iranian nuclear program. According to available information (including American ones), Pakistani specialists were involved in the development of the Iranian nuclear program. US military action against Iran would have serious negative consequences for Pakistan (and not only for it). According to R. M. Mukimjanova, in this case, the internal political situation in Pakistan (Iran borders on its most turbulent province - Balochistan) will become more complicated, anti-American sentiments will increase in the country, etc. The situation in the region adjacent to Pakistan is already complicated by the US aggression in Iraq, which Islamabad refused to support. Finally, Pakistan is afraid of losing supplies of Iranian oil and refined products.

Economic ties between Pakistan and Iran are relatively small. The trade turnover in 2004/05 amounted to $ 480 million, while it amounts to a large deficit for Pakistan. At the same time, the volume of contraband trade, according to unofficial data, exceeds 1 - 1.5 billion dollars. Pakistan mainly receives oil and refined products from Iran (more than 2/3 of its trade turnover), as well as electricity (for Balochistan). Pakistan exports food (wheat, rice, etc.), construction materials, and light industry products. Pakistan, Iran and India have agreed to build a powerful gas pipeline from South Pars . The Pakistani side attaches great importance to the implementation of the project, hoping to receive not only gas, but also funds from its transit. R. Mukimjanova believes that relations between Pakistan and Iran will be determined in the long term by mutual interest in economic cooperation and contacts on topical regional issues.

M. S. Kameneva (Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences) in her speech "The goals of Iran's cultural policy in the region and its implementation" drew attention to the fact that Iran's desire for leadership was manifested in the country during the Pahlavi dynasty mainly in the military, economic, political and social spheres. After the Islamic Revolution, the leadership of Iran began to actively cultivate the idea of cultural expansion. The refusal to focus on Western civilizational values and the elevation of Islamic cultural traditions to the absolute allowed Iran to further claim a leading position in the region. The leader of the Islamic Revolution, Imam Khomeini, paid close attention to the development of Iranian culture and considered it the foundation of the Iranian nation. The Organization for Cultural Affairs and Islamic Relations plays an important role in its promotion. It was from the perspective of a potential regional leader, including in the field of culture, that M. Khatami took steps to develop, deepen and expand the understanding of the theory of the" dialogue of civilizations " - a dialogue between Western and Eastern societies (instead of the idea of an intercivilizational conflict by S. Huntington). Ms Kameneva noted that an important factor in achieving cultural excellence at the regional level is the following:-

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The Government of Iran considers the Persian language and literature, promoting the thesis that Persian, along with Arabic, is the language of Islam and Muslim civilization. In the current situation, Iran has all the prerequisites for taking a leading position in the field of culture in the region, which is facilitated by several objective factors: the Iranian civilization and Iranian culture are among the oldest in the world; Islam, one of the developed world religions, is the state religion of Iran. Finally, the large number of expats from Iran in the countries of the region creates a fertile ground for the perception of Iranian culture, which is actually their native culture.

An analysis of the reports presented at the conference clearly shows that Iran's influence in the region has grown significantly in recent years. Iran has managed to establish fairly stable relations with its neighbors and use the American presence in the region to eliminate the Taliban and Saddam Hussein regimes that are hostile to it. The ratio of factors of Iran's influence in the region was changing. In the first years after the revolution, religious influence prevailed, increasing the effect of the "Islamic renaissance". During the period when Khatami was the country's president, the main focus of Iran's regional policy was on strengthening its cultural influence and strengthening its economic position in the region. After the Neocons came to power, the military buildup was most noticeable. The use of bellicose anti-Israeli and anti-American rhetoric by the current leadership of the country creates and increases doubts about the peaceful nature of the nuclear program being implemented in Iran. This leads to an imbalance in the regional relations established by 2005-2006 and threatens to complicate the situation in the region.

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