The dynamic aspect of comparative demographic and political analysis is particularly important due to the different rates of natural population movement in individual countries and regions, as well as the significant role of migration in the modern world. Demographic processes, often being the object of targeted policies, retain the character of an independent variable that affects the capabilities of various forces operating on the world stage. The relevance of the historical and futurological review of relations between Russia and the Islamic world presented in the article through the prism of demographic processes is due to the increased attention of public and state circles of the country to the current stage and prospects of its interaction with the world of Islam.

The world of Islam usually refers to a number of interrelated categories. First, the Muslim population of the planet, people of different countries, regions, continents, united by belonging to Islam upon birth, as well as faith in Allah (God), divine truths and laws based on them (Sharia). Secondly, countries where the majority of the population is Muslim, and Islam is the state religion or one of the foundations of the official ideology. Third, all states where Muslims have a certain social influence (forms of autonomy, political rights, parties and organizations, mass media, etc.), as well as international political status (for example, participation in the Organization of the Islamic Conference).

HISTORICAL RETROSPECTIVE

All three definitions are to some extent appropriate for the purposes of the article. In addition, for almost a thousand years of the initial period of the existence of Islam, they essentially coincided. For Muslims, with rare exceptions, lived in the countries of their political domination. Only with the beginning of Modern times, in the middle of the 2nd millennium AD, there were pockets of Muslims living in the territory of non-Islamic states. These primarily included Russia (the Grand Duchy of Moscow, the Kingdom of Moscow), which in the middle of the XVI century annexed the Muslim regions in the Volga region and the Urals (the Kazan and Astrakhan khanates, the lands of the Bashkirs), and a little later - Tatar Siberia.

The Russian Empire has historically emerged as the first, and until then the only, state body that includes representatives of a religion as aspiring to political dominance as Islam. Only later, mainly in the eighteenth century, during the creation of overseas colonies in Asia, such enclaves of musul-

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Manic populations appear within the dominion of Europeans, primarily the English and Dutch.

In Russia in the XVI-XIX centuries, the state carried out a relatively more or less active policy of spreading Christianity and converting Muslims to Orthodoxy. The British rulers of India, where nominally, until 1858, the supreme power of Muslim rulers from the Mughal dynasty remained, also encouraged the efforts of Christian missionaries, but they were primarily aimed at converting adherents of pagan cults (animists) and outcasts (untouchables) within the system of Brahman Hinduism. At the same time, there was a rivalry between Islamic and Christian proselytism, as well as between them and Hinduism1.

The uniqueness of the Russian experience of relations with the Muslim world lies not only in this circumstance. Having experienced, unlike other European political entities, the domination of Muslims (after Islam was established in the Golden Horde), Muscovy entered into a continuous struggle with the Islamic world, which from the middle of the XV century gained a powerful leader in the form of the Ottoman Empire. The confrontation between the military powers, Russian and Ottoman, for two centuries went on with varying success. Only in the XVIII century. The Moscow Tsardom, which was transformed into the Russian Empire with its capital in St. Petersburg, managed to launch consistent pressure on the positions of the Ottomans, as well as Persia in the Black Sea region, the Crimea, the Caucasus and the Caspian region [Degoev, p.90-91; Revyakin, p. 54-56].

It should be noted that the borders of the Russian Empire under Peter I and his early successors most closely resembled the borders of modern Russia. It already owned vast expanses of Siberia and the Far East (with the exception of Primorsky Krai), controlled a significant part of the Black Sea region and the North Caucasus, while at the same time having very shallow western territories extending towards Europe.

If you look at the demographic size of Russia at that time, then within the empire in 1722, according to the first revision of the taxable population, 14 million people lived. By 1762 (the time of Catherine II's accession), the number of inhabitants had increased to 19 million. [Encyclopedia, p. 75]. There are also higher consolidated estimates of the population of Russia: 17.5-20 million people in 1700, 20 - 26 million in 1750. [Kozlov, p. 240-241; Kennedy, p. 99]. Such indicators put Russia among the leaders among European countries. France was the most populous there (21-22 million in the middle of the 18th century). Meanwhile, there were 10 million people in the British Isles, 18 million in the Habsburg Empire (centered in Austria), about 2 million in the United States, and about the same number in Holland and Sweden, 6 million. - in Prussia. The total number of inhabitants of the above countries and territories in 1750 was about 85 million people, and the entire European (by origin) population was close to 100 million.

Estimates of the total population of the planet in the middle of the XVIII century. they range widely from 630 million to 960 million people [Petrov V. V., pp. 24, 26-28; Historical Estimates...]. Consequently, the share of Europe (together with Siberia and North America) was equal to 10-16%. The main part of the inhabitants of the then world (as now) came from Asia, primarily China and India. Taking as the most reliable estimate of the global population, the average figures of 700-720 million people should be attributed to

1 The author of a modern monograph on the history of the British Empire, N. Ferguson, notes that the British authorities in India did not allow missionary activity for a long time, and it was only from the 1820s that it became widespread [Ferguson, p. 112-114].

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China accounts for about 300 million people, while India accounts for 170-200 million people. In the rest of the regions (except Europe), approximately 100 million more people lived.

As for the Islamic area, estimates of the number of inhabitants within its limits are complicated, in addition to general reasons, by the traditional disdainful attitude of Muslim rulers towards the number of their subjects, as well as their tendency to exaggerate, sometimes fantastic figures.2
According to a number of modern estimates, during the first heyday of the Islamic world, the era of the Baghdad Caliphate (750-1258), there were more than 30 million people (maximum 50), more than one - tenth of the world's population (11-13%) [Sachs, Shabsigh, p. 7].

During the subsequent period, up to the beginning of the 15th century, the Islamic world experienced major demographic losses caused by the raids and destruction of the Mongols (Genghis Khan and his descendants, primarily the Hulaguids) and the heirs of their power in Iran and Central Asia (Tamerlane), as well as severe epidemics of bubonic plague and cholera. The shift of trade routes from land to sea and the decline of agricultural culture under the rule of steppe nomads also had a great influence [Petrov A.M., pp. 116-119].

The share of Muslims in the global population has declined, but not too significantly, as most estimates show that the total global population, in particular the European one, experienced a decline in the middle of the 14th century. the horrors of the "black death" (the population of the Earth in 1200 is estimated at 360-450 million, and in 1400-at 350-374 million) [Historical Estimates...].

A new Islamic upsurge is associated with the rise of the Ottoman Beylik (the state of the Seljuk Turks in Asia Minor) and the expansion of the borders of their empire in the XV-XVI centuries. The Ottoman Empire extended its power to a large part of southeastern Europe, north and northeastern Africa, and western and southwestern Asia. The number of inhabitants within its borders at the peak of Ottoman rule in 1500-1700 can be estimated at 20-30 million people (presumably up to 5 million people, or more, were non-Muslims, mainly Christians). [Issawi, 1995, p. 79; McEvedy, 1978, p. 137]. At the same time, the entire Islamic world was, of course, wider than the Ottoman Empire. This included Shiite Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, with a total Muslim population of about 10 to 15 million people, as well as Mughal India, where the Muslim population was, based on retrospective estimates, about a fifth of the total population, therefore, approximately 20 to 30 million people (with the total number of inhabitants in Hindustan 100-150 million people). Islam had spread to a large part of insular and peninsular Southeast Asia by then, and there, again based on a retrospective analogy, there were probably about 10 to 15 million Muslims. muslims. Finally, in Africa, outside the Ottoman Empire, there were apparently at least 10 million more. muslims. Thus, their number in the world for 200 years could fluctuate, slowly increasing, in the range from 70 million to 90 million people [Istoriya Vostoka..., vol. III. p. 171; Moslem Mir..., 1996, pp. 58-61; Kennedy, 1987, p. 11; McEvedy, 1978, p. 145, 153, 155, 163, 183, 195, 198, 221, 227].

Most estimates made by demographic historians indicate that there was no noticeable increase in the World's population between 1500 and 1650. Moreover, estimates for the middle of the XVII century (470 - 545 million) are lower than at its beginning (545-579 million). [Historical Estimates...]. The share of Muslims in the global population in 1650, probably,

2 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's speech at the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in 1923 is very colorful in this regard. Speaking about the great Turkic nation, he declared that it has "over one hundred million souls". He also estimated the number of the Arab people at "one hundred million souls" [cit. by: Medvedko, p. 480]. Meanwhile, the combined number of Turks and Arabs in the early 1920s was a maximum of 50-60 million people.

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It was equal to 13-19%, but by 1700, taking into account a significant increase in estimates of the total population of the planet to 600-679 million, it dropped to 12-17%.

The demographic potential of the Islamic powers, taking into account the domination of the Ottoman Empire in Greece and the Balkans, and most importantly the Mughal Empire in India, can be estimated in the XVI - XVII centuries. significantly higher-the power of Islam extended to about 35-40% of the world population. These two centuries are considered the last period of expansion of the political power of Islam, the largest in terms of coverage of the territory and population. At the same time, the "great split" of the Islamic world into the Sunni (led by the Ottoman Empire) and Shiite branches occurred at this time, which politically triumphed in Persia.

The next two centuries (XVIII and XIX) were a period of marked reduction in the size of the Islamic world, both in terms of the relative number of adherents to the religion, and in terms of the strength and influence of Muslim powers. The power of Muslims in India has suffered particularly significantly. After the death of Padishah Aurangzeb in 1707, the Mughal Empire steadily declined. Its capital, Delhi, was captured and sacked by the Iranian forces of Nadir Shah Afshar in 1739. After that, the state effectively collapsed, ceding control of the west and north-west of Hindustan to Hindu rulers (Marathas and Rajputs), as well as Sikhs. By the end of the eighteenth century, the dominant power in the subcontinent was the British, who established full real control over it in 1818, and formal control in 1858.

After an unsuccessful attempt to take Vienna in 1683. The Ottoman Empire was plagued by a series of setbacks in its wars with the Austrian Empire and Russia. In the 18th century, Turkey lost control of the Crimea and the northern Black Sea coast, and in the first half of the 19th century, Turkey lost control of the Crimea. ceded power over the western Caucasus to the Russians.

Since the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, Istanbul's control over southern Europe has steadily weakened. In 1829, after the defeat in the war with Russia, England and France, the Ottoman Empire (High Porte) granted independence, and then independence of Greece, recognized the autonomy of Serbia and the Danubian principalities.

The Persian Shiite Safavid Empire, squeezed between the Sunni powers (the Ottoman, Mughal Empires and the Sheibanid state in Central Asia), was able not only to survive, but also to experience a noticeable rise in the XVI - XVII centuries. However, in the first half of the XVIII century. it was sharply weakened politically and economically. The end of the dynasty in 1736 paved the way for the aggressive policy of Nadir Shah, and after his death - attempts to consolidate and struggle for supremacy. As a result, at the very end of the XVIII century, the Turkic rulers of the Qajars came to power. In the middle of the century, the military-tribal Afghan empire of Durrani was formed on the eastern outskirts of Persia, which took the place of a buffer between it and India. From the north, Persia was threatened by a Russian offensive in the direction of the eastern Caucasus, and after suffering a series of defeats, Persia was forced to abandon its claims to it.

Since the mid-19th century. Persia found itself in the grip of two European empires, the British, which established indirect control over Afghanistan, and the Russian, which gained a foothold not only in the Caucasus, but also in Central Asia. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Qajar Empire, while remaining formally independent, fell under the economic rule of Britain and Russia, which divided it into spheres of influence.

A similar fate befell the Ottoman Empire at that time, which, despite the reforms undertaken in 1839-1876 (Tanzimat), also found itself in financial and economic dependence on Europe. Its position in North Africa has sharply weakened. France took control of Algeria in the 1830s and Tunisia in the 1870s. Since 1882, England has had a decisive influence on the policy of Egypt, which remained formally part of the Porte.

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The retreat of the Islamic world under the onslaught of the European one in the XVIII - XIX centuries was widespread. In addition, it occurred in west and east Africa, on the islands of the Indian Ocean, from Madagascar to the Indonesian archipelago, and in the peninsular part of Southeast Asia (in Malaya).

By the middle of the 18th century, a significant part of the Trans-Volga Great Steppe (Kazakh, in tsarist times it was called Kirghiz or Kirghiz-Kaisatskaya), as well as the Altai and Semirechye fell under Russian rule. At the same time, China (the Qing Empire) pressed Muslims from the east. He established control over Mongolian Dzungaria and East Turkestan, transforming them into the governorate of Xinjiang (New Frontier). A new stage of the Russian Empire's offensive against Muslim states in Central Asia began in the 1950s and 1960s. Taking advantage of the enmity between the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Kokand, the tsarist troops defeated them one by one. Bukhara, as well as the Khiva Khanate, became protectorates of Russia, and the Kokand Khanate was liquidated. In the first half of the 1880s, after the armed resistance of the Turkmens, the Transcaspian lands came under Russian control.

TRENDS OF RECENT CENTURIES

The number of Muslims in the XVIII - XIX centuries grew more slowly than in the world as a whole. This was due to the weakening of their political power and the crisis experienced by the traditional economy in the desert, steppe and mountainous areas of Muslim settlement. The transfer of the main routes of world trade from land to the ocean, which was completed by that time, also affected. By becoming dominant, the maritime component of the exchange of goods, services, and ideas has affected the general state of Muslim communities, leading them to become closed and self-isolated.

The Muslim world reached its demographic nadir (lowest point) at the turn of the XVIII-XIX centuries. According to the census conducted at the time of Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, there were only 2.5 million people [The Economic History..., 1966, p. 3]. According to adjusted estimates, the population of the" Nile country " in 1800 was 3.5-4 million, in the once populous Iraq (Mesopotamia) there were from 1 million to 1.5 million people, in all of Arabia no more than 5, in Iran - 6 million, in Turkey (Anatolia) - 9 million, and in all of Turkey (Anatolia) - 9 million. The total population of the Ottoman Empire is 24 million [Issawi, 1995, p. 91, 117; McEvedy, 1978, p. 137, 147, 151, 227]. According to other sources, at the beginning of the 19th century, there were 4 - 4.5 million people in Egypt, 1.2-1.5 million in Syria, including Mountainous Lebanon and Palestine, 3.5 - 4.3 million in Arabia and Iraq, and 7 - 9 million in the Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia). The total population of Arab countries was between 16 and 20 million. [Istoriya Vostoka..., vol. IV, pp. 68-69].

During the 19th century. in the Islamic area, uneven but generally increasing economic and demographic growth was observed. The integration of North Africa, the Middle East, and Southern Asia into a more developed European international political system and the expansion of trade between Europe and Asia created the general conditions for the beginning of recovery. The intercontinental exchange of goods was especially accelerated after the commissioning of the ship built in 1869. The Suez Canal. The widespread use of new means of communication and communication-telegraphy, steamship communication, and railways - contributed to the involvement of Muslim Asian countries in world (European) political and economic processes. This involvement was mostly forced, resulting from the expansion of direct and indirect control of European empires, primarily the British one. The reaction of the Muslim world to the process of submission was threefold. First," from above " attempts were made to modernize, copy European models in the economic and other spheres, and secondly, "from below" there was an active rejection of such a policy, which was formed by the Government of the Russian Federation.-

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Table 1

Population of Russia and the Muslim world (retrospective estimates, million people)

Year

Russia 1

Bolshaya Rossiya 2

Central Eurasia 3

Middle East and Africa

Middle East and South Asia 4

Southeast Asia

The Muslim world 5

1700

11 - 16

14 - 20

4 - 6

30 - 35

40 - 45

11 - 17

85 - 103

1750

14 - 21

17 - 26

5 - 7

30 - 33

45 - 50

14 - 19

94 - 109

1800

17 - 27

26 - 42

5 - 7

36 - 40

50 - 56

17 - 21

108 - 124

1850

33 - 42

56 - 70

8 - 10

40 - 46

60 - 67

23 - 28

131 - 151

1900

69 - 71

135 - 139

10 - 12

58 - 66

80 - 92

33 - 40

181 - 210

1950

101 - 102

180 - 181

13 - 15

106 - 112

142 - 153

69 - 72

330 - 352

2000

143 - 146

290 - 295

50 - 54

475 - 522

516 - 554

206 - 214

1247 - 1344

-----

Notes:

1 population within the borders of the Russian Federation,

2 population within the borders of imperial Russia and the USSR (hypothetical for 2000),

3 Muslim population in Transcaucasia (South Caucasus) and Central (Central) Asia,

4 The Middle East includes Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan,

5 not including Muslims in Russia, China, or any other continent that is not part of the regions highlighted in the table.

Sources: Vyatkin, p. 15; Demographic modernization..., p. 16 - 17, 446, 503, 520; Kozlov, Table 12. pp. 240-241; Muslim world, pp. 164-165; Petrov V. V., pp. 63, 98; Population of the USSR, p. 21; Encyclopedia, p. 75-76; Carr-Saunders, p. 42, 280; Clark, p. 64; Davis, p. 17, 25-26; Historical Estimates...; McEvedy, var. pp.; Michaletos, p. 2-3; Muslim Population.

movements in defense of traditional values were resolved and speeches were held under the slogans of jihad. Finally, as if" from the side", with the participation of representatives of the middle educated strata, efforts were made to reconcile innovations and traditions, and the foundations of the Islamic reformation and renaissance were laid.

If in the mid-nineteenth century the number of Muslims in the world probably only slightly exceeded 100 million, then at the beginning of the twentieth century it was already twice as large (with an average annual growth rate of about 1.2%), according to the most common estimates, the Islamic world accounted for about one-ninth of humanity in 1900 (11 - 13%), i.e. 180-210 million people (see Table 1).

Since the middle of the XVIII century. Russia is being established as an important part of the European international political system, and its trade and economic cooperation with Europe is growing. At the same time, rapid population growth begins. Between the 1750s and 1850s, the population of the empire grew 3.5-4 times - from 17-25 to 68-70 million people [Gaidar, p. 436]. The increase was associated with both territorial expansion (Poland, Finland, and the Caucasus), as well as high birth rates and impressive rates of natural population growth. Already after 1850, when the phase of territorial expansion was mostly over, the number of subjects of the empire doubled in half a century, reaching 129 million people in 1897 (according to the first census and without taking into account the dependent states of Central Asia) [Encyclopedia, p.76].

The rate of progressive natural population movement remained exceptionally high in Russia (an average annual increase of 1.7%) until the First World War. Contemporaries, in particular, the Minister of War General A. N. Kuropatkin, the famous scientist and public figure D. I. Mendeleev, expected that in the middle of the XX century. its population will reach 400 million, and at the end of the century it will exceed 550 million people [Sidorova, p. 25, 27]. However, these forecasts did not come true - instead of growth, a stage of demographic devastation came.

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The first major human losses (over 2 million soldiers and officers) Russia suffered on the fields of the World War in 1914-1917. Over the next three years, due to the reduction of the territory, Civil war, epidemics and forced emigration, the population of the state decreased from 171 million to 132 million people. The demographic fate of the USSR and its central part, today's Russia, was later severely affected by famine 1920 - 1922, 1932 - 1933, 1946 - 1947 mass political repressions, which peaked in 1937, and finally the huge loss of life during the Second World War. The total number of premature deaths in the first half of the 20th century is estimated in the range of 50-65 million, and approximately 11-15 million more. losses were caused by the effect of failed births [Demographic modernization..., p. 399 - 401, 437 - 438, 442].

In the post-war period, the population of the USSR and Russia (RSFSR) grew quite rapidly. In 1950-1989, the former increased from 179 million to 288 million, and the latter - from 101 to 147 million people [Demographic modernization..., pp. 173-174; 443, 447]. One of the main reasons was the reduced mortality rate due to the relatively young structure of the population, which was formed under the influence of the tests that the middle and older generations endured in the previous period. Advances in medicine and public health were also important, especially in the fight against epidemics and reducing child and maternal mortality. The pronatalist policy of the state and the corresponding sentiments in society led to an increased birth rate and high population growth rates in the 1950s and 1960s. The process of demographic modernization (a decline in the birth rate following a reduction in mortality) began to manifest itself later and remained barely noticeable. Population growth in the RSFSR and the USSR continued, and at times (in the mid-1980s), under the influence of a purposeful state policy, the birth rate curve went up.

In the 1990s, due to the aging of the population, an implicit regime of reduced reproduction was revealed. The dramatic drop in the birth rate during that decade made matters worse. Working together, the two phenomena caused a significant population decline. It declined from 148.5 million in 1990 to 145.6 million in 2000. The decrease would have been much more significant (about 7 million) if it had not been compensated by the influx of population from neighboring countries (former Soviet republics) [Demographic Modernization..., p.447; Rybakovsky, p. 5].

The Muslim world in the first half of the twentieth century continued to experience pressure from the more developed European states. As a result of the First World War, its main support and centuries - old symbol-the Ottoman Empire-collapsed. In its place, a national Turkish state emerged (in 1923, the sultanate was abolished in Turkey, and the following year - the caliphate). In neighboring Persia, the Qajar empire was replaced by a new Pahlavi monarchy, based on its deep historical roots (this is why the country was officially renamed Iran in 1927).

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire allowed the Arabs to step up their struggle for national sovereignty. The main obstacle on this path was the United Kingdom and France, which strengthened their international positions. Egypt was transformed into a kingdom in 1922, but the British retained leverage over it: military bases and control over the Suez Canal. In the late 1920s, however, the historical and religious center of the Islamic world-Arabia, united, despite them, under the rule of Ibn Saud - eluded the British. In the next decade, Britain grants formal independence to Iraq and weakens its control over another Hashemite kingdom, Transjordan. Anti-colonial sentiments cover the Arab lands under the protectorates of France-Syria and Lebanon.

Between the two World Wars, there were two tendencies among Muslims in India-one in support of pan-Indian nationalism and the other in favor of creating a separate state for Muslims. Supporters of nationalism based on religious identity

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They were able to split the country and create Pakistan, the first Islamic republic in history. This happened after the end of the Second World War, when the collapse of the colonial system began, which allowed the Islamic peoples to find a "second wind". In the Middle East, a system of Arab States was already being formed in the first post-war years. To the east of it, in addition to Pakistan, Muslim Indonesia is gaining independence, and with some time lag - Malaysia.

At the same time, from the point of view of demography, the Islamic world in the middle of the XX century. it was not yet an exceptionally large array. According to rough estimates, the number of Muslims in the world in 1950 was 330-350 million, or 13-14% of the world's population, not much more than at the beginning of the century (see Table 1).

In the second half of the last century, the world is experiencing a demographic explosion due to rapid population growth in less developed regions, including the Islamic one. The rapid increase in the population was due to a steep decline in mortality, made possible by the use of advances in medical science and public health, and the maintenance of the birth rate at a traditionally high level.

The number of followers of the Prophet Muhammad in the world grew at an exceptionally rapid rate in the 1950s and 2000s, which is reflected in Table 1. It is interesting that, as it follows from it, over 300 years the ratio between the population of Russia and the Muslim world, having soared up, returned to its original position. Both in 1700 and in 2000. it was approximately 1: 10, while in 1850 and especially in 1900 it was 1: 3, and if you take the Greater Russia in the early and middle of the twentieth century, then less than 1:2. The demographic and political situation of Russia (the Russian Empire)is particularly favorable in relation to the Muslim states, it was in 1900.

The sudden breakthrough in numbers achieved by the world's Muslims over the past 100 and especially 50 years is confirmed not only by the data used in compiling Table 1. Leading experts in the field of confessional statistics, D. B. Barnett and T. M. Johnson, estimated the number of Muslims in the world in 1970 at 553 million, or 15.3% of the world's population. population. In the following decades, according to their calculations, a noticeable increase in the share of world Muslims continued-by 1980. it reached 16.5%, in 1985 - 17.1%, and in 2000 - up to 19.2 - 19.5%. The total number of Muslims in the last year of the XX century. They believe it to be 1188 million people, which is almost three times more than in 1950 [Annual Table...; Huntington, p. 65].

If in the middle of the century every seventh or eighth inhabitant of the planet belonged statistically to the world of Islam, then at the end of it every fifth. The average annual increase in the number of Muslims in the second half of the century was 2.6-2.7%, exceeding by almost 10 points the corresponding indicator for the world population as a whole (1.8%). There are also higher estimates of the number of followers of the Prophet Muhammad at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries. Often, the most reliable figure is 1.3 billion rubles. human. As of 2005, the number of Muslims in the world is also estimated at 1.4 billion, and their share in the world population is already 22%. A number of Islamic research centers and electronic portals publish information that the number of Muslims reached 1.5 billion by the end of the 20th century. a person and even more. However, a quick review of the calculation methodology shows a tendency to unjustified exaggeration. Thus, the share of Muslims in India, according to some such data, is 16.2%, while according to the results of the 2001 census of India, their share was 13.4%. [Muslim population...; Muslims in India...].

Over the last three decades of the 20th century, the Muslim population of the world has not only grown significantly, but also the influence of Islam on world processes has strengthened. In 1969, the first high-level conference of Islamic States was held in the capital of Morocco

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Rabat city. The conference led to the creation of a pan-Islamic interstate association centered in Saudi Arabia called the Organization of the Islamic Conference. In 30 years, the number of DEC members increased from 25 to 57, and the number of inhabitants in the participating countries reached 1,328 million by 2004 [Belokrenitsky, p. 33].

It should be noted that the number of Muslims in the world and the total demographic power of the largest Islamic international political organization are very close, although, of course, the substratum of estimates in these two cases is different - the share of non - Muslims in the population of the OIC member countries is quite large, while a large number of Muslims live outside the region formed by organizations. It is interesting to conclude that the number of non-Muslim minorities in Islamic States is approximately equal to the number of Muslim minorities in non-Islamic countries.

By the way, the above-mentioned estimates of specialists in confessional statistics give an idea of the dynamics of changes in the number of people belonging to different groups in terms of their faith and self-identification. It follows from these data that under the influence of secularism and socialism, the number of so-called non-religious people in the world has increased dramatically in the 20th century. If in 1900 it barely exceeded 3 million, but by 2000 it had grown to 768 million people. There were only 226,000 atheists at the beginning of the century, and 150 million at the end. At the same time, the number of adherents of secular religions and non-religious beliefs increased most rapidly between the 1900s and 1970s [Annual Table...].

Thus, if during the first two thirds of the 20th century the non-religious part of the world's population grew most rapidly, then in 1970-2000 the world Muslim community grew significantly faster than others, and this growth was accompanied by the rise of both pro-and pan-Islamic, and Islamist movements and ideologies.

It is known that the strength and prevalence of a particular ideology and derived socio-political movements depends, among other things, on the size of the reference group, i.e., the class, the masses of people to whom any ideology appeals. In Marxist terms, this group corresponds to the concept of "class in itself", and in liberal political science-the category of a group of interests of a non-associative or non-associated type [Almond, p. 129-135]. Many readers of this journal need hardly be reminded of the attempts made in Soviet science to expand the size of the working class and industrial proletariat at the expense of other categories of wage labor. All this was dictated by the desire to reinforce the belief in the " proletarian ideology "by pointing out a significant and constantly growing segment of people in both developed and developing countries who can" respond " to its arguments. The same pattern is observed, apparently, in relation to the ideology of Islamism. The more adherents of Islam there are,the more reasonable the claims and expectations of its creators and adherents appear. This is probably one of the most important visible links between international demography and world politics.

MUSLIM POPULATION OF RUSSIA

As noted above, Russia is the only country in the world where the Muslim minority appeared five centuries ago, at the very beginning of Modern times. In the XIX century. The main areas of settlement of Russian Muslims (the Volga region, the Urals, the Crimea) were added to the mountainous North Caucasus regions, Eastern Transcaucasia, as well as Central Asia (Western Turkestan and the Transcaspian Region). According to the first population census of 1897, 11.2 million people lived within the Russian Empire. Muslims (8.7%) [Encyclopedia..., p. 86]. To this figure we must add completely mu-

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Sulman population of the unrecorded Bukhara Emirate and Khiva Khanate. Estimates of the number of inhabitants in these two dependent states are conditional, since local rulers refused to calculate, but in total the population there was, apparently, from 1.5 million to 3 million people [Lavrov, p.179-180; Logofet, p. 114]. Thus, having 13 - 14 million rubles. At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, Imperial Russia concentrated 6-7% of the world's Muslim population within its borders. According to some authors, the number of Muslims in tsarist Russia at the beginning of the XX century exceeded 20 million people [Muslim world..., p. 178]. This assessment does not seem excessive if we are talking not about the very beginning of the century, but about the eve of the First World War.

The entire first half of the 20th century was a period of severe trials for the Muslims of "Greater Russia" and a gradual reduction in the share, and often the number of inhabitants. It is characteristic that the Bashkirs, according to the census of 1897, were 1.9 million, and according to the census of 1989 - less than 1.5 million people. During the period of collectivization in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the decline in the number of other steppe peoples, primarily Kazakhs, who partially emigrated from the USSR, was widespread. The number of Kazakhs in 1916-1945 decreased by 45% [Landa, p. 230]. The strongest blow to the demographic positions of the peoples of the North Caucasus and the Crimean Tatars was caused by their mass persecution and resettlement at the end of the Great Patriotic War [Landa, pp. 234-236].

As in the world as a whole, the demographic growth of Muslims in the USSR became especially noticeable after 1970. It was during the last two decades of the Union's existence that the "scissor effect" was revealed in the comparative growth rates of the Muslim and non-Muslim populations. The relative increase in the number of Muslims clearly affected the demography of Soviet Central Asia. The demographic picture of the Caucasus has also changed. According to the last census of the Soviet period in 1989, the share of Russians was only slightly more than half of the population (52%). The share of Muslims was 18.5% against 8.5% according to the 1937 census [Tulsky, p. 7].

As for Russia proper, according to the 1989 census, ethnic (statistical) Muslims accounted for 11.8 million people, or about 8% of the population. Taking into account the increased natural growth rate of the Muslim population and the migration effect, the State Statistics Committee expected that in 1999 the share of Muslims will increase to 9%, and their number will exceed 13 million. Based on the results of the 2002 census, officials estimated the number of Muslims at 14.5 million. Every tenth permanent resident of Russia turned out to be a Muslim [Interview with V. Zorin...]. Thus, there is a tendency for a gradual increase in the share of Russian Muslims, but they still constitute a relatively small minority, although the largest among other confessional groups.

Muslims permanently residing in modern Russia are divided into three large groups. The first and largest group consists of residents of the Volga and Ural regions - Tatars (5.5 million according to the 2002 census) and Bashkirs (1.6 million). The second group is represented by the peoples of the North Caucasus. The most numerous among them are Chechens (1.4 million). Together with related Ingush people (412,000), their number is close to 2 million. Other ethnic groups include the Avars (757,000), Dargins (510,000), Lezgins (412,000), Kabardians (520,000), Kumyks (423,000), and Karachays (192,000) who live compactly in Dagestan. According to the census, the total number of ethnic Muslims in the North Caucasus was 5.3 million.. The third group consists of representatives of the ethnic groups of Central Asia and Transcaucasia. The most numerous of them are Kazakhs (655 thousand) and Azerbaijanis (621 thousand), and the total number exceeds 1.5 million people. It should also be noted that 1.5 million permanent residents of Russia did not indicate their nationality in the census form and, apparently, at their expense, the number of Muslims, according to official estimates, increased by about half a million more [Main results...].

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In addition to the permanent population subject to the census, Russia has a large number of Muslims temporarily residing on its territory, who have arrived legally or illegally. Their number, according to later estimates, reaches 4-5 million people, while the most numerous among them are now Azerbaijanis (1.5 - 2 million). and Tajiks (1 million) [Malashenko, p. 10]. Together with temporary residents, the number of ethnic Muslims in Russia at the beginning of the XXI century is almost 20 million, and these figures, not without reason, due to the need to take care of the needs of all believers, insist Islamic spiritual leaders [Ibid.].

DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE OF RUSSIA AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD

An analysis conducted at the Center for Demography and Human Ecology (CDECH) of the Institute of National Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences showed that the trends towards population decline in Russia are long-term. As in other economically developed countries, the birth rate is not likely to exceed the level required for extended reproduction for most of the twenty-first century. According to the average, most likely forecast of natural population movement, the number of inhabitants in Russia will decrease to 125 million by 2025, to 98 million by 2050, and to 64 million by 2100. As in most other long-term calculations, demographers of the CDEC have identified low and high variants based on different estimates of future fertility rates (mortality rates are calculated in one variant). According to the high version, the number of inhabitants in Russia will steadily decrease to 130 million in 2100, and the low version - to 20 million people [Demographic modernization, p. 503].

Overall, comparable results were obtained by the UN Population Division. In 2050, the Russian population is expected to reach 108 million according to the UN medium version, 130 million according to the high version, and 89 million according to the low version [Worldpopulation...].

In both cases, we are talking about the reproduction of the population without taking into account migration. The influx of population from abroad can change the situation in principle. Calculations of the scenario of stabilization of the population of Russia at the level of 144 million people (adopted for 2000) were made in the CDEC. They showed that in order to maintain the number at an unchanged level, it is necessary that migration should average 879 thousand people per year in the period from 2000 to 2024 and 1222 thousand during 2025 to 2049. In other words, it is necessary that it should add up to an influx of 22 million people in the first quarter of the twenty - first century and 30 million in the second. At the same time, the authors of the forecast believe that the reproduction regime is the same for indigenous people and migrants, which is not very realistic. It would be more logical to assume a higher birth rate for the incoming population. But even without taking this circumstance into account, with migration that can stabilize the population, about half of Russians will be migrants and their descendants by the middle of the century.

We should agree with the authors of these forecast calculations that the stabilization scenario is unlikely to have a favorable outlook. By not addressing issues related to accelerated economic development, it creates a lot of social problems. At the same time, Russia cannot do without moderate immigration either. It is justified due to the prevailing socio-economic conditions. However, until recently, immigration has mostly served as a channel for replenishing the number of temporary and illegal residents of the country. At the same time, it consisted mainly of Muslims from Central Asia and Transcaucasia.

As for permanent migration, it was relatively small. Leading domestic demographers note that the course of the state policy of the Russian Federation aimed, in essence, against the entry of the population on a legal and permanent basis, is aimed at continuing the migration process.-

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Table 2

Muslim population of Russia (estimates for the future, million people)

Year

Population, medium variant A*

Population, high option B*

Muslims, permanent residents **

Percentage of Muslims, option A

Percentage of Muslims, option B

1990

147.7

147.7

12.0

8.1

8.1

2000

147.4(145.6)

147.4

14.1

9.6 (9.7)

9.6

2005

144.0

144.0

15.2

10.6

10.6

2015

136.5

140.0

17.8

13.0

12.7

2025

128.2 (125)

135.6

20.9

16.3 (16.7)

15.4

2050

107.8 (98)

130.0

31.1

28.9 (31.7)

23.9

-----

Notes: * UN calculations, in brackets of the TEAC.

** at a constant growth rate of 1.6% per year; observed in the period between censuses

1989 and 2002

Sources: Demographic modernization..., pp. 441, 503; World Population Prospects...

almost all the years of its existence, especially since the mid-1990s [see: Perevedentsev; Rybakovsky]. Since the middle of this decade, there have been new developments in politics that can create conditions more favorable for the arrival and settlement of a new population in the country.

Calculations for the long-term growth of the number and proportion of Muslims who are permanent residents of Russia are given in Table 2. It follows that no dramatic changes in the confessional and ethnic composition of the population should occur while maintaining the rate of increase in the number of Muslims that characterized the period of the 1990s and early 2000s.. But together with the Muslims temporarily staying in the Russian Federation, their total number may approach 30 million people in the near future.

The strengthening of immigration processes (on a permanent and temporary basis) can turn into an essential aspect not only of Russia's domestic but also foreign policy. It may affect its relations with neighboring Muslim countries. It will probably take considerable political skill to deal with the problems arising from a complex of phenomena, which is based on trends towards an increase in the share and mass of the Muslim population of Russia and the inevitable, in one way or another, expansion of the layer of Muslims coming to the country.

The demographic future of the Islamic world is presented as a blooming flower. According to the latest 2006 UN Survey of World Demographic Prospects, the world population for 2000 is estimated at 6124 million, which is 64 million higher than the previous estimate in biannual surveys. World population growth is now expected to be faster in the first half of the twenty-first century. By 2050, according to the average version of the forecast, the number of inhabitants on earth will reach 9.2 billion, and not 8.9 billion, as UN demographers previously believed [World Population Prospects...].

The bulk of the new population growth will fall on the less developed regions and the poorest and insufficiently rapidly developing (sometimes degrading) countries. As of the beginning of the twenty-first century, the population in less developed regions is growing six times faster than in developed countries, and in the least developed region (49 countries) "almost ten times faster. This kind of disparity is likely to persist and lead, on the one hand, to an almost constant number of residents (mainly due to the immigration effect) in 30 economically developed countries, including Russia (they now account for 1.2 billion people). people), and on the other hand-to the growth of the demographic scale of other countries from 5 billion to 8 billion. human.

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Due to the fact that no Muslim country, according to the interpretation adopted for the purposes of the UN demographic survey, belongs to a developed region, the above trends fully apply to the Islamic world. It is well known, moreover, that of the developing countries, Muslim countries show the highest population growth rates. Without touching here in detail on the reasons for this situation, we note only the strong traditions of having many children in the Islamic area, as well as the customs of widows ' marriage and polygamy. Cultural and civilizational rules sanctified by religion, combined with some economic and social factors, explain the increased resilience of Islamic societies to the processes of demographic modernization.

Meanwhile, the UN predicts that mortality rates will steadily decline in less developed regions, including the Islamic one. Despite the impact of the HIV epidemic/As a result, the mortality rate will decrease in all countries, including the most affected African countries. The average life expectancy (the amount of survival at birth, i.e. based on the currently existing mortality rates) will almost universally increase steadily. And this will affect even such poor multi-and densely populated states as Bangladesh. At the beginning of the 21st century, the average life expectancy of both men and women exceeded 60 years, and in the coming decades it should rise to 70-75 years. According to forecasts that now seem almost incredible, the population in this country will exceed 250 million people in the middle of the century, which means an increase in the average density to about 2 thousand people per 1 square kilometer [World Population Prospects...].

Reducing mortality will cause an aging population and new major problems for less developed countries. At the same time, their demographic weight will increase. But the age pyramid and the average age of residents will change in the direction of turning these countries into more "solid" ones, helping to overcome the "youth hump" (the share of people aged 15-25 years). The projected monotonous decline in the birth rate in most of the less developed countries, including Muslim ones, will also contribute to this.

According to religious statistics, the number of Muslims in the world in the late XX and early XXI centuries increased faster than any other category of the world population included in it - their average annual growth was 2.1% compared to 1.3% of Christians, 0.8% of non-religious people. If we assume that the relative difference in growth rates will not change in the next quarter of a century, then the share of Muslims on the planet will grow to 23% by 2025 (compared to 20% at the beginning of the forecast period), Christians will decrease to 30% (from 33%), and their ratio will change from 37: 63 to 43: 57. The number of Muslims will come close to 2 billion. human. According to other estimates, Muslims will make up 30% of the world's population by 2025, while Christians will make up 25% (the ratio for 2000 is 30% of Christians and 19% of Muslims) [Annual Table...; Muslim Population...].

In the middle of this century, according to some estimates, the share of Muslims in the world will be 35%, which will be an absolute record in the history of Islam [Michaletos, p. 3]. Interestingly, the share of Europeans in the world population between the First and Second World Wars was close to this level [Cipolla, p. 102, 104; Woytinsky, p. 395].

According to the average version of the UN Population Division's forecast, the total population of the nine largest and most influential Muslim states-Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia and Nigeria-will exceed 1.5 billion in 2050. human. All of them, with the exception of Saudi Arabia and Malaysia, will exceed or almost equal the population of Russia. It will most likely have to accept the loss of a high place in the world economy-

page 107
It will continue to be one of the 15, or at least 17, most populous states in the demographic hierarchy. In addition, a demographically stronger Muslim world will frame Russia in a broad swath from the south and southwest. The population of the five Central Asian states will increase to 76 million by mid-century (from 56 million in 2000). And the Muslim South-Central Asian region (the five Central Asian states plus Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan) will have 550-600 million people - almost twice as many as in 2000 and in the previous decade. six times more than in 1950. [Demographic modernization..., p. 520; World Population Prospects...].

It is not only Russia that is projected to face the problem of reducing its demographic potential. It will become a "headache" for many countries in Europe and Japan. Of the major economically developed countries, only the United States is expected to see steady population growth, with the prospect of reaching the level of 400 million people by 2050 (285 million in 2000). [World Population Prospects...].

The common fate seems to imply a mutual consideration of experience in mitigating the severity of both the economic and political consequences of the ongoing shifts. As for the demographic weight of Russia on the world stage, it probably needs to be taken into account when planning a long-term foreign policy strategy.

conclusion

The analysis of historical and futurological trends clearly shows the dynamics of changes in the demographic and geopolitical parameters of Russia in comparison with the Islamic world. At present, there is a clear revival of world Islam, which, after overcoming a very long demographic and political crisis, entered a phase of rapid quantitative growth more than half a century ago.

At the same time, the international political weight of States and associations of an Islamic nature does not seem to fully correspond to these trends. The reason, perhaps, is a fundamental change in the foundations of world politics, which now depends much more on economic, scientific and technological potentials than on demographic ones. The defining influence of economics in international affairs is considered a distinctive feature of the modern, postcolonial history of the world [Megatrends..., pp. 10-11]. Russia, which has embarked on a path of economic recovery, has much to gain from such changes.

But although there seems to be every reason to believe that an economy based on innovation and scientific achievements will play a decisive role, one cannot ignore the variability of the future and ignore trends that can seriously distort the inertial contour of future world politics. Among them, a prominent place is occupied by the above-mentioned mismatch of the processes of increasing the demographic weight of the Islamic world and preserving its generally subordinate, somewhat belittled position in international affairs.

It is possible to outline favorable and unfavorable scenarios for the evolution of the world situation and the situation of Russia in connection with this circumstance. The first of them, based on the immutability of the relative weight of Islam in world politics, is based on the assumption of a gradual reduction in the growth rate of the Muslim population. This assumption is not groundless. It is unclear, however, how significant this slowdown will be and how it will fit in with trends for Russia and the world.

page 108
Reducing the birth rate, being a key variable, depends on a complex of economic and socio-cultural reasons. Oversimplifying, it can be argued that unless there is a noticeable change in the spread of education among women and their employment in working outside the home amid rising incomes and urbanization, it is difficult to expect a decisive rejection of the traditional attitudes of Muslim society towards having many children. However, certain adjustments to the birth rate dynamics can be made under the influence of information (demonstration effect) and the availability of modern family planning tools.

The second, unfavorable scenario of demographic changes (with unchanged roles in world politics) implies an increase in the gap in the human potential of the countries of Islam and the world as a whole, including Russia. Its implementation will probably mean a growing tension between the Muslim world and its external environment. Against this background, it is possible to strengthen the positions of radical Islamists, exacerbate the problems of religious extremism and terrorism. The Islamist wave may once again overwhelm Russian shores. And in this case, Russia's ability to negotiate with moderate forces in Islam, to find a compromise, while at the same time not allowing concessions to extremists and relying on the support of a broad coalition of international forces, will become extremely important.

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