Army and society

This article is the first of a series of articles devoted to the analysis of the role of the armies and special services of the countries of the Middle East in the political life of these countries. The starting point in the study of this topic is to consider the historical and socio-political prerequisites and results of the military's rise to power in Middle Eastern states after World War II, as well as specific means and methods of political control by civilian authorities over the army in order to deter the military from carrying out coups and ensure relative internal political stability in The article examines the problems of relations between the government, the army and "political Islam" in the context of globalization and modernization in the region from the point of view of determining possible ways and prospects for the development of the region's countries in the new geopolitical conditions in the Middle East. The issues of combat effectiveness and combat readiness of Middle Eastern armies are studied using specific examples of regional wars and the role of military-technical cooperation of the region's countries with foreign partners (USSR/Russia, USA, other Western countries, China, North Korea).

Over the past decades, the Middle East has been one of the most turbulent regions in the world. At the same time, the degree of conflict in the region had a pronounced upward trend. This situation was determined both by the peculiarities of the geostrategic position of the region, the presence of a number of large states with divergent interests, and the rapid development of demographic processes, the aggravation of the problem of water resources, and the not always positive influence of external forces. The Arab-Israeli conflict has also had and continues to have a serious impact on almost all aspects of Israeli and Arab society.

Historically, power in the Arab world has been concentrated in the hands of a single family or group of powerful individuals united around a strong personality. This also predetermined a peculiar mechanism for the transfer of power-either by inheritance or by coups, often with the military playing the dominant role. From 1952 to 1986, about 30 military coups took place in Arab countries. During approximately the same period (1951-1991), 14 Arab leaders fell victim to the struggle for the succession of power, starting with Abdullah Bin Hussein in Jordan and ending with Mohammed Boudiyaf in Algeria. The transition from rivalry to cooperation between the army and the authorities in the 1970s and 1980s marked the beginning of a long period of stability in civil - military relations in the Arab East. However, the lack of truly democratic changes has led to the fact that authoritarian practices in the leadership have remained unchanged for many years. Moreover, the role of parliamentary institutions has been reduced to a purely representative function and constitutional formalization of the traditional process

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political parties, in the absence of competition, actually turned into a one-man party and could not have a real impact on the processes of changing power.

As a result, there is a paradoxical situation in the Arab world, when the process of political development seems to have gone backwards and countries with a republican system of government began to increasingly acquire the features of a monarchical system of power. The preservation of this process was also facilitated by the long-standing Arab-Israeli confrontation, which often resulted in acute military conflicts, which served as an additional motivation for the position of conservative Arab elites who opposed any significant changes in society. For the past three decades, the current system has worked quite reliably, at least from the point of view of the authorities in power. At the same time, despite a certain dissatisfaction of the Arab population with their position and the actions of the authorities, during this period there were no mass popular movements in the Arab East aimed at overthrowing the existing system, unlike in the beginning and middle of the last century. The foreign opposition was poorly organized and preferred to engage mainly in literary work, internal "showdowns" and setting up their own businesses, while anti-government protests of radical Islamists were quite successfully and severely suppressed by the authorities and, apparently, did not have a serious support base in the broad strata of the Arab population. It is characteristic that this situation suited many world powers, including the United States, which sought to preserve the status quo based on their strategic, primarily economic, interests.

At the turn of the century, the situation began to change. The growing globalization, the increasing spread of information and telecommunication technologies, the aggravation of demographic problems, the depletion of water resources, and the growing socio-economic difficulties in the context of increasing influence among the masses of Islamic radicalism began to come into conflict with the existing practice of public administration. The activity of the foreign opposition has also intensified, not without the help of the relevant political structures of the West.

The events of September 11, 2001 in New York and the subsequent global fight against terrorism, which the United States conducted first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, radically changed the political situation and the balance of power in the region and forced many world powers to take a fresh look at their relations with Arab countries and their leaders. Arab leaders find themselves in a far from easy position today. On the one hand, they understand the objective need for democratic transformation. On the other hand, the reform program of the "expanded Middle East and North Africa" initiated by the United States and approved by eight industrialized countries of the world aroused considerable apprehension and skepticism among them. This was clearly demonstrated during the work of the so-called Future Forum, which was established at the G8 summit in Sea Island in the summer of 2004 as part of the "wider Middle East" initiative, and the second meeting of which was held in Bahrain in early November 2005. Egypt, the largest country in the Arab world and one of the main US allies in the region, actually disrupted the adoption of the final documents of the summit. The Egyptian delegation, followed by representatives of Saudi Arabia, opposed the US-proposed program and funding mechanism for non-governmental organizations in Arab countries, whose support in the West is considered an important tool for promoting reforms in the region.

Despite the fact that a new generation of leaders is gradually coming to power in Arab countries (Morocco, Jordan, Qatar, Bahrain, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates), large financial flows and major political decision-making are still largely controlled by the old ruling elites. In such a situation, forced steps, also dictated from the outside, to remove the old ruling elites from power can only strengthen their resistance to reforms, de-escalate their resistance to the new regime.-

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to stabilize the situation and create a political vacuum in a particular country, in which the probability of Islamists coming to power is high.

In most cases, the transfer of power in Arab countries took place peacefully, at least at an early stage. In Jordan, Abdullah II inherited power from his father. After his accession to the throne, he sought to pursue a policy similar in basic internal and external parameters to the previous course of King Hussein. At the same time, the geostrategic position of Jordan, which has predetermined its role as a "buffer" state, the scarcity of minerals and high unemployment, and the internal security issues that have worsened due to the Iraq war and the Palestinian issue may have a negative impact on the military and political balance of power in the kingdom.

In Syria, the prospect of worsening relations between military and civilian leaders also looks quite real today. Until recently, President Bashar al-Assad's position seemed fairly solid. Any changes to the current constitution were determined primarily by the President himself. He controlled all the power tools of the former regime and could use them as he saw fit. At the same time, Bashar al-Assad put the repressive apparatus under tighter control of the political authorities, and tried to give the form of legality to the repressions of the authorities themselves. Potential political rivals did not have legal opportunities to create a serious opposition with a broad social base of support. Since coming to power, Bashar al-Assad has taken a number of measures to liberalize the Syrian economy and democratize public life in the country. Building on the achievements of the previous policy of economic liberalization, which provided the upper middle class with a generally comfortable existence, Bashar al-Assad pursued a tougher fiscal policy that improved the lives of most civil servants.

In recent years, Bashar al-Assad has significantly rejuvenated the Syrian military and political elite, tried to instill a new political culture in it, and thereby significantly expanded the base of his own support within the main mechanisms of power-the party, the state apparatus, and law enforcement agencies. Starting in July 2004 with the reform of the army and special services, Bashar al-Assad dismissed 440 high-ranking officers of the army and special services in less than a year [The New York Times, 19.03.2005]. He was also able to give real content to the work of the "minor" under X. Such as the parliament, NPF, public organizations, professional and student unions, which was the key to deepening democratic transformations. The course of "continuity for reform" adopted by Bashar al-Assad had a deep political justification. By keeping the overall framework of the previous system unchanged, Bashar al-Assad was able to implement a phased program of reforms without any visible threat of disruption of the balance of power in the ruling elite and social upheavals in society. In addition, the previous government structures still enjoyed support among a large part of the Syrian population.

This policy was largely in tune with the aspirations of Syrian citizens, who did not want to return to the era of military coups in the 1950s and 1960s, nor repeat the bloody events of the late 1970s and early 1980s associated with the Muslim Brotherhood insurgency, nor chaos like what is happening in neighboring Iraq. At the same time, in the traditional ruling elites of the SAR, there is a lack of support. Assad was more likely to be seen as a successor to X. Assad, who runs the powerful authoritarian state he inherited. In many respects, the strength of Bashar al-Assad's position was ensured by his father's policy of strengthening political control at all levels of government. During the three decades of his reign, X. Assad has created an effective mechanism for controlling the army and security services and virtually eliminated the possibility of factional power struggles in the army and security services. The success of Bashar al-Assad's policy was largely promoted

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the fact that in the first years of his rule, the Syrian president did not face serious political and regional crises.

Today, the situation in the Middle East and in the world has changed dramatically. The new political leadership of the Syrian Arab Republic, headed by Bashar al-Assad, faced a complex of new problems. This includes the potentially dangerous situation developing around Syria, the very difficult socio-economic situation in the country, and the need to implement more radical reforms, in which the Syrian society can quickly become disillusioned if calls for them are not supported by concrete actions. Intra-regime contradictions may result in a power struggle if the current unity around President Bashar al-Assad begins to erode. In these circumstances, the leadership of the army and special services may decide that B. Assad is not able to take Syria out of harm's way [Akhmedov, 2005; Perthes, 2001, p. 149].

Critical countries in this regard are also Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Libya, where a change of leadership may occur in the near future. In all three countries, senior managers hold senior positions, with their sons and relatives acting as possible successors. Their ability to consolidate power is still very uncertain. In the event of an intra-elite struggle for power, the army and special services may become involved in it, which will create a threat of a split in the armed forces of these states.

Egypt's political system is also highly static and difficult to reform. Real power is in the hands of the pro-presidential, ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). The remaining parties serve only as an entourage designed to disguise the actual one-party system. At the same time, a number of new opposition parties and movements, including those of a secular nature, have emerged in the country in recent years. Among them, the most prominent are the party "Al-Had" ("Tomorrow") and the public movement "Kifaya" ("Enough"), which sharply criticize the policy of the authorities. However, they have not yet been able to gain enough political weight in society to influence state policy. Therefore, the first alternative presidential elections in Egypt in the country's history, held in the fall of 2005, showed that inter-party competition is still largely only formal in nature. The parliament is dominated by one party - the NDP. The Government is formed under the direct patronage of the President. As a result, these state institutions are largely "facade" in nature and are designed to ensure the political course developed by the presidential administration. The separation of powers in Egypt, therefore, is virtually nonexistent, and the institution of presidential power has an unlimited monopoly on power.

The process of evolution of the ruling Egyptian elite was extremely difficult and took place at a slow pace, hidden from the public. The problem of transforming the existing power structure is complicated by the fact that over the years of relative stability of the regime, only Islamists, primarily represented by the Muslim Brotherhood, have remained as the only effective alternative political force in Egypt. At the same time, while some of the organization's members support "moderate" Islam, reject violence as a means of political struggle, support democratic reforms, support cooperation with the authorities, and have their own representatives in parliament, banks, and print publications, a considerable number of "brothers" are very belligerent and hostile to the regime. Therefore, the Egyptian authorities have recently made active attempts to attract some of the "moderate" Islamists to their side and direct their aspirations within the framework of a legal political structure. It is not for nothing that Islam was given a lot of space in the program of the ruling NDP. H. Mubarak's election program contained extensive plans for the development of social programs designed to significantly improve the situation of ordinary Egyptians. Thus, the authorities hoped to beat out political trump cards from Islamists who speculate on the mood of the poor in the West.-

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villages. On the eve of the parliamentary elections, H. Mubarak secretly ordered the law enforcement forces not to interfere too harshly with representatives of the moderate wing of the Muslim Brotherhood during the election campaign. At the same time, the authorities made it quite clear to the "brothers" that they are ready to allow their candidates to participate in the elections not as representatives of an independent party, but as part of the lists of legal socio-political organizations. The results of the November 2005 parliamentary elections in Egypt showed that the country is on the verge of major changes.

In these circumstances, the country is facing an acute issue of developing a modern mechanism for changing the government and its continuity. In Egypt, for example, it is often said that X. Mubarak intends to start training his son Gamal - a successful businessman - as a possible successor in the power field. Although the President openly denied these rumors in April 2001 [The Jerusalem Post, April 3, 2001], in 2004 Gamal became head of the political department of the ruling party, and during the 2005 presidential election he headed his father's campaign headquarters. Along with Mubarak's son, some top military leaders and intelligence officials were also considered as possible candidates for the presidency [Mideast Mirror, Sept 5, 2001].

In the post-revolutionary period, the Egyptian armed forces became the backbone of the regime. Therefore, the choice of a likely successor from the military environment seems justified from the point of view of political logic and existing practice, especially since Egypt had the experience of transferring power from Nasser to Sadat in 1970 and from Sadat to Mubarak in 1981. However, these events were rather dramatic in nature and were primarily associated with the death of the president. In this regard, it is noteworthy that over the past 20 years the post of Vice-President of the Republic of Armenia has remained vacant. Given that the position of Vice-President is seen as the last step to the presidency, the appointment to this post would be a landmark event in the political life of Egypt. Apparently, H. Mubarak is well aware of the complexity of this problem and has already begun to prepare a solution to the issue of the succession of power in the country. Recently, the president made a number of personnel changes in the top command of the army. Instead of Divisional General Hamid Wahbe, Divisional General Sami Anan was appointed as the new Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Egypt. The president's entourage believes that the replacements made are "planned" in nature. Egyptian military and political circles tend to link periodic personnel changes in the top command of the armed forces with "another new stage of Mubarak's rule." However, in this situation, attention is drawn to the fact that X. Wahbe, who, like Mubarak, previously commanded the Egyptian Air Force, was considered one of the closest people to the president and was even considered as a possible candidate for the post of Vice-president of Egypt [MENL, 28.10.2005].

As in other Arab countries, security in Egypt is based on the ability of the military to control the transfer of power and prevent intra-elite conflicts from turning into open power struggles. Today, the real guarantor of maintaining internal political stability and security in the Republic of Azerbaijan is not a very fragile and weak democracy and a largely formally existing multi-party system, but the armed forces. In the event of popular unrest, mass riots, the resumption of armed and terrorist actions by the radical Islamic opposition, the army will remain the mainstay of the regime, its last and reliable reserve. Moreover, the army in Egypt is a truly national institution, and one of the most modern and dynamically developing. From this point of view, the steps taken by H. Mubarak on personnel reform in the army and modernization of the national armed forces seem quite justified and logical, especially in the context of the president's plans and decisions on reforms, the change of power and its continuity.

The uncertainty of prospects remains in those countries where, it would seem, the problem of changing the government has been solved and is a "family matter", as, for example, in Saudi Arabia

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Arabia. The current mechanism of succession of power in the kingdom was formed in the 30s of the last century, during the reign of the founder of the modern Saudi state, King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud. According to it, power in the kingdom is hereditary in nature and is transferred to the eldest representatives of the Saudi family and the four largest tribal clans of Saudi Arabia related to it. Article 5 of the so-called Basic Law, adopted by King Fahd in the early 1990s, and the council of 18 senior princes of the royal family established in 2000 to determine the succession of power, have somewhat expanded the power of the authorities to choose a successor. However, these measures were cosmetic in nature and could not change the current practice.

So far, the traditional mechanism of power change is working quite steadily. The transfer of power to Crown Prince Abdullah after the demise of King Fahd in August 2005 took place without apparent conflict in the ruling elite. For the first time in the history of the kingdom, the head of state was not from the Sudeiri clan, whose representatives traditionally ruled the country after the death of Ibn Saud. At the same time, the elevation of Abdullah to the Saudi throne could hardly indicate a major change in positions of power in the upper echelons of the ruling elite. Rather, it is the result of a compromise between rival factions of the royal family in order to preserve the continuity of the Saudi course. In one of the first decrees, the new king appointed a native of the Sudeiri clan, Sultan Bin Abdulaziz, who has served as Defense Minister since 1962, as the heir to the throne. Thus, the traditional mechanism of power change and the balance of power in the ruling elite were preserved.

However, it is difficult to say for how long the balance of power achieved will remain unchanged, especially given the changes that have taken place in the kingdom and the region over the past 10 to 15 years. The issue of succession became more acute in the second half of the 1990s after a sharp deterioration in Fahd's health and changes in the socio-economic situation of the kingdom. The once fabulously rich country was gradually "getting poorer". The average per capita income of $ 14,000 in 1981 declined to $ 6,000 in the late 1990s. The total number of unemployed people in the early 2000s was about 23-25% of the economically active population. The share of unemployed women was particularly high - 11.8%. Every year, about 500 thousand young Saudis entered the labor market. This is quite a lot for 20-million Saudi Arabia. The previously debt-free State ran a budget deficit of one year's GNP in the late 1990s. The Saudi monarchy, whose revenue from oil sales in 1981 was $ 110 billion, received only $ 30 billion in 1998. [Akhmedov, 2000, p. 18-25].

The unspoken rules of a kind of social contract, according to which the Saudi clan held power in the country, and the population received subsidies, have ceased to suit many today. The reduction of budget allocations for social projects has led to an increase in income differentiation among the subjects of the kingdom. Against this background, the ostentatious luxury of the royal court and the surrounding elite did not contribute to maintaining an atmosphere of"social peace". Moreover, the conflict in Saudi society was escalating due to demographic, cultural factors and the problem of generational change. Disagreements over the kingdom's development path deepened between the so-called baby boomers, who were formed in American universities in the 1960s and 1970s and took leadership positions in the era of wealth and abundance, on the one hand, and the younger generation of Saudi Arabs who studied at Saudi universities, were educated according to religious curricula, and moved forward in the period of "new poverty" and economic difficulties - on the other hand. The struggle between "modernists" and "conservatives" on key issues of the country's future development was at the heart of those sometimes harsh disagreements and contradictions that were carefully tried to extinguish at the top of the power pyramid. However, maintaining the same balance is becoming increasingly difficult.

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Representatives of the third generation of the ruling royal family are gradually coming to the political forefront and demanding their share of power.

In order to maintain the balance of power, the Saudi leadership will soon have to start developing a new formula of power that can provide access to the government of a new generation of Saudis, and not only from the current ruling family. This is especially true given the existence of an anti-systemic opposition in the country, whose ranks are regularly replenished by people from poor urban strata and rural migrants. In this regard, the fight against poverty and unemployment is becoming an urgent task of the Saudi authorities, especially since the favorable situation on the world oil markets significantly facilitates its solution. Estimated data for 2005 show that revenues from oil in the current market environment and the level of its production can range from $ 160 to $ 180 billion. The Saudi leadership is much more concerned about the significant religious opposition, which not only potentially threatens the country's stability, but can also undermine the legitimacy of the current government, which is based on the principles of Islam and Sharia. The deepening social inequality in the country undoubtedly serves as a breeding ground for the growth of opposition sentiments, which, in the absence of secular political and public institutions, acquire a religious connotation.

However, if the cracked "social world" can be tried to glue together by massive financial injections, then it is much more difficult to cope with the solution of political problems of a pan-Arab nature. The escalating tensions in Iraq and Palestine are making calls for jihad a regular feature of Friday sermons in the kingdom's mosques. An anti-terrorist operation by Saudi security forces in September 2005 in Dammam, one of the main oil refining centers in the kingdom, against the Al-Awfi group showed that the size of the armed Islamic opposition is significantly larger than previously thought, and is not limited to the Saudi Al-Qaeda cell. In addition, the armed opposition enjoys the sympathy and support of various groups of the country's population, including those represented in the Saudi security forces.

Indeed, the conflict potential of the region is a serious factor that can destabilize the political situation not only in Saudi Arabia, but also in other Arab countries. First of all, this applies to Arab states that have diplomatic relations with Israel and are considered US allies in the Middle East. Perhaps this is one of the reasons for the surprising fact that Syria is still an "island of security" in the midst of the" sea of violence " that rages around it. The US war on terrorism, which is often associated with a war against Islam, the presence of US troops in Iraq, and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict contribute to the growth of public tension in the Arab East. The prospect of using the army to suppress mass demonstrations and the involvement of local security services in reprisals against their own citizens, dissatisfied with the rapprochement with Israel and America, are the subject of real concern for the authorities of these states. The danger of such actions is clearly seen in the example of Syria, where in the late 1970s and early 1980s the authorities were forced to use military units to suppress the armed rebellion of the Muslim Brotherhood. Sunni soldiers refused to carry out punitive operations in cities with an overwhelmingly Sunni population. As a result, there was a split in these units along confessional lines, discipline fell, and the troops were demoralized. The authorities urgently had to mobilize special units staffed by Alawites.

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The active involvement of the United States in the affairs of the region leads to an increase in discontent among the general population and provokes anti-American demonstrations. During the 2003 war in Iraq, anti-American demonstrations were held in many States in the region. The security forces tried to control these processes. However, Arab leaders feared that such demonstrations could go beyond the political framework and destabilize the regime [The Independent, March 26, 2003; New York Times, April 6, 2002; Mideast Mirror, July 26, 2002]. The special services and regular units of these countries found themselves in a difficult situation. In fact, they had to oppose the opinion of the majority of their own people. So far, Arab regimes have managed to cope with social protests and keep them from escalating into uncontrolled actions. However, it is almost impossible to predict when the degree of internal tension will increase so much that it will lead to a violation of the internal political stability of relations and the balance of power. It is also difficult to predict to what extent the special services and the army will be able to act against their own people. It cannot be ruled out that regular troops may take a back seat, preferring not so much to suppress as to appease the protesters. If the regime loses the support of the army, it will become more vulnerable to the opposition, primarily operating under the banner of political Islam.

The processes of globalization and related democratization and reforms, the main vector of which is still determined by the West, are often interpreted by the Arab public consciousness as an attempt by Western powers, primarily the United States, to redraw the political map of the Middle East and assert their dominance there. Perhaps the psychology of Arab society is not yet ready for such far-reaching changes, the objective need for which arose much earlier. At the same time, this perception of reality is reinforced by the current US policy in the region. This not only casts doubt on the sincerity of the Arab leaders ' democratic transformation, but also puts genuine secular supporters of liberal reforms in the region in a very difficult position in the face of both conservative ruling elites and the growing strength of Islamic reform movements, which in some cases are highly politicized.

So, recently, the demands of representatives of the so-called radical, political Islam to legalize and expand their participation in the political life of Arab countries have become increasingly insistent. Leaders of Islamist movements realized the scale and depth of the coming changes much earlier than many Arab leaders. The failure of plans to create an Islamic caliphate, the narrow ideological base of extremism, and the lack of a universal socio-political program prompted representatives of "political Islam" to quickly adapt to the new regional realities. A number of ideologues of the moderate Islamist movement (Egyptian Sheikh Youssef Qaradawi, head of the Tunisian Islamist Ennahda party Rashid Ghannouchi) seek to adapt Islam to democracy, "democratize Islam". This forces them to modify the original views of Islamic ideologues, which are based on the idea of creating an Islamic caliphate. They advocate the rejection of violence as a means of political struggle, condemn terrorism, call for the creation of an" Islamic democratic state", support the principle of holding free parliamentary elections, reconsider the idea of the divinity of power, support democratic procedures for changing power, reconsider the role of women in society, and in some cases act as active fighters for human rights.

But can moderate Islamist ideologues be considered champions of democracy in the Arab world? And what about the Islamist slogan "Islam is a religion and a state"? Will the Islamists, once in power, be able to abandon this slogan and become secular rulers? Will a "democratic Islamic state" be able to-

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vo " to ensure political pluralism - one of the fundamental principles of democracy? And how can sharia be linked to human rights? If moderate Islamists believe that a Muslim should not marry an atheist, and a Muslim woman is forbidden to marry a Christian or a Baha'i, then can we talk about freedom of choice in this case? And, if the criminal penalty for adultery is abolished in Turkey, does this mean that Turkey is not an Islamic state? All these and many other issues cause heated discussions in Arab society and show that" Islamic democracy " has certain limits. Therefore, at different poles of Arab society, the reform movement in Islam and its slogans raise serious doubts about their sincerity and suspicions about the truth of the Islamists ' future intentions and their next steps if they come to power. Many Arab leaders rightly believe that in the event of free and democratic elections, Islamists may come to power. Arab traditional ruling elites fear a possible, even temporary, alliance between moderate Islamists and left-liberal forces. Secular democratic forces are wary of Islamic reformers, seeing them as their competitors in the democratic struggle for power. Moreover, both sides recognize the reformist path as the only correct one.

The recent history of Arab countries has been replete with examples of the struggle and mutual influence of religious (pan-Islamism, Muslim modernism) and secular (pan-Arabism, particular nationalism) ideological trends. These trends largely determined the evolution of Arab social thought and helped Muslims adapt to the ideas and concepts borrowed from the West. Therefore, the main problem in promoting reforms, which the Arab countries themselves and their international sponsors will have to face in the near future, will probably be how successful attempts to combine a secular reform project with elements of the Western system of values on a national-patriotic basis and Muslim modernism with traditional Islamic ideas and ideas will be..

In these circumstances, a serious threat to internal political stability is the penetration of Islamists into the army and factionalism in the armed forces. The emergence of various groups, especially in key units of the armed forces, usually immediately precedes a coup. Having originated in the depths of secret groups within the army, the idea of a coup then receives the support of supporters of this group, united with it by horizontal and vertical ties in the armed forces. This is the scenario that most military coups in Arab countries followed. Factionalism is particularly dangerous when militant Islam becomes more pronounced among officers. Under these conditions, an ideological basis is created for the actions of the conspirators and a motive for armed action against the authorities arises, despite the high risk for the participants of the conspiracy.

In fact, the military, as a rule, does not share the views of radical Islam. To some extent, this is due to the fact that back in the 1950s and 1960s, the revolutionary officers in Arab countries were more receptive to secular theories. Compared to other segments of the population, officers were better educated, traveled abroad more often, and therefore had more opportunities to get acquainted with the ideas of socialism and social democracy and their bearers. The pragmatism and patriotism of the professional military also contributed to the gradual transformation of the ideals of traditional Arab society. In addition, the periodic purges carried out in most Arab armies significantly reduced the number of adherents of radical Islam in the officer corps and forced them to look for employment in other areas. All the armies of the region, with the exception of Iran, tried to prevent Islamists from entering the officer corps. Mistakes in this case could be costly, as in the case of Egyptian President A. Sadat, who was assassinated in 1981 by a deeply secretive group of Islamists in the army during a military parade. In Algeria, where I've been holding back for a long time-

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While the ruling National Liberation Front party was a leading factor in the army, the appearance of a new generation of officers in the army leadership, who received a good modern education in contrast to those who came from the old army structures, made it possible to make a decision in the mid-1990s on the gradual professionalization of the army. In many ways, this step was dictated by the danger of Islamization of the Algerian army, taking into account the active propaganda activities of Islamists in the armed forces and the unreliability of the composition of conscripts. In Turkey, the military defends the secular ideology of Kemalism. In Syria, the army rather severely suppressed the uprising of the armed Islamic opposition in the early 1980s.

At the same time, the army was not always on the side of the secular principle in politics. Thus, in Pakistan, the armed forces became one of the main agents of "Islamization" of society during the rule of Zia ul-Haq and were largely formed based on the religious conviction of recruits. It is characteristic that the only party that the authorities allowed to create its own cells in the army was Jamaat-i Islami. The army elite led by P. Musharraf, who took over the leadership of Pakistan as a result of a military coup on October 12, 1999, took a tougher stance against Islamists. This was largely due to the fact that the deterioration of the socio-economic situation in Pakistan during the reign of B. Bhutto led to the activation of not so much moderate Islamists controlled by the authorities, but rather Islamic radicals who posed a threat to the security of the state. Faced with the need to solve complex economic and social problems in the global fight against terrorism after the events of September 11, 2001, the Musharraf regime banned the activities of several Islamic movements and parties in Pakistan. However, many of the previously arrested Islamist leaders were soon released, and in the 2002 parliamentary elections, twice as many Pakistanis voted for the Islamic party bloc, which enjoyed the secret support of the army, as in 1997.

There are no insurmountable ideological differences between the army and Islamists in Pakistan, but their cooperation is limited to certain limits. Thus, in 2003, the authorities again banned a number of Islamist organizations, which, as they believed, did not want to take into account the political and tactical guidelines of the Pakistani leadership in the fight against international terrorism and normalization of relations with India. Thus, the army and Islamists in Pakistan were not at all united in their political and tactical attitudes. The military in Pakistan was willing to tolerate moderate Islamists as long as they recognized their authority, did not violate peaceful forms of political activity, which could pose a threat to Pakistan's isolation in the international arena. Nevertheless, it is quite difficult to predict how long such a balance of relations will last and who will ultimately prevail [Landa, 2005, pp. 236-237]. However, countries such as Pakistan and Iran are rather an exception. In general, the armed forces in the countries of the region sought to defend their own positions and interests and reacted harshly to the actions of Islamists.

Nevertheless, for reasons of political order, the military often allows moderate Islamists to be active in a limited way, using them to their advantage, while maintaining full control over their activities. Thus, the secular nature of the Turkish armed forces is seen as one of the most important achievements of the republican system. The army here performs a kind of integration role, bringing together people from different regions, different backgrounds and social levels and turning them into a single nation. The Turkish military was so determined and irreconcilable on the "Islamist issue" that it was able to force Prime Minister N. Erbakan, the leader of the Islamist party, to expel his supporters from the army. The Turkish military closely followed the attempts of the National Order Party (now Refah) of N. Erbakan to establish Sharia rule in the country.

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Refah was banned three times by the military or under pressure from them (in 1971, 1980, and 1998), but was revived again under other names. At the same time, the army fought against Islamists in its own ranks. Thus, in 1994-1996 alone, 556 officers were dismissed as supporters of "Sharia rule" [Landa, 2005, p.234].

Relations between the army and Islamists in Yemen were somewhat different. Lieutenant Colonel Ali Abdullah Saleh, who became President of the YAR in 1979, gradually turned the national armed forces into the main pillar of his power. In the fight against the left, he also relied on Islamists, mainly from the Muslim Brotherhood. After the victory over the leftists, not without the support of the fundamentalist Islamist organization Islamic Front, many of whose representatives joined the newly formed legislative and executive bodies, the military found itself in a situation where they were forced to continue to provide Islamists with a wide field for their political activities. The crisis of ideas of scientific socialism in the NDRJ in the context of the termination of military and political support for Moscow ultimately led to the unification of South and North Yemen, and completely on the terms of the latter. By this time, the position of Islamists in YAR, whose territory in the 1980s was used to train Mujahideen who fought against Soviet troops in Afghanistan, was even more strengthened. Steps taken by President Saleh in the second half of the 1990s. Measures to modernize the armed forces of a unified Yemen, which involved closer military cooperation with the United States, caused discontent among both leftists in the south and Islamists in the north of the country.

Local Islamists affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood have formed the Yemen Unity for Reform (YER), led by Abdallah bin Hussein Al-Ahmar, sheikh of one of the largest and most politically influential confederations of Yemeni tribes. While generally supporting the President's course, YER often criticizes the government's actions and the slow pace of reforms. However, the authorities are most concerned about the actions on their own territory of various Islamists from other, primarily neighboring Arab-Muslim states, which, as is believed, may further lead to the transformation of Yemen into one of the bases of international terrorism, which is fraught with foreign policy isolation of the country. While taking certain steps against many Islamists, President Saleh is in no hurry to put an end to this issue, avoiding conflict with the influential patrons of Islamist groups from among the tribal leaders. In the context of the rather strong elements of tribal fragmentation and clan anarchy that persist in Yemeni society, which prevent the centralization of the state, the unifying ideas of Islam and their Islamist leaders objectively play the role of assistants to the authorities in their fight against various kinds of separatists and the opposition. The most active political forces of society - the tribes and the army-are interested in attracting moderate Islamists to their side as a factor that stabilizes the political situation in the country and can at a certain stage play a positive role in mobilizing the masses to overcome backwardness.

Infiltration of the army has been a major challenge for Islamist groups in Egypt since the 1990s. This was partly due to the fact that the government during this period began to pursue a policy of "Islamization from above", trying to take radical Islamists out of the political process and at the same time take control of active moderate representatives of the Islamic movement. The sphere of state influence on the activities of the Ministry of waqfs, mosques, and madrasas has significantly expanded. As part of this policy, the authorities built their relations with the most influential Islamic movement in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite the fact that the activities of the brotherhood were banned in Egypt, the authorities actually turned a blind eye to the charity, educational and social work of the organization's members.-

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Of course, it's a good idea. They published books and pamphlets, and established a broad network of social assistance throughout the country [Vidyasova and Umerov, 2002, p. 172]. The tactic of rapprochement with the" brothers "was justified by the desire of the authorities to keep the mood of the Egyptian" street " within certain limits. This was especially important in the context of growing social tensions over the war in Iraq and the unresolved Palestinian issue. At the same time, all attempts by the organization's leaders to achieve legalization were met with constant refusal. In December 2003, during the parliamentary by-elections, representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood were not allowed to run for office in a number of constituencies.

In January 2004, M. Akef took over the management of the organization. He was considered one of the organization's least radical leaders. Many of his statements and actions clearly testified to his "reformist orientation" [Kudryavtsev, 2004, p. 196]. Immediately after his election, M. Akef headed for rapprochement with the government. The new leader of the organization, apparently, realized that it would not be possible to achieve his goals in a confrontation with the authorities, and this would inevitably lead to repression. In the organization, the position of the younger generation of "brothers", who stood on the positions of the "liberal-reformist" sense, was strengthened. The social image of Egyptian Islamists has changed dramatically over the past 30 years. The number of young people under the age of 29 has significantly increased in their ranks. Almost half of them had higher education. They spoke out against the use of violence, in favor of radical reforms within the organization, refusing to rely on the " older generation "and attracting young people to the organization, increasing the activity of the" brothers " in trade unions and youth movements, primarily in universities and mosques, and expanding the social sphere of the organization's activities. As a result, its activities have become more offensive. The Muslim Brotherhood sought to secure legal conditions for conducting political struggle, strengthened its positions in trade unions, state institutions, universities, local authorities, and law enforcement agencies, seeking to use them as a political springboard for infiltrating parliament and the government.

By the end of the 1990s, Islamists made up the majority in the leadership of Egypt's leading trade unions and public associations: lawyers, doctors, engineers, university teachers, etc.The elections to the boards of the trade unions of lawyers and journalists held in 2003 showed that Islamists enjoy great authority among ordinary trade union members. Obviously, it was not without the approval of the Government that the organization launched an initiative to implement reforms in Egypt in August 2004. At least, their initiative was actively advertised in the official media and was supported by various parties in Egypt. On this basis, the organization's leaders expressed their willingness to cooperate with the authorities.

In turn, the authorities, through the organization of the so-called national dialogue, sought to expand the social base of the regime and at the same time achieve greater control of the Islamic opposition. At the same time, H. Mubarak and his inner circle may have expected that the "brothers", having received seats in parliament, would support the presidential course, including in matters of continuity of power. Moreover, one of the likely candidates for the post of President of the Republic of Korea, Son X. Mubarak Gamal has already made it clear that he holds similar positions on this issue. At the same time, the Egyptian leadership still viewed the Muslim Brotherhood as its main political rival and was reticent about the prospect of transforming the organization into a political party. At the same time, the government feared that the "brothers" would not stop using violent methods in their struggle for power. Therefore, in their relations with them, the authorities sought to pursue a policy of" carrot and stick": either taking steps towards Islamists, or periodically making arrests. So, in October-December 2003. Police and security forces eliminated several Islamist groups and arrested activists of the organization in Alexandria and several other cities in Egypt.

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In general, the Egyptian army played a very small role in the fight against Islamic extremists. In the 1980s and 1990s, a wave of sectarian terrorist attacks swept through Egypt. Between 1991 and 1996 alone, about 1,000 people died as a result of these acts of violence. The largest and most publicly known terrorist attack was an attempt by extremists to capture foreign tourists in Luxor in November 1997, during which 58 people were killed. It is characteristic that during the Luxor events, the role of the military was reduced to the evacuation of 14 wounded to Cairo by army transport [An-Nasr, N 702, December 1997, p. 61]. The fight against terror was thus not assigned to the army as a direct task. The Egyptian armed forces primarily served as a defensive and deterrent force. The caution shown by the authorities in this matter was quite obvious. The involvement of the army in the fight against Islamists could lead to the penetration of Islamic radicals into the army ranks. Among the organizers of the murder of A. Sadat were an acting colonel of the Egyptian army, as well as a reserve general. Mubarak's attempts to create special forces to fight Islamic extremists were not very successful. As a result of a mutiny in the law enforcement companies in February 1986, 20 thousand people suspected of having links with Islamic radicals were dismissed from these units. Therefore, the creation of military settlements in Egypt was based on the desire of the authorities to isolate the military from civil society and thus prevent the possibility of infiltration of Islamists into the army environment.

At the same time, the army press took steps to delegitimize Islamist ideology and its supporters. A direct parallel was drawn between the actions of Islamists in Algeria and Egypt [Al-Nasr, No. 673, July 1995, p.62; No. 702, February 1998, p. 22]. Although the army was not directly involved in the conflict between the authorities and the Islamists, a number of high-ranking military leaders believed that if the extremists became more active, the armed forces could be involved in counter-terrorism operations. At the same time, the regime, through military trials of Islamists, made it clear that it was ready to use the armed forces if necessary in the fight against Islamic radicals.

The development of political processes in Egypt and the region as a whole will undoubtedly affect the change in relations in the triangle "power, Islamists, army". The significant success of the Muslim Brotherhood representatives in the November-December 2005 parliamentary elections opened up new opportunities for Islamists to participate in government. If the "brothers" are legalized, they will be able to really influence changes in legislation and nominate their candidate in future presidential elections. This can significantly change the military-political balance, especially in the context of the aggravation of the issue of the change and succession of power.

In Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood movement, which was active in the 1950s and 1960s, and the extremist Islamic groups associated with it, were completely defeated in the period from 1976 to 1982. At the same time, along with the cases of veiled criticism of the authorities that became more frequent in the mid-1990s, during sermons in numerous Syrian mosques (about 2,500), the creation of new extremist Islamic organizations was noted, which set the task of overthrowing the current regime by armed means. Students of Islamic educational institutions were increasingly becoming centers of intensive religious processing in Syria. The largest state training center was the Sharia Faculty of the University of Damascus. In the second half of the 1990s, about 4,000 students attended its courses [Akhmedov, 2003, p. 35]. The main reasons for the intensification of the activities of Islamists were the deteriorating economic situation in the country, a decrease in the standard of living of the population and, as a result, an increase in social tension. The peace negotiations with Israel that began in the 1990s also played a role, which led to the formation of a certain "defeat complex" among the broad Syrian masses. Well-known events in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia also had a significant impact.

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The Syrian leadership understood that the growth of religious sentiment in the country could not be reversed, and the main task in this regard was to give the Islamization process a controlled character that did not pose a threat to the regime. At the same time, the Syrian special services were tasked with strengthening their work in national and foreign Islamic centers in order to neutralize their efforts, control their activities and prevent provocations. The regime was more concerned not so much with the radical internal Islamic opposition, which, despite a number of annoying overlaps, was generally confidently controlled by the security authorities, but rather with its links to foreign Islamic extremist organizations and the actively developing process of mass Islamization of Syrian society. The release from prison of some 2,400 political prisoners in the mid-1990s, most of whom belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood and were accused of anti-government activities, became a significant phenomenon in relations between the authorities and the opposition.

At the same time, the Syrian leadership sought to finally close the dossier of the Muslim Brotherhood abroad, settling relations with them, as part of a single process to acquire an increasing number of allies to solve foreign policy tasks, strengthen stability and achieve public harmony in the country. An active mediation role between Damascus and the "brothers" abroad was performed by the supreme controller of the Syrian "brothers" Abu Guda and Amin Yakin, who returned to the SAR and repeatedly appealed to both sides to normalize their relations. We also managed to establish contacts with representatives of the brotherhood in Saudi Arabia and their leader, Hassan Huweidi, who is known for his moderate position on religious issues. However, after Khuweidi left office in 1996, the Syrian regime lost an important channel of influence on the Saudi "brothers", who were led by extremist elements led by Ali Sadr al-Din al-Bayanuni, who agreed to return to Syria on condition that they were allowed to engage in political activities.- Vasat, 16.03.1997]. The Syrian leadership believed that the country is not in a position where it would be possible to risk allowing the activities of Islamic radicals, who in the event of any complications or cataclysms in the country could again find themselves on the other side of the barricades. At the same time, the regime, through the mediation of the Minister of Culture of the SAR, Najah Attar, managed to reach an agreement with her brother M. Attar, who headed the foreign branch of the brothers in Germany, to abandon political actions hostile to the regime inside and outside the SAR. Some progress has also been made in negotiations with Adnan Saad al-Din, the leader of the pro-Iraqi National Front for the Salvation of Syria, established in Paris in February 1990.

The Syrian leadership paid serious attention to working through the channels of foreign relations (Foreign Ministry, PASV, special services) with Islamic radical organizations in Arab countries, primarily in Algeria and Sudan, as well as in Iran and Turkey. At the same time, the regime's attempts to create a so-called Sunni-dominated Islamic Party led by prominent representatives of the SAR's religious establishment, M. Sheikho and R. Buti, in order to further integrate it into the existing political structure (PFP), failed. Expressing full loyalty to the regime and personally to the president, the Supreme Mufti of the SAR A. Keftar, as well as M. Sheikho and R. Buti spoke out against such an idea, explaining their position by saying that, firstly, the majority of the PFP members are Muslims, and therefore they represent the interests of the majority of the country's population, and, secondly, the creation of such a The presence of representatives of other religions in the country would inevitably lead them to create their own parties and, as a result, lead to an aggravation of inter-confessional relations in the country. The Syrian leadership, despite the large number of confessions and movements in them, generally managed to ensure inter-confessional and inter-communal harmony, including by force. Therefore, the situation in the religious sphere and in the country as a whole could be assessed as stable and controlled. In the relations between the existing regime and the Syrian "brothers", fundamental changes could hardly have taken place immediately, including in the military sphere.-

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the question of the mass and organized return of Islamists and the legalization of their political activities.

The coming to power of the new President Bashar al-Assad made certain adjustments in the relations of the new political leadership of the SAR with "political Islam". Bashar al-Assad canceled the decree issued in 1983 prohibiting female students from wearing the hijab. In 2003, a decree was issued, according to which conscripts were allowed to pray in military camps. This step contradicted all the previous practice of the authorities, who sought to eradicate any manifestations of religion in the army environment [Eyal Zisser, 2005, p. 107]. Hafez al-Assad was never associated with religion in the military. The attitude towards Islam in the army was limited to the presence in the Omeyad mosque on holidays of a number of major Syrian military leaders together with the president [Jaysh ash-Sha'b, N 1854, 1.07.1999]. Immediately after X's death. A number of Muslim Brotherhood leaders who were abroad approached Bashar al-Assad with a proposal to start a dialogue on reconciliation with the authorities and return to Syria [Arab News Network, 28.06.2000]. In November 2000, Bashar al-Assad ordered the release of about 400 members of the organization from Syrian prisons. Despite the fact that after Bashar al-Assad came to power in the country, most of the Syrian "brothers" renounced violence as a means of political struggle, the authorities were afraid that if their political activities were legalized in Syria, they would be able to quickly unite with the left-liberal movement [Ll-Hayat, 4.03.2001]. The prospect of Islamist opposition organizations merging or becoming more closely aligned with liberal democratic forces was very worrying for the authorities. Therefore, despite the fact that many members of the brotherhood have been released over the past year and a half, it is hardly safe to say that the authorities are ready to legalize their political activities. The emergence of an Islamist party outside the framework and control of the government, especially if it is based on a broad social base, was unacceptable for the Syrian political leadership.

The strengthening of "political Islam" in the Syrian Arab Republic, however, raised the question of the inevitability of allowing representatives of the Islamic movement to participate in state affairs. The growth of religious sentiment in Syria is noticeable at every turn. Over the past few years, the number of mosques built with private donations in major Syrian cities has increased significantly. The number of women wearing hijabs is growing. The latter is typical not only for poor areas, but also for the aristocratic quarters of Damascus. Fashion includes women's home meetings where they talk not only about cooking recipes and the latest fashion trends, but also discuss religious issues and study religious disciplines. At the same time, many Muslim preachers during Friday sermons in Syrian mosques began to appeal to the authorities to accelerate the pace of political and democratic changes in the country. Thus, they expect to achieve greater participation in the leadership of the country. The Grand Mufti of the Syrian Arab Republic, Salah Keftaru, the son of the late Syrian Mufti Ahmed Keftaru, delivers a sermon every Friday to a crowd of 10,000 at the Abu Nur Mosque in Damascus. He also runs Syria's largest religious educational organization, which grew from 5,000 to 7,000 students between 2002 and 2005. According to S. Keftaru, the" revival " of Islam in the SAR has little to do with the events of September 11, 2001 in New York, but is the result of the complete failure of the policy of the secular authorities of Arab countries, which forces young people to look for an alternative to the official authorities [Syrian Economic Center, 24.01.2005]. Such a statement, made several years ago, would have inevitably led to the mufti's arrest.

Over the past 40 years, the ruling party, PASV, based on the secular ideas of Arab nationalism, has waged an uncompromising struggle against any manifestation of radical Islam. Recently, some high-ranking party officials have begun to believe that the Baathists need to get closer to the Islamic movement in order to increase their popularity among the broad strata of the Syrian population, especially young people. Indeed, this is a popular site-

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The popularity of "political Islam" in Arab countries was facilitated by the fact that religious sentiments spread most rapidly among young people, who made up between 50 and 60% of the population of Arab countries. Syrian parliamentarian Muhammad Habash believes that the authorities should conduct a dialogue with" moderate " Islamists. According to him, about 80% of the "modern Islamic street" in the Arab East are traditionalists-conservatives who do not recognize any other faith than Islam, and 20% are "reformers" who believe that there is "more than one road"to faith in God. Both of them respect the right to life of adherents of a different faith and differ only on philosophical and theological issues. And only 1% are "radicals" and extremists [Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 25.02.2005]. The divergence of views on this issue in the ranks of Bashar al-Assad's reform team caused some ferment both among the PASV members and in the camp of the left-liberal opposition. The majority of the party members were in favor of preserving the secular nature of the PASV. However, this point of view is not shared by all the party and administrative leadership of the SAR. At the end of 2004, about 100 prisoners were released from Syrian prisons, most of whom were somehow associated with Islamists. At the same time, leaders of religious communities were given more freedom to discuss topical policy issues in mosques.

However, Syria's Islamist community is not unified. There are also hardliners, supporters of an armed struggle with the authorities. Thus, one of the leaders of the Syrian "brothers", Zuheir Salem, who heads the organization's research department, published on his website a call for the Syrian opposition to join forces with the" anti-Syrian movement of Lebanon " and oppose the existing government in the SAR [Akhbar al-Sharq, 23.02.2005]. Some Syrian political circles, including the leadership of the Syrian Arab Republic, were inclined to consider the performance of a small armed group in the Mezze district of Damascus in April 2004 as "one of the results of fundamentalism." Other representatives of" political Islam "call for the creation of a" democratic Islamic state"," democratization of Islam", holding democratic elections, supporting Islam, taking into account the rights and needs of religious minorities. They were ready to cooperate with the authorities and support the democratic transformation of the Syrian leadership. This, in particular, is stated in the "Political Project for the future of Syria" - a kind of reform program proposed by the Syrian "brothers" to the SAR public. This 214-page document, presented in a brief version at a press conference of the Syrian " brothers "in London on December 16, 2004, contained proposals for the construction of an" Islamic democratic state " in Syria [Akhbar al-Sharq, 23.02.2005]. From the late 1960s until the events in Hama in 1982, the Syrian "brothers" repeatedly sent similar signals to the Syrian authorities.

Over the past few years, attempts by the "brothers" to establish contact with official Damascus have intensified. Back in 2002, the leader of the Syrian "brothers" Sadr al-Din al-Bayanuni, together with the allied organizations of the foreign Syrian opposition, signed the so-called Honorary Charter, in which he addressed the Syrian authorities with a proposal for cooperation, supported the ideas of democracy and political pluralism, free elections, etc. Al-Sharq al-Awsat noted that the "brothers" have corrected their previous position of complete rejection of the possibility of a "political solution" to the problem of the Golan Heights, and expressed readiness to cooperate with any political forces in the SAR and abroad in "rebuilding the SAR on a democratic basis" [Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 21.12.2004]. According to leading Syrian experts, the international organization of the Muslim Brotherhood and its Syrian branch decided to start working with the ruling circles in the Arab East since the mid-1980s, despite existing disagreements on the role and function of state power. Such work is carried out by the "brothers" not only in Syria, but also in other Arab countries: Yemen, Jordan, Kuwait, and Iraq. Within the framework of their Syrian organization, there is a group of pragmatists who limit their activities exclusively to practical work, do not

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going deep into the issues of reforming the former worldview of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Syrian authorities do not believe their messages and do not want to deal with them as an organization. At the same time, the Syrian leadership agrees to conduct a dialogue with individual representatives of the organization on their return to Syria with a guarantee of their safety. Thus, the authorities in Syria do not see the need to cooperate with radical Islamic groups such as the Brotherhood.

The Syrian intelligentsia is generally positive about the growing influence of "political Islam" on the government in terms of more vigorous economic reform and more openness in state administration, but the left-liberal circles of the SAR express concern about the strengthening of the political positions of Islamists. Together with representatives of the Syrian secular political class, they are trying to prevent this. Many of them openly accuse the authorities of underestimating the danger of the growth of a mass Islamic movement, which they believe is the main competitor of the liberal secular forces of Syria in the conditions of free elections. Proponents of this view believe that if today the rapprochement between the ruling PASV and Islamists is based on a common dislike for the United States and its military presence in Iraq, then it is very difficult to predict how relations between them will develop when American troops leave Iraq. On the other hand, it cannot be ruled out that during the presidential, parliamentary and municipal elections scheduled for 2007, the situation in Syria may develop according to the "Egyptian" scenario. In this case, the army and special services will inevitably be involved in the process of interaction between the authorities and Islamists, which will affect the nature of relations between military and civil institutions in the SAR.

Relations with the army - as the most important institution of the state - continue to have a great influence on the fate of Islamism in the Arab East. Along with the party and state bureaucracy, the military actively opposes Islamists in most Arab countries. By proclaiming themselves as defenders of revolutionary values, the Arab armies simultaneously demonstrated their commitment to nationalism and secularism. As a rule, the authorities try not to involve regular army units in the fight against Islamic extremists, fearing infiltration of their supporters into the armed forces. The main work on the prevention of religious extremism and the fight against armed actions of Islamists is carried out by state security agencies and special military units. However, with the growing popularity of the ideas of "political Islam" in Arab countries, the gradual legalization of Islamist movements and organizations, and the transformation of their "moderate" part into an integral element of power structures, the penetration of representatives of "political Islam" into the armed forces will increase. The authorities will also have to deal with the growing threat of terrorism. To counter this threat, it will be necessary to create appropriate forces that can effectively ensure not only external defense, but also internal security.

list of literature

Akhmedov V. M. O roli pravyashchikh elit araby gosudarstv v voprosakh ustoychivosti i kachestva regional'nogo politicheskogo poryadka [On the role of ruling elites of Arab States in issues of stability and quality of regional political order].

Akhmedov V. M. Syriya na rubezhe stoletii [Syria at the Turn of the Century]. Vlast i politika, Moscow, 2003.

Akhmedov V. M. Syrie pri Bashare Asad [Syria under Bashar al-Assad] / / Regional experience of modernization in the conditions of external instability, Moscow, 2005.

Vidyasova M. F., Umerov M. Sh. Egypt in the last third of the XX century. Moscow, 2002.

Kudryavtsev A.V. On the new leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood / / Middle East and Modernity, Moscow, 2004.

Landa R. G. Political Islam. Preliminary results, Moscow, 2005.

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The Syrian Economic Center. The Internet.

Eyal Zisser. Bismil-ab. Bashar al-Assad. As-sanawat al-ula fi-l-huqm. Al-Kahira, 2005.

Arab News Network (L.).

Middle East News Letter (MENU).

Mideast Mirror (L.).

Perthes V. The Political Economy of the Syrian Succession // Survival. V. 43. N. 1. Spring 2001.

The Independent (L.).

The Jerusalem Post.

The New York Times.

Washington Post. 24.01.2005.

Periodicals: Al-Hayat (L.). An-Nasr (Egypt). Akhbar al-Sharq (R.). Al-Sharq al-Awsat (L.). Jaish al-Sha'b (Syria).

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