Although the last quarter of the 18th century was marked by a severe systemic crisis, the latter, however, should be considered not only as a period of decline, but also as a transition from one state system to another, namely, as a difficult period of the country's systemic transition to a new model of the state. It is therefore a mistake to underestimate the extent to which Egypt was prepared for the reforms that followed in the first half of the nineteenth century. For a more accurate assessment of the level of development of Egypt's statehood in the Ottoman period, it is necessary to draw on political and anthropological theories of universal stages of statehood development. We have chosen a three-stage model of the evolution of statehood: early states-developed states - mature states. The application of the three-stage theory of statehood to the history of Egypt made it possible to draw conclusions that, first, Egypt reached the level of a developed state long before the Ottoman conquest; secondly, it continued to remain at the level of a developed state throughout the entire period of Turkish rule, even during the crisis of the XVIII century. as a result of modernization during the reign of Muhammad Ali in the first half of the XIX century. Egypt has become a typical developed state.

ASSESSMENT OF THE LATE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS AND PREPAREDNESS OF THE REFORMS OF THE FIRST HALF OF THE XIX CENTURY. IN EGYPT

The first stage of the Ottoman period of Egyptian history (XVI century) is characterized by a significant development of Egyptian statehood. Further, in the XVII and XVIII centuries, as a result of the gradual weakening of the power of the Turks in Egypt, complex socio-political processes took place, which resulted in an increase in the systemic crisis and significant structural changes in society, which largely prepared for the cardinal reforms of the first half of the XIX century. Earlier (Grinin and Korotaev, 2009), we showed some of the processes that took place in the state and society of Egypt during the Ottoman period of its history. In this article, we aim to analyze the level of state development of Egypt in this and previous periods on the basis of a political-anthropological evolutionary scale, as well as to draw some conclusions about the degree of continuity and the depth of the gap between the epochs of the new Mamluks and Muhammad Ali, the degree of preparation of Muhammad Ali's reforms and the reasons for their success.

Most researchers rightly believe that during the reign of Muhammad Ali in Egypt (1805-1849), the era of the creation of a modern state begins [Rif'at, 1920, pp. 57-75; Rafi'i, 1930, pp. 613-623; Gurbal, 1944; Shukri, 1948; 1958; Sa'id, 1959, p. 39-54; Yahya, 1969, pp. 583-622; Husain, 1981; ' Attar, 1989; Sabri, 1991, pp. 31-79; Jamal and Ibrahim, 1995, pp. 125-133;

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al-Bitrik, 1999; Marsot, 1984; Goldschmidt, 2004; Holt, 1969; Hunter, 1999; Flower, 1972; Cuno, 1985; 1992; Fahmy, 1998; Lawson, 1999; Richmond, 1977; Zelenev, 1999; 2002; 2003]. But when a fair assessment of the importance of the reforms carried out by Muhammad Ali is made, a number of researchers often overlook or ignore the problem of the degree of preparation of Egypt for them, i.e. how mature they are, how receptive society is to them, and also why some areas of activity ended in success and others did not. And since the importance of preparation by the previous development of the processes that took place in the first half of the XIX century is not always taken into account, the assessment of the epoch is sometimes made mainly from the point of view of the role of the individual, subjective intentions and ideas of Muhammad Ali himself (and the assessment of the latter's activity may even be negative), without taking into account many objective factors (see about such approaches, for example; [Egypt..., 2000; Lawson, 2000]). Meanwhile, as Arthur Goldschmidt (2004, p. 13) rightly points out, Egyptian modernization was not caused solely by external influences, which, of course, played a very important role, but was the result of political, social and intellectual changes that had already taken place within the country and had been gaining momentum for a long time.1 In this sense, the assessment of Muhammad Ali's activities is somewhat similar to the assessment of Peter I's transformations that prevailed in the 19th century.2. Slavophiles, for example, attributed all the problems of modern Russia to the fatal influence of Peter's reforms, which forcibly interrupted the true Russian traditions, while Westerners, on the contrary, believed that everything that is good in Russia is due to Peter, and regretted that he did not have time to introduce certain Western institutions [Shapiro, 1993, pp. 392-395, 429].

As a result of this "subjectivization", which arose under the impression of the grandiose transformations carried out by Muhammad Ali in a short time, it sometimes seems that the state structure of Egypt in the XVIII century was quite primitive and archaic. 3 However, as we pointed out earlier (Grinin and Korotaev, 2009) and will see later, this is not the case at all, otherwise Egypt would not have been the most developed province of the Ottoman Porte (Rafi'i, 1929, pp. 9-62; Yahya, 1969, pp. 127-212; Khusain, 1981, pp. 9-19 Muhammad, 1985, pp. 159-279; Ahmed, 1987 (1); Jamal and Ibrahim, 1995, pp. 24-39; Crecelius, 1998, p. 59]. And this superiority of Egypt, in our opinion, is largely due to the fact that even before the XIX century. it was already at such a level of statehood development that it was ahead of most of the Ottoman provinces in this respect (with the possible exception of the center of the empire, which included Istanbul and part of ethnic Turkey [Yahya, 1969, p. 129-194; Husain, 1981, p. 9-19; Muhammad, 1985, p. 159 - 279; Shalabi, 1989, pp. 11-22]. At the same time, in general, during the Turkish rule, as a result of the fact that Egypt was part of the vast Ottoman Empire and was connected with other provinces, as well as with Europe, the political culture of the Egyptian elite surpassed the level characteristic of the Mamluk Sultanate [Hathaway, 1998 (2), p. 117].

We also agree with Daniel Cresilius, who points out that in the series of secessionist movements of the eighteenth century. In the Ottoman Empire, very few provinces had the kind of economy and political potentials that would allow them to survive as independent countries. He points out that in the struggle for the independence of Egypt, Ali Bey

1 The high degree of preparation of Muhammad Ali's reforms with all the previous developments is indirectly confirmed by the fact that, despite the failures of the last period of Ali's reign, his dynasty strengthened, and the main reforms took root and turned out to be the starting point for further modernization (see for more details, for example: [Rafi'i, 1930, pp. 613-623; ' Attar, 1989; Marsot, 1984; Goldschmidt, 2004; Hunter, 1999; Zelenev, 2003; Grinin, 2006 (1)]).

2 Here is just one of a great many such assessments: "Peter is the whole of Russia; its flesh and spirit, its character and genius, the embodiment of all its virtues and vices." Written by the Polish historian Kazimir Waliszewski in 1887. [Valishevsky, 1993, p. 5]).

3 Just as the assessment of the level of development of the state structure of pre-Petrine Russia was underestimated, the fallacy of which was shown by V. O. Klyuchevsky, who, in particular, wrote that the entire XVII century was an era that prepared the transformation of Peter the Great (Klyuchevsky, 1937, p. 393).

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al-Kabir (1760 - 1772) relied on unique Egyptian forces, which included a national identity and long historical experience as the center of a great empire, a powerful agriculture and commercial base, as well as military traditions among the ruling Mamluk elite [Crecelius, 1981, p. 8; Rafi'i, 1929, pp. 21-23]4.

One can also agree with Kenneth Cuno when he objects to too sharp a contrast between the "Ottoman" and "modern" periods of Egyptian history, and insists that there is more continuity between these epochs than is often thought [Cuno, 1992, p. XV].

Therefore, it is quite logical to assume that without a sufficiently high level of economic, social, political and administrative development of Egypt by the beginning of the XIX century, the reforms of Muhammad Ali could hardly have taken place at all, and certainly would not have been sufficiently successful.

Based on the above, when assessing the political and economic crisis in Egypt at the end of the XVIII century, we should move away from the traditional interpretations of the situation only as a simple degradation [Kimche, 1968, p. 448; Issawi, 1947, p. 12; 1963, p. 19], which are not uncommon today [Goldschmidt, 2004, p.19]. 12]. In any case, the scale and tragic consequences of the crisis are usually thoroughly and vividly covered by researchers, while the deep processes of social and political transformation of Egyptian society at this time often remain in the shadows or completely "behind the scenes" (for an example of such a "distortion", see: [Rafi'i, 1929, p. 9 - 62; Ivanov, 2000; Atsamba and Smilyanskaya, 2004]). In our opinion, the crisis of this time had the obvious features of an evolutionary crisis 5, as a result of overcoming which the country could make a qualitative breakthrough in development 6. Perhaps this nature of the crisis has led to its prolonged and exceptionally severe nature.

The weakening of Turkey and the increase in the degree of de facto autonomy of Egypt in the eighteenth century not only disrupted the socio-political balance in the country, but also, in fact, set the Egyptian political and administrative system the tasks of ensuring a new order and unity in conditions of significant autonomy, which should be adequately addressed.

4 F. M. Atsamba and I. M. Smilyanskaya [2004, p. 77], comparing the Mamluk regime in Egypt and the political regime in the center of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the XVIII century, clearly give priority to the latter in terms of its degree of development, since it observed the processes of bureaucratization of the civil service, refusal to use slaves in it,military reforms began, while the Mamluks sought to expand the slave market, they lacked forms of legitimization of rulers, personal relationships prevailed, etc. In many ways, of course, this is true. Indeed, the political system based on Mamluk political and military domination had outlived its usefulness and had to be replaced. Nevertheless, it seems that there is a noticeable exaggeration of the archaic nature of the Mamluk political system, possibly due to its exoticism, and an underestimation of the degree of maturity of Egyptian society, which is able to positively perceive the reforms. At the same time, it is not taken into account that if Egyptian society at the end of the XVIII century began to outstrip the political system in terms of development, then Turkish society, on the contrary, was poorly formed, lagged behind the development of the state, which could not "pull it out". This was one of the reasons that explains Egypt's sudden surge in the first decades of the nineteenth century and the crisis in Turkey at the same time. Otherwise, the failure of the reforms of the legitimate Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) in Turkey, based on a bureaucratic state, and the success of such reforms of the illegitimate usurper Muhammad Ali in Egypt should be explained only by the personal qualities of the reformers, which, I think, is not entirely correct.

5 E. I. Zelenev comes to similar conclusions [Zelenev, 2003].

6 In this sense, this crisis was similar to the difficult periods in the development of Russia at the beginning of the 17th century, China in the first half of the 17th century, the Ottoman Empire itself at the end of the 18th and first decades of the 19th century, France during the Fronde period in the middle of the 17th century, and a number of other similar periods in the history of various countries. What they have in common is that, firstly, states managed to overcome them in one way or another without disintegrating, and, secondly, the way out of the crisis marked the beginning of powerful qualitative transformations that took place within the nearest century after the end of the corresponding period [Grinin, 2007 (3) 1.

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she was unable to for a long time. Therefore, the second half of the 18th century can be considered in a certain aspect as a transition from one state system to another (see on the ideas of structural transformation in the 18th century: [Cuno, 2000, p. 94-95]). And since such a transition is often accompanied by noticeable crisis phenomena, they should not only be interpreted as signs of decline and degradation, but also considered as an indicator of an important transformation of society.

In accordance with modern theories of the evolution of statehood (see below), there should be a balance between the social and political-administrative systems at the level of statehood development that Egypt was already at in the XVIII century, when the role of the other system increases with the weakening of one system. Such hidden "compensatory" opportunities in society are most clearly manifested precisely in times of such crises. In this respect, Egypt of the eighteenth century undoubtedly demonstrates, along with the decline of legality, other signs of degradation of the old political system [Rafi'i, 1929, p. 42-44; Vizarat al-harbiyya, 1957, p. 12-22; Yahya, 1969, p. 311-321; Husain, 1981, p. 19 - 48; Jamal and Ibrahim, 1995, p. 98-99; 1996, p. 5-11], as well as increasing the role of social forces, in particular the Ulema clergy [Rafi'i, 1929, p. 49; Marsot, 2005; Gran, 1999], and the affluent elite of urban and rural residents (a'yanov) [Rafi'i, 1929, p. 49-54], and the Mamluks themselves, including in attempts to solve important state issues, and in the search for new forms of regulation of social and administrative problems.

Egyptian society in the second half of the 18th century is not completely degraded, as it seeks a way out of the crisis by restructuring or consolidating social forces. There is also a growing need to create a new management model. This suggests a parallel with the behavior of Russian society during the Troubles in the early seventeenth century, which also managed to find the strength to consolidate itself in anarchy and recreate the political system anew, and with noticeable improvements.

The prototype of the new political model was significantly formed during the reign of first Ibrahim-kahya (1744-1754), and then Ali bey al-Kabir (1760-1772) [Rafi'i 1929, p. 21-23; Husain, 1981, p. 23-30; Jamal, Ibrahim, 1995, p. 50 - 58]. As Peter Gran [Gran, 2005, p. 30] put it, Ali Bey outlined the rough outlines of the Egyptian state in practice. It was a form of one-man power that could centralize the country and bring warring forces to heel, including through harsh and repressive measures. The model of individual rule later influenced the change in the form of the political regime in Egypt at the beginning of the 19th century (see Marsot, 2005, p. 45; Kilberg, 1978; Ivanov, 2000, p.417-418). Ali Bey faced the need for military and political reforms, which he failed to implement successfully. However, the very attempt to reform the military and administrative-political sphere gave Egypt as a whole, and directly to Muhammad Ali, an important historical experience.7 This experience, in particular, helped to understand that the main obstacle to reform was the Mamluks themselves, who had previously been the driving force of Egypt's development. And the realization of the impossibility of reforms on the old social and elite basis of society determined the depth of the break with the old tradition (both in Peter and Muhammad Ali).

Thus, at the end of the XVIII century. Egypt has reached a point where it can finally make an evolutionary leap. And he made it in the era of Muhammad Ali, as soon as the minimum suitable conditions were created for this.

7 Similar to what Russia had in the time of Peter as a result of not particularly successful reforms under Alexey Mikhailovich in Russia in the XVII century, as well as under Fyodor Mikhailovich and Sofia (see: [Klyuchevsky, 1937, pp. 344-394]).

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SOME FEATURES OF THE EVOLUTION OF EGYPTIAN STATEHOOD IN THE OTTOMAN AND PREVIOUS PERIODS

We believe that for a deeper understanding of the features of the socio-political development of Egypt in the XVI-XVIII centuries. there is a need to point out several important features of the relationship between power and society, which are inherent in Ottoman Egypt and important for understanding its specifics, but which, however, developed very long before it.

First of all, it should be said that the relationship between society and the state in Egypt for thousands of years was characterized by the alienation of the indigenous population from power. Already in Late Egypt (XI - IV centuries BC), the country was conquered several times by foreigners (Libyans, Nubians, Assyrians) and for a long time foreign dynasties (Libyan, Nubian) were established, which, however, also could not firmly unite the country [Edakov, 2004]. Gradually, foreign dynasties and alienation of the population from the rulers became more frequent. This will become the most important distinguishing feature of the entire subsequent history of Egypt up to the beginning of the XX century [Marsot, 2004, p. vii; Goldschmidt, 2004, p. 6; and Semenova, 1982, p.104-105].

In 525 BC, the Persian king Cambyses conquered Egypt, and from that time on, the rule of successive foreigners and foreign dynasties became almost continuous. Moreover, from this time until the 20s of the XX century. Egypt has almost never remained within its current borders, but has always (at least formally) been part of a larger State. 8 The difference, however, was that sometimes Egypt was the center of this large state (for example, during the Greek Ptolemaic dynasty, the Shiite Fatimid dynasty, the Mamluk dynasties of the XIII - XVI centuries, during the reign of the Albanian Muhammad Ali in the XIX century), and at times it was only a province of a large empire (Roman, Byzantine, Umayyad, etc.). Abbasid caliphates, the Ottoman Empire). In our opinion, in general, Egypt achieved great success precisely during the periods when it was itself the center of a large state.

It is also worth noting that in the Middle Ages, Egypt turned out to be one of those countries where the achievements of different civilizations not only converged, but also partially melted down. In Egypt of the late Middle Ages and early Modern times, a very interesting and peculiar combination of features of Eastern and European states is observed: with a high level of development of the bureaucracy and a large role of state ownership of land [Semenova, 1982, p. 100-102] - which brings it closer to the Far Eastern regimes-there was still no system of total state control.

There was a significant autonomy of the population in solving their own affairs (which was generally a feature and achievement of Islam); there was a developed urban culture and a high level of development of commodity and monetary relations, combined with the high prestige of merchants and artisans, which brought Egypt closer to a number of European countries. 9 In Egypt, as in the Islamic world in general, there were no clearly defined estates, but for a long time the Mamluk corporation was the leading one, representing, in fact, a kind of military quasi-lineage [Ayalon, 1987 (2)]. And this, on the one hand, distinguishes Egypt from such countries as China or Korea, on the other hand, it brings it closer to some extent (despite all the differences between the nobility and the Mamluks) with Europe and Japan.

8 And even after gaining formal independence in 1923 and until the mid-50s of the XX century. Egypt, on the one hand, was actually part of the vast British Empire, and on the other hand, Sudan was part of Egypt. In fact, Egypt gained its current borders only after the separation of Syria from the UAR in 1961, and taking into account the Israeli occupation of Sinai as a result of the June 1967 war, only in the late 70s, after the Camp David agreements.

9 It is not without reason that Egypt was the first Eastern country to suffer economically from the so-called commercial revolution of the 15th and 16th centuries, which resulted in a radical restructuring of world trade [Petty, 1981, p. 33; 1998; Winter, 1998 (2)].

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Another feature of the Egyptian state and society concerns a very long period of history immediately preceding the Ottoman one. As is known, the Abbasids in the 9th century introduced the practice of creating a personal guard of Ghulams, i.e. slaves-prisoners of war, which later (naturally, along with many other factors) led to the weakening of the Caliphate itself [Sa'id 'Ashur, 1965, pp. 1-3;' Abd ad-Dayim, 1996, p. 29-30; Ayalon, 1994, p. 1-39]. However, the practice of using warrior slaves spread widely, and as a result, in Egypt, where these slaves were called Mamluks (ar. Mamluk means "owned by someone, slave", plural mamalik), they managed to play a very important role for more than six centuries.10
Several centuries later, the Ayyubid sultans, faced with the unreliability of mercenary troops, surrounded themselves with a guard formed from personally loyal Mamluk slaves ['Abd ad-Dayim, 1996, p. 32-35; Badawi, 1996, p. 21-30; Sa'id' Ashur, 1959, p. 9-17; Sa'id ' Ashur, 1965, pp. 3-4; Zaklama, 1995, pp. 17-20; Qasim, 1998, pp. 11-12; Semenova, 1995, pp. 239; Ayalon, 1981, pp. 46-50; Ayalon, 1988, p. 21; Goldschmidt, 1994, p .178-179]. The Mamluk forces proved their advantages in a number of victories over the Crusaders [Sa'id 'Ashur 1959, p. 14-16; Sa'id' Ashur 1965, p. 4-7; Fayid ' Ashur, 1995; Zaklama, 1995, p. 38-49; Badawi, 1996, p. 17-19; Qasim, 1998, pp. 12-14]. However, the sultans have become a toy in their hands. And in 1250, the last Ayyubid sultan was overthrown [Abd ad-Dayim, 1996, p. 36-43; Sa'id 'Ashur, 1959, p. 16-25; Sa'id' Ashur, 1965, p. 9-22; Badawi, 1996; Qasim, 1998, p. 14-24; Kadyrbayev, 2006].

The Mamluk Sultanate emerged, controlling Egypt and Syria from 1250 to the beginning of the 16th century. Power passed into the hands of Mamluk military leaders, who began to nominate sultans from their midst ['Abd ad-Dayim, 1996, p. 41-49; Sa'id' Ashur, 1959, p. 22-28; Qasim 1998, p. 25-53; Semenova, 1966, p. 27], and the Mamluks, then there are "people of slave origin who formed the ruling elite" [Northrup, 1998, p. 244]; and also [Petry, 1994, p. 72-73]. The Mamluk sultans created the appearance of continuity of their state with the Abbasid caliphate, one of the surviving members of the Abbasid family who survived the Mongol capture of Baghdad in 1258 was proclaimed caliph, but he did not have real power (which somewhat resembled the system of the holy but powerless emperor in Japan with the actual shogun rulers forming their own dynasty) [Marzuk, b. D., pp. 59-63; Surur, 1947, pp. 67-103; Zaklama, 1995, pp. 150-154; ' Abd al-Dayim, 1996, pp. 61-65; Badawi, 1996, pp. 115-129; Qasim, 1998, pp. 88-89].

The Mamluk state, according to Michael Winter, was a unique political entity [Winter, 1992, p. 1]. In any case, the existence of a slave state, which for centuries became the ruling elite, is a rare case in history and an important feature of the political system of Egypt, as well as some other countries of the Middle East (for example, late medieval Iraq). But it is even more surprising that under this regime, Egypt became the center not only of the new caliphate, but in fact of the entire Islamic world for more than two and a half centuries [Piterberg, 1990, p. 275; Petry, 1998, p. 462]. In addition, despite all the shortcomings, the Mamluk regime was able to provide the country with a long period of external security in the face of the Mongol invasion and confrontation with the crusaders. The most famous victory of the Mamluks in 1260 over the Mongol army at Ain Jalut (in Palestine), when the latter suffered a complete defeat, and their commander-in-chief was captured and executed. In those days, few countries could boast of repeated victories over the Mongols. And such success is rightly attributed to the high fighting qualities of Mamluk soldiers and military formations [Sa'id ' Ashur, 1959, p. 29-

10 Other important institutions also emerged under the Abbasids, which lasted for a very long time, such as the office of Grand Vizier, and new forms of land ownership: ikta' (conditional, for service, possession) and waqf (possession granted to Muslim institutions).

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50; Sa'id 'Ashur, 1965, pp. 30-38; Fayid' Ashur, 1995, pp. 77-127; Ayalon, 1960, p. 149; Zaklama, 1995, pp. 50-65; Badawi, 1996, pp. 75-99; Qasim, 1998, pp. 54-75].

Apparently, one of the reasons for this success, as well as the remarkable stability of the Mamluk regime in a turbulent international environment (Petty, 1998, p. 462), is related to the nature of the recruitment of the elite by the new Egyptian regime. As is known, Mamluk sultans, as well as individual commanders (emirs) acquired slave boys mainly of Turkic or Caucasian origin, who were converted to Islam and brought up in Mamluk homes. The young men received military and other training both at home and in special schools. The large houses of the Mamluk emirs numbered hundreds of such warriors. Being in what is essentially a family and kindred environment fostered a special closeness and mutual understanding between members of the same house, which made such an association very cohesive in personal and military terms. The training of the Mamluks was also excellent, and the training system brought up agility, resourcefulness, courage and self-confidence in the boys [Petty 1994]. When a young man became a warrior, his slave status changed, and he turned into a free Muslim with all civil rights, including the right to start a family [Ayalon, 1960, p. 158-160; Marzuk, B. D., pp. 67-80; Zaklama, 1995, pp. 18-30]. At the same time, Mamluk children, as a rule, could not acquire the status of parents and had a lower social rank, for example, they were in less privileged troops [Haarman, 1998, p. 64-67; Richards, 1998, p. 33-35; Semyonova, 1966: 52] or chose a theological or religious profession. "civil" administrative career [Ivanov, 1982, p. 146]. This led to the fact that the Mamluk corporation was constantly updated, and the emirs and heads of Mamluk houses were not the children of emirs and heads of houses, but the most energetic leaders. This slowed down the process of degradation of the Mamluk corporation, although, of course, it could not completely save it from decomposition. The structure of the Mamluk army was quite harmonious: it was distinguished by the emirs of a hundred, forty, ten and five Mamluks. Two-thirds of the income from the iqt of their emir was to be spent on the maintenance of Mamluk soldiers [Semenova, 1966: 51].11
All of this was directly related to the peculiarities of the development of the Egyptian political regime during the Ottoman period. It is not without reason that Karl Petry emphasizes the considerable flexibility of Mamluk institutions as the reason for their successful adaptation to the new conditions of Ottoman rule [Petty, 1998, p. 489]. There are reasonable doubts whether the Mamluk houses of the XVI-XVIII centuries were direct heirs of the houses of previous eras [Hathaway, 1998 (2), p. 108; Oto, 1985, p. 29; Piterberg, 1990, p. 282]. Therefore, the Mamluks of the Ottoman period are often referred to as "new Mamluks" (Hathaway, 1995; Cuno, 1992). But it is important that no one doubts that many traditions were preserved [Hathaway, 1998 (2), p. 107]. In this aspect, an important but still unresolved question is also somewhat clarified [Winter, 1998 (1), p. 11], about how the Mamluks, deprived of the most important sources of income after the Turkish conquest of Egypt and restricted in the right to hold top positions [Winter, 1998 (2), p. 516], managed to maintain their strength in the XVI century. Indeed, such social resilience is an infrequent occurrence in history and deserves attention. However, when explaining this phenomenon, we should not forget that the Mamluks were quite developed and had

11 For more information on the organization of the Mamluk army of the Egyptian sultans, see [Ayalon, 1953 (1); Ayalon, 1953 (2); Ayalon, 1954]. In addition to the Mamluk detachments themselves, there were, of course, other units consisting of mercenaries, which in terms of numbers made up the majority (but not the main fighting force) of the army, for example, the so - called Halka [Haarmann, 1998, p. 62; Richards, 1998, p. 33-35; Semenova, 1966, p. 51-52]. At the same time, the emir commanders had to have a certain number of their own Mamluk soldiers, but during the war they also commanded military detachments consisting of a different category of soldiers. For example, the emir of a hundred could have a hundred personal Mamluk soldiers and command a thousandth detachment of soldiers of a different category [Semenova, 1966, p. 51-52].

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strong corporate traditions. This implied, in particular, a high degree of organization, a habit of holding a certain position and submitting to discipline, and the fact that heredity did not play an important role in this corporation. As already mentioned, according to the rules, the sons of Mamluks (awlad an-nas) could not hold the posts left by their fathers [Haarmann, 1998; Richards, 1998; Ivanov, 1982, p. 146]. So the Mamluks constantly needed to prove their personal advantages. It is also very important that the Mamluks, members of the same house, were a closely knit group with the ideology of "nepotism", so if one of them received a military or civilian post, he sought to attract his own and promote them [Marsot, 2004, p. 42].

THE EVOLUTION OF EGYPTIAN STATEHOOD IN THE LIGHT OF THE THEORY OF THE DEVELOPED STATE

For a clearer understanding of the level of statehood development achieved by Egypt at the time of the Turkish conquest and during the entire Ottoman period, it seems necessary to draw on historical, political and anthropological theories that describe the universal stages of statehood development. The most famous stadial scheme of the evolution of statehood belongs to Henry J. M. Klassen and Peter Skalnik. They distinguish two main stages: an early state and a mature state. Relatively speaking, this concept divides all states into early states, i.e. those with insufficiently developed bureaucracy and state ideology; and mature states, in which the bureaucratic apparatus becomes effective, and formal administrative elements in management become leading (for the "early - mature state" scheme, see: [Bargatzky, 1987; Claessen, 1978 Claessen, 1984; Claessen, 1985; Claessen and Oosten, 1996; Claessen and Skalnik, 1978 (1); Claessen and Skalnik, 1978 (2); Schifferd, 1987]).

However, as our analysis shows, this evolutionary scheme is still incomplete, since it ignores the fundamental differences between the states of the industrial and pre-industrial eras. After all, both bureaucratic agrarian-craft states, starting from the period of Middle Kingdom Egypt, and industrial states up to modern ones were classified as mature states [Grinin, 2008] 12. Some researchers, on the contrary, distinguish only pre-industrial and industrial types of state in the process of statehood evolution (Cohen, 1978). But this does not take into account the huge difference between bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic agrarian states. Based on this, one of the authors of this article proposed a three-stage model of the evolution of statehood: early states-developed states - mature states [Grinin, 2006 (1); Grinin, 2006 (2); Grinin, 2007 (1); Grinin, 2007 (2); Grinin, 2008]. In our opinion, this typology better corresponds to the realities of the Middle Ages (especially late) and early Modern times in the history of a number of Eastern countries, especially such as China, Japan, Iran, the Ottoman Empire, and Egypt.

Early states are still insufficiently centralized states, politically organizing societies with an undeveloped administrative-political and socio-class structure, which flourished in antiquity and the main part of the Middle Ages. With all the variety of their forms in general (compared to developed ones), these are always states, relatively speaking, incomplete, since in each of them some important elements of statehood were either absent or were present.-

12 This conceptual flaw was actually recognized by H. J. M. Klassen himself (in a letter to one of the authors of the article).

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but they are underdeveloped. In particular, many early States did not have the necessary degree of centralization and/or did not have the full set of essential features of the state (especially such as a professional administrative apparatus, tax system, artificial territorial division and written law), or did not develop all or part of them to a satisfactory degree. But this "incompleteness" could also occur in the sense of the relationship between the state and society.

In the light of the topic of the article, the second stage, i.e. the developed state, is the most interesting one for us. Developed states are already established centralized states of late antiquity, the Middle Ages and Modern times, which politically organize societies with a clearly defined class division. A developed state already has all the attributes of a state mentioned above (including a professional management and suppression apparatus, a system of regular taxation, and artificial territorial division). This type of state was the result of long historical development and selection. Therefore, many features that may or may not have been present in the early states become mandatory in the developed ones. A developed state can be considered as a class-corporate state, since it is not only closely connected with the features of the social and corporate structure of society, but also constitutes these features in political and legal institutions.

A mature state is already the result of the development of capitalism and the industrial revolution, i.e. it has a fundamentally different production basis. Such a state forms more specialized management institutions than a developed (and even earlier) state, as well as a clear mechanism for transferring power, and necessarily has a professional bureaucracy with well - defined characteristics [Weber, 1947, p. 333-334]. A mature state relies on an established or emerging nation with all its characteristics. It is gradually being transformed from a class-based state to a purely class - based state, and in its final stages into what can be called a social state. Based on what has been said, it is obvious that in ancient times and the Middle Ages there were no mature states, but only early and developed ones. The very first mature states appear in Europe at the end of the XVII-beginning of the XVIII century. At the same time, the change of one type of statehood to another in different places does not occur simultaneously, so states of different evolutionary types can coexist for a long time. Thus, in the 19th century mature, developed and early states coexisted.

Thus, in our opinion, Egypt in the Ottoman era of its history, as well as during the British occupation (XVI - early XX century), is in some respects a very characteristic example of a developed state and at the same time a very peculiar version of it. Such a combination of features and characteristics provides a good opportunity to show the development of Egypt from the point of view of the general and special in socio-political evolution, in particular in the development of statehood. Thus, with regard to Egypt, it is confirmed that the theory of stages of statehood can serve as a very effective tool for determining the level of development of states both in different epochs of the history of the same state, and when comparing different states with each other. Thanks to this, we were able to draw the following conclusions.

First, Egypt reached the level of a developed state quite a long time ago (already in the period of the New Kingdom [Grinin, 2007 (2); Grinin, 2007 (3); Grinin and Korotaev, 2007; Korotaev and Grinin, 2007] and remained at this level for more than three millennia, i.e. much longer than the previous one. than any other country in the world. Despite all the metamorphoses of the country's political and social history, the change of rulers and dynasties, Egypt, although not a sovereign power, has always maintained centralized governance in the country.

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difference from European and other states [Semenova, 1982, p. 104]. Moreover, the change of foreign dynasties and empires to a certain extent increased the level of statehood of Egypt, which consistently adopted the achievements of the Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Persians, and Arabs, passing them through its cultural, political, and administrative traditions. As a result, the level of governance in Egypt has at times been very high. One of the indirect indicators of this is the high level of urbanization and development of urban life in general in Egypt over a number of epochs (since the progress of cities here has always been closely linked to state policy).

Thus, during the reign of the Mamluk Sultan Nasir Muhammad in the first half of the 14th century, which is considered to be the highest in the country's development under the Mamluks [Northrup, 1998, p. 253], up to 200,000 people lived in Cairo, while in the 14th century there were "only" 80,000 people living in Paris and in London - 60 thousand people [Raymond, 2001, p. 137]. There is reason to believe that under the Ptolemies and Fatimids, Egypt came very close to the second stage of the developed state - a typical developed state (see below) - and even entered it in some epochs (this can be said, in particular, with regard to the initial stage of the Ottoman period of Egyptian history in the XVI century). But Egypt finally overcame this level only in the XIX century. as a result of the reforms of Muhammad Ali.

Secondly, during the period of Turkish rule, especially in the 16th century, it made significant progress in the development of its administrative structures. It should be recalled that the Qanun nam Misr was the basis of all the activities of the administration in Egypt and the life of its military units, and this document regulated provincial administration, the amount of taxes, and the situation of the Mamluks [Winter, 1992, p. 16-17; Winter, 1998 (2), p. 515-516; Piterberg, 1990, p. 282; Kimche, 1968; Cuno, 1985, p. 30; Holt, 1969]. The system of government of Egypt, the amount of taxes, the amount that was to be sent to Istanbul, the amount of salaries of officials, the number of officials and titled persons, specific sources of spending on certain budget items, and much,much more - everything was described on the Eve of Nam Misr. And in this respect, it (as well as the Turkish legislative documents-kanuns in general) represented a very rare case for developed countries of a similar level of development to create a system of clear rules that more or less formed the basis of actual practice.13
Egypt continued to remain at the level of a developed state even during the crisis of the XVIII century, during which it formed the prerequisites for the changes that occurred in the XIX century. Here it is worth noting several important characteristics that are inherent in developed countries and are present both in the XVIII century and in the previous period in Egypt:

A. Artificial territorial division, which implies the ability of the central government to manipulate this division (divide or merge administrative divisions, change borders between them, etc.) [Ahmed, 1987 (2), pp. 62-63]. It should be pointed out that Egypt for a long time had a fairly well-established system of administrative and territorial structure. During the Ottoman period, Egypt was divided into a number of relatively speaking "districts" or " counties "(often called sanjaks), which in turn were divided into smaller administrative and judicial districts (kazs), and those, further, into " volosts "(nahiyas) [Ahmed, 1987 (2), p. 58-64; as-Sayyid,

13 Turkish sultans, beginning with Mehmed II (1451-1481), were engaged in codifying institutions, including issues of state structure. Under Suleiman I Kanuni (the Legislator), codification became comprehensive (taking into account, of course, the general legal level of that time), which was recorded in the general Turkish kanun-nam (code of laws). The foundations of the qanun-nameh of Suleiman I were concretized in numerous legal provisions on the vilayets (provinces) of the Ottoman Empire drawn up during the same period, which reflected a variety of local specific conditions and the corresponding norms of customary and local law [Tveritinova, 1969]. Qanun-nameh Misr was such a specification of the Ottoman legislation for Egypt.

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1997, pp. 221-258; Kharidi, 2000, pp. 184-206; Zelenev, 2003, p. 25]. However, it should be borne in mind that in general, the Turks took as a basis the former system of territorial division [Atsamba, 1991, p.109, 124], which existed in a more or less permanent form in Egypt for a very long time. In particular, the number of provinces in Egypt proper from the 12th to the 15th centuries ranged from 14 to 20 [Semenova, 1966, p. 28]. For example, the Mamluk Sultanate had 15 provinces, including 8 in Lower Egypt and 7 in Upper Egypt (Garsin, 1998, p. 314). Approximately the same interval in the number of sanjak provinces appears in the literature about Egypt of the XVI - XVIII centuries. Kirillina and Ryabkov [1991, p. 130] speak of 14 provinces at the end of the 18th century, while N. A. Ivanov [2000, p. 412] writes that Egypt was administratively divided into two dozen provinces (iklim). It is also often mentioned in the literature that Qanun-nam Misr defined the total number of provinces in Upper and Lower Egypt by the number 14 (Marsot, 2004, p. 40), but since the 16th century there may have been changes in their number 14.

B. A rather complex system of central and provincial administrative bodies. However, since earlier (Grinin and Korotaev, 2009) we discussed in detail the specifics and assessments of the level of state structure in Egypt during this period (including a well-thought-out system of separation of powers), this saves us the need for repetition. However, in the aspect of our research, it is important to emphasize that the system of the new political regime - the beylikat (rule of a group of top officials, beys, mainly of Mamluk origin), which developed in the XVII - XVIII centuries in Egypt, for all its originality, also had a number of features of a developed state. This is indirectly proved by the fact that the beylikat regime had no analogues in other provinces of the Ottoman Empire, since it was the result not only of Turkish influence, but also of several centuries of previous development of Egypt [Zelenev, 2003, p.44].

V. During the XVII - XVIII centuries, the social structure of Egypt also began to acquire some features of class status, which is generally characteristic of a developed state society. In particular, one can note the transformation of the Turkish military contingents( Ojaks), especially the janissaries, into a kind of estate, which is noted by some researchers.15 Important factors that determined the transformation of the Janissaries from military units into a de facto estate were: (a) decrees allowing them to inherit their social status, which thereby turned into a hereditary one; (b) the close integration of the Janissaries and the urban trade and craft strata, which the Janissaries protected from harassment for a certain fee and who then became themselves "enroll" in the janissaries for money, in order to have an honorary title and some protection from arbitrariness. Such phenomena were observed everywhere in the Ottoman Empire, and Egypt was no exception (Meyer, 2000, p. 379; Kimche, 1968, p. 455; Petrosyan, 1986; Shaw, 1962, p. 2; Ivanov and Oreshkova, 2000, p.89; Marsot, 2004, p. 43-44). According to the data provided by N. A. Ivanov [Ivanov, 2000, p. 410], already at the end of the

14 Of course, much of the system of administrative structure and local government in some periods remains unclear [Holt, 1969, p. 71-73]. As for the Ottoman period itself, it is quite possible that a certain division of real and official power in Egypt, which, in particular, is mentioned by P. M. Holt [Holt, 1969, p. 71-73],arose as a result of the preservation of the old institutions of the XV century and the emergence of new realities of the XVII - XVIII centuries, explains some discrepancies among historians in the interpretation of different management systems, territorial divisions, and the assessment of events.

15 This transformation was also facilitated by the polyfunctionality of the Ojaks. After all, in addition to purely military functions, the corps also performed important administrative tasks: police, patrol, tax collection, road protection. Corps commanders and senior officers were ex officio members of the Egyptian and provincial divans (Zelenev, 1999; Zelenev, 2003; Atsamba, 1991; Marsot, 2004; Winter, 1998 (1); Crecelius, 1981; Kimche, 1968). The number of the Turkish garrison in Egypt immediately after the conquest is generally estimated at 5.5 thousand people (M. Winter says about 5 thousand). The number of horsemen and 500 arquebusiers [Winter, 1998 (2), p. 511], and then it increased to 10,000 warriors [Winter, 1998 (1), p. 4; McGregor, 2006, p. 29].

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In the 17th century, 77% of all artisans and merchants in Cairo were members of military units, and by 1756, 89%, i.e., the absolute majority of merchants and artisans of the Islamic faith.

There was a tendency to turn into a real estate and Mamluks16, which was expressed, in particular, in their desire to consolidate their dominant position in the offspring. Thus, if during the Mamluk Sultanate, the son of a Mamluk emir could only rarely join the upper class, then in the Ottoman period and especially in the XVIII century. there were already quite a lot of cases when the children of emirs reached the highest ranks that a Mamluk could reach [Ayalon, 1960, p. 156-157; Kilberg, 1978, p. 7]. This probably explains complaints about the decline of Mamluk corporate honor and "morals" in the 18th century (al-Jabarti, 1978 (1), p. 145). At the same time, the Mamluks from the military and "middle-higher" stratum in terms of importance and income, as they became as a result of the Ottoman transformations in the XVI century, increasingly became a military-proprietary and upper class, owning various beneficial rights, positions and objects of property and giving them to their "lenniks".

However, it is even more significant that in Egypt, the Ottoman and Mamluk military also merged into a single class as a result of various alliances and rivalries (as we have already discussed [Grinin and Korotaev, 2009]).17
It is possible to say with a certain degree of convention that the Ulama also had some signs of class status. In our opinion, this was largely facilitated by the judicial reform of the 16th century during the time of Suleiman I Qanuni, as a result of which the Egyptian state began to organically include in its apparatus an important part of the class of ulema - judges-Kadis [Marsot, 2005, p. 43]. The Ulama, as an organized and educated (and purely Egyptian in ethnic terms) class, were more aware of the needs of society, which consisted in restoring order, ending internal conflicts, and reducing tax exploitation, which adversely affected the country's economy.

Third, with the reforms of Muhammad Ali in the first half of the 19th century, Egypt began a process of modernization.18 These reforms, therefore, can rightly be regarded as the most important milestone in the history of Egypt. 19 At the same time, it is a mistake to underestimate Egypt's readiness for these reforms and the level of development of its statehood in the previous era, as discussed above. On the contrary, it is desirable to go deeper

16 This was also facilitated by the fact that since the end of the 17th century, bailouts became lifelong instead of the previous system of annual confirmations, and often this right was also inherited [Ivanov, 2000, p.414]. Such a system of lifelong bailouts was called malikyan, but the term iltizam continued to be used [Cuno, 1992, p. 27]. In addition to the land tax (70% of the budget revenue), urban crafts and trade were included in the buyout, and the role of these urban iltisams increased, so that in the XVIII century. they already accounted for 17% of the total Egyptian budget, which was the second most important revenue item [Zelenev, 2003, p. 23].

17 This is why Jane Hathaway (1995; Hathaway, 1998 (1); Hathaway, 1998 (2)) suggests that rather than the concept of a neo-Mamluk military regime in the eighteenth century, we should talk about the concept of a system of military households, both purely Mamluk and organized according to their type by senior Turkish military officials Many of them actively recruited their own Mamluks, while the Mamluk houses themselves included clients from the Ottoman Ojaks.

18 Recall that Muhammad Ali eliminated the Mamluk "estate" and land ownership, created a modern army and navy in Egypt (with the main number of soldiers and sailors being indigenous Egyptians for the first time in centuries), founded a modern industry for his time, carried out reforms in education and legal proceedings, land relations, territorial, administrative and state structure, He won victories over Turkey, conquered Sudan, and founded a dynasty that ruled Egypt until 1952 [Rafi'i, 1930, p. 113-600; Sabit, 1943; Shukri, 1948; Husain, 1981; ' Attar, 1989; Shalabi, 1989; Sabri, 1991,p. 31-79; Nasir, 1991]. 1993, pp. 82-138; al-Bitrik, 1999, pp. 55-63; Marsot, 1984; Goldschmidt, 2004; Hunter, 1999; Flower, 1972; Cuno, 1985; Cuno, 1992; Lawson, 1999; al-Jabarti, 1978 (2); Zelenev, 2003]; see also: [Grinin, 2006 (3); 2007 (2)].

19 But not as a more radical transition from the stage of the early state to the stage of the developed state, i.e. it was not a stadium transition, but only an intra-stadium transition.

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to trace the continuity between epochs, to see how the processes that gained momentum in the 19th century were born in the 18th century or even earlier. And the theory of stages of statehood makes it quite possible to do this.

Fourthly, in terms of the theory of stages of statehood, the breakthrough that Egypt made in the first half of the 19th century should be evaluated as a movement within one-developed-stage of statehood from its first stage to the second, when all the features of a developed state are already fully manifested in the system, and the archaic is mostly gone. This theory distinguishes three stages of a developed state: archaic, typical, and transitional. At the same time, this conclusion quite adequately explains the reasons for the large differences in the models of statehood of Egypt in the XVI - XVIII centuries and in the period after the reforms of Muhammad Ali.

* * *

Historical dynamics of the development of Ottoman Egypt (and even the whole history of Egypt over the past two thousand years) It can be considered from the point of view of fluctuations and fluctuations, as a result of which, figuratively speaking, the political and administrative side came out ahead, and then the lagging part caught up and outstripped the other (or, conversely, the escaped sphere again fell in terms of development to the subsystem from which it broke away). In this model of analysis, it seems that in the 16th century, as a result of the changes in Egypt made under Suleiman I (in particular, the introduction of a new system of governance in accordance with Kanun Nam Misr), the political and administrative aspect of Egyptian society is far ahead. Then gradually, due to both the weakening of the Ottoman state order and the transfer of power in Egypt to military groups and dictators, as well as a number of socio-economic processes (including the transition to bailouts [Cuno, 1992; Marsot, 2004; Shaw, 1962] and the strengthening of the tax press, the decline of large-scale trade, etc.- Dzhabarti, 1978 (1); Cuno, 1992, p. 30; Marsot 2004; Ivanov, 2000]) the social side begins to outstrip the political one. The latter was reflected in the strengthening of macro-social ties in society.

To better understand this process, it is worth considering: why did the country not break up into separate territories in the last crisis quarter of the XVIII century, as is usually the case during feudal troubles? After all, it would seem that everything favored such a "disintegration" scenario. The scale of the crisis was enormous, because during this period crop failures, famine, plague, changes of government, military coups, Turkish invasion, deterioration of the economic situation, etc. coincided (and not entirely by chance [Korotaev, 2006]) [Avad, 1925, pp. 41-53; Rafi'and, 1929, pp. 9-62; Khusain, 1981, pp. 30-48; Kilberg, 1978]. There were no legitimate contenders for power, but there were many private military detachments and "feudal" houses. In our opinion, Egypt was largely kept from disintegrating by sufficiently developed social relations, including the general Egyptian character of the Mamluk class, the consolidation of urban corporations, the increased role of the Ulama in terms of social mediation [Marsot, 2005], as well as the self-consciousness of Egyptians who are used to seeing the country as one. These same forces also provided much support to Muhammad Ali. The opposite situation can be seen in this and subsequent times in neighboring Syria, which was very far from unity (Zelenev, 2003).

Further, as a result of Muhammad Ali's reforms in the 19th century, the state side begins to significantly outstrip the social side. But at the end of the 19th century, during the British occupation, the pendulum again went in the other direction.

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