The development of military affairs can be described as a complex, non-linear process, in which there are periods of rapid change, times of relative stagnation and even rollback. The changes that were made to the military tradition inherent in a particular society depended on a combination of many objective and subjective factors. Nevertheless, historical patterns still made themselves felt sooner or later. This is especially true for the Late Middle Ages and early Modern times, when, according to the apt remark of the American historian W. McNeil, "the all-planetary ecumene closed" and "world history received a new dimension" [McNeil, 2004, pp. 741, 747]. The sharply intensified relations between States and peoples of different continents have contributed to a more intensive exchange of knowledge and technology than before. At the same time, the interstate struggle and competition for spheres of influence, resources, control over trade routes, etc. sharply escalated at the same time.

In these circumstances, success largely depended on the level of military development. Even the Prussian military theorist K. Clausewitz remarked, " ... there is a war... a true tool of politics, the continuation of political relations by other means" [Clausewitz, 2002, p. 47]. And since the army was one of the most important tools of the state to implement its political plans, a lag in the development of military affairs could have the most serious consequences for the state and society. The desire to keep up with possible opponents inevitably stimulated progress in military technology, and after that - in tactics and strategy.

The time of the late Middle Ages in military affairs was marked by an extremely important innovation: gunpowder was introduced into military practice and after that firearms were invented: first cannons, and then hand-held ones. At the end of the Middle Ages and at the dawn of Modern times, at the end of the XV - beginning of the XVII century, firearms and gunpowder turned into a powerful force that changed the course of world history and turned traditional ideas about military affairs upside down. This coup was called the "military revolution" by the British historian M. Roberts [Roberts, 1967, p.195-225].

It can be defined as an irreversible, avalanche-like process of change in military affairs caused by the introduction of gunpowder and firearms into everyday military practice in Eurasia. These technological innovations led to a revolution in tactics and strategy, and ultimately the birth of a new military tradition. Its main features: the gradual increase in the role of infantry armed with firearms, with the prospect of turning it into the "queen of the fields" and at the same time reducing the value of the army.

This paper was prepared with the support of the grant of the President of the Russian Federation for state support of young Russian scientists MD-1685.200:.6 and an intra-university grant from BelSU 2006.

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cavalry; rearmament of armies with firearms and their dominance on the battlefield; transition to new types of fortifications; replacement of the former medieval militias with a regular army, completely supported by the state, and, finally, the replacement of the old shock tactics of the late Middle Ages with defensive linear in spirit, which allowed using the constantly increasing power of firearms with the greatest efficiency.

Discussions around the essence of this term have been ongoing since it was first used in 1955. And although many experts believe that there was no revolution in military affairs in connection with the introduction of gunpowder into the military practice of Eurasia [see, for example: Hale, 1985, p. 46; Lynn, 1997, p. 5-9], nevertheless, to reject the very idea of a revolution in military affairs only on the grounds that That the changes in military equipment, tactics, and strategy have been extended over several decades, if not centuries, seems inappropriate. A radical revolution in military affairs at the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of Modern times really took place, and it was truly global in nature (Penskoi, 2005, pp. 194-206). And, in our opinion, N. Davis was wrong when he wrote that "... the revolution in military affairs has become another area where overly arrogant historians boldly spread the results of their local research, which is important only for certain parts of Western Europe, to the entire continent" [Davis, 2005, p. 380]. Not only the countries of Western Europe were drawn into the cycle of the military revolution, but to varying degrees and with varying success almost all the major states of Eurasia.

The Ottoman Empire, which was a "military state" during this period, could not stay away from it [Zelenev, 2003, p. 273]. Contrary to the generally accepted opinion about the backwardness of military equipment, tactics and strategy of Turkey from Western Europe, it should be noted that the Ottomans were quite early and actively involved in the processes of improving military affairs related to the use of gunpowder and firearms. In the service of the Turkish army, guns appeared already in the 60s of the XIV century, i.e. only 30 years later than in Western Europe. In the 15th century, the Ottomans used artillery on the battlefields everywhere, and at the end of the 15th and beginning of the 16th centuries, they acquired hand - held firearms [Konstantin Mikhailovich, 1978, p. 99]. The introduction of gunpowder and firearms accelerated the arrival of changes in the military affairs of the Ottoman Empire. This process took place in Turkey, as well as in Western Europe, as shown by the study of trends in the development of military affairs in these regions, in the same general direction. At the first stage, the old, familiar medieval military tradition was improved by implanting elements of new military practice. At the second stage, there was a transition to a new model of military development, radically different from the previous one. The third stage was to adapt, adapt the characteristics of the new military system to specific local conditions.

Both in Europe and in Turkey, the main patterns of the first stage of the military revolution can be traced quite clearly. Another thing is that the transition to the second stage in the West ended much faster, while in Turkey it was delayed and ultimately remained incomplete. Therefore, the picture of the military revolution in Turkey turned out to be "blurred", and the heavy, one might even say catastrophic failures of the Ottomans in the fight against the Europeans in the XVIII-first quarter of the XIX century overshadowed their previous successes. These same failures contributed to the further lag of Ottoman military affairs from the European one. As a result, the transition of the Ottomans to the second and then to the third stages of the military revolution occurred too late, in fact, in the second quarter of the XIX century, when it was almost impossible to correct the situation.

However, at the turn of the 15th and 16th centuries, this was still a long way off. In Western Europe, in the fire of wars of the second half of the XV - first half of the XVI century. born and improved

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military school, which can be called a Renaissance, or Spanish-Catholic. Its most characteristic feature is the predominance of infantry, armed for the most part with polearm edged weapons and operating on the battlefield in massive combat formations with the support of musketeers, artillery and cavalry - ratars, gendarmes and cuirassiers who replaced them. Focused on a general battle, on ramming large masses of infantry and hand-to-hand combat, the Renaissance military machine was magnificent. However, having a high impact power, it was too heavy, sedentary and tied to the communications through which its supply was carried out. Supply was her weak spot. Therefore, with the greatest efficiency, it could be used only in the limited size and relatively densely populated European theater of operations.

In the south-east of Europe, in the steppe and mountainous areas, it could not successfully resist the Turkish military machine, which emerged around the same time as a result of the improvement of the medieval nomadic military tradition. The Ottoman model of military construction absorbed many elements of the military traditions of both the East and the West, and its universalism contributed to the fact that the Ottoman Empire went from victory to victory for more than a century and a half.

The Ottoman military machine was based on the traditional system, worked out for centuries by the nomads of Asia, based on the interaction of numerous light and relatively insignificant in number, but well-trained and equipped heavy irregular cavalry. The nature of the armament and high mobility of the Ottoman armies also led to their inherent orientation towards waging a "small" war, to deplete the enemy through rapid raids in order to devastate the enemy's territory, capture prisoners, property and livestock. The emphasis was placed on speed, maneuverability, surprise, evasion of the general battle. If it still came to a general battle, then the traditional battle scenario was used, which included, as M. V. Gorelik pointed out, three "spades": an archer, a spear and a blade. "Throwing weapons upset the enemy's ranks ," says the historian, " a shock attack with spears completely broke the enemy's formation and put him to flight, blades destroyed his manpower..."[Gorelik, 1995, p. 381].

However, what had proven itself well in the course of the" small " border war did not fully correspond to the conditions of mountainous Asia Minor, where the traditional advantages of light irregular steppe cavalry could not be fully realized. Light-armed Akinci horsemen, who formed the basis of the Ottoman army in the XIII-early XIV centuries, as the experience of battles with the Byzantines in Asia Minor showed, had insufficient combat capability. They could defeat the enemy, but they could always withdraw to the protection of the fortifications of numerous cities and fortresses, against which the Akinci were powerless. The superior irregular nomadic cavalry needed urgent reinforcement with infantry and modern siege equipment if the Ottoman sultans were to become hegemons in Asia Minor. In addition, the sultans needed a reliable military force that could be used as a counterweight to the tribal militias and squads of vassal beys.

The need to acquire infantry that could successfully operate in the mountains of Asia Minor and during sieges of Byzantine cities and fortresses led to the fact that the light irregular cavalry of Akinci, which was based on squads of vassal Ujbeys and Gazi volunteers, was supplemented by detachments of foot militia-Azaps, recruited from among free community members. It can be assumed that at first a significant part of them consisted of Greek Democrats who converted to Islam, experienced border guards [Oreshkova, 2001, pp. 480-481, 483]. However, this was not enough, and therefore, according to the Turkish chronicles, in 1329, the elder brother of

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the second Ottoman ruler Orhan, Alaeddin, who held the post of vezir, formed a settlement army (yaya ve musellem). This army consisted of infantry (yaya) and cavalry (musellem) detachments organized according to the decimal principle. Free Turks-community members who were exempt from paying taxes in peacetime and worked on their land plots, and in wartime who went on a campaign at the behest of the ruler and received, in addition to war booty, a salary from the treasury in the amount of one akche per day-were recruited into the yaya ve myusellem detachments [Petrosyan, 1984, pp. 191-192]. These semi-professional soldiers were close associates of the bey, a kind of his guard, and service in the ranks of these troops was considered very honorable and profitable [Oreshkova, 2001, p. 482; Konstantin Mikhailovich, 1978, p. 46].

However, neither Akinci, nor Azaps, nor military settlers became the "calling card" of the Ottoman army. The main distinguishing elements of the Ottoman military machine, created and developed during the conquests of the first Turkish sultans in Asia Minor and the Balkans, were the Timariot mounted militia and the Kapikulu slave warrior corps, which was based on the famous janissaries.

The beginning of the military-fief timar system was laid by the founder of the Ottoman state Bey Osman (1258-1324), who began distributing cities and lands to his associates on the rights of conditional holding. The main condition for using such a gift for a sipahi rider is to go on a campaign at the first call of the bey (then the Sultan) "equestrian, crowded and armed". Over time, the rules of Timariot service were adjusted, and by the middle of the 16th century, Lutfi Pasha, Grand wazir of Sultan Suleiman I Qanuni, wrote in his treatise Asaf-nameh,"...having a timar [with an income of] six thousand akche, puts up two jebel (warrior-rider. - P. V.), [with an income of] ten thousand akche-three jebel. Ze'amet [with an income of] twenty thousand akche puts up four jebel..."[Lutfi-pasha..., 1974, p. 96]. Another Turkish writer, Kochibey Gyumyurdzhinsky, spoke about this a hundred years later:"...Each loan should be deducted for every 5000 akcha [income] of one equipped man - at-arms (jebel), and the owner of timar-for every 3000 akcha [income] of one equipped jebel. According to the ancient law, a timar with an income of up to 20,000 akcha gives three jebel " [Second Treatise..., 1953, p. 239]. The Timariot militia, which was relatively cheap for the Sultan's treasury and at the same time distinguished at first by its high combat capability, quickly pushed Akinci to support roles.

The second and perhaps most famous pillar of the Ottoman military machine, its symbol was the famous janissaries. Their creator is considered to be the grandson of Osman, Murad I (1362-1389), who, with the help of Kadi Bilecik Kara Khalil, formed the first thousand "new troops" - janissaries. The Janissaries were a very serious force, especially since later their detachments were supplemented by units of mounted soldiers-sipakhi (alty belyuk khalki), artillerymen (topchu ojagi), gunsmiths-dzhebedzhi and service personnel, forming the kapikulu corps - the Sultan's guard, a permanent army that was completely supported by the Sultan. Unlike the Yaya, the Janissaries were considered the property of the Sultan, since they were slaves by their social status. Hence the name of the guard corps, which the janissaries joined as part of kapikulu, "slaves of the court".

From the very beginning, the Kapikulu were completely supported by the Sultan's treasury and for a long time led a lifestyle similar to that of a monk. The main goal of their life is war against the infidels, and the main occupation (at first) is military exercises [Shamsutdinov, 1986, pp. 34-38]. Well-trained professional fighters, distinguished by excellent discipline, loyalty to the Sultan and religious fanaticism, the soldiers of the Kapikulu corps quickly turned into the main striking force of the Ottoman army and the sultan's loyal support. Noteworthy is the fact that the sultans have acquired the following families:-

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a stationary army with obvious signs of a regular one centuries earlier than it was made in Europe.

Thus, by the middle of the XV century, the Ottoman military machine acquired a generally complete appearance, in which it existed for almost two hundred years. It included, in addition to the Kapykulu corps and the Timariot militia, a semi-professional foot and mounted settlement army (Yaya myusellem), detachments of mounted volunteers(Akynji), Ujbey squads, an Azap foot militia, Yuryuk nomad detachments, and military contingents fielded by Christian vassals of the sultan (Voynuk, martoloz). Such an army generally corresponded to the needs and capabilities of the developing multi-layered Ottoman state and society, where the growing central power, which was becoming more and more despotic, coexisted with elements of local self-government [Zelenev, 2003, p.268].

The completion of the formation of the military machine coincided with the entry of Turkey on the path of"military revolution". At its first stage, the most striking signs of change were the rapid increase in the number of armies and the entry into service of troops in ever-increasing numbers of firearms. Both of these features are clearly traced in the development of Ottoman military affairs in the XIV-XVII centuries. If under Orkhan and Murad I the sultan could put no more than 50 thousand soldiers in the field, then a hundred years later up to 140 thousand soldiers marched on the campaign [Konstantin Mikhailovich, 1978, p. 99; Petrosyan, 1984, p. 194; Radushev, 1990, p. 108; Shamsutdinov, 1986, p. 34-35, 38]. By the middle of the XVI century, the number of Ottoman troops exceeded 150 thousand people. According to the testimony of Ottoman writers, only under the command of the Rumelian Beiler bey, according to the registers, there were 12 thousand sipahs and 18 thousand exposed by them to the Jebel, not counting supernumerary ones, "...in short, in order to repel the German king, by the will of the Almighty, only the Rumelian army was enough... " [Kochibei Gomyurdzhinsky, 1873, p. 92].

The strength of the Kapikulu corps and its base, the Janissary infantry, grew especially rapidly. If in 1514 there were 10156 janissaries on the salary, then in 1567 - 12798, and in 1609 - already 37627. To this must also be added the rapid growth in the number of personnel of the artillery corps (which included topcha gunners, furleyts-top arabadzhi and gunsmiths-dzhebedzhi), which increased from 1,171 people in 1514 to 2,671 people by 1567, and in 1609 amounted to 7,966 people. The increase in the number of Kapikulu continued throughout the 17th century, although by this time the progressive decline in the combat effectiveness of both the corps as a whole and the Janissaries in particular had become obvious. By 1680, the number of Janissary infantry was 54,222 [Agoston, 2005, p. 26, 30]. However, the need for such troops remained so high that only the unsuccessful war with the Holy League in 1683-1699 and, as a result of the defeat in the war, the huge budget deficit and the inability to continue to maintain such a large permanent army forced the Sultan's court to sharply reduce the composition of kapikulu.

Thus, the above facts demonstrate a general trend towards an increase in the size of the Ottoman army. Another characteristic feature is the ever-increasing supply of firearms to the Ottoman army. The process of mastering the technology of producing artillery pieces, gunpowder and developing skills in handling new equipment took the Ottomans about 30 years, and already at the end of the XIV century, in 1394, they used artillery in siege warfare. In 1422, the Ottoman artillery made a full statement during the siege of Constantinople undertaken by Murad II, and in 1444, the Ottomans first used cannons to shoot not only at cities, but also at moving targets - at ships that tried to prevent the transfer of Sultan's troops across the Dardanelles.

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The Ottoman military leaders appreciated the prospects that were revealed to them with the advent of artillery. Having mastered the art of using artillery in both field battles and sieges, the Turks paid extremely great attention to the development of both field and siege artillery for their time. In particular, two large workshops were built in Istanbul specifically for the centralized supply of large quantities of more or less uniform hand firearms, artillery and ammunition, in Tophan and Jebhan, which worked for the Sultan's arsenals. Nothing like this existed in Europe at that time. Similarly, much earlier than the Europeans, the Turks acquired a corps of professional gunners, called topchu above, as well as detachments of professional furleits - top Arabaji. Mobile field artillery was successfully used by the Turks 20 years before the French King Charles VIII set out on his famous Italian campaign in 1494.

The Hungarian historian G. Agoston, who studied the processes of introducing artillery into Turkish military practice, noted that the Ottoman siege art was superior to the Habsburg fortification art until the very end of the XVI century (Agoston, 2005, p.35). The fact that the Turks were "skilled city-hunters" is shown by the fact that during the campaigns undertaken by the Ottomans in 1521 - 1566, only four Hungarian fortresses managed to withstand the Turkish siege, but only one of them, Keseg, was besieged by the main Sultan's army in 1532. The technical level of the Ottoman artillery throughout most of the sixteenth century was extremely high, not to mention the fact that the Turkish gunners, who were a highly professional corps of personnel who were supported by the Sultan, were completely superior to their European counterparts. It is enough to point out only that the Turks, earlier than the Europeans, switched to the use of mainly bronze tools.

It is noteworthy how quickly the Turks mastered manual firearms. Ottoman chronicles reported that hand-held tyufengs appeared in service with the Turkish infantry as early as 1421, and even if we assume that this is an exaggeration, nevertheless, it must be recognized that since the middle of the XV century. Turks increasingly used hand firearms-first in the defense of fortresses , and then in the field battles.

Special attention was paid to the rearmament of the Janissaries with hand-held firearms. It is worth paying attention to the fact that the Janissaries were initially mainly armed with throwing weapons - bows and crossbows. The Turks never used heavy infantry on a large scale, equipped mainly with polearms (like the Swiss or Landsknechts), which was a characteristic feature of the Renaissance military school. Although the bow was used by the Janissaries during the campaign of 1663-1664. against the Habsburg troops, however, as their main weapon, it was replaced by the Turkish equivalent of the European match musket in the first half of the XVI century. In any case, during the campaign of 1532 out of 10 thousand. 9,000 janissaries were armed with tufengs, and only a thousand were armed with polearms [Agoston, 2005, p. 24]. A very remarkable ratio - in Europe at that time it was almost the opposite.

Before the start of the next military campaign, the Ottoman authorities called for mounted and foot volunteers armed with firearms - tyufengchi. Later they were called Sekbans, saryja, Levendi, and their numbers continuously grew throughout the XVI century. This was also facilitated by the decline in prices for hand-held firearms: a matchlock musket of Turkish manufacture cost from 300 to 600 akce at the end of the XVI century-twice or three times less than a good horse [Inalcik, 1978, p. 198]. Detachments of mercenaries-sekbans (sekban buluklieri), armed with firearms, by the end of the XVI century., as noted by a modern Turkish historian X. Inal-

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jik, not just steel."..one of the most effective branches of the Ottoman army", but they were able to significantly displace traditional military formations, even the Timariot militia [Inalcik, 1973, p. 48].

The new weapons also required the Ottomans to improve their traditional tactics. While maintaining its foundation, the pragmatic Turkish military leaders closely followed what was being done in their neighbors, and quickly adopted those tactical innovations that seemed useful and important to them. This happened, for example, with the use of Wagenburg to protect the infantry, without which the janissaries and Tufengchi could not stand on the battlefield. Having first encountered the use of wagenburg during the campaign against Janos Hunyadi in 1443-1444, the Ottomans quickly adopted this innovation and successfully used it against both Europeans and their eastern opponents - for example, against the Safavids. In the classic Ottoman order of battle, the infantry, armed with cold weapons and firearms, stood in the center, hiding behind wooden-earth fortifications - ramparts, ditches, palisades, large wooden shields-chapars, or fenced off with Wagenburg borrowed from the Hungarians. Artillery was also installed here. The Thymariot cavalry formed up on the flanks. The infantry, supported by artillery fire, played the role of a kind of fortress, a pillar of the order of battle. Under its cover, the cavalry, if it failed to overturn the enemy from the first raid, could put itself in order and repeat the attacks again and again, until it achieved success [Konstantin Mikhailovich, 1978, pp. 86-87, 101-102; Kamenev, 1984, p. 140; Agoston, 2005, p. 19; Huseyn Hezarfenn, 1990, p. 271; Second Treatise..., 1953, p. 228-229].

Thus, by the middle of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman military school had acquired a more or less complete outline. Its characteristic features were speed and mobility, extensive use of detour maneuvers and military tricks, good organization of supply and communications, strict discipline, high level of training of soldiers, close interaction on the battlefield of infantry equipped with firearms, artillery, light and heavy cavalry. The technical superiority of the Sultan's armies over their enemies, supplemented by the presence of a permanent kapikulu corps, religious fanaticism, the strictest discipline and professionalism of the soldiers, contributed to the rapid expansion of the borders of the state of the descendants of Ertogrul and Osman Bey. The fall of Constantinople in 1453, the defeat in 1473 of the army of Usun Hasan, Sultan of the Eastern Anatolian state of Ak-Koyunlu, victories over the classical eastern cavalry armies of the Persian Shah Ismail in 1514 and the Egyptian Mamluks in 1516; the capture of Rhodes, defended by the Ionnite knights, in 1522. the destruction of the Hungarian army in 1526 at Mohac - all this clearly testified to the superiority of the Ottoman military school over its opponents both in Europe and in Asia.

However, the crisis was inevitable, if only because the advantages of the Ottoman military machine were the reverse side of its shortcomings. Although brought to a high degree of perfection, it still remained typical medieval, quite traditional. Although by the beginning of the 17th century the number of Ottoman infantry and artillery had grown immeasurably since the Sultans of the 14th and first half of the 15th centuries, the basis of the Ottoman military machine had not changed. As noted by Yu. A. Kamenev, " ... the military-fief system that developed in the XV-XVI centuries reinforces the predominance of cavalry militia, which is common for feudal troops of previous eras, armed with cold weapons-sabers, pikes, bows, etc. During the XVI-XVII centuries. the number of Sipakhi cavalry was 150 - 200 thousand people, while infantry units (mainly janissaries) in the XVI century. they numbered no more than 30 thousand, and in the XVII century about 50 thousand people" [Kamenev, 1984, p. 140].

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These figures may have changed, but the essence remained the same: we are looking at a typical Asian, nomadic army, which was dominated by traditional irregular light cavalry with an equally traditional set of defensive and offensive cold and throwing weapons and appropriate tactics [Pink, 2003, pp. 9-12.]. As long as the Ottomans had to deal with the problem of the Ottoman Empire, they were able to with European armies fighting according to the rules of the Renaissance system, the shortcomings of the Turkish military machine were not too noticeable. The European armies of that era were too sedentary and dependent on regular supplies to successfully resist the Ottoman army, which had more flexible and versatile tactics, significant numerical superiority, and better individual training of soldiers [Chase, 2003, p.17-18, 62]. In addition, the Turks up to the end of the XVII century. they maintained an advantage over the troops of their most dangerous opponents, the Habsburgs, Venetians and Poles, in organizing the correct supply of their troops and in artillery power [Agoston, 2005, p. 9].

However, in Europe, military affairs did not stand still, and already in the middle of the XVI century.the first signs of a crisis of the Ottoman military machine were outlined. Heavy battles with varying success in North Africa with the Spanish, the unsuccessful siege of Malta in 1565, the defeat at Lepanto in 1571 - all these were just the first bells signaling the beginning of the decline of Ottoman military power. The rapid development of firearms and the growing saturation of European armies with various types of them made the fight against them more and more difficult for the Turks. This was especially evident during the Porte's war with the Holy Roman Empire in 1592-1606. The Habsburg generals learned well the lessons taught to them by the Ottomans in the previous decades during the Hungarian campaigns. By avoiding field battles, the Imperials sought to reduce fighting to serf warfare. Besieging numerous enemy strongholds, fortified according to the new system, trace italienne (as noted by the French historian F. de la Reine). Its spread in southern Europe was largely due to the Turkish threat (Brodel, 2003, p. 710), and the Turks lost precious time. This was exactly what the Imperials needed, as they were well aware of the vulnerability of the Ottoman strategy - its seasonality. With the onset of autumn, the combat capability of the Ottoman army, as noted by X. Inalcik began to fall rapidly due to supply problems and worsening weather conditions [Inalcik, 1973, p. 114].

European generals also learned that the strength of the Ottomans was their numerical superiority and better individual training of fighters. Therefore, they focused on fighting at a distance. As the imperial General R. Montecucoli wrote, in a battle with the Turks, it is necessary " ... from the very beginning, approaching the enemy, it is necessary to meet evo with cannon fire. Then, as they drew nearer, they poured bullets from their muskets and pistols; then they struck him with their spears, and at the end of the task, with broadswords or bayonets, they grappled with him..."[Notes..., 1760, p. 10]. Avoiding close combat, the Imperials relied on fire combat, and at the turn of the XVI-XVII centuries. they were able to surpass the Ottomans in this. It is no accident that the Ottoman commander Mehmed Pasha wrote to Sultan Mehmed III in 1602, analyzing the reasons for the failure of the Sultan's troops in the fight against the imperials: "In the field or during a siege, we are in a difficult situation, since most of the enemy forces are infantry armed with muskets, while the majority of our army is horsemen, and we lack experienced musket shooters... " [cit. by: Inalcik, 1978, p. 199].

In addition, unable to surpass the Turkish warriors in individual skill, their European opponents tried to use their advantage in discipline. The individual professional fighter, masterfully wielding cold and firearms, was opposed to the coordinated actions of dozens and hundreds of soldiers and officers who fought as a single unit. This is exactly what R. Montecucoli wrote about when he emphasized that " ... the barbarian peoples use all their strength and will.

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hope is placed in the great number and ferocity of people; and the Christian regular army trusts in the courage and good order of its troops "[Notes..., 1760, p. 212].

It is obvious that at the turn of the XVI-XVII centuries, the structure, organization, tactics and strategy of the Ottoman army ceased to fully meet the requirements of the time. There was an urgent need to move to a higher stage of its development, from "nature" to "art", from an irregular, cavalry-based army to a permanent, regular one, in which infantry armed with firearms would predominate. And it's not that the Turks didn't feel it. It is safe to say that signs of the beginning of the transition to the second stage of the military revolution have already begun to appear. The most important of them was the above-mentioned increase in the role of secban detachments. Recruited mainly from the landless peasants of Anatolia, Bosnia, and Albania, and led by experienced Buluk Bashi captains, the Sekbans quickly moved to the forefront of the Ottoman army, significantly pushing not only the Azap, Yaya,and Musellems, but even the Timariot militia. By the same time, the Ottomans had accumulated some experience in the massive use of infantry armed with firearms on the battlefield: for example, in 1526, in the battle of Mohac with the Hungarians, the janissaries built in nine ranks continuously upset the ranks of the attacking Hungarian cavalry and thereby facilitated its defeat by the Sepoys. It seemed that the Turks had only to make the last step - to give the secban detachments a regular character and, most importantly, to work out linear tactics.

However, the fundamental transformation of the Ottoman military machine, despite a rather favorable moment in the first decades of the XVII century, after the suppression of the so-called Jalali troubles, was not implemented. The answer must be sought, obviously, in the very essence of the Ottoman state, which was not able to continue to adapt as flexibly to the changed conditions as in the first stages of its existence. The revolution in military affairs in Western Europe was closely connected with the transition from craft to manufacture. It is no accident that a new linear tactic, characteristic of the second stage of the military revolution, was born in Holland, the most technically and economically developed country in Western Europe.

The Ottoman Empire and Ottoman society were not ready for this transition. As S. F. Oreshkova noted, " ... the imperial state structure of the Eastern type and Islam, which were the main social forming factors, contributed at first to the progress of the Turkic-Muslim society. Subsequently, they led to a slowdown in the pace of social development, preventing the improvement of what was acquired by this society during the period of conquest and the formation of the state... The preservation of early class features in the Ottoman state structure, which was expressed in the long-term use of the Kapikulu institute and the growing separation of public administration from society and social development, and Islamic control over the sultan's actions... they gave rise to stagnation and a sense of crisis, which the Ottoman society begins to realize already from the end of the XVI century " (Oreshkova, 2001, pp. 493-494).

A negative role in slowing down the pace of development of the armed forces was played by the military stratum - "people of the sword","askeri". As E. I. Zelenev noted, the traditional eastern armies formed during the formation of the empire "...are traditionally organized... For a relatively long time, they met the needs of an authoritarian state and corresponded to the capabilities of a multi-structured Eastern society with strong elements of local self-government. In addition, the army's dependence on politics and economics, science and culture, ideology and the moral and psychological state of the population has always been balanced by its very strong influence on all spheres of public life, protecting the forms of political and social organization of society that are convenient for it (emphasis added). - P. V.)... In the Ottoman Empire as a whole... army on

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throughout the entire period of the XVI - early XIX centuries, it played a key role in political life, often acting as a subject in relation to the state and the entire civil society" [Zelenev, 2003, p.268, 378].

Apparently, one of the reasons for the rejection of major changes was the fact that the traditional Ottoman military machine in the first decades of the XVII century had not yet fully exhausted its potential. Of course, it is already outdated, but with skillful use it could still maintain sufficient efficiency for a long time. It is no coincidence that the Kepryulu clan's reforms, called "traditional" ones (Vitol, 1987, p.41), were aimed at restoring the traditional military institutions that proved their effectiveness during the times of Selim I and Suleiman Qanuni.

In addition, the severe socio-political and economic crisis that shook the Ottoman state and society at the turn of the XVI-XVII centuries was not associated with the threat of loss of national independence and territorial integrity of the empire (as it was, for example, in Russia at the beginning of the XVII century). the change was not fully realized by the Ottoman ruling elite.

The military structures that emerged during the rise of imperial power have been a drag on major changes since the end of the sixteenth century. It took a series of serious military setbacks in the second half of the 17th and 18th centuries for Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) to embark on major military reforms and create an army trained and armed on the latest European models. However, the moment for the completion of the "military revolution" and the transition to new principles of organizing the military machine was missed. In the first half of the 19th century, Turkey finally turned into the" sick man " of Europe, whose inheritance was seriously divided by the great powers.

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