There are several types of polyjuridism (legal pluralism), which with a certain degree of convention can be designated as ethnic, confessional, regional and political. Ethnic pluralism, as a rule, goes back to the features of the customary law of ancient and medieval tribes, and in its remnants-and modern peoples. Confessional polyjuridism lies on the surface: adherents of different religions, even if they belong to the same nation, often adhere to different legalized religious canons. Regional polyjuridism is usually associated with a historically formed administrative division; its most famous examples are the marked discrepancy between local and federal legal norms in Germany and the United States in different lands and states of these countries. Finally, political polyjuridism is most often associated with conquests that lead to a more or less prolonged coexistence of the legal systems of winners and losers. This list is hardly exhaustive: there are, for example, such types of polyjuridism that are associated with the reception of law that is learned by some and not learned by other segments of the population.

It happens that all or at least many of these types of polyjuridism co-exist. This is exactly the situation we find in the legal space of the North Caucasus over the past one and a half to two centuries.

Ethno-legal pluralism has existed in the North Caucasus for all the time available for historical reconstruction and still persists today. Each indigenous people has its own legal customs-adats regulating blood feuds or replacing their compositions, the order of reconciliation of blood relatives, the nature of hospitality or expulsion from their native places, reverence for elders, marriage and family life, features of legal proceedings, etc. These customs were superimposed by polyjuridism confessional, which arose with the penetration of Christianity into the region first, which was formed in the first place. only the Ossetians, and then Islam, with its extremely tenacious code of behavioral, including legal, norms - Sharia-remained. The North Caucasus is no stranger to regional polyjuridism: the adats of Greater and Lesser Kabarda, Digoria and Tagauria in Ossetia, and Lowland and Mountainous Dagestan have their own specifics. But, perhaps, the most pronounced political polyjuridism in the region, which arose with the entry of the region into the Russian Empire, and then the RSFSR and Russia.

The incorporation of the North Caucasus into the Russian Empire was gradual, and each time the peoples of the region underwent various legal transformations. However, it was only after the end of the Caucasian War that these changes, both in terms of legislation and in terms of the judicial system, became another major factor in North Caucasian polyjuridism. Along with the two traditional systems of law - adat and Sharia-another, Europeanized legal system began to operate.

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Before the spread of imperial legislation in the North Caucasus, it was mainly adats and sharia that competed (although there were some attempts at law-making on the part of local, mainly Kabardian and Dagestani, princes). The western part of the region, where Islam did not have time to take deep roots, preferred adats, while the eastern part preferred Sharia. However, this was only a first approximation, because in different areas of law the ratio of adat and sharia was not the same. Sharia law is considered tougher than adat, but this is true only in relation to criminal law. Here sharia law is characterized by truly barbaric sanctions: cutting off the hand for theft, prolonged imprisonment in a pit for many minor offenses, etc. Most likely, this is due to the fact that during the formation of Sharia law - the early class period - it was necessary to apply particularly strict measures to protect property and curb the willfulness of the individual. One way or another, the criminal sphere of Sharia law has not taken root even in such long - ago Islamized regions as Dagestan [Aglarov, 1986, p.154-155].

In other areas of life, Sharia as an ordered early state law is often more humane than late-primitive patriarchal adats. This is clearly seen in the example of norms related to blood feuds. The Adats allowed both the blood feud itself and the replacement of it with compositions that were sharply differentiated in terms of class. For example, the Kabardians did not take revenge on their superiors, but the blood price charged was so high that it could ruin a large related group (Gardanov, 1967: 234-238). Sharia generally condemns blood feuds, and the standards established by it are uniform, although quite high.

The historical" advancement " of sharia law in comparison with adats is evident in the example of marriage and family law. According to the Adatah, marriages were supposed to be isogamous, i.e. equal, and the Shari'ah, as in the case of compositions, assumes that all believers are equal before God. According to adat, the obligatory condition for marriage is the bride's ransom from her family (in literature - kalym), but according to Sharia, this ransom (in literature - kebin) is transferred not to the bride's family, but to her herself, as security in case of widowhood or divorce at the initiative of the husband:" And give their wives their veno as a gift" (The Qur'an, 4,3). This rule of sharia is borrowed from the ancient Eastern legal codes [Dyakonov, 1952, p. 244], just as the corresponding precept of Transcaucasian Armenian-Georgian law is taken from the Byzantine Code of Laws of Emperor Justinian I [Gosh, 1954, p.121; Tkeshelev, 1890, p. 39]. In practice, most often there was a compromise: part of the ransom belonged to the bride, part to her relatives, who collected the dowry with this money. But even in this form, the Sharia injunction was a significant step forward in comparison with the usual legal norm of the undisguised sale of a bride. In addition, the belief that kalym is something like the equivalent of a dowry began to spread. In 1870, one of the residents of the village of Nalchikskoye complained to the court: "My father Paluan Kardanov gave me in marriage to my real husband Zhazhuko Batov, from whom he demands a kalym of 100 rubles for me, but I do not want to give him one, as he is... did not celebrate any clothes" [CGA KBR, f. 22, op. 1, d. 19, l. 1ob.].

Kalymny marriage according to adats led to marital coercion, prenatal (i.e., even before the birth of children) collusion, collusion in the cradle or underage, the exchange of girls-brides and the existence of ancient customs of levirate and sororata, aimed at preserving the family once paid kalym. It was also one of the reasons for the abduction of brides, since in this case it was necessary to reduce the payment for the "disgraced" girl, and relatives helped the groom's family to collect kalym in order to avoid blood feuds [Smirnova and Ter-Sarkisyants, 1995, p. 63, 65]. Kebin marriage under sharia also knew most of these customs, but in a more veiled form, and stealing brides by Sharia was explicitly prohibited. The code of a sharia zealot like Shamil explicitly prescribed that mullahs who performed abduction marriages should have their mouths sewn shut.

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The Adats grossly infringed on the rights of a married woman, depriving her of a share in common family property; the sharia gave her the right to such a share, although in a more curtailed form than for men. Divorce initiated by an Adat woman was not allowed in at least some of the peoples of the region (for example, the Ingush), but it was allowed by Sharia law, although it was more difficult than for men. Other personal rights of women were also more humane for their time. According to the adat, the adulterous wife was allowed not only to be killed, but also to be maimed (although this could lead to blood feuds on the part of her relatives), according to the Sharia, she was put on trial by society, which, however, could also take her life. The situation was similar with other members of the household. According to the adat, the landlord was allowed to kill them or sell them into slavery; according to the Sharia law, he was only allowed to disinherit them.

The only thing that Sharia law has strengthened the subordination of the Mountain woman is the tightening of her segregation and partly concealment. A woman has lost the right to enter the men's side of the house, and an outsider has lost the right to enter the women's side. Peasant women did not wear bedspreads (this was customary only in large and long-time Islamized cities of Dagestan), but they had to cover their hair with a headscarf, and in the presence of older or outsider men, they had to cover the lower part of their face with the end of the headscarf. Here is a typical example: at the beginning of the 20th century, the people's cadi of the Nalchik district passed a resolution at a meeting of peasant representatives "prohibiting all women from the age of 10 to appear on the street, as well as at dances with their heads bared, i.e. without headscarves, and also prohibiting girls from taking men by the palm of their hands" [CGA KBR, f. 159, op. 1, d. 312, l. 72-73]. All this shows that researchers who have long proved that it was Sharia law that sharply worsened the situation of the once free Mountain woman, in many ways distorted the facts.

Why sharia law helped segregate the sexes and hide women is a complex question. It can be solved only on the basis of global ethnological material and within the framework of a special study. In general, the North Caucasian adats and Sharia law, which was once based on Arab customary law, have a lot in common. The very word "adat" - a custom-is of Arabic origin, although most Arab peoples in this case use the word Urf. It is not always possible to say with certainty which norms of Caucasian adat or Sharia are historically more "advanced" and which are not. This applies not only to their common value categories (respect for elders, hospitality, under certain conditions - polygamy), but also to such seemingly unambiguously negative phenomena as marriages with underage (from our point of view) girls. Sharia law, which originated in a hotter climate, allowed marriage of men and women aged 12 and 9 years, respectively (if there are signs of puberty). In the North Caucasus, with its more temperate climate, the Adats adjusted this age to 15-16 and 12-14 years (the exception was the Stavropol Nogais, who were marked by early marriages of girls). It seems that both of them have their own reasons in relation to a certain natural environment.

The imperial authorities legalized both systems of traditional law, with the exception, as already mentioned, of the criminal sphere of Sharia. Relatively few things were excluded from the adats: blood feuds and the so-called criminal harboring of guests, i.e. people who violated imperial laws and resorted to protecting the institution of hospitality (Kazharov, 1994, p.286).

The traditional judicial system was also legalized - according to adat and Sharia.

The Adat court was usually held within large patrilineal groups that emerged as a result of segmentation and budding of large (less often small) families. In the world ethnological literature, such groups are called patrilinidges (from Lat. father -father, linea-line). In the Russian literature, they were assigned the name patronymia, introduced in the 1930s (Obliquen, 1961, pp. 6-8, 32-42). onym - name) that

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It was most likely caused by the prevailing desire at that time to isolate itself at least terminologically from Western science. Patrilineges existed among all the peoples of the Caucasus and not only among them, differing only in the number of levels of patrilineal organization (usually from 2 to 4-5). They connected their members with memories of a common ancestor and the cult of this ancestor, and at the grassroots levels also with the territorial proximity of families, sometimes with the remnants of common property (a forest tract, mowing, a common mill, etc.), material mutual assistance, and where blood feuds persisted, physical mutual protection. The Patrilineges had their own recognized head, held their own meetings, and, most importantly for our topic, their own kindred courts. The head of the patrilineage was usually the oldest of the able-bodied males, and the patrilineal courts were also usually composed of elders ("old men of honor").

The Sharia court was administered by the Qadis, who were also mostly elderly people and were considered "honorary old men". That is why (although not only for this reason) all peoples once had gerontothymia - the veneration of the elderly [Pershits and Smirnova, 1986, pp. 88-95].

At the same time, even if we leave aside the criminal sphere of law, the imperial administration, along with the adats and sharia, gradually began to introduce Russian legislation and judicial proceedings, for example in Kabarda and Ossetia, by creating mixed courts of presidents - imperial officials, deputies from among patrilineal elders and spiritual judges. These were, in particular, the mountain verbal courts, district verbal courts and aul courts (for the consideration of secondary cases). In general, judicial reform in the region took several years, and court rulings were often based on various instructions and rules. And yet: along with adat and sharia, a third component has emerged - general Imperial legislation and legal proceedings. The ultimate goal of the innovation was to eventually replace local adats and sharia with all-Russian laws and bylaws. So far, in some areas of law, preference has been given to adat (more often in property law), in others - to Sharia (mainly in marriage and family law), in others-to general imperial laws (mainly in criminal law) and by - laws. But this was not done directly, not directly [Petrov, 1901; Agishev and Bushen, 1912; Reneke, 1912; Nevskaya, 1958]. If the case did not involve criminally punishable acts, then the parties had the right, having agreed among themselves, to choose the system of law, and even legal proceedings. It was a sensible, decades-long reformist course of transformation.

A completely different course of transformation was taken after the October Revolution and the establishment of Soviet power in the North Caucasus. A well-known cultural pattern was ignored: innovations are introduced only when the recipient society is ready to accept them (for example, Turkey in the 1920s and Iran in the 1960s). Meanwhile, Sharia courts were banned in the North Caucasus as early as 1927, and the older patrilineal adat courts were banned a year or two later. As is well known, in the 1920s they were still acting not only by compulsion, but also by persuasion. The destruction of religious traditions is well known. As for the fight against folk traditions, it is necessary to dwell on this in particular.

The authorities tried to create the appearance of some kind of advanced public opinion by organizing an "initiative from below" and using the mass media. The first was most often done with the help of party and Komsomol cells, the second - by the hands of militant publicists, mainly from local sources.

To compromise the adat patrilineal courts, it was necessary first of all to disavow the patrilineal courts themselves. In 1928, the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) "On the work of party organizations of the national regions of the North Caucasus" drew attention to the connection between

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between "kulak influence" and " family ties and traditions "[Essays on the history of Karachay-Cherkessia, 1972, vol. 2, p. 122]. Since that time, not only the circulars of local party and Soviet organs, but also the minutes of various meetings, the North Caucasian press and periodicals literally teemed with attacks against kindred solidarity. In Chechen-Ingushetia, where family ties were particularly close, even a special word-brand was coined - "taipovstvo" ("taipovshchina"), formed from the name of the highest-level patrilineage. In the pages of the magazine Revolyutsiya I Gorets, the idea was developed that kinship interests are incompatible with party and state interests. "For a communist who is still connected by the umbilical cord with his family (surname), the fist of this kind is in certain respects "his". Therefore, the strength of family ties is often stronger than class problems " [Butaev, 1930, p. 3 and el.Another author wrote about the Kulak nature of the top Chechen secret [Avtorkhanov, 1931]. Karachay publicist I.-A.-K. became especially famous in this field. Khubiev, who wrote under the pseudonym I. Karachayly. In the newspapers "Soviet South" and "Mountain Life", in the magazines "Revolution and Highlander", "On the Rise", "Soviet North Caucasus", etc. he repeatedly wrote about the ruinous nature of" tribal "ties between the poor and the" kulak", a party member and a white officer, a Komsomol member and an" honorary old man", and that mutual bail was useful in the face of tsarism, but in the conditions of Soviet power it turned into its opposite [Karachayly, 1984, p.139]. The frankness with which the party speaks about its unwillingness to tolerate associations beyond its control, and the naive and cynical subjectivism in assessing the same phenomena, are also noteworthy here. Such instructions did not go unnoticed. Later, the same social order was carried out, for example, by M. Mamakaev in Chechen-Ingushetia and S. Kulov in North Ossetia. And in the following decades, scientific and propaganda literature often attacked kinship solidarity among certain peoples of the North Caucasus.

A special harm to the patrilineal organization was seen in the fact that the courts of "honorary old men" operated under it. Therefore, no less, if not more, went to what they began to call another newfound word-brand - "old age". The same I. Karachayly declared almost all old people class enemies and condemned gerontothymy as such. "It is easier for the Kulak, "he wrote," to exploit the poor man, because he is not just a 'kulak', but an 'honorary old man', a 'patrimonial authority'. They do not honor old people in general, but only rich and noble old people, and there can be no question of respect for the elderly poor... It follows that the custom of respect for the elderly is aimed at preserving and strengthening the dominant position of parasitic elements" [Karachayly, 1984, p. 49, 53, 141]. Naturally, the old people who were judged by the Adat court suffered the most: they were accused of adhering to the old times and having a bad influence on others, especially on young people. Heads of related associations, members of the councils of elders and judges-mediators-were deprived of the right to vote, and many of them were expelled. And with the beginning of the Stalinist terror, the old people of the North Caucasus were often simply destroyed physically. According to the writer L. Razgon, on Kolyma he saw whole trains of decrepit Dagestani elders sent to camps to certain death, so that they would not interfere with building a "new life" in their homeland [Razgon, 1989, pp. 175-176]. Only later did they begin to differentiate between the positive folk tradition of respect for elders and blind worship of their authority - a kind of cult of elders [Chomaev, 1972, p. 133-134; Abdullaev, 1971, p. 231].

Traditional legal systems were also eradicated by the same methods. Already at the turn of the 1920s-1930s, the authorities of the Mountain ASSR published the first prohibitive decisions against not only blood feuds, but also the payment of compensation for blood, as well as a number of former marriage and family customs. At the same time, relevant decrees and laws were applied to the national autonomies of the North Caucasus

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RSFSR, where all crimes classified as "domestic" were consolidated, unified and sanctioned (later - "remnants of ancestral life", even later - "remnants of local customs"). At the same time, an article was introduced into the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure allowing public charges to be brought against the entire range of domestic crimes, regardless of the complaint of the victims. The article was directly directed against the local legal specifics, as it often happened that victims, under the influence of relatives and neighbors, did not dare to resort to the protection of the new law. This was considered as disrespect for traditions, for the guardians and zealots of traditions-the elders, and on the part of women - and as disrespect for men [TsGAOR, f. 393, op. 78, d. 103, l. 127; TsGA SOR, f. r. 1667, op. 1, d. 326, l. 6; CGA of the Czech Republic, f.p. 158, op. 1, d. 570, l. 104]. The norms of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR only in one case did not differ in principle from the previous imperial laws (blood feud was considered as premeditated murder), but the approach was stricter and far from the usual polyjuridism of the population: payment and receipt of compositions, as well as evasion from reconciliation, were also punished. Forced bride abduction, which was punishable under both adat, sharia, and imperial law, was now equated with forcing a woman to marry or preventing it (up to two years ' imprisonment). Completely new and unusual for the local legal consciousness were sanctions for paying and receiving a marriage ransom (imprisonment or forced labor for up to one year), polygamy (the same sanction) and marriage with minors or minors (two years and eight years, respectively).

Unsurprisingly, there were unexpected complications in the preliminary discussion of some of these norms on the ground. The population, including many women, protested against the abolition of the marriage ransom, not without reason believing that this would affect the size of the dowry [CGA KCR, f. r. 19, op. 1, d. 121, l. 67; CGA CR, f. r. 158, op. 1, d. 1158, L. 45]. There were voices against prosecution for polygamy, as the deprivation of liberty of husbands affected the financial situation of wives and children. Demands were made to distinguish between daytime and nighttime bride abductions, since real forced abductions were usually committed during the day, and at night - abductions with the consent of girls who expressed their protest against family despotism in this way [CGA KCR, f. r. 19, op. 1, d. 1115, l. 45]. In 1923. The Congress of Soviets of the Ingush district allowed a "conditional" marriage ransom in the amount of 200 rubles and two sets of clothes for the bride [TSGA SOR, f. r. 41, op. 1, d. 155, l. 25ob.].

Life has shown that legal pluralism cannot be eliminated immediately. Most of the norms of Chapter X of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR turned out to be premature and ill-conceived. Despite the harsh sentences, the prescriptions of adat and sharia continued to apply. Prenuptial ransom never went out of the ordinary, only being more hidden in times of tightening and becoming more explicit in times of relative liberalization. There were many ways to circumvent it: to pay with money, not with livestock or food, to lend money ostensibly in debt, etc. Circumvented and still circumvent the regulations against polygamy: those who are already in polygynous unions, fictitiously terminate one of the marriages; those who have just entered into them, do without legalizing marriage. It happened and still happens that, fearing neighbors, they lived with different wives in turn. Cases of actual forced bride abduction have generally been kept hidden from the authorities and resolved by consensus. After all, a kidnapped woman, even if she was not raped, is considered disgraced, and it is not easy for her to find another husband. In cases where the case has gone to trial and punishment, it is not uncommon for the abducted woman to wait for the abductor to marry her. The situation with blood feuds has also changed little: the murderer himself, as before October, is handed over to the authorities, but blood relations between relatives have been preserved and continue; in case of reconciliation, they adhere to the ancient ri-

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toilets. Not accepting this de jure, but recognizing it de facto, the authorities themselves (for example, in Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Ossetia) in the 1950s and 1960s created reconciliation commissions out of old people. This situation, although to a much lesser extent, persists to this day.

Perhaps there would be no hidden or semi-hidden legal life if the authorities took into account the experience of legal pluralism accumulated in many countries of the world. For example, in France, Muslim emigrants (mainly Arabs) marry and divorce under Sharia law, which pedantic jurists see as a "sub - rule" rather than a right [Carbonnier, 1986, pp. 183-184]. Is this kind of selective polyjuridism so bad, taking into account national or confessional traditions in some cases, and regional specifics or remnants of previous legal systems in others?

From the point of view of the etiology of law, there is no legal crime, no moral omnivore. It is only necessary to set aside both cultural absolutism and cultural relativism and try to distinguish between harmful, neutral and useful traditions. Illegalized blood feuds, such as barbaric lynching, or forced bride abduction, such as violence against individuals, are unacceptable from the point of view of modern universal morality, and therefore law. Covering a woman's face (often more or less symbolic) or dividing a residential space into male and female halves are rather neutral values. But the marriage ransom, balanced by a dowry, and allowed under certain conditions (for example, if the first wife is disabled or childless) and bigamy, which has become part of the popular mentality that has been established for centuries and millennia, are not without positive features.

No matter how one treats national and confessional traditions, ethical values and legal norms, it is clear that for many decades they have either not been taken into account or leveled. Legal pluralism was not recognized in theory and was practically unknown in real life. Is it any wonder that recently, marked by a dramatic liberalization of socio-political life, as well as the revival of ethnic and religious traditions, superheated steam began to escape from the cauldron. Certain aspects of the Chechen war have become the most acute, but far from the only manifestation of the conflict situation. Ruslan Aushev strongly urged that along with the federal legislation, republican legislation should be implemented that takes into account the specifics of local customs. In Ingushetia, there was a question of legalizing blood feuds. The Supreme Legislative Body of Chechnya raised the issue of legalizing polygamy as early as 1996.

I think that what we have seen in Chechnya and Ingushetia will not be confined to them. Perhaps the next step is neighboring Dagestan, where the most Islamized peoples (Kumyks, Avars, Dargins, etc.) will also make certain legal demands in the field of law. The problem of legal pluralism has matured in Russia. And regardless of what official forms polyjuridism will take (corresponding reservations in federal legislation, parallel operation of federal and local codes with the right of the parties to sue under one of them, "law" and "sub-law"), it cannot be dismissed. And even when it is resolved, many other questions arise: about a tort or lawsuit, about the jurisdiction of the parties, about the relationship between jurisdiction and administrative, ethnic, religious affiliation, etc.

Despite the adoption of the new Criminal and Civil Codes of the Russian Federation in 2004, these questions will continue to come up again and again for a long time to come. Moreover, the current situation differs significantly from the most common one. As a rule, the legitimation of customs completes their real renewal. In this case, legitimation of customs precedes renewal. This is one of the factors that ultimately determines Russia's preservation of its integrity and long-term security.-

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the most important ways of development of its Muslim republics: towards the European (Eurasian) civilization or Islamic fundamentalism.

list of literature

Abdullaev M. G. On the nature and forms of manifestation of some ethnic prejudices in everyday life (based on the materials of the North Caucasus). Stavropol, 1971.

Avtorkhanov A. K voprosu izucheniya taip, tukumov i klassovoi borby v chechenskoi seleke [On the issue of studying the taip, Tukum and class struggle in the Chechen village].

Agishev N. M., Bushen V. D. Materials on the review of mountain and people's courts of the Caucasus region. St. Petersburg, 1912.

Aglarov M. A. Rural community in Nagorny Dagestan in the XVII-early XX century. Moscow, 1986.

Butaev I. On legal bias in practice in national regions and the fight against it // Revolyutsiya i gorets [Revolution and Highlander], 1930, No. 5.

Gardanov V. K. Public order of the Adyghe peoples of the XVIII-first half of the XIX century. Moscow, 1967.

Gosh Mkhitar. Armenian Judicial Journal, Part 1. Yerevan, 1954.

Dyakonov I. M. Zakony Vavilonii [Laws of Babylonia]. Assyria and the Hittite Kingdom / / Bulletin of Ancient History. 1952. N 4.

Traditional public institutions of Kabardins and their crisis in the late 18th - first half of the 19th century. Nalchik, 1994.

Karachayly I. Articles and essays. Issues of atheistic work and the fight against survivals. Cherkessk, 1984.

Carbonnier J. Yuridicheskaya sotsiologiya [Legal Sociology], Moscow, 1986.

Koran, translated and commented by I. Y. Krachkovsky, Moscow, 1986.

Obliquen M. O. Ethnography and history of the Caucasus. Research and Materials, Moscow, 1961.

Tkeshelev M. Studies on Georgian law. Issue 1. Family Law, Moscow, 1890.

Nevskaya V. P. Annexation of Circassia to Russia and its socio-economic consequences. Cherkessk, 1958.

Essays on the History of Karachay-Cherkessia, vol. 2. Stavropol, 1967.

Pershits A. I., Smirnova Ya. S. Gerontothymia - honoring the elders. 1986. N 5.

Petrov L. Usrednoe pravo i zakon na Kavkaze [Customary law and the law in the Caucasus]. 1901. N 1.

Razgon L. Nepridumannoe, Moscow, 1989.

Reneke N. M. Gorskie i narodnye sudy Kavkazskogo Kraya [Mountain and People's courts of the Caucasus Region]. 1912. N 21.

Smirnova Ya. S., Ter-Sarkisyants A. E. Family and family life Part 1. Formation, type and structure . Series "Peoples of the Caucasus", Moscow, 1995.

Chomaev K. I. Pre-revolutionary features of ethnic psychology of the mountain peoples of the North Caucasus // Questions of national psychology. Cherkessk, 1972.

Central State Archive of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic (CGA KBR). F. 22. Op. 1; F. 159.

Central State Archive of the Ossetian Republic (TsGAOR). F. 393.

Central State Archive of the North Ossetian Republic (TsGA SOR). F. R. 1667. F. R. 41.

Central State Archive of the Chechen Republic (TsGA CHR). F. R. 158.

Central State Archive of the Karachay-Cherkess Republic (CGA KCR). F. R. 19.

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