The Russian colonization of the eastern lands, the so-called "meet the sun movement", was part of a global process that marked the beginning of the creation of the largest colonial empires. Although, in general, the nature of colonization was determined by the peculiarities of relations with other cultural peoples, the specifics of the internal development of the metropolis turned out to be just as important. One of the essential features of the formation of the Russian Empire was the fact that there was no clearly defined border between the center (metropolis) and the periphery (colony), since the annexation of new lands was based on the type of expansion of the territory, i.e. the creation of a single geopolitical space. Russian-Kalmyk relations provide a vivid example of such integration.

At the turn of the XVI-XVII centuries, a powerful movement of Russians to the East began, and at the same time the West-Oiratsky uluses 1 headed by Kho-Urlyuk moved from the East. The result of these movements was the settlement of the northern Caspian region by the Mongol-speaking peoples and the development of Siberia by the Russians. "Desperately in need of exchange markets, tightly cut off from China, the Oirat khans and princes tried to break through to the markets of Central Asia, but were rebuffed by the Moghulistan and Kazakh khans and sultans. The situation was aggravated by the growing shortage of pastures both due to increased internal needs and even more due to failures on the battlefields" (Zlatkin, 1983, p.73).

Like any nomadic society, the Western Oirats needed relationships with other peoples in order to acquire the necessary goods produced by farmers. But the internecine struggle of the Mongol uluses - three centers (Mongolia of the Altyn Khans, Dzungaria, and Southern Mongolia)-and internal conflicts between the Dzungars (Kharakhula, Batur-khuntaiji) and the Torguts (Kho-Urluk) led to the fact that significant groups of Torguts and some Derbets left Dzungaria. The search for new pastures was complicated by two factors. On the one hand, the main body of land directly adjacent to the territory of Dzungaria was inhabited by Kazakhs, who did not allow their competing neighbors to enter their lands. On the other hand, those lands that were relatively free could not be used for nomadic farming, as they represented the taiga zone.

Thus, the Kalmyks were forced to roam in the border zone between the Kazakh steppe and the taiga developed by the Russians. Not only the Kalmyks, but also the Russian pioneers were extremely interested in trade, because they needed it-

1 At first, the Kalmyks were called the Western Oirat ulus exclusively by their neighbors. Then this name was assigned to those Derbet and Torgoutsky ulus that remained in the Lower Volga region after the "Torgoutsky escape". Nevertheless, the use of the word "Kalmyks" in a certain sense is justified when it comes to those Western Oirat ulus that migrated to the West along with Kho-Urlyuk.

page 46
travel on undeveloped trails in Siberia. The movement and meeting in the " no man's land "(in Western Siberia) later led to significant changes both in the social organization, as well as in the political and cultural spheres. It is hardly necessary to idealize the mutual disposition of these two peoples. However, mutual interest formed the basis for the development of their relations and marked the beginning of the integration of the nomadic community into the emerging empire. If Russia, on the wave of a powerful European movement to the East, expanded its territory and developed new lands, then the western Mongols were more likely to look for the "promised land" in order to avoid the danger from the Mongols themselves and the consequences of internal conflicts. In addition to the Torgouts, Derbets (Dalai Batur) and Khoshuts (Gushi Khan) also took part in the feud. But the main array of Oirats that migrated to the north were the uluses of Torgouts and Derbets.

The first Kalmyk embassy to Moscow was accepted not only by Vasily Telepnev, a clerk of the Embassy Order, but also by Tsar Vasily Shuisky (Erdniev, 1980, p.36). In the letter of the Order of the Kazan Palace dated February 27, 1608, the Tarsk voivode I. V. Mosalsky was ordered: "And if the Kolmack people who share us will come to Tara, with the bazaar - with horses, and you would tell them to follow the prison in which Prigozh is located, with our serving people to trade, on our cloth and on the the horses were ordered to change the food paper... and no duties were levied on them and on their goods, so that they might come in advance with sold horses and all sorts of goods, and they would keep them safe, so that they could live and train them in everything. And how they will expel you, and you would let them go to your uluses without spending " [Materials..., 1959, p. 27-28]. But the first contacts with the Kalmyks began in the second half of the XVI century.

The largest socio-political unit of the Kalmyks was the ulus, which consisted of aimags, which were related communities. The head of the aimag was zaisang 2, and the ulus was headed by taishi 3. The ulus organization was implemented in a sporadic system of subordination in vital events (for example, in the event of a military threat, the distribution of pastures, etc.). However, usually each ulus practically retained autonomy in all internal affairs, and often in external ones. A special feature of the Western Oirat ulus was the lack of unity of command in the form of khan's power, since according to the Mongolian tradition, the Khan's dignity was the prerogative of the Genghisids exclusively and only in a straight line. Since the 17th century. this unwritten rule began to be violated, especially in connection with relations with new neighbors, primarily with Russia. During military operations or other important events in the Western Oirats, theTaishi general became the sole commander, whose duties included overall leadership of the actions of all allies.

Under each taishi there was a kind of advisory body (zargo5), consisting of zaisangs of this ulus. Thus, the West Oiratsky ulus represented a rather complex organization, which was a union of 6 associations.

At the same time, there was another structural parameter. Sometimes they talk about the Oirat Union ("Derben oirad", lit. "Four Oirats"), which included Torgouts, Derbets, Khoshuts and Dzungars. In fact, we are talking about a tradition according to which

2 -kalm. zaisan (representative of the noble class): - aimachny zaisan [Kalmytsko..., 1977, p. 244].

3 -kalm. the viceroy of Taisha [Kalmyk-Russian dictionary..., 1977, p. 485].

4 This most likely reflected the actual position and was not part of the title at first.

Zarh-5 Kalmyk "court" [Kalmyk-Russian dictionary..., 1977, p. 242].

6 However, it is not possible to speak of a confederation as a relatively rigid organization, since the configuration of such an association could be different depending on the conditions of its occurrence.

page 47
The Oirats under Genghis Khan were divided into four tumans, as evidenced by Rashid al-din and referred to by Vladimirtsov (Vladimirtsov, 1934, p. 157).

If we consider the Oirat ulus in the constitutional sense, then there can be no question of a single organization in the usual sense, since each ulus had independence in making certain decisions that did not concern, however, issues common to all or several uluses. A common problem (often a threat) immediately united these autonomous entities and contributed to the consolidation of efforts. Thus, it is also impossible to agree that during the period of mass migration, the Kalmyk ulus did not form a unity, since such conditions can be assessed as extreme. Of course, such an association of uluses was in the nature of a temporary union. This process did not always go smoothly: "So, back in 1635, a quarrel occurred between two major taishas (former allies in 1604-1605) - the Derbet Dalai and the Torgut Kho - Urluk, which caused military operations... The reason for the quarrel was the desire of the Dalai (as well as the Choros Khara-khula) to subordinate Urlyuk to their power and force his uluses to roam together, to prohibit the head of the torgouts Urlyuk from conducting independent political relations with the Russian authorities, with the Nogai murzas, etc." [Avlyaev, 2002, p. 234]. This situation in a certain sense reflected the beginning of the political consolidation of the ulus organization and ultimately led to the dominance of the Torguts, and then to the formation of the khanate.

About the reality of the Khan's power should be said in particular. On the one hand, the title of khan also meant the khanate. But under the ulus system, this was impossible. As already noted, each ulus retained its independence in almost all matters related to internal and external affairs, but when a common task arose, the leadership of all Kalmyks was taken over by the chief taishi. On the other hand, according to the customs of the Mongol peoples, the title khan could only be assumed by a descendant of the Genghis family. The need for centralization of power was explained, firstly, by the fact that all Kalmyks were perceived by their neighbors as a single people. Secondly, the Russian, Crimean and Turkish authorities addressed all issues to the chief taishi (then Khan), and through him distributed salaries, gifts and other benefits. Violation of the common Mongolian custom did not have serious political significance within Kalmyk society, since the chief taishi became khan, who, as it was said, had temporary powers. Khan received a different position outside. Although the Russians and Turks did not immediately recognize the khan's dignity legally, as this would require transferring relations to a different level: the khan's title was perceived as the highest dignity, in fact it was used to consolidate their influence, in other words, to "nationalize" the Kalmyks and consolidate them. It should be noted that the very name "Kalmyk Khanate" did not have a legal meaning7. The Khan's dignity remained only formal and did not entail any specific political consequences. 8 Russia only recognized Ayuka as Khan 9 in 1708, and before that it had addressed him as the chief taishi. But this recognition remained essentially formal as well (Chodarkovsky, 1992, p. 126).

Russia and Turkey, while objectively contributing to the strengthening of the Khan's power, contributed both to the destruction of the traditional social organization and inter-Zulu integration. Consolidation of the Kalmyks caused ambivalence, since it was not in Russia's interests to have a strong neighbor on the borders, who could become an enemy at any time. The desire to weaken the Khan's power or at least limit it.-

7 This probably explains why "almost all pre-revolutionary authors ignored the question of the origin and existence of the Kalmyk Khanate on the Volga" (Avlyaev, 2002, p. 244).

The acquired 8 khan's dignity was perceived differently from the innate one: a factor explained as a relic of blood relations, reflecting social stratification.

9 The Crimean Khanate recognized Ayuka as Khan in 1695, and Turkey in 1704.

page 48
This was reflected in the insistent demand of the Russian authorities to involve the zaisangs of other uluses in zargo. This would ensure even greater centralization and take into account the interests of representatives of other uluses, which would undoubtedly limit the khan's power and allow the Russian authorities to play on internal inter-Ulus contradictions. And this, in turn, led to the fact that the Russian state increasingly intensely interfered in the internal affairs of the Kalmyks. Finally, this was done under Ubashi, who lost the title of khan and became the governor (1761-1771), subordinate to the Astrakhan governor.

It is very important to note that the Kalmyks who needed pastures did not have serious clashes with the Russian pioneers, who preferred the forest and forest-steppe, and therefore the starting point of the relationship was consent. The Russians were willing to buy horses and some goods for the pastoral economy, and in exchange offered goods necessary for nomadic society. Nevertheless, some clashes did occur, so the problem of establishing relations, obtaining guarantees of loyalty was acute and difficult to solve.

One of the ways to regulate relations was the contract - shert. This procedure was applied in relations not only with the Kalmyks, but also with other peoples living on the eastern border, usually with Muslims. The word 10 itself came from Arabic and was introduced into the Russian language through the Turks. 11 The process of signing and executing was called sherting. As a rule, the Russian literature was dominated by the view of sherty as a kind of contract, which fixed the consent (in this case, the Kalmyks) to be subjects of Russia. "However, the approach to the issue of sherti was not the same between the tsarist authorities and the Mongol rulers. The former understood the sacrifice of sherti as the entry of a particular people into Russia, the latter - as an opportunity to conclude a military alliance that was beneficial to them and did not want to bind themselves to any long-term obligations. This gave rise to all sorts of misunderstandings, which, however, were resolved peacefully" [Mezhdunarodnye..., 1989, p. 10].

At first, relations between Russians and Kalmyks were based mainly on spontaneous trade. It was not possible to conclude a contract with them. The exchange of embassies also did not lead to success. If the Russian embassy was always interested in concluding a contract in order to achieve a certain goal, then the Kalmyks were interested in information and gifts required in this case. They did not consider it possible to negotiate in exchange for promises. In fact, Russia was considered by the Kalmyks as another ulus with which they could exchange something on an equal footing. However, the Russians pursued diplomatic and political goals, wanting to place the Kalmyks in vassalage. During one of these attempts in 1606, an angry Kho-Urlyuk executed the entire embassy. If the Russian ambassador represented the monarch in a certain sense, then according to the Kalmyks, darga 12 was only a liaison between the ulus, a kind of delegate. The special ritual performed during the exchange of embassies presented considerable difficulties. So, at the mention of the king, you should get up and take off your hat. Daichin 13 refused to do so for a long time, but finally agreed that his interpreter should get up and take off his cap.

Shertovanie as a treaty of alliance first occurred under the Torgout taishi Monchak 14, who not only became an ally of Russia, but also opposed his father

10 From the Arabic - "to negotiate, to make an agreement", actually - "condition, position, agreement" [Baranov, 1962, pp. 501-502].

11 was first used in the charters of 1474 [Sreznevsky, 2003, p. 1587].

- Darh 12 kalm. elder, headman; khotna darh - elder of khoton [Kalmyk-Russian dictionary, 1977, 184].

13 Chief Taishi in 1647-1661

14 His name is also found in the forms Bunchuk and Puntsuk. Chief Taishi in 1661-1669

page 49
(Daichina). In sherti, joint participation in military operations against a common enemy or any other specific enterprises could be recorded. Nevertheless, shert remained a kind of special ritual for the Kalmyks, which, for example, is used to seal the bonds of fraternity. Moreover, the command of one taishi, even if it was the main one, did not mean that the conditions defined by it would be mandatory for others. Legally speaking, it was a fact that had its own time limits and defined the scope of application in accordance with tradition. By the way, the outstanding Kalmyk figure Ayuk 15 has repeatedly clashed, but relations with him were far from easy for the Russian authorities.

Despite the fact that the Russians wanted to see sherti as a kind of oath that meant accepting citizenship, it is quite obvious that the authorities still did not fully trust such agreements and demanded additional guarantees, in particular amanats (hostages). As a rule, they were representatives of the elite, sons or relatives of taishi. Thus, it would be wrong to assume that the Russian government was naive enough to trust sherti and view her as accepting citizenship.

It is more a desire to see the nomads as permanent allies, or at least predictable and loyal neighbors, rather than trust in the Sherti, that can explain the consideration of such an oath as entering into citizenship. One can hardly agree with those authors who consider the date of the "voluntary entry of the Kalmyks into Russia" to be 1609, i.e., the "bringing of sherti" by Kho-Urlyuk (Avlyaev, 2002, p.4 et seq.). Not only did the latter represent only a part of the Oirat, but subsequent events do not indicate any subordination. Moreover, in the initial period of relations up to 1655, a written contract was not drawn up at all. The parties exchanged embassies and oral agreements, which did not always entail adequate actions.

The first written contract dates back to the time of Daichin. But the document was written in Russian, and its contents were generally communicated through an interpreter. Subsequently, the Office of Foreign Affairs established a staff of translators, including translators of the Kalmyk language. Thus, in 1679, among the employees of the Chancellery were Taras Ivanov, an interpreter of Tatar and Kalmyk languages, and Vasily Martynov, an interpreter of Kalmyk languages (Chodarkovsky, 1992, p. 64). The agreement with Ayuka in 1697 was also written in the Kalmyk (Zayapandit) language (or perhaps it was just a good translation). [Chodarkovsky, 1992, p. 67]. Many documents of this kind have been preserved only in Russian, although it can be assumed that they are bilingual. As for the first drafts, if they were drawn up, they were written exclusively in Russian, and the other party could only guess about the terms of the contract from the explanations given by the translator. In all likelihood, the Russians were trying to achieve much more than what the Kalmyks were willing to do, and the result was that the Kalmyks were "unreliable subjects", since they often violated the treaty and refused to comply with some of its requirements. The desire to pass off the wishful thinking is explained by numerous edits to documents compiled by Russian officials. This is especially clearly seen in the examples of translation of embassy correspondence analyzed by N. P. Shastina. So, the haughty tone of the letters was changed to humble and submissive, respectful words were added, the title of the king was added, and so on. As an example of successful interpretations in this practice, Shastina cites the appeal "white khan". If Lubsan-taiji in letters to the king calls himself hagan, which meant a ruler with the broadest rights, then he calls the king white

15 Son of Monchak. Chief taishi in 1669-1690, Khan in 1690-1724.

page 50
khagan, which, according to Mongolian customs, meant a local ruler (Shastina, 1958, p. 90). For a Russian, this could not sound derogatory, but, on the contrary, was perceived as a tribute to respect.16 In this case, we are talking not so much about the desire to elevate oneself, which some authors consider a "special Russian mentality" [Chodarkovsky, 1992, p. 64], as about the usual practice of relations between peoples. After all, the same applies to Mongolia, China, and Ottoman Turkey. The major Powers regarded the "small" peoples as subordinate, or at least clearly inferior. "At the time of all the negotiations for the bringing of shertei, and there were four of them in the period from 1673 to 1684, Ayuka took a rather independent and uncompromising position, setting a number of preliminary conditions, in case of non-fulfillment of which he threatened to 'wander on his own'." Moreover, during the negotiations on sherti in 1684, Ayuki's envoy on his behalf told the Astrakhan voivode A. I. Golitsyn that "Ayukai never beats his forehead as a great sovereign, only wants to be in peace and council" (Batmaev, 1985, p. 37).

The quarter did not only result in the fulfillment of purely military obligations. Russia wanted to see the Kalmyks as its subjects and therefore tried to "formalize" the acceptance of Kalmyks "for service" by paying them a salary that was not regular, but still was one of the means of ensuring loyalty. This was difficult, since the salary was usually considered as a "gift", and the Kalmyks actually "received" a reward for "service", seizing the property of the defeated, in fact, plundering.

In fact, the first time the oath of allegiance was taken was on the day of Tseren-Donduk 17 (1724), when a special ritual was performed. He placed a Buddha image on his forehead, although it was customary to use a sword when it came to a military alliance.

Shert was the tool that was traditionally used as the initial moment of unification. Such a document, even if not fully formed, proclaimed a certain unity, the fate of which could also result in unification. It is worth paying attention to the fact that the consolidation process in a certain sense depends on prior approval, the establishment of a certain chain of command. It seems that the need for" supreme power", which is actually or fictitiously able to satisfy it, is an indispensable condition for unity. In the case of Russian-Kalmyk relations, contractual relations were "reinforced" by various "complaints" from the Russian authorities. In this sense, the declaration, which at first retained the features of an ordinary contract on specific joint actions and obligations, later becomes more and more like an oath [Posolskie..., 2003, pp. 57, 62]. Nevertheless, for a long time, despite the schertation, the Kalmyks remained essentially outside the Russian statehood. Even the Department of Kalmyk Affairs was a subdivision of the body that provided foreign policy activities, i.e., the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. An embassy order.

The Kalmyks had sufficient military power, but they were not reliable allies. Their neighbors tried to secure stronger guarantees, which was expressed in attempts to convert. So, the Grand vizier of the Ottoman Empire sent a rosary as a gift to Ayuka, as if inviting him to convert to Islam. But Buddhists also use rosaries, and it is unlikely that Ayuka was able to "correctly decipher" this symbol. Attempts at conversion were also made by the Crimean Khanate, but they were also unsuccessful.

It is worth paying attention to such a curious difference: a subject and a loyal subject. Despite a certain semantic similarity, these concepts are quite common.

16 If such an interpretation is allowed, it is only as an additional meaning in relation to Moscow, since the symbolism of white is rather connected with the cardinal directions. For example, the familiar name "Golden Horde" was actually designated "Ak Horde", i.e. "white". For more information about the color symbolism of the Mongols, see: [Zhukovskaya, 1988, pp. 153-169].

17 Kalmyk Khan in 1724-1735

page 51
they differ significantly in the political and legal sense. So, the subject was applied to all those who obeyed the authorities. The word loyal subject had a twofold meaning: first, law and authority, but second, law and faith. Religious affiliation was a kind of political marker and performed certain political functions. For that time, the religious factor to a certain extent was also a guarantee for the conclusion of unions. There could be no question of any religious intolerance, but to a large extent the similarity in faith, or rather the perception of a different faith as the law, gave certain guarantees. In the instructions to I. K. Kirillov in 1734, it was written:"...As for the rules of procedure in court and justice, we must look at the custom of each nation, and how and why in which people the righteous are satisfied, and the guilty are fined, and in the courts mentioned above, we must also establish them; for it is our Most gracious permission that all who are not of any faith or people should have justice and a speedy we were content, and so the vain bitterness in red tape, and the people who do not know our Russian judicial rights, were suppressed by false fictions in court (from which not only damage can occur to Our interest, but it is also repugnant to God)" [National..., 1992, p.199].

In 1664, the Russian government, as M. L. Kichikov notes, sent Monchak "a silver-gilded mace decorated with jaspers, a white royal banner with a red border, as well as valuable offerings" [cit. by: Erdniev, 1980, p. 45]. Such a gesture could be considered as recognition of the high status of the Kalmyk Taishi. Although some authors are inclined to consider this recognition of the Kalmyk Khanate, it was most likely evidence of the strengthening of Daichin as the main taishi. The Moscow authorities clearly emphasized that this offering should be considered a sign of granting the Kalmyks the same political status as the Zaporozhye Cossacks, i.e., broad autonomy within the framework of citizenship.

Religion contributed to the sacralization of power, i.e., removing it from the control of ordinary human relations, being a kind of spiritual legitimization of power. There were certain advantages to appealing to spiritual authority. Thus, some Kalmyk Taishi (in particular, Ayuka) persistently sought the title of khan from the Dalai Lama, which allowed them to strengthen their power over other Taishi to a certain extent. But this could only have an internal meaning for the Kalmyks themselves, but not for their neighbors. In this case, the Dalai Lama was only an image of the highest authority, despite the fact that the real situation in Tibet (Martynov, 1978) remained hidden from the mass of Buddhists.18 Although Ayuka did not receive the title of Khan from the actual supreme spiritual head, the procedure itself in this case was, according to Mongolian customs, quite legal in nature.

The similarity of religious affiliation made it possible to appeal in international relations to a higher, supranational force, which provided a more or less stable guarantee in relations with other peoples. In this case, stability in the relations of co-religionists was promoted by the experience of the history of their relationships. Despite the Ottoman Empire's understandable interest in the Kalmyks in the context of the struggle against Russia, the Turks clearly distinguished between "their own" and "others'". If the Turks perceived the Uzbeks who were close in language and culture as brothers (karindaslik -like-heartedness), then the Kalmyks were considered in a purely "service" aspect (kullugumizda - in our service). Of course, there was a political background, but here it is important to emphasize the psychological subtext of the relationship. So much so

18 Ayuka received the title of Khan in 1690, and the Fifth Dalai Lama died in 1682. Due to the difficult political situation in Dzungaria, deshi Sanjay Jamtso continued to act on behalf of the deceased Dalai Lama, and this continued until 1697, when Tsanyang Jamtso became the Sixth Dalai Lama (Kychanov and Savitsky, 1975, p.90).

page 52
the Russians also took the same utilitarian approach to this problem. The main motive for the treaty was the need for a military alliance or, at least, the performance of security functions by the Kalmyks.

In the political history of Russia, religion has often been the most important tool for spreading power. The fact of baptism was a kind of proof of the faithfulness and reliability of the newly converted peoples. This is indicated by the negative connotation of the expression "non-Christ". So it was with the peoples of the Asian part of the country, with the peoples of Siberia and the Far East. At the same time, Russian pioneers "converted to their faith", attracting aborigines with various gifts, promises and various tricks. Often the neophyte, having received payment for baptism once, went to be baptized again in order to receive another reward. Some Kalmyks themselves converted to Orthodoxy, Islam, and even Catholicism out of a desire to obtain certain benefits, including political ones [Chodarkovsky, 1992, p.39]. At first, this could be explained by a kind of confessional twinning. If the heavenly Father is one, then all the problems that arise in the family can be solved by contacting him and making a decision. But the surviving forms of patriarchal relations existed only at the level of specific performers. Over time, such procedures took place only in a situation of uncertainty, when the intentions of any people were hardly predictable. Thus, Russia, which had a long experience of communicating with Muslim peoples who believed in one God, could be more confident in relations with them than, for example, with the" idolaters " - Kalmyks-Buddhists.

The existence of Ottoman Turkey, the Crimean Khanate, was of great importance. Kalmyks had complicated relations with Nogais, Kazakhs and Bashkirs. Relations with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were also ambiguous. Relations with Ottoman Turkey and the Crimean Khanate, which developed in different ways in different years, were of great importance for both of them. Relations with nomads, such as the Nogais, who were initially pushed out of the Lower Volga region by the Kalmyks, and then complex historical conflicts led to the dispersion of the Nogais throughout Transcaucasia. All this became more complicated as Russia, moving East, established new international ties with Dzungaria, China, and Tibet. So, after the death of the Dzungarian Boshoktu Khan, Tsevan-Rabtan became the new khan. At one time, Ayuka gave him his daughter Saterjab as a wife, and he married his daughter Darma-Bala. During the ensuing struggle for the khanate over all the Oirats, Ayuka sent an embassy to Tibet led by his nephew Arabjur (1698). The Russian government was afraid of Ayuki's speech against Tsevan-Rabtan, because, having made peace with the Dzungars and fearing for its position in Siberia, it did not want to complicate relations with China, which claimed Dzungaria. At the same time, the first Qing embassy to Ayuka was held. Russia has closely monitored the activities of this embassy. The Siberian governor M. P. Gagarin reported to the Chancellor G. I. Golovkin: "It is really impossible to find out the emperor from the Chinese why that messenger is going to Ayuka, but it is notable that it is not with a small matter, because they never send ambassadors or envoys anywhere to China, but they sent him, it is notable that it is not with a small matter. small business" [Mezhdunarodnye..., 1989, p. 230]. In this embassy, the Russians saw the goal of enlisting Chinese support in the Kalmyks ' struggle against Tsevan-Rabtan. However, this mission (1712, 1714) did not resolve Ayuki's problems. There was a feud between his sons, who fought for the right of inheritance. In this situation, Russia supported Ayuka and he retained his title.

Russia's interest in the Kalmyks was explained by the desire to use their military power to protect the southern borders in the fight against nomads, as well as against Turkey and the Crimean Khanate. This is also explained by internal problems, such as the suppression of the Bashkir, Bulavinsky and Astrakhan uprisings (1705-1709). However, the interaction was not always successful. As already mentioned, the Kalmyks were not so religious.-

page 53
not given, as the Russian government wanted it to be. And when the latter did not comply with their obligations, the Kalmyks also acted of their own free will. Often, which is especially characteristic of the Ayuki period, in response to the government's demands to participate in any military campaign, the Kalmyks refused, explaining that they had an agreement with the enemy of Russia. There were cases when, having agreed to participate in a military action, Kalmyks, for one reason or another, still did not take part in it. As, for example, in the Battle of Poltava 19.

Ottoman-Crimean efforts to win over or at least neutralize the Kalmyks sometimes succeeded. Thus, the Kalmyks did not take part in the Crimean campaigns of 1687 and 1689, during the initial period of the siege of Azov. On the contrary, they warned the Turks about the impending siege, for which the pasha of Azov sent Ayuka numerous gifts. But by the end of 1695, Ayuka realized that Azov could not stand and, remaining a "friend of the Turks", sent his ambassador to the Russians, gave 3 thousand horsemen to A. S. Shein and more than a thousand horsemen to kn. Cherkassky.

Attempts by the Kalmyk Taishi to become full-fledged subjects of international relations were unsuccessful, and the economic pressure of the Russians on the Volga lands 20 created the most difficult conditions for nomadic life. This sometimes led to the fact that some Kalmyks sought to move to a settled life. Such actions were usually discouraged by the Russian authorities, as they provoked protests from other Taishi and Zargo 21.

Even in the initial period of relations, the Kalmyks were perceived as a single people. Relations with them were built according to the rules of external relations. When interacting, a procedure similar to the conclusion of an international contract (sherti) was performed. In a certain sense, the representation of a large social group as a subject of mutual relations is also an important characteristic of political education. In this case, it does not matter how exactly the two subjects were related, it is important that they were recognized as such. The only way to integrate in this case is to use formal institutions of power and then reassign them. The liquidation of the Kalmyk Affairs Department and the transfer of the Kalmyk administration to the Astrakhan governor significantly reduced the level of relations. Kalmyk affairs increasingly became the subject of internal relations. Even the title of viceroy, originally given to the chief taishi, was eliminated after the "Torgout escape".

"TORGOUT ESCAPE"

The actual liquidation of the Kalmyk Khanate and the significant complication of traditional economic activities in connection with the settlement of the Volga region by Russians, on the one hand, contributed to the integration of the Kalmyks into the system of the Russian state, on the other hand, could not but affect the attitude of the Kalmyks themselves to these events. Another important factor is the arrival in 1758 of a part of the Dzungars led by Tseren-taiji in the Volga region. The Dzungarian Khanate, defeated by Qing China, ceased to exist, and the remnants of the Dzungars were forced to flee.

After defeating their strong neighbors, the Qing authorities withdrew their troops (Chernyshev, 1990, p. 77) from territories that were of no interest to them. Meanwhile, "the rulers of the Volga Kalmyks, well aware of the depopulation of Dzungaria, their ancient tribal nomads, began to make plans to return" (Chernyshev, 1990,

"Despite the fact that 3,300 Kalmyk horsemen under the leadership of Chakdorjab were several days late (the battle took place on June 27, and the Kalmyk cavalry arrived on July 4), they nevertheless contributed to the victory, as they contributed to the panic in the Swedish camp, who believed the rumors about the forty-thousand Kalmyk cavalry sent by Ayuka [Chodarkovsky, 1992, p. 145].

20 This period is the beginning of the settlement of the first German colonists in the Lower Volga region (70s of the XVIII century) and the development of salt fisheries and fishing.

21 The village of Zamyany still exists in the Astrakhan region.

page 54
p. 78]. Obviously, Tseren-taiji played an important role in this project. In the past, the Kalmyks maintained active ties with the Dzungars, maintaining a certain sense of political unity, but despite offers to return, they refused to do so. Therefore, it is possible to understand the motives of Tseren-taiji to use joint efforts to return their native nomads. The process of persuasion was not easy, and we had to resort to a ruse. A rumor was spread about a supposedly" revived " lama, who began to persuade the people to return to Dzungaria (Chernyshev, 1990, p. 79). In 1771, the "Torgout escape" began: 30909 caravans led by Ubashi set off. There are 11,198 caravans left on the Volga River (Chodarkovsky, 1992, p. 232). This trip was extremely difficult. The Russian government gave chase. At first, the main force consisted of dragoons, Cossacks and Bashkirs, then the Kazakhs joined them. Nevertheless, almost half of the Kalmyks achieved their goal (Chernyshev, 1990, p. 85).

The Qing authorities welcomed the Kalmyks and gave them a warm welcome, but then dispersed them over a vast territory, destroying the tribal organization of the Oirats and weakening ethnic ties. The "Code of the Chamber of External Relations" developed in Lifangyuan defined the principles of life and activity of Oirats in almost all spheres [Chernyshev, 1990, p. 92].

The plight of the Kalmyks who arrived in Dzungaria is evidenced by their appeal in 1774 to the Russian authorities for permission to return to the Volga, but the Chinese, who found out about this, immediately resettled the Oirats even further to the east. In 1790, Ubasha's son also appealed to the Russian authorities to facilitate the return to the Volga, but the Chinese authorities kept the Kalmyks strictly dependent [Chodarkovsky, 1992, p. 235], and the Russians did not want to complicate relations with China. The Qing government brought in large contingents of its troops and established a military regime [Chernyshev, 1990, p. 93].

list of literature

Avlyaev G. O. Proiskhozhdenie kalmykskogo naroda [The origin of the Kalmyk people]. Elista: Kalmyk Book Publishing House, 2002.

Baranov Kh. K. Arabic-Russian dictionary, Moscow: State Publishing House of Foreign and National Dictionaries, 1962.

Baskakov N. A. Tyurkskaya leksika v "Slovo o polku Igorev" [The Turkic vocabulary in the "Word about Igor's Regiment"]. with the publishing house Vostochnaya Literatura), 1985.

Batmaev M. M. Reflection of Russian-Kalmyk relations in the process of wool formation // Voluntary entry of the Kalmyk people into Russia: historical roots and significance. Elista: Kalmyk Book Publishing House, 1985.

Vladimirtsov B. Ya. Obshchestvennyj stroj mongolov [The Social order of the Mongols]. l.: AN SSSR, 1934.

Zhukovskaya N. L. Categories and symbols of traditional Mongol culture, Moscow: Nauka, GRVL, 1988.
Zlatkin I. Ya. Istoriya Dzungarskogo khanstva [History of the Dzungarian Khanate], Moscow: Nauka, GRVL, 1983.

Kalmyk-Russian Dictionary, Moscow: Russian Language, 1977.
Kychanov E. I., Savitsky L. S. People and Gods of the snow country, Moscow: Nauka, GRVL, 1975.
Martynov A. S. Status of Tibet in the XVII-XVIII centuries. Moscow: Nauka, GRVL, 1978.

Materials on the history of Russian-Mongolian relations 1607-1636. Moscow: Publishing House of Oriental Literature, 1959.

International relations in Central Asia. Documents and materials, vol. 1. Moscow: Nauka, GRVL, 1989.

National policy of Russia. Collection of Documents, Moscow: IEA RAS, 1992.
Embassy books on Russia's relations with the Kalmyk Khanate 1672-1675. Elista: APP "Dzhangar", 2003.

Sreznevsky I. I. Materials for the dictionary of the Old Russian language, Moscow: Znak Publ., 2003, vol. III.

Chernyshev A. I. Obshchestvennoe i gosudarstvennoe razvitie oiratov v XVIII V. Obshchestvennoe i gosudarstvennoe razvitie oiratov v XVIII V. M.: Nauka, GRVL, 1990.

Chimitdorzhiev Sh. B.Vzaimootnosheniye Rossii i Mongol'lii v 17 - 18 vv. [Relations between Russia and Mongolia in the 17th-18th centuries]. Moscow: Nauka Publ., 1978.

Shastina N. P. Russko-mongol posolskie otnosheniya v XVII v. [Russian-Mongolian Embassy Relations in the 17th century].

Erdniev U. E. Kalmyks. Elista: Kalmyk Book Publishing House, 1980.

Chodarkovsky M. Where Two Worlds Met: The Russian State and the Kalmyk Nomads, 1600 - 1771. Ithaca: Cornell University, N.Y., 1992.

Permanent link to this publication: