The Ottoman period of Egyptian history is traditionally divided into three stages: the strong Ottoman power (XVI century), the weakening of this power and the position of the Ottoman administration (XVII century), and the transfer of power to the Mamluks (XVIII century). But the historical dynamics of the development of Ottoman Egypt can also be considered from the point of view of fluctuations and fluctuations in the evolution of political and social processes. One of the main goals of this article was to show the high level of state and social development of Egypt during the Ottoman period. This allows us in the next article to focus on the proof of the position that according to the political-anthropological scale of comparison of the evolutionary level of states, Egypt can be considered a developed state even before the Ottoman conquest and that it remained so throughout the entire period of Turkish rule, including the era of the protracted crisis of the last quarter of

In the Ottoman period of Egypt's development (1517-1798), many researchers distinguish three major stages. These stages generally coincide with the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, respectively [Cambridge..., 1998; Shaw, 1962, p. 3 - 5]. The general chronology of stages can be presented as follows.

The first stage-from 1517 to the end of the XVI century (conditionally until 1587), i.e. from the conquest of Egypt to the beginning of rebellions in the Turkish military corps. Several years after the conquest of the country (1517-1525) were quite turbulent and led to an economic decline associated, in particular, with changes in the monetary and tax system, as well as in the system of weights and measures [Winter, 1992, p. 11], but after the suppression of rebellions and the restructuring of socio-political life, a calm period begins and an economically prosperous era. The Mamluks did not play a major role in the life of Egypt during this period [Winter, 1998 (1)].

The second stage - the end of the XVI-beginning of the XVIII century (approximately 1587-1711), a period of weakening of the power and influence of Turkey in Egypt, at times-a period of deep economic and social crises and unrest. The beginning of a return to the tax payoff system. This period opens with mutinies of troops dissatisfied with the actual reduction of their salary and its delays, and also ends with mutinies at the end of the XVII and beginning of the XVIII centuries, among which the uprising of 1707-1711 was called the "Great Indignation". But unlike a century ago, it was more like a real war between elites (i.e., in fact, military groups) for the leading position [Marsot, 2004, p. 43]. This is a time of gradual rise of the Mamluks in their rivalry and at the same time alliance with the Turkish military elites.

The third stage was the 18th century (from 1711 to 1798), the period of the final weakening of Turkish power and the rise of Mamluk houses. Then the active struggle for power began-

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It also occurs within the victorious Mamluk houses, resulting in a transition to individual domination by individual people [Crecelius, 1998, p. 59]. A regime of personal power is established, sometimes in fact a regime of military dictatorship, although always disguised by the possession of a legitimate position. Periods of solid power, however, were often followed by years of hard and fairly bloody power struggles. Internal conflicts became particularly acute in the last third of the 18th century. However, in general, it is at this time that the very uneven process of forming a new, almost autonomous Egyptian state begins, including attempts to gain full independence from Turkey. The latter was caused in the 1770s. the war of Egypt with Turkey, and in 1786-the invasion of Turkish troops in Egypt to restore Ottoman rule there. The last third of the XVIII century was marked by a severe and prolonged socio-economic and political-demographic crisis ['Awad, 1925, p. 41-53; Rafi'i, 1929 (1), p. 9-62; Husain, 1981, p. 30-48; Korotaev, 2006], which caused significant changes in the social structure of society and the worldview of its most active strata, which prepared the conditions for the transformation of the Egyptian state in the XIX century. At the end of the 18th century, the French invaded Egypt, and their expulsion ultimately led to the fall of the Mamluks [Rif'at, 1920, p. 39-40; Rafi'i, 1930, p. 102-128; Sa'id, 1959, p. 50-51; Husain, 1981, p. 135-137; Jamal, Ibrahim, 1995, p. 133-134; Rajabi, 1997, p. 94-114; al-Bitrik, 1999, p. 25-26] and the coming to power of Muhammad Ali," the last Mamluk", in the words of A. Marceau 1.

It should be taken into account that many socio-economic and even political processes in Egypt in the XVI-XVIII centuries were local variations of general Ottoman processes [Holt, 1969, p. 23]. So, the XVI century was prosperous not only for him, but for the entire empire, and at the end of the XVI - beginning of the XVII century.it began an economic crisis and everywhere, including Egypt, there were military riots and unrest. In the 17th century, the transition from a military type of state in Turkey to a bureaucratic one was underway [Hathaway, 1998(1), p. 34], which also affected the political situation in Egypt. The buyout system in the XVII-XVIII centuries. It has spread to many provinces of Turkey. There is also a close connection between the changes in Ottoman provincial politics that occurred in the 17th century and the rise of provincial elites in the 18th century, including in Egypt (Piterberg, 1990). However, many of these general Ottoman phenomena acquired specific features in Egypt, which is not surprising, since Egypt was the largest [Winter, 1998(1), p. 3] and the most developed province of the Ottoman Porte [Rafi'i, 1929(1), p. 9-62; Yahya, 1969, p. 127-212]. Husain, 1981, pp. 9-19; Muhammad, 1985, p. 159-279; Ahmed, 1987 (1); Jamal and Ibrahim, 1995, pp. 24-39; Crecelius, 1998, p. 59]. In addition, from the very moment of the occupation, the Ottomans considered Egypt as a special case, a special part of the empire, so not all Ottoman institutions were implemented in Egypt (Winter, 1998(1), p. 3-4).

RAISING THE LEVEL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND ECONOMIC LIFE

For an adequate understanding of this stage, it is necessary to take into account the general dynamics of the previous Mamluk period, with a brief overview of which we will begin this section. The first century of Mamluk rule as a whole was a time of socio-economic recovery of the country, which was also associated with the growth of

1 Naturally, there are discrepancies in the attribution of certain events to a particular period. Michael Winter identifies as a separate period the end of the XVII-beginning of the XVIII century, characterized by turbulent events and the struggle of military groups; and he has four periods [Winter, 1992, p. 18]. Others single out separately the period of the conquest of Egypt by the Turks (1517-1525) [Holt, 1968, p. 83-90]. But in general, the overall picture remains roughly the same.

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the significance of Egypt as the most important crossroads of trade routes between the West and the East [Marzouk, B. D., pp. 326-334; Surur, 1947, pp. 281-342; Sa'id 'Ashur, 1959, pp. 198-214]. However, since 1347, the socio-economic situation in Egypt began to deteriorate [Qasim, 1998, pp. 342-377; Korotaev, 2006; Shoshan, 1978, 1982] 2. The "Black Death" and the subsequent chain of new catastrophic plague epidemics, the inability of the authorities to protect the population from the raids of Bedouin tribes, the growth of taxes and illegal fees the luxury of the elite against the background of impoverishment of the population and other negative factors created an economic and spiritual crisis in society and caused a decline in the prestige of the Mamluks [Ahmed, 1987(2), p. 15-17; Haredi, 2000, p. 145-147; Ayalon, 1988, p. 29-30; Ayalon, 1993; Garsin, 1998, p. 316-317; McGregor, 2006, p. 17-19; Petry, 1994].

According to N. A. Ivanov [1984, p. 16], "social insanity" deepened in the country, which was facilitated by the internecine struggle of pretenders to the throne and the rapid change of ruling dynasties and rulers [Abd al-Sayyid, 1966; Winter, 1998(2), p. 494]. It is known that Ibn Khaldun wrote [Ibn Khaldun, 1958; Ibn Khaldun, 2004; see also: Korotaev, 2006; Korotaev, 2007; Turchin, 2007, pp. 188-194]. The Mamluks were not able to effectively oppose the expansion of Portugal, which was growing stronger at the beginning of the XVI century on the trade route to India [Ahmed, 1987(2), p. 17-19; Abd al-Dayim, 1996, p. 165-171; McGregor, 2006, p. 19-22; Petry, 1998, p. 465 - 467]. This completely undermined their respect for them, and at the same time, the authority of the Ottoman Turks as defenders of Islam grew. As a result, the Egyptians began to wait for the latter as liberators who could restore order, raise the prestige of the faith, and ease taxes and levies [Ivanov, 1984, p. 37]. In 1516, the Mamluks were defeated in Syria, and in early 1517-on the outskirts of Cairo (Ahmed, 1987(2), pp. 25-33; Winter 1998(2); McGregor, 2006). The huge Mamluk caliphate fell, and Egypt became a Turkish province [Haredi, 2000, p. 114-144; Winter, 1998(2), p. 494; McGregor, 2006, p. 22-26; Hess, 1973]. Colossal booty was transported to Istanbul by a caravan of a thousand camels (ash-Sharqawi, 1956, p. 9-10; an-Nimnim, 1995; McGregor, 2006, p. 26).

The new conquerors-the Ottomans-made significant changes in the management, property and tax relations of Egyptian society. The land holdings of Mamluks and other well-off strata were confiscated, and all their tax privileges and immunities were abolished [Khusain, 1981, p. 31; Ivanov, 1984, p. 380; Zelenev, 2003, p.23; Winter, 1992, p. 11]. Taxes were greatly reduced, the tax collection system that led to great abuses was eliminated, and any levies or "gifts" from the population were prohibited [Abd al-Dayim, 1996, p.230; Shaw, 1962, p. 20]. The land was given to the peasants for life use [Ivanov, 1984, p. 206-207; Zelenev, 1999, p. 170], and it was even allowed to transfer this right by inheritance [Shaw, 1962, p.21]. This, however, has become not only the right of the Fellahs, but also their rather heavy duty [Shaw, 1962, p. 20]. To a large extent, the housing stock in cities was socialized, and fixed prices for goods were set, as a result of which " the Ayyans, representatives of the well-to-do stratum of the urban patriciate, suffered seriously. They lost their privileged position, lost their former influence and a significant part of their property" (Ivanov, 1984, p. 4). 207]. According to N. A. Ivanov [1984, pp. 206-207], with whom one can largely agree-

2 347 - not a random date, but the beginning of a wave of plague epidemics for Egypt. From 1331 to 1346, the plague spread from Asia to Europe in different ways (McNeill, 1998, pp. 176-177), and Egypt, located at the crossroads of three continents, certainly could not avoid this global disaster. Only during the 135-year period of Circassian Mamluk rule (1382-1517), plague epidemics were observed in Egypt 16 times, i.e. on average every 8 years [Korotaev, 2006, p. 601. For more details on the impact of epidemics on the socio-demographic dynamics of Egypt in the XIV-XV centuries, see: [Dols, 1977; Borsch, 2004; Borsch, 2005; Shoshan, 1978, 19821.

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However, all these changes meant a serious social upheaval, which was expressed primarily in a radical restructuring of agrarian relations, as a result of which the feudal ruling class of medieval Arab society was eliminated3.At the same time, this "peasant" policy should not be idealized, since the fellahs were largely attached to their plots, those who left them were returned by force, and strict sanctions were imposed for evading their duties [Shaw, 1962, p. 20].

The new authorities began to struggle to restore basic order in the country - in particular, very strict measures were taken against the outrages of Bedouins, up to awards for their heads. For a time, such security was established in the country that, according to Ibn Iyas, " the wolf and the lamb could walk together." by: Ivanov, 1984, p. 42; see also: Shaw, 1962, p. 4]. The court was also reformed [al-Sayyid, 1997, p. 385-428; Abd al-Dayim, 1996, p. 222-225; ' Isa, al-Mahmoudi, 2000; Winter, 1992, p. 11-12; Winter, 1998(2), p. 509-510; Nappa 1995(2)], which became much closer to the population, including rural ones, and most importantly, according to the Turkish model, a hierarchy of judges-kadis was established, i.e. "a strictly subordinated Sharia organization is a new and completely unique phenomenon in the history of Islam" [Ivanov, 1993, p. 242; see also: Winter, 1998(2), p. 509-510; Hanna, 1995 (2)].

Easing the situation of farmers and, to a certain extent, taking care of them, as well as active intervention in local technical, administrative and tax practices, which ensured a fairly effective restoration of elementary order in it [Winter, 1998(2), p. 516; Winter, 1998 (1), p. 4], as well as the policy of settling vacant land large-scale irrigation works(Winter, 1998 (1), p.4; Shaw, 1962, p. 19-20) led to an increase in agricultural production and an increase in the rural population in the first decades of Ottoman rule (Ivanov, 1984, p. 212; Shaw, 1962, p. 19). In general, "for two generations Egypt has enjoyed peace and quiet", remaining a "docile and prosperous" province [Ivanov, 1984, p. 47; and Holt, 1961, p. 216; Marsot, 2004, p. 41], and Egypt has experienced a noticeable economic and demographic growth [Hathaway, 1997, p. 7; Cuno, 2000, p. 96; Shaw, 1962, p. 18].

Turkish Sultan Selim I Yauz (Grozny) (1512-1520) died three years after the conquest of Egypt. The new Sultan Suleiman I Kanuni (Legislator) (1520-1566), nicknamed the Magnificent by Europeans, abandoned the policy of autonomy of Egypt and headed for its "Ottomanization". This caused a revolt in 1523-1524 [Winter, 1992; Winter, 1998(2), p. 513-515; McGregor, 2006, p. 28-29]. After its brutal suppression, Egypt was given the" basic law", the Kanunnameh Misr (Misir Kanunnamesi, i.e. the " Book of the Laws of Egypt "[Kanunnameh-i Misr, 1986]), which was in force for almost three centuries, in fact until the reign of Muhammad Ali, while maintaining its influence on the Egyptian political and legal system in the future [Al-Sayyid, 1997, p. 129-135; Winter, 1992, p. 16]. The laws of Suleiman I, along with the general Ottoman administrative ideas, at the same time absorbed much of the former norms that existed in Mamluk Egypt [Winter, 1992, p.16; 1998(2), p. 515-516]. For the full text of this normative act, translated into Arabic, see [Kanunnameh - i Misr, 1986].

In general, the 16th century, despite the inevitable negative aspects and excesses of the occupation [see: an-Nimnim, 1995], can be estimated as a time of beneficial influence of the Turkish government on the statehood and economic state of Egypt (compare, for example: [Winter, 1998(1), p.5-6]).

3 Such measures, as well as a certain concern for farmers, were generally characteristic of the early Turkish ideology and policy [see: Ivanov, 1984, p. 202-211; and also: Oreshkova, 1982, p. 121; Zelenev, 1999, p.169-170].

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But the "Ottomanization" of Egypt did not mean total control from Istanbul. On the contrary, according to M. Winter, the Ottomans were pragmatists and realized that the special nature of the Egyptian economy requires minimal intervention in its management [Winter, 1992, p. 17]. Therefore, they had sufficient control over only a few state functions, leaving others in a more free regime [Nappa, 1995 (1), p. 3]. But we also think that the special development of Egypt in comparison with other provinces greatly contributed to this. Such a mixed system of governance also led to the fact that the Turks did not interfere much in the management of smaller administrative units within Egypt (sanjaks), and even more so at a lower administrative level [see Atsamba, 1991, p. 124]. At the same time, they actively relied on local traditions of power, which to a large extent became an important reason for the future "renaissance" of Mamluk houses, which retained their influence locally. The Turks also appointed tribal sheikhs as chiefs of certain districts and counties [Winter, 1998(1), p. 22].

The most important management institution and pillar of Ottoman power in Egypt were located there seven military formations (conditionally-corps), which were called ojaks (or foci), including the Mamluk (Circassian) corps [Muhammad, 1985; Abd al-Dayim, 1996, pp. 216-220; as-Sayyid, 1997, p. 285-356; Kharidi, 2000, pp. 223-232]. Initially, the most important of all the Ojaks was the Janissary.

According to the Kanun Nama Misr, the governorship of the province of Egypt was supposed to be a governor appointed from Istanbul, who was originally called beiler bey, and since the 17th century-vali; the Egyptians often also called him the honorary title of pasha [see Pasha].: Husain, 1981, pp. 11-12; Abd al-Dayim, 1996, pp. 210-213; Shaw, 1962, p. 1; Shaw, 1964, p. 4; Atsamba, 1991, p. 110]. His term of office was only one year, but sometimes governors stayed for several fokas. The Pasha headed the province together with his deputy and several senior officials (including the Chief Treasurer and Chief Judge), who were also appointed from Istanbul and therefore not directly subordinate to him [Muhammad, 1985, p.161-171; as - Sayyid, 1997, p. 166-175; Haridi, 2000, p. 149-167]. These officials formed a kind of government, or small divan, which was supposed to work almost daily. There was also an extended (large) divan, which met four times a week and included the heads of a number of important corporations and the commanders (or representatives) of seven military corps that played an important role in the life of Egypt, but were not directly subordinate to the governor. The main decisions had to be approved by a small or large divan, which in some cases could even displace the pasha [see: ash-Sharqawi, 1956, p. 40; Husayn, 1981, p. 16; Abd al-Dayim, 1996, p. 220-222; as-Sayyid, 1997, p. 182-194; Haredi, 2000, p. 168-169; Atsamba, 1991, p. 122-123].

To understand the specifics of the governance system in Egypt, it is very important to keep in mind that on the Eve of Nam Misr, a peculiar system of checks and balances was provided within the hierarchy of Turkish officials. This primarily concerned the balance in the distribution of authority and real power between the pasha and members of the divan (including military commanders), many of whom were also appointed directly from Istanbul. This was done by the Turkish government out of fear that the pasha in Egypt would not gain too much power (which could lead to the province falling away from the empire). And in the Sanjak districts of Egypt, the role of a certain counterweight to the Turkish military was often played by the Mamluks (later they became, however, the main "players" on the central political scene). Such a system did not allow anyone in Egypt to have too much power personally (see Shaw, 1962; Nappa, 1995(1), p. 3,5; Atsamba, 1991;Zelenev, 2003)) .4
4 This was good under the firm rule of Istanbul and the Empire, but bad when it was weakened. In the latter case, in the words of the Arab historian Zeyn N. Zeyn, " the Arabs suffered not so much from the excess of Turkish rule, but because it was not enough! "[cit. by: Ivanov, 1984, pp. 203-2041.

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In contrast to the "Mamluk" (13th-15th centuries) period of Egyptian history that preceded it, which is exceptionally rich in historical sources, most of the Ottoman period is very poor in them and therefore remains rather obscure in terms of our knowledge of it [Winter, 1998(1), pp. 1-2; Holt, 1961, p. 214; Kimche, 1968, p. 448; Ayalon, 1987, p. 144; Piterberg, 1990, p. 282; Meyer, 1984, p. 34]. This is especially true in the sixteenth century, where many of the processes remain largely unclear. This, in particular, concerns the evolution of the position of the Mamluks, whose economic power was temporarily eroded. It is known that in the first years after the Turkish conquest, the former owners of Egypt had quite a hard time. Many of them were executed, while others were completely impoverished [Zelenev, 2003, p. 23; McGregor, 2006, p. 25]. However, loyal Mamluks were soon pardoned [Hathaway, 1995, p. 39; Atsamba, 1991, p. 109], many of them were enlisted in the special "Circassian" corps, while others were assigned to the Turkish military corps [Muhammad, 1985, p.33-51]. As M. writes: Winter, the Ottomans realized that it would be wasteful to kill such excellent warriors, who were not equal among the Ottoman cavalrymen [Winter, 1998(2), p. 511]. Mamluks began to receive monetary salaries. Some of them took up positions in the provincial government, including the administration of districts (sanjaks).

Thus, although the Mamluks played a secondary role in the sixteenth century [see: Holt, 1961, p.218], they managed to integrate into the new system. This was also facilitated by the general flexibility of Mamluk institutions [Petry, 1998, p. 489], the high degree of cohesion within Mamluk houses, and the fact that Mamluks knew Egyptian life better than the military and officials from Turkey, who often changed their places of service [Marsot, 2004, p. 42; Zelenev, 2003, p. 44]. Thanks to all this, the Mamluks, it seems, were able to survive in the conditions of losing their former incomes and then rise again to the heights of power. Since the Mamluks in the XVI-XVIII centuries. (as, however, before) acquired mainly in the Caucasus, they are often referred to in literature as Circassians or Circassian Mamluks. However, there were many people of other nationalities among them (from almost all regions of Turkey and neighboring countries), whose number increased in the XVIII century.

FORMATION OF A NEW POLITICAL REGIME

To understand the political processes that took place in Egypt, it is very important to take into account the economic changes that greatly influenced the evolution of the Egyptian political system, and often acted as the most important driving force and source of these changes. This also applies to the inflationary and economic crisis of the late 16th and early 17th centuries, and the transition from direct tax collection to pay-offs in the 17th century [Cuno, 1992], and the growth of this system with the transformation of many pay-offs into lifelong and hereditary ones in the 18th century [Cuno, 1992; Marsot, 2004; Shaw, 1962]. and the deterioration of the trade situation in the XVIII century, which led to a change in the behavior of the population and Mamluks [Marsot, 2004; Marsot, 2005; Hanna, 1995(1); Hanna, 1995(2); see also: Ayalon, 1960, p. 156-157; Kilberg, 1978, p.7].

In the last decades of the 16th century, the prosperous period of Turkish history ends. One of the main reasons for this was the so-called price revolution, i.e. a sharp increase in prices as a result of the massive import of gold and silver from the New World to Europe. As a result of rapid inflation, the economic situation in the Turkish Empire is rapidly deteriorating [Hathaway, 1998(1), p. 34; Goldstone, 1988]. Prices in 1585-1586, i.e. by the end of the XVI century, compared with prices at the end of the XV century (primarily for food) rose 1.8 times, and at the beginning of the XVII century (1604-1605) - 4.7 times. And the real value of silver, respectively, fell 2.5 times during this period [Barkan and McCarthy, 1975, p. 9, 15-16]. The most dangerous consequence of rising prices was that re --

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the nominal salary of the troops, at a fixed nominal level, was sharply reduced, and the government was unable to change the situation.5 Riots, local uprisings, mutinies, and military unrest became a widespread phenomenon in the empire (Barkan and McCarthy, 1975, p. 3; Goldstone, 1988). In particular, five military revolts took place in Egypt in 1587-1605 [Ivanov and Oreshkova, 2000, p. 90; see also: Holt, 1961, p. 217; Holt, 1969, p. 71, etc.]. And in 1609, the rebellious Mamluks captured the city of Tanta in Lower Egypt and tried to proclaim the creation of a new state. an independent Mamluk sultanate [Ivanov and Oreshkova, 2000, p. 90; see also: Holt, 1961, p. 218]. The chronicler Ibn Abi-s-Surur estimated the suppression of this rebellion as the second conquest of Egypt by the Ottomans [see: Holt, 1961, p. 218].

The long period of unrest and revolt of 1587-1609 in Egypt finally ended. The situation in the empire temporarily stabilized, but the position of the Turks in the provinces still weakened. In Egypt, this was reflected in the fall of the real power of the Pasha [Hathaway, 1998 (1); Crecelius, 1998, p. 61; Holt, 1961, p. 218]. Cases of his actual overthrow and refusal to accept a new pasha have become more frequent. In order to be able to control the situation, the governors were forced to intrigue, maneuver between various influential groups, push them against each other, including involving the Mamluks in suppressing Janissary riots [Zelenev, 2003, p.44], as well as to perform certain functions. As a result, the Mamluks became an increasingly important factor in the political system in Egypt, which marked the beginning of their new rise [see: Holt, 1961, p.218].

Thus, the primary balance of power in Egypt, established after the Turkish conquest, was disrupted, the supreme power was weakened, and the country's real autonomy was strengthened. Most of all, the Mamluks have benefited from this change, and as a result, the influence of large Mamluk houses gradually increases, whose members take up various positions in the army, local provincial and central government. According to some sources, the number of Mamluk corps increases to three (Marsot, 2004, p. 42; Zelenev, 2003, p. 44). And in connection with the transition from direct tax collection by officials to a system of payoffs that was outlined in the XVII century, they begin to revive their economic power, since it was the Mamluks who mainly concentrated the payoffs in their hands, which also allowed them to control land relations and influence the population.6
Gradually, in Egypt in the 17th century, a new political regime was formed and strengthened, although not approved by any law, but quite real and viable, which actually existed until the French occupation of Egypt in 1798 [Marsot, 2004, p. 44]. At the same time, the political and administrative structures approved by Qanun Nam Misr continued to operate officially in Egypt. The new system was born in the process of struggle for the distribution of resources and critical posts in conditions when the Pasha had weak positions, and many of the purely Ottoman posts were controlled by the Mamluks.

5 The situation was further complicated by the fact that the Ottoman system of finance and expenditure was a kind of hostage to its own complexity and inflexibility (for the complexity of this budget system, see, for example, [Shaw, 1968, p. 3-4). As a result, the system was not flexible enough in the face of inflation, since all expenses were scheduled once and for all, and changing them was not easy.

6 The farmers themselves were called iltisams, and the farmers were called multasim. The system of bailouts became increasingly widespread in the 17th century, and in the 18th century. she became the lead [Hathaway, 1995, p. 39; 1997, p. 9; 1998(2), p. 108; Piterberg, 1990, p. 285; Baer, 1962, p. 1-2; 1969, p. 621. In addition, the payoffs were made from temporary life-long ones (Malikians) with a pre-emptive transfer right inherited [Ivanov, 2000, p.414; see also Cuno, 1992, p. 27; Marsot, 2004; Shaw, 1962].

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The new political regime is often called beylikat (sometimes emirate), after the titles of the most prominent Mamluk beys (or emirs/amirs), since approximately two dozen Mamluk beys formed the highest political circle capable of influencing the most important processes in Egypt.7 The title of bey was one of the highest ranks (positions) in the Ottoman Empire. The titles of beys and corresponding monetary salaries were also given to the Mamluk elite in the first half of the 16th century, during the time of Suleiman I the Magnificent; however, according to M. Winter [Winter, 1998(1), p. 12], it is necessary to distinguish between the titles of beys of Ottoman and Mamluk origin. It should also be taken into account that these titles were not hereditary, but had to be approved by the general Egyptian divan, so the personal composition of beys changed significantly depending on the results of their struggle for influence and in connection with other events. But in one way or another, these Mamluk beys, or rather the houses they represented or headed, created their own large military forces; gradually concentrated large amounts of money, many military and civilian posts in their hands; entered the Egyptian and provincial divans, etc.8
In general, they could really influence all major political and economic events in the country9. The economic basis of the beylikat system, in addition to the tax-paying system, was control over the most lucrative posts. 10
In general, the beylikat was a system of unofficial, but quite real power of the oligarchy of the largest Mamluk houses ("club of Mamluk nobility", in the words of E. I. Zelenev), which were close to the Ottoman governor, but were not officially included in any of the seven Turkish military formations (Zelenev, 2003, p.44). At the same time, among such houses, two of the largest are distinguished (Faqariyya and Qasimiyya), who fought among themselves for the highest posts, and then for power in Egypt [Hathaway, 1998(1); Hathaway, 1998 (2); Crecelius, 1998, p. 63; Holt, 1961, p. 218-219 Winter, 1992, p. 21]. The most prominent representative of the seventeenth-century beylikat is considered to be Ridwan bey al-Faqari, head of the House of al-Faqariyya, who held the post of head of the pilgrim caravan for a quarter of a century (1631-1656), until his death [Winter, 1992, p.21], and was the de facto head of state [Marsot, 2004, p. 43]. Thus, the beylikat system significantly compensated for the segmentation of Mamluk society, in which each large household was self-sufficient and independent [Philipp, 1998, p. 122].

Since the Turkish regime remained primarily a military one, where key positions were held by the military [Ivanov, 1982, p. 144], it was quite natural that as a result of its weakening, the Mamluk military class came to power. However, their position was not yet so significant that they could claim monopoly power in the country. The Beylikat remained fairly strong until the middle of the 17th century, but after the death of the aforementioned Ridwan bey al-Faqari, the struggle between the houses began

7 There are many ambiguities with the actual number of Mamluk beys, but the number 24 is often called, of which 12 were the main (two-bunchukovs), and 12 were their deputies [Atsamba, 1991, p.119].

8 The Mamluks also "privatized" the courts, which often worked directly in their homes, and also set up home prisons, where they threw their enemies [see: Hanna, 1995(2), p. 56-57].

9 Here it should be borne in mind that representatives of this upper and narrow circle, occupying leading positions and living mostly in Cairo and other major cities, had constant opportunities for close official and unofficial contacts, and often were simply obliged to solve various issues together.

The 10 most important posts were considered to be: head of the pilgrim caravan, head of security of the tax delivery caravan to Istanbul, head of ports, and some others [Muhammad, 1985, p. 173-257]. It is worth noting that there was an exceptionally direct link between the volume of income and the power of houses. The higher the income, the more slaves they could buy at home and the more warriors they had. As for payoffs, as already mentioned, they gradually became life-long from temporary ones.

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al-Faqariyyah and al-Qasimiyyah led not only to their temporary weakening, but to the weakening of the Beyliqat regime as a whole. As a result, the position of Turkey was partially strengthened, but especially the janissary elite [Marsot, 2004, p. 43], which included Kuchuk Mehmed, who controlled power in Egypt from 1676 to 1694 [Zelenev, 2003, p.47], and several other dictators. This, however, was a harbinger of the transition to the dictatorship regime in the next, XVIII century.

Thus, it should be borne in mind that along with the Mamluks in the XVII century, another category of military personnel - Turkish garrisons (especially janissaries) - was growing stronger. However, it is important to keep in mind that these two types of military power were not strictly separated from each other (see, for example, [Hathaway, 1995; 1998(2)]; for the complex processes of interaction and formation of these elites, see also [Piterberg, 1990]). Firstly, the Mamluks were part of almost all Turkish corps [Piterberg, 1990, p. 282; Zelenev, 2003, p. 287] and held high positions in them; secondly, the corps system also included Mamluk corps, one of which was formed from the Mamluks of the Ottoman governor [Cuno, 1985,p. 287]. p. 29]. In addition, the Mamluks also had many clients among Ojac soldiers and officers (Hathaway, 1998 (2), p. 108; Marsot, 2004).

Thus, in the 17th and early 18th centuries, Egypt had two military classes: the Ojak military corps (primarily janissaries) and the Mamluks, who competed for influence and supreme power in the country. At the same time, in the 17th century, there is a complex dynamic both in the rivalry and success of these two military elites, and in their gradual symbiosis. In the course of this competition, more or less long-term alliances of Mamluk houses with janissaries and other Ojaks were formed, which could also be complicated by alliances with nomadic tribes [see: Zelenev, 2003, p.46]. Therefore, the political system of Egypt in the 17th century could more accurately be called the regime of a military oligarchy, in which at times the Mamluks prevailed, at times the janissaries, but gradually the vector of development led to the fact that the positions of the Ottoman military weakened, and the Mamluk houses grew stronger. Perhaps this result is due to the stronger economic position of the Mamluks and the strong local connections of the Mamluk houses.

The crisis of the seventeenth century was further compounded by a series of catastrophic epidemics (most notably the plague), which affected Egypt in the first half of the twentieth century. 1602, 1609, 1619, 1621 - 1622, 1624, 1626, 1630 - 1631, 1642 - 1643, 1646, 1653 - 1654, 1656, 1668, 1671, 1677, 1685 - 1686 1692 and 1700-1701 [Ibrahim, 1998, p. 299-302; see also: Ahmed, 1987(1), p. 234-239; Haredi, 2000, p. 369-377]. It should be noted that, as was shown by S. J. Borsch (2004) in relation to the "Black Death" era, the demographic collapse in Egypt in the second half of the XIV - XV centuries did not lead to an increase in the level of consumption of the ordinary population (as it was observed during previous demographic collapses [see: Korotaev, 2006]). and to its lowering. The fact is that unlike the previous demographic collapses of the Islamic era, which were accompanied by a fairly rapid stabilization and the beginning of recovery growth, the recovery growth after the "Black Death" of the middle of the XIV century was constantly interrupted by more and more epidemic waves, which led to an ever-increasing reduction in the country's population. As a result, there was an increasing shortage of the manpower needed to maintain Egypt's irrigation systems. As a result, a very significant part of these irrigation systems declined, and in the second half of the 14th and 15th centuries, the area of cultivated land - and consequently the amount of food produced in the country-declined even more than the population. This led to a decrease in food production per capita - and, accordingly, to a decrease in the level of per capita consumption - and, in general, to the strongest economic growth in the world.-

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the crisis [Borsch, 2004; Borsch, 2005]. There is every reason to assume that the catastrophic series of epidemics of the XVII century also led to similar consequences. [for more information, see Korotaev, 2006].

In the late 17th and early 18th centuries. Egypt once again experienced a strong (according to N. A. Ivanov's definition, even unprecedented) disorder of economic life and the depreciation of money. This increased the intensity of political passions and struggles between different forces, for example, between the Turkish army corps (in particular, the Janissaries, on the one hand, and the coalition of other corps, on the other). These groups were joined by the aforementioned Mamluk groups al-Faqariyya and al-Qasimiyya. The struggle between such coalitions in 1707-1711 eventually ended in a real war in Cairo, where clashes continued from March to June 1711 [Ivanov, 2000, pp. 408-409]. As a result of these bloody events, the warring corps first lost their leaders, and then lost their positions, and the resulting vacuum was again occupied by the Mamluks [Marsot, 2004, p. 44].

In the future, the weakening of the Ojaks forced the Turkish government to attract Mamluk military forces to solve various tasks, which contributed to their strengthening. Therefore, the political system of the beylikat once again acquired the most important importance in the life of Egypt and maintained it until the French occupation, and in an even more pronounced form than in the XVII century, namely, with the establishment of control over all seven military corps in Egypt and over its main resources [Marsot, 2004, p. 44; Zelenev, 2003, p. 50]. Thus, we can agree with S. Shaw that the history of Ottoman Egypt is a history of repeated conflicts between members of military associations and between them and representatives of the Porte in Egypt, conflicts centered on the desire to control the government hierarchy and sources of wealth or income [Shaw, 1962, p.3].

BEGINNING OF THE TURN TO THE NEW EGYPTIAN STATE

The events of 1711 marked the beginning of a new stage, characterized by the following changes:: a) the tendency to complete domination of the Mamluks, to turn them into the leading military force in Egypt, while simultaneously reducing the importance of Turkish military garrisons; b) an even greater decline in the power of the Pasha [Crecelius, 1998, p. 61]; c) the appearance of the highest position officially recognized by Istanbul in the country - Sheikh al-Balad, which was occupied by janissaries Crecelius, 1998, p. 62]; d) the strengthening of the tendency to create a de facto independent (from the Ottoman Empire) polity [Rafi'i, 1929(1), p. 9-62; Yahya, 1969, p. 213-310; Husain, 1981, p. 19-48], but with a not entirely clear type of political regime. This situation facilitated the transition, according to D. Crecelius, from the domination of Mamluk houses to the individual rule of individual people [Crecelius, 1998, p. 59] - in other words, the transformation of the beylikat from a system of oligarchic rule to a regime of personal dictatorship (sometimes in the form of a duumvirate or triumvirate).

The system of dictatorship also changed the way Mamluk beys-emirs were appointed in the late 1820s. If earlier this was somehow controlled by the Ottoman authorities, and, as a rule, ranks were assigned to the general Egyptian divan only for a year, after which they were re-approved or appointed to another position [Atsamba, 1991, p. 119], then dictators began to promote their proteges to these positions, or even directly appoint them [Hathaway, 1995, p. 44; Hathaway, 1998(2), p. 115]. In particular, in the last decades of the 18th century, the majority of Circassian beys were from the house of Kazdukhli [ibid.; see also: Kilberg, 1978, p. 11], although until the middle of the 18th century, none of its representatives were included in the beylikat and did not bear the title of bey [Zelenev, 2003, p.47].

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The period of 1711-1730 was characterized by Mamluk feuds, during which the previously leading Mamluk house of al-Qasimiyyah lost its former importance, and the house of al-Faqariyah split into warring groups after defeating the house of al-Qasimiyyah. As a result, the third group, the house of Qazduhli (al - Qazduhliyya), became stronger, and a new type of dictator, Ibrahim-Qahya al-Qazduhli (1744-1754), emerged from it11. Under him, according to a member of the Russian embassy, the governor lived "for Tokmoz alone" [see: Meyer, 1990, p.67], and often Ibrahim tried to keep the post of governor vacant for a long time [Kilberg, 1978, p. 11].

Thus, after 1730, a semi-independent Egyptian state was gradually formed, which at times only nominally recognized the suzerainty of the Porte (Ivanov, 2000, p. 410), and at some points aspired to legal independence. However, such semi-independence required a special political and administrative system, which was lost in Egypt after the loss of sovereignty. And its creation took a lot of time and sacrifice. At the same time, in the XVIII century, there is an increase in duality and parallelism in positions, functions, structures, forms of appointment, etc.: "Formally, the Mamluks were elected to all these leadership positions. In fact, they came to power through a military coup, accompanied by a radical redistribution of all the most important state positions" [Ivanov, 2000, p. 411].

But in general, the main direction of the formation of a new political form was in the direction of strengthening the system of individual government. The latter is strengthened by the middle of the XVIII century. and in one form or another (with periods of coups and civil strife) lasts almost until the end of the XVIII century. Thus, using the expression of D. Kimche, a new political superstructure is being created in Egypt (Kimche, 1968). However, such a system was inevitably associated with power struggles that subsided as soon as the next dictator consolidated his position, and flared up again after his death or as a result of his weakening. Political stabilization is more typical for the period of the 1740s and 1760s, and the struggle for power is especially intense in the last third of the 18th century.

An even more famous dictator than Ibrahim Kahya was Ali bey al-Kabir (1760-1772), 12 who made a desperate attempt to become an independent ruler from Turkey and restore the glory of the Mamluk Caliphate by entering into a military alliance with Russia. He was the first ruler to attempt to reform the Egyptian army with the help of Europeans. Ali Bey al-Kabir eventually came to understand that in order to strengthen his position, he needed to destroy the Bey government(Ahmed, 1987 (3), pp. 133-152; Marsot, 2005, p.45; Kilberg, 1978) and, accordingly, the beylikat regime. Ali Bey's war with Turkey eventually ended in his defeat. Despite all the shortcomings of the Mamluk regime, we can agree that the rule of Ali Bey al-Kabir proved that military and political power can be centralized, even if the Egyptian leaders were unable to separate Egypt from the Ottoman Empire [see: Rafi'i, 1929(1), pp. 21-23; Zaklama, 1995, pp. 126-136; Goldschmidt, 2004, p. 15; Cuno, 1992, p. 28].

Further political events in Egypt are connected with the struggle for power of the "heirs" of Ali Bey and Muhammad Bey Abu-z-Zahab, who ruled behind him, among whom it is especially worth mentioning Murad Bey and Ibrahim Bey, who were in power, although with the help of the former Soviet Union.

11 Sometimes his name is written as Ibrahim-kethoda. Kahya and kethoda (kethuda) are synonyms that have meanings related to an economic or administrative position. One of these meanings has the meaning of "deputy" - corps commander, fortress commandant, governor, etc. [see: Meyer, 1984].

Kabir 12 means "Big", "Great".

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in long intervals, until the French invasion itself. They no longer sought to directly separate Egypt from Turkey, but they stopped sending money there altogether, which, in the end, led to the Turkish military invasion of Egypt in 1786 and the temporary restoration of Ottoman power there [Kilberg, 1978, p.11]. It is characteristic that the inhabitants of Egypt, and especially of Cairo, exhausted by anarchy and endless oppression, at first expected the Turks as a force capable of finally restoring order and restoring the rule of law, and gave them every possible assistance. However, the Egyptians soon became disillusioned with them, as they were already other Ottomans than in the period of Selim I and Suleiman I.

These political changes in the middle and second half of the 18th century coincided with the deterioration of the economic situation in the country, which was greatly facilitated by conflicts between the Mamluks and the increase in illegal taxes. The situation was also aggravated by the raids of Bedouin tribes, whose sheikhs were virtually independent in some areas of Upper Egypt. At this time, especially in the period between 1780 and 1798, the country was repeatedly hit by famine, so that sometimes the inhabitants of cities ate dogs, cats and rats, and even reached cannibalism [al-Jabarti, 1978, p. 239; Gold-schmidt, 2004, p. 15]. This, together with two plague epidemics and various natural disasters, led to a significant reduction in the population and a deterioration in the economic situation, in general-to a socio-demographic, economic, and political crisis at the end of the century [see fig. on the deterioration of the situation, epidemics, lawlessness, and famine: al-Jabarti, 1978; Cuno, 1992, p. 30; Ivanov, 2000] 13. At the same time, certain positive economic trends were also observed in eighteenth-century Egypt: a marked increase in economic specialization, production of export crops (cotton, sugar cane, rice), marketability and commercialization of the economy, which significantly prepared for the rapid growth of the Egyptian economy in the nineteenth century. [Sabri, 1991, pp. 80-177; Gran, 1999; Cuno, 1992; Cuno, 2000].

All this also led to great social changes.

First, there were changes in the economic and social situation of the Mamluks, who began to control an increasingly significant part of the payoffs (now for life) and large-scale trade. Mamluks increasingly openly and pompously demonstrated the luxury and "grandeur" of their existence [Ivanov, 2000, p. 414; Raymond, 2001, p. 274-279], and attempts to make their position hereditary intensified. And this greatly changed their social and behavioral characteristics. As a result of the fact that in the 18th century the Mamluks began to control large-scale trade, including export-import trade, according to A. Marsot, even a Mamluk-merchant alliance was formed [Marsot, 2004; see also: Gran, 1999, p. 11-12], which at first strengthened the positions of the alliance members [Marsot, 1984, p. 1]. However, in the future, trade in the most profitable goods (such as coffee) declined, and the economic situation as a whole worsened [Marsot 2004; Ivanov, 2000, p.414]. Income was not enough, and at the same time, to maintain their military power, the Mamluks had to buy expensive European weapons.

Secondly, the search for the necessary sources of income has led to a significant change in economic and social relations in the country as a whole. Some Mamluk houses went bankrupt and had to sell part of their rights to buy off [see Cuno, 1992, p. 37-47], mainly to people from the well-off strata (members of the spiritual corporation of Ulema and a'yan, i.e. representatives of local communities).

13 According to various sources, by 1800 the population of Egypt ranged from 3,800 to 4,500 thousand people (McCarthy, 1976, p. 33; Panzac, 1987, p. 15; Raymond, 2001, p.300; Korotaev, 2006). There are suggestions that in the last quarter of the XVIII century. Egypt could lose about 25% of its population [Korotaev, 2006, p. 12; see also: Raymond, 1981, p. 698-699].

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urban and rural elites). Thus, the economic importance of the middle strata of the population grew, which by the end of the XVIII century. they concentrated up to one-third of all iltisams in their hands [see: Ivanov, 2000, p. 414] and were able to play a major role in further political events.14
Third, the reduction in income led to the fact that the Mamluk Multazim increased levies and illegal taxes, as a result, the population abandoned their lands or fled (according to N. A. Ivanov [Ivanov, 2000, p. 413]). At the end of the XVIII century, taxes from the fellahs were twice as high as the amount of taxes from them at the same time. Suleiman I in the XVI century).

Fourthly, these negative trends, in turn, caused an increased activity of the spiritual class of the Ulema (and urban strata in general), which in some cases actively prevented attempts to increase extortion and extortion, including organizing mass protests and even uprisings in cities, which increased their role as social intermediaries between the population and the population. Mamluks [see: Marsot, 2005]. Gradually, too, there was a growing awareness that the Mamluk regime required change.

The reforms and the defeat of Ali Bey al-Kabir, and then the restoration of Turkish power in Egypt, ultimately showed the futility of trying to solve the political problems facing society without breaking the old social relations. This was most evident as a result of the French invasion (1798-1801). However, the model of creating strong individual power was established in society.

The landing of Napoleon Bonaparte's troops in Egypt on July 2, 1798 and the subsequent military defeats of the Mamluks [see: Rif'at, 1920, p. 7; ' Awad, 1925, p. 91-154; Rafi'i, 1929(1), p. 77-83; Vizarat al-harbiyya, 1957, p. 31 - 53; Sa'id, 1959, p. 11-12; Yahya, 1969, p. 343-361; Husain, 1981, p. 59-61; Jamal and Ibrahim, 1995, p. 77-79; Tarle, 1992, p. 64-69], according to many researchers, marked the beginning of a new era. epochs for this country [Rafi'i, 1929 (2); ash-Sharqawi, 1955, p. 178-191; Jamal and Ibrahim, 1995, p. 117; Hijazi, 2000, p. 19-58; Haredi, 2000, p. 411-458; Goldschmidt, 2004, p. 19; Lawson, 2000; Faksh, 1980, p. 42]. The relatively short stay of the French army and occupation administration in Egypt, on the one hand, sharply undermined the prestige of the Mamluks, and on the other, it involved part of the upper strata of the Cairo population in active political activity, which caused new social forces to come to life. And the result did not slow down in the form of the nomination of a new successful and energetic ruler, Muhammad Ali [Rif'at, 1920(1), p. 19-32; Rafi'i, 1929 (2); Sa'id, 1959, p. 39-19; Shukri, 1958; Yahya, 1969, p. 583-622; Husain, 1981, p. 107-1120; Sabri, 1991, pp. 31-38; Jamal and Ibrahim, 1995, pp. 125-133]; Zelenev 2002].

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14 At the same time, it is very important that there were many ethnic Arab-Egyptians among them, who were largely excluded from active political life, since leading positions even in the judicial apparatus before the French invasion were held by non-Egyptians [see: Kirillina and Ryabkov, 1991, p.138].

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