Almaty: Daik-Press, 2007, 296 p.

For the first time, Kazakhstan has published a study 1 that examines modern historical myth-making in relation to this country. The authors of this study analyzed a wide range of distributed printed publications, semi-official textbooks, and scientifically untenable, if not shabby, publications (including "monographs") designed to give a different legitimacy to Kazakhstan's statehood.

1 Sponsored by the im. Friedrich Ebert.

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The work opens with a detailed introduction, which examines the components of "myth-perceiving consciousness" and the circumstances of its formation. Three thematic sections are written by leading Kazakhstani scientists, each of whom is an expert on the corresponding segment of the history of the Kazakh ethnic group. The first section - "Mythologization of the problems of ethnogenesis of the Kazakh people and the Kazakh nomadic culture" - was written by the leading expert on nomadic studies N. E. Masanov (unfortunately, by the time the book was published, he had passed away); the second - " Events and people of the Kazakh Steppe (the Late Middle Ages and Modern Times) as an object of historical remystification" - by the famous researcher of that era I. V. Erofeeva; the third - "Inertia of myth-making in the coverage of the Soviet and post-Soviet history of Kazakhstan" - by Zh. B. Abylkhozhin (also the author of the introductory chapter). In fact, the reviewed monograph is an open dispute between professional scientists (historians and ethnologists), on the one hand, and those whom they call supporters of "patriotic asceticism in the name of the idea of strengthening the spirit of the nation, its high - status self-affirmation" (p.6), on the other. Even if this dispute is just beginning and its outcome is not at all a foregone conclusion, if only because historical myth-making in Kazakhstan, as in other post-Soviet states, including Russia, is an integral element of politics, including the process of nation-building with all its costs and achievements, the authors of the monograph demonstrated genuine scientific honesty by responding to the following questions: who in their country promotes outright anti-historism in relation to the main milestones of the path taken by the people of Kazakhstan.

The problems associated with the phenomenon called "myth-making" by the authors of the monograph are largely understandable to any historian who deals with the processes taking place within sovereign states in the post-Soviet space or national-territorial formations within some of these states. They are also understandable to a wide range of specialists who deal, in particular, with the history and ethnology of the post-Yugoslav space or the vast area of the Afro-Asian world. Of course, each individual "myth-making" case has its own specifics, which is expressed in dates, names of mountains, valleys, rivers, names of external enemies that even today, as "patriotic ascetics" believe, threaten their peoples and countries, as well as in the names of "great men", "national saviors", and once upon a time who changed the course of history, as well as in the names of "national traitors" who gave them up to be" torn apart "by external "enemies". The myth-making phenomenon is a worldwide phenomenon.

The section written by N. E. Masanov essentially deals with primordial ideas about the "crystallization of the Kazakh people", at least in an era separated from the present by 2500 years, that the Kazakhs "laid the foundation of the Mongoloid race", spreading from the "Kazakh Steppe" to the "islands of the Pacific Ocean", that the Kazakhs "laid the foundation of the Mongol race", and that the Kazakhs Kazakhstan as the "epicenter of the world-historical process". At the same time, there are less "global" details of the Kazakh ethnogenesis and the role of this ethnic group in world history - the" Kazakh origin "of Genghis Khan, the interpretation of the conquest of Transoxiana by the Sheibanids, the "urban" nature of the "Kazakh civilization" that spread "from the western walls of China to the Carpathians and from the tundra to Iran" - which negate the idea that that the Kazakhs were nomads. N. E. Masanov's list of "historical discoveries" made by "scientific" compatriots claiming to possess the truth is not limited to these details. It is huge and, as always happens in cases of a primordialist formulation of the question, absurd, although the propagandists of this "new view" on the history of their people and their origin are not inclined to notice this absurdity, remaining in positions of faith in their own rightness.

I. V. Erofeeva in her section examines those subjects of modern historical myth-making that relate to Kazakh-Dzungarian relations (mainly Dzungarian military and political expansion in the direction of Kazakh lands), the circumstances of the transition of Khan Abulkhair to Russian citizenship, as well as the post - Soviet interpretation of the personalities of two Kazakh rulers-Abulkhair and Abylai. It also focuses on the "details" that frame and color these stories. Did Russia provoke the Dzungarian expansion? Did Khan Abulkhair play the role of a "traitor" to Kazakh "national interests"? Were the figures of both Genghisid Khans - the overthrown Abulkhair and the exalted Abylai-antipodes from the point of view of not only historical retrospect, but also their own relationships as real actors in domestic political conflicts?-

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Are there any conflicts in the Steppe itself and in the sphere of contacts with surrounding powers, in particular the Russian Empire? The "patriots-ascetics" answer all these questions positively.

And this creates the most complete picture of where the watershed lies between a true historian and an amateur"historian" who produces not scientific knowledge, but a pseudoscientific myth that replaces it. Unlike those with whom she argues, I. V. Yerofeyeva really knows the subjects under consideration, which allows her to draw a line between representative sources (including, in particular, records of oral Kazakh folklore, as well as genealogy-shezhmre) and texts used by her opponents. She herself justifiably calls these sources "forged", "deliberately falsified" (p. 163), whether we are talking about folk songs or dostans related to certain events of Kazakh history, the authorship of which her opponents attribute to certain batyrs.

Based on her own practical, rather than theoretical, knowledge of the regional archeology of Kazakhstan, its toponymy, and local folk traditions that exist in certain regions of the country, I. V. Yerofeyeva is just as skeptical about the current heroization of the Kazakh Khans - participants of the Kazakh-Dzungarian confrontation, as this confrontation itself, which is usually presented as almost a historical event. the only reason for the subsequent movement of part of the Kazakh nobility in the direction of rapprochement with the Russian Empire, and in the future, the adoption of Russian citizenship. Her conclusion is that "in addition to intensive communication between Kazakhs and Dzungars in political and socio-economic life, both peoples closely interacted with each other in the field of military affairs and various spheres of public relations, everyday life and culture" (p. 147), is important not so much for establishing the historical truth, but for refuting the fundamental idea for "patriotic ascetics", according to which open or hidden Russian "support" for what they unconditionally qualify as "Dzungarian aggression", led to the appearance of "national traitors" among the Kazakh nobility, who helped establish the independence of the Kazakh people. Russian protectorate over the Steppe and eventually to a long stage of Russian "colonial oppression". In the context of the same idea, "national traitors" were to be confronted by "national heroes", opponents of "colonialism" and "fighters for national freedom". In other words, who should be included in the gallery of portraits of "great Kazakhs" today-Khan Abulkhair or Khan Abylai? In the Soviet era, for example, the official interpretation of the personality and activities of Khan Abulkhair could vary in a wide range from a severely negative attitude towards him to almost as a "harbinger" of the future "unity of fraternal Soviet peoples".

In the review of the famous work of I. V. Yerofeyeva " Khan Abulkhair: commander, ruler and politician "(Almaty: Sanat, 1999), in particular, it was stated that "in the post-Soviet states, as in the post-colonial countries of the East, the creation of a number of historical figures - "signs" - is capable of creating a number of historical figures... to create a national identity, implies a nomination... regional center, whose interests should prevail in the selection of those historical figures who will be included in this list"2. This means that the question of the significance of the contribution of a particular Kazakh ruler to the development of his ethnic community becomes self-sufficient when a particular regional center of modern Kazakhstan turns into a force that pulls together both the territorial space of the state and the ethnic community, which in this case is proclaimed "state-forming".

At the same time, seemingly paradoxical things may arise, which Zh.B. Abylkhozhin writes about in his section. The famine of 1932-1933 on the territory of modern Kazakhstan, interpreted by" patriotic ascetics "as a "genocide" of the Kazakhs, so that "their lands were occupied by Russian immigrants from the central regions" (p. 250), would not have become a reality, as these "ascetics" believe, if, for example, the post of the head of the State of the Republic of Kazakhstan had not become a reality. The Kazakh Regional Committee of the CPSU (b) in those years was not occupied by F. I. Goloshchekin, but by his successor L. I. Mirzoyan. More fundamentally ,the "ascetic" myth-making is framed by references to the mythical "exploits" of medieval and modern Kazakh rulers and includes them, if not in the gallery of the "fathers" of this "nation", then, at least, in the list of their "best friends".-

2 Kosach G. G. [Rec. on:] I. V. Erofeeva. Khan Abulkhair: commander, ruler and politician / / Orient (Oriens). 2000, N 3, p. 192.

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moschnikov " - "philanthropists" from the mother country, who cared about the "preservation" of this "nation". This circumstance is more significant because this kind of selective approach to Soviet leadership appointees who worked at the head of the highest party (and state) bodies of the Kazakh autonomy/union republic creates truly boundless opportunities for manipulating the historical memory of the Russian-speaking community of modern Kazakhstan (as well as its other ethnic elements). All the same circumstance opens up vast prospects for influencing the development of relations between Kazakhstan and Russia, if only because the distribution of these appointees, who never acted independently, but only implemented the central party's instructions on the parameters of "philanthropy" or "misogyny", multiplied by historical "evidence" of Russian-Russian relations between the two countries, is quite different.In addition to the imperial "encouragement" of Dzungarian "expansion" and "aggression", it perpetuates the image of Russia as the only real enemy of today's Kazakhstan and a threat to the national security of the Kazakh ethnic group.

For Zh. B. Abylkhozhin, it is important to trace a deep internal connection between the attempts of modern Kazakh " patriotic ascetics "to achieve what in the post-colonial countries of the East was usually qualified as the desire to" de-colonize history "and the constructions of" Soviet official ethnography " (p.268). (Although I will add, based on the sections written by his co-authors, that these constructions very often took their origin in some pre-revolutionary analogues.) The very possibility of this connection is defined by him as a certain consequence of the process of modern "modernization, involving the dismantling of the former economic and social structures and way of life", which "generates in the mass consciousness... aggressive reflection." In turn, the situation of this kind of "reflection" brings to life "quasi-tribalist relations" as a "tool of adaptation in the urban process" (p. 270). In addition, J. B. Abylkhozhin emphasizes that the still remaining ability of Kazakh society to produce "quasi-tribalist relations" is primarily related to the essential characteristic inherited from the era of the Soviet society, including its Kazakh offshoot, which he defines as an "agrarian (traditional) society" based "on pre-industrial, that is, natural-conditioned productive forces". forces" (p. 15).

Most likely, both N. E. Masanov and I. V. Erofeeva agree with Zh. B. Abylkhozhin's conclusion about what is the basis of modern pseudo-historical myth-making developing in Kazakhstan, although in their sections they also express their own judgments about the causes that give rise to myths and promote their spread.

Thus, according to N. E. Masanov, the possibility of existence and the ability to survive (if not to constantly revive) the myth is associated with insufficient development of the problems of Kazakh ethnogenesis and the existence of a considerable number of scientific hypotheses that develop the issues of the origin of the Kazakh ethnic group. The same author also speaks about the "discontinuity" of the very process of formation of Kazakh historical science, emphasizing that "at least three generations of specialists in the history of pre-revolutionary Kazakhstan were not formed in the country by the time it gained sovereignty", which is necessary to make this school a phenomenon based on "self-sufficiency, stability and stable development". razvitie " (p. 56). In turn, "the sovereignization of Kazakhstan based on the post-Soviet cultural and historical heritage has led to ... subjectivization in the perception of the past", when history appeared "in its deformed interpretation", playing "a negative, disorienting and differentiating role" and "fueling ethnocentrism and xenophobia" (pp. 59-60).

I. V. Erofeeva's point of view is expressed no less explicitly. She speaks about " the specifics of the Kazakh historiographical situation, which consists in the absence of nomadic Kazakhs in the pre-colonial era... developed tradition of transmitting written historical information and experience in creating handwritten historical literature... In the XVI - first half of the XIX century, almost all the historiography of Kazakhstan was represented by written sources and historical works of people who did not belong to the Kazakh ethnic group and were not relays of its own knowledge and ideas about its past." In other words, it could only be about " Russian historiography... historical events in the Kazakh steppe", which were considered "through the prism of geopolitical interests" of the empire. Even when written "works on history and ethnography" created by "the most educated representatives of the Kazakh people" appeared in the middle of the XIX century, their conclusions lay in the following areas:

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"in the general context of the scientific historiographical paradigm of that time". As a result, in modern Kazakhstan there is a " stable illusion that... the true history of the Kazakhs is still waiting to be discovered " (pp. 135-136).

Did this situation change during the Soviet era? Answering this question, Irina Erofeeva is rather pessimistic: "In the Soviet period, the subject-thematic range of historical and ethnographic problems and the general level of its scientific study... were conditioned... pragmatic needs of building a socialist society " (p. 138), i.e. the Soviet era did not eliminate the aforementioned "stable illusion", and in the era of post-Soviet development of Kazakhstan, this "illusion" turned into reality, if only because the former Soviet republic was spared the need to coordinate the paradigm of its own development with the no longer existing central government.

Speaking about the" modern historiography of Kazakhstan", N. E. Masanov, Zh. B. Abylkhozhin and I. V. Yerofeyeva refer to the pseudo-historical work of only one group of current historians of this country. Their "creativity" - a myth that has all the features of exclusivity (however, the case of F. I. Goloshchekin - L. I. Mirzoyan, ambivalent from the point of view of exclusivity-inclusivity) - is related not to science, but to politics, due to the fact that it is aimed at owning land, power and cultural heritage, openly proving (by manipulating data from archeology, history, and linguistics) the almost universal significance of the" civilization "of the ethnic group that is considered"state-forming" in Kazakhstan.

The modern historiography of Kazakhstan cannot but include the forms of modern pseudo-historical myth-making associated with its other ethnic communities, because the process of building this state (including the construction of a historical discourse recognized by all its citizens and appropriately constructed) is not at all complete. Due to this circumstance, the field of history inevitably becomes a field of confrontation between competing ethnic myths, each of which creates its own version of the historical past of the territory where sovereign Kazakhstan has now emerged, and the prospect of its further development based on it. For obvious and understandable reasons, the Kazakh historical myth has become the leading one in Kazakhstan, and the sphere of dissemination of other ethnic myths has become marginal. At the same time, the reduction in this sphere was determined, among other reasons, by the fact that the myths of the local Russian-speaking community carried a real or imaginary threat to the territorial integrity of the country.

Nevertheless, the thoughts of the authors of the monograph cited above in connection with the reasons for the appearance and persistence of the national historical myth cause vague dissatisfaction, which is reinforced by some passages of the work itself. It seems that what is said in the monograph about the" deep " reason for the appearance and spread of the myth ("agrarian" and "nature-based productive forces" society), as well as about the "discontinuity" factor in the formation of Kazakh historical science, only slightly brings us closer to understanding what the historical myth is based on as a constantly recurring phenomenon. and an expanding phenomenon.

Alas, but this myth does not grow only from the state of transition of a particular society. (However, the very arguments about the" agrarian "nature of Kazakhstan's society, in my opinion, look like a resurrection of the ideas of publicists of the time of the "democratic" spells of "glasnost"and " perestroika".) This myth is also an essential feature of the public mood that exists in the societies of developed countries that have long passed away from transition. Of course, there, at its official level, it tends to become more inclusive, which, however, does not in any way prevent the spread (in times of serious social trials) in the public environment of these countries of its more radical, if not openly racist, variants. It would be absurd, at the very least, to talk about the lack of formation of historical schools in developed countries or about the "discontinuity" of their evolution. Yet all too often these schools find themselves in a difficult position to find adequate responses to the challenges that their competitors present to them. In turn, for countries that are still looking for their place in the surrounding regional and international space, this situation becomes dangerous, primarily because a national myth can, as has happened more than once in the past, radically change the path of a country's formation.

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Probably, in science, with its numerous hypotheses and assumptions resulting from its constant search for truth, there will always be a gap between what it says and what it does not yet give a complete and reasonable answer to, creating a breeding ground for myth. This environment turns out to be extremely fruitful when a new State emerges, when it feels the need to justify its emergence and right to exist, or when an old and seemingly unquestionable State from the point of view of its own legitimacy faces a situation of deep crisis. Moreover, the professional scientist himself is sometimes forced to create a myth that seems more acceptable to his people in the interests of refuting the myth (for example, as a publicist).

N. E. Masanov, a subtle and profound expert of Kazakh nomadism, who created a national and internationally recognized school of nomadic studies, could, as the text of the monograph proves, for example, create a hymn to the nomadic past of his people. His words: "We are nomads! We are nomads! We are Kazakhs!" (p. 122) - a vivid confirmation of this. But did the scientist not act within the framework of creating a myth when he interpreted Islam as "an immanent phenomenon of Arab culture" (p. 121), when he spoke of Kazakh shamanism as a phenomenon that grew out of the fact that the Kazakh ethnic community occupied "the middle space between civilizations and cultures" (p. 122)? In his case, the great myth, designed to emphasize the true meaning of the people, corresponded to a primitive myth, becoming an instrument of action, a struggle to change public attitudes, to ensure that Kazakhstan enters the modern world, proud of its real heritage, and not fictitious proofs and vicious symbols of far-fetched, and therefore false and false "greatness". The myth of N. E. Masanov stemmed from a love (but "strange", according to the Russian classic) for his homeland.

It is this idea of "strange love" that permeates the entire monograph. However, in my opinion, the main thing is that a professional historian is obliged to fight for the autonomy of his craft, to tell the truth to the "patriotic ascetics" and the politicians behind them. While maintaining his dignity, he is obliged to describe the processes taking place around him, so that his work contributes to their objective understanding by the society of which this historian will remain a part forever.

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