(50s-EARLY 80s)

The countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America that are developing along the capitalist path, having found themselves on the periphery of world capitalism and faced with unresolved internal problems, introduce new sharp contradictions into the world capitalist system, weakening its position. Healthy social forces in such countries are engaged in a struggle to solve urgent socio-economic and political problems in the national interest, for economic independence and democracy. And since the internal reaction in these countries operates with the support of imperialism, the struggle against it is associated there with the struggle against the latter's sinister plans. Hence, it is clear how important it is to study the laws and peculiarities of the development of such countries, their progressive anti-imperialist potentials, and the possibilities of transforming them from a reserve of capitalism into a reserve of anti-imperialist struggle.

These countries are characterized by a connection with the world capitalist system not only in economic but also in political terms, borrowing the experience of developed capitalist states in creating their own political superstructure. Of particular interest from this point of view are those countries that have been implementing a system of Western bourgeois political institutions for a relatively long time. Such countries include Turkey, where the formation of the latter according to the Western model intensified already in the 1920s, after the victory of the national liberation movement. More than half a century of experience in the functioning of bourgeois political institutions in republican Turkey, the development of political struggle in a limited bourgeois democracy, is essential for understanding the general and special features of such experience. It is also interesting in practical terms, because it allows many developing countries that later gained political independence and are now "testing" the Western system of political institutions, taking into account historical and other differences, to clearly imagine what it can give them.

In 1918 - 1923, the Kemalists successfully united various social strata - the majority of Turkish society-in the struggle for national independence. The victory in the national liberation war opened the way for the Kemalists to transform themselves in the socio-economic and political spheres in order to accelerate the development of capitalism. According to the Kemalists, the creation of a political party was supposed to facilitate the solution of this problem and help to realize the political mobilization of the masses in the new conditions. As Kemal Ataturk emphasized, only by creating a political organization can the entire nation be involved in the implementation of socio-economic tasks,

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who faced the country after the victory of the national liberation movement 1 . In 1923, the People's Party (later the Republican People's Party) was created, which, expressing the interests of the bourgeoisie, bureaucracy, and large landowners, attracted representatives of almost all social strata of Turkish society, sought to unite their efforts and ensure their support for its policies.

However, the process of development of capitalism naturally led to a deepening of the class differentiation of Turkish society and, as a consequence, to a clearer designation of class interests. In this regard, the activities of the ILP began to cause discontent in various segments of society. Workers in conditions of increased exploitation and reduced living standards began to move away from this party. Many intellectuals were outraged by the fact that the ILP, while remaining practically the only party and using its monopoly on power, began to resort to authoritarian methods of leadership, hindering the exercise of bourgeois-democratic freedoms. In the officer corps of the Turkish army in the mid-40s, a political movement opposed to the CHP emerged. As D. Seyhan, an active participant in the preparation of the military coup of May 27, 1960, reports in his memoirs, the officers were dissatisfied with the fact that a one-party despotism reigned in the country, the gendarme and the policeman stood over the people, in the cities speculators profited from the troubles of people, and in the village agha exploited a half-starved farmhand. As a result, the young officers created a secret organization with the goal of eliminating the leader of the ILP and. Inenu and his administration And "continue implementing Ataturk's reforms" 2 .

The bourgeoisie, which grew stronger in the 1930s and 1940s, demanded a more liberal economic policy and a reduction in state regulation. It was not without reason that she perceived IUU fishing as a kind of synonym for the state - bureaucratic apparatus, which, in her opinion, hindered free enterprise. Indeed, the positions of the bureaucracy in the party and the state were very strong, they were preserved from the time of the Ottoman Empire. In principle, this phenomenon of continuity of traditional structures is generally characteristic of dependent countries that were not colonies in the past3, and it has also found expression in Turkey. A part of the bourgeoisie sought to create a party of its own, which would express its interests in a more concentrated way.

Demands to abandon the one-party system were increasingly voiced in various social strata. As a result, the leadership of the ILP in 1945 was forced to agree to the transition to a multi-party system. A number of new parties emerged in a short time, but only one of them, the Democratic Party, created by a group of former ILP figures and based on the interests of large private businesses, was able to compete politically with the ILP. In the second half of the 1940s, the Democratic Party (DP) rapidly increased its influence and in the 1950 parliamentary elections was able to win a convincing victory over the CHP. The coming to power of the Democratic Party was welcomed by those who associated with it hopes for democratization and better living conditions. This caused satisfaction among the officers of the opposition ILP, who believed that a democratic order had been established, which would ensure the implementation of the overdue reforms .4
The main content of the political situation in the 50s was

1 Allan C. Ataturk'un sosyal goriisjeri. Istanbul. 1965, s. 40 - 44.

2 Seyhan D. Golgedeki adam. Istanbul. 1966, s. 14 - 16.

3 See Shirokov G. K. Colonies and dependent countries: problems of historical difference. - Peoples of Asia and Africa, 1983, N 3.

4 Talat Aydemir'in hatiralari. Istanbul. 1968, s. 22.

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The struggle between the two main bourgeois - landlord parties, the PD and the ILP, gradually escalated, with the former striving to maintain its position as the ruling party, while the latter sought to regain its influence and return to power. In the first half of the 1950s, DP was doing well. Through a series of social and economic events, demonstrating her respect for Islam, she attracted the sympathy of a huge mass of rural small entrepreneurs. Although objective economic conditions did not allow the DP leadership to fully implement the promised liberalization and limit the position of the public sector, it took a number of measures aimed at fully encouraging private capital (local and foreign), attracting it to a number of industries (especially mining, sugar, cement), and increased lending to private capital in industry. Comprehensive support was provided to large producers in agriculture.

All this, against the background of mass discontent with the Republican People's Party, has so far brought political dividends to the DP in the form of votes. In the 1954 elections, it won 504 out of 550 seats in the Mejlis, while the ILP suffered another crushing defeat, gaining 31 seats (against 69 in the 1950 elections). As a result, the DP leadership began to believe that the ILP could no longer be considered as a political force, and it was openly ignored. Inenya was sometimes "forgotten" to be invited to official receptions. The leader of the ILP ,the" second man " after Kemal Ataturk, avoided appearing at the front doors of the Mejlis, preferring to use the back door. In the ILP itself, the election results caused confusion. At the XI Congress of the party, which was held soon after, even proposals were made to recall the party's parliamentary group from the Mejlis. However, Inenyu strongly opposed this and called for the maximum use of all opportunities to fight against DP 5 . Further events showed that the ruling party underestimated its political opponent.

After 1954, there was a change of cadres in the leadership of the ILP, a group of energetic young figures appeared on the ground and in the center (among them was the future leader of the party B. Edzhevit). The ILP gradually gathered its strength and increased its attacks on the DP government, skillfully exploiting all its mistakes. IUU fishing activity increased as economic difficulties worsened. Large capital investments, increased loans, and a lot of expensive projects have resulted in inflation and higher prices for essential goods. The development and mechanization of agriculture led, on the one hand, to the strengthening of large capitalist farms, and on the other, to the ruin of thousands of peasants and their migration to the cities, where they joined the ranks of the unemployed and paupers. The doors of the economic paradise promised by the Democratic Party turned out to be open only for big business.

The deterioration of the workers 'situation and the intensification of the opposition affected the results of the next parliamentary elections," held by the authorities ahead of schedule, in 1957. The PD won 47.3% of the vote and 419 seats in the Mejlis, while the CHP won 40.6% of the vote and 178 seats. This has strained relations between the ruling party and the opposition to an extreme degree. Given the lack of experience of political pluralism, the immaturity of bourgeois political institutions brought from the West to the soil of Turkey's multi-layered society, the PD leaders did not want to put up with the idea of losing power. PD leader A. Menderes liked to say: "I will never be ex-prime minister." In such a situation, the leaders of the DP violated the "rules of the game" by using unacceptable measures.-

5 Kilt S. 1960 - 1975 doneminde Cumhuriyet halk partisinde gelismeler, Istanbul. 1976, s. 122 - 123.

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acceptable methods from the point of view of bourgeois democracy. The sharp struggle for power between the PD and the ILP and the violations of bourgeois freedoms committed in the country (against the background of mass discontent with the PD's policies) caused the coup d'etat on May 27, 1960.

If the results of the 1957 elections led to the emergence of an internal opposition in the ranks of the DP, on the contrary, they inspired confidence in the ILP. In early 1959. For the first time in several years, Inenyu was accompanied by a large group of deputies from his party on a propaganda trip to the western regions of the country. In an effort to prevent the development of opposition activities, the PD leadership began to use local authorities, the police, and the army to suppress them, and instigate attacks on participants in meetings and rallies of the ILP and Inenya personally. In the mid-1950s, laws were passed that significantly restricted the freedom of assembly and demonstration, as well as the activities of the opposition in the Mejlis. The ILP, taking into account the growing public dissatisfaction with the policy of the authorities, skillfully used the mass media. By the end of the 1950s, the circulation of pro-government newspapers (mainly Zafer and Son havadis) was only 70,000 copies, while the circulation of pro-CHP newspapers and magazines reached 1.5 million .6 The authorities were very concerned about this, and responded with restrictions on press freedom and reprisals against journalists. The closure of newspapers and magazines, the confiscation of their issues, and the arrest of journalists became commonplace by the end of the 1950s.

Of course, all this caused outrage among the intelligentsia, students, and the officer corps. Using its traditional connections among the intelligentsia and bureaucracy, as well as its youth organizations, the ILP skillfully fueled this outrage. At the same time, the Republican People's Party, unlike its political opponent, realized that the multi-party system creates new conditions for political struggle. The leaders of the ILP, not without the help of young leaders, felt the need to abandon to some extent the concepts of a "national" party, from the authoritarian habits of the past, and create a political face for their party that would allow it to successfully solve the problem of political mobilization of the masses and securing the votes of voters. Thus the foundations of the party's future new course were laid. Already during the pre-election campaign of 1957 and later, during the preparation for new elections (which was interrupted by the coup of May 27), such slogans as "Freedom of speech, press, and assembly!", "Independence of radio and universities!", and "Workers' right to strike and conclude collective agreements " formed the basis of the ILP platform! ", "Employees have the right to form trade unions!", " Ease the burden of debts and taxes for farmers!"7. All these requirements were attractive to the general public.

Embittered by the growing success of the opposition, the DP leaders succeeded in getting the Mejlis to pass a law on April 18, 1960, establishing a commission to investigate "illegal subversive activities of the ILP and a part of the press". This in itself did not contradict the Constitution and the statute of the Mejlis, but the laws of April 18 and 27 granted the commission enormous powers, it was given judicial and executive functions, and its decisions and sentences were final. This was a blatant violation of the norms of bourgeois democracy and caused a storm of protests. On April 27, student demonstrations and rallies began, which soon became widespread and continued until May 27, when a military coup was carried out.

6 Aydemir S. S. Ikinci adam. III cilt. Istanbul. 1975, s. 399.

7 Bila H. CHP tarihi (1919 - 1979). Ankara. 1979, s. 307 - 308.

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The creation of secret groups in the army that were opposed to the DP regime and were plotting a military coup began in the mid-50s. However, it would be wrong to reduce the whole matter to dissatisfaction with the DP's policies. Here it is best to give the floor to the young officers themselves-the petty-bourgeois radicals who actually prepared and carried out the coup of May 27. The aforementioned Seyhan and another participant in the preparation of the coup, who became a member of the National Unity Committee, O. Erkanli, repeatedly stressed that "the essence and main task of the coup was based on an assessment of the events after 1938. "8 that" May 27 is the result of the development of events after the death of Ataturk from 1938 to 1960, is incorrect and insufficient explain May 27 only by the DP's ten-year period in power, the events and mistakes of that period. " 9 Seyhan was very clear about this: "The opinion that the coup was prepared only in order to eliminate the compromised party and put another one in its place is completely untrue... We thought a lot about the future forms of government in Turkey, but none of us pursued personal goals and were not so poor in mind that everything was reduced to replacing one party with another in power. " 10
So, at first, patriotic Kemalist officers opposed the policy of the ILP and supported the newly created Democratic Party, pinning certain hopes on it. However, then their discontent was also caused by the DP's policy. Close observation of the inter-party struggle and the multi-party system has led to a negative attitude towards this system as a whole. Therefore, the radical officers became convinced that a multi-party system, a bourgeois democracy, must be opposed to a military dictatorship of a petty-bourgeois nature. In preparation for the coup, they intended to implement a number of socio-economic measures in the interests of working people, mainly urban and rural small bourgeoisie, strengthen state planning and the public sector as a means of implementing such policies, and limit large-scale capitalist entrepreneurship. They also wanted to reorganize the state apparatus, "bring it closer to the people," democratize the education system, free the media from the power of big capital, and pursue a more independent foreign policy within the framework of existing commitments. The petty-bourgeois nationalism of the radical officers also manifested itself in the intention to put a barrier in the way of "extreme trends", which included scientific socialism, to strengthen national motives in ideology and culture, and to fight against "Kurdish separatism"11 .

The system of views of radical officers was formed under the influence not only of events in Turkey, but also of processes taking place all over the world, and in particular in neighboring countries. The 50s were characterized by an increase in the political activity of the army in the East. In a number of countries, including the Arab countries, the officers acted as a political force that expressed the sentiments of the petty bourgeoisie .12 This, of course, influenced the politicization of the Turkish army in general, the ideology and practical actions of radical officers in particular.

The radical movement was not the only one in the secret groups that were preparing a coup. Some of the officers, especially the generals who joined the

8 Seyhan D. Op. cit., s. 42.

9 Erkanli О. Anilar... sorunlar... sorumlular. Istanbul. 1972, s. 2 - 3.

10 Seyhan D. Op. cit., s. 42, 45.

11 Erkanli O. Op cit., s. 13 - 16, 43 - 44, 50 - 53.

12 See Zarubezhny Vostok i sovremennost ' [Foreign East and Modernity], Vol. 1, Moscow, 1980, pp. 481-487.

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They were alarmed by the fact that the fierce struggle between the two largest political parties for power led to an acute political crisis, caused massive anti-government demonstrations, and as a result created a situation that threatened the regime. The conservative trend was looking for ways to save the regime and restore the efficiency of the institutions of bourgeois democracy. In the end, it agreed with the radical officers that a coup was necessary, but considered it only aimed at removing a disgraced political group from power, which would put an end to the anti - government movement that had taken on a dangerous scale, and then at holding parliamentary elections as soon as possible.

The military coup of May 27, 1960 seriously changed the alignment of political forces and the direction of the political struggle. Power passed to the Committee of National Unity( CNE), which meant the establishment of a military dictatorship. But in fact, the situation was not so clear. Both of these political trends were represented in the CNE, which predetermined the lack of unity and a coordinated program of action. After the coup, the Democratic Party was banned and its leaders put on trial. It is clear that in such circumstances, the ILP, whose main political rival was removed from the game, considered its main task to convince the military to hold elections as soon as possible and "return to democracy." In a circular sent immediately after the coup to local party organizations (with the permission of the KNE), Inenyu approved the coup and called for preparations for the elections .13 In fact, the ILP did not need to convince the conservatives in the CNE to hold elections as soon as possible - they themselves were in favor of it. As early as May 28, the head of the KKE, Army General J. R. R. Tolkien, was appointed. Gursel assured Inenya of his loyalty. On May 29, Inenyu visited Gursel, stressing the need to "maintain control of the army" and hold elections as soon as possible14.It was only after the young officers of the CNE expressed their dissatisfaction with these contacts that they were temporarily suspended.

So, in the political struggle after the coup of May 27, radical officers found themselves on one side of the "barricade", and on the other-conservatives together with the ILP. In social terms, the radicals, seeking to protect the interests of broad strata of the working people, mainly the petty bourgeoisie, wanted to preserve the military dictatorship for a long time. The conservatives, together with the ILP, expressing in principle the interests of the ruling class, the bourgeoisie, sought to restore bourgeois democracy. Under these conditions, military dictatorship, if it were really carried out in the interests of the working people, would be essentially more democratic than democracy in the interests of the bourgeoisie.

In the first months after the coup, the KKE, mainly under the influence of radicals, implemented a number of measures to stabilize the national economy, strengthen the position of the public sector and develop state planning. The rampant rise in prices was suspended, a law was passed on extending income tax to large landowners, 15 taxation of large capital in industry and trade was increased, the state apparatus was reduced, and serious measures were taken against corruption. The CNE decided to pay the peasants ' debts in installments, tried to solve some problems of the workers, and a number of measures were taken to improve the system of public education and health care.-

13 Aydemir S. S. Op. cit., s. 470 - 472.

14 Ibid., s. 471.

15 After the formation of a civilian government as early as February 1962, large landowners secured the repeal of the law (Yasa M. Iktisadi mesejelerimiz. Istanbul. 1966, s. 92 - 93).

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research Institute and Social security. New significant nuances, also under the influence of radicals, began to manifest themselves in Turkey's foreign policy. For example, the CNE issued a directive to the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN: 1. Support national liberation movements; 2. Take a more independent line from NATO when voting on various issues; 3. Develop and strengthen ties with third world countries 16 . All of this has alarmed big capital at home and Turkey's Western allies. Entrepreneurs and the top bureaucracy sabotaged the activities of the KKE, and economic difficulties were used to discredit the army and demand a "return to democracy." The Western allies were increasingly concerned about the activities of the radicals, not wanting to repeat what happened after the 1952 revolution in Egypt and the 1958 revolution in Iraq.

By the end of 1960, the differences between the two movements in the CNE had become even more acute. The denouement came in November, when 14 young officers-members of the KNE were withdrawn from its composition. Radicals were popular in the officer corps and feared by the ruling elite, so the operation was prepared with great care, involving the command of the Ankara and Istanbul military garrisons, the police, and security forces. On the night of November 13, all 14 had their home phones turned off, were arrested at dawn, and were informed of their discharge from the army. After several days of detention, 14 former members of the KKE were sent as advisers to various Turkish missions abroad.

By that time, the agreement between the conservatives in the KKE and the leadership of the ILP had become quite clear. The CNE promised to hold parliamentary elections in October 1961, and the ILP, which had no doubts about its victory in them, provided the remaining members of the CNE with the status of life members of the upper house, and personally J. R. R. Tolkien. Gürselu - the post of president. Both sides have fulfilled their promises.

After the coup on May 27, the leadership of the ILP paid great attention to drafting a new constitution .17 It has ensured that basically all its wishes are reflected in it. His approach to what the new constitution should look like generally coincided with the position of the conservative current in the KKE. The practice of the multi-party system established in Turkey in the 1950s showed the insufficiency of its provision with constitutional and legal norms, which contributed to gross violations of bourgeois democracy by the DP. Based on this, the ILP considered that a more detailed and thorough study of the constitutional foundations of bourgeois democracy was necessary in order to guarantee its observance in the future. The 1961 Constitution is characterized by all the vices of bourgeois constitutions, the actual lack of security for workers ' rights, etc.However, it significantly expanded the framework of bourgeois democracy in Turkey, which had a great impact on the development of social and political life in the country.

In the 1960s, the further development of capitalism, accompanied by the deepening of class differentiation and the aggravation of social contradictions, together with the expansion of rights and freedoms stipulated by the new constitution, gave an impetus to the rise of the struggle of the masses for their rights. First of all, it affected the character of the working-class movement. The working class has grown in number, and the number of trade unions has increased. The proletariat declared itself in full voice as the main revolutionary force in the mass strikes, meetings and demonstrations that grew from year to year. The struggle of the industrial proletariat was the main, but not the only, element of the industrial proletariat.-

16 Camli I. Dunya, Amerika, Turkiye. Istanbul. 1966, s. 6.

17 The new Constitution was adopted in a referendum on 9 July 1961.

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internal flow in the movement of workers. The traditionally politically inert peasantry was also on the move. The growth of social tension in the countryside found an outlet in the peasants ' land grabs and their clashes with landlords, protest rallies against the dominance of usurers, speculators, and buyers of crops, and against unfair purchase prices. The urban petty bourgeoisie, employees, and working intelligentsia were also politicized - these social strata, coming into conflict with the ruling elite, joined the mass movement. The end of the 60s was characterized by a rapid growth of student unrest.

All this was reflected in the political sphere: in the 60s there was a kind of "explosion" in the left movement. Sensing the growing political activity of the working masses and taking advantage of their constitutional freedoms, the leftists devoted all their fervor and energy to critically assessing the problems of their country and understanding various kinds of socialist ideas. A prominent Turkish scholar and publicist. Cem noted as "an important feature of Turkey" that "in the 60s and 70s, socialism, despite its childhood illnesses, mistakes, and vacillations, showed rapid development." 18 At the same time, the left-wing intellectuals, naturally, could not isolate themselves within the framework of their country; they correlated their reasoning and conclusions with the experience of the world communist movement, the theories of petty-bourgeois socialism and social democracy. This was facilitated by the filling of the country's book market in the 60s, in the conditions of democratization, with a mass of all sorts of left-wing translated publications. However, the continued prohibition of the Communist Party and the articles of the Criminal Code prohibiting "communist propaganda" significantly reduced the possibility of spreading the ideas of scientific socialism.

A characteristic feature of the left-wing movement of the 1960s was the concentration of left-wing groups around numerous periodicals, on the pages of which they expressed their views and held discussions with other groups. One of the most popular publications of this kind was Ion magazine, published in January 1961. Its pages discussed the possibility of Turkey's transition to a socialist path of development based on the "restoration of the revolutionary principles of kemalism". A number of publications, such as the magazines Devrim, Sol Kemalizm, and Turk solu, belittled the role of the proletariat in the "national revolutionary process" and, conversely, hyperbolized the importance of the petty bourgeoisie and its "vanguard" - the civil-military intelligentsia .19
The most significant phenomenon in the left-wing movement was the Workers ' Party of Turkey (RPT), established in February 1961. Its program, adopted in 1964, expressed the interests of the working masses - the proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie, and the working intelligentsia. Both the program and the social composition of the party testified to its petty-bourgeois character. However, the Russian Orthodox Church raised the question of moving to a non-capitalist path of development, and advocated an "independent, anti-imperialist, anti-colonial, peace-loving foreign policy." 20 The party's popularity grew rapidly. In the 1965 elections, it won 15 seats. For the first time in the history of the Republic of Turkey, a left-wing party was not only represented in the Mejlis, but was also able to form its own parliamentary group there. RPT deputies systematically spoke in the Mejlis in defense of the rights of workers and other groups of workers, exposed the machinations of big capital, and criticized Turkey's alliance with the United States and NATO. In 1969, the RPT MP B. Boran stated in the Mejlis,

18 Cem I. Tarih acisindan 12 mart. II cilt. Istanbul. 1977, s. 94.

19 See Huseynov A. A. Mass media in the socio-political life of Turkey, Moscow 1981, pp. 56, 67; Avcioglu D. Turkiye'nin duzeni (dun-bugun-yarin). Ankara. 1969, s. 477; Belli M. Yazilar 1965 - 1970. Ankara. 1970, s. 260. .

20 Parti programlari. Birinci kitap-Birinci cilt. Istanbul. 1970. s. 359 - 361.

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that "it is appropriate for Turkey to withdraw from NATO, because this alliance does not serve the interests of collective security, but the goals of the United States" 21 . However, by the end of the 60s, the influence of the Workers ' Party began to decline. On the one hand, this was caused by pressure from the authorities, and on the other - by the intensification of the struggle of groups within the party, which led to its split in 1973.

Thus, the left movement in the 60s, despite all its weaknesses, entered the arena of political struggle in the form of various circles and groups, and mainly in the form of the Workers ' Party, marking a qualitatively new phenomenon in this struggle compared to the 50s. In the activities of bourgeois political parties, the contradictions within the ruling class, which became more acute in the 60s, also found expression. At the same time, there was a struggle for votes, for power within the multi-party system.

The Republican People's Party, as expected, won the first post-coup elections in 1961, but this success did not look convincing. Shortly after the coup, the ILP saw to its right the DP's political successor, the Justice Party (PS), which emerged in February 1961, and was rapidly growing in influence. To its left, it found the Workers ' Party, which was quite successful in attracting the sympathies of the petty bourgeoisie and the working class - precisely those social groups that the ILP began to pay special attention to in the late 1950s and which were now slipping out of its influence. In this regard, in the early 60s, the question of determining the place of the ILP in the multi-party system became acute, and it was increasingly discussed in both the central and local party bodies. In the run-up to the 1965 elections, the ILP leadership declared that the party intended to free itself from excessive centrist tendencies, "with one foot on the left and the other on the right", and would strive to acquire a "social-democratic face".22 Thus, the leadership of the oldest bourgeois party in Republican Turkey decided to turn to the ideological arsenal and practice of European social-democratic parties that emerged on the basis of right-wing opportunism in the labor movement. This is one of the examples (in this case in the sphere of the political superstructure) of the peculiarity of the development of capitalism in the East in the conditions of the already established world capitalist system.

One of the leaders of the ILP, Ecevit, a staunch supporter of the new left - of-center course, wrote that the latter was formed under the influence of the social democratic movement that emerged "in Western democratic countries"23 . For the leadership of the ILP and the part of the bourgeoisie that supported it, such a course seemed tempting, because while it preserved the bourgeois character of the party, it also opened up new opportunities to attract the working masses to the ILP, weaken the influence of the ideas of socialism on them, slow down the development of the working-class movement and direct it towards social reformism. The leaders of the ILP made no secret of their hopes that the "left of center" course would not only strengthen the existing regime, but also, as Ineniu stated, "eliminate the threat of communism."24 The 60s were marked for the ILP by the emergence of a new course and the struggle around it. Right-wing parties have not failed to accuse the ILP of becoming "too left-wing." Strong opposition to the new deal persisted within the ILP until the early 1970s. Nevertheless, it was gaining strength, contributing to the growth of the popularity of the ILP, which led to an aggravation of its struggle for power with its main rival, the Justice Party.

21 Yurt ve dunya, Istanbul, 1977, N 2, s. 491- 493.

22 Bila H. Op. cit., s. 387.

23 Ecevit B. Ortanin solu. 7-ci baski. Istanbul. 1975, s. 27, 32.

24 Bila H. Op. cit., s. 394.

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The party quickly established a network of local organizations across the country. It was not difficult to do this - it basically came down to replacing the signs of the former DP. Already in the 1961 elections. The PS demonstrated its influence, receiving 34.6% of the vote. The PS program defined the party's goal as "making the Turkish nation a developed member of the free world", and in its foreign policy it proclaimed "strengthening and deepening cooperation with the free world in all areas" .25 Specific provisions of the program were aimed at ensuring the most favorable conditions for the activities of private businesses, especially large ones, which, for their part, naturally supported the PS. The Party also counted on attracting the votes of the petty bourgeoisie, especially the rural ones. However, unlike the social-democratic phraseology of the ILP, this party used the methods of its predecessor, the DP, playing on the private-property instincts of the small entrepreneur and luring him with opportunities to get rich and take advantage of the fruits of the capitalist "paradise".

There was another factor that determined the rivalry between the ILP and the PS. The ILP has traditionally been a bulwark of bureaucracy. One of the main principles of this party was statism - a course to strengthen the public sector, with which it linked the development of the economy. The DP, and then the PS, on the contrary, sought to limit the public sector, expanding the opportunities of the private capitalist system. Here, the struggle was both over the path of further development of capitalism and the fate of the relatively powerful stratum of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, for which the public sector is "the direct economic basis and justification of its activities." 26 Naturally, the bureaucracy firmly supported the ILP in this struggle.

The struggle between the ILP and the PS reflected an important but not the only contradiction within the bourgeoisie. In the 60s, the PS, as the political successor of the DP, sought to unite all groups of the bourgeoisie, but both in its program and in its practical actions, especially after it came to power in 1965, it showed a tendency to ensure the interests of industrial capital primarily. As a result, a group was formed within the party, expressing dissatisfaction with large landowners and Anatolian merchants that their interests were relegated to the background by the" team " of the young and energetic leader of the PS S. Demirel. On the basis of this group, in December 1970, the Democratic Party was created, headed by F. P. Shestakov. Bozbayli is a member of the Mejlis, a former prominent figure of the PS. The new party's program included a number of restrictive measures against industrial capital concentrated in large cities. In contrast, it was planned to encourage large landowners in every possible way. Counting on the support of small and medium-sized entrepreneurs in the city and countryside, the party declared its intention to improve their situation by limiting large-scale industrial capital, paying more attention to religion ,and "spiritual uplift." 27 The creation of the DP and its sharp criticism of the PS leadership for not ensuring full continuity of the course of the Democratic Party of the 1950s contributed to the intensification of the struggle between the bourgeois parties.

There was also another contradiction - between the large commercial and industrial capital concentrated in large cities and connected with the West, on the one hand, and the much weaker "provincial" commercial and industrial bourgeoisie of Anatolia, on the other.

25 Adalet partisi. Program ve tuzuk. Ankara. 1969, s. 3, 36 - 37.

26 Zarubezhny Vostok i sovremennost ' [Foreign East and Modernity], vol. 1, p. 329.

27 Bozbeyli F. Demokratik sag. Istanbul. 1976, s. 70; Sencer M. Turkiye'de siyasal partilerin sosyal temelleri. Istanbul. 1974, s. 377 - 381.

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The process of concentration and monopolization of capital in the 60s began to put considerable pressure on the Anatolian bourgeoisie and even threaten its existence. There was such a situation that the course of the PS on preferential support of industrial capital was not profitable for all industrialists, and the benefits from it did not reach the mass of Anatolian entrepreneurs. The latter began to understand that they needed to strengthen their positions, seek state support, loans, and access to foreign trade operations that had become a monopoly of the "neocompradors". In the political sphere, this also led to the emergence of a trend within the PS, which tried to express the interests of Anatolian entrepreneurs and criticized the party's leadership for neglecting them. On the basis of this trend, the National Order Party (PNP) was created in January 1970, headed by N. Erbakan. Its program emphasized that the state should support"not a narrow group of private entrepreneurs, as is done now, but entrepreneurs throughout the country." Particular attention was paid to freedom of religion, and it was pointed out that " the TNG opposes the use of the principle of laicism (the secular nature of the state. ) as a means of exerting pressure on religion and believers " 28 . The main feature of the party created by Erbakan was the requirement to strengthen the religious factor in all areas. The TNG called for contrasting the moral values of Islam with "immoral Western capitalism." In this way, the interests of the" national "Anatolian bourgeoisie were opposed to the" neo-Comprador " capital of large cities. Soon after its creation, the PNP began to attract a large number of Anatolian entrepreneurs, and the party's mass base began to grow rapidly.

Thus, the objective laws of capitalism, which is rapidly developing on the basis of a multi-layered society, on the one hand, and a certain expansion of bourgeois - democratic freedoms, on the other, predetermined in the 60s the rise of the struggle of Turkish workers for their rights, the rapid development of the left movement, the separation of groups in the ruling class and the intensification of the struggle between them. By the beginning of the 70s, these main factors of the country's socio - political life were becoming increasingly clear, and the contradictions sharply worsened in all areas against the background of aggravated economic difficulties. In 1970, the mass movement, especially the working class movement, reached its peak. The largest number of strikes was recorded compared to any year in the past decade. The situation was complicated by a rapid surge of youth protests, among which extremist actions took an increasing place. In such circumstances, the PS government headed by Demirel was unable to control the course of events. Concern over the fate of the regime forced the ruling elite, including the military elite, to look for a way out of this situation. In January 1971. one of the largest Turkish newspapers wrote that the 1961 constitution, the democratic regime "do not work today", and the parties do not fulfill their functions .29 The country found itself in a state of crisis that was dangerous for the development regime, and at the same time, the inability of the multi-party system to overcome this crisis on its own was revealed. So the base was created for the next military intervention.

The "military factor" in the political life of Turkey in the second half of the 60s temporarily faded into the background. Radical officers who were removed from the KKE, after returning from exile abroad, adapted to the system of bourgeois democracy, joining the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.-

28 Parti programlari, s. 397 - 399, 413 - 416.

29 Cumhuriyet, 17.I.1971.

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new parties. Their supporters and followers were severely repressed after two failed coup attempts in 1962 and 1963. The conservative generals sought to implement, as far as possible, the policy of "managed democracy", observing the activities of political institutions and the development of the situation in the country. Since coming to power in 1965, however, the Justice Party has worked hard to get rid of this observation. The acute socio-political crisis of the late 60s once again politicized the army.

By the end of 1970, three political trends had emerged in the officer corps. The first of them was headed by the former Chief of the General Staff, President J. R. R. Tolkien. Sunai and Chief of the General Staff, Army General M. Tagmach. It supported the policy of the PS leadership to significantly reduce the freedoms provided for in the 1961 Constitution by amending it, to adopt reactionary laws directed against the workers ' and left-wing movements, and to repress these movements. Until the last moment, this direction used every opportunity to support the government of S. Demirel. At the head of the second direction were the Commander of the Air Force, Army General M. Batur, and the Commander of the Ground Forces, Army General F. Batur. Gurler. It was close to the ILP, reflecting the party's position and Inenyu's own. These positions were aimed at exploiting the current crisis situation, which was aggravated by sharp criticism of the PS, and removing the government of Demirel from power - either forcing him to resign using pressure from the army, or, if a military intervention took place, as in 1960, using the army to remove his main rival from the political scene. This would eliminate the danger of changing the 1961 Constitution, the brainchild of the ILP, and introducing anti-democratic amendments to it. The ILP saw a way out of the crisis in strict compliance with the Constitution, curbing the workers ' and left-wing movements on the path of social reformism. The third direction was personified by several groups of radical officers who planned to establish a military dictatorship by means of a coup and thus lead the country out of the crisis and implement a number of reforms. In principle, this trend continued the work of the radical group in the KKE, with the difference that it worked ideologically and organizationally in contact with left-wing intellectuals who supported the positions of petty-bourgeois reformism and considered the civil-military bureaucracy the main force of the "revolution".

By the beginning of 1971, political activity in the officer corps had increased dangerously, and pressure from below from radical officers was growing. At this stage, the two "juntas" - Sunay - Tagmach and Batur - Gyurler, while continuing to fight for their own line, at the same time united against the third direction in order to first divert the threat from the regime as a whole, and only then decide on the "nuances" of this regime. As a result, the military command, by taking a number of strict measures, strengthening control over military units, managed to deprive the radicals of the opportunity to act independently. On March 12, 1971, the President and the Chairmen of both Chambers of the Mejlis were presented with a memorandum signed by the Chief of the General Staff and the commanders of the three branches of the armed forces. This document had the character of an ultimatum, which stated that " the parliament and the government... they plunged the country into a state of anarchy, civil war, social and economic disorder"30 , and demanded the resignation of the government, which was carried out on the same day. A few days later, more than 100 officers were dismissed from the army or moved to remote areas. Some authorities

30 Ibid., 13.III.1971.

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The Turkish press described this as a blow to the radicals, who "wanted to repeat the May 27 coup, but in a more organized and consistent manner." 31
After March 12, the military command chose a mediated form of intervention in politics-through "supra-party" governments that operated under the control of the generals in 1971-1973. As a result of preventive measures against radical officers, two out of three areas remained in the officer corps. However, then there were shifts within the ILP that changed the balance of forces between these directions. The fact is that Inenyu has ceased to be a defender of "his" constitution, a champion of expanding democracy. This was the logical conclusion of his confrontation with the "team" of Edzhevit, the main mastermind of the new deal, which began in the late 60s. Inenyu now felt that the left-of-center course had gone too far, and that Egevit had gained too much influence in the party. The old leader of the ILP had a desire to use the events of March to put an end to both this "fieldwork" and the Egevit group. Inenyu entered into an agreement with the" junta " of Sunay-Tagmach and agreed to the party's participation in a supra-party government. As a result, the Sunay - Taghmach "junta" became the master of the situation and gradually increased pressure to implement measures that the Demirel government planned but failed to implement. During the" transitional " period of 1971-1973, the PS leadership and Demirel personally, using the majority in the Mejlis, which continued to function, restored their authority and strengthened control over the government. The ILP, torn by internal contradictions, could not resist these forces, although some generals sympathized with it.

The political action of the army on March 12 differed from the coup of May 27 not only in form, but also in content. If the coup of May 27 was prepared and carried out by radical officers, then the March 12 memorandum was directed against their planned action. The CNE, especially before the removal of radicals from its membership, carried out a number of significant measures in the interests of workers, and went on to partially recognize the rights of workers. The activities of the "supra-party" governments after March 12 were carried out in the interests of the ruling class as a whole, or some of its groups. Harsh measures were taken against the labor movement, left-wing organizations were crushed, and mass repressions were carried out against progressive figures. After May 27, the KKE, working with the Republican People's Party, saw the way to strengthen the destabilized multi-party system in expanding bourgeois freedoms, as reflected in the 1961 Constitution. After March 12, the military command, interacting mainly with the Justice Party, solved the tasks not only of stabilizing the multi-party system that had again lost its balance in the 60s, but also of fighting against the workers ' and left-wing movements. It saw the means for this in the reduction of bourgeois freedoms, which was reflected in the amendments made to the 1961 Constitution.

In 1973, parliamentary elections were held, which ended the "transition" period and meant a return to the"democratic order". The army "went to the barracks" to observe how the multi-party system will function in the new conditions. It can be said that the socio-political events of 1974-1980 largely developed in the same way as they did in the 60s. Having slowed down in its run - up under the emergency measures of 1971-1973, the mass movement of workers began to gain strength again. The labor movement has become more widespread, has increased

31 Ibid., 18.III.1971; like, 1974, N 1, s. 5.

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the political consciousness of the working class, the progressive trade unions became more active. The intensity of workers ' actions and the strike movement was constantly increasing and reached its highest level in 1980. The further introduction of capitalist relations naturally led to the aggravation of all the contradictions of the Turkish multi-layered society. A characteristic phenomenon in the mass movement of the 70s was the solidarity of workers and other layers of workers - the working intelligentsia, employees, the petty bourgeoisie, as well as young people - which manifested itself in joint mass meetings and demonstrations.

The growth of social tension found expression not only in the intensification of the struggle of workers for their rights, but also in such a form of petty-bourgeois spontaneous protest as anarcho-terrorist actions. In the 70s, they became particularly widespread, accompanied by mass political assassinations, the number of which increased from year to year. Thus, 3 political murders were committed in 1974, 26 in 1975, 82 in 1976, 239 in 1977, 831 in 1978, and 1,150 in 1979 (until December 17) .32 Numerous leftist and ultra-right groups, which had become very active, were engaged in political terrorism. In the summer of 1980 Ecevit had to admit that, in fact, "there is a civil war going on in some parts of the country." 33 Anarchoterrorism has become one of the most important destabilizing factors in the country.

The heavy crackdown on the left-wing movement after March 12 slowed but did not stop its development. Just like the mass movement of the working people, it began to grow again. An important event in the left-wing movement was the creation of the Turkish Workers ' Party in April 1975, headed by Boran. Its program was significantly different from the program of the RPT of the 60s. In assessing the level of development of Turkey, the alignment of class forces and determining the immediate and long-term tasks, the party firmly stood on the position of scientific socialism. In June 1974, the Socialist Workers ' Party was established, with A. Kachmaz as its general chairman. The party's program set out the task of fighting for the establishment of people's democratic power with the subsequent transition to socialism, and many provisions of the program were also based on scientific socialism. In May 1975, the former leader of the RPT, M. A. Aybar, created the Socialist Party (later renamed the Socialist Revolutionary Party), which aimed to build in Turkey "taking into account its socio-economic structure and national characteristics, Turkish independent democratic socialism", using exclusively peaceful methods of activity. The party's platform was largely of a petty-bourgeois nature. Some other areas of the left-wing movement have also taken shape in the party. The creation of several left-wing parties meant a step forward in the organizational design of left-wing trends, but at the same time it consolidated and deepened their fragmentation. While maintaining such weaknesses as ideological overlap, disunity, and the lack or complete absence of a mass base, left-wing parties have achieved some success in conducting mass campaigns and demonstrations in cooperation with progressive trade unions and public organizations, opposing internal reactions, calling for Turkey's withdrawal from NATO, and eliminating bilateral agreements with the United States. Scientific socialism, which replaced the petty-bourgeois ideology, took a greater place in the ideology of the left movement.

Along with all this, by the end of the 70s, the political machine of the ruling class was increasingly disrupted. Flared up after March 12

32 Bulutoglu K. Bunalim ve cikis. Ankara. 1980, p. 333 (figures are given by the author with reference to the data of the General Directorate of Security of Turkey).

33 Ianki, 9 - 15.VI.1980, N 480, s. 3.

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The internal party struggle in the ILP ended with the defeat in 1972 of the opposition to the new course and Inenu, who joined it, and Edjevit was elected general chairman of the party. In the 1973 elections, the new deal paid its first political dividends: The ILP came out on top in terms of the number of votes received (33.3%). This success was consolidated in the 1977 elections, when the CHP received 41.4% of the vote. However, the ILP's stay in power as part of coalition governments in 1974 and especially in 1978-1979 did not bring it success. By proposing a set of measures in the interests of the working people, in an effort to make capitalism attractive to them, this party has placed itself in an ambivalent position. "The ILP," the representatives of the Workers 'Party rightly pointed out," has one eye on capital and the other on the workers and peasants. " 34 When it was in opposition and campaigning for the election, it had to think about remaining respectable for the bourgeoisie and at the same time sufficiently "revolutionary" for the masses. While in power, she tried to satisfy both of them. She did not succeed, she was criticized and dissatisfied with both right and left. Since 1979, the popularity curve of IUU fishing has noticeably declined.

In the 1970s, the Justice Party, in an effort to ensure optimal conditions for the development of capitalism, still adhered to the bourgeois-conservative course and relied on a "liberal" economy, while continuing to pay special attention to the interests of large industrial capital and emerging national monopolies. The success of the ILP in the political mobilization of the masses greatly alarmed the PS leadership, which began to search for countermeasures. First, it did everything possible to negate the influence of the DP, which had increased by the mid-70s, and it largely succeeded. Some of the voters who had left the party for the DP returned to the PS. Secondly, and most importantly, the PS decided to counter the influence of the ILP by uniting right-wing forces. In December 1974, it issued an appeal to the" nationalist parties", which emphasized:"Today, more than ever, we need to unite our efforts" 35 . Three 36 parties that formed the Nationalist Front (NF) together with the PS responded to the call. The ILP and the left-wing parties, whose very logic demanded unity of action, were unable to respond to this. In the struggle for power, SF proved to be an effective tool. Despite the noted electoral success of the ILP, the bloc of right-wing parties in 1973-1980 was in power longer than the coalition governments of the ILP.

In the 1970s, two other bourgeois parties-the National Salvation Party (NPS) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MND) - played a prominent role in the political struggle. The NTC was created in 1972 and was the de facto continuation of the National Order Party, which was banned in 1971. The NTC program repeated the main provisions of its predecessor's program. The PNS proposed its own alternative to capitalist development, based on the strengthening of the role of the "Muslim" Anatolian bourgeoisie, the opposition of Islamic solidarity to the influence of the West, and a certain foreign policy and foreign economic reorientation of Turkey from the West to Muslim countries. This led to the undermining of the commercial, industrial and financial capital of large cities connected with the West, and in its person the NTC made a strong enemy. He, in turn, did everything to restore the army against the NTC, emphasizing it

34 Cumhuriyet, 18.V.1977.

35 Ufuk ve cizgi. Milliyetci butunlesme hedefindeki kiriksiz cizgide Demirel belgeseli. Istanbul. 1976, s. 102 - 103.

36 The National Salvation Party, the Republican Confidence Party, and the Nationalist Movement Party.

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hostility to the principle of laicism. While participating in government coalitions with both the CHP and the PS, the National Salvation Party has criticized both parties, saying that they pursue a policy of subordinating Turkey to the interests of the West. This greatly aggravated the inter-party struggle. The NTC enjoyed considerable success and built up a solid mass base. A large number of Anatolian religious small entrepreneurs were attracted to it, attracted by its criticism of big capital and the proclamation of Islamic slogans of morality, the fight against usury, etc.

The Nationalist Movement Party was the second minor party that showed itself prominently in the political struggle. This is the name given to the Republican Peasant National Party in 1969. NP) after A. Turkesh and a group of like - minded people-former members of a radical group in the KNE-joined it. Turkesh's extreme nationalism, which was evident in the 1940s and 1950s, led him from petty-bourgeois radicalism to the most reactionary circles of the bourgeoisie. He used a non-noticeably influential RC. The NP as a "shell" in which it put its ideas, which were reflected in the new party program. The fundamental basis of this program was nationalism and Islamism as "sources of strength of the Turkish nation". The program provided for a number of reforms. In particular, the administrative one was aimed at introducing a presidential system and a unicameral parliament on a corporate basis, while the social one included the creation of professional corporations. In the economy, it was envisaged to strengthen the organizing role of the state and strengthen the position of the public sector, subordinate private initiative to the "interests of planned economic recovery", and fight against usury, speculation ,and the black market. 37 The most characteristic features of the HDP were concentrated nationalism and a tendency to strengthen the role of the state, centralization of power, as well as militant anti-communism. One of the party's slogans in the 1977 election campaign was significant in this regard: "The ILP encourages communism, the PS contemplates it, the NTC forgives, and the MND destroys it." 38
All this constituted another alternative to the further capitalist development of Turkey. Part of the bourgeoisie considered the option of "strong power" to be the most reliable way and therefore supported the MHP. This party also enjoyed the support of the chauvinistic petty bourgeoisie, the nationalist youth. Unlike other parties, the MHP not only promoted its ideas, but also prepared to implement them by force, creating paramilitary groups, promoting its people to the state apparatus and the army. Big capital sought to use the HDP as a cudgel against the democratic movement, but at the same time feared that its intentions to strengthen state regulation and seek economic independence could harm its interests and its ties with the West. Therefore, big capital turned the military elite, which considers itself the guardian of Ataturk's principles, against the MHP, pointing out that this party wants to usurp power and eliminate the democracy it founded.

The struggle between the bourgeois parties unfolded, as it were, on two planes. In one, various groups of the ruling class faced off in the struggle for the preferential satisfaction of their specific interests, and in the other, there was a struggle for the ways of further development of capitalism. If in the 60s the struggle in the first "plo" prevailed-

37 Parti programlari, s. 192 - 193, 178 - 179, 220 - 229; Turkey A. Temel gorusler. Istanbul. 1969, s. 21- 23, 77 - 98.

38 Gunaydin, 23.IV.1977.

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In the 1970s, the struggle for "alternatives" and further ways of developing capitalism was launched. The necessity of this for the bourgeoisie was dictated by the consolidation of the working class and its powerful actions, the movement of other working strata, the activation of left-wing forces, and the aggravation of the vices of dependent, peripheral capitalism. In the 70s, several "alternatives" were put forward-forms of political power of the bourgeoisie - from social - democratic to pro - fascist. Each of them was supported by various factions of the ruling class, but none could provide a decisive advantage. The activities of the bourgeois parties took place in a fierce struggle for power, efforts to create government coalitions, which turned out to be fragile. 1974-1980 the government was replaced by seven cabinets, which worsened political instability. The Parliament in the conditions of aggravated inter-party struggle, political intrigues and combinations was not able to consider and solve the problems of the country.

As a result, representatives of the military elite in the late 70s were faced with approximately the same problems as their predecessors on the eve of March 12, 1971. The difference was that the radical movement in the officer corps no longer manifested itself as an independent political force, and anarcho - terrorist activities became much more widespread. The tendency to unite military radicals with left-wing intellectuals, which was revealed in the 60s, was further developed in the 70s, while officers showed interest in various areas of the left - wing movement-from scientific socialism to left-wing extremism.

Concerned about the development of events in the country, the military command has repeatedly appealed to the constitutional authorities to "restore order". Since such appeals failed, a military coup was carried out on September 12, 1980, and the National Security Council (NSC) assumed power. The National Security Service's report No. 1 of September 12, signed by its chairman, Chief of the General Staff, Army General K. Evren , 39 defined the purpose of the "operation" - "to preserve the unity of the country and nation, prevent a possible civil war, restore the state and its authority, eliminate the causes that hinder the functioning of the democratic system." On the same day, the National Security Service announced that the parliament and the government were dissolved, the parliamentary immunity of deputies was abolished, the activities of political parties were banned, and their property was transferred "under the protection and control of the military authorities."40 In form, these military actions were largely similar to the coup of May 27, 1960, but in content they were similar to what was done after March 12, 1971. The same problems faced by the generals on March 12 and September 12 led to an analogy in the goals and methods of achieving them.

The activities of the National Security Service were concentrated in 1980-1983 in three main areas:: stabilization of the internal political situation; solution of certain socio-economic problems; preparation of new laws to ensure the stability of the regime and the reliable functioning of bourgeois political institutions. Immediately after the coup, strict measures were taken against political terrorism. Within a few months, the wave of terrorism was brought down, thousands of extremists were arrested, and huge amounts of weapons and ammunition were seized. Mass trials of leftist and right-wing extremist organizations have begun across the country. Kampa-

39 The National Security Service consists of the commanders of the three branches of the armed forces and the Commander of the Gendarmerie.

40 Hurriyet, 12.IX.1980.

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The campaign against terrorism enjoyed popular support and satisfaction. However, in parallel, the offensive against the country's democratic forces was being launched and gradually increased. In 1981-1982, the Turkish press repeatedly reported on the arrests of many teachers, journalists, leaders of progressive public organizations and trade unions on charges of "communist propaganda". As after March 12, the left-wing movement was subjected to heavy repression, and many of its leaders were forced to emigrate.

The core of the National Security Council's economic policy was the" stabilization program", developed by the Demirel administration and put into effect in January 1980 - thus, complete continuity was observed in the economy. The essence of the program was to "liberalize" the economy by reducing state price controls, encouraging more private capital, both local and foreign, increasing the cost of products of state-owned economic organizations (GEO) and commercial bank loans, and ensuring a more "flexible" exchange rate .41 The program was developed and implemented not so much on the basis of the needs of the national economy, but based on the interests and requirements of international economic and financial organizations, which were reduced to forcing the Turkish economy, regardless of national interests, to work for export, to repay debts and loans received from the West. It is no coincidence that organizations such as the IBRD and the IMF were pleased with the progress of the program and recommended "resolute implementation" 42 .

In the social sphere, the military authorities paid special attention to the policy on the labor issue. Its essence - and the military did not hide it-was, on the one hand, to meet certain needs of the workers within the framework of the "social world", and on the other - to put an insurmountable barrier to the development of the working-class movement, especially its connection with scientific socialism. The authorities raised wages slightly, forbade entrepreneurs to lay off workers in order to somehow stop the growth of unemployment, and strengthened control over entrepreneurs ' compliance with social insurance rules. But on the other hand, workers 'strikes were banned, the Progressive Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK) was closed, and its leadership and hundreds of activists were arrested. Workers were effectively deprived of the right to enter into collective agreements. All this, in essence, has destroyed the ability of the workers to fight for their rights, created exceptionally favorable conditions for increasing their exploitation and increasing the profits of the capitalists.

By banning the activities of political parties, the military administration dealt a particularly severe blow to left - wing parties-their leaders were arrested or forced to flee abroad. Among the bourgeois parties, the PNS and the MHP were severely repressed. Their leaders Erbakan and Turkesh were arrested. In April 1981, trials of the leadership of both parties began, with the NTC accused of using religion for political purposes, and the MHP accused of "creating an armed organization in order to establish sole power in the state and change the existing system." In October 1981, the National Security Service adopted a law on the dissolution of all political parties, and their property was transferred to the state fund. Unlike the political actions of May 27 and March 12, this time the military command did not rely on any party.

Immediately after the coup, the National Security Service announced its intention to revolt-

41 See Turkish Economy 1980. TUSIAD. Istanbul. 1980, pp. 36 - 37.

42 Milliyet, 12.III.1981; Cumhuriyet, 22.IX.1981.

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strengthen the institutions of bourgeois democracy. In November 1980, the General Secretary of the National Security Service, Army General Kh. Saltyk, without naming specific dates, introduced the public to the program of "transition to a normal democratic order", which included the following events:: 1) provision of conditions for the formation of the Constituent Mejlis; 2) adoption of a law on its structure, rights and duties; 3) formation of the Constituent Mejlis and preparation of a new constitution; 4) holding a referendum on it; 5) preparation of new laws on political parties and elections in accordance with it; 6) creation of new parties; 7) holding general elections and establishing a parliament; 8) ending the functioning of the Constituent Mejlis and the National Security Council 43 .

In 1980-1983, the National Security Service implemented this program. On October 23, 1981, the Consultative Mejlis began its work, all 160 members of which were directly or indirectly appointed by the National Security Council and which, together with the National Security Service, formed the Constituent Mejlis. On October 18, 1982, the National Security Council approved the draft of the new constitution prepared by the Consultative Mejlis, and on November 7, a referendum was held, as a result of which it was adopted. The leitmotif of the military administration in preparing the new constitution was as follows. Since the restrictions on bourgeois freedoms introduced in the 1961 Constitution after March 12 did not provide a proper barrier to workers ' and left-wing movements and "harmful ideologies", it is necessary to expand such restrictions. The 1982 Constitution is characterized by further significant restrictions on bourgeois rights and freedoms. At the same time, the rights of the President and the executive branch in general have been expanded. The role of the state has been strengthened in almost all areas - in the economy, regulation of social problems, ideology, the education system, and youth education. Regulations for political parties have been tightened, and State control over them has been strengthened, which aims to ensure a more stable functioning of the multi-party system in the future. A number of provisions of the Constitution are aimed at strengthening the influence of the army on political life. The rights of the working class and trade unions are severely restricted.

In April 1983, new laws on political parties and elections were adopted, which developed the relevant provisions of the Constitution. At the end of 1983, the newly formed political parties began to function under the strict supervision of the military administration. Three of them - the Fatherland Party (PA), the Narodnik Party (NP) and the National Democratic Party (NDP) - were allowed to participate in the parliamentary elections held on November 6, 1983. The victory was won by the Fatherland Party, which received 45.15% of the vote. In this way, bourgeois democracy was restored, albeit in a much reduced form. Although the old parties are banned, but the established political trends, each of which has its own social base, have remained. And they are already making their way into the arena of political struggle. Analyzing the results of the last elections, the Turkish press noted, in particular, that PO's victory was secured mainly by supporters of the former Justice Party and partly by the Nationalist Movement Party. The NP took advantage of the overwhelming support of the "moderate" New deal supporters of the Republican People's Party. At the same time, this does not give grounds to talk about the revival of two large former parties. The NDP, created with the support of the generals, did not have a definite social base and ended up in last place following the results of the elections .44 Held on March 25, 1984.

43 Cumhuriyet, 2.XI.1980.

44 Ibid., 19.III.1984.

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Other parties took part in the local government elections, one of which, the Social Democratic Party (SODEP), achieved notable success. It can be assumed that it received the votes of some supporters of the ILP, as well as some of the former left - wing parties.

The experience of the political struggle in Turkey in the 50s and early 80s showed that in this country, along with political parties operating within the framework of bourgeois political pluralism, the army as a political force became an indispensable participant. During this period, changes in the socio-economic structure of Turkish society determined that each of the two main factors of political struggle-the multi-party system and the army-underwent changes, and the nature of interaction between them also changed. At the same time, the stages of such interaction were outlined, and a certain pattern in their alternation was identified. The first stage of the political "partnership" and at the same time the confrontation between the multi-party system and the army was the 50s, the coup d'etat on May 27, 1960, and the first "transition regime" - the period of the KKE's activity. The second stage consisted of the 60s, the memorandum of the military command on March 12, 1971, and the "transition regime" of 1971-1973. The third stage of interaction between political parties and the army was formed in the 70s, the military coup of September 12, 1980, and the next "transition regime"that followed.

In general, the events of the 1950s and 1980s indicate that, unlike developed capitalist states, bourgeois political institutions in a society such as the Turkish one, whose socio-economic basis is characterized by the presence, along with the leading, formative capitalist one, of other pre-capitalist ways of life and the corresponding multidimensional social structure, were unable to cope with this situation. emerging socio-economic and political crises. And each time they were "helped" by the army, which saved the regime, "repaired" the multi-party system and brought it back into action. Thus, a peculiar Turkish model of political activity of the army emerged. With its policy during the "transition period" of 1980-1983, the adoption of a new constitution and a number of new laws, the Turkish generals made serious changes in the system of bourgeois political institutions, not wanting to allow a repeat of the crisis situations of the late 60s and 70s in the future. However, the next phase of the inter-party struggle that has already begun indicates that the social contradictions that were muted during the "transition period" are once again manifesting themselves.

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