Moscow: IV RAS Publ., 2015, 905 p.

The historical experience of these relations plays a significant role in shaping the current stage of relations between countries. In the last few years, there have been clear changes in the structure of our relations with Turkey and with European countries. The study of past events that have become significant for certain historical periods is of great interest from a scientific, historical and practical point of view. An attempt to analyze these relations from the European, Russian and Turkish sides is particularly relevant.

Nina M. MAMEDOVA-Candidate of Economic Sciences, Leading Researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, mamcdovan@mail.ru.

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A new major fundamental study of the famous medievalist S. F. Oreshkova is devoted to the problem of the emergence of the Eastern Question. The author believes that one of the key factors of this problem and its origin was the Nemirov Congress of 1737, which was poorly covered in the history of diplomatic relations, held during the Russo-Turkish war. The negotiations in Nemirov, mediated by some European countries, were one of the first attempts for both Russia and the Ottoman Empire to use European countries and diplomatic rules to resolve mutual contradictions. Each side hoped for European support, but the result of European intervention was that bilateral relations became an international Eastern issue, which allowed Europe to control its solution.

The monograph by S. F. Oreshkova is the first scientific work dedicated specifically to the Nemirov Congress. The paper compares the goals and objectives of each of the parties involved in the negotiations in an interesting way, and evaluates the results of their negotiations. This corresponds to a new direction in historical science, which tries to characterize the historical process from the standpoint of the mentality of each of the parties involved in foreign policy relations. The paper convincingly shows that Osterman's demands for Austria to fulfill its obligations under the 1726 treaty led to the Nemirov Congress as an attempt to obtain concessions from the Turkish side through diplomatic means. It was important for Russia to make a decent peace with the Ottomans. Austria needed a breather for another war. The Ottoman Empire, sufficiently exhausted by military operations with Persia, counted on the compliance of Russia and the support of Austria. But the congress did not bring the expected results, the war was not over. An attempt by Russia and the Ottoman Empire to conclude a treaty defining their borders without European participation failed. But the course of the Nemirov negotiations, the conflicts that emerged in his work, revealed the most vulnerable problems in Russia's relations with the Port and Europe.

Especially interesting is the material of the first chapter, which examines the issue of the Russian-Turkish territorial division in the south of Eastern Europe, Austria's claims to the lands of the Ottoman Empire, and Europe's desire to prevent the strengthening of Russia, which ultimately led to the emergence of the Eastern question. After Peter I, Russia began to feel like a European country, which worried Europe.

In this context, the author's interpretation of the reasons for Peter I's reorientation of his policy from north to south (Prut campaign) and the influence of European diplomacy on Russian-Turkish relations is noteworthy. Perhaps this influence can be explained by the policy of returning previously conquered territories to Iran in order to free up resources for opposing the Port. The author rightly believes that the Russo-Turkish war of 1735-1739 was untimely for Russia, it was unleashed not by the Ottoman Empire, but by the diplomacy of the Russian Vice-Chancellor A. I. Osterman, who misrepresented Russia's geopolitical tasks. One cannot but agree with the author that, although Osterman aspired to become one of the actors of European politics, he did not take into account the specifics of its relations with the Islamic world. It was Austria's position that caused the failure of the Nemirov Congress, but it did not renounce either the alliance with it or the continuation of the war with the Porte, although the results of the Belgorod Peace of 1739 could have been achieved already in Nemirov. In any case, the entire logic of the reports and letters selected and presented in the work, including those of the Empress Anna Ioannovna, strongly attests to this. In fact, during this period, Russia abandoned an independent policy in solving the problem of delineating the geopolitical space in the south, and these problems already in the XIX century led to the emergence of the Eastern question.

The Eastern question, as a collective problem of European international politics, later became a tool that allowed European countries to distract Russia from independently solving the problem of their southern borders and, of course, from possible influence on European affairs.

The so-called lyrical digressions concerning the characteristics of historical figures, their relationships, and descriptions of the work of specific performers of foreign policy in different countries are very interesting and informative for both historians and the general reader. Thus, the paper contains interesting information about the principles of formation of Ottoman diplomacy based on the doctrines of Islam, the peculiarities of Ottoman diplomatic practice in the first third of the XVIII century. In the 1730s, Ottoman foreign policy was actually determined by the Grand Wazir's assistant, Osman Khalifa, and candidates for all senior positions were represented by the head of the eunuchs, Haji Beshir agha. The fate of foreign policy often depended on the personal contacts of Osman Khalifa and his entourage.

Repeatedly, the author emphasizes that during the period under review, the diplomacy of the Ottoman Empire showed itself capable of rejecting the traditional view of the nature of interstate relations and taking into account the real balance of power in Europe, which is very important for the development of international relations.

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the Ottoman Empire's understanding of the problem of its territorial integrity. The work shows, and this is very important for understanding the history of Russian-Turkish relations, that even during the period of its active expansion, the Ottoman Empire tried not to interfere in the affairs of the north-eastern part of Europe, which is part of the zone of Russia's territorial interests. During this period, the common border of the two countries was not an inevitable cause for conflict.

It is convincingly shown that before and during the Nemirov Congress, Russian diplomats were influenced by European propaganda that exaggerated the degree of Turkey's disintegration. In Russia itself, this has led to an exaggeration of Russia's ability to expand its territories in the south, especially in the plans of Field Marshal Minich, who was appointed commander of the army in 1735 in the new war. Minich expected that Russian troops would occupy Constantinople as early as 1739 (p. 124). The origins of the Eastern issue are shown in the paper to a large extent as a diplomatic rather than a geopolitical problem, which allows us to take a fresh look at the nature of Russian-Turkish relations.

The work is particularly valuable and interesting because for the first time an unknown Turkish manuscript was used to analyze the position of the Ottoman Empire, which was found during the Vakhidov and Zakharov expedition to the Volga region in 1934 and which was actually rediscovered by S. F. Oreshkova in the Manuscripts Department of the Leningrad Branch of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR (now the Institute of Oriental Manuscripts of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Leningrad). Another almost unused source is the Ottoman chronicle Tarihi Subhi. Previously unknown publications of the Russian historian A. Kochubinsky have been introduced into scientific circulation.

Relying on these sources and a large body of domestic and foreign works dealing with the topic of the Nemirov Congress, the author managed to draw a three-dimensional picture of the complex relations between Russia, the Ottoman Empire and European countries in the first third of the XVIII century, the consequences of the failures of the Nemirov negotiations. The author comes to the conclusion that both the Russo-Turkish war of 1736-1739, which left an insignificant mark on European history, and the vague, intermediate non-World negotiations nevertheless predetermined the further development of Russian-Turkish relations for almost a century and a half. They showed the complexity of relations with the eastern country and the need to take into account the peculiarities of the mentality of its population. They also showed the different influence of the European component on Russian foreign policy, as well as the need to take into account the Russian position when forming an effective pan-European policy. And one cannot disagree with these.

For historians, of course, applications to the work are of great interest. First, it is the text of the Russo-Turkish treaty of 1739 and comments to its article 9 on granting Russian merchants the opportunity to enjoy the rights granted to merchants of other nations. Second, the capitulations, or tracts, between the Ottoman Porte and France of 1740. It was the text of this document that was used to develop the first Russian-Ottoman capitulation in 1780. But the very adoption of the agreement of 1740 was the result of the Russo-Turkish war of 1735-1739, one of the most significant episodes of which was the Nemirov Congress of 1737.

S. F. Oreshkova's monograph will be of interest not only to specialists, but also to anyone interested in issues of history, international relations, and little-studied problems of the past that continue to directly or indirectly influence Russia's relations with its neighbors.

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