On November 27-29, 2006, the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences hosted the international scientific conference "Russia, the Islamic World and Global Processes in Historical Retrospect and Current Trends", organized by the Department of Near and Middle East Countries of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences with the support of the Russian Humanitarian Science Foundation (RGNF). 06 - 01 - 03407 d). In accordance with the invitation program, the organizing committee opened an email page in the Yandex electronic system, which received about 50 applications for participation in the conference, short abstracts of reports from specialists from Moscow, other Russian cities, CIS countries and a number of foreign countries. To participate in the conference, the organizers sent out individual invitations to prominent conference specialists working in Turkey, Bulgaria, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and other countries. Special invitations were also sent to scientists from Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The conference was attended by Professor of Ankara University (Turkey) E. Tellal, Professor of Tehran University, Head of the Center for Russian and Eastern European Studies M. Sanai, Professor of Peshawar University (Pakistan) Azmat Hayat Khan (Director of the Center for the Study of Russia and Central Asia) and Sarfraz Khan, member of the Institute of Balkan Studies of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences Dr. Y. Bibina, deans of the faculties of universities in Erbil D. Hamad and in Sulaymaniyah N. Ramadan (both cities are located in Iraqi Kurdistan). The conference was also attended by K. S. Sarsenov (Uralsk University, Kazakhstan), V. N. Plastun (Novosibirsk University), B. M. Yagudin and SM. Mikhailova from Kazan, university teachers from Barnaul, Lipetsk, Penza, Ryazan. Young researchers from Armenia and Ukraine made presentations at the conference.

The conference was opened by R. B. Rybakov, Director of the Institute of Information Technology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, with a brief opening speech. Stressing that Islamic topics are regularly the subject of scientific forums organized by the BSW Countries Division (this is the fifth conference it has held in the last eight years), he wished the participants success in their work. Speakers at the first session of the plenary session were the Heads of the Department. V. Ya. Belokrenitsky ("The significance of the Islamic world for modern Russia"), Head of the Turkish section of the Department N. Yu.Ulchenko ("Russia and Turkey: main stages of economic development and bilateral cooperation"), M. Sanai ("Iran, Russia and the Islamic World"), Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Iran Sector of the BSW Division

page 148

N. M. Mammadova ("Mutual Interests of Russia and Iran and their Evolution") and Azmat Hayat Khan ("Islam and Pakistan-Russia Relations").

V. Ya. Belokrenitsky noted that the Islamic world usually refers to two different concepts : first, the world of Muslims, adherents of Islam (born in an Islamic environment or converted to the faith); secondly, the totality of Muslim states, i.e. states that consider themselves Islamic, although not necessarily only to them and not even necessarily in the first place to them. The speaker proceeded primarily from the second definition. The group of States that consider themselves Islamic is best represented by members of the group formed in 1969-1970. Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). In this case, the Islamic world now consists of 57 states, with a population of 1.4 billion. This represents about 22% of the world's population, which has reached 6.4 billion people. Having briefly described the economic parameters of the Muslim world and its increased political opportunities, the author of the report focused on the assessment of relations between Russia and Muslim states. He noted that Kazakhstan stands out as a trade partner among the countries of the near Islamic circle (six CIS countries). The total volume of trade with them in 2004 was $ 11 billion. and with the entire Islamic world-approximately 26-28 billion, accounting for about a tenth of the volume of Russia's foreign trade.

V. Ya. Belokrenitsky drew attention to the trend towards a general strengthening of the position of the Islamic world (as well as the whole of Asia and North Africa) and identified a number of factors that in particular contribute to increasing the importance of this world for Russia. Among them, it is worth noting, firstly, the ideological factor (the emphasis on civilizational identity and independence in foreign policy attracts certain political circles in Russia). Secondly, the migration factor. The people currently entering the country, as well as future migrants, mostly belong to the Muslim world, come from Eastern Transcaucasia and Central Asia. According to forecasts, by 2050, in the case of the so-called stabilization regime of reproduction (provided that the number remains at the current level), the number of emigrants and their descendants in Russia will exceed half of its population. If an extrapolation rather than a stabilization scenario is implemented, then the population of Russia will decrease to 101 million people by the middle of the century, while the population of Central Asia will increase to 76 million, and South-Central Asia (CA plus Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan) - to 600 million people.

N. Y. Ulchenko gave a retrospective review of the economic relations between Russia and Turkey since the 1920s, the period of the first real economic contacts between the two states. The report summarizes the experience of developing bilateral economic ties over more than 70 years. The main trend of their development, according to the author, was the close interweaving of economic and political interests of the parties, and the main task of the Russian side in the process of further development of relations, it sees in achieving more specific benefits, not only of a political nature, but also economic ones on the basis of ensuring parity of interests. Ulchenko drew particular attention to the cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey in the energy sector, mainly in the supply of Russian natural gas to Turkey. Recently, after the Blue Stream gas pipeline laid under the Black Sea came into operation, Ankara has been rapidly adapting to its new role not just as an importer of energy raw materials, but as a transit supplier to the markets of third countries, primarily European ones. They understand that the European market is supplied with gas from Russia, the North Sea and North Africa. Turkey's goal is to become the fourth gas route from Russia to Europe.

M. Sanai noted that Russia has historically been closely connected with the Islamic world, and has played an important role in the economic and political development of Muslim countries. In recent years, the eastern direction has been growing in Russian politics, in particular, the possibility of participating in international organizations and regional unions is being used (Russia is an observer country of the OIC). The share of the Muslim population in Russia is growing, and its number, according to some estimates, for example, the Internet encyclopedia Wikipedia, is approaching 27 million people. (Note that according to the latest census of the Russian population conducted in 2002, the number of "statistical Muslims" did not exceed 15 million) At the same time, the growth in the number and political and social activity of Muslims in the future, according to the Iranian scientist, will have an increasing impact on the country's policy. According to Sanaei, Iranian Islam does not threaten Russian interests.

page 149

Following the evolution of relations between Russia and Iran and their mutual interests at different stages of historical development, Mammadova drew attention to the coincidence of national interests of Russia and Iran in the XV-XVII centuries. It was at this time that both states were formed as politically independent and centralized. In addition, it was during this period that they were, paradoxically, united by the similarity of the geopolitical situation associated with religious and ideological originality. Moscow, after the adoption of the Union of Florence by Constantinople, actually opposed itself to Western Christian Europe. Iran, which adopted Shi'ism as an official religion at the beginning of the sixteenth century and did not recognize the Ottoman Empire's right to a caliphate, found itself in a similar situation. Having become a kind of ideological and religious enclaves, both states were bound by common geopolitical interests due to the expansion of the Ottoman Empire. But since Peter I and the fall of the Safavids, the historical and socio-economic development of the two empires has diverged dramatically. In the period of extensive mainly development of Russia in the XIX century. its expansion to the south and southeast is carried out mainly at the expense of lands that were either part of the Iranian state or dependent on it.

Drawing attention to the change in the paradigm of interests in connection with the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, practical steps to export it to Iran, N. M. Mammadova noted that the economic interest of both countries developed over the centuries turned out to be more significant compared to ideological factors. Special attention was paid to the coincidence and difference of interests of Iran and Russia in the post-Soviet period, which can be compared to a certain extent with the beginning of the formation of common goals in politics in the XV-XVI centuries. The report notes the convergence of regional interests, the specifics of joint economic projects, and the expansion of cooperation within the SCO, to which Iran was admitted as an observer in 2005. The author of the report also noted the existence of disagreements, in particular on the issue of the delimitation of the seabed and the rights to natural resources of the Caspian Sea. N. M. Mammadova stressed that Moscow is also concerned about Iran's use of nuclear energy as a political tool. According to the speaker, the Iranian side could, having refused to play on the former "imperial" syndrome of Russia, accept Russian proposals on the nuclear program. Despite these difficulties, the two countries still have more overlapping interests than dividing ones.*

Azmat Hayat Khan focused on the current state and prospects of development of relations between Pakistan and Russia. The main conclusion of his report is that the level of bilateral relations is far from meeting the interests of the two countries and there is every reason to increase it. The Islamic ideology, which is official in Pakistan, is moderate in nature and does not hinder the country's cooperation with other states. Given the significant role that the Islamic Republic of Pakistan plays in the Islamic world, in the OIC, Moscow could gain a lot geopolitically from expanding its ties with Islamabad.

At the second plenary session, Professor of the Higher School of Economics K. M. Truevtsev ("The Islamic World and Globalization: Problems of adaptation"), an employee of the Center for Arab Studies of the Institute of Islamic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences L. A. Shishkin made presentations. Niyazi ("The Global Crisis and the New Bipolarity"), Deputy Director of the Institute of International Relations. head of the same Center I. D. Zvyagelskaya ("Evolution of Russia's Approaches to Central Asia"), leading researcher of IMEMO RAS D. B. Malysheva ("Russia's Business Partners in Central Asia"), journalist-analyst S. A. Shermatova ("Islam and Politics in Central Asia") and V. N. Plastun ("Russia's Business Partners in Central Asia").Islam in the post-Soviet space and US policy in the Central Asian region").

K. S. Sarsenov ("Kazakhstan and Russia") delivered speeches at the third session of the plenary session.: new realities"), Professor of RSUH E. S. Melkumyan ("Arab countries of the Persian Gulf and Russia"), MGIMO fellow (U) Political scientist I. V. Kudryashova ("Political Islam in Modern Global Politics"), Professor G. G. Kosach ("Saudi Arabia: Ways to Internal Stability"), member of the Center for Arab Studies of the Institute of Islamic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences B. V. Dolgov ("Democracy and Islamism in Arab Countries") and a specialist from the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies B. Z. Mirkasymov ("The American concept of the Greater Middle East and Russian Interests").

* N. M. Mammadova's report in the journal version will be published in one of the next issues.

page 150

On the second day of the conference, the sessions were divided into sections " Russia and Turkey "and" Russia and Iran " (headed by N. Y. Ulchenko and N. M. Mammadova).

At the first section, 17 reports were heard, many of which were made by employees of the sector. S. F. Oreshkova in the report "The Ottoman Empire: the experience of interfaith cooperation between Islam and Orthodoxy" analyzed the experience of interfaith interaction accumulated by the empire over the 500-year period of its existence. It was emphasized that this state entity could not have been maintained for so long without certain concessions and agreements of the authorities and subjects. The basis of religious tolerance of different peoples and religions is laid in Islam itself. This was also facilitated by the previously established practice in the territories conquered by the Ottomans. The report presents an analysis of the system of millets (religious communities) that has been legalized in the Ottoman State since the time of Mehmed II Fatih, the scope of its competence, the deviations from it that took place in different periods of history, the positive and negative consequences of the separate coexistence of different faiths in one state. The specific material about millets given in the report is very interesting, especially since it has hardly been touched upon in our Turkological literature so far.

Covering the topic "Turkish Pan-Islamism and the Russian Caucasus", N. G. Kireev tried to assess the evolution of the state ideology of the last years of the Ottoman Empire - from Ottomanism to a certain synthesis of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism. After the territorial losses in the Balkan wars of 1912-1913, the Young Turks finally adopted the ideas of pan-Turkism and pan-Turanism. Islam, in the concept of pan - Islamism, was also seen as a lifeline for the empire. The appearance of new states on Turkey's Caucasian borders after the events of 1917 in Russia, which declared independence, seemed to contribute to the implementation of the Young Turks ' plans. Turkey launched an intervention in the Caucasus, which, however, exhausted the last forces of the Ottoman Empire and accelerated its defeat by the Entente forces (England). After the establishment of Kemalist power in Ankara, the Young Turks persuaded Mustafa Kemal to support the independence of the Caucasian republics, linking their pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic plans to this. The British saw the independence of the Caucasus as an opportunity to create a cordon sanitaire between Soviet Russia and new Turkey. However, neither the Entente nor the Young Turks managed to create a barrier between Moscow and Ankara.

E. Tellal devoted his report to the topic "The influence of religion on Turkish-Russian relations (1992-2006)". Referring to the situation of religion in Turkey, he recalled the choice of a secular regime by the Kemalist authorities. The return of religion to politics began in the 1950s, and the military coup of 1980 was followed by a "genuine leap of religion into politics." In the 1990s, fundamentalist Islam was declared a "national security threat", and in late 2002, "moderate Islam"took over political power. Assessing the impact of religion on relations between Turkey and Russia, the speaker noted that if in the 1990s there were still a number of related problems, they were eliminated in the future. Of interest is the question raised by E. Tellal about the activities of the fundamentalist fossils. Gulen schools in former Soviet republics, including the Russian Federation. According to Turkish media reports, between 2001 and 2006, 16 such schools were closed in Russia, and 50 teachers who worked there were accused of espionage and expelled from Russia. And in Turkey itself, the Turkish expert noted, F. Gulen and his "Cemaat nurcu" are a subject of acute concern. This issue may become a topic of cooperation between Turkey and the Russian Federation.
A. R. Nabieva (Kazan) in her report "The clash of Interests of Russia and Turkey in the post-Soviet space" argued that relations between the two states were and continue to be in a phase of"chronic rivalry". The author highlights such aspects as the Chechen problem, the Karabakh and Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts, and the interests of the parties in Azerbaijan. She believes that there is still euphoria in Turkey about the transformation of the former Central Asian republics of the USSR into a zone of its influence. The bone of contention remains the activity of cultural and educational institutions in the territory of the Russian Federation, initiated by the Turkish religious figure F. Gulen, the leader of the Nurdjist sect. Finally, the interests of Russia and Turkey overlap in the energy sector - the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline project was implemented to the detriment of Russian economic interests.

Yu. A. Li in the report "Interpretation of the problem of cultural community of Turkic-speaking peoples in the works of Turkish and Turkic researchers" showed that after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the proclamation of sovereignty by the Turkic-speaking republics of Central Asia and Transcaucasia-

page 151

Mutual interest in the common cultural heritage in Turkey and the new Turkic states has sharply increased. As a result of joint efforts, in 2002 the two - volume work "Literature of the Turkic World" ("Turk Diinyasi Edebiyati") was published-the first experience of creating a manual for studying the literary process of the Turkic-speaking peoples.

[S. M. Mikhailova] devoted her speech to the history of Kazan University, evaluating it as an outpost of Russian science in the East. It was created far from the European nests of scholarship, from the dense guardianship of the power structures of the Russian Empire. Genetically, from the first years of its existence, it was associated with the Moscow University. The author suggests that the specific and unique mission of Kazan University should be taken into account in connection with the dynamics of relations between the central government and the Muslims of Russia. The policy of concessions and maneuvering in relations with the Russian Islamic world, i.e. the cultural world of the East, was explained not only by socio-political tensions in the Volga and Ural regions, but also by the tasks of developing Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Russia's ties with the Ottoman Empire were an important factor. The peculiarity of the geographical and geopolitical position of Kazan was determined by the government's course on the formation of the Eastern category at Kazan University. In the second quarter of the century, it became the largest center for the study of Eastern cultures, languages and history. Structurally, the category in this period included the departments of Mongolian, Turkish-Tatar, Armenian, and Sanskrit. Graduates of Kazan University, students of I. I. Halfin, M. H. Fren, A. K. Kazem-Bek, I. N. Berezin, O. M. Kovalevsky, M. G. Makhmudov worked in the capital's universities, in the Lazarevsky and Vostochny Institutes and other scientific and educational institutions. The Society of Archeology, History and Ethnography, which in 1898-1914 was headed by the outstanding orientalist N. F. Katanov, was distinguished for its research, educational and social activity. For half a century of its activity, the society has published 34 volumes of Izvestia, containing approximately one thousand publications. Now the Kazan State University has recreated an Oriental Studies Center - both educational and scientific.

J. Bibina presented the report "European Prospects of Russia and Turkey". She recalled that Turkey's path to European integration began back in the 1960s, when the Ankara Association Agreement with the EEC was signed. Since 1999, Turkey has been officially considered a candidate country, and today it is closer to the cherished goal than ever before. At the same time, never since the beginning of EU enlargement has a single candidate caused such fierce disputes, and never before has the EU leadership made it clear that a successful end to negotiations is far from guaranteed. Doubts and objections are mainly reduced to the fact that Turkey is an Islamic country, whose culture is alien to the European one. The demographic factor is also frightening, both in the European center and in the periphery, especially in the Balkan region. Thus, the population of Bulgaria in the future will decrease from 7.7 million. In 2005, the population of Greece is expected to decrease by a little more than 5 million in 2050, while the share of the population of Turkey in the united Europe will reach almost 20% by 2050. At the same time, supporters of Turkish integration see the annexation of the country westernized by Ataturk as an opportunity to overcome the split between the Christian and Muslim world. Economic analysis shows another important aspect - the growing role of Turkey as a transport corridor between East and West (meaning the delivery of Caspian oil and natural gas to Europe).

As for Turkey itself, there are increasing phenomena that distance it from European values and way of life. This is primarily due to the growing influence of Islam, which seeks to impose its norms of life on the entire society and acquire more "visible and invisible power", to get out of the sphere of purely personal choice. It is symptomatic that the leadership of the Turkish army, represented by Chief of the General Staff I. Bashbug, publicly declared the danger of fundamentalism in Turkey.

The report of M. Perincek (Ankara) "Political and military cooperation between Turkey and Soviet Russia in Transcaucasia in 1920-1921" described in detail the events related to the beginning of this period, noted the vital role of Soviet military assistance for Turkey, as well as the political support provided by Moscow to the Kemalists, which led to the conclusion of the Treaty on the Caucasus. 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty.

B. M. Potskhveria's report "The USSR and Turkey during World War II" examined the USSR's attitude to Turkey's neutralist policy, discussions between the two countries, including with the participation of Britain and the United States, on various issues, in particular, the need for Turkey to enter the war, the regime of the Black Sea Straits, the Soviet Union and the United States. requirements-

page 152

its changes, etc. Bilateral relations were complicated, and mutual distrust persisted, especially during the last stage of the war.

E. I. Urazova in her report "Topical issues of Russian-Turkish regional economic cooperation" noted that if in the 1990s the policy of the two states was characterized by inconsistency, divergence of directions, which generated friction, then from the beginning of the XXI century pragmatism begins to prevail, a tendency to converge and coordinate positions on regional problems and bilateral economic cooperation. An important step was the adoption by the parties in November 2001 of the joint "Action Plan for the development of Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey in Eurasia".

B. M. Yagudin devoted his speech to the analysis of political, economic and cultural relations between Tatarstan and Turkey at the turn of the XX and XXI centuries. In 1995, an agreement was signed between the Government of the Republic of Tatarstan and the Government of the Republic of Turkey on trade, economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation, as well as a number of other bilateral acts were adopted. In addition to common Turkic unity, linguistic and cultural commonality, there were also purely pragmatic considerations related to the strengthening of Turkish economic potential to establish close ties. Relations between Turkey and Tatarstan have been particularly active since 2001. They are characterized by realism in the approaches of both sides, focusing on the implementation of specific projects. At the same time, the potential of cooperation is clearly underutilized, especially in the field of culture, science and education.

Young researchers from Moscow - A. I. Gadzhaev ("Investment Cooperation between Russia and Turkey") and Kiev - S. V. Netesa ("Relations between representatives of Islamic peoples in Ukraine and Muslim regions of Russia") also made presentations on modern issues.

The reports of L. G. Sibgatulina from the Department of History of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences "Nakshibendi Tekke in Istanbul: the Central Asian "trace" " and A. V. Boldyrev from the Department of BSV countries "The problem of the Black Sea Straits in Russian-Turkish relations in the late XIX-early XX centuries" were devoted to separate historical subjects. Having traced them from the beginning of the 15th century to the beginning of the 20th century, A.V. Boldyrev noted the well-known dualism in relations between Russia and Turkey over the Straits, associated with the desire to gain privileges in their use and deny them to countries that are not adjacent to the Black Sea. The section also included a report by E. Y. Borkovskaya (Russian Academy of Civil Service) "Islam and the Russian experience of state-building (socio-legal aspects of policy towards Muslim peoples in the pre-Soviet period". Having traced the discriminatory policy of autocratic Russia in relation to Muslim peoples and other "foreigners", E. Y. Barkovskaya noted that certain changes in it were outlined only at the beginning of the XX century, when the tsarist government adopted the first legislative acts, according to which a number of aspects of the belittled status of minorities were eliminated. Civil equality was declared only after 1917, when the Provisional Government adopted a decree "On the abolition of religious and national restrictions".

The section" Russia-Iran " presented 10 reports prepared mainly by employees of the Iran sector of the BSV Department, and their discussion took place, in which M. Sanai, A. Arafi (Rector of the International Islamic University, Tehran), M. Imanipour (Head of the Cultural Representation at the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Russian Federation)took an active part, along with others A. Montazeran (Adviser on Politics and International Relations at the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Russian Federation).

L. M. Kulagina reviewed the historical stages of relations between Iran and Russia, dating back more than 450 years. The Turkmanchay Treaty of 1828 put an end to the Russo-Iranian wars, defined the borders between the two countries, and promoted the establishment of friendly and peaceful relations between Russia and Iran. Trade and economic relations played an important role in the development of Russian-Iranian relations. By the beginning of the 20th century, Russia accounted for 50% of Iran's imports and 70% of its exports. Russia's economic penetration into Iran, which resulted in the construction of roads, telegraphs, ports, banks, commercial and industrial enterprises, helped develop the northern and eastern provinces of Iran bordering Russia. Russian-Iranian relations were strained during the Constitutional Movement, which threatened Russia's influence and position in Iran. In 1911, the Tsarist troops entered Iran and brutally attacked it.

page 153

they have dealt with the revolutionary movement. In 1914, during the First World War, Iran was occupied by foreign troops. After the October Revolution, the Soviet government annulled the unequal treaties and agreements concluded by Russia with Iran, refused concessions and wrote off all Iran's debts to the tsarist government. From now on, we can count down to the latest stage of interaction between the two states.

Sergey Druzhilovsky (MGIMO) in his report "Evolution of the Islamic model of development in Iran and prospects for the development of Russian-Iranian relations "noted that the model of development of Iran has constantly evolved and adapted to the changing situation in the country and the world. However, just as these changes cannot be denied, they cannot be considered as an attempt at secularization associated with the weakening of the position of the Iranian clergy. Today, as at the dawn of the "Islamic revolution", all major socio-political and economic processes and changes in Iran are still controlled and initiated by the Shiite clergy in power. According to the author of the report, the country's systemic reforms are initiated by the highest Shiite clergy themselves. By delegating its authority to loyal secular elements, it reserves the highest control functions.

The analysis carried out allowed S. B. Druzhilovsky to draw several conclusions concerning the development of Russia's foreign policy towards Iran. The collapse of the Islamic regime is unlikely in the foreseeable future. The progressive development of Iran and the internal cohesion of its population do not give a chance for a violent overthrow of the regime. The failure of the Israeli operation in Lebanon, the unfavorable development of the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq as a result of their military operations for the US foreign policy do not speak in favor of repeating similar scenarios in relation to Iran. Russia's relations with Iran should be put on a long-term basis, regardless of the position of the Americans. Tehran itself has long and constantly declared its desire to bring the development of relations with Moscow to a strategic level. There are a number of political and economic projects that could strengthen Russian-Iranian cooperation. This is the prospect of Iran's full participation in the SCO, and possibly in the CSTO, as well as joint transport corridors, energy and scientific and technical projects. The creation of a joint gas consortium would allow controlling about half of the world's gas market. According to the speaker, it would be necessary to stop "demonizing" Iran, since it (with or without its nuclear program) does not pose a serious threat to Russia, and full-scale cooperation with it could help it solve many problems.

V. I. Sazhin (Voice of Russia Radio) in his report "Russia's position on resolving the Iranian nuclear program" stated that Iran formally fulfills the requirements of the NPT. Numerous IAEA reports on Iran's nuclear program do not contain direct evidence of the presence of a military component in Iran's nuclear program. Nor can there be any, since the current level of development of Iranian nuclear technologies, primarily in the field of uranium enrichment, has not yet reached the point where it can be argued that a "critical" stage in the enrichment process has arrived - "dual-use" technologies have appeared. According to the speaker, this is still a long way off. But the truth is that when that happens, it will be too late: the Iranian atomic bomb is only a few weeks away. At the same time, there is indirect evidence of Iran's desire to develop nuclear weapons. The Iranians claim that they need a full nuclear cycle to establish their own independence in the field of peaceful nuclear energy. But, according to V. I. Sazhin, Tehran is deceitful, as it lacks a raw material base. At the same time, Iran's uranium ore reserves are quite sufficient for the production of nuclear weapons. Creating your own complete nuclear fuel cycle infrastructure is generally a waste of money, if you do not take into account the military component.
Therefore, the question naturally arises: why does Iran seek its own production of enriched uranium? Another question: why did Iran need 44 special detonators, the attempt to illegally export them from Germany by two Iranians was prevented by the German special services at the end of 2002? And finally, why would he need ballistic missiles with a range of more than a thousand kilometers, because they are effective only in the presence of nuclear warheads? These questions raise serious doubts about the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program and allow us to agree with those who claim that Iran wants a nuclear deal.-

page 154

to obtain nuclear weapons or, in any case, to create an infrastructure for their production, and at any time necessary for Tehran.

Speaking on the topic "Russian national interests and Iran's nuclear program", Vladimir Sotnikov stressed that Russia is interested in cooperation with Iran. As for the Iranian nuclear program, the scope of Russian involvement in it is clearly outlined. Russia continues mutually beneficial cooperation with Iran in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy-the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant on the basis of strict compliance with all its obligations on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the IAEA. In February 2005, Iran and the Russian Federation signed an agreement on the export of reprocessed irradiated nuclear fuel from the Bushehr nuclear power plant to Russia, which fully corresponds to both Russia's interests in preventing the use of peaceful nuclear energy enterprises for developing nuclear weapons near the borders of the Russian Federation, and its international obligations in this regard. The appearance of nuclear weapons in Iran, according to the speaker, contradicts the national interests of Russia in connection with the threat of the emergence on its southern flank of the so - called Islamic nuclear belt, consisting of a tandem of two nuclear states-Pakistan and Iran, with the possible involvement of Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Under certain conditions, this belt may eventually become part of an even larger "nuclear arc of instability" stretching from de facto nuclear Israel to nuclear-tested North Korea.

According to V. I. Sotnikov, the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution containing so-called soft sanctions against Iran, namely a ban on the supply of high technologies to Iran, including in the nuclear field, freezing of Iranian holdings in international financial institutions, etc., meets Russian interests. In addition, the continuation of constructive diplomatic negotiations would correspond to the interests of the Russian Federation between the " six " states and the Islamic Republic of Iran on stopping Tehran's uranium enrichment in exchange for guarantees from these states on non-aggression against Iran and on supplying it with the necessary technologies for the oil and gas industry.

Speaking in the debate on the reports, A. Montazeran outlined Iran's official point of view on the nuclear issue. He noted that IAEA inspections are carried out regularly and, although Iran has not signed the so-called additional protocol, Iran does not refuse international inspections in practice. At the same time, none of them found anything that would indicate the development of nuclear weapons.

A. I. Polishchuk in his report "Problems and prospects of implementing the concept of' Dialogue of Civilizations ' "focused on the need for Russia, which is objectively a bridge between Europe and Asia, to pay more attention to the Islamic world. In his opinion, this will contribute to the destruction of the unipolar world order. Russian-Iranian relations are based on various factors, among which the most important is economic.

G. P. Avdeev (VU MO) devoted his speech to inter-parliamentary relations between Russia and Iran. He stressed that over the past 10 years, they have reached a high level and are an indicator of the growing mutual interests of the two countries. To a large extent, thanks to the efforts of the highest legislative bodies, Russia and Iran were able to find stability in their relations and find optimal solutions to complex problems in a contradictory international environment. These ties were formed during difficult periods of reforming state power structures for both countries. In a difficult situation for Russia, Iran has become a political partner in deterring Sunni radical groups, primarily in the North Caucasus, in resolving the issue of communication links between Armenia and the outside world, in the peaceful settlement in Tajikistan and in the fight against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

E. V. Dunaeva in her report "Interests of Russia and Iran in the Caspian region" noted that the special interest shown today in the world to this region is explained both by the presence of significant hydrocarbon reserves, and by the peculiarities of its geographical location - a bridge between Europe and Asia, a crossroads of emerging international transport communications "North-South" and "North-South".West-East" and the dividing lines of the spheres of influence of the three world religions. The region is important for ensuring Russia's geopolitical interests in the Caucasus, Central and South Asia, and has huge potential for expanding and consolidating its economic and strategic positions. The Caspian region is also strategically important for Iran in terms of protecting its political interests-

page 155

In the region, there are many advantages associated with strengthening its influence, maintaining security, fighting separatism, drug trafficking, and ensuring economic benefits from expanding sales markets, transit of hydrocarbons, goods, and passenger flows.

In order to effectively solve economic problems, Iran and Russia are interested in the political stability of the region. Today, the Caspian region is not so much an object of cooperation between littoral states as an object of diplomatic strife and confrontation. Some American analysts predict that by 2015 the Caspian Sea will become one of the most unstable regions in the world. Russia, taking into account the possible appearance of military forces of non-Caspian states in the Caspian Sea in 2005, took the initiative to create a Caspian security system-CASFOR. Given the dominance of the Russian navy in the Caspian Sea, this initiative did not receive much response. A number of experts link the possibility of creating such a grouping with success in resolving all legal issues of the status of the Caspian Sea. Since this initiative of the Russian Federation is aimed at countering the penetration of third forces into the region, it may be attractive for Iran. It is possible that Tehran's consent to participate in this project, albeit on a limited scale, will help conclude an agreement on the legal status of the Caspian Sea.

In her report "The American Factor in Relations between Russia and Iran", Irina Fyodorova focused, in particular, on the views of American political scientists on the development of US-Iranian relations, primarily on their ideas about various options for changing the regime that is unfriendly to the United States in Iran-from a tough large-scale military operation or limited strikes on alleged nuclear facilities Iran before the gradual erosion of the regime from within. Russia's actions, according to the author of the report, may consist in efforts to exclude military options for resolving crisis situations around the Iranian nuclear program and further strengthen the role of international organizations (the UN, the UN Security Council and the IAEA) in this regard.

I. R. Gibadullin in his report "Shiite organizations of Russia and Iran" examined the social base of the emergence and activity of Shiite organizations in Russia. They include people from Azerbaijan who temporarily or permanently reside in Russia. Throughout the 1990s, Shiite communities in Russian cities were formed quite spontaneously. Most of them have not received any organizational formalization, remaining under the jurisdiction of Azerbaijani national cultural centers and local societies. The emergence of Shiite religious communities on the territory of the Russian Federation and the activation of their activities are associated not only with migration processes, but also with the popularity of Shiism among new Muslim converts in Russia. According to Interfax, 90% of Russian Muslims living in Moscow are Shiites, while in the country Shiites make up, according to estimates, about 3% of the total number of Muslims. The number of Shiite Russians is growing, and there is already a definite tendency for them to occupy an intellectual niche in the leadership of the Shiite community in Russia. According to the speaker, the growing Shiite community in Russia is a conduit for Iranian influence in society and the political establishment. Therefore, the state needs to learn how to use the "Shiite factor" for its own benefit, for which it should abandon the usual Sunni-centered stereotypes in relations with Russian Muslims and take measures to integrate Shiites into the Russian Ummah as fully as possible on the basis of traditional Muslim institutions for Russia.

The reports of the third day of the conference were presented in three sections: "Russia and Kurdistan", "Russia and Pakistan", "Russia and Afghanistan".

At the first section (head - O. I. Zhigalina) 9 reports were heard.

Speaking on "Stages in the development of relations between Russia and Kurdistan", O. I. Zhigalina (Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences) came to the conclusion that both under tsarism and under the Soviet regime, Russia always sought to be on friendly terms with the Kurds, using the Kurdish national movement for its foreign policy purposes. Soviet Russia needed this mainly to ensure the security of the Transcaucasian border and to influence Turkey and Iran, especially during periods of exacerbation of regional conflicts. Although after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation lost its common border with ethnic Kurdistan, relations between the Russian Federation and foreign Kurds are still important. They should be based on a mutual desire for peace in the region and broad cultural and scientific cooperation.

page 156

Developing this topic, M. S. Lazarev stressed that the interest in studying the history, culture, customs, way of life, and political situation of Kurdistan has never waned in Russia. Back in the 19th century, many interesting works about Kurds and Kurdistan appeared in Russia, written by scientists and diplomats. In the second half of the century, the Russian Academy of Sciences became the organizing center for studying the history, ethnography, language and literature of the Kurdish people. Scientists of modern Russia conduct comprehensive research on Kurdish history, the social organization of the Kurdish community, literary monuments, etc.

Konstantin Vertyaev in his report "The Kurdish issue in modern Russian-Turkish relations" expressed the opinion that the Russian Federation does not attach due importance to the problem of Kurds in Turkey, considering it an internal matter of the neighboring state. Meanwhile, as Turkey becomes one of the most important economic and political partners of Russia, an idea is being formed about the constructive cooperation of the parties in this matter. In the light of the changes taking place in the Middle East, the prospects for resolving the situation both in Turkish Kurdistan and in the adjacent parts of the Kurdish ethnic area are outlined.

N. Z. Mosaki in his report "Russia and the Iraqi Kurds" also stated that the Kurdish problem continues to occupy a peripheral place in Russian foreign policy, which, in his opinion, causes a negative reaction of the Iraqi Kurds, who allow themselves to sharply criticize Russia's position. At the same time, the role of Iraqi Kurdistan as the political center of the Kurdish ethnic area of West Asia does not leave indifferent the Russian official circles, which decided to open the Consulate General of the Russian Federation in Erbil. This indicates Moscow's desire to play a more active role in Iraqi politics and increase attention to the development of Kurdish regions.

Armenian researcher A. E. Harutyunyan in his report "The Kurdish problem as a destabilizing factor in Turkish-Syrian relations" noted that in the 1990s, the Kurdish factor was the reason for the complication of relations between Ankara and Damascus. Syria used it for the purpose of political pressure on Turkey, and the latter condemned the Syrian authorities for supporting the activities of the Kurdistan Workers ' Party (PKK). However, the situation began to change gradually at the end of the decade: there was a convergence of Turkish-Syrian positions on a number of international issues, including the Kurdish one. Turkey and Syria, according to the expert, remain united in one thing - to prevent the creation of an independent Kurdish state on the territory of Iraq.

Conference guest Dler Hamad in his report "The creation of the Ansar al-Islam group in Iraq and its ideological connection with the Al-Qaeda organization "analyzed the process of the emergence of the Islamic movement in Kurdistan and the formation of an extremist current within it. He stressed that the leadership of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has declared war on the latter. Most of the Islamists were destroyed. However, the surviving warlords created a kind of regional branch of al-Qaeda in Kurdistan-the Jund al-Islam group ("Soldiers of Islam"). The speaker also described the activities of some other radical Islamist organizations operating in the Kurdistan region, which do not consider the existence of democracy, freedom of conscience, political pluralism and other achievements of modern society possible. Speaking under Islamic slogans, they use terrorist methods to create an Islamic state by force, in accordance with medieval Muslim ideas about the state.

G. I. Starchenkov in his report "The problem of tolerance in modern Islam" noted that radical Islamism is a manifestation of intolerance to other forms of socio-political structure of society. At the same time, he emphasized the religious tolerance of the Kurds. The majority of Kurds belonging to Sunni Muslims does not prevent the regional government of the Kurdish Autonomous Region (KAR) of Iraq from declaring freedom of conscience and recording this principle in fundamental documents.

N. Ramadan delivered a report on the constitutional structure in the Republic of Iraq. Having briefly analyzed the first draft of the "Basic Law of the Federal Kurdistan Vilayet", prepared back in the 1970s by the leader of the Kurdish national Movement, Molla Mustafa Barzani, N. Ramadan then described the draft constitution of the Kurdistan region, some provisions of which were first included in the Temporary and then Permanent Constitution of Iraq. He himself participated in the preparation of both the draft Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the draft Constitution of Iraq. The second draft of the Kurdish constitution was adopted by a special commission on November 7, 2002. Then work on it continued. As a result, the tre was developed-

page 157

This project consists of an Introduction and 8 chapters, with 160 articles. The expert stressed that the experience of many Asian and European countries was used in the development of the project. In contentious cases, priority is given to the laws set out in the QAR Constitution, rather than the laws of the Permanent Constitution of Iraq. The KAR Constitution legalizes the use of the Kurdish flag, coat of arms, national anthem, the existence of the people's army-Peshmerga, the equal use of two languages-Kurdish and Arabic, and lists national holidays. All this, according to the speaker, is the creation of prerequisites for the formation of Kurdish statehood.

Academician of the National Academy of Sciences of Armenia, member of the Institute of Internal Affairs of the Russian Academy of Sciences [Sh.Kh. Mgoi] emphasized in his report "Statehood formation in South Kurdistan" the importance of the important achievements of the Iraqi Kurds that became possible after the overthrow of the dictatorial regime of S. Hussein. In his opinion, the creation of prerequisites for the formation of a Kurdish independent state is hindered by the activities of radical groups, the resistance of regional powers to the development of the Kurdish independence process, and the passive political position of Russia does not contribute to it. The Kurdish issue cannot be resolved by force. This is possible only through the search for a compromise, taking into account the interests of peoples and national states.

At the section "Russia and Pakistan" (head - S. N. Kamenev), 12 people made reports and presentations. V. N. Moskalenko in the report "Russian-Pakistani relations and Islam: problems and prospects" showed that if at a certain stage not so much Islam itself, but the ideology of radical Islamic solidarity served as a basis for the development of the country's relations with Pakistan. As a result of the fact that it was a factor that complicated the development of bilateral relations, today this kind of impact is essentially absent. This was primarily due to the normalization of the situation in Chechnya, the weakening of the position of Islamic extremism in the Central Asian republics, and, of course, the policy of the current leadership of Pakistan on the issue of terrorism under the flag of Islam. Vladimir Moskalenko stressed that the new situation opens up great opportunities for expanding contacts between the two countries in various fields, including security and the fight against extremism.

S. N. Kamenev's report "Development of Russian-Pakistani economic relations" noted their evolution after the visit of Pakistani President P. Musharraf to Russia in March 2003. The bilateral trade turnover increased from $ 83 million in 2003 to almost $ 400 million in 2006. Pakistan is developing ties with Russia in the gas sector, primarily with Gazprom. Both sides note real opportunities for cooperation in the field of irrigation and land reclamation, as well as in the metallurgical sector. With the help of the USSR, the largest metallurgical plant in Pakistan was built. There are examples of the beginning of cooperation in the field of space research. The Pakistani side always raises the question of establishing military-technical cooperation, to which Moscow has not yet given an answer.

Dmitry Ganich highlighted the issues of practical bilateral cooperation since 2003. He noted that over the past three years, high-level contacts have become more frequent, and consultations between representatives of the foreign ministries of the two countries have become regular. Delegations of the State Duma and the Federation Council of the Russian Federation visited Pakistan. All this, as well as progress in trade and economic relations, allowed the author to claim that a new stage in cooperation is beginning.

In her report "Military-technical Cooperation between Russia and Pakistan", Maria Morozova stressed that Russian military equipment can be delivered to Pakistan through third countries almost without hindrance. This was the case, for example, with the supply of Ukrainian T-80UD tanks, 80% consisting of Russian components, as well as with Chinese FC-1 fighters equipped with Russian engines assembled in St. Petersburg. The question of direct access of the Russian military-industrial complex to the Pakistani market is still open. But there is a lot of evidence that this problem will be solved soon enough. At the same time, the Indian factor will not be an obstacle, especially since India has already opened its arms market to the United States, which continues to be Pakistan's main partners in the field of military-technical cooperation.

In her report "Russia-Pakistan: the potential of scientific, technical, educational and cultural cooperation", I. N. Serenko showed that this potential was almost not used for a long time in the relations between the two states. Now it's time to activate it. In particular, it is possible to create a Russian-Pakistani analytical center to conduct comprehensive scientific research, in order to expand contacts in the field of science,

page 158

culture, education, tourism and sports attract governmental and non-governmental organizations and associations.

R. M. Mukimdzhanova's report "Interaction between Russia and the Central Asian States in ensuring regional security" considered issues of cooperation between Russia and the Central Asian states, taking into account the situation that the presence of military forces of the United States and a number of other Western countries, as well as India, gives it in the region.

Sarfraz Khan (Pakistan) presented a report entitled "Various ideological trends in Islam: a comparative analysis" and analyzed the views of representatives of extreme and moderate Islamic trends in Pakistan and other countries, primarily Arab ones. The report touched upon the issue of Jadidism and the contribution of Russian Muslims to the reform of Islam. The scientist emphasized the wide spread of moderate and constructive sentiments among representatives of the Muslim community in Pakistan.

Mikhail Krysin (Penza) made a report on the recent history of the Indo-Pakistani conflict in 1965 and the role of the Soviet Union in its settlement. Highlighting in detail the factual side of the issue, the speaker stressed that Pakistan, in his opinion, agreed to the mediation of Moscow, which was clearly more favorable to India, hoping to expand its economic and military cooperation with the USSR in the future.

N. V. Melekhina (Moscow State Institute of International Relations) and P. V. Topychkanov(Carnegie Moscow Center) also delivered a report on "Russia's Position on the Kashmir issue". "Party-political reaction in Pakistan to the development of relations with Russia at the beginning of the XXI century" and P. V. Bronnikov (MGIMO (U) MFA) "The Islamic Factor in Bangladesh".

The section "Russia and Afghanistan" (head - V. G. Korgun) presented 10 reports.

V. G. Korgun, in his report "General assessment of Russian-Afghan relations at the present stage", emphasized the complex nature of the internal political situation in Afghanistan, the activation of forces opposed to the current government of H. Karzai, and the revival of militant detachments of the Taliban movement overthrown in 2001. At the same time, the speaker noted, the country continues to work on economic recovery, infrastructure development, primarily road and air links. Under these circumstances, Russia provides significant support to Afghanistan, and it acts independently, although it coordinates its assistance with participants in international programs. Thus, at the last conference on assistance to the economic revival of Afghanistan (London, January-February 2006), Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that from 2002 to 2005, Afghanistan received extensive bilateral assistance, including humanitarian aid in the amount of $ 30 million and supplies to the Afghan national army in the territory of Afghanistan. V. G. Korgun noted that Russia can expand its participation in various projects of economic development of Afghanistan in the future. Significantly, it has announced its intention to consider canceling Kabul's estimated $ 10 billion debt.

M. R. Arunova in the report "Russia's first contacts with Afghanistan" stressed that they, according to some information, began earlier than was generally believed - in the middle of the XVII century. R. R. Sikoev also touched upon this topic, noting that the first reliably known, but, however, unsuccessful attempt to establish official contacts was the direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. to Afghanistan in 1764 on the instructions of Catherine II army captain B. Aslanov. The speaker stressed that Russia has shown great interest in developing contacts with Afghanistan at all historical stages. The prospects for Russian-Afghan relations also seem promising to him : without Russia, Afghanistan is unlikely to be able to solve its problems, and its readiness to help this will increase as its economic position in Central Asia strengthens.

Yu. N. Panichkin (Ryazan) reviewed the history of the diplomatic struggle between the Russian and British empires in the Middle East in the first half of the 19th century. He noted that the initiative in establishing official contacts then belonged to the Afghan side. In 1836, the first representative of the Emir of Kabul arrived in St. Petersburg, who on his behalf appealed to Russia with a request for help against the actions of hostile forces that enjoy the support of England.

Yu. P. Laletin (MGIMO) presented the report "Relations between Russia and Afghanistan in the context of the Afghan political tradition". A. L. Bahand (Embassy of Afghanistan in the Russian Federation) presented the report "From the history of Russian-Afghan relations in the XVIII-XIX centuries". Yu. N. Tikhonov

page 159

(Lipetsk) read the well-documented report "The events of 1924 in Khost and the position of the Great Powers".

In his report "Russian-Afghan Economic Cooperation", U. Akimbekov (PhD student of the Institute of Political Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences) identified a number of areas and projects of Afghanistan's economic recovery in which Russian participation would be most productive. These include, first of all, the construction of power transmission lines that will allow energy to be supplied to the country from Tajikistan, where the construction of new hydroelectric power plants has begun with Russian help.

H. In his speech on the impact of the situation in Afghanistan on the neighboring countries of Central Asia, Khashimbekov noted that the normalization of the situation in Afghanistan will remove the pressure of tension from the young states of the region that have embarked on the path of confident economic growth. The anti-terrorist activities of organizations such as the CSTO and the SCO are of great importance for improving the situation in the region. An important task remains the fight against drug smuggling, the center of production of raw materials for which remains Afghanistan.

The results of the conference were summed up at the final session. Speaking about some general results, V. Ya. Belokrenitsky noted that a total of 76 reports and presentations were heard at the conference. The main part of them was devoted to the topic "Russia and the Islamic world" in its historical and modern refraction. The Conference highlighted the need to further study the prospects for developing ties and contacts between Russia and the belt of Muslim countries and regions located south of the CIS borders, on the threshold of "Greater Russia".

Permanent link to this publication: