In September 1730, an uprising took place in Istanbul, which ended with the overthrow of Sultan Ahmed III. This uprising was an important historical event that affected the political life of the Ottoman Empire. This question is reflected in the works of Russian Orientalists and Turkish historians, but there are conflicting opinions in the literature about the causes and nature of the uprising. So, some historians believe that the reason for the uprising was the failure of the foreign policy of Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha. Others see the main reason for the uprising in the difficult economic situation of the country [Meyer, 1963, p. 82]. Leaning towards the latter view, we also believe that events related to foreign policy reasons also played a role. It was they who played the role of a catalyst in the outbreak of the uprising. It seems that only a complete description of the unfolding events can help restore the picture of what is happening. The proposed article highlights the details that are relatively poorly reflected in the research. The main source used is the secret report of the Russian resident in Istanbul, I. I. Neplyuev, dated October 1, 1730.

Ivan Ivanovich Neplyuev, who was one of the professional Russian diplomats during the reign of Peter I, played an important role in concluding the Russo-Turkish Treaty of Istanbul in 1724 and preventing war between the two empires. By the time of the uprising, I. I. Neplyuev, who already had 10 years of diplomatic experience in Turkey, had acquired a network of informants in the Turkish capital.

Special mention should be made of the above-mentioned I. I. Neplyuev's relation of October ¹, 1730.1 As is clear from this report, on September 17, 1730, a riot began in Istanbul, which grew stronger by the hour. The Sultan, in order to appease the rebels, was forced to kill the vizier, mufti and Kapudan Pasha (commander of the fleet), but the rebels, not content with this, overthrew Sultan Ahmed himself and put on the throne Ahmed's nephew, Mahmud.

Neplyuev said that the new sultan immediately after assuming the throne sent a letter to the Iranian Shah Tahmasp II, promising to return all the previously captured territories. ²

¹ All dates are given according to the Julian calendar, which at that time was 11 days behind the Gregorian calendar.

² In October 1722, insurgent Afghan tribes entered Isfahan, the capital of the Safavid Empire, and Shah Sultan Hussein abdicated in favor of the Afghan leader Mir Mahmud. However, the shah's eldest son, Tahmasp, who was outside the capital, did not recognize this and declared himself Shah. His power extended to the southwestern Caspian provinces, and the bulk of the empire's lands were under Afghan occupation. The North-western lands, including Eastern Transcaucasia, were occupied by the Ottoman Empire, and the Caspian provinces from Terka to Rasht were occupied by Russia. It was only with the addition of the talented commander Nadir Khan Afshar to Tahmasp that the Iranian troops began to oust the Afghans from their occupied lands. In April 1730, under the onslaught of Nadir's troops, the Afghans left Isfahan and Tahmasp returned to the capital.

page 121

according to the secretary in charge of foreign affairs of the Ottoman Empire, Reis-ul-kittab, "the Sultan committed such an act because the Persians are already not far from the ancient borders, and their Turkish rebel army does not want to go there to Persia and the rebels declare it directly" [AVPRI, l. 28ob.].

Speaking about the reasons for the uprising, I. I. Neplyuev noted that the people were dissatisfied with the Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha, who was married to the sultan's daughter and during his twelve-year rule appointed his relatives to almost all the highest positions. He caused particular indignation among the janissaries, because Ibrahimpasha "sent troops of the Janissary rank to Persia due to the war at different times, and thus their numbers decreased, so that there could hardly be up to 5,000 people in Constantinople (of which there were usually 40,000), but even then they were dismissed" [AVPRI, l.34ob., 35].

In addition, according to Neplyuev, the vizier tried in every possible way to hide from the people the loss of the cities of Hamadan and Kermanshah, fearing that this would cause general indignation, since he, carried away by the idle life in the capital, did not care at all about the defense of state borders. Therefore, the vizier began to create the appearance that he was supposedly going on a campaign, which was first scheduled for August 5, and then, at his own request, postponed to September 17. Embezzlement and corruption flourished in the country. Only one kakhya of the vizier (manager of the palace) accumulated 40 million leva in cash. This fortune was collected at the expense of income from the Erzurum mines and payoffs, from the sale of various things up to tallow candles [AVPRI, l. 187].

The report of I. I. Neplyuev about the vizier's campaign is also confirmed by the information of another eyewitness-the French Count de Marcilly, who wrote that on August 3, the vizier with part of the army set out from Istanbul, but, being at a loss, did not know whether to continue the campaign or return to the capital [Count Marcilly, 1738, p.1].

This uncertainty and uncertainty in the actions of the vizier caused the indignation of the army, which suffered great losses. Preparing for a long campaign, its participants-janissaries were forced to leave their shops and sell their property in order to purchase weapons, uniforms and horses [Count Marcilly, 1738, p.2]. In peacetime, the janissaries were engaged in crafts and small-scale trade. According to Marcilla, long before the planned campaign to Iran, there was a general discontent with the government among the population. Marcilly was able to correctly assess the current difficult internal political situation in the country. So, he wrote that "the lack of food supplies, which was already from a long time, the multiplication of the price of all things, the poverty into which the decrease in the merchant class led the whole state, the many hardships of taxes and insults that they suffered from the army marching to the Persian borders, where it was said that they had already caused some confusion, general disgust among the people. The surrender of Tauris, after shedding many Muslim blood on these conquests, caused terrible confusion among the soldiers" [Count Marcilly, 1738, p. 2].

The events that took place in Tabriz further aggravated the situation. Sent from Istanbul to the Shah's court on July 1, 1730, the Ottoman representative Mehmet Efendi met Nadir Khan, the commander of the Shah's troops and the de facto ruler of the country at that time, near Tabriz and handed him the text of the treaty. Nadir Khan made it clear that the approval of the treaty depends entirely on the will of Tahmasp P. At the same time, he demanded from Mehmet Efendi that the head of the Ottoman garrison of Tabriz surrender the city, which according to the terms of the treaty was to pass to Iran. Mehmet Efendi wrote a letter to Pasha, who was in Tabriz. The latter was inclined to implement this clause of the treaty, but the janissaries opposed such a decision. They made a sortie, but were defeated, leaving up to four thousand dead on the battlefield, the rest escaped [AVPRI, l. 39ob.]. After this, the janissaries gathered in Erzerum, rebelled. The rioters sent their representatives

page 122

with letters of support for their demands to the janissaries in Istanbul. The rebels claimed that when Turkey captured Tabriz, the local houses, shops and caravanserais were sold to the military and civilians who wanted to settle in Tabriz. However, the Ottoman government, voluntarily ceding this city to Iran, dealt a significant blow to the new owners, who lost the acquired property. Therefore, in order to restore justice, they demanded the return of the owners of houses, shops and caravanserais, as well as the money they paid to the treasury. The janissaries were also outraged by the very decision to surrender Tabriz [AVPRI, l. 40].

I. I. Neplyuev, who received news of the Janissary revolt in Erzerum in the last days of August, wrote that the vizier reacted to this news with great caution. Summoning the janissary officers, he ordered them to write to Erzurum to calm down, promising to compensate for the losses. And indeed, the vizier sent up to 70 thousand levki to pay off the janissaries [AVPRI, l. 40ob.].

Count Marcilli noted that the main instigator of the Istanbul riot, Patrona Khalil (an Albanian by birth), was very upset that he spent all his fortune on buying weapons, uniforms and other military preparations in the amount of 200 piastres [Count Marcilli, 1738, p.3].

On August 27, a council was held in the sultan's camp in Uskudar, which showed serious differences in the ruling circles over the loss of Tabriz and the beginning of unrest among the janissaries in Istanbul. Some ecclesiastics demanded that the vizier be immediately sent on a campaign. In this regard, the position of the ulema (supreme spiritual authority)is of interest by the name of Mirza-zadeh, who said that " the Persians take away their lands, whatever they eat is contrary to the law, and that they are Turks, taking other places by bloodshed without using convenient protection, they lose this to the Turks in violation of the law." This opinion was shared by Ulama Damag-zade and Sheikh-zade, Istanbul efendi (spiritual head of Istanbul) and reis-ul-kittab. At the council, it was decided that the sultan should remain in the capital (in case of defeat, the sultan's presence in the army would seriously undermine the authority of the state), and the vizier Ibrahim Pasha should go on a campaign. On August 30, this decision was announced to the people [AVPRI, l. 42]. A few days later, the date of sending the vizier on a campaign was postponed from September 17 to October 15, "for which the murmur between the clergy and the people began "[AVPRI, l. 42ob.].

By order of the vizier, Mirza-zade, who opposed him in the council, and other persons who were considered the main instigators of the unrest, were arrested. But this could not save the situation, and on September 17, at ten o'clock, a riot began, which quickly spread.

I. I. Neplyuev describes the beginning of the riot as follows::

"...On the 17th of September, at the 10th hour before noon, a riot began inside Constantinople in the following order. A janissary of Albanian origin, Patron Ali (meaning Khalil - T. M.), agreeing with one Erzerum Janissary, Mirali, and others like himself, up to twelve people, and at the mentioned 10th hour, made a superstitious prayer in the moshek (mosque - T. M.), and went out to the bazaar, raised a green banner and they shouted that anyone who is a true Mohammedan should join them, against the unjust ministry, which was why up to fifty people had gathered, and they raised another banner and, dividing into two with the same voice, took the people to themselves..."[AVPRI, l. 43 and vol.].

According to Neplyuev, the janissary of Agasi (the chief of the janissaries), having learned about the beginning of the riot, immediately came out and, meeting a small part of the rioters, dispersed them, and then went against another part consisting of 200 people. But they told him that they had rebelled against an unjust government and had nothing against him personally, but they did not consider him their commander. The rebels advised the janissary of Agasi to return to his home, which he did [AVPRI, l. 44].

page 123

When the news of the beginning of the revolt reached the kakhya vizier, who had stayed in the capital in connection with his daughter's wedding, he moved across the bay to the sultan's camp in a strange boat. Kaimakam (the sultan's viceroy in the capital) and Kapudan Pasha, who was then in charge of policing Istanbul, were also notified of the riot. The latter did not take any measures to suppress the uprising and fled to the sultan [AVPRI, l. 44]. All the courtiers were assembled at Uskudar, the camp of the Sultan, who that afternoon sent Agasa's janissaries to inquire about the rioters ' demands. Agasi's janissaries found the rebels, whose number had already reached two thousand people on Et Meydany (Butchers ' Square). The rebels told the janissary Agasi that they had nothing against the Sultan, but were dissatisfied with the injustices on the part of the government, and therefore demanded to bring to justice the chief vizier, Mufti, Kapudan Pasha, vizier kahya and Reis-ul-kittab, who had ruined the country with exorbitant taxes and deprived them of their privileges. So, the vizier's kahya distributed paid-off articles to his relatives. The government failed to protect the state from foreign invasions, ceding many cities that had been conquered at great cost. Tabriz was surrendered, and the local janissaries and inhabitants were left to the mercy of the enemy. Even the campaign was turned into a comedy, which led to the ruin of the janissaries and other military personnel, who, having received orders to be ready for the campaign, left their studies, sold apartments and shops, lost money to purchase military equipment and, ultimately, were deceived. Therefore, the rebels demanded that the perpetrators be handed over to them.

When the Sultan learned of this, he called together the corps commanders of all branches of the army and the heads of state institutions, and within three or four hours they moved by galley from Uskudar to Istanbul. The vizier proposed to the Sultan that night, with the seven thousand soldiers at court, to attack the rebels, who at that time did not exceed three thousand men, but Sultan Ahmed III rejected this proposal [AWPRI, l.44-45], hoping that by sacrificing his ministers, he would be able to maintain power. The number of rebels was constantly growing. They locked the city gates and set up a guard to prevent anyone from leaving the city.

The rebels declared that they would not hurt anyone, as they had rebelled only against the government; Greeks, Armenians, and Jews were ordered to stay out of doors for security reasons [AVPRI, l.47]. Merchants were also ordered to close their shops so as not to suffer damage during the unrest. The rebels gathered on Al-Meydani began to heavily arm themselves, looting shops. It is noteworthy that they did not take anything from the shops except weapons. As noted by I. I. Neplyuev, only one Janissary corps joined the rebels, and then without officers. Although many people were eager for a change of power, however, seeing the small number of rioters, they did not risk joining them [AVPRI, l. 47 and vol.].

As it turns out from Neplyuev's report, on the morning of Friday, September 18, by order of the Sultan, a banner "Sanjaki Sherif" (sacred banner) was displayed in front of the palace, calling on loyal Muslims to protect the Sultan, and it was announced that everyone would be paid a permanent salary of five aspren a day and 25 levki at a time. The Sultan on the same day sent a man to the naval gunners with an appeal to support him or, in extreme cases, to remain neutral. The gunners replied that they would not join the rebels, but at the same time they would not separate from the Janissary corps [AVPRI, l. 48 and vol.].

The rebels sent envoys with banners to Istanbul, Uskudar and Galata to gather supporters. According to the Russian resident, "it was a strange disgrace", since few people went under the Sultan's banner, and many joined the rebels. No one quarreled with those who went to the opposite camp. Those who joined the Sultan marched unarmed, because the palace had enough of them; those who joined the rebels came with their own weapons. By twelve o'clock in the afternoon, the number of rebels reached 12 thousand.

page 124

The Sultan, seeing his weakness, stopped gathering supporters and closed the gates; by his order, the harem was moved from Uskyudar to Istanbul [AVPRI, l. 48 and ob.].

The Sultan sent one of his courtiers to the rebels to re-examine their demands. The rioters, as before, demanded the extradition of their ministers. The Sultan left these demands unanswered. Meanwhile, on the same evening, the number of rebels reached 30 thousand. The Janissary aga (commander of the Janissary corps), who was elected by the rebels, forbade the rebels from looting and violence. It was allowed to plunder only the houses of Kapudan Pasha, the vizier of kahya, Reis-ul-kittab, the chief of the Galata port and some other courtiers, in order to provide the rebels with food [AWPRI, l. 48ob.].

That same night, the Sultan summoned a naval officer named Abdi Ali, appointed him commander of the fleet and sent him to the Admiralty to try to keep the naval units on the Sultan's side [AWPRI, l. 49ob.].

On Saturday, September 19, the sultan was no longer able to take any measures, and his situation was becoming hopeless, as the number of rioters doubled in a day (to 60 thousand), and they captured the artillery. On the same day, the rebels brought Ulema Mirza-zade, who was under house arrest in his country residence, to their camp and elected him mufti [AWPRI, l. 49ob.].

Ahmed III, seeing the constant increase in the number of rebels, as well as the transfer to the rebel side of many bostanji (soldiers of the Sultan's palace guard), ordered the arrest of the vizier, his kahya and Kapudan Pasha, who were strangled that same night. Neplyuev gives a very interesting detail, saying that "... when they began to execute the vizier, he asked that Kapitan pasha be strangled first, whom he considered guilty of everything, since the uprising began and expanded due to his negligence" [AVPRI, l. 49ob.-50].

On Sunday, September 20, the bodies of the vizier, Kapudan Pasha and the vizier's Kahya were placed in a cart drawn by two oxen and taken to the rioters in Al-Meydani. The rebels, after abusing the bodies, tied the body of the vizier to the tail of a horse and sent it back to the Sultan's court, claiming that it was not the body of the vizier. This was done to bring about the overthrow of the Sultan himself, who was told that they were dissatisfied with him and wanted to install his nephew Mahmud, the son of Sultan Mustafa, on the throne. Thus, on September 20, power in Istanbul passed into the hands of the rebels, who posted guards everywhere. The sailors also joined them. The rebels opened the prison gates and released the prisoners; at the same time, they punished those who, under the name of rebels, engaged in looting. They were immediately cut into small pieces [AVPRI, l. 50ob. -51].

The Sultan appointed his son-in-law Mehmed, who served as his silahdar (squire), as the new vizier. In the same report of I. I. Neplyuev, it is said that by order of the Sultan, a friend of the vizier, former Mufti Hafizulla-efendi, was put on a galley and thrown into the sea. However, later this information was not confirmed and it turned out that the Mufti was still alive [AVPRI, L. 51ob., 52].

On the evening of September 20, Sultan Ahmed III released his nephew Mahmud, who had been imprisoned for over 27 years, from house arrest. Taking off his fur coat, the sultan threw it over him, asking for mercy to himself and to his children. Ahmed Sh, along with the children, was placed in the room where Mahmoud [AWPRI, l. 52ob.], who was 33 years old at the time, was being held. On the morning of September 21, the rebels gathered in a place called Eyyub and declared Mahmud Sultan [AWPRI, l. 53ob.].

The courtiers went to see Mahmud, and his coronation was scheduled for September 25. The new sultan left Mehmed Pasha in the post of vizier, and appointed Mirza-zade, who was elected to this position by the rebels, as mufti. The post of aga janissary and other top positions were given to persons also elected by the rioters. The sultan presented the leader of the rebels, Patron Khalil, with a horse decorated with rich decorations. The Sultan also promised that none of the participants in the uprising would be punished [AVPRI, l. 54ob.].

page 125

Sultan Mahmud I appointed Nedilli efendi, who had served as a silahdar under his father, Sultan Mustafa, as the vizier of Kahya, and Reis-ul-kittab Suleimanefendi, who had previously held this position.

On the same day, the sons - in-law of the former Sultan Ahmed III, Ahmed Pasha and Ali Pasha, as well as the son of the murdered vizier Ibrahim Pasha, Ahmed Pasha, were arrested. The rebels, who had gathered on Al-Meydani in tents brought from Uskyudar, began to register in the janissary book without permission, without the sultan's decree. Their number already exceeded 70 thousand. Kul agasi (registrar of the palace staff), elected by the rebels and confirmed in office by the new sultan, ordered to stop recording, explaining that there were too many janissaries, and the treasury would not be able to support them. The rebels, outraged by Kul Agasa's actions, cut him up into small pieces [AVPRI, l. 55].

The rumor that spread on Tuesday, September 22, that the former Sultan Ahmed was poisoned, was not confirmed. On the same day, a sultan's decree was issued prohibiting walking with weapons in Istanbul, but the rebels on Al-Meydani were all armed [AVPRI, l. 55].

On September 24, the new sultan released the sons-in-law of the former sultan Ali Pasha and Ahmed Pasha, as well as the son of the murdered vizier. I. I. Neplyuev writes that the Iranian ambassadors were also released from guard, ordering them to continue peace negotiations. There is an interesting report in the report that at that time there was an impostor in Istanbul, a Safavid prince, who was kept under guard for security reasons during the uprising.

On Friday morning, September 25, all the nobles gathered in the Sultan's courtyard, and the janissary rioters lined up on both sides of the street, without weapons or battle shields, as was customary during military campaigns. At 10 o'clock in the afternoon, the sultan, wearing a turban on his head decorated with feathers and a diamond, set off with all his court retinue for Eyyub Meydany. The Sultan was followed by several soldiers with short spears, then by the rebel leaders Patrona Khalil and Mir Ali, prominent civilians and clerics, Yany-char-agha and some pashas. Then they rode, as usual, the vizier on the right and the mufti on the left. Behind them rode mirahur (the stable keeper) with the Sultan's richly decorated horses, and then Sultan Mahmud himself, with a mustache and no beard, because during his house arrest he was not allowed to grow a beard. The sultan was followed by Silahdar and the treasurer. Money was thrown into the crowd, mostly a pair (a small monetary unit), and sometimes chervonets. The procession was brought up by palace musicians with timpani and drums. When the procession arrived at Eyyub Meydani, the mosque where the new ruler's coronation was usually performed, a saber was attached to the new sultan's belt. After the ceremony, people shouted congratulations to Sultan Mahmud, who went to another mosque - Sultan Ahmed, and from there returned to the palace. According to Neplyuev, this time there was no gunfire [AVPRI, L. 56ob.].

On September 26, the ambassadors of foreign countries sent their interpreters to the vizier with congratulations on the occasion of the new Sultan's accession to the throne. However, instead of the vizier of interpreters, kahya received him, declaring that the vizier was busy with other important matters. At this time, the vizier received the leaders of the rebels, Patron Khalil and Mir Ali, who received the ranks and were considered Akiba pashas of the first class [AWPRI, l. 57].

On September 27, the Sultan appointed the former Sultan's son-in-law, Ahmed Pasha, to the position of Kapudan Pasha. On the same day, they found the former Reis-ul-kittab, who was not killed. He was placed in a country palace, and the chief of the palace, through the new Sultan's mother, obtained his pardon.

On September 28, registration for the janissaries stopped, and on September 29, all the military and insurgents who signed up for the janissaries were given 25 levki. Such a sum was usually issued upon the accession of a new sultan [AWPRI, l. 57ob.]. However, the rebels did not disperse and demanded a decree from the new Sultan Mahmud on forgiveness for participating in the rebellion. Warriors from other cities were arriving, demanding gifts. And only after that-

page 126

After the Sultan issued a decree of pardon on September 30 and ordered gifts to be distributed to the new arrivals, the rebels went home [AVPRI, l. 57ob.-58].

According to the Russian resident, at the insistence of the rebels, the palace and park built by the former vizier Ibrahim Pasha, called Saadabad, were destroyed [AVPRI, p. 58].

I. Neplyuev also received information that 10 million levs were found in the house of the former vizier of Kakhya, and about 15 million levs were found in the seraglio of the former sultan [AVPRI, l. 58ob.).

From a later report by I. I. Neplyuev, it turns out that even after the announcement of the Sultan's pardon, not all the janissaries laid down their weapons. 20 thousand rubles. the janissaries did this, and the other 20 thousand continued to go with guns and banners and did not obey the sultan's decree. They carried out only the orders of the Serdengechti (literally, warriors who renounced their heads, i.e. suicide bombers, usually marching ahead of the advancing army), which numbered up to two hundred people. Chief among them was Patrona Khalil, who constantly interfered in state affairs. He and several supporters came to the vizier Mehmed Pasha with demands to appoint people chosen by the rebels to positions in the government. The vizier was forced to yield. At the insistence of the leaders of the uprising, Michael was appointed Prince of Wallachia, while the former sultan approved Mavrokordat, the son of the deceased Prince Nicholas [AVPRI, l. 183ob. - 184].

Then a sultan's decree was issued prohibiting Serdengechti from riding horses with guns and wearing red armbands - the clothes of rioters. Istanbul residents were also told not to give in to the demands of the janissaries, who rampaged and forced residents to wear only black clothing, punishing them for disobedience. Residents were instructed to disarm the rioters and bring them to trial [AVPRI, l. 184b.].

The janissaries continued to behave defiantly. On October 14, Patrona Khalil and his companions went to the vizier and began to insist on the removal of the new vizier Kahya Nedili-efendi. He also demanded that the former Reis-ul-kittab be exiled and that Rustam Pasha be appointed vizier. Soon the former Reis-ul-kittab was sent into exile [AWPRI, l. 184ob. -185].

Patron Khalil and Serdengechti's audacious antics forced the Government to take extreme measures. The Sultan, after secretly consulting with the Crimean khan, the vizier, the courtier Mohsun Abdullah Pasha and the Mufti Damag-zade, found out the situation in the city. After changing his clothes, he secretly walked around the city and found out the opinion of the people. Through Mohsun Pasha, he learned that the veteran janissaries would not defend the rebels, no matter what the Sultan did to them, since they, i.e. the rebels, Patrona Khalil, and serdengechti had embittered the population [AWPRI, l. 189 et al.].

In the end, all the courtiers, including the muftis and ulemas, were outraged by the constant interference of the rebels in state affairs. A sultan's decree was issued, according to which the rioters had to "completely calm down and go to their homes" within ten days, otherwise they would face punishment [AVPRI, l. 185ob.].

Mohsun Abdullah Pasha, kapijilar of Kahyasi (head of the gate guard) Ibrahim Pasha and Damag-zadeh, together with the Crimean khan and the vizier, decided, under the pretext of discussing Iranian affairs, to assemble an extended divan (council) in order to summon Patron Khalil and his comrades to the Sultan's palace and put them to death. They also persuaded the Sultan to implement this plan [AVPRI, L. 190ob.].

The Grand Divan was convened on November 12, and the unsuspecting Patron Khalil and some of his comrades participated in it. In the divan, the issue of the Iranian siege of Ganja was discussed, in connection with which it was necessary to send troops there. Patrona Khalil and his comrades loudly declared that they are ready to protect not only Ganja, but also to return those territories to Armenia.-

page 127

briz and other cities taken by the Iranians, as well as capture cities occupied by Russian troops who were allies of the Persians. Mohsun Abdullah Pasha and the other conspirators realized that only a small part of Serdengechti had come to the diwan with Patrona Khalil, so it was said that this important issue needed more serious discussion, and therefore a new diwan should be convened with the participation of the Sultan himself [AWPRI, l. 191 et al.].

The new large sofa was scheduled for the morning of November 14. Its participants, including Patrona Khalil and Serdengechti, arrived at the Sultan's Palace. During the meeting, the Crimean khan, vizier, Mufti, Mohsun Abdullah Pasha and Kapudan Pasha, Yanun Khoja, came to the Sultan ostensibly with a report on the discussions in the Divan. Everything was put on alert. About a thousand warriors were gathered in the courtyard. Kapudan Pasha brought 200-300 armed sailors into the palace early in the morning. The vizier and other courtiers entered the sultan's presence, suggesting action. Having received the consent, Yanun Khoja went out to the rioters in the courtyard and announced that the sultan wanted to give Patron Khalil and the janissaries of the aga the title of pasha of the first class for their services and send one to Sofia, the other to Nis. He asked not to object to this decision and accept sable coats as a gift from the sultan. Even before that, Yanun Khoja ordered the gates to be locked. Unsuspecting their Patron, Khalil and his companions entered the Sultan's presence and bowed to him. The Sultan went into another room, and at a sign from him Yanun Khoja stabbed Patrona Khalil, while others rushed at the janissaries of the aga. Thus, the rebel leaders were killed [AVPRI, l. 193-195].

After that, Janun Hoxha announced 24 Serdengechti to enter the Sultan's chambers to receive kaftans as a reward for their services. The Serdengechti, suspecting danger, refused the reward and went to the gate, but it was locked. On the orders of Yanun Hoxha, 16 Serdengechti were killed, and eight were captured alive [AVPRI, l. 195 and vol.].

The bodies of the dead Patrons Khalil and Serdengechti were taken to the palace Square. The appointed janissary of the Aga, Mohsun Abdullah Pasha, went out to the people and announced that the sultan's enemies had been killed. The population was rather reserved and even somewhat approving of the incident. The janissaries recognized Abdullah Pasha as their commander [AWPRI, l. 196].

Soon the vizier came to the square and ordered the bodies of Patrona Khalil and others to be thrown into the sea and the remaining Serdengechti captured. On the same day, Yanun Khoja was awarded the title of pasha of the first class [AVPRI, L. 196ob.].

The captured Serdengechti and janissary commanders who had been given positions at the request of the rebels were executed. Albanian soldiers suspected of sympathizing with their Patron Khalil were killed [AVPRI, L. 196ob. -197]. A reward was announced for the capture and murder of Serdengechti Mir Ali, who was in Erzerum at the time.

An analysis of the report of the Russian resident in Istanbul, I. I. Neplyuev, leads to the conclusion that one of the reasons for the Istanbul uprising of 1730 was the unsuccessful internal and external policy of the government of Vizier Ibrahim Pasha. This information also helps to reconstruct a more detailed picture of the uprising and clarify some details.

list of literature

Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI). F. 89. Op. 1. 1730 g. 8.

Count of Marcilly. News of two disturbances that occurred in Constantinople in 1730 and 1731 during the deposition of Ahmet III and the enthronement of Mahomet I (translated from French). St. Petersburg, 1788.

Meyer M. S. Revolt of the urban lower classes of Istanbul in 1730 (Reasons and character) / / Peoples of Asia and Africa. 1963. N4.

Permanent link to this publication: