Russia's relations with Iran have a long history. Even the first Russian principalities maintained ties with the East not only through the trade route "from the Varangians to the Greeks", but also through the Volga-Caspian Route, which was one of the ancient transit routes connecting north-eastern Europe with Persia. Large merchants, as a rule, carried out not only a trade, but also a diplomatic mission. Each of the merchants or statesmen carried with them letters from their sovereigns on the establishment of friendship and on permission to trade. Each era has made its own adjustments to the palette of developing relations between our two countries - from friendly to confrontational.

From the point of view of identifying those interests that determined the nature of Russian-Iranian relations in historical retrospect, it seems most appropriate to consider them starting from the XV-XVI centuries. It was during this period that both states emerged as politically independent and centralized. Iran became a politically independent and centralized state with the coming to power of the Safavids and the adoption of Shiism as the official religion in 1501, which provided it with legitimate political independence from the caliphate. By the end of the 15th century, Russia was transforming from a Horde ulus into an independent Moscow state that managed to preserve its Christian identity. The experience of the political and economic development of the Russian Christian principalities within the Muslim Horde, especially in comparison with the regions outside the Horde state, can hardly be considered positive, at least unambiguously positive. Perhaps the positive thing was a closer acquaintance with the Islamic world, the mentality of Islamic peoples, and the ways of conducting diplomatic and economic relations.

Of course, attempts to establish relations with Iran were initially dominated by trade interests, since before the Mongol invasion, the Volga-Caspian Route was quite effective, along which trade was carried out between the Russian principalities and territories that were part of Iran's sphere of influence. It is not for nothing that the return embassy of Vasily Panin, which went to Shamakhi in 1465 under Ivan III, had many merchants, including Afanasy Nikitin, who became famous for his "Legend of Walking across the Three Seas". For the growing economically young Muscovite state, which has no access to the sea in the west and south, the free use of the Volga River for the export of its goods is becoming vital. Kazan and Astrakhan were also economically interested in expanding trade. However, the Crimea constantly continued to interfere in Moscow's relations with Kazan and Astrakhan, which periodically sought the transfer of the khanates to the Ottoman protectorate (as, for example, under the Kazan-Russian Peace Treaty of 1529) [Pokhlebkin, 2001, p.105].

Vasily IV in 1526 even began an economic blockade of Kazan, forbidding Russian merchant ships to descend the Volga below the village of Makarievo, although this measure did not allow Russian merchant ships to cross the Volga River.

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at the same time, it also hit the Russian merchants. However, already under his son Ivan IV the Terrible (1530-1584), this measure led to the emergence of the Makaryevskaya Fair as the largest center of trade with Persia and other eastern countries. Economic interests predominate in the relations of the Moscow state with Iran when Ivan IV began the territorial expansion of Russia through the annexation of Muslim lands. Ivan the Terrible was interested in establishing permanent relations with the Safavid state to conduct not only Russian trade, but also European trade, especially after the establishment of trade relations with England in 1553. Since the arrival of the Andi Beg embassy from Shah Khodabende in Moscow in 1586, Russian-Iranian relations have acquired the character of regular diplomatic relations. Countries are beginning to exchange large embassies, which spend a year or two, sometimes more, on travel and stay. These are usually both trading missions. Thus, the embassy of Haji Khosrov (1592-1594) from Safavid Iran first received a written right to duty-free sales within the Moscow Tsardom by Iranian merchants [Bushev, 1976, p. 200 - 201]. The gradual establishment of more or less regular diplomatic and trade relations between the Moscow and Safavid states also increased the interest of European countries in using the Volga-Caspian Route to Iran and further to India.

Economic interests in establishing relations with Moscow dominated in the XVI-XVII centuries. and in Iran. Safavid Iran provided an example of perhaps the last surge in the "Asian mode of production" - by increasing domestic economic potential, and not by conquering new territories, as was the case in the Ottoman Empire, which achieved economic growth during its maximum expansion also in the XVI century. - under Selim 1 (1512-1520) and his son Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-1566). During this period, Iran is objectively interested in transit through Russia, and in Russia itself as a market for its main export product - silk.

It is impossible not to pay attention to the religious component in the emerging relations between our states. Paradoxically, it turned out to be a unifying rather than a dividing factor during this period. Both countries actually turned out to be religious enclaves at that time. Orthodox Moscow, which did not recognize the Union of Florence, was not only somewhat isolated from the rest of Europe, but also increasingly acquired religious independence. After the fall of Constantinople, which recognized the Florentine Union, Moscow metropolitans were actually appointed independently, and already under Fyodor Ioannovich, on the initiative of Boris Godunov (in 1589), the patriarchate was introduced.

Iran, which became Shiite, did not recognize the rights of the Ottoman Empire (in 1517) to the caliphate, 1 hoping to return the caliphate to the descendants of Ali. Iran's contradictions with the Ottoman state grow not only into territorial, but also into religious ones. By the way, the Muscovite state, by including the Sunni Horde khanates (whose rulers, as a rule, were supplied by the Crimean Khanate, which was actually part of the Ottoman Empire), thereby maximally reduced the likelihood of the caliphate's influence on them, although the sultan tried to fully use his caliph status only in Khush when the Crimea became part of the Ottoman Empire. Russia. And Moscow could not have had such concerns about Iran. It is interesting to note that in Europe, which in the XVI and even XVII centuries suffered defeats from the Ottomans, Iran, VI-

1 After the conquest of Egypt, the descendant of the Abbasid caliphs was brought to Istanbul, where he was forced to transfer his title to Sultan Selim I. The religious motive of the legitimacy of the Ottoman dynasty was reinforced by the fact that the holy cities of Mecca and Medina were in the hands of the Ottoman sultans. [Udo Steinbech, 2006, p. 23].

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dimo, because of its religious differences with the Ottomans and the patronage of the Iranian Shahs to Christians, was perceived as a state quite close in culture, in the organization of urban economy.

Having become religious enclaves of their own, both states were bound by common geopolitical interests determined by the need to repel the Ottoman expansion, which primarily directly concerned Iran. It is possible that there were no real plans for the capture of the Volga khanates from the Ottoman Empire in relation to the Moscow state. But the Muscovite state could not ignore the possibility of their subjugation by the Ottomans and the fact that Moscow would remain practically cut off even from the Caspian Sea and the Volga Route. Under Ivan IV, the Kazan (1552) and Astrakhan Khanates (1556) became territories of the Moscow State; in 1557, the Nogai Horde recognized its dependence on Moscow, and at the end of the XVI century, the Siberian Khanate. It is known that the Moscow clergy supported the fight against Kazan, but the goal of state policy was not to Christianize the khanates, but mainly to remove them from the possible influence of the Ottoman Empire, which became the Ottoman Caliphate. The expansion of the Russian state to the east began-to replace the lost western lands.

A similar policy was pursued by the Safavids, who conquered Georgia and Shirvan in 1519, and Bahrain in the very beginning of the 17th century. Throughout the XVI-XVII centuries. Iran is at war with the Ottoman state. Iran is therefore interested in arms supplies, including from Moscow. So, in the message of the Crimean khan to the Turkish Sultan Suleiman I Kanuni, it is said that the shah's embassy arrived in Moscow in 1521, which received from the Moscow prince "many cannons, craftsmen and armor." In 1569. Ivan IV sends an Embassy of Khoznikov to Iran, which carries 100 cannons and 500 rifles as military aid to Iran to fight the Ottoman Empire. [Russia and Iran. Iranian Studies in Tatarstan..., 2001, p. 135].

Already at the end of the 16th century, an attempt was made to conclude a military alliance, when Abbas I offered Fyodor Ioannovich to act together against the Ottoman state, promising Derbent and Baku in return. However, the Iran-Turkey peace treaty concluded in 1590 was regarded by Moscow as an attempt to draw it into a unilateral war with the Ottomans. At the same time, Godunov took the initiative to create an anti-Turkish military alliance between Iran and European states [Bushev, 1976, p.201]. For Russia, the development of newly acquired lands is more significant from the point of view of national interests at that time, and soon the time of Troubles and the Polish invasion comes. At the beginning of the 17th century, Iran independently regained the lands of Azerbaijan along with Tabriz.

In the 17th century, the geopolitical situation changed. The inclusion of the Ukrainian lands in Russia brought Russia closer to the Ottoman Empire, made the problem of ensuring the security of these lands, their access to the southern seas relevant, i.e. it actualized the solution of mainly geopolitical tasks. These tasks were closely linked to the pan - European tasks of reducing the influence of the Ottoman Empire.

The new stage of civilizational development of European countries after the industrial Revolution made it possible to weaken the caliphate first economically and then militarily. The Ottoman Empire is trying to compensate for the loss of its position in Europe at the expense of eastern lands, including the Iranian and Caucasian territories. This is what Russia is trying to use in its changed geopolitical interests.

In Russia, Peter I begins to carry out geopolitical tasks that simultaneously turn out to be related to the tasks of limiting the Muslim expansion of the Ottoman Empire. For the first time, he uses the religious aspect in relations with Iran at the official level, which to a large extent only "covered up" the geopolitical tasks of the new empire (which appeared as a result of appropriation).

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The Senate gave Peter the title of Emperor and crowned him as Emperor of Russia). In the manifesto of 1722, which preceded the "Persian campaign", in addition to the goals of gaining a foothold in the Caspian Sea and ensuring the security of the Volga-Caspian route, the tasks of liberating the Christian peoples of Georgia and Armenia were proclaimed. They became the reasons and reasons for the start of the war against Iran, or the "campaign of Peter I". One of the reasons was the weakening of the Safavid state, which actually led to the loss of statehood.

Since that time, the directions and paths of the historical and socio-economic development of Iran and Russia have radically diverged. Russia under Peter the Great makes the final choice, taking the path of a European type of development, albeit with large deviations. Iran, which even under the Safavids, especially at the beginning of the 17th century, was perceived in Western Europe as no more "Asian", and sometimes even less Asian, than Russia, remains in line with the development of eastern, or rather Muslim, countries of the East. At the heart of Russia's interests during this period, geopolitical interests predominate, as the empire begins to develop according to the imperial imperative - to expand geographically. On the part of Iran, these interests can be defined as national-state interests, since the main ones were attempts to preserve, including with the help of Russia, statehood as Iranian.

According to the Treaty of St. Petersburg of 1723, Russia should help Iran in the fight against the Afghans, receiving in return Derbent, Baku, Gilan, Mazandaran and Gorgan. Of course, Iran conceded a lot, but it did not have the strength to fight on two fronts - with the Ghilzai-Afghans and with the Ottomans. The Ottoman Empire was not going to be left without compensation for the loss of those Iranian lands that were in its sphere of interests. Therefore, in Istanbul in 1924, a treaty was signed, according to which Turkey agrees to the terms of the St. Petersburg Treaty, but receives in return the Eastern Transcaucasia and part of Western Iran.

However, after Peter's death, Russia's interest in the Iranian direction of external expansion, which required significant financial expenditures, fades and begins to be limited mainly to supporting and preserving the Christian territories of Transcaucasia as part of the empire. In this regard, it is interesting to pay attention to the effect of not only objective factors, but also subjective ones. Objectively, the Russian Empire entered the expansion phase, but with the departure of such a subjective factor as Peter, this objective factor ceased to work. It has declared itself, but it has not become a national task. And as soon as it met the resistance of the growing state of Nadir Shah, Russia gave up most of the conquered Iranian territories.

But already in the nineteenth century, the colonial phase of the development of capitalism, the colonial expansion of Great Britain in South Asia, and the predominantly extensive type of development of Russian capitalism contributed to the fact that the so-called imperial imperative acquired the character of a national task. It manifests itself in expanding the territory, ensuring the security of the Christian peoples of Transcaucasia by including their lands in Russia, and strengthening their economic positions in Iran. At this historical stage, Russia is doing the same as other European countries. Moreover, in the 19th century, the external factor, as an incentive for expansion, also changed. The place of the Ottoman Empire is increasingly occupied by the expansion of the British Empire, which has approached the borders of Russia. The Caucasus and Transcaucasia are included in Russia, as well as part of the Central Asian territories. Iran becomes a semi-colony of Russia and England. As in the time of Peter I, at the beginning of the 19th century, these interests of Russia were solved mainly by military means, but now they are already successful for Russia. At the same time, unlike Western countries, Russia's territorial expansion was not just a military conquest of territories. And the expansion of Russia to the west is not quite adequate to the expansion to the east and south. The Eastern policy of Russia not only used national and confessional contradictions to include the lands in its composition, but also often used them as a basis for the integration of other regions.-

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it was activated. For various reasons, Russia has become embroiled in the conflict relations of local national and territorial elites (however, as now). And it was this factor that prevailed in relations between Russia and Iran during this period.

At this time, there is no need to talk about the coincidence of interests of Iran and Russia as national ones, since Russia's expansion in the south took place at the expense of Iran. Nevertheless, the claim that it was Russia's struggle with Britain for influence in Iran that helped it avoid losing its state sovereignty is virtually unquestioned.

At the end of the 19th and 20th centuries, the structure of Russia's interests in Iran was clearly dominated by economic interests implemented through trade agreements and concession agreements. By this time, Iran is also increasingly beginning to benefit from ties with Russia, especially from foreign trade, which until almost the end of the 19th century had a positive balance in favor of Iran, but these interests as a national one had not yet been formed. We can speak separately about the interests of the merchants associated with the Russian market, those Iranian entrepreneurs who focused on the Russian market, and the interests of the vast mass of the labor force that became "otkhodniks" and made up a very significant percentage of those employed in the oil fields and industrial enterprises of the Caucasus.

The situation changes in the first years after the establishment of Soviet power, when the main tasks for the RSFSR become ideological. The latter is trying to "export the Soviet revolution", including to Iran [Genis, 2000, pp. 258-260], by sending its troops to Gilan. But more significant during this period were the interests of the RSFSR related to security due to the British intervention. Therefore, in exchange for the renunciation of claims to the property of tsarist Russia, Soviet Russia achieved the inclusion in the 1921 treaty of Article 6, which gave the right to send troops in the event of a threat to Russia on the territory of Iran.

By 1925, problems with the choice of the form of statehood had been solved in both countries, national separatist movements were mostly eliminated, and the main problems moved to the area of economic recovery, as a necessary condition for maintaining political independence.2 Russia is the first country to recognize Iran's adoption of the foreign trade monopoly law and independent customs legislation. However, by the end of the 1930s, common economic interests were being sacrificed for ideological ones. Not the least important role in relations between Russia and Iran is played by changes in the nature of power in both countries, which have increasingly gravitated towards dictatorship, the global economic crisis, and Iran's orientation towards expanding Germany's military and economic presence.

During the Second World War, Russia's military and ideological interests were of the greatest importance, resulting in the Iranian military operation, which was practically the only successful military action for the USSR in the initial period of the war, and the proclamation of autonomous republics in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan at the end of the war. After their fall and the subsequent defeat of communist and democratic organizations, relations between our countries were virtually frozen.

However, attempts to reform the Soviet economy and the beginning of large-scale economic reforms in Iran in the 1960s and 1970s of the last century lead to a revision of relations. The Soviet economic system is on the rise, and the economic interests of Iran and Russia coincide during this period. But these are not only interests

2 The consolidation of Soviet power and the transition to NEP changed the direction of Russia's interests in Iran, putting economic considerations first. This is true, but the position of peaceful and economic influence on Iran did not win out immediately, since another one was also considered (initiated by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister L. Karakhan) - the overthrow of the Shah and the formation of a social-nationalist government [Persits, 1996, p.36].

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economic, but to a certain extent also geopolitical. The USSR demonstrates to the West its capabilities in those industries in which the latter refused to participate, while Iran, which is politically and economically dominated by the United States, demonstrates its independence in pursuing a foreign economic course. As early as 1962, Iran declared that "it will never allow Iran to be a means of aggression against the territory of the Soviet Union" [Pravda, 16.09.1962].

A new stage of relations and a new range of interests is associated with the emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation. At present, the implementation of Iran's program for the construction of its first nuclear power plant in Bushehr with the help of Russia has become a kind of "visiting card" of our mutual interests. But our joint interests do not begin or end with the nuclear program. During the most tense period of post-Soviet history, Iran was more our supporter than our opponent. Iran, which set its goal after the Islamic Revolution to export it, did not become its real conductor in our country. Iran, as a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which headed it during the operation against illegal military formations in Chechnya, defined their actions not as Islamic, but as separatist. Thus, the religious factor did not become a dividing factor for the two countries.

There are also similarities in the geopolitical interests of Russia and Iran regarding NATO's eastward expansion, the deployment of US military forces in the region, and the presence of third countries in the Caspian Sea. Both countries do not equate the objective process of globalization with the monopoly of one country in solving international and, especially, national problems. The interests of both countries coincide in maintaining border security and combating drug trafficking coming from Afghanistan.

The main geopolitical task for Russia and Iran has acquired the character of national interest and is connected with the prevention of separatism and the disintegration of our countries along religious and ethno-confessional lines. For example, the idea of holding summits of Turkic states and creating the Commonwealth of Turkic States, as well as the work program of the international Turkic Kurultai, can be evaluated differently. However, the statement of the Turkish Prime Minister R. Erdogan at the last Kurultai in September 2006 that "the creation of the Commonwealth will allow the Turkic-speaking states to act in the international arena from a single position" [Koritsky] may strengthen separatist sentiments among the Turkic peoples of both Russia and Iran.

The latest foreign policy concepts of Iran fully correspond to the nature of interests and practical relations with Russia - both M. Khatami's concept of " dialogue of civilizations "and M. Ahmadinejad's concept of" justice and ethics " (about the unacceptability of the dictate of one power).

The economic interests of the two countries largely coincide, despite the fact that both countries are oil and gas exporters. At the current stage of development, they are mutually interested in coordinating their actions in the global energy market. Russia and Iran are also interested in implementing joint energy projects. Military cooperation between them is also mutually beneficial. For Russia, it is primarily economically beneficial, since Iran is one of the largest importers of our weapons (the third after China and India). But this aspect of cooperation, in our opinion, is much more in the interests of Iran, which is experiencing difficulties with the purchase of Western military equipment. Such cooperation also helps to solve certain geopolitical problems , both for Russia and Iran. Joint transport projects are also of equal interest. By proposing the construction of a nuclear power plant in Russia during the most difficult economic period for it, Iran has largely contributed to the maintenance of this Russian industry. Cooperation-

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Iran's cooperation with Russia is more attractive than with other countries in the region, as it has a fairly significant economic potential and a fairly diversified economy. That is why Russia supported joining in 2005. Iran joined the SCO as an observer.

However, we cannot talk about a complete coincidence of interests. Disagreements remain over the delimitation of the seabed and the natural resources of the Caspian Sea. (Iran still adheres to Russia's original position on the status of the Caspian Sea.) Russia has no major real projects in Iran, except, perhaps, for the protracted construction in Bushehr. There are no new contracts for the construction of nuclear power plants either. Russia cannot but be alarmed by Iran's use of nuclear energy as a political tool. Iran's position, while revealing weaknesses in the legal framework of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, has also made the regime less stable. There are no convincing arguments for the expediency of building more than 20 nuclear power plants in such an earthquake-prone region as Iran. In general, the Russian-Iranian trade turnover is low, only $ 2-2.5 billion. Russian capital does not actually participate in the Iranian business. At the same time, Russia, defending Iran's right to its nuclear program, risks losing its hard - won positions in the world community-not only economic, but also political positions (for example, agreements with the EU, with NATO). I would like the Iranian side to understand the interests of modern Russia, refuse to play on its former "imperial" syndrome and be able to make tactical concessions necessary for the implementation of its strategic goals. Moreover, the strategic goals of our countries generally coincide.

list of literature

Bushev P. P. Istoriya posolstv i diplomaticheskikh otnoshenii Russkogo i Iranskogo gosudarstv v 1586-1612 gg. [History of Embassies and diplomatic relations of the Russian and Iranian States in 1586-1612].

Genis V. L. Krasnaya Persia [Red Persia]. The Bolsheviks in Gilan. 1920-1921. Documentary Chronicle, Moscow: MNPI, 2000.

Koritsky S. A. The Turkic Summit in Antalya. www.iimes.ru

Mamedova N. M. Russo-iranskie ekonomicheskie otnosheniya [Russian-Iranian Economic Relations]. Iranistics in Tatarstan, Moscow: Paleya Publ., 2001.

Persits M. A. Shy intervention. About the Soviet invasion of Iran. 1920-1921 Moscow, 1996.

Pokhlebkin V. V. Tatars and Rus. 360 years of relations between Russia and the Tatar states in the XIII-XVI centuries 1238-1598 (From the battle on the Sit River to the conquest of Siberia). Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 2001.

Steinbech is on parole. Istoriya Turkii [History of Turkey], Moscow: Progress-Traditsiya Publ., 2006.

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