One of the most important problems of our time is the struggle for ending the arms race and for disarmament. In recent years, a number of international agreements and arrangements have been reached in this area, among which the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons occupies a special place. Its significance is obvious: it is a question of limiting the number of countries that possess these weapons, and thereby preventing the growing danger of nuclear war. In the Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU at the XXV Party Congress, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, noted:: "The scope of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has expanded. It has recently been joined by a number of other major states, including Germany and Italy. At the same time, taking further effective measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons on our planet remains one of the most important tasks."1
Despite the fact that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has been widely recognized by the peoples of the world, many capitalist States still often hear voices calling for the revision of its main provisions under the pretext of "ineffectiveness" of the treaty. Some bourgeois political scientists argue that this treaty has failed to fulfill its main task, since States that already had significant nuclear weapons stocks, or did not intend to create them at all, have become parties to it. At the same time, according to their statements, there are no militarily significant States among its participants, including those that possess nuclear weapons, as well as countries that have the intentions and real capabilities to create them .2
The example of Italy, where there was a long and persistent struggle over signing and then ratifying the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, largely refutes these arguments. To assess the urgency and complexity of this struggle, during which the Italian position on nuclear issues was formed, it is enough to turn to the beginning of the 60s, when Italy was one of the first countries in Europe to respond to the proposal of US Secretary of State Karl Herter on the creation of a multilateral nuclear force (MNF). The MYAS plan and other proposals that promised Italy access to nuclear weapons were supported by right-wing parties, the most conservative forces in the state apparatus, and major industrialists associated with nuclear power and military production.

1 "Materials of the XXV Congress of the CPSU", Moscow, 1976, p. 23.

2 M. Thee. The Nuclear Arms Race: Trends, Dynamics, Control. "Instant Research on Peace and Violence", Tampere, 1976, N 1 - 2, p. 21.

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The proponents of nuclear weapons were opposed by the Communists and socialists, who consistently supported Italy's full accession to the treaty, the leadership of the Republican Party and some sober-minded politicians in the ruling circles, who understood the danger of Italy acquiring nuclear weapons. The struggle of political forces in Italy over the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons spans a decade - from 1965, when Italy, as a member of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, entered into negotiations to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to 1975, when the Italian parliament approved a bill to ratify the treaty. Of course, the internal political struggle over the issue of Italy's nuclear status did not always go on with the same intensity during this time. The most acute debates on this issue were related to the consideration and adoption of concrete measures: discussion of the articles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, approval of decisions on its signing and ratification.

The first period in Italian policy on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (it could be called the most favored-nation period for the treaty) opens with a note from the Italian Government dated March 23, 1965, sent to Geneva .3 It called for the urgent resumption of the work of the Committee of 18 States on Disarmament, whose last session closed on 17 October 1964. In July 1965, at the Geneva talks, Italy took another step: the Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. Fanfani, appealed to the States that do not possess nuclear weapons, but have the capabilities to create them, with a call to establish a nuclear moratorium. 4 This proposal meant that non-nuclear Powers should commit themselves not to acquire nuclear weapons within a jointly determined time limit. It was assumed that the Soviet Union and the United States would prepare a joint draft of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons during this period and submit it to the Geneva Conference for consideration. In February 1966, after the Committee of 18 States on Disarmament had been familiarized with the American and Soviet drafts of the treaty, the Italian delegation in Geneva proposed the establishment of a drafting committee on the text of the treaty in order to thoroughly study the proposals of the United States and the USSR .5 Six months later, on August 20, the Italian delegation submitted a memorandum to the Committee of 18 stating that it was urgently necessary to eliminate the differences between the USSR and the United States on the text of the treaty and develop a common position on this issue .6 Perhaps this initiative ends the period of favoring the treaty in Italian foreign policy.

This period was due to the emerging positive developments in the international situation and within the country. Some easing of international tensions has contributed to the emergence of new trends in the attitude of Italy and a number of other capitalist States towards nuclear weapons. By the mid-1960s, the impracticability of the multilateral nuclear forces plan had become apparent to both its proponents and its opponents - internal differences on this issue had not been resolved. In addition, the coming to power of the new government in Germany led to a certain adjustment in Bonn's foreign policy on the issue of access to nuclear weapons. Constructive elements have been reinforced in American politics.-

3 E. Bettini. II Trattato contro la proliferazione nucleare. Bologna. 1968, p. 143.

4 "Contro la proliferazione nucleare". R. 1967, p. 38.

5 Ibid., p. 100.

6 Ibid., p. 118.

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This was also reflected in Italian foreign policy, which almost always reacted to fluctuations in the US foreign policy line. Within the country, the ruling Christian Democratic Party's appeal to the left-of-center formula (including socialists in the government) to some extent helped strengthen the position of the left. Of all the parties, only the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement and the monarchist party were against limiting nuclear weapons.

A new stage in Italy's policy towards the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons opens in 1967, when a joint Soviet-American draft treaty was presented to the participants of the Geneva conference .8 Italy's position on the specific articles of this draft has shown that its nuclear weapons policy has undergone significant changes. In particular, the head of the Italian delegation in Geneva, Ambassador F. Cavaletti of Italy to Switzerland, raised a number of objections to the draft treaty. He said that the treaty legitimizes a discriminatory decision to divide the world into two categories of nuclear and non - nuclear Powers. In addition, the treaty, in his opinion, hinders the technological progress and trade of non-nuclear countries. Finally, according to him, the treaty may harm the further development of the European Economic Community, especially with regard to Western Europe's plans to develop its nuclear forces .9
Thus, without openly rejecting the idea of concluding a treaty, the Italian government switched to tactics of maneuvering and playing on the contradictions between the United States and Western Europe. It also expected to receive certain concessions from the two main nuclear powers in exchange for signing the treaty. One of the main demands made by Italy was "recognition of the nuclear status of a united Europe", which meant international recognition for the" European state "of the right," inherited " from France and Great Britain, to have its own nuclear forces. By this demand, which largely negated the significance of the treaty, Italy was trying to mitigate the consequences of the failure of the multilateral nuclear forces plan, with which it initially associated significant military and political interests.

The bet made by the ruling circles on European nuclear forces was explained by the significant strengthening of the European direction in Italy's foreign policy and some distance from the US position on the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Numerous speeches of Italian statesmen concerning Italy's attitude to the treaty contain direct or indirect assurances of loyalty to Europeanism. The Italian Government's statements of 12 June 1968.10 and 28 January 1969.11 explaining Italy's intention to sign the treaty, in particular, emphasized that the Treaty on the Non - Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is compatible with the Euratom Treaty 12 and does not constitute an obstacle to the development of military and political integration of Western Europe.

7 See M. Will rich. Non-Proliferation Treaty. Charlottesville (Virginia). 1969, pp. 31 - 66.

8 S. Baker. Italy and the Nuclear Option. California. 1974, p. 14.

9 "La proliferazione delle armi nucleari". Bologna. 1975, p. 80.

10 E. Bet tin i. Op. cit., p. 129.

11 A. Albonelli. L'ltalia e l'atomica. Faenza. 1976, p. 29.

12 European Atomic Energy Agency-an association of Western European countries-members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in the field of the nuclear industry. It was created in December 1957.

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By the time the treaty was signed on 28 January 1969, the Italian Government had submitted Protocol No. 13, which contained a list of all comments to the treaty that had been made in the past by Italian Governments. On the same day, the Government announced the postponement of the treaty's ratification, ostensibly until the conclusion of an agreement between Euratom and the IAEA 14 on a control system for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. However, although the agreement was signed in April 1973, Italy did not ratify the treaty until two years later, on the eve of the opening of the Review Conference.

The turn in Italy's attitude towards the treaty in the late 60s was associated with some events in international life and the aggravation of the internal political struggle over the issue of nuclear non-proliferation. France's withdrawal from the NATO military organization in 1966. He influenced the relationship between Europeanism and Atlanticism in Italian nuclear weapons policy. As noted above, certain forces in Italy had high hopes for the creation of a European nuclear force with the help of France and Great Britain. The changing situation in the Middle East in the late 1960s (the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the closure of the Suez Canal, and the expulsion of the last Italian citizens from Libya after the revolutionary coup in 1969) caused concern among the Italian ruling circles, who claimed Italy's special position in the Mediterranean. This resulted in a course to strengthen Italy's Mediterranean position, which gave an additional trump card to supporters of its acquisition of "effective nuclear combat capability". The anti-communist campaign launched in a number of capitalist countries in connection with the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was echoed by proponents of nuclear proliferation in Italy. They succeeded in delaying the signing of the treaty, which was originally scheduled for 1968.

By the end of the 60s, the balance of political forces inside the country had changed. The rejection of the left-of-center formula and the subsequent turn of the centrist current in the Christian Democratic Party to the right strengthened the camp of opponents of the treaty. Tensions have escalated in the Liberal party, which abstained from voting in Parliament on the signing of the treaty in 1969. The right - wing parties-the Italian Social Movement and the monarchist Party-voted against. The unification of some Christian Democrats and liberals played into the hands of the so - called nuclear bureaucracy of the three most important departments-the National Committee for Nuclear Energy (CNEN), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, which were backed by certain circles of the Italian monopoly bourgeoisie.

The opposition of these forces was particularly evident during the third phase of Italy's policy on the limitation of nuclear weapons (autumn 1974-spring 1975), when the issue of ratification of the treaty was on the agenda. The urgency of resolving this issue during this period was explained by a number of factors, which will be discussed below. It is necessary to mention here only two reasons that have caused a broad political debate around the ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. First, the conclusion of the agreement between Euratom and the IAEA on a system of control over the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in 1973 eliminated the ofi-

13 "La proliferazione delle armi nucleari", p. 80.

14 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an organization established under the auspices of the United Nations to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The IAEA was established in 1957 in accordance with the decision of the UN General Assembly of December 4, 1954.

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the main reason why Italy delayed its ratification. Secondly, on May 5, 1975, a review conference was to open in Geneva, in which only States that had ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons could participate in full rights. This fact was essential for the ruling circles of Italy.

The reason for the discussion on ratification was an article by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs R. Gaia "Nuclear Diplomacy", published on June 29, 1974 in the newspaper" La Stampa " under the pseudonym R. Guidi. This article, which called for the creation of nuclear weapons in Italy, largely reflected the views of the highest bureaucracy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has earned a reputation for being one of the most conservative agencies in Italy for its position on the treaty. During the preparations for the signing of the treaty, Italian diplomats expressed a number of reservations and comments that undermined its effectiveness and hindered the progress of negotiations. Suffice it to recall the speech of the head of the Italian delegation at the 1967 Geneva Conference, F. Cavaletti, who raised objections to the main provisions of the treaty. Criticism of the treaty was also contained in the works of well-known Italian diplomats P. Cuaroni and R. Ducci15 .

The negative attitude of high-ranking officials of the Italian Foreign Ministry (Farnesina) to the treaty throughout the entire history of the issue did not correspond to the official position of the Italian government. An American researcher of Italian foreign policy, S. Baker, wrote that the foreign ministers of the 60s, the Demochristians A. Fanfani and A. Moro, and the socialist P. Nenni, who reflected the official point of view, often had to encounter resistance from the Farnesina bureaucracy. 16 "Fundamental political issues are resolved at the top, while current affairs are handled by the bureaucracy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose views on national interests do not always coincide with those of political leaders."17
R. Gaia's article was a logical continuation of the position of Italian diplomacy on the issue of limiting nuclear weapons. R. Gaia wrote that the prospects for the emergence of nuclear weapons in some developing countries allegedly showed the need for a significant revision of the treaty. And in this situation, rapprochement between the members of the European Economic Community "in terms of nuclear dignity would be extremely important." He further noted: "Moreover, given the psychological difficulties that West Germany has to face in the field of nuclear weapons, it is clear that certain steps in this direction among the non-nuclear-armed members of the European Community should be taken first by Italy." These views were shared by influential circles in the Ministry of Defense and the National Committee on Nuclear Energy. The Italian military's interest in nuclear weapons began to manifest itself in the late 50s, when Italy, as a member of NATO, called for the deployment of medium-range ballistic missiles equipped with nuclear warheads in Western Europe. "They (Italians. - N. A.) also supported the policy of widespread immediate use of tactical nuclear weapons in combat operations, arguing that increased firepower gives a pre-emptive effect on the use of nuclear weapons.-

15 See P. Quaroni. Un trattato che поп produrra пё distensione ne disarmo. "La Discussione". 10.VI.1967; R. Ducci. Le armi e l'Uomo. "Corriere della Sera", 15.VII.1967.

16 S. Baker. Op. cit., p. 10.

17 Ibid., p. 10.

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on defense, " 18 wrote General N. Pasti, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the NATO Nuclear Forces.

Among the opponents of limiting nuclear weapons in the highest military circles were representatives of two extreme trends - anti-American and pro-American, and both of them, each from their own positions, were in favor of introducing Italy to nuclear weapons. The first, the so - called national Gaullist movement, emerged under General Di Lorenzo, who was involved in the preparation of the military coup in 1964, and enjoyed influence primarily in the highest spheres of the Air Force. It relied on the creation of a powerful national military industry, on the development of an independent European strategy based on its own nuclear weapons and on privileged relations with France. The other group - the movement for bilateral relations with the United States-was represented mainly by Navy admirals from E. Henke to J. Birindelli, who advocated the implementation of the multilateral nuclear forces plan and the development of a "special" relationship with the United States, which meant almost complete dependence on American strategic decisions and on the American military industry. It is significant that General J. R. R. Tolkien also Di Lorenzo and Admiral Birindelli, who held high positions in the Ministry of Defense, left the military service for a political career, joined the right - wing parties-monarchist and neo-fascist, who took a negative position towards the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

In 1957, with the assistance of the Ministry of Defense, the Center for the Use of Nuclear Energy for Military Purposes (CAMEN) was established in San Pietro in Grado, near Pisa. The creation of this center contributed to the integration of the military in research and development in the field of nuclear energy and later turned into an independent factor that influenced the attitude of certain military circles to the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. "This is a real nuclear complex, located on an area of 10 square kilometers, where hundreds of researchers, military and civilians work. The military, of course, controls everything here: laboratories, institutes, and employee movements... Some large Italian industrial companies associated with nuclear power have branches here. " 19 The military in KAMEN is dominated by naval officers. To a large extent, this fact explains KAMEN's special attention to the development of shipboard nuclear power plants .20 This orientation of scientific and technical research at CAMEN fully corresponded to the Mediterranean direction in Italian foreign policy. With the support of like-minded people from the Ministry of Defense, certain forces in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interested in increasing Italy's political influence in the Mediterranean and in deploying military programs focused on this area, used the argument of the allegedly growing Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean and the construction of Soviet bases in Yugoslavia as justifications in the late 60s and other countries.

In this regard, it is not without interest to recall another addition to the treaty proposed by Italy together with the Netherlands at the Geneva talks: "The restrictions provided for in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will not apply to military equipment permitted, with the exception of the production of nuclear weapons

18 Ibid., p. 12.

19 C. Incerti. L'ltalia e pronta a costruire l'atomica. "Europeo". 19.IX.I974.

20 "La proliferazione delle armi nucleari", p. 75.

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use of nuclear energy, for example, in shipboard power plants"21 . This proposal can serve as an example of close cooperation between Farnesina and the Ministry of Defense in Italian foreign policy.

Once again, the opponents of limiting nuclear weapons in military circles demonstrated their negative attitude to the treaty on the issue of ratification of the treaty, supporting the point of view of Deputy Foreign Minister R. Gay.

In September 1974, the journal Politica e Strategia, an organ of the Institute for Strategic and Defense Studies with close ties to the Ministry of Defense, published a series of articles on national defense and nuclear weapons. Among the authors of these articles were the Director of the Institute, General D. Fanali (formerly Chief of the Air Force Staff), and the editor of the magazine, F. Kantov. De Yorio, who openly called for the creation of nuclear weapons in Italy, and a number of experts, among whom A. Albonetti, one of the members of the leadership of the National Committee for Nuclear Energy, the representative of Italy to the IAEA, occupies a special place. Albonetti published an article on "National Defense and Nuclear Autonomy" in the magazine, in which he defended the idea of creating a European nuclear force and, accordingly, criticized the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This article, due to its author's authority and high official position, was perceived by the Italian public as an expression of the point of view of the highest bureaucracy of the KNEN, in whose position on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons parochial, narrow-minded interests played a major role.

As the main fund that subsidizes all of Italy's nuclear research, the National Committee for Nuclear Energy viewed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a threat to its almost unlimited powers. The lack of direct political control over the activities of KNEN left its leadership more freedom of action in determining the goals of nuclear research. In addition, it was important for private companies to support CEN policies, which participated in some CEN programs "in order to give Italy greater technical independence from other countries" 22, for example, in the export of uranium fuel. Attempts to limit KNEN's "nuclear activity" have been made by left-wing parties, which have repeatedly criticized the KNEN administration for subordinating the committee's activities to the interests of private industry, and by the Interministerial Committee for Economic Programming (CIPE).23 In the late 60s, CHIPE revised the KNEN budget and demanded changes in some programs, in particular, the reconstruction of the Enrico Fermi nuclear ship for civilian purposes. However, these attempts did not fully achieve their goal. The activities of the KNEP have largely provided Italy with the opportunity to acquire "effective nuclear combat capability"in a short period of time, if desired .24
Albonetti's article, which was somewhat different in tone from Gaia's speech, actually expressed the same idea - a demand for Italy to "take an independent path" in the development of nuclear technology, both civil and military, and review the main provisions of the treaty. The period from the autumn of 1974 to the winter of 1975 was a culminating one

21 "World Armaments and Disarmament". "SIPRI Yearbook 1972". Stockholm. 1972, p. 347.

22 "La proliferazione delle armi nircleari", p. 72.

23 CIPE is an economic programming body established under the Council of Ministers of Italy.

24 S. Baker. Op. cit., p. 10.

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in the struggle between opponents and supporters of limiting nuclear weapons in Italy. The controversy raised in the press and in political circles around the speeches of R. Gaia and A. Albonetti showed that the reactionary bureaucracy and right-wing forces in Italy are opposed by a broad democratic opposition consisting of representatives of the left and some centrist parties that have increased their influence on public opinion in the country.

In the center of criticism of the left forces and the bourgeois-democratic press ("L'Europeo", "L'Espresso", "II Mondo", "Paese Sera", etc.) were influential people from the National Committee for Nuclear Energy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and CAMEN, supported by some industrial companies. Journalist C. Incerti published an article in the magazine" L'Europeo "on September 19, 1974 with a revealing article "Italy is ready to create an atomic bomb". He wrote that economic considerations have now been added to the military and political considerations of the proponents of nuclear weapons, as a major deal is planned in the near future for those who will prove to developing countries their ability to build nuclear power plants. And to prove its ability in this area, Incerti's article said, Italy can create, in the opinion of R. Gaia and his supporters, a" propaganda " atomic bomb and weaken American nuclear guardianship. It is for these reasons that Italy joined the project of the Association of Uranium Enrichment Organizations (Eurodif) less than a year ago, which provides for the construction of a powerful uranium enrichment plant by gas diffusion. That is why, the journalist wrote, the Italian company Nuovo Pignone supplied the most modern compressor to the French nuclear center in Pierlat, and the FIAT concern supplied the central part of the reactor for the West German nuclear ship Otto Hahn. A letter from 142 Italian physicists addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs also had a great resonance. In this letter, published in December 1974. Many Italian newspapers and periodicals have emphasized the urgent need for the early ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons .25
Among the political parties, Communists, Socialists, and Republicans continued to strongly support the treaty and criticize the "nuclear bureaucracy." This is evidenced by numerous articles published on the pages of "L'Unita", "L'Avanti", "La Voce Repubblicana", and requests from the leadership of the PCI, ISP and IRP in Parliament in the autumn of 1974 - winter of 1975.

In the speeches of Italian Communists in the press and in parliament - Senator U. Pecchioli, an expert on military problems, in the magazine "L'Europeo" for September 19, 1974; Senators F. Kalamandrei, P. Valenz, G. Adamoli, F. D'angelosante, who sent a request to the Senate on December 10, 1974; a member of the leadership of the PCI S. Segre The Rinascita magazine of December 27, 1974 - and many others-strongly rejected the idea of creating nuclear weapons in Italy and expressed concern about the policy of a number of responsible officials in the state apparatus, preventing the ratification of the treaty, and the Italian government, which is taking a wait-and-see position on this issue. At the same time, the Communists noted that the idea of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in Italy is finding more and more supporters, including major experts on issues related to the use of nuclear energy for military purposes: scientists-physicists E. Amaldi, F. Calogero, K. Skaerf-initiators of the open letter of 142 physicists, former Secretary General of KNEN F. Ippolito, the General

25 "L'Avanti", 10.XII.1974.

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N. Pasti is the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the NATO nuclear forces, as well as a number of prominent scientists in the field of international relations. Of great importance in the fight against the" nuclear bureaucracy "was the editorial" The nuclear bomb of super-bureaucrats", which appeared on the pages of" L'Avanti "on July 6, 197.and, in fact, opened in the press a campaign to expose the policy of the" military-diplomatic establishment " that pushed Italy to create nuclear weapons.

The Christian Democratic Party continued to take an ambivalent position on the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. On the one hand, aware of the responsibility that falls on the ruling party, the HDP leadership officially recognized the need to ratify the treaty. On the other hand, with close ties to forces interested in making Italy nuclear-armed, the Christian Democrats sought all possible ways to circumvent the main provisions of the treaty. Therefore, in the midst of the controversy surrounding the articles of R. Gaia and A. Albonetti, the Christian Democratic press directly or indirectly defended the point of view of supporters of European nuclear forces. The Italian Liberals (ILP) and the Social Democrats (ISDP) followed a similar line, which tended to be allied with the most conservative forces. However, unlike the CDP and ISDP, the liberals did not take an active part in the discussion. The right forces, accusing the left and the bourgeois-democratic press of "slanderous attacks" on Gaia and Albonetti, defended the opponents of the treaty. Recognition of the European nuclear status was proclaimed by them as the basis for European independence.

The controversy raised in the press and in political circles was so intense that government intervention was required. Foreign Minister A. Moreau, dismissing the charges against Farnesina, confirmed in his speech to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies on August 1, 1^74, the Government's intention to ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons .26 Secretary of Defense J. R. R. Tolkien Andreotti refuted R. Gaia's article, stating that "the question of the scientific and technical possibilities of creating an atomic bomb belongs to the field of pure theory and is absolutely devoid of relevance." 27
On March 25, 1975, the Italian Government submitted to the Chamber of Deputies a bill on ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The parliamentary debate that opened in April 1975 completed the last stage in Italian policy towards the treaty.

The successful outcome of the struggle of political forces in Italy over the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was greatly facilitated by the emergence of new and the development of already ingrained trends in international relations and within the country. The deepening de-escalation of international tensions in the early 1970s contributed to the emergence of new approaches in a number of capitalist countries, including Italy, to solving pressing international problems. Contacts between Italy and the socialist countries have expanded. Great progress was made in the development of political relations between Italy and the USSR, which until the 70s significantly lagged behind the level of economic relations between these countries. As a result of official visits of representatives of both sides - the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A. A. Gromyko to Italy in November 1970.,

26 "La proliferazione delle armi nucleari", p. 118.

27 "Cornunicato stampa del Ministero della Difesa", Mb 141, 14.IX.1974.

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Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy A. Moro in July 1971 and President of the Council of Ministers of Italy J. P. Blavatsky. Andreotti in October 1972 to the Soviet Union-a convergence of points of view on the most important international problems was recorded. The sides noted their positive attitude to strengthening peace and security in Europe and expressed interest in the early convening of a Pan-European Conference on Security and Cooperation. During the talks, various disarmament issues were discussed, and the role of implementing the principle of non-use of force, which covers all types of weapons, including nuclear weapons, was highlighted. In February 1974, during A. A. Gromyko's visit to Italy, both sides stressed the importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the importance of immediate accession to it by all States .28
Another important factor that influenced Italy's decision to ratify the treaty was the intensification of inter-imperialist contradictions in Western Europe, especially as a result of the energy and economic crisis. The objective difficulties of political unification of the EEC countries on the platform of Europeanism postponed indefinitely the idea of creating a European nuclear force, which was of such great interest to Italy in the second half of the 60s. In addition, the new armed conflict in the Middle East and the energy crisis have significantly complicated relations between the United States and Western Europe.

The complexity of U.S.-Italian relations was compounded by changes in Italian domestic politics. The ruling circles of the United States were seriously concerned about the increased influence of the Communist Party in Italy and the possibility of the PCI's participation in the government or in the parliamentary majority. The participation of Italian communists in the government, according to Washington, called into question the fulfillment in the future of the military and political obligations of Italy, which played, figuratively speaking,the role of a NATO aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean. In this regard, it is interesting to note the peculiarities of the US attitude to the events in the internal political life of Italy. From Washington's point of view, the best option for establishing strong US-Italian relations would be to create a stable centrist government in Italy with the participation of "enlightened technocrats" from the industrial and financial circles. In addition to the close economic ties between the financial and industrial capital of Italy and the United States, political considerations also played a role for the American government. Paying tribute to the anti-communist stereotypes of the Cold War era that were ingrained in the views of the American ruling circles, the US leadership took an uncompromisingly tough position regarding the possibility of the PCI joining the government or the parliamentary majority. The involvement of right-wing neo-fascist forces in Italy's governance threatened to reorient its foreign policy to the detriment of US interests. It is no accident that on September 4, 1974, the right-wing Roman newspaper Tempo wrote before the visit of the President of the Italian Republic, J. R. R. Tolkien. The United States believes that Western Europe should independently create such weapons systems that it considers most suitable for its security, separating its own interests from those of the United States.

Thus, further delay on the part of the ruling circles of Italy with the ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons seemed extremely undesirable for Washington also because it strengthened the position of the Italian communists,

28 Pravda, 22. II. 1974.

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strongly campaigned for Italy's full accession to the treaty. During the visit of Italian President and Foreign Minister A. Moro to the United States, the US government expressed its readiness to provide economic assistance to Italy .29 Many political observers saw this as the desire of the US ruling circles to take advantage of Italy's economic difficulties in order to influence the development of its foreign and domestic policy in the spirit desired by Washington.

Among the internal political factors that led to the full accession of Italy to the treaty, first of all, we should mention the growth of the authority and influence of the left forces. The May 1974 referendum on divorce was a major victory for Communists and Socialists, not only in the area of civil rights. Its significance goes far beyond the problem at hand. Conservative forces hoping to split the unity of the masses during the referendum were defeated. The results of the referendum showed what broad social strata separated from the Christian democracy, which for 30 years monopolized power in the country. The victory of the left forces is also associated with another factor of domestic politics - the emergence of new, more realistic approaches to solving major political problems. In addition, there is a psychological peculiarity in the thinking of the ruling circles that cannot be ignored when it comes to shaping Italy's foreign policy, namely, the fear of non - participation in international affairs, generated by the "inferiority complex of a minor power". May 5, 1975 A review conference was to open in Geneva, in which Italy could participate in full rights only by ratifying the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

All these factors undoubtedly determined the results of the parliamentary debates. The balance of power in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate in 1975 was somewhat different from the balance of power between political parties in 1969. The right - wing Italian Social Movement-National Right Forces party, which voted against signing the treaty in 1969, voted against the bill on its ratification in the Chamber of Deputies and abstained in the Senate. The Italian Liberal Party, which abstained in the 1969 vote, did not participate at all in either the debate or the vote in both houses of Parliament in 1975. The other political parties - the PCI, the ISP, the IRP, the CDP, and the ISDP-voted in favor of adopting the draft law on ratification of the treaty. But in the parliamentary debate, the differences in views on the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons between the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, on the one hand, who are in favor of compatibility of the treaty with the "European article" (that is, recognition of the nuclear status of a united Europe), were once again revealed30, and the Communists, socialists and Republicans, on the other hand, who unconditionally supported the bill on the ratification of the treaty.

Italy's ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was an important international event. Italy, a developed capitalist country that is a member of NATO, has actually declared its renunciation of nuclear weapons. Four other Euratom member countries - Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg-followed suit.-

29 "L' Espresso", 22.IX.1974, pp. 124 - 125.

30 The Demochristian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Roumor, speaking in the Senate on the occasion of the end of the debate on the draft law on ratification of the treaty, quoted the words of former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United States of America, John Kerry. Medici: "The main thing for us remains the recognition of the compatibility of the treaty with the creation of a European community that would have the right to nuclear status "(see A. Albonetti. Op. cit., p. 36).

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On the eve of the opening of the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the United States completed the process of ratification of the treaty and became full parties to it.

Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to think that the struggle over the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in Italy is over. There are still many unsolved problems that continue to worry the Italian public. These are problems related to the control of the Italian government over the use of nuclear weapons located in Italy, with the establishment of international control over the activities of KAMEN under the agreement between Euratom and the IAEA, which in 1974 received the right to verify and coordinate all research and industrial production in the field of nuclear energy. History has shown that the fate of the treaty in Italy largely depended on the balance of power between the right and left parties. The strengthening of the Communist and socialist positions by 1975 greatly contributed to the ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and will continue to play an important role in curbing the dangerous aspirations of the "nuclear bureaucracy" and right-wing extremists. The resolution of outstanding issues of concern to the Italian public and ensuring the security of Italy as a whole will also depend on the realism of its ruling circles responsible for making foreign policy decisions.

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