The 1950s were a turning point in the history of the Ottoman Empire: the influence of England and France on the Sultan's government began to take on more distinct forms. The most important milestones of this period were Turkey's entry into a military alliance with European powers against Russia and the first bonded debt obligations.

The historiography of the Eastern (Crimean) War is extensive. However, in domestic and foreign studies, the origin and nature of the war are considered mainly from the point of view of the economic and political interests of the European powers and Russia .1 Much less studied is the position of the Ottoman Empire2, especially its entry into the war and receipt of the first military loans. As for modern Turkish historiography, it pays great attention to the foreign policy of the Port in the XIX century. As a result of the activities of the Turkish Historical Society (Turk tarih kurumu)3, which unites historians of the Istanbul and Ankara schools, significant changes have taken place in Turkish historiography since the 1940s, with a certain tendency to objectively cover the foreign and domestic policy of the Ottoman Empire and the influence of Western powers on it. However, the history of the Crimean War as a whole was not the subject of special research, but was considered in general works along with other problems. 4 This is the main reason why,

1 E. V. Tarle. The Crimean War. Tt. I-II. M.-L. 1950; I. V. Bestuzhev. The Crimean War of 1853-1856, Moscow, 1956; N. S. Kinyapina. Foreign policy of Russia in the first half of the XIX century. Moscow, 1963; L. S. Semenov. Russia and England. Economic relations in the middle of the XIX century. L. 1975; V. D. Gooch. A Century of Historiography of the Origines of the Crimean War. "American Historical Review", 1956, vol. 62; A. J. Barker. The War against Russia 1854 - 1856. Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1971; E. Holt. The Crimean War. L. 1974; D. Yudd. The Crimean War. L. Hart-Davis. Maccibon. 1975; G. B. Henderson. Crimean War Diplomacy and other Historical Essays. N. Y. 1975.

2 See Haji Murad Ibrahimbeyli. The Caucasus in the Crimean War of 1853-1856 and International Relations, Moscow, 1971, pp. 55-59, 85-91; A.D. Novichev. History of Turkey, Vol. III. Novoe vremya. Ch. 2 (1839-1853). L. 1973; A.D. Dulina. The Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1838 and its impact on the economic development of the Ottoman Empire. "Peoples of Asia and Africa", 1976, N 3.

3 Established in 1931 on the initiative of the founder of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Until 1935, it was called the Society for the Study of Turkish History. The main task of the society is to research and publish works on the history of the Ottoman Empire. It pays great attention to the history of the Tanzimat (reform era), Russian-Turkish relations and wars, including the Crimean war. Equally important in the work of the society is the study of the history of Turkey in the republican period.

4 Y. Akura. Osmanli devletinin Dagilma devri. (XVIII ve XIX asirlarda). Istanbul. 1940; S. Ulkutasir. Sivastopol harbi. Istanbul. 1947; J. Okcu. Turk-Rus mucadelesi taihi. Ankara. 1949; A. N. Kurat. Tiirkingiliz munasebetlerine kisa bir bakis, (1553 - 1952). Ankara. 1952; S. Ziya. Tansimat devrinden sonra Osmanli nizam ordusunun tarihi. Istanbul. 1957; I. H. Uzunarsili. Osmanli tarihi. C. IV, 1 kisim. Ankara, 1956; with IV, 2 kisim. Ankara. 1959; E. Z. Karal. Osmanli tarihi. Since V (1789-1856). Ankara. 1961; A. C. Eren. Turkiyede кос, ve koc.men meseleleri. Istanbul. 1966, s. 12 - 41, 115- 117 e. a.

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that in the modern Turkish historiography of the Crimean War, it is not possible to distinguish clearly defined trends or trends.

Along with the tendentious interpretation of the history of the Crimean War, inherited from the court historiographers-chroniclers of the second half of the XIX century, Turkish literature since the 40s has traced critical assessments that expose the inflammatory, expansionist policies of France, Austria ,Prussia and especially England in the East, including in Turkey. 5 However, in the works published during the Second World War and in the first post-war years, there is an activation of pan-Turkist aspirations .6 In the 60s, some progressive trends began to appear in Turkish historiography. A new generation of historians7 has come forward to reflect on the guilt of the Western powers in the stagnation of the country's economic development, critically assess the interference of these countries in Russian-Turkish relations, and analyze more deeply the era of Tanzimat and its significance in the internal life of Turkey. However, some of the Turkish (so-called young) historians still do not reject a one-sided approach to the events of the Crimean War .8 The manifestation of some elements of democratization in the interpretation of historical facts can also be traced in the new works of the older generation of Turkish bourgeois historians, although the tendentious coverage of the problems of the Crimean War occupies a predominant place in them, as before. In general, the Turkish historiography of the 1940s and 70s underwent significant changes: from apologizing for the foreign policy of England, France, and the Ottoman Empire, to falsifying many aspects of this multifaceted problem, Turkish historians moved to a critical understanding of the foreign policy of these states.

This article attempts to show how modern Turkish historiography treats the origin and nature of the Eastern (Crimean) War of 1853-1856, the relations of the Porte with Russia and Western powers, the relationship between Turkey's entry into the war and its receipt of loans from England and France in 1854-1855.

Most of the contemporary Turkish works are characterized by a tendency that goes back to the Sultan's court historiography to look for the origins of the war only in the aggressiveness of tsarism towards the Ottoman Empire, which was allegedly defended by the European powers. This applies both to general works on the history of the Ottoman Empire and to special studies on the history of Russia, Russian-Turkish relations, and the war of 1853-1856 itself .9 Such an interpretation of the problem leads, in essence, to the rejection of the analysis of the international contradictions of the era of industrial capitalism,

5 F. H. Armaoglu. Siyasi tarih dersleri. 1789 - 1919. Ankara. 1961; E. A. Cavli. Kirim harbi. Paris muanedesi. Istanbul. 1967; K. Bulutoglu. 100 sorumda Turkiyede yabanci sermaye. Istanbul 1970; J. Cera. Turkiyede geri kalmisligin tarihi. Istanbul. 1971 e. a.

6 C. Baysun. Mustafa Resit pasa. Tanzimat. Istanbul. 1940; E. B. $apolyo. Mustafa Resit pasa ve Tanzimat devri tarihi. Istanbul. 1946; O. L. Barkan. Turk toprak hukuku tarihinde Tanzimat ve 1274 (1958) tarihi arazi kanunnamesi. Tanzimat. Istanbul. 1940; R. S. Burcak. Turk-Rus-Ingiliz munasebetleri 1791 - 1941. Istanbul. 1946 e. a.

7 J. Cem. Op. cit.; O. Koymen. The Imperialism of Free Trade: the Ottoman Empire. The Report to V International Congress of Economic History. Moscow. 1970; K. Bulutoglu. Op. cit. e. a.

8 H. F. Giirsel. Tarih boyunca turk-rus iliskileri. Istanbul. 1968; S. Ayverdi. Tiirk-Rus munasebetleri ve muharebeleri. Istanbul. 1970.

9 For example: S. Ulkutasir. Op. cit.; T. Unal. Turk siyasi tarihi. 1700 den 1958-e kadar. Ankara. 1958; C. Uсоk. Soyasal tarih 1789 - 1950. Ankara, 1961; T. Oztuna. Baslangicindan zamanimiza kadar Turkive tarihi. 12. Istanbul. 1967; H. F. Giirsel. Op. cit.; E. Z. Karal. Op. cit. With V.

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which determined the pan-European character of the war of 1853-1856. It does not take into account the growth in the 1930s and 1940s of the economic and political influence of the Western powers on the Ottoman Empire, which stimulated the clash between Russia and Turkey. The author distorts the nature of Russian-Turkish relations, which developed in the pre-war years far from as unambiguously as it is presented in the works of Turkish historians. Some of them tend to see relations between Russia and Turkey as almost the only reason for the Eastern War.

The most complete development of this thesis is found in the works of A. N. Kurat on the history of Russia and Russian-Turkish relations .10 In his last lifetime work (as, indeed, in previous ones), he focuses on wars and tensions between Russia and Turkey. Kurat describes the periods of peaceful and friendly development of Russian-Turkish relations fluently, as if they are dissolved in the vicissitudes of the Middle East policy of the great powers. This eliminates the completely independent nature of relations between Constantinople and St. Petersburg, which Russian diplomacy has always sought and Turkish diplomacy has repeatedly turned to, without the mediation of Western Powers. Breaking away from the concrete historical situation, Kurat believed that the invariable principle of the tsarist policy of the XIX-early XX centuries in relation to Turkey was either the occupation of Constantinople or the establishment of control over it .11 The allied treaties of 1799-1805 and especially of 1833 were interpreted in this connection as a modified form of Russia's desire for dominance in the Straits, in view of which the Porte was forced to move closer to the Western powers and strengthen its army in every possible way. Putting forward these provisions as the main ones in describing the foreign policy trends of the Ottoman Empire on the eve of the Eastern War of 1853-1856, Kurat leaves aside the beginning of the Tanzimat (reform era), the growth of trade and political influence of the powers, 12 and the struggle in Turkish government circles regarding domestic and foreign policy. 13
Kurat attributes the growing conflict in relations between Turkey and Russia to the period after the Treaty of London in 1841. Established, as he believes, on the initiative of England in 1841, the international regime of the Straits put an end to the predominant influence of Russia, which was carried out during the years of the Unkyar-Iskelessi Treaty of 1833. Insufficient military power, as Kurat writes, did not allow Nicholas I to start dividing Turkey in 1841. After 1848, when the internal and foreign policy positions of tsarism were strengthened, the tsar was able, according to Kurat, to concentrate his efforts on the war with Turkey. Among the ultimate goals of Russia, the Turkish historian calls the capture of the Straits, Malta, and access to the Mediterranean Sea14 . The lack of any reliable data on this subject does not stop the author, as, indeed, in another case, when he claims that in 1844, Nicholas I allegedly offered London a partition

10 A. N. Kurat. Rusya tarihi. Baslangicindan 1917 ye kadar. Ankara. 1948; ej и sd. Tiirkiye ve Rusya. XVIII jiizyil sonundan kurtulus savasina kadar turk-rus iliskileri. Ankara. 1970.

11 A. N. Kurat. Tiirkiye ve Rusya, s. IV-IX.

12 See L. S. Semenov and V. I. Sheremet. Foreign economic relations of Turkey during the Crimean War. Vestnik LSU, series "History, Language, Literature", 1973, N 14; V. I. Sheremet. Some questions of English politics in the Middle East in the second quarter of the XIX century. "Topical issues of the history of the United States and England in the new and modern times", L. 1975.

13 A. D. Novichev. The struggle between reformers and conservatives during the Tanzimat period (1839-1853). "Turkological collection 1974", Moscow, 1975,

14 A. N. Kurat. Tiirkiye ve Rusya, s. 68, 69.

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Turkey (a statement known from the works of G. Temperley, F. Bailey15 and other representatives of Western historiography of the 30s-40s).

In fact, tsarist diplomacy during these years sought "joint dominance in the East with England."..preserving the Sultan's sovereignty over the territories currently occupied " 16 . Nicholas I did not understand that the British bourgeoisie was as interested as the French in the "Turkish inheritance". Nor did he realize that the conquest of Constantinople and the Straits was no less an object of England and France than of the tsarist government. Concern for the "integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire" served as a cover for England, France and Austria for their aggressive plans. However, the possibility of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire as a result of an internal crisis was not excluded: national uprisings, a palace coup, etc. Britain's position in the Middle East and its relations with Russia, France, and Austria were particularly important. Without touching upon the essence of the contradictions between the Western powers and Russia, or the differences among the European powers that were so acute on the eve and during the war, Kurat singles out only the policy of England, which, in his opinion, is subordinated to the tasks of countering the plans of tsarism in relation to Turkey .17
Another prominent member of the older generation of Turkish historians, E. 3. Karal, who specializes mainly in the history of nineteenth-century Turkey, also believes that in the early 1950s, " the main plans of the tsar were connected with the fate of the Ottoman Empire."18 However, Karal was the first in the post-war Turkish historiography to attempt to consider the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire, taking into account the totality of factors of internal development and international relations. He showed, for example, that Anglo-French diplomacy (at least twice - in 1806 and in 1828), with its advice and recommendations, contributed to the involvement of Turkey in the war with Russia, and that Porte's trade agreements with Western powers were the main reason for the ruin of Ottoman handicraft and manufacturing production. 19 When assessing the situation that developed in the Middle East in the late 40s-early 50s of the XIX century, Karal proceeds from other premises. He believes that the beginning of the Tanzimat, the sympathetic attitude towards it in England and France, and the hostile attitude in Russia and Austria gave rise to Ottoman diplomacy to seek to strengthen relations with the first two powers against the "destructive intentions" of the latter two, especially tsarist Russia. 20
The period between the Peace of Adrianople in 1829 and the outbreak of war in 1853 is characterized, according to Karal, by attempts of tsarism to subordinate the Ottoman Empire to its exclusive influence by one method or another. The insistence on freeing itself from Russian aid, which the Porte was forced to accept in 1833, and the expansion of the Port

15 G. Temperley. England and the Near East. Vol. I. Crimpa. L. 1936; F. E. Bai1ey. British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement. A Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1826 - 1853. Cambridge. 1942.

16 AVPR, F. Reports of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ll. 14-14 ob, 22-23; ibid. f. Chancellery, 51, ll. 69-71. Memorial note for transmission to K. V. Nesselrode dated July 22, 1844 with notes by Nicholas I.

17 A. N. Kurat. Turkiye ve Rusya, s. 63 - 68. Along with an apology for the protective policy of England towards the Ottoman Empire in the 30s-50s of the XIX century (see R. S. Burcak. Op. cit.) in Turkish historiography, there are also works whose authors realistically explain this policy by the interests of the British crown in the East.

18 E. Z. Karal. Op. cit. p. V, s. 219.

19 ae. Z. Karal. Op. cit. p. V, s. 98-99, 118-120; p. VII. Ankara. 1956, s. 254.

20 E. Z. Karal. Op. cit. With V, s. 218.

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the strengthening of ties with Western countries, a series of internal transformations-all this contradicted, according to Karal, the ideas of Nicholas I, "symbolizing Russia, about the doom of a sick person on the Bosphorus," and forced the tsar in the late 40s of the XIX century to seek either the partition of Turkey or the establishment of his patronage over it .21 On this issue, the positions of Kurat and Karal coincide.

An important reason for the growing tension in Russian-Turkish relations in the late 1940s. Karal sees that Turkey and Russia took opposite positions towards the Polish and Hungarian revolutionaries (more precisely, the emigrants of 1848). The protection of these emigrants by the Port and the granting of asylum to them should indicate, in Karal's opinion, that the Sultan's government understood the "problems of European democracy"22 . This strengthened, according to Karal, pro-Turkish sentiments in England and France and contributed to their rapprochement with Turkey, while straining relations with Russia. Thus, Karal is trying to support his thesis that the common positions of the Western powers and Turkey in the Crimean War were formed long before it.

In 1970, the fifth volume of the "Ottoman History" of Karal was published in the third edition. The development of Russian-Turkish relations from the end of the 18th century to 1856 is presented here as a peculiar graph. The upper points of the sharp-angled peaks of the graph are indicated by the Treaties of Iasi of 1792, Bucharest of 1812, Adrianople of 1829, and the Paris Peace Congress of 1856. The lower points of reference are the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kaynardzhi of 1774 and the union treaties of Turkey and Russia of 1799 and 1833. The Baltic-Liman (Akkerman) Convention of 1826 is placed on the half of the decline after 1812. Consequently, the entire period of 1774-1856 has, according to Karal, two deep recessions: 1792-1799 and 1829-1833, and one intermediate half-decline of 1812-1826. All three recessions coincide with periods of peaceful development of relations between the two countries. At the same time, immediately after the conclusion of the union treaties (judging by the schedule of the Karal), tensions in Russian-Turkish relations began to increase, turning into wars. The top four points are obviously not the same: the three treaties concluded after the end of the wars between Russia and Turkey, and the Paris Peace Congress of 1856. with the participation of the defeated Russia and a coalition of European powers, which ended the pan-European war. The lower three points of the graph are equally unequal in terms of comparability: the Kuchuk-Kaynardzhi Peace Treaty after the war of 1768-1774 and the two allied Russian-Turkish treaties of 1799 and 1833. Connected by straight lines, these points give a picture of sharp declines and rises, which should probably show the instability of relations and the inevitability of clashes between Turkey and Russia, including in 1853.

This chart does not take into account periods of peace between Russia and Turkey that lasted more than half a century in total. In addition, the graph shows four high points of collisions and only two-normalization of relations, which is an obvious falsification. With such an arbitrary selection of plotting points, events are evaluated based on very formal signs of chronological coincidence. As a result, the Egyptian expedition of Bonaparte in 1798, the anti - Sultan speech of the ruler of Egypt Muhammad Ali in 1831-1840, and Dosti were placed on the descending "lines of peace".-

21 Ibid., s. 220 - 221.

22 Ibid., s. 221-222. Similar views were expressed by Kurat, F. H. Armaoglu, T. Oztuna and some other Turkish historians.

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Greece gained independence and Serbia gained autonomy in 1830. Putting such diverse events as the annexation of Crimea to Russia in 1786, the Serbian Uprising in 1804, the Ackermann Convention in 1826, the arrival of Hungarian-Polish emigrants in Turkey in 1848-1849, and the aggravation of the question of "holy places" in 1851 on the "edge of growing tension" leads the reader to distant, very unproductive periods. analogies without explaining the nature of the problem. Karal's formalistic search eventually led to a simplified and largely misinterpreted interpretation of the entire diversity of relations between Russia and Turkey, while completely excluding economic relations from the field of view. One cannot, however, deny this Turkish historian the desire to objectively take into account the facts of the internal political history of the Ottoman Empire (the liberation movements in Serbia and Greece, the speech of the powerful vassal of the Porte, Muhammad Ali).

Foreign historiography has repeatedly emphasized the religious motives that led the supposedly belligerent parties. Concerning the origin of the war of 1853-1856, Turkish historians Ya. Okchu, J. Uchok, A. B. Kuran, F. Erkin, and others.23 the crisis of international relations in the early 1950s tends to be reduced mainly to the struggle between Russia and France for "holy places". According to them, Turkey allegedly tried to reconcile both sides by granting privileges to both Orthodox and Catholic clergy. However, the" pacification " activity of the Port was thwarted by the mission of A. S. Menshikov in Constantinople in 1853. Some historians are inclined either to ignore the struggle for control of the "holy sites" 24 or to emphasize the Port's neutrality in the dispute between the Christian powers 25 .

The concept of the motive of "holy places" in the clash between Russia and Turkey is developed in some detail in Karal's work. Paying tribute to the arguments known from Western historiography about the exceptional religiosity of Nicholas I, who considered himself the head and defender of the Orthodox Church, Karal at the same time looks for the reason for the aggravation in the international situation. A connoisseur of documents and literature (both Turkish and European), however, whenever it is necessary to identify the initiator of the next complication in the Middle East, he invariably turns his eyes to the northern shores of the Black Sea. In his opinion, Nicholas I, not having obtained London's consent in 1853 to jointly decide the fate of the "sick man", took advantage of the problem of "holy places" to implement plans for the division of the Ottoman Empire without European partners .26
In such a fundamental question as the origin of the war, it is important to establish exactly where the winds that caused the European fire of 1853-1856 blew from. Contemporary testimonies, works of modern English authors, as well as Arab researchers suggest that France, after the London Agreements of 1840-1841 on the Levant and the Straits, was the first of the great powers to use the Catholic church.-

23 J. Okcu. Op. cit, s. 118-119; p. Ucok. Op. cii, s. 165 - 176; A. B. Kuran. Osmanli imparatorlugunda ve Tiirkiye cumhuriyetinde inkilap hareketleri. Istanbul. 1952; F. Erkin. Les Relations turco-sovietiques et la question des detoits. Ankara. 1968.

24 A. N. Kurat. f urkiye ve Rusya, s. 71 - 72.

25 T. Oztuna. Op. cit. From 12, s. 7.

26 E. Z. Karal. Op. cit. C V, s. 222. The initiative role in the dispute about the "holy places" is assigned to Russia and France. Erkin. He believes that at the conclusion of the London Treaty of 1841, Russia met resistance to its expansionist plans from the Western powers, primarily England, and therefore intensified the issue of "holy places" (F. Erkin. Op. cit., p. 39). V. A. Georgiev in the book "Russia's Foreign Policy in the Middle East in the late 30s-early 40s of the XIX century" (M. 1975) convincingly showed how cautious and compromise Russia's position was during the conclusion of the London Agreements of 1840 and 1841.

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kove in the East for political purposes 27 . Support for" one's own " religious direction, extensive missionary activity and proselytism (along with economic expansion) were effective weapons in the struggle of Western powers for influence in the Middle East on the eve of the Eastern War.

Post-war Turkish historiography increasingly began to show a desire to take a more critical approach to the role of Western powers in the Russian - Turkish contradictions of the first half of the XIX century, attempts to reveal their expansionist policy in the Near and Middle East, incitement and inciting Turkey against Russia. Moreover, some modern Turkish historians (I. H. Uzuncharshyly, Karal, Armaoglu, T. Unal, N. Akshit, etc.) try in their works to show the dual policy of the governments of England and France in relation to Turkey, to blame them for the defeats that the Turkish army suffered in the wars with Russia. One of the representatives of the older generation of Turkish historians, Uzuncharshyly, analyzing Russian-Turkish relations at the end of the XVIII century, accuses the governments of England, France, Prussia and Austria of " inciting against it (Russia. - Years.) The Ottoman Empire " 28 . Unal writes: "Trusting the French and their help, we took their side" in 1806. Criticizing France's policy in the Middle East at the beginning of the 19th century, Unal notes: "Napoleon, having become an enemy of Russia in 1801, began to incite the Turks against the Russians." 29 Karal spoke about the provocative role of French diplomacy in the events of 1806 and 1828. Similarly, these stories are covered by Akshit, Armaoglu, S. Ulkutashir, E. A. Chawli 30 and other modern Turkish historians.

The new generation of Turkish historians (I. Cem, O. Koimen, G. Kazgan, K. Bulutoglu, etc.), formed in the conditions of a certain democratization of public life after the May 1960 coup, thinks more about the reasons for Turkey's lag and the harmful role of the introduction of Western capital into the economy of the Ottoman Empire in the 30-50s of the XIX century, that is, on the eve of and during the Eastern War. Thus, Cem and Koyman call the Anglo-Turkish Trade Convention of 1838 and the wartime loans the first milestones that determined Turkey's subordination to the policies of the capitalist powers of the West .31 Koimen focuses on the economic subordination of the Port to the English dictate, which caused the disruption of craft production in the Ottoman Empire, which was especially clearly manifested in the 50s of the last century .32
Cem points out a direct link between the methods of British diplomacy, which protected not so much the Port as its own interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, and Turkey's accelerating economic backwardness as its political subordination to British politics grew. However, these Turkish historians also cite the war as one of the main reasons for Turkey's financial dependence, 33 and do not disclose the fact that England used the dependent position

27 See notes of the Consul General of Russia in Beirut during these years: K. M. Bazili. Syria and Palestine under the Turkish government in historical and political relations. M. 1962, p. 287; his. Unpublished review " Experience of spiritual statistics in Syria and Palestine. 1841". AVPR, St. Petersburg GAUN, op. 181, d. 512; K. Sabibi. The Modern History of Lebanon. L. 1965; R.Wood. The Early Correspondence of Richard Wood. 1831 - 1841. L. 1966; A. L. Tibawi. A Modern History of Syria Including Lebanon and Palestine. L. 1969.

28 I. H. Uzuncarsili. Op. cit, s. 629.

2 9 T. Unal. Op. cit., s. 66 - 67.

30 S. Ulkutasir. Op. cit. From IV, 1 kisim; N. Aksit. Tarih. Istanbul. 1956, s. 186; F. H. Armaoglu. Op. cit., s. 82 - 83; E. A. Cavli. Op. cit.

31 O, Koymen. Op. cit., pp. 13 - 14, 17; J. Cem. Op. cit, s. 281 - 202,

32 O.Koymen. Op. cit, pp. 19 - 10, 23 - 14.

33 K. Bulutoglu. Op. cit, s. 68 - 72.

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Ports in their fight against Russia's growing influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East.

"Young" Turkish historians tend to be less direct and one-sided in their assessment of the causes of the clash between Russia and Turkey in 1853. For example, the concept of the exclusive role of "holy places", in fact, does not find any supporters among them. Thus, H. Gursel and S. Aiverdi tend to see the origins of the military conflict in the opposition of tsarism to the reformist renewal of the Ottoman Empire .34 Ayverdi notes that the endless negotiations about "holy places", their statute and statements of a pan-Slavist nature in support of Christians only covered up the desire of tsarism to oppose reforms and, taking advantage of Turkey's weakness, seize Constantinople and the Straits .35 This position is described in more detail by Gursel. In his interpretation, tsarism was opposed to liberal reforms in Turkey because of the contradiction between absolutism and liberal transformations in general, as well as because of the fear of facing an internally consolidated and solid Ottoman Empire. Changes in the status of the Christian subjects of the Porte, which took place within the framework of the Tanzimat, according to Gursel, were used by tsarism to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey, which ultimately led to the war of 1853-1856 .36 It is known, however, that Russia's attitude to the Ottoman Empire's reforms changed throughout the first period of their implementation. Without delving into the discussion of this problem, which requires further study, we will refer to the well-known modern Turkish historian T. Tunay, who writes in his monograph on Western art and political life in Turkey:: "After the great Western powers gained superiority over the Ottomans, they first turned out to be advisers to the Porte, then, taking the initiative, began to intervene in order to carry out reforms. Even later, this intervention turned into a strong pressure that took on the character of a dictate; it was carried out in the name of Western culture, but in fact was determined by the interests of the great Western powers."37
The pressure that Tunay writes about was clearly evident already in the first months of the war. When on June 26, 1853, the tsar's manifesto on the introduction of Russian troops into the territory of Moldavia and Wallachia was published and this action began to be carried out, the Porte did not start retaliatory military actions, deciding, on the advice of the British ambassador in Constantinople, to demonstrate, as Karal writes, the illegality of Russia's actions .38 Turkish historians ignore one very important fact: at that time, the Western powers were making final preparations for war with Russia. On June 25, the British and French squadrons anchored in Besik Kerfez Bay at the entrance to the Dardanelles . Diplomats in London and Paris were removing the last obstacles to a major war. At the end of July, at the initiative of Austria, the so-called Vienna note of England, France, Austria and Prussia was prepared, addressed to the Ottoman Empire and Russia. This note was intended to encourage Porto to confirm Kuchuk-Kainard's articles.-

34 H. F. Gursel. Op. cit, s. 101 - 102; S. Ayverdi. Op. cit., s. 196 - 198.

35 S. Ayverdi. Op. cit., s. 200.

36 H. Gursel. Op. cit., s. 102.

37 Cit. by: A. D. Novichev. Gulhani Hatti sherif of 1839 and its foreign policy aspect. "Turkological collection 1972", Moscow, 1973, p. 391.

38 E. Z. Karal. Op. cit. p. V, s. 232. According to Karal (E. Z. Karal. Op. cit. p. V. s. 230-231) and other historians, the pause between the introduction of Russian troops into the Danubian principalities and the Sultan's Hatt-i sherif about the war with Russia was used by the Porte to concentrate the 130,000-strong army in large fortresses of European Turkey and near probable po In the past wars, there were no places for Russian troops to cross the Danube; the Turkish army in Eastern Anatolia also reached its starting lines.

39 C. Ucok. Op. cit., s. 178.

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the Treaties of Zhiya (1774) and Adrianople (1829) on the protection of Russia over the Orthodox subjects of Turkey, as well as guarantee the extension to them of new fermans on the situation of Christians in the Ottoman Empire. France and Russia were required, in accordance with the note, to ensure that the Sultan's authorities strictly fulfilled these conditions .40 Austria's initiative reflected the common desire of the countries that signed the Vienna Note to prevent Russia and Turkey from settling their differences beyond the control of Western powers. Turkish historians pass this circumstance by in silence.

On September 29, 1853, Khatt-i Humayun Abdul-Majid was published, which contained a demand that Russian troops leave the Danube principalities within 15 days. Through the Turkish embassies, the contents of the Sultan's decree were transmitted to European newspapers .41 For the first time, a document of this kind contained a statement about the coincidence of the positions of the United States and Western powers. The Turkish ultimatum of October 4, 1853, was transmitted through the commander of the Turkish army in European Turkey, Omer Pasha M. D. Gorchakov, who was at the head of the Russian army .42 At the same time (October 2 - 3), 1853, it became known in Constantinople that the squadrons of England and France were preparing to pass through the Dardanelles to the Sea of Marmara. The tsar's manifesto for war with Turkey did not follow until November 2, 1853, after Turkish troops had already begun operations in the Balkans and the Caucasus, and at the same time it became known that England and France were providing the Port with a large loan. This was the sequence of events that preceded the official start of the Eastern (Crimean) War, which Turkish authors do not always take into account in their constructions.

In the interpretation of most Turkish historians, the defeat of the Ottoman fleet by a detachment of Russian ships under the command of P. S. Nakhimov at Sinop on November 18 (30), 1853, created a threat to the straits and became the direct reason for the entry of England and France into the war. However, in contrast to the works of the 1940s and 1950s, when Turkish historiography extolled the humane selflessness of the Western powers, who allegedly defended the Sultan's sovereignty over the Straits and the territory of the Ottoman Empire as a whole, 43 modern Turkish historians write that the reaction of London and Paris to the outcome of the Battle of Sinop testified to their deep interest in the fate of the Black Sea Straits. N. Ozdalga and Karal N. Ozdalga were quite definite about the motives of the actions of the Western powers after Sinop, for example, he believes that the position of England was determined by the sharpness of Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Near and Middle East and the fact that it was advantageous for England to maintain Turkish domination in the Straits .44
Karal also notes that France is particularly interested in the Levant. However, in their works, and in the studies of Ulkutashir and Chawla on the Crimean War, and in the general works of Shapoglio, Armaoglu and others, the readiness of Western powers to mediate the restoration of peace in the Middle East is exaggerated .45
40 A. M. Zayonchkovsky. The Eastern War of 1853-1856 in connection with the current political situation. Vol. II, part I, St. Petersburg, 1913, pp. 15-16.

41 E. Z. Karak. Op. cit. p. V. s. 233. K. Marx linked the publication of the Turkish manifesto on war in Europe with the "sinister intentions of the ruling classes of England towards Turkey" (K. Marx and F. Kropotkin). Engels, Soch. Vol. 9, p. 438).

42 Turkish historiography does not agree on the date of declaring war on Russia. For example, J. Uchok and T. Oztun consider October 4 to be the day of the beginning of the war (see C. Usok. Op. cit., s. 180; T. Oztuna. Op. cit., s. 9).

43 J. Okcu. Op. cit. With V; E. F. Turgay. Rusya tarihi. Istanbul. 1948.

44 N. Ozdalga. Turk Bogazlarinin tarih ic.indeki onemi. Istanbul. 1965, s. 16 - 17; E. Z. Karal. Op. cit., s. 235 - 236.

45 CM. S. Ulkutasir. Op. cit.; E. A. Cavli. Op. cit.; E. B. Sapоlyo. Osmanli sultanlari tarihi. Istanbul. 1961.

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The news of Sinop did indeed coincide with the development in London, Paris, and Vienna of the December 1853 proposals addressed to Turkey for mediation by the Western powers in its conflict with Russia, which were based on the idea of preserving the territorial unity of the Ottoman Empire and implementing changes in the legal status of Christians under the general supervision of the powers. Turkey and Russia were invited to settle their relations at an international conference. Such a plan essentially placed Turkey and the development of its relations with Russia under the control of Western powers. The reaction of Constantinople was negative: Abdul Majid believed (and expressed this in a conversation with the French Ambassador Baraguet d'illier) that the Treaty of London of 1841 guaranteed the integrity and independence of Turkey and that Russia's withdrawal from the Danubian principalities should precede any negotiations. 46 However, these proposals remained on paper. In Paris, and then in London, it was decided (mid-December 1853) to conduct the Anglo-French fleet through the Bosphorus to the Black Sea. On January 2, 1854, the combined Anglo-French fleet passed the Bosphorus and headed for Varna. Austria's Turkish note of December 31 was forgotten

1853 with a proposal to restore peace with Russia on terms that generally coincided with the proposals of the four powers .47 Britain and France were not interested in the Turkish peace initiative; Vienna expressed its readiness to support this initiative only in connection with its plans to participate in the yet-to-be-declared European war. As events have shown, Constantinople was wrong to rely on Austrian neutrality. Modern Turkish historiography mistakenly regards the broadcast statements of Franz Josef and his Foreign Minister Buoli on neutrality as the real program of Austria .48 All this shows that the Western powers did not want to mediate, but to defeat Russia and push it away from the Balkans. They intended to force Turkey to follow the course of complete submission, which was determined by the London Agreements of 1840-1841.

To ensure the implementation of their plans to defeat Russia, the Western powers imposed financial obligations on the Port, along with military treaties. Financiers in London and Paris were negotiating the terms of the first Turkish loan when the Anglo-French squadron returned to the Bosphorus roadstead after a 20-day cruise in the Black Sea. In January-February, the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Treaty 49 was prepared and signed on March 12, 1854, which became the first multilateral agreement between Turkey and Western powers in the history of the Ottoman Empire. Two weeks later, Britain and France declared war on Russia. This triple alliance, according to some Turkish historians (Ya. Okchu, J. Erkin), testified that the Ottoman Empire was accepted as an equal member of the Union of Europe-

46 Minutes of the meeting of representatives of England, France, Austria and Prussia of December 5, 1853 and their appeal to the Port see: A. M. Zayonchkovsky. Op. op. vol. II, part I, appendix, pp. 116-117.

47 See E. Bapst. Les origines de la guerre de Crimea. P. (1912), appendices, pp. 501-504. The note clearly outlined the Port's dissatisfaction with the violation of the Straits regime and the excessive" zeal " of the powers in protecting the sultan's Christian subjects. By intensifying military operations, Britain and France stopped this trend.

48 E. Z. Karal. Op. cit. p. V, s. 236-238.

49 "Noradounghian Gabriel-effendi. Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire ottoman". T. II. P. 1900, N 151. Most Turkish historians consider the Triple Treaty a direct consequence of the defeat of the Turkish squadron at Sinop. For example, T. Oztuna writes that it was the Battle of Sinop that stimulated the decision of England and France to defend Turkey (T. Oztuna. Op. cit., p. 10). A. K. Meram's position is more objective. He not only does not link the treaty with Sinop, but also shows that by concluding it, England sought to support those circles in the Ottoman Empire that harbored revanchist plans for the Russian Black Sea region (A. K. Meram. Ismet Inenu. Ve ikinci cihan harbi Istanbul. 1945, s. 145).

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of the European powers 50 . However, article IV of the treaty excluded any control by the Porte over the movements of Allied troops on the territory of the Ottoman Empire. Determining the fate of Turkish lands, including the Straits, was in the hands of England and France. In fact, having violated the London Treaty of 1841 by introducing squadrons through the Straits into the Black Sea, England and France turned this violation into the norm of their policy, fixing it in the treaty of March 12, 1854. This fundamental circumstance was not taken into account by Turkish historians, as well as the fact that, not considering the Triple treaty sufficient, England and France signed an additional agreement on military cooperation on April 10, 1854, regardless of what situation Turkey might find itself in. The next day, Britain, France, Austria, and Prussia signed the Vienna Protocol, which prohibited uncoordinated negotiations with Russia .51 Behind Turkey's back, it was agreed to carry out (under the control of Western powers) reforms concerning the situation of non-Muslim subjects of the Sultan.

The further involvement of Turkey in the war and the expansion of its participants (for example, at the expense of Sardinia) took place, in fact, against the will of Constantinople. In modern Turkish historiography, Sardinia's participation in the war is regarded only as an auxiliary military support. However, long before the outbreak of the war, the Piedmontese government decided to ally with England and France in order to free itself from the influence of Austria. The Sardinian Foreign Minister, Count C. Cavour, told the British and French representatives that "the union of Sardinia with the Western Powers remained his greatest desire." 52 The interests of Sardinia and Turkey in the Crimean War had nothing in common. The most objective assessment of Sardinia's participation in the war was given by Chawli, who writes: "By joining the war of 1855, the Italians did not ensure the political unity of their states. They depended entirely on Austria." Referring to Sardinia's goals in the war, the same Turkish historian emphasizes that "Piedmont hoped to gain its independence with the signing of a pan-European peace." 53
The Eastern (Crimean) War, as an analysis of its course shows, was waged by the Western powers not to "protect the Ottoman possessions", but to achieve each of them its own political goals. In many cases, they simply ignored the Desk, acting behind its back. The Ottoman Empire had by this time accepted the bonded terms of the loan and was bound by a military treaty. Neither her opinion nor the internal situation interested Western diplomats, although information was received from embassies accredited to the Sultan's government that the Turkish population was very hostile to the news of the entry of the expeditionary armies of Western powers into the country. "The arrival of the Anglo-French auxiliary troops," the press testified, " does not please the Turks, just like the presence of the allied fleets in the Bosporus. They seem to have a premonition that these foreign troops will not leave Turkish territory without major changes in Turkey. " 54 In the Turkish people, the Eastern (Crimean) War

50 However, contemporaries who were well aware of the state of affairs noted that in this triple alliance, the Porte's initiative in the most important matters was very limited (D. G. Rosen. History of Turkey, Part II, St. Petersburg, 1872, p. 222).

51 N. S. Kinyapina. Op. ed., p. 221.

52 Viconte de Guichen. La Guerre de Crimee (1854 - 1856) et l'attitude des puissances europeenes. P. 1936, p. 314.

53 E. A. Cavil. Op. cit., s. 16 - 17.

54 "St. Petersburg Vedomosti", 1854, N67. Turkish historians prefer to keep silent about the internal situation of the country during the war and its consequences for the population, because this would contradict the enthusiastic assessment of Tanzimat generally accepted in Turkish historiography.

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it was unpopular, because it put a heavy burden on him. The entry of the Ottoman Empire into the war was accompanied by a deterioration in the already difficult situation of the masses. The war created favorable conditions for increasing the import of foreign goods (primarily English) into the Ottoman Empire. After 1855, England firmly occupied the first place in the foreign trade of the Ottoman Empire. French exports to Turkey more than tripled between 1852 and 185655 .

Turkey's entry into the war not only marked the beginning of its financial enslavement: there was also the transfer of some customs offices to foreigners, as well as the granting of concessions to them. In 1854-1856, an agreement was drawn up with F. The Lessepeom for the construction of the Suez Canal is the third or fourth of a series of projects that rival British and French representatives have sought to impose on the Port since 1840 .56 It rejected these projects as violating its national interests. The Turkish literature notes that the attempts of British financiers to bind Turkey with loans on bonded terms in 1840 and 1850-1852 were unsuccessful .57 However, the nature of the political control that accompanied the conclusion of military loans by the Sultan's government in 1854-1855 has not yet been clarified by Turkish historians.

After the Battle of Sinop, French bankers (this time ahead of their English competitors) offered the Port a loan of 10 million francs. However, prior to the conclusion of the triple military alliance, loan negotiations did not go beyond the preliminary stage. On August 4, 1854, Abdul Majid issued a decree on receiving a 6% loan of 3 million pounds sterling. It was provided by private banks with the approval of the British government. H. Eniai, who studied the history of Ottoman debt, explained the "preferential" terms of the loan received through the banks of England and France, by the allied relations of these powers with Turkey. 58 But the only concession was a 15-year loan repayment period. Also noteworthy is the creation of a commission independent of the Port, which included two Galata bankers with close ties to banks (one in London, the other in Paris). They monitored the expenditure of the loan strictly for military needs and the receipt of income. After lengthy discussions, Britain and France demanded that Egypt's revenues be allocated as collateral for the loan (France was particularly insistent on this). Military expenditures, administrative reform undertaken at the height of the war at the insistence of the Western Allies, and other costs resulted in a deficit of £ 5.8 million in the Turkish budget. 59 In the summer of 1855, London banks (primarily N. Rothschild and Sons) provided the Port with a 4-percent loan for 5 million pounds to repay it, and most importantly , so that Turkey does not get out of the war. 60 In the summer of 1855, London banks (primarily N. Rothschild and Sons) provided the Port with a 4-percent loan for 5 million pounds. The Turkish historian S. Kuneralp emphasizes the exceptional profitability of this loan for England .61 A tighter control over the use of the loan was established than in 1854. Government observers sent by London and Paris62 were granted the right to

85 N. V. Mikhov. Принос към историята на търговията на Турция и Болгария. Т. VI. София. 1971, p. 345.

56 AVPR, f. Chancellery, d. 51, l. 71.67 See K. Bulutoglu. Op. cit., s. 69.

58 H. Yeniay. Osmanli borc.lari tarihi. Ankara. 1936, s. 9, 11.

59 A. du Velay. L'histoire financie Re de la Turquie. P. 1903, p. 143.

60 O. Anderson. A Liberal State at War. L. 1967, pp. 226 - 227.

61 S. Kuneralp. Bir osmanli diplomati Kastake Musurus pasa. 1807 - 1891. "Belleten", L. XXXIV, N 135. Ankara. 1970, s. 433.

62 The loan received a government guarantee. Turkish authors often do not take this important aspect into account.

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inspect virtually all Port revenues and expenses. The transfer of the customs duties of Syria and Smyrna to creditors as collateral for the loan, in addition to the Egyptian tax, allowed them to control the main centers of Turkish foreign trade. The implementation of all reforms was taken under the control of Porte's allies. An adviser to the Austrian Government oversaw the development of laws protecting the property of foreigners in the Ottoman Empire. All this served the interests of the powers more than the national objectives of Turkey.

Let's sum up some results. Modern Turkish historiography has a number of works containing extensive factual material (often unique, drawn from the state archives of Turkey) about the events preceding the Eastern (Crimean) War, and about it itself. From individual criticisms of the Middle East policy of England and France, the progressive part of Turkish historians proceeds to reveal the harmful consequences of the expansion of Anglo-French capital into Turkey. In their works, they showed the extent and forms of Turkey's dependence on Western European powers, and the expansionist nature of their policy in the Middle East. However, methodological inconsistency did not allow these authors to find out the reasons for the collapse of the attempts of the Sultan's regime to adapt to the requirements of capitalist development of the country.

As for Turkey's goals in the Eastern (Crimean) War and its nature, modern Turkish historiography, while emphasizing the defensive position of the Porte in every possible way, carefully ignores the revanchist aspirations of its ruling circles and insufficiently objectively judges the role of the combined efforts of London, Paris and Constantinople in unleashing the Russo-Turkish wars. Meanwhile, only by studying all the manifestations of the domestic and foreign policies of the belligerents together can we find out why, after the Crimean War, Turkey was no longer able to "recover from the blow received thanks to the alliance with England and France"63 . The crisis of the Ottoman Empire was used by Britain and France to consolidate their influence within its borders. The trade privileges granted in 1838 and the political guardianship established in 1841 were supplemented by the Eastern (Crimean) War with the military-political and financial control of the Port by the Western Powers.

63 K. Marx and F. Engels, Soch. Vol. 11, p. 492.

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