From the editorial board

Grigory Sergeevich Shakhbazyan, a prominent Russian Arabist, a well-known expert in the field of economic and social problems of modern Iraq, a senior researcher at the Center for Arab Studies of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Candidate of Economic Sciences, died suddenly on June 2, 2007.

G. S. Shahbazyan was a member of the central board of the Soviet-Iraqi Friendship Society (now the Society for Friendship with Iraq), and in 1999 was elected Vice-president of the Committee for Scientific, Cultural and Business Cooperation with Iraq. This article, written in 2007, has not lost its relevance, as there is still a danger that Iraq may disappear as an integral State.

March-April 2003 A political regime change has taken place in the Republic of Iraq as a result of the Shock and Awe military operation against that country. The operation, launched on March 20, lasted three weeks. The military coalition that conducted the operation included the US armed forces as the main participant, as well as troops from Great Britain, Australia, Poland and other countries. During the occupation of Iraq, the number of coalition members grew to forty-five. May 1, 2003 US President George W. Bush announced the end of the war in Iraq. The Iraqi Ba'ath or PASV regime, led by Saddam Hussein, which had ruled here since July 1968, i.e. for almost 35 years, was overthrown, and the PASV itself was outlawed.

On May 22, 2003, the UN Security Council approved Resolution No. 1483, which set out the main ways to solve the problem of post-war reconstruction of Iraq. According to the resolution, from the moment of its adoption, the sanctions imposed on Iraq in 1990 (resolution No. 661) were terminated, with the exception of the embargo on military supplies, and from November 21, the activities of the Committee on Sanctions and the UN Oil-for-Food Humanitarian Program were terminated. In accordance with the decisions of the UN Security Council, the United States and Great Britain were recognized as occupying Powers that have specific obligations and powers under international law. [Encyclopedia..., 2004, p. 472; Sapronova, 2006, p. 67, 68].

Since April 2003, Iraq has been governed by the Interim Coalition Administration( CAA), and in fact by the US military authorities. Retired General Garner was appointed its head, and since May 2003 - former Ambassador, Special Envoy of the President of the United States Paul Bremer. The ACA had 23 departments, each headed by an American who had several Iraqi consultants. The ACA allowed local government elections to be held in the country. July 2003 An Interim Governing Council (CAAC)was established in Baghdad Iraq, consisting of 25 people who had

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ministry authorities and representing the main ethnic and religious groups of the population - Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds, as well as former secular immigrants. The WUS consisted of 13 Shia Arabs, 6 Sunni Arabs, 4 Shia Kurds, 1 Turkoman and 1 Assyrian Christian. The VUS was supposed to operate until the creation of permanent government bodies in the country. On August 31, 2003, the VUS, in agreement with the VKA, distributed ministerial posts, which made it possible to informally call the VUS the interim government of the country [Iraq under American..., 2003, pp. 42, 43; Anderson and Stansfield, 2004, p. 226, 228, 252, 253].

On March 8, 2004, the Iraqi Supreme Court adopted the Basic Law of the country (a new interim constitution), on the basis of which transitional authorities were to be established by June 30, 2004, after which the institutions of the Interim coalition Government, including the CAA, were to be dissolved. The interim Constitution - the "Law on the Administration of the State of Iraq in Transition" - was of a constituent nature, as it was aimed at creating new State authorities and forming the foundations of a new state-political system. It should also be taken into account that the Constitution of 2004 was adopted under the conditions of foreign military occupation after the complete elimination of the entire former system of State administration. According to the provisions of the Interim Constitution, the transition period began on 30 June 2004 with the formation of a sovereign interim Government and was to end with the formation of a national Government of Iraq based on a permanent constitution no later than 31 December 2005.

At the end of May 2004, Ayyad Alawi, a Shiite member of the UUS, who founded the movement in exile in 1991, was appointed Prime Minister of the country Iraqi National Accord. Ghazi al-Yawar, a 46-year-old Sunni, nephew of Sheikh Mohsin al-Yawar, head of the three-million-strong Shammar tribe, and a member of the Supreme Judicial Council since July 2003, was appointed to the post of President of Iraq [Sapronova, 2004, pp. 69-73; Iraq: 100 days..., 2004, pp. 52, 53, 62, 63; Anderson and Stansfield, 2004, p. 231].

On 28 June 2004, two days ahead of schedule, the CAA handed over power to the Interim Government. In fact, the US administration continued to retain the main levers of power, which was largely due to the resistance movement that developed after the occupation of Iraq, which could have forced the resignation of any government if it had not relied on foreign bayonets.

On January 30, 2005, Iraq held elections for the Transitional National Assembly, an Interim Parliament that was to adopt a new permanent constitution designed to mark the return of Iraq's (so far formally) full-fledged sovereignty. It should be borne in mind that all the country's constitutions adopted after the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958 were temporary in nature. The January 30, 2005 parliamentary elections were intended to be the first democratic elections in Iraq's history, and their holding, according to the coalition, was the first step towards the creation of a new State and civil society. At the same time, these elections cannot be called successful, as they were mainly attended by Shiites and Kurds. More than 120 parties were granted the right to participate in the elections. On January 30, 2005, approximately 8.5 million Iraqis participated in the voting, or 58% of the total number of registered voters (about 12 million people). Since the census of prospective voters was not possible due to time constraints, the electoral lists were prepared on the basis of those compiled by the country's authorities in the 1990s. lists of citizens for sale to them by at low prices of rations that included food and industrial goods (flour, butter, sugar, soap, etc.), any citizen with a valid card for purchasing these goods received the right to participate in voting. The Baghdad authorities did not issue these rations.-

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Wali to the residents of Iraqi Kurdistan, who won de facto autonomy in the early 1990s, and residents of Shiite areas in the south of the country.

The results of the January 30 elections showed the success of Shiite parties, which under the PASV regime almost did not take part in the political life of the country. The first place in terms of the number of votes received was taken by United Iraq Alliance, Formed on the basis of twenty-two mainly Shiite parties and groups, the Alliance won 48% of the vote and 140 seats in Parliament. In second place was a coalition of Kurdish parties - Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan (26% of the vote and 75 seats in Parliament). The secular block came in third place - The Iraqi list led by the then Prime Minister A. Alawi (14% of the vote and 40 seats in Parliament). The remaining 20 seats in the parliament went to small parties and public organizations. In the lists of parliamentary candidates submitted for the elections, 33% of the seats were to be held by women [MEED, 2006, N 52, p. 4; MEED, 2005, N 2, р. 5; http://www.electionworldorg./iraqhtm (09.03.2005)].

The elected National Assembly was to complete the draft constitution by August 15, 2005, and a general referendum on the adoption of the constitution was scheduled for October 15 of the same year. After the referendum, the National Assembly resigned, as expected in advance, its powers. By December 15, 2005, Iraq was to hold elections for a permanent parliament, which in turn would appoint a fully constitutional Government. It had until December 31, 2005 to take power into its own hands [MEED, 2004, N31, p. 26].

As a result, the organizers of this electoral process, primarily the US authorities, believed that the foundations of civil society were being created in Iraq. In the United States, it was assumed that after the adoption of the constitution and the creation of a permanent government, most of the coalition troops could be withdrawn from Iraq.

On April 7, 2005, the appointment of Ibrahim al-Jaafari, a 58-year-old Shiite, as the country's Prime Minister was approved. Elected in the National Assembly elections from United Iraq Alliance Dr. I. al-Jaafari spent 23 years in exile: 9 years in Iran (after fleeing Iraq in 1980), and the rest in London. On April 6, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Jalal Talabani, was elected President of Iraq, while Shiite A. Abdul Mahdi and Sheikh Ghazi al-Yawar were elected Vice-presidents. [MEED, 2005, N 8, р. 3; http://print.infoplease.com/ ... (Iraq Crisis, 2005)]. The composition of the Iraqi Government was officially approved by the Interim Parliament after much debate and discussion only on April 28, 2005.

On August 15, 2005, Iraq extended the deadline for finalizing a permanent constitution so that Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish delegates could find a compromise solution on controversial issues such as the distribution of oil export revenues, the country's federal structure, women's rights, and the role of Islam in Iraq's governance. On 28 August 2005, the Iraqi Constitutional Committee signed a draft of the new constitution, which was to be submitted to a nationwide Iraqi referendum on 15 October 2005. Sunni participants condemned the draft constitution. None of their fifteen representatives, who were members of the constitutional committee, signed this document. Sunni consent to hold the referendum was obtained the day before the referendum. In return, Sunnis were given the right to amend the Constitution and hold a new referendum.

On October 15, 2005, after overcoming many obstacles, some of which were mentioned above, a nationwide referendum was held in Iraq, which approved the draft constitution. 61% of citizens with the right to vote took part in the referendum (according to other sources-63%). Since the militants promised to shoot anyone who went to vote, there was no time to protect citizens at the polling stations-

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70 thousand police officers were assigned. All the country's borders were closed. Iraq declares four-day weekend and curfew [Izvestiya, 29.08.05]. According to the Central Election Commission, 79% of citizens who visited polling stations voted for the draft constitution. However, more than 2/3 of the voters in two provinces and less than 2/3 in the third province, which is mostly Sunni, voted against. If the constitution was rejected by 2/3 of those who voted in at least three provinces out of four in which Sunnis are the majority, the process of adopting the constitution would begin again [ibid.; http://print.in-foplease.com/ ... (Iraq Crisis, 2005)].

Two months later, on December 15, 2005, Iraq held elections to the first permanent parliament since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime. About 11 million rubles. voters took part in the election. 275 seats in the parliament were contested by more than 7 thousand candidates from 300 parties [http://print.infoplease.com/ ... (Iraq Crisis, 2005)].

The results of the elections were published in Iraq on January 20, 2006.Representatives of twelve political blocs and coalitions won seats in Parliament. United Iraq Alliance, which included more than 20 Shia Islamic parties and groups, but the main role was played by the party Ad-Daawa and Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (HSIRI), won 128 seats in parliament; an alliance of two major Kurdish parties - WPC and UC and six smaller parties Kurdistan Alliance - 53 seats; Iraqi Consent Front (or National Accord Front), consisting of three Sunni parties (Sunni Arabs), - 44; Iraqi Front for National Dialogue (Sunni Arabs, with a total of 14 parties and groups) - 11 seats; Iraqi National List led by former Prime Minister A. Alawi (a secular bloc consisting of Sunnis and Shiites) - 5 seats; Kurdistan Islamic Party-5; Reconciliation and Liberation Bloc (Sunni Arabs) - 3; Risaliyyun (Shia) - 2; Turkoman Iraqi Front (ethnic Turks) - 1st place; List of the Iraqi nation (Sunni) - 1st place; Religious sect of the Yezidi minority - 1st place; Ar-Rafidain List (Christians) - 1st place [http://print.infoplease.com/ ... (Iraq Crisis, 2005); http://nehtwsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/45...; MEED, 2006, N 4, p. 3].

Summing up the results of the elections to the National Assembly of Iraq, which took place on December 15, 2005, it can be noted that, as in the January elections to the Interim Parliament, the Shiite majority won United Iraq Alliance - 128 seats in the 275-seat National Assembly. Although the Shiites have the largest faction, they have not been able to achieve a majority (i.e. 138 votes - more than 50% of the seats), as was the case in the interim Parliament elected in early 2005. The reason for this was probably the decision of Sunni parties not to boycott the December 2005 elections. As a result, the two largest Sunni electoral blocs - Iraqi Consent Front and Iraqi Front for National Dialogue (Sunni Arabs) - won 55 seats, and together with two other small Sunni parties that independently competed in the elections-59 seats. The alliance of two large and six small Kurdish parties won 53 seats in the elections. The majority of representatives of political parties that entered the Iraqi parliament demanded the formation of a government of national unity [Kommersant, 21.01.2006].

After more than four months of deliberation, Nouri al-Maliki, a member of the Shi'ite party, was confirmed as Prime Minister of Iraq on April 22, 2006 Ad-Daawa. Former Prime Minister I. al-Jaafari, also a Shiite, was not confirmed, because representatives of Sunni Arabs and Kurds rejected his candidacy. Many in Iraq believed that al-Jaafari was a divisive politician and that he was incapable of forming a national unity Government. Representatives of the Iraqi and US authorities have long urged al-Jaafari to leave his post.

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the post, and he refused. For this reason, the appointment of a new Prime Minister was delayed. The new Government was created only in May 2006. [http://print.infoplease.com/ spot/iraqtimeline5.html (Iraq War, Timeline, 2006); ttp:/ / nehtwsvote.bbc.co. uk/mpapps/page-tools/print/news.bbc.co. uk/2 / hi/middleeast/45...].

The main stages of creating a new system of supreme state administration bodies (parliament, government) in post-Saddam Iraq were described above. These bodies are formed in accordance with the number of representatives of the most important ethnic and religious groups living in Iraq: Sunni Arabs, Shiite Arabs, Kurds (regardless of the latter's religious affiliation), non-Muslims (mostly Christians). It is advisable to briefly review the situation of each of these groups after the elimination of the anti-people regime of S. Hussein in the context of the ongoing civil war and the actions of the new state management structures formed in recent years on a democratic basis.

Sunnis are the leading branch of Islam, about 90% of Muslims profess Sunnism, but in Iraq 32-37% of the total population are Sunnis, of which less than 20% are Arabs; Shiites in Iraq, respectively, occupy the first place in terms of their number: 60-65% of the total population, of which about 80% are Arabs. Ethnically, about 60% of Sunnis are Arabs, 36% are Kurds, the rest are from the Caucasus (in Arab countries they are called Circassians), Turkomans, natives of India and Pakistan. However, although Sunnis in Iraq are a minority of the population, in other Arab countries they are in the majority. Of the 21 Arab countries in 20 (i.e. everywhere except Iraq), Sunnis are in power. During the years of Saddam Hussein's regime, the real ratio between the number of Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq was carefully concealed by the authorities, and the differences in the socio-economic situation between Sunnis and Shiites were in every possible way obscured. These differences have existed since the time of the Ottoman Empire. All senior positions in administrative bodies, in various sectors of the economy, and most of the officer positions in the army and police were primarily assigned to Sunnis (under the Ba'ath regime - Sunnis - members of this party). Numerous special services and selected army units, such as the President's personal guard, the Republican Guard, and the Special Republican Guard, were formed exclusively or mostly from representatives of Sunni tribes [Encyclopedia..., 2004, p. 35; Islam, 1983, p. 139; Scientific notes..., 2006, p. 200; Iraq: 100 days..., 2004, p. 35].

The collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime was perceived by Sunnis as the end of their hegemony in Iraq. Sunnis have much to lose if the US experiment in democratizing Iraq is successful, and therefore they have a clear incentive to make it fail. The Sunni triangle (Baghdad-Mosul-Rutba) is the most rebellious and dangerous area of the country for US troops. If the uprisings and public demonstrations of defiance against the US occupation forces in Fallujah became an expression of public opinion in Iraq, then the core of the Sunni zone turned into 2003-2004. in the most important node of armed resistance to the US presence in this country.

There is very high tension among Sunnis in relation to the north of Iraq, namely, the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk. The Kurds ' desire to annex Kirkuk, turning it into the regional capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, has alarmed Sunnis, provoking a bloody confrontation between Arabs and Kurds in this city. However, Sunni outrage reached its peak when the US Chief of Staff in Iraq, Peter Bremer, launched a policy of "de-Baathification", using the "denazification" of Germany after World War II as a model. In the context of external interference in the affairs of Iraq by the United States, neighboring regional Powers,-

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if the Shiites take control of state institutions and the Kurds succeed on the path to autonomy, we can expect the emergence of an organization in the ranks of the Sunnis, which will turn into a force capable of seizing and retaining power and subjugating other groups of the population. This option cannot be ruled out, as the Shiites ' organizational weakness is well known. The Kurds are divided internally. Sunnis have traditionally been the most politically consolidated and organized part of Iraqi society.

In a representative democracy, where political power reflects the size of each ethno-confessional community, the role of Sunnis could be reduced to a position of political subordination to Shiites and Kurds. Both Kurds and Shiites benefit from the destruction of the existing hierarchy of power in Iraq. Only Sunnis have much to lose. The best way for Sunnis to prevent the United States from fulfilling its mission is to play the card of Iraqi nationalism and create the core of an organized resistance movement. The Kurds have reason to hope that the US military will remain in Iraq. Shiites, as mentioned above, have no organized cohesion, so Sunnis remain the most likely source of organized resistance in today's Iraq.

After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime, the Sunnis did not find any political figure who could represent their community in the Bremer ACA. The Sunnis did not have a political organization until 2003. Faced with the powerful political machine of the Kurds and the mass character of the Shiites, the Sunnis were in many ways an underrepresented part of Iraqi society.

A week after the fall of Baghdad, the country created a collective body of representatives of Sunni religious institutions in Iraq-the Muslim Ulema Committee. Due to the disunity of Sunni religious figures, it was not until January 2004 that the Ulema Committee was able to form its own governing bodies - the Sunni Advisory Council, which includes 45 Ulemas, as well as a 13-member General Secretariat elected by the members of the Advisory Council. Most Sunni religious leaders condemn the occupation of Iraq and demand the immediate withdrawal of coalition forces from its territory. [Iraq: 100 days..., 2004, p. 46,47; Anderson and Stansfield, 2004, p. 151-153].

The Shia community in Iraq is the largest in Arab countries and ranks third in the world after Iran and Pakistan. In addition to Arabs, it includes 30% of the Turkomans living here and all Iraqis of Iranian origin. About 80% of Shiites live in the south and east of the country, as well as in Baghdad. Most of the Shiites are rural residents. The townspeople live in sacred Shiite centers: in the cities of En-Najef, Karbala, Ku-fa, in the Kazimein district (on the outskirts of Baghdad). The spiritual leader of the Shiites, the Ayatollah, lives in En-Nejef.

The socio-political aspect of the Shiite problem in Iraq is that here Shiites have traditionally been the oppressed part of the population and occupied a subordinate position. For four centuries, Iraq was part of the Sunni Ottoman Empire. The formation of the Kingdom of Iraq in 1921 and the coming to power of King Faisal (a Sunni) did not change the position of the Shiites. After the secular Ba'ath Party came to power in 1968, the Government censored religious publications and closed a number of Shia religious institutions. Shiite clerics were forced to rally the faithful to protest. In the late 1950s, a Shia political movement (party) was secretly founded in Najaf with the blessing of the Shiite leader of Iraq, Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim (d. 1970) Ad-Daawah al-Islamiyyah (Islamic call). One of its organizers was a young Shiite scholar, an expert in theology and religious law, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. Since the end of 1974, Shia political demonstrations began in Iraq. 25 Shiite leaders were arrested and secretly detained.

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they were convicted, and some were executed. The victory of the anti-monarchist Islamic Revolution in neighboring Iran in 1979 was a major boost to the Shiite movement. Then the Baathist government tightened its fight against the Shiite underground. March 31, 1980 party Ad-Daawa It was banned in Iraq, and membership in it became punishable by death. In April 1980, Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr (Iraq's "Khomeini"), 45, and his sister and associate Amina al-Sadr, 30, were executed while under house arrest. Since the late 1970s, about 200,000 Shiites, mostly Iraqis of Iranian origin, have been deported from Iraq to Iran [Encyclopedia..., 2004, p. 469; Tripp, 2002, p. 160].

According to well-known Middle East experts L. Anderson and G. Stansfield, since the formation of Iraq in the 20s of the last century, there has been "an informal system of political apartheid: there were almost no barriers to the advancement of Shiites in the financial and commercial world, but access to political power was almost completely closed. The highest echelons of the armed forces and intelligence services have always been controlled by Sunnis "[Anderson and Stansfield, 2004, p. 134, 135].

The June 2002 Iraqi Shiite Declaration states that continued isolation from significant power structures has contributed to the transformation of Iraqi Shiites into a generally accepted social reality. The Declaration also states that "the crystallization of Shiites into a separate group owes more to a policy of discrimination than to any specific religious views" [Ibid., p. 135].

During the rule of Saddam Hussein's regime, he managed to eliminate almost all forms of legal social structures. The removal of this regime has created a serious power vacuum in Iraq, which is being filled by any force capable of providing a semblance of order and basic social services to the desperate population. Organized religion is increasingly filling this vacuum. Shi'ism will play an important political role in the future of the Iraqi State, as it is one of the very few remaining social structures that has the ability to mobilize the broad masses. The Shiites in Iraq recognize themselves first as Iraqis, and only then as Shiites. This was shown by the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988, during which Iraqi soldiers (most of the rank and file were Shiites) bravely fought against their" brothers in faith " - the Iranian Shiites. In this context, the " Shiite south "does not have any important differences from the" Sunni center " due to the close human ties between these regions. Intercommunal ties are so strong that it is difficult for some Arabs to identify themselves - whether they are Shiites or Sunnis [ibid., p. 135, 137].

If the revival of Shiite identity continues to unfold with the same intensity, the situation in Iraq will change. Currently, the most important administrative institutions are the "Shia - free zone". This provision, according to the leaders of Shiite religious and public organizations, should be changed. However, in this process, there may be a conflict between local Iraqi clerics and those whose reputation has been damaged by cooperation with Iran. Muqtada al-Sadr remains the figure most capable of mobilizing the masses, but the goals of his activism are difficult to predict. Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the spiritual leader of Iraq's Shi'ites, still holds the leading role among Shi'ite leaders. In post-Saddam Iraq, the role of tribal leaders (sheikhs) is also important.

The Kurds are the last of the three main Muslim ethnic and religious groups described here, but not in their significance. Since 1991, the Kurds have won de facto political independence within Iraq and are building an economy that is minimally dependent on the rest of the country. In essence, Iraqi Kurdistan is a separate country for all the people of Iraq. In the current situation, the Kurds are not interested in an early withdrawal of US troops from Iraq.

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The situation in Iraqi Kurdistan is analyzed in detail by Russian Kurdish scholars in a recently published book [The Kurdish question..., 2006, p. 341].

In the course of military operations in Iraq, from 60 to 100 thousand civilians were killed. Two million people became refugees and 1.8 million people were displaced. Every year, 15% of children under the age of 8 die. By March 2007, 3,220 U.S. troops, 132 Britons, and 124 other coalition personnel had been killed and 25,000 seriously injured. [Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 20.03.07].

A civil war is raging on the territory of Iraq along ethnic and religious lines, mainly between Shiites and Sunnis. It threatens to split the country into three parts - Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish. As a result, Iraq is on the verge of disappearing as a single State, and its future and territorial integrity are in question.

list of literature

Izvestia.

Iraq under American rule: democratization or "Vietnamization".
Iraq: 100 days of transitional government.
Islam. Short reference Book, Moscow, 1983.

Kommersant.

The Kurdish question in West Asia at the beginning of the XXI century. Moscow: IV RAS, Institute of the Middle East, 2006.

Nezavisimaya gazeta.

Sapronova M. A. The Iraqi Constitution, past and present.
Academic notes of the Center for Arab Studies. Issue 4. Moscow, 2006.

Encyclopedia of countries of the world.
Anderson L., Stansfield G., The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy or Division, N.Y., 2004.

MEED. L., 2004, 2005, 2006.

http://www.electionworldorg./iraqhtm (09.03.05)

http://print.infoplease.com/spot/iraqtimeline4.html (Iraq Crisis, 2005)

http://print.infoplease.com/spot/iraqtimeline5.html (Iraq War, Timeline, 2006)

http://nehtwsvote.bbc.co.uk7mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/45...

Tripp Ch. A History of Iraq. N.Y., 2002.

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