In recent years, the influence of Islam and organizations and groups operating under its slogans on the socio-political situation in the countries of the Islamic world has become increasingly acute. No less urgent is the problem of the impact of political processes taking place in modern Muslim societies, including the formation of democratic institutions in them, on the development of ideology and activities of religious and political organizations. In this regard, the experience of Egypt, one of the leading countries of the Arab - Muslim world and the African continent, is indicative. An analysis of the political situation in Egypt in recent decades shows that there is a real, albeit "non-systemic" Islamist opposition to the existing regime in the face of radical organizations, the coming to power of which can create many problems both for the Egyptian people and for the region as a whole.

Western analytical and political circles often express the opinion that Islamism plays a positive role in Egypt and a number of other Middle Eastern countries, although the governments of these states and secular pro-government or opposition forces in them are concerned about the prospects for representatives of "political Islam"to come to power.

Concerns about the "political transformation" of a number of extremist Islamist organizations that have a long history of underground existence and the use of radical methods of struggle against secular and nationalist regimes in the Arab states seem to be very well founded. Thus, the activities of most Islamist organizations in the Republic of Azerbaijan, as in many other countries of the world, have acquired a pronounced anti-state character and pose challenges to both domestic and regional stability.

In Egypt, the most irreconcilable radical Islamist organizations are Al-Jihad1, Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Society) and At-Takfir wa al-Hijra (Accusation of Disbelief and Withdrawal from Society)2. Their ideology reflects to varying degrees the views of the well-known ideologist of radicalism Sayyid Qutb

1 Involved in the assassination of President Sadat in 1981, as well as a number of other high-profile terrorist acts, including terrorist attacks in the United States. The founder is Abd al-Salam Farragh [see: Landay and Savino, 2000; Al-Jihad al-Islami...].

2 This is the name given to Islamist groups that interpret the hijra as a departure from a modern society mired in disbelief. Created by Shukri Mustafa. The hijra of radical Islamists is a tactical retreat that provides for a return at the moment when conditions are created in society for the implementation of the idea of a "genuine Islamic state" [see: Zambelis, 2006; Karpacheva, 2007, pp. 53-56].

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on the ways of overthrowing state power by revolutionary means by the forces of "true Muslims".

The ideology of Al-Jihad, which appeals to the sacred texts and religious authorities of the past (Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn al-Jawzi, etc.), emphasizes the need for an uncompromising "struggle of Islam with modern Jahiliyah"3. Under the term Jahiliyyah, the leaders and supporters of Al-Jihad refer to capitalism, Marxism, "international Zionism" and other ideological and political movements that threaten to " destroy the unity, greatness and well-being of the Ummah." The goal of this organization was to create a global Islamic state based on the recognition of the supremacy of the divine will as the sole source of legislation and rid the Ummah of dependence on the" infidels "and" ignorant " (jahil).

According to the leaders of Al-Jihad, all the current leaders of Egypt and other Muslim countries are "enemies of Islam", despite the fact that part of the population remains "true Muslims". Based on this statement, one of the leaders and ideologues of Al-Jihad, 'Abboud al-Zumr, used the term dar al-muraqqab ("mixed territory"). It refers to countries where the ruling circles are "infidels" and the main population is Muslims (Razhbadinov, 2002, p. 10). However, the very name of the organization reflects the primacy of the concept of jihad in its ideology and practice: "holy war "is considered by its members as a key tool for reviving the"true faith". At the same time, they divide enemies into "close" and "distant"ones. The latter include, first of all, Israel and the Western Powers. According to the extremists, an irreconcilable struggle should be waged against them. In this section, the ideology of "Al-Jihad" echoes the ideas of the adherents of "Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya", who also refer to modern Muslim countries as Jahiliyyah societies, and their leaders as apostates.

Members of Al-Jihad consider educational and propaganda work - da'wa-to be an important component of preparing Muslims for the creation of an Islamic state. However, in practice, this activity focuses on the ideological justification of the need for jihad as an armed struggle that includes intelligence, subversive and terrorist activities.

After the suppression of extremists in response to the assassination attempt on President Sadat, the organization's ideologist A. Farag was executed in April 1982, and two years later Al-Jihad disbanded. 'Abboud al-Zumr put forward the "transition phase" thesis, according to which Al-Jihad, which has suffered significant losses, should temporarily stop military activities, switching to propaganda work. Some members of the organization perceived this as an apostasy from the principles of jihad. One of the most radical Islamist leaders, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who later moved to Afghanistan [Wright, 2002], also did not agree with this passive position of 'Abboud al-Zumr and created Al-Jihad al-Jadid with his supporters. It is the organization that has claimed responsibility for a number of terrorist acts, including the attempted assassinations of Press and Information Minister Safwat Al-Sharif in 1993, Interior Minister Hassan al-Al-Fi in 1993, and Prime Minister ' Atif Sidqi in 1993.

In the mid-1980s, many members of Al-Jihad and Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya left for Afghanistan to wage jihad. They believed that the military experience they gained in Afghanistan would help in the upcoming fight against the Egyptian and other Arab regimes. At that time, Al-Jihad had an external leadership headed by Ayman al-Zawahiri (see Blanche, 2001). Since then, a whole transnational network of organizations has begun to operate, repeating the structure of the Egyptian "Al-Jihad". Al-Zawahiri took jihad far beyond the Middle East-

3 Jahiliyyah (Arabic) - lit., "ignorance", "paganism", "pre-Islamic era".

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Re-Examining..., 2005; Zawahiri Foreshadowing Attacks..., 2007], emphasizing the need to focus efforts on the fight against the West and Israel. According to this Osama bin Laden supporter, the governments of Muslim countries are completely dependent on the West and will collapse as soon as the "distant enemies" supporting the Arab regimes are hit. In connection with the announcement of new priorities, Al-Jihad al-Jadid, under the leadership of al-Zawahiri, introduced the practice of intensive use of terror as the most "effective" method of waging war against opponents. In 1995, its members carried out five terrorist attacks against Egyptian "targets" in Switzerland, Bulgaria, Pakistan and Egypt, and in 1998, they also participated in the organization of bombings at the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

On a number of issues, radical organizations in Egypt have serious differences. Thus, Al-Jihad rejects the practice of participating in political activities adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood4. As an objection, the Muslim Brotherhood states that they recognize the people as the source of power and believe in the legitimacy of free and fair elections. Developing this thesis, they come to the conclusion: it is necessary to do everything possible to ensure that the laws adopted by the parliament comply with Sharia law [Habib M., 2006].

The leaders of Al-Jihad are extremely negative about the activities of the Takfiris, considering that their leader Shukri Mustafa did nothing to fight for Islam, but only destroyed the lives of young people, putting them out of society. The leaders of Al-Jihad see withdrawal from society as evading jihad.

An analysis of Al-Jihad's activities over the decades shows that after its defeat in 1981, the organization was no longer able to conduct "effective" subversive work capable of posing a critical threat to the regime in Egypt. Al-Jihad's resources in Egypt have been weakened by the authorities ' tough actions and anti-terrorist strategy. However, the ideology of Al-Jihad has had a significant impact on the development of the jihadist movement throughout the region. Ayman al-Zawahiri, along with Bin Laden, became one of the founders of the ideology of modern jihad, the personification of the world radical movement, which is increasingly active today in order to justify from a religious and political point of view the need for a "Muslim struggle against the West."

Another trend in the Islamist movement is the Takfiri movement. A prominent representative of this trend is the organization "At-Takfir wa al-Hijra". Its strategy is based on the need to leave the "infidel society", create a "true Islamic society" in isolation, and then return to overthrow the "infidel government" and establish an Islamic state. Members of this organization refer to modern Muslim societies as "infidels", as do members of Al-Jihad and Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya. Fighting "near and far enemies" is also defined by the Takfiri as a necessary way to "defend Islam" and establish a truly Islamic government. And only after the destruction of the" near enemies", as the" Takfiri " believe, will it be possible to move on to the complete liberation of the Ummah from the domination of the West.

After the execution of Shukri Mustafa in 1978 for creating a radical society with subversive goals, the Takfiri organization became, according to Egyptian and Western sources, underground and transnational in nature. Groups called At-Takfir wa al-Hijra continue to operate secretly in Egypt itself, as well as in Sudan, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Europe (Mili, 2006). Nevertheless, in recent years, this organization has been trying in every possible way to demonstrate its

4 The Muslim Brotherhood was founded by Hassan Al-Banna in 1928 and is today the most powerful and numerous Islamist organization in the Islamic world.

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"moderation" and a departure from the methods of terror. In general, radical Islamist organizations in Egypt currently seek to conceal the true goals and forms of their activities.

At the same time, various "jihadist" groups that continue to operate in the country create an unsafe situation in tourist areas of Egypt and threaten strategically important infrastructure of the country. Recent events show that Egypt is considered by transnational and local terrorist groups as one of the main "fronts of jihad". For its part, the Egyptian Government is taking tough measures to combat terrorism in order to maintain political stability.

In late March 2006, the Egyptian authorities for the first time accused the Al-Qaeda-linked Islamist group Al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad of organizing and carrying out terrorist attacks in Taba and Sharm el-Sheikh.5 Soon after, a large terrorist group, At-Ta'ifa al-Mansoura ("Victorious Community"), which had more than 20 fighters, was neutralized in Cairo. According to the special services, the group members maintained contacts with foreign terrorist organizations in order to send militants to "jihad" zones. The Cairo underground group consisted of young people-entrepreneurs, students, ministers of worship. According to experts, they tried to act on the model of Al-Qaeda in Iraq in order to create an atmosphere of general chaos in Egypt and thereby discredit the country's leadership. According to the Interior Minister of Egypt, the group collected information about explosives and poisons on the Internet, planned operations in tourist areas and the explosion of the Cairo gas pipeline. Cutting off gas supplies to Cairo could disrupt the energy supply of the entire densely populated Nile Valley.

The main target of terrorists remains tourist sites. This was confirmed on April 24, 2006, during the bombings in the resort town of Dahab in Sinai, which killed 18 people and injured over 80 others. A group called the Mujahideen of Egypt claimed responsibility for the attack. The explosions were "timed" to coincide with the national holidays of Egypt-Victory Day in Sinai, Revolution Day and Army Day. It is obvious that the terrorists want to demonstrate to the authorities their strength and ability to strike anywhere and at any time. In addition, the protests in Dahab followed the April 14, 2006 massacre of three Coptic churches in Alexandria, where terrorists killed one and wounded about 12 people, which provoked an increase in sectarian tensions. The ensuing clashes between Christians and Muslims were used by extremists to increase their influence in the country. Trust between religious communities has been threatened. At the same time, the confrontation between the authorities and the Muslim Brotherhood has escalated in the country6.

Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood), an organization founded in Egypt in 1928 and now has "branches" in more than 70 countries around the world, stands apart from the radical Islamist movement. It is the largest Islamist organization that considers educational and propaganda work among the masses (da'wa) as the basis of its ideological activity. Ostentatious moderation is the main difference between the Muslim Brotherhood and many other Islamist organizations. Demonstrating their "departure from radical methods of struggle", the Muslim Brotherhood was successful in the November-December 2005 parliamentary elections in the United States.

5 In October 2004, a hotel bombing in Taba killed 34 people. In July 2005, terrorists attacked Sharm el-Sheikh, killing more than 70 people.

6 In early March 2006, the authorities suspended the publication of the party newspaper and arrested several members and leaders of the organization. In response, Muslim Brotherhood leaders have stepped up protests and criticised the government, accusing it of being"ineffective".

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Egypt 7. Unlike in the 1980s and 1990s, the Muslim Brotherhood ran separately from other opposition parties. At the same time, the main competition in the elections unfolded precisely between them and the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). In this regard, the result obtained by the Islamists looks impressive-88 seats.

The ruling party and independent deputies included in the government bloc won 326 seats. Despite the fact that the NDP managed to secure more than 70% of seats in the National Assembly, it was the Muslim Brotherhood that declared itself the winners: for the first time in the country's history, they managed to get an opposition bloc into parliament that can influence the decision-making process on domestic and foreign policy issues. Observers note that the predominance of Islamists in the opposition over secular forces, with which the PDP is used to dealing, presented a serious problem for the ruling party of H. Mubarak [see: Dunne, 2006, p. 5]. In addition to the growing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, the election results confirmed the weakness of the secular opposition.8

The main result of the election was that the Muslim Brotherhood was able to nominate its own candidate for the post of president, as well as conduct a political struggle in the state authority. Representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood have announced their readiness to join the opposition bloc that will oppose the NDP in parliament. In addition, the leader of the brotherhood, Muhammad Mahdi ' Akif, said that their representatives in parliament will seek to reduce the powers of the president of Egypt and amend the constitution, although they do not intend to advocate a change in the country's foreign policy. In particular, this organization did not agree to recognize the state of Israel, but also does not call for war with it, "respecting" the agreements signed earlier by Egypt (the 1979 peace treaty). In this way, the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood tried to allay the fears of the international community about the possible radicalization of the foreign policy positions of Egypt, which traditionally has a reputation as an important center Middle East diplomacy and an active mediator in the settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The 2005 parliamentary elections attracted increased international attention. Most of the representatives of non-governmental organizations, the media, and the diplomatic corps who observed the elections noted the growing liberalization of the country's political life initiated by the authorities themselves. At the same time, everyone noticed that the opposition forces, which were in a semi-legal position in the past, were coming to the political forefront. Members of such organizations have come to be seen by some in Egyptian society and by some Western analysts as a possible "alternative" to the existing regime in Egypt.

Many Egyptian and foreign observers have expressed concern that the Muslim Brotherhood is probably considering the possibility of a political coup in Egypt. At the same time, representatives of the movement have taken measures to protect their "image" and stated that their movement is still far from the goal of gaining political power [see al-'Aryan, 2006; al-Sayyid Habib, 2006]. The head of the Muslim Brotherhood, 'Akif, stressed that the main task of his organization is to" promote-

7 "Independent candidates" from the Muslim Brotherhood, who took part in the elections under the general slogan "Islam-solving problems", won 34 seats in the first round of elections. In the end, their representation in the Egyptian People's Assembly increased from 17 to 88 seats, more than fivefold, although the Islamists themselves expected to get about 70 seats. According to the current legislation, there are 454 deputies in the Parliament of Egypt, 444 of them are elected during elections, 10 are appointed by the President [see: Abdel-Latif, 2005; El-Menshawy, 2005; Essam El-Din, 2005; Sid-Ahmed, 2005].

8 The Wafd party, for example, managed to get six of its deputies into Parliament, the National Progressive Party-two, and the Gad (Tomorrow) party - one. The leader of the opposition Gad party, Ayman Nur, who was second only to Mubarak in the September 2005 presidential election, did not qualify for the People's Assembly.

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reform by educating and educating the people", rather than the coming to power of an Islamist president in Egypt [see: 'Akif, 2006]. Such statements indicate, first of all, that the leaders of the association understand that the conditions for their coming to political and state power are not yet "ripe" in the country.

The Muslim Brotherhood's harsh approach to other minorities in the country is clearly seen through the prism of the Coptic problem. The "Brothers" consider them full citizens of the country, who enjoy all their rights and freedoms, with the exception of one: "the right to be elected to the post of president." The ambiguity of the official position of the Muslim Brotherhood on State reform and the relationship between the State and religion, as well as between representatives of different faiths, is a constant source of concern for Copts.

This case is also significant. In April 2006, the Administrative Court of Alexandria issued an order allowing the Ministry of Internal Affairs to issue identity cards to citizens indicating their membership in the Baha'i religious community. The Muslim Brotherhood responded with a protest. On May 3, 2006, during a parliamentary debate on this issue, members of the Muslim Brotherhood called the Baha'is "apostates who should have been killed" [see Mashru Qanun..., 2006].

The success of the Muslim Brotherhood in the parliamentary elections has led many observers and members of the movement themselves to wonder if the time has come to change their tactics and start fighting for political power [see, for example, Habib R., 2005].

Akif noted on this issue that " the harbingers of the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood project and the readiness of society to accept the Islamic state are now appearing in Palestine and other Muslim countries." [www.ikhwanonline.com, 16 February 2006]. This answer is significant. The electoral successes of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas indicate that this process has already been launched, as, according to Islamists, " large segments of the population now demand the introduction of the Islamic system in public affairs, politics and legislation." However, these" achievements " of Islamists are considered by them not as the result of political activity, but as the result of educational work, which allowed them to widely spread their ideas and gain followers among the masses [Habib R., 2005]. This approach is based on the fact that Hasan al-Banna wanted his movement to reflect the comprehensive nature of Islam, as expressed in the so-called 'alamiyya principle. According to this principle, the association created by him is considered not just as a religious or political movement, but as a socio-political, missionary and socio-economic one at the same time. Moreover, according to the followers of al-Banna, it was the social base of the Muslim Brotherhood that ensured the viability of the movement, since it would not have been able to survive if it had been a purely political phenomenon [Habib R., 14.03.2006]. The organization's leaders want it to attract other political forces from both the opposition "camp" and the ruling party and government. In addition, in their opinion, it is necessary to formulate a " political message "that clearly sets out" specific " solutions to Egypt's current problems [see Izz al-'Arab, 2006].

However, supporters of the" old order "claim that the traditional internal organization of the brotherhood is the basis of their resilience and provides them with "popular support" [ibid.]. They note that the "brothers" should be engaged in the formation of a "truly Islamic society", from which an Islamic state will allegedly arise [Sharh Risalat..., 2006].

9 The Muslim Brotherhood prefers to call its organization a movement, trying to give it a more mass character.

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By raising the status of the Muslim Brotherhood, the parliamentary elections have made it an even greater threat to the existing regime. The members of the Islamist movement themselves can't help but realize that their success in the elections actually reduced the" tolerant attitude " of the authorities towards them. According to the Muslim Brotherhood, the security services have taken a number of forceful and counter-propaganda measures among the population ['Arafah, 2005; Limadha Tadhtahidu..., 2006]. The authorities have tried to minimize the impact of the Muslim Brotherhood's opposition on a key issue: the extension of the state of emergency imposed in the country since the assassination of President Sadat in 1981.The State of Emergency law allows the authorities to arrest and detain people without charge for an indefinite period, as well as to try civilians by military tribunals.

Another obstacle to the political ascent of Islamists was Article 76 of the Constitution of the Republic of Egypt, concerning presidential elections. Earlier, she demanded that the parliament nominate one candidate for the post of president, which was approved by a referendum. This provision was repealed in February 2005, when H. Mubarak proposed to Parliament to prepare amendments to the constitution, providing for the holding of presidential elections by universal direct secret ballot, as well as the possibility for every Egyptian to run as a presidential candidate. According to Mubarak himself, "this fundamental change is the result of political stability" in the country. This article of the Constitution provides for alternative elections with several candidates, but sets such conditions for their nomination that, in fact, do not give the Muslim Brotherhood a real opportunity to win their candidate.

Continuing discussions about the future status of the Muslim Brotherhood, members of the movement seem to be becoming more and more convinced of the need to develop both educational and missionary functions and socio-political activities of the brotherhood. At the same time, adherents of a legitimate political course consider it necessary for the Muslim Brotherhood to maintain the image of a moderate Islamist organization that deals with political reform and liberalization of all spheres of life in Egyptian society. For their part, adherents of Da'wa methods continue to use the powerful resources of the Muslim Brotherhood, which no Egyptian secular opposition party or group can compete with, to mobilize mass support for Islamists and preserve the viability of their movement. The new moderate character of Islamists, systematically shaped by the movement's propagandists in the media, can at best be seen as cosmetic changes in the image, which still hides a radical ideology.

Due to numerous accusations by Egyptian public figures against the Muslim Brotherhood that their desire for religious revival hides ideological and intellectual conservatism and radicalism, the leaders of the brotherhood focused exclusively on educating the loyalty of its members, rejecting new, creative thinking. All this has led to a decrease in the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt on Islamist organizations in the region and in the world. Despite their formal leadership among other organizations of the Muslim Brotherhood, leading positions were taken by such figures as Shaikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who left the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and non-Egyptians-Rashid al-Ghannouchi, Hassan al-Turabi, Faisal al-Maulawi.

Despite this, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood sees its success in the 2005 elections as a confirmation of the correctness of its strategy and methods of work. Although the initiative to liberalize the political regime came "from above", as well as from outside, from the United States, which is exerting pressure on the leadership of Egypt, the Egyptian is-

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Lamists believe that the main factor that led them to "victory" was their own purposeful work in the field of propaganda and agitation, charity, social assistance, and political mobilization of the masses. Given this, it can be assumed that among the Muslim Brotherhood, the position of supporters of traditional methods of work and gradual progress towards long-term goals - the Islamization of society and the creation of an Islamic state-will strengthen. In their opinion, the slogan "Islam is the solution" meets the aspirations of the majority of Egyptian voters. In this regard, for many Islamists, there is no need to radically change their slogans and methods of working with the masses, since they are already confident in the viability and effectiveness of their organization.

At the current stage, the "brothers" believe that they should not actively seek the fall of the regime and enter into a more acute confrontation with the ruling political forces, which have powerful administrative resources. The main argument was the unwillingness of the masses to radically "change the regime" and accept the "Islamic state".

The liberalization of the political "rules of the game" initiated from above in Egypt immediately yielded results and brought radical Islamist forces to the country's political scene, determined to be active and continue their purposeful struggle for gaining political and state power. At the same time, at the current stage, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood will adhere to the tactic of "demonstrative moderation", which distinguishes it from many other Islamist organizations in Egypt and a number of Muslim countries. The brotherhood's ideologues have not abandoned their long-term goals, but they are inclined to "follow a different path" than other Islamist organizations that resort to terror and violence. However, the Brotherhood's demonstrative rejection of violent methods of struggle did not lead to a change in their goals and a rejection of radical positions in relation to the secular state and society, which is fraught with the resumption of an acute confrontation between the Islamist opposition and the ruling forces of Egypt and creates conditions for destabilizing the socio-political situation in the country.

The analysis of events shows that Egypt remains one of the main targets of extremists and terrorists in the region. The terrorists are trying to show that the victims of terrorist attacks-foreign tourists, like the Egyptians themselves, are "hostages" of the policy pursued by the leaders of their countries. In order to turn Egypt into another "zone of chaos" in the region, terrorists and extremists not only create local underground cells and carry out terrorist attacks, but also exploit all the factors that are "explosive" for the political situation in Egypt, including sectarian conflicts and the strengthening of the opposition.

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