The vast centralized state created by King Abdelaziz, although it passed the stage of early modernization in some areas of public life (military, administrative), was managed by traditional methods until the mid-50s of the XX century.

Historically, the political and socio-economic life of the country was regulated by tribal relations that permeated all aspects of public life, and tribal patriotism (asabiya) continued to play a significant role in the behavior of Saudis. Although tribal autonomy gradually weakened during the formation of the centralized state, the tribal system remained the most important cultural and social institution of political identity. Tribal sheikhs continue to play a pivotal role in individuals ' relations with the Government.

In the context of the emerging new political culture, the determining factor in public life continued to be not so much loyalty to the state as to the House of Saud, with which most tribes were connected by matrimonial ties. The most important issues were resolved at majlises (councils) convened by the emirs (sheikhs), where the traditional spirit of egalitarianism prevailed and any member of the tribe could expect to be heard and a quick and fair trial. The clans and clans were equal in legal terms, and the sheikh, as an arbitrator, had to listen to the opinion of each and achieve a unanimous decision. Although the tribal system of sedentary and nomadic tribes underwent fundamental changes during the twentieth century, which were accompanied by a transformation of the social position of the leaders (due to the loss of some old and new functions), the traditional aristocracy retained political weight and social prestige.

After the restoration of the power of the Saud family over Nejd in 1902, Abdelaziz, known by his family name Ibn Saud, waged continuous wars for almost a quarter of a century, as a result of which" in the name of God and by force of arms", as well as diplomacy, subjugated most of the tribes of Arabia, whose territories were united into a single state with its capital in Riyadh. Abdelaziz effectively and masterfully used the majlises convened in his residence as the most important instrument of his power. He ruled the country according to the laws of tribal society, like the ideal Sheikh al-Mashaih.

At first, each province continued to be governed by a special order based on local traditions, laws and customs, and the links that connected the provinces into a single state were the personality of the king, a single foreign policy and emirs (governors) appointed by the king, in whose hands all administration was concentrated.-

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strative and military power. Each province, in the absence of a single financial and tax system, was an autonomous economic unit. Consistently pursuing a policy of centralization, Ibn Saud traveled extensively throughout the country in the 1920s and 1930s, convening royal majlises in the main cities of the provinces, where the authority, influence and intentions of his emirs and sheikhs of the largest tribes and Ulams became known to the ruler of the country, and the latter promptly made decisions on the main issues of local government.

The most important milestone in the development of the modern administrative system of the country was the conquest of Hijaz. This province, connected to the Mediterranean world, thanks to its pilgrimage and the port of Jeddah, had a more complex governance structure, approaching the European models borrowed by the Ottoman Empire. Abdelaziz decided to use more developed forms of the Hejaz state structure in order to gradually "pull up" the archaic, conservative and tribalist Nejd to its level. On August 31, 1926, the document "Basic Provisions of the Gejaz Kingdom" was published, according to which the Arab Gejaz Kingdom was proclaimed a "monarchical Islamic state" with advisory institutions, independent in both internal and external affairs. All administration was in the hands of King Abdelaziz, who was "bound by the rules of glorious Islam "[Constitution..., 1936, p. 150, 153]. The Ottoman system with some institutions of self-government did not undergo any significant changes. Prince Faisal, the king's 20-year-old second son, was appointed Governor-General (an-naib al-amm) of the Western Province (Hijaz), or Viceroy. An Advisory Council (Majlis ash-shura) was established in the capital of the Hejaz (Gejaz) Kingdom of Makkah, consisting of the governor, his advisers and six persons appointed by the King. The Council was supposed to meet once a week (if necessary more often) under the chairmanship of the governor. The decisions of the Council took the force of law only after its approval by the king. In the 1930s, the role of the Council grew, as the Government passed through it the main draft laws, the budget, concession agreements adopted by directorates (ministries), statutes and charters. In the mid-1930s, the number of members of the Council was increased to 13, and the rotation of councilors was carried out annually [Aal Al-Sheikh..., 1412 AD, p. 150-157; 1, p. 180, 253].

A few years later, by royal decree of December 29, 1931, the Council of Assistants-Deputies (Majlis al-Vukala) was established. In early 1932, the Council began its work. During the King's absence, the activities of the Council were directed by the Governor of Hijaz, who also headed the Ministries of Foreign and Internal Affairs. The Chairman of the Council was responsible for the Ministries of the Royal Chancellery, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Military, Internal Affairs, and Justice. The provincial emirs were also accountable to him [Constitution..., pp. 163-164].

Of course, these were not modern ministries, but rather traditional divans or somewhat more modernized directorates with a very small staff of advisers and clerks subordinate to the vizier (minister, secretary). The work of these bodies contributed to the unification of various parts of the state, led to some streamlining of administration, unification of the legal system, and marked the beginning of the creation of modern forms of public finance. The Council of Assistants became the embryo of the future Council of Ministers, which it was transformed into in October 1953, and the Hejaz Consultative Council, formed in 1926, became the prototype of the future national representative body of the same name, established in 1992. The completion of the first stage of consolidation of the country took legal form in the Royal Decree of September 18, 1932 on the establishment of the changing the country name: The Kingdom of Hejaz, Nejd and the annexed territories was re-established-

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It was renamed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and September 23, 1932 was declared the National Day of KSA [Shaheen Seifaddin Hassan, 1993, p.67].

As the Sheikh of sheikhs became a sovereign, the titles of the head of state also changed. In the first years after coming to power, Ibn Saud, like his predecessors from the Saudi family, was called emir and imam. Many Najdians continued to refer to Ibn Saud as Imam and, with his proclamation in 1921, as Sultan of Najd. After the extension of his power to the north-western regions, he received the honorary title of Sultan of Najd and the annexed territories, and after the conquest of the Hijaz in 1925, he became known as the King of the Hijaz and Sultan of Najd and the annexed territories, somewhat later-the king of the Hijaz and Najd and the annexed territories, and finally, after the formation of the KSA, he received the title of king of KSA [al- Useimin Abdallah al-Salih, 1999, p. 90].

The center of the country's political life was the royal residence: for the first two decades, the old Imam's palace in the historical part of Riyadh, and later the beloved al-Murabba Palace (Qasr al-Murabba) - a square fortress built to the tastes of the owner in 1936 and now protected as a memorial to the era of early modernization. In this simple and modest, but cozy two-story building, Ibn Saud spent the last 17 years of his life. From the outside, it resembles a traditional Arabian fortress with almost blank walls without windows on the ground floor, and from the inside, along the walls of both floors there are long balconies of light white and gray color, opening onto a paved courtyard with several small palm trees.

This building housed the royal court and the most important government departments. The main role among them was played by the Royal Divan (chancellery), where drafts of state regulations (nizam), statutes and decrees (marsum) were prepared. In the royal palace there were offices of the king's chief advisers (among whom in the 30s - 40s of the XX century his personal physician, the Syrian Rashid Pharaoh, stood out), as well as a number of sofas, among which the most important were: protocol, religious affairs, tribal affairs and complaints. The leaders of these divan viziers had a higher status than the officials who headed the highest government bodies located outside the royal palace. The Royal Majlis met daily. It included the King's brothers, his two eldest sons (Crown Prince since 1933 Saud and Faisal) and diwan leaders, councillors, top Ulama, provincial governors and sheikhs of major tribes.

* * *

The formation of the modern administrative system was spontaneous. Thus, after the annexation of the Hijaz, it became necessary to create a Directorate of Foreign Affairs to maintain diplomatic relations with countries whose consulates were located in Jeddah, as well as to solve problems related to the Hajj. In 1930, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was established under the leadership of the Viceroy of Hejaz, Faisal. It became a model for the formation of other ministries in subsequent years. From the second half of the 1920s, the financial system began to take shape. At first, tax collection departments were established in cities under the leadership of emirs of various ranks (governors and mayors). In 1927. They were merged into the Directorate General of Finance in Mecca, which was transformed into the Agency of Finance in 1929. Finally, in 1932, the Agency was transformed into the Ministry of Finance. From 1929 until 1954, Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman bin Hamdan was at the head of this economic super-ministry, enjoying the full confidence of the King. It was he who signed an agreement on oil exploration and production with the American oil company Standard Oil of California (SOCAL) in May 1933. All in-

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Matters related to the activities of ARAMCO and other foreign companies were the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance. It should be noted that in the era of the founding father of the state, a modern financial and credit structure was never created. There was no single monetary unit, the credit system was almost completely controlled by foreign banks, internal trade was regulated on the basis of the Ottoman Trade Code of the XIX century, and agreements with oil companies were drawn up on the basis and in terms of Western contract law [Saudi Arabia, 1984, pp. 207-208].

During the wars for the creation of a unified state, the army consisted of militias of nomadic tribes and the settled population of Nejd (al-Jihad army), which, at the call of Ibn Saud, gathered under his banners, and after the end of the next campaign, returned to their native places to a peaceful life. After the transfer of a significant part of the nomads to settlement on the initiative of Abdelaziz and the creation of khujar (plural from Khujra-settlement), it was the detachments formed from the inhabitants of the above-mentioned paramilitary settlements that turned into the main striking force of the royal army. Despite extremely limited resources, the king set about building a modern army, using the small core of troops of the new system that he inherited in the Hejaz.

In 1927, the Directorate of Military Affairs was established in Mecca, which began to reorganize the former Sherif army, on the basis of which three battalions were formed: artillery, machine-gun and infantry. In 1939, the royal decree on the formation of a modern army was issued and the Department of Military Affairs was transformed, to which all departments related to defense were subordinated. In 1940, the first parade of modern troops was held in Jeddah. At the same time, the defense Agency was formed, and the department was transformed into the general staff. In 1946, the Defense Agency became the Ministry of Defense. One of the factors that accelerated the creation of this ministry was an agreement with the United States on the construction of an American air base in Dhahran (to protect American oil facilities, the construction of which was carried out in 1944-1946).

The first Minister of Defense was appointed 26-year-old son of the King, Lieutenant General Mansour, who made a significant contribution to the modernization of the armed forces. A number of military educational institutions (lower secondary and secondary) were opened; purchases of modern weapons were organized; foreign instructors were invited to train officers and soldiers; groups of Saudi military personnel were sent to study abroad; factories for the production of ammunition were founded. After Mansur's death in 1951, his brother Prince Mashal became Minister of Defense [Al-Mamlaka..., 1999, p. 48-49; 11, p. 392-393; Ar-Rashid Nasir Ibrahim, 1990, p. 93-94].

In 1950, two new ministries were established: Health and Internal Affairs. The creation of the latter was especially important, from now on the emirs of the regions (emirates) were put under its control, which ensured more effective management at the regional level. Of particular importance in the reform of the administrative system was the royal decree on the Council of Ministers, signed on October 9, 1953, which was not only a major milestone in the formation of modern institutions of power, but also a political testament of Ibn Saud.

The ever-expanding scope of foreign TNCs ' activities and the growing number of national enterprises needed to serve the oil industry and create the appropriate infrastructure, as well as the increasing influx of petrodollars into the country (25 million tons of oil were produced in 1950), on the one hand, and the accelerated formation and complexity of the activities of various state departments and departments, on the other, the conditions of traditional society led to a sharp aggravation of social problems.

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The far-sighted king understood that the emerging political and economic system was facing a structural crisis [Khadduri Majid, 1981, pp. 50-51]. The situation was complicated by the progressive deterioration of the health of Ibn Saud, whose powerful figure and unquestionable authority for a long time ensured the relative unity of the state and at least the appearance of cohesion of a large royal family. Forced to retire from public affairs, he increasingly entrusted the performance of his duties to his two eldest (out of 34 surviving) sons. The eldest, Saud, was born on the eve of the return of Riyadh to Saudi control in 1902. In 1922, he became Emir of the province of Nejd, and in 1933, at a joint meeting of the Council of Assistants and the Advisory Council, on the recommendation of the king, he was proclaimed Crown Prince. He resembled his father in appearance-tall, solidly built, sedate; he had fought in many battles, was distinguished for his bravery, once saved his father's life in a critical situation; inherited the humor and cheerful disposition of Ibn Saud, and was respected among the sheikhs of the Najd tribes. Faisal was four years younger. At the age of twenty, he became Viceroy of the Hejaz, and in 1924 - Minister of Foreign Affairs. He adopted the inner qualities of his father, especially his piety, severity, ascetic disposition, subtle mind and ability to detect human weaknesses. Like his older brother, he had distinguished himself in the wars, had an outstanding knowledge of Muslim theology, and was popular among the country's top clergy. Faisal became a prominent figure in diplomatic circles and had no rivals among his compatriots in terms of experience and competence in the construction of state administrative bodies [The Kingdom..., 1990, p. 85; al-Mamlaka..., 1999, p. 65-73].

In the last years of his life, Ibn Saud was very concerned about preserving the unity of the royal family after his death. Most of all, he was afraid of an internal family split. With a pang in his heart, he recalled the history of the Saudi dynasty, which in the last quarter of the XIX century lost power in Nejd due to rivalry within the Emir's family. He bequeathed the kingdom he created to all his descendants, among whom the eldest king was to serve as the head of the family and nation. He was particularly concerned about the secret rivalry between his older sons. A few months before his death, he summoned them to his house and demanded that they embrace each other and swear on the Koran never to quarrel under any circumstances.

In the 1940s, as the new administrative system was consolidated, the Council of Assistants increasingly lost its influence. On October 9, 1953, the Royal Decree on the status of the Council of Ministers was published. The Chairman of the Council was the King, and in his absence-the Crown Prince. The King's sons became ministers: Faisal (foreign affairs), Mishal (defense), Fahd (education), Sultan (communications). A month after Ibn Saud's death, Crown Prince Saud became King and Prime Minister on November 9, and Faisal became Crown Prince and Deputy head of government [Saudi Arabia..., 1984, p. 50; Bidwell, 1973, p. 5, 122; Ta'in..., 1413-1414 AH, p. 43-44 al-Farsi Fuad Abdassalam, 1412 AD, pp. 65-66]. However, by the time the new king ascended the throne, he was seriously ill, and his will was weakened. Nine months later, on August 16, 1954, the Crown Prince became Prime Minister.

* * *

The first years after the death of the founding father were very difficult for the kingdom. The systemic crisis that began in the first post-war years was becoming increasingly dangerous. The country lacked the administrative bodies and institutions that were necessary to manage the growing flow of petrodollars and play a role in the region. No less threatening to the regime were the turbulent revolutionary events taking place in neighboring Arab countries. It was pe-

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During the rise of Arab nationalism and republicanism, Egyptian President Abdel Nasser became the idol of the Arab masses. Egyptian propaganda had a serious impact on the mood of young people, threatening the foundations of the monarchical regimes of the Arabian Peninsula.

During these years, under the influence of internal and external factors, as well as in fulfillment of the will of Ibn Saud, the ruling family increasingly began to raise the question of the need to create an institution of "senior princes", expressing the collective opinion of the royal family, which should include the most authoritative, capable and pious princes. This informal body, whose decisions had to be approved by the top Ulama and tribal leaders, became an important factor in the country's political life. Without any legal authority, he appeared at the forefront of public life in critical periods. In the spring of 1958, by decision of this body, all real political power was transferred to the Crown Prince and Prime Minister Faisal, whose Cabinet took urgent and energetic steps to combat the financial crisis and implement the financial stabilization program developed by him. At the same time, the government began to reform, or rather, create a modern financial system. Strict import restrictions were imposed (luxury goods were banned), for the first time the king's personal treasury was separated from public finances, unproductive spending was sharply reduced, and the income of the ruling class, including members of the royal family, was regulated and significantly reduced. The tough economic policy pursued by the Crown Prince with an iron fist was later highly appreciated, but at that time it caused discontent among a significant part of the elite, which led to the resignation of the government [Ozoling, pp. 166-178].

The victory of the September 26, 1962 revolution in Yemen, which led to the overthrow of the ruling Hamid al-Din family and the monarchy, provoked a strong reaction in the Arabian Peninsula. The monarchical regimes of the Persian Gulf face a real threat. During this critical period, it was decided to entrust the formation of the Government to Faisal. On October 31, 1962, a new government was formed, which included his closest associates from the royal family. The following year, due to the deterioration of the King's health, Faisal became the de facto head of state, and on November 2, 1964, he was proclaimed king. The first years of Faisal's rule were marked by a fierce struggle to choose the socio-economic and political path of development. On the one hand, conservative Ulama and members of the ruling family sought a return to the harsh mores of the 1920s and 1930s; on the other, "liberal princes", young officers in a small army, and a group of American university graduates from elite families demanded "modernization" and less strict adherence to religious rules. The new king chose a compromise path of development - the option of modernization based on a conservative concept of social development.

In November 1962, Faisal put forward a program of reforms based on the idea of using oil rents to radically reorganize the national economy, create a modern system of transport and industrial infrastructure, and transform the social and cultural spheres. All this was impossible without improving the work of the Council of Ministers, the middle and lower levels of the administration, and the accelerated development of the "secular" education system. Under Faisal, the Council of Ministers became the core of the political and administrative system, the most important body responsible for economic, social and cultural transformation.

Faisal's political activities also had an important regional dimension. The Saudi monarch has put forward pan-Islamism as a counterweight to radical nationalism. The confrontation of two political and ideological trends in the Arab world

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The world reached its climax during the grueling civil war in Yemen (1962-1970), which turned into an arena of open struggle between currents. The" holy Alliance " of Arab monarchies was headed by Saudi Arabia, and the "progressives" camp was headed by Egypt. The antagonism between the two coalitions was based not only on differences in the political and social system, but also on the attraction to the two opposing world camps. In Nasser's personality and Arab nationalism and socialism, the king saw a deadly threat to the Saudi regime and the Muslim religion; in the spread of atheism and communism, he saw a greater danger than in Israeli politics. In an attempt to compensate for its weakness in the region, it has focused on building an alliance of Muslim states. In 1962, the League of the Islamic World was established with its headquarters in Mecca - the first organization created to counter the spread of the influence of Nasser's Egypt, and a little later, as financial opportunities expanded, it focused on the spread of Salafi-Hanbali "Wahhabi" Islam [Arab World, 1990, pp. 188-189; Kepel, 2004, p. 56, 76].

In the 1960s and especially in the 1970s, the influence of Saudi Arabia increased markedly. Riyadh took leadership positions in OPEC and through this influential international organization methodically strengthened its influence in the region and the world. Feisal, who knew how to wait patiently for his time, waited for it. The defeat of the Arab armies in the 1967 Six-Day War dramatically changed the balance of power. Nasser, who suffered the greatest humiliation, was forced to give up his leadership role in the region. At the Khartoum summit of Arab leaders (August 1967), the Egyptian President and the Saudi King were reconciled. Saudi Arabia (along with Kuwait) pledged to provide financial assistance to the "frontline" countries, and Egypt in return had to stop the propaganda war against the Arabian monarchies. As a result, Faisal's authority in the Arab world has grown markedly.

The fourth Arab-Israeli War and the subsequent use of the formidable "oil weapons" marked a new period of rise and establishment of the leading role of oil-producing monarchies in the Arab world. Rising prices for oil and petroleum products have turned exporters of "black gold" into owners of untold wealth, and Saudi Arabia has received almost unlimited funds to realize its ambitious dreams of a monopoly on understanding Islam on the scale of the entire Islamic world [Khadduri, 1981, p.199; Shaheen, 1993, p. 73].

After the tragic passing of King Faisal, his program, which laid a solid foundation for conservative reformism, was strictly implemented by his closest associates and successors, Kings Khaled (1975-1982), Fahd (1982-2005) and the current ruling (since August 2005) Abdallah.

* * *

At the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, a new phenomenon emerged in Saudi public life. Up to this time, modernization has affected the economic, social and cultural areas. As for the political sphere, despite the promised reforms, it remained in an unshakable state under the strict control of the political and religious elite. Meanwhile, during the first five-year plans, over the course of two decades, such important modern social communities as state bureaucracy, technocrats, businessmen, intellectuals, professors, and officers were formed or noticeably increased, with a significant part of them receiving American, European, or Egyptian education ("people of science, knowledge, and experience" in Saudi terminology). However the accelerated formation of new middle strata was not accompanied by the emergence of a serious opposition movement primarily due to the extreme demand and quite satisfactory material support-

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the location of these layers. The main reason for public discontent was an external impulse: in connection with the occupation of Kuwait by Iraqi forces in August 1990, at the request of its king, the army of the international coalition, based on American forces, was introduced into the country. The appearance of a half-million-strong army of" godless people " with their chaplains and rabbis to save the holy land of Islam made an indelible impression on the entire population of the kingdom. The liberal opposition, familiar with Western democratic values, hoped for the introduction of a constitution promised by Faisal, the formation of an Advisory Council, the beginning of the Saudi infitah-liberalization and protection of individual rights. In February 1991, when the international coalition army was completing the operation to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait, a new petition was sent to King Fahd demanding the adoption of the Basic Law and the formation of an Advisory Council.

The activation of Saudi liberals provoked a sharp reaction from the right wing of the opposition. Strict Salafists criticized all forms of Westernization and the harmful influence of Christians and Jews, against the monopoly of power of the Saudis, for the complete Islamization of the country and the strengthening of the influence of Ulam. They supported the demand for the creation of an Advisory Council, but with the condition that it would consist mainly of ulams capable of mitigating the monarch's arbitrariness [Kepel, 2004, pp. 213-215]. The danger of uniting the liberal and Islamic opposition on at least some political issues, along with other factors, forced the ruling elite to finally begin to carry out gradual transformations in the political sphere. On March 1, 1992, the tenth anniversary of his accession to the throne, King Fahd announced a reform of the country's administrative system. A number of royal nizams (regulations) were published: the Main Regulations of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; the Regulations of the Consultative Council; the Regulations of the Regions (regional Administration); the Regulations on changing the system of succession to the throne in the KSA.

Among these regulations, the most important is the Basic Regulation, in fact, the basic law of the state. The regulations are imbued with the Islamic spirit. KSA is a sovereign, Arab, Islamic state, its religion is Islam, the constitution is the Noble Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet, the official language is Arabic, the capital is the city of Riyadh; national holidays are: the Feast of Sacrifice and the Feast of Breaking the Fast, i.e. the two main holidays generally recognized in the Islamic world, which were established in the era of the first the four righteous caliphs in the seventh century. The official system of chronology is the Islamic Hijra. It is emphasized that the political system is a monarchy; power belongs to the sons of the founding king Abdelaziz ibn Abdarrahman Aal Saud and the sons of his sons; the king chooses the crown prince and can remove him; subjects take an oath of obedience and loyalty to the king.

The foundation of Saudi society is the family, which is supported by the state, which strives to preserve Arab and Islamic family values, cares about the welfare of its subjects, strengthen national unity, and prevent actions that cause division and disunity in society.

National natural resources are the property of the State; State property is inviolable; the Sharia law respects the system of private property, which can only be confiscated on the basis of a court decision.

The highest State authorities consist of the judicial, executive and regulatory branches. The King is the highest authority. He is the guarantor of the execution of decisions of courts of all instances and the application of Islamic law; the King implements national policy in accordance with Sharia law; he is the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, appoints ministers and their deputies, and

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also officials of the highest rank; he is the supreme commander - in - chief of the armed forces of the kingdom [Nizam..., 1413-1414 AD].

The main Regulation is a compromise document. On the one hand, in order to please the conservative religious establishment, it claims that the Koran and Sunnah continue to be the constitution of the kingdom, and on the other hand, it contains concessions to liberal democratic circles. This document became, along with the Basic Regulations of Hijaz of 1926, an important milestone in the history of the political modernization of the KSA.

On March 1, 1992, the King signed the second most important document - the Rules of Procedure of the Consultative Council, in which the latter is considered as the successor of the first Consultative Council, formed in 1927 in Mecca and until 1957 was the most important administrative and advisory body of the state. However, during the period of rapid modernization of Saudi society in the era of King Faisal, the core of the modern administrative system was the Council of Ministers, which also took over some functions of the Advisory Council. The new Council, which consisted of a chairman and 60 members appointed by the King from among "learned, experienced and competent people", was tasked with providing advice to the King and the government [Nizam..., 1413-1414, p. 205-209; The Middle East Journal, 1992, N 2, p. 496; The New York Times, 02.03.1992]. A member of the Council can be a Saudi citizen, both by origin and birth, known for his piety and abilities, at least 30 years of age. The term of office of the Council is set at four years; when forming the next composition of the Council, at least half of its members must be replaced by new persons. The Council is authorized to express its opinion on the general policy of the State. The Head of Government submits draft plans for the country's economic and social development, as well as draft treaties and agreements with foreign countries to the Consultative Council for discussion. Decisions of the Council are submitted to the Head of Government, who submits them to the Council of Ministers. If the positions of both Councils coincide and the royal approval, the law comes into force; in case of divergence of the positions of the Councils, the issue under consideration is transferred to the king for sole decision - making [Nizam..., pp. 205-209].

In addition to the Rules of the Advisory Council, a number of royal decrees were issued in September 1992: "On the appointment of former Minister of Justice Sheikh Mohammed bnu Ibrahim bnu Jubayr as Speaker of the Advisory Council", "On the appointment of members of the Advisory Council" and "Internal Regulations and Principles of work of the Advisory Council" [Financial Times, 1992; Taiin..., 1413 - 1414 G. H., pp. 209-212; Lavaih..., 1413-1414, pp. 212-220; The Middle East Journal, 1993, N 1, p. 109). Major government officials, prominent university professors and scientists, technocrats and business leaders, religious leaders and generals were appointed to the Council.

Internal regulations and principles of work of the Advisory Council defined the rights and duties of the Chairman, his deputy, the General Secretary of the Council and advisers, the composition and functions of the General Committee and Standing Committees, as well as temporary commissions formed by the Committees to consider certain issues, etc..
The composition of the Council was welcomed by liberals and caused open discontent among Islamists. At the end of September 1992, religious authorities published a message to the King "Memorandum of Good Advice", designed in harsh tones. The government was accused of deviating from Islamic canons; the Ulama demanded the restoration of the independence of the religious establishment, the termination of cooperation with the United States, and the restoration of a policy of national integration based on Salafism and Sharia [The Washington Times, 1992; The Middle East Journal, 1993, No. 1, p. 109; al-Farsi, 1412 AD, p. 215].

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However, most of the Saudi elite opposed the strengthening of the role of the Salafi-Hanbali clergy in the country's political life. On December 4, 1992, the King's decree radically reorganized the Council of Supreme Ulamas (SVU): seven members of the Council who refused to condemn religious scholars who criticized the government were replaced by 10 younger and more "progressive" Ulamas. But the Islamist opposition was not going to back down. On May 3, 1993, six clerics founded the Committee for the Protection of Legal Rights, whose goal was to protect the principles of Sharia law. The regime's response was swift and decisive. On May 15, the leaders and many supporters of the Committee were arrested. Due to a number of reasons (poor knowledge of Islamic dogma, superficiality, extremely harsh forms of criticism of the government, etc.), the Committee's activities did not have a significant impact on the political life and ideological field of the country.

Much more important were the speeches of dissident groups, which, without insulting or discrediting Ulam, tried to negotiate with them and even attract them to their side. Thus, in the early 1990s, the Sunni-Islamist opposition movement "Al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya" (Islamic Awakening) began to form, which included large Ulama and young people united by the idea of the need for change. The activities of the activists of the movement, despite their legal nature, caused dissatisfaction with the authorities, and after a commemorative demonstration in Bureida organized by large ulama oppositionists, which attracted several hundred young activists, the latter were arrested in September 1994. The King has taken a series of vigorous measures to neutralize growing religious extremism. In July 1993, the prestigious Sheikh Abdelaziz Bin Baz was appointed to the long-vacant post of Grand Mufti. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs, after a radical reorganization, was renamed the Ministry of Hajj and Waqf Affairs; the most prominent theorists (theologians and jurists) of the disbanded Al-Sahwa movement were co-opted into the new structure of the IED; in October 1994, the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs was established under the leadership of the Second Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Emir Sultan Bin Abdulaziz bin Abdulaziz bin Abdulaziz bin Abdulaziz bin Abdulaziz bin Abdulaziz bin Abdulaziz bin Abdulaziz bin Abdulaziz bin Abdulaziz bin Abdulaziz bin Abdulaziz bin Abdulaziz bin Abdulaziz bin Abdulaziz bin Abdulaziz bin Abdulaziz Abdelaziz; in mid-1995, by royal decree, the IED was again updated by half [The Middle East and North Africa, 2002, p. 969].

* * *

The Advisory Council's suggestions and recommendations have helped to improve the work of the Council of Ministers, significantly improving the quality of its legislative activities. Following the expiration of the Advisory Board's term in July 1997, a royal decree was issued to form a second Board and increase the number of councillors from 60 to 90. An important step in the modernization of the political system was media infitah (liberalization of mass media). This was initiated by the appearance of the weekly Al-Watan (May 1998), where a group of young intellectuals who were opposed to the official religious doctrine had the opportunity to openly express their views and exchange opinions with their like-minded people and opponents. The theorists and activists of this movement deserve special attention, as they are the ones who started revising the old doctrines and finally came up with a new program. Whereas previously they advocated political reforms on an Islamic-democratic basis, since 1998 the focus of their propaganda has shifted to the need to combine changes in the political sphere with religious reform on an Islamic-democratic basis, the core of which was an unprecedented criticism of Hanbali-Salafi ("Wahhabi") orthodoxy. Such a broad program was designed to ensure an alliance with non-Khanbali Sunni and non-Sunni activists, especially with liberals and Shiites. As a result of intensive exchanges of views with lide-

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Rami of other youth movements managed to form a common national democratic political platform, which meant the emergence of a fundamentally new trend in the Saudi intellectual space [The Middle East Journal, 2003, N 3, p. 401; 2004, N 3, p. 346; 12, p 269; Kepel, 2004, pp. 215-216].

The opening of public access to the Internet in January 1999 meant the strengthening and deepening of media infitah. Islam-liberal intellectuals actively used Internet forums to disseminate and discuss their theses. The first two forums played a decisive role in the emergence of a new trend: the first, held in 2000, formulated the platform of moderate Islamism, which attracted the attention of Islam-liberals; the second, organized in 2002, its participants made up a wide ideological spectrum: from anti-religious liberal intellectuals to Islam-liberals [The Middle East Journal, 2004, N 3, p. 358].

The events of September 11, 2001 and their consequences had a decisive impact on changing the overall domestic political climate in the Kingdom. An unprecedented large-scale campaign has been launched in the Western media against the Saudi regime. The vulnerability of the kingdom, whose security was based on a "special relationship" with the United States and provided by American military power, was exposed. U.S.-Saudi relations were severely tested during the 1990 - 1991 Kuwait crisis, but were restored by the efforts of both sides interested in the normal functioning of the most important oil artery. Now, the internal political crisis has deepened as the government has been subjected to simultaneous external pressure and pressure from the internal opposition (both Islamist-conservative and liberal), which demanded the withdrawal of American troops from the country and the implementation of socio-economic and political reforms.

Prince Abdullah, who had served as the de facto head of State since late 1995 due to King Fahd's illness, assumed the royal throne on August 3, 2005 after the King's death. In accordance with his reform program, non-Muslim tourism was gradually allowed, debates about the status of women in society were initiated, Islamic dissidents, including young intellectuals who developed an Islam-liberal program, were released from prison, and finally a mechanism for broad media infitah was launched [The Middle East Journal, 2002, N 2, p. 223; 2004, N 3, p. 358].

Allowing public dialogue was a well-calculated move by the King, setting the stage for implementing reforms, releasing the accumulated steam of public discontent, and at the same time demonstrating to the critical West the commitment of a significant part of the ruling elite to greater openness in Saudi society. Another factor contributing to the open dialogue was the discrediting of ultraconservative Islamist groups that shared the ideology and supported al-Qaeda's actions. The clerical factions were in a state of extreme confusion. For the first time in recent decades, favorable conditions have emerged for the performance of Islam-liberals, who have developed a number of important documents, among which the reformist charter "Vision of the Present and Future of the Motherland"is of particular interest. This document was prepared for five months by a group of young Islamic-liberal intellectuals, which included representatives of all Islamic madhhabs and trends, Sunnis and Shiites.

In mid-January 2003, the Charter was presented to the Crown Prince, and 13 copies were given to the most influential members of the royal family. This document was dedicated to the most pressing and acute internal problems and contained requirements for political, economic and social reforms. The charter, which began and ended with an expression of loyalty to the royal family, contained a number of policies:-

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These include the separation of powers; the rule of law; equal rights for all citizens, regardless of regional, tribal, or religious affiliation; the formation of elected national and regional advisory councils; and freedom of speech, assembly, and organization to form a truly civil society.

The economic demands called for a fair distribution of wealth and a strong fight against corruption and waste. As evidence of the authorities ' good intentions, the charter contained the following wishes: the release of political prisoners (or a fair trial for them), the restoration of suspended intellectuals, and, finally, the organization of a national dialogue in which all regions and social groups would be represented. The Charter was written in correct tones, emphasizing the need for reforms within the framework of Sharia law, and the terms "democracy" and" parliament " were not mentioned [Al-Quds. 30.01.2003; The Middle East Journal, 2004, N 3, p. 360-362; Seyranyan, 2005, p.271].

The serious attitude of the ruling elite to the Charter is evidenced by the fact that on January 22, Abdallah met with 40 of the 115 signatories, assuring them of his support, but at the same time noting that he is not the only person making decisions, and that reforms will take time. Soon after, the official press received a signal for a broad discussion of issues related to the reforms. In June 2003, the first National dialogue conference in the country's history was held, to which 30 Ulama representing all religious groups of the country were invited: Sunni-Salafi and non-Salafi, Sufis, Shiites of two branches-Imamites and Ismailis. As a result of the exchange of views, the document "Al-Saudiyya: a frank discussion of issues of religious pluralism, freedom of speech, women's rights and extremism" was adopted [The Middle East Journal, 2004, N 3, p. 362-363], which recognized the need for reforms. The Charter and the document adopted at the national dialogue dealt a serious blow to the dominant Hanbali-Sunni doctrine. However, the struggle in the religious sphere has not ended. This is evidenced by the fact that representatives of the Hanbali establishment refused to attend the June conference, obviously wanting to belittle the significance of this event.

However, the most important trend in the religious life of modern Saudi Arabia is that "Wahhabism" (Salafi Sunnism) is increasingly interpreted mainly in a "patriarchal way from a historical point of view", as a "religious tradition", and the idea of revising the official religious doctrine in favor of Islamic pluralism is increasingly being strengthened [Filonik, Vavilov, 2004, p. 172; The Middle East Journal, 2004, N 3, p. 345, 362-363]. In an emotional speech delivered in October 2003, Abdallah stated:: "It is high time to purge our society of the seeds of bigotry and hatred and replace them with the seeds of tolerance and unity... Islamic land has always belonged to all Muslims, men and women" [Financial Times, 18.11.2003].

Steps that demonstrate the determination to carry out reforms in the political sphere were Abdallah's statement in September 2003, and then the government's decision of October 13, 2003 to hold elections for half of the municipal councillors at the end of 2004 [MEED, 19.12.2003-01.01.2004, N 1, p. 32; 17-23.09.2004, p. 27; The Middle East Journal, 2004, N 3, p. 363]. For the first time in all the emirates (districts), the electoral mechanism was to be launched and tested, which, according to many analysts, was a serious test for the country's political system. Reformists and conservatives held diametrically opposed positions. Reformists expressed the hope that in the near future the principle of electability will be extended to the Advisory Council.

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The next initiative was the Royal Decree of 29 November 2003, which gave the Advisory Council broader legislative powers, namely the right to consider or initiate draft laws without the prior consent of the King. The Advisory Council was given the right to issue "constructive challenges" to the Council of Ministers on Policy Issues. Previously, if the positions of the two Councils diverged, the issue was referred to the King for final decision, but from now on, according to the decree, the bill was returned for reconsideration to the Advisory Council. A little more than a year after the aforementioned decree, when forming the fourth composition of the Council in 2005, the number of its members was increased to 150 people, which indicated an increase in its political weight [MEED, 19.12.2003 - 01.01.2004, N 1, p. 32; 24 - 30.06.2005.N 25, p. 34].

The municipal elections were originally scheduled for September, then postponed to November 2004. There was no experience of dividing the country into electoral districts, forming election commissions, and compiling voter lists. On September 11, the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs issued a decree that the first stage of elections will be held in Riyadh on February 10, 2005, the second-on March 30 in the northern and central districts, and the third-on April 21 in the rest of the country [MEED, 19.12.2003-01.01.2004, N 1, p. 32; 17-23.09.2004, N 38, p. 3, 27-28]. A number of issues were to be resolved in the run-up to the elections. First of all, whether political parties will be allowed to participate in the elections or whether independent candidates will be nominated. Soon, the participation of political parties was deemed premature and the following clarifications were introduced: male Saudi citizens aged 21 and older, including prisoners, were given the right to vote, and women, military and municipal employees were banned from voting. According to official data, half of the members of 178 municipal councils in all 14 emirates of the kingdom were to be elected [MEED, 17-23.09.2004, N 38, p. 3].

The elections were both a learning process and the first step in creating an electoral culture and attracting citizens to actively participate in public and political life.

Carefully prepared partial municipal elections were held on time and in a relatively calm environment after a decisive crackdown on terrorist groups. However, some tensions still persisted due to the Government's failure to completely defeat the terrorists, and minor clashes between security forces and militants continued during the election period (for example, in the Mecca area in April 2005).

The elections were an important event in the political life of the kingdom and showed the government's determination to continue the promised reforms, which were both a reaction of the elite to external pressure and a wave of American criticism, and a response to the demands of the moderate and constructive Islam-liberal opposition. It should be emphasized that the reaction to the intensification of political life in 2003-2006 It shows the realization of the ruling elite, led by King Abdullah, that only greater public participation in domestic political life will ensure long-term stability and public support for the regime.

* * *

Thus, the first years of the twenty-first century marked a new milestone in the modernization of the Saudi political system. The process of modernization of Saudi society went through a number of stages, from superficial changes in limited areas in the 1920s and 1930s to its sharp acceleration from the beginning of the 70s of the XX century, when the kingdom caught up with the developed countries of the Arab region in terms of economic and social development. However, until the beginning of the 1990s, forced modernization covered the economic sphere.

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and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the social sphere, as well as the education system. As for political modernization, it began only in the early 1990s and accelerated noticeably in the first years of the twenty-first century.

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