The study of the features of interaction between institutions of traditional society and the army makes it possible to understand to what extent belonging to the army environment strengthens the secular worldview of officers and the secularist nature of the army. This makes it possible to predict the likelihood of military intervention in politics in the context of ethnic and religious conflicts and determine their ability to resolve such conflicts.

Keywords: Middle East, political Islam, army and society, ethnic and religious conflicts.

In recent years, under the influence of globalization and modernization1, the population of Middle Eastern States has become increasingly politicized. At the same time, group interests are updated. Internal contradictions are most clearly manifested in deepening ethnic and religious conflicts. Their ideological basis is often religion. The latter circumstance is caused by the growing influence of external factors on the processes taking place in the region. Clashes on ethnic or religious grounds pose a serious threat to the security and integrity of Middle Eastern countries, which determines the need for the use of the army in resolving ethnic and religious conflicts.

Currently, in many countries of the Middle East, religion and religious figures significantly influence the formation of identity, the nature of power, inter-community relations, solving the problem of human rights and the role of women in society, and expand the enforcement of religious legislation to the detriment of secular legal proceedings. In the Arab-Muslim states of the Middle East, the army continues to have a significant impact on the domestic and foreign policy of the state and the life of society. The nature of relations between government and religion, the army and the government determines the role of religious institutions in the armed forces. It is the army that is ultimately used by the authorities to resolve ethnic and religious conflicts. In the context of the growing use of armed forces against terrorist and extremist elements, 2 the role of the army in society is increasing. The recent experience of a number of Arab countries shows that only with capable armed forces and security agencies, as well as the determination to use them in civil conflict, can a State stop the political expansion of Islamism.

The tough line of the Algerian military leadership in 1992-1999 allowed not only to weaken the wave of terror unleashed by the extremist wing of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), but also to force the extremists to negotiate national reconciliation. In Egypt, attempts to destabilize the internal political situation, pre-empted by-

1 As a transition from a traditional society to an industrial one.

2 In Algeria, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Egypt, Turkey, And Pakistan.

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Adopted in the 1990s by a number of extremist Islamic organizations, they were suppressed by the secular regime of Hosni Mubarak due to the reliance on the army and security forces.

Ethnic nationalism and religious extremism are also devastating for the army itself. Penetrating through organizational structures into military formations, they can disrupt the cohesion of the army ranks, because, having fallen under the influence of the ideas of radical Islam, some commanders of combat units can direct military equipment against their own command, authorities and neighboring peoples.

Most scientists who have studied the officer corps of armies in multiethnic and multi-confessional countries come to the conclusion that military service, socialization of military personnel, and their professional experience weaken ties with the traditional community. The army in these countries is a "melting pot" in which officers acquire a nationwide secular identity (Janowitz, 1964). The experience of Europe and Russia, along with purely internal factors, has had a significant impact on strengthening the secular component in modern institutions, including the army, in a number of Middle Eastern states, especially in Turkey.

Secular, nationally oriented officers are less influenced by political trends of a confessional and ethnic nature and are very influential in integrating the army ranks. The commitment of such army officers as the guarantor of national sovereignty and national (rather than communal) self-identification reduces the likelihood of unauthorized intervention of the army in politics and processes provoked by ethno-confessional factors. Thanks to this, the army can serve as an effective regulator of such conflicts, since it is able to act as a relatively impartial arbitrator and mediator.

According to studies, it was the military regimes that did a good job of ensuring national integration, as well as those countries where a coalition of military and civilian leaders was in power, relying on a strong secular army. For example, in Syria in the second half of the 1970s, when the Muslim Brotherhood moved from political and educational activities to armed struggle against the government, putting the country in danger of sectarian division, the authorities were able to take very tough measures and stop the activities of this organization. The final stage was the military operation in Hama in 1982. Then, at the cost of numerous victims among the residents of this city, the armed stronghold of the "brothers" was eliminated, and the movement itself in the country was finally defeated [Asia and Africa Today, 2008, p.21].

There is a perception that the military, which occupies a dominant position in the institutions of power, determines the nature of decisions made. However, it is impossible not to take into account the fact that the army is a cast of society. Since the officer corps represents the main groups of society, it is not free from extra-army contradictions. In most countries of the Middle East, peoples are still divided along confessional, ethnic, regional, and tribal lines. After 1945 and until the early 1970s, there were at least nine acute conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa (Mehden, 1973, p. 8).

Within the armed forces of these states, communities were formed that fought on an ideological and ethno-confessional basis. Military coups there were the result of the confrontation of various ethnic, religious, class and fraternal groups. In Syria alone, 8 military coups took place in 22 years (1949-1971). In the first years after gaining political independence, 3 due to the French recruitment system adopted earlier, the officer corps of the Syrian army was characterized by a high degree of religious imbalance. All right, officers -

3 In 1946.

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people from ethnic and religious minorities, as a rule, became active participants in military coups. Husni Al-Zaim, Sami Hinawi, and Adib Shishekli, the organizers of three coups in 1949, represented the Kurdish minority in Syria (Akhmedov, 2003, p. 87).

In countries where officers belonged to one of the population groups, the secular nature and national orientation of the officer corps could also be very limited. Unity in the branches of the armed forces was formed not as a result of the assimilation of secular and national values, but on the basis of a sense of exclusivity of a particular group. In Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the elite units were formed mainly from representatives of Sunni tribes living in the places where the Iraqi leader was born. The same practice was used in Syria, where these units were recruited from the Alawites of the Assad clan. When such officers interfere in politics, they contribute to inciting ethnic and confessional conflicts, acting in the interests of their own faith or ethnic group, and once in power, they cannot extinguish them. Events in Sudan, Pakistan, and Iraq show that this practice leads to the disintegration of the state along ethnic and religious lines. During the years of the military's rule, several million people were killed in armed clashes in these countries.

Since its creation in 1947. Pakistan has constantly faced the challenge of maintaining national unity. Despite ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences that could potentially lead to clashes, conflicts were avoided in 1947-1958, during the rule of the civil authorities. During the years of the military rule (1958-1971), traditional disagreements resulted in open confrontation, which turned into a civil war in eastern Pakistan, which ended with the formation of the independent state of Bangladesh from the eastern regions.

As an example, we will also consider the events in the Sudan. When the government of General Ibrahim Abboud came to power in Sudan as a result of a military coup on November 17, 1958, traditional contradictions had already turned into a sharp conflict, provoked by the chauvinistic policies of the government of Abdullah Khalil and erupted against the background of failures in economic activity. It was attended by Muslims-northerners, lighter in skin color, who made up about 70% of the population, who were opposed by dark-skinned southerners, part of whom professed Christianity, and part - traditional beliefs. During the last years of civilian rule, racial and religious divisions have become very pronounced in the Sudan. In the South, there were sporadic outbreaks of violence against "Northerners" - government officials, and in army units - mutinies of natives of the South4 against their superiors-Northerner officers.

However, it was under the military government that this conflict turned into an open civil war. Represented exclusively by "Northerners", the officer corps flatly refused to comply with the demands of residents of the South for more equitable representation in government bodies and proportional allocation of budget funds for the development of the southern regions of the country. The military, more than the civilian government, acted in the interests of the economically and politically dominant North. At the same time, they tried to neutralize ethno-confessional contradictions and impose "national unity"on the country. These events were held under the slogan of "Sudanization" of the South. Christian schools and missions were closed, and foreign missionaries were expelled. Extensive construction of mosques and madrassas began in the southern regions, and the Religious Affairs Department promoted Islam. Arabic was declared the only language in both the education system and the administration. These activities, which were aimed at strengthening national unity, were carried out in the following areas:-

4 i.e. representatives of the Black population.

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they had the opposite effect. Two years after the military came to power, most Southerners moved to neighboring countries. Then the uprising began. It was after the military decided that the only solution to the problem of national integration was to increase repression and use force, that the uprising turned into a civil war. When the military government of Abboud fell in 1964, Sudan was politically disintegrated [Be'eri, 1970, p. 216; Beshir, 1968, p. 81].

The second military government, which came to power on May 25, 1969, was formed by a new political force - "free" officers, representing junior and middle officers who came from the petty-bourgeois strata. It has learned a number of lessons from the failure of its predecessors. The military began to pursue a compromise line and demonstrate more flexible approaches to ensuring national unity. Southerners were given greater independence at the federal level, they were given places in local government and even took up a number of posts in the army and government; allocations were made for the development of the South. Jafar Nimeiri, who came to power during the July 1971 events, concluded an agreement with the rebel leaders to end the armed confrontation. According to the Addis Ababa Agreement of February 28, 1972, the South received a certain degree of autonomy within the unified Sudan.

All these issues are still relevant. It should be noted that even in cases where the officer corps has a "mixed" character5, the solidarity of the military is low. The belittled position of individual communities, their jealousy towards "privileged" confessions, mutual distrust and factionalism can lead to a split in the officer corps. Often provoking is the practice of appointments and promotions, which in the army with its inherent discipline and the principle of unity of command is perceived more acutely than in the civilian environment. Now, in most Arab armies, it is almost impossible to ensure that promotion depends not only on seniority, but also on taking into account personal qualities and professional merits, and that proportional representation of various ethnic groups and faiths is ensured in the officer corps. Much is also determined by the level of education, which remains very low for the majority of the population in the countries of the region. Those with secondary and higher education generally support the principle of meritocracy as a basis for career appointments.6 Those whose educational status is lower are in favor of a representation system, considering that positions should be distributed in proportion to the number of confessional groups. Promotion of one of the officers affects the interests of others and the community as a whole. Therefore, the military supports one or another principle based on community beliefs: promotion to the rank of an officer of a privileged religious community for personal merits can be regarded by representatives of other faiths as an infringement of their community interests.

At the end of 2007, a series of rebellions took place in a number of military schools located in Homs and its suburbs in Syria, and the authorities were forced to put down elite units of the Military Counterintelligence Directorate (MHRC) and the Air Force and Air Defense Counterintelligence Directorate. The main reason for the discontent of the mutinous cadets and teachers, most of them Sunni officers, was the privileged position of their Alawite colleagues, in particular, the advantages that they enjoyed when receiving vacations, promotions and promotions. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was forced to intervene in the conflict, who ordered the Chief of the General Staff of the SAR Armed Forces, Ali Habib, to temporarily close the border.

5 is represented by two or more ethno-confessional groups.

6 The management principle, according to which leadership positions should be occupied by the most capable people.

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these educational institutions. UNHCR Chief Assef Shawkat was instructed to thoroughly investigate the incident and conduct additional investigations against all cadets and teachers. Bashar al-Assad also recommended that Shaukat continue to strongly reject reports for training in military educational institutions of all officers, in connection with which at the stage of preliminary verification there were the slightest doubts about their reliability [Al-Siyasa, 09.11.2007].

The life values of officers formed in childhood and adolescence are related to their local ethnic and religious origin. In adults, these values are somewhat weakened under the influence of a new self-identification, which, however, is not able to completely replace the commitment of officers to their tradition. When an ethnic or religious conflict arises in a country, ties with the traditional community become more relevant and can outweigh the professional cohesion of the officer corps and the sense of national unity. For example, in Lebanon, where the Muslim population began to outnumber the Christian population at the turn of the 1970s, the officer corps was almost entirely represented by people from Christian communities. During the civil war (1976-1991), the army, which took a position of non - interference in inter-communal disputes, managed to avoid participating on any side. This did not prevent Muslims from creating their own armed formations like the Christian militia. The army, in the period of acute internal political disagreements, preferred to sit out in barracks.

It should be borne in mind that the managerial style of military personnel who come to power or have influence on it shows that they do not always adequately perceive political realities. They often believe that acute ethnic or religious conflicts can be resolved in the same way as military and technical issues - by a "frontal" attack, by force. Ignoring political, economic, social and cultural parameters does not allow the military to ensure the resolution of these conflicts.

For almost three months in the fall and winter of 2007, the army restored order in northern Lebanon, in the town of Nahr al-Barid, storming Palestinian camps where militant Islamist groups had settled. The victory of the Lebanese armed Forces over the Fatah al-Islam rebels undoubtedly strengthened the authority of the Lebanese army and its commander Michel Suleiman, who was unanimously elected President of Lebanon in May 2008. However, the problems remained. How did a previously virtually unknown organization manage to turn from a small group in such a short time into such a powerful combat unit, which took several months to fight? The Lebanese military "cleared" the area of Nahr al-Barid from the rebels. But is it safe to say that the army controls the underground shelters that are so plentiful in northern Lebanon, because there may be surviving rebels hiding out, waiting in the wings? Should we not be afraid of a new outbreak of violence in the northern regions of the country bordering Syria in the near future? This will leave the Syrian authorities with a very difficult choice: to remain neutral in the face of the threat of an outbreak of terrorism on their borders, or to help their Lebanese colleagues by crossing the border of Lebanon? The Lebanese authorities ' lack of clear and precise answers to the questions raised in 2007, which were engaged in an acute internal political struggle, led to the fact that less than a year later they had to find answers to them, not without the help of concerned Syrian neighbors. Other Arab-Muslim countries in the Middle East are facing similar problems today. In Yemen, the army, which once helped unite the South and North into one state, can now become an indirect cause of the country's split as a result of the war with the Islamic opposition.

As a rule, the military assess compromises, deals and cooperation with opposition groups negatively. Rather they tend to install ip-

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a moral ethno-confessional balance, as Hafiz al-Assad did in Syria. But the distinctive feature of the Assad regime was the fragility of its power structure, which was based on the complex articulations of inter-communal, clan and family blocks, built, in turn, on mutual intra-elite and interpersonal obligations. For three decades, only Assad's remarkable will and political foresight, his tenacity, flexibility and ability to maneuver allowed him to maintain the balance of power he found. Coalition support for the government was effective only if a number of indispensable conditions were met: the participation of coalition members in government, meeting the basic socio-economic needs of various groups of the population, and maintaining a balance of power between the various parts of this coalition.7 The real danger for the authorities was not so much in external enemies, but in the violation of the integrity of the established system. The structure that began to erode after his demise was eroded by Asad [Akhmedov, 2005, p. 46-47].

In the current context of the activation of Islamic ideology in the Middle East, the former concept of a secular, nationally oriented officer has evolved and is rather conditional in nature. A secular worldview and a sense of national identity, on the one hand, and a commitment to traditional values, on the other, coexist peacefully in a military environment only as long as ethnic and religious differences do not escalate into acute conflicts. The likelihood that the US military will continue to adhere to secular ideology and national ideals and act as an unbiased intermediary or arbiter from these positions is seriously reduced. At best, the fear of losing their own privileges can force the officer corps to act as a guarantor of the country's unity and express the idea of national harmony.

Given the growing Islamization of Arab countries, on the one hand, and the growing desire of various political forces to reconstruct society using elements of liberalism and democracy, on the other, the actions of the military will largely be determined by the nature of the ruling regime and its attitude to the presence of religious institutions in the army. Thus, in the Ataturk-era Republic of Turkey, where religion was separated from the state, under the radical republican regime, the authorities were quite tolerant of the voluntary observance of rituals and some basic norms and rules of Islam by soldiers in private, but they did not appeal to the norms of Islamic morality in political and educational work in the army. The secular nature of the Turkish armed forces was seen as one of the most important achievements of the republican system. In Turkey, the army played an integration role, bringing together people from different regions, backgrounds, and social levels into a single nation. The Turkish military was so determined and unapologetic about Islamism that it was able to force Prime Minister Najmeddin Erbakan, the leader of an Islamist party, to dismiss his supporters from the army. The military has closely followed the attempts of the National Order Party to establish Sharia rule in the country. The party was banned three times (in 1971, 1980, and 1998)by the military or under pressure from them, although it was revived again under other names. At the same time, the army was fighting Islamists in its own ranks. Thus, in 1994-1996 alone, 556 officers were dismissed as supporters of "Sharia rule" [Landa, 2005, p.234].

However, in 2002, after the victory of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the parliamentary elections in Turkey, whose ideology was largely based on the principles of Islam, and the coming to power of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the situation began to gradually change. Using the country's "special" form of democracy,

7 While ensuring the leading positions of Alawites in the army and special services.

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Erdogan managed to significantly weaken the influence of the military on the country's politics without violating the Constitution, which caused serious concern to the Turkish generals. For all that, the army still retains a secularist character.

In States where religion was not so strongly separated from the State, religious rituals could be incorporated into official military ceremonies. However, religion did not determine the loyalty of the army to the ruling regime. In Syria, the authorities officially declared their commitment to Islam, but in fact sought to eradicate religious institutions in the army environment. The Syrian command limited itself to attending the Umayyad Mosque with the President on public holidays.

The coming to power of the new President Bashar al-Assad in Syria has somewhat changed the attitude of the leadership towards political Islam, including the role of Islam in the army and society.8 In 2003, a decree was issued, according to which conscripts were allowed to pray in military camps. The growth of political Islam in the SAR raised the question of the inevitability of allowing representatives of the patriotic Islamic movement to participate in state affairs. However, the authorities intended to approach this issue very carefully and selectively. In this regard, attention is drawn to the three-day conference "Syria and international challenges", which was held at the Higher Military Academy of the SAR at the end of March 2006.It is characteristic that the Minister of Defense of the SAR, Hassan Turkmani, not only supervised the preparation of this conference, but also took a personal part in its work. Along with the military elite of Syria, the Syrian clergy were quite widely represented at this forum: Sheikh Ahmed Hasoun, Archbishop Isidor Batykha, Sheikh Muhammad Habash, etc.

The main topic of discussion was the problem of political Islam in Syria and its relations with the army. The very fact of organizing such a conference and its agenda showed a fundamentally new approach of the Syrian military leadership to the problems of political Islam. It is obvious that the Syrian military leaders are ready to thoroughly and deeply understand the positions of representatives of various religious and political movements on the political role of Islamic movements and their influence on the national armed forces. The greatest response was caused by the report of the deputy of the Syrian Parliament M. Habash entitled " Syria stands up to challenges. Mission of the Islamic Street". The speaker, in particular, criticized the behavior of individual commanders of army units, who, as he believes, demonstrate a disdainful attitude to religion and emphasize the factor of personal courage in moral and educational work with personnel. According to Habash, this may negatively affect the morale and morale of Syrian soldiers and officers. We are talking primarily about people from traditional, low-income strata of society, who make up more than half of the personnel of the Syrian armed forces. Belittling the role of religion in educational work, Habash believes, can push the military to the path of extremism. As long as regular army units continue to prohibit performing prayers and mentioning the call "Allahu Akbar" during combat training, 9 the probability of this will grow. M. Habash even raised the question: how effectively can military marching music strengthen the morale of Syrian soldiers, especially in real combat? [Markaz al-Dirasat al-islamiyya, 26.03.2006].

In recent decades, the attitude of the authorities towards Islamic organizations in most modern Arab-Muslim countries of the Middle East has been ambiguous. Today, the political elites of many states in the region are transforming the authoritarian model of public administration, making it more liberal. Without it

8 Bashar al-Assad revoked a decree issued in 1983 prohibiting female students from wearing the hijab.

9 This prohibition does not apply to conscripts.

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It is quite difficult to ensure the stability of existing regimes, especially in the context of the global financial crisis and falling oil prices. The governments of most countries in the region have recognized the relevance of the factor of political Islam and are trying to adapt its moderate wing to the current state system (mainly in the social and intellectual sphere), rigidly countering any attempts by Islamists to influence political decisions.

Many regimes in the Arab-Muslim countries of the Middle East find themselves in a difficult situation today. Outside, they support the Palestinian movement "Hamas", the Lebanese party" Hezbollah", the Islamic resistance units of Iraq and Afghanistan, but inside their own countries they often carry out harsh repression against the Islamic opposition (even moderate ones). Naturally, this ambivalent attitude towards Islam has a certain impact on the mood of the army, where many officers are very sympathetic to the actions of the Islamic resistance in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan, and even envy its victories in the conditions of complete inactivity of their armies in the face of external threats. This situation is unlikely to be maintained for long. The recently increased religiosity of many soldiers and officers may eventually turn from a "private matter" into a political idea and give impetus to the search for a new collective identity, making them allies of the Islamic opposition to the current government. We cannot exclude the possibility that the authorities, trying to maintain their positions, will provoke a clash with moderate Islamists of the army and special services.

Very soon, Arab leaders will have to decide which is the greatest threat to their power and stability in the country: a political dialogue with moderate Islam with sporadic (perhaps inevitable) outbreaks of violence by Islamic radicals, or the suppression of moderate Islam and a war with radical Islamists involving the army and special services. The consequences of such a war can be completely unpredictable for the regimes themselves and for the region as a whole. If it is possible to smooth out the existing discrepancies between the attitude of the authorities to Islam, on the one hand, and its perception in society and the army, on the other, then the threat of ethnic and religious conflicts may be relegated to the background.

list of literature

Asia and Africa today. 2008. N 6.

Al-Siyasa (Kuwait). 09.11.2007.

Akhmedov V. M. Syria under Bashar al-Assad. Regional experience of modernization in the conditions of external instability, Moscow: IV RAS, 2005.
Akhmedov V. M. Voennye sily v obshchestvenno-politicheskoi zhizni Syrie [Armed Forces in the socio-political Life of Syria]. 2003. N4.

Landa R. G. Political Islam: Preliminary results, Moscow, 2005.
Markaz al-Dirasat al-islamiyya. 26.03.2006.

Be'eri E. Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society. N.Y.: Praeger, 1970.

Beshir M.O. The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict. N.Y.: Praeger, 1968.

Janowitz M. The Military in the Political Development of New Nations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.

Mehden F.R. von der. Comparative Political Violence. Eglewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1973.

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