In the 1970s and 1980s, as a result of the energy crisis and related changes, non - military aspects of security policy became relevant. The consequences of these transformations and other factors on the bipolar system were so large-scale that after two decades it ceased to exist. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the number of areas of responsibility and decision-making centers grew, because the United States could not bear the burden of financing security policy alone. Thus, the norms of international law in the field of ensuring global security, which were established during the Cold War, no longer reflect reality. As a result, regional security subsystems began to form.

Key words: Central Asia, security mechanisms, consequences of the collapse of the USSR.

By the end of bipolarity, it became obvious that securing local spaces - regions - is less expensive and more effective. The post-1991 world has gradually accelerated into a polycentric system of relations with decentralized security institutions. Officials openly acknowledge this as a fait accompli in international life. In particular, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation SV. "The regionalization of global politics speaks to the search for regional solutions to conflicts and crisis situations," Lavrov said. Strengthening the regional level of governance in conditions where global mechanisms fail serves as a kind of safety net in the event of the development of "deglobalization" processes, a guarantee that fragmentation will not go deeper, when each state will stand up for itself and against all others" (Lavrov, 2009).

Other processes took place in the post-bipolar world economy. With the full assistance of the United States, globalization trends began to gain strength, which were reinforced by the Washington Consensus2. In accordance with it, it was considered that the state should minimize its role in managing the economy. The international community is already feeling the consequences of implementing such a completely ill-conceived concept in connection with the global economic recession, which contributes to the regionalization of the world economy. Experts believe that, as at the beginning of the 20th century, the degree of integration has again exceeded the capabilities of its control systems, and now operators are forced to reduce the depth of integration, partially restoring manageability due to the primitivization of development forms. In other words, " there is a transition from globalization to regionalization: the formation of enlarged macroregions, leading to the development of the world economy."

1 For more information, see [Buzan and Weaver, 2003, p. 43-44].

2 A type of macroeconomic policy that a number of economists recommend for use in countries experiencing financial and economic crises. The term was coined in 1989 by the American economist John Williamson.

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There is a strong cultural, political, economic and technological competition between them "(Delyagin, 2009).

As a result, the institutional "fragmentation"of 3 security structures has not at all simplified the approach of subjects to the very concept of security, and therefore their attitude to it. In place of the common geopolitical space (the socialist bloc and the USSR), a number of other entities have emerged, tending to different centers.4 The intense impact of spontaneous transformations on established and emerging regions complicates the process of managing regional security institutions in the context of continuing centrifugal trends in the post-Soviet space and asymmetric actions of non-regional actors.

Inadequate perception and lack of understanding of the essence of cause-and-effect relationships in development processes on the part of the latter contribute to the intensification of these processes. The research of the post-Soviet expert community also lagged far behind the rapidly developing events that took place after 1991, and it was only in the second half of the 1990s that pioneering research on the theoretical and systemic foundations of regional security appeared in Russian science. However, despite this, there are still gaps in political science and regional studies that do not allow for a thorough study of this area.

When studying the mechanisms of formation of regional security in Central Asia, it is especially important to study the mechanisms of deterrence of inter-state wars in the region in the presence of major contradictions. How strong are these mechanisms?

Systemic foundations of modern regional transformations. The impulses affecting the security of Central Asia from the outside are inter-regional in nature. Its place and role in the new hierarchy are not defined, but it is gradually being drawn into various interregional and global processes. This, in turn, expands the scope for the intense impact on the security of this region of the transformations that are taking place in Europe, Asia or North America. The formation of new States in the region and the establishment of direct ties at the international level intensified interstate contacts over time and "brought together" the communities of these countries. New ties have also introduced negative elements, which have somewhat increased the level of contradictions in the region. More or less important processes that arise in distant and neighboring States, as well as the activities of non-State actors, such as new non-traditional international network structures-terrorist organizations-inevitably affect security.

To these threat factors are added those processes that are developing in the region itself (associative or dissociative regionalism, etc.). From this point of view, the region remains a poorly structured and unorganized entity, with little development of regional and interstate relations and relations. The structure of inter-State relations is dominated by political ones, which takes the non-military aspects of security, such as the economy, into the background. Central Asian states have to take a costly path and solve regional problems alone. The extensive structures of the European Union make it possible to solve security problems more quickly than, for example, the countries of the Middle East can. The security of any region of the world depends on the degree of its structuration or"regionality" 5.

Those managed transformations that do not take into account the long-term development perspective and negative aspects, eventually lead to a violation of the balance in the region.-

3 This means strengthening the role of regional structures.

4 For example, Central Asia (CA).

5 B. Hettneh and F. Soderbaum introduced the concept of "regionness", which implies the degree of regional ability to articulate the interests of an emerging region [Hettne, 2005, p. 543-571].

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and become destructive to the internal subsystem. The rapid development of the agricultural complex and the development of new land in the 1960s and 1970s, without taking into account all the consequences in the Soviet republics of Central Asia, led to the ecological degradation of the region in just a few decades. The anthropogenic factor has changed from a creative tool to a destructive one.

The nature of destructive phenomena is currently poorly understood from the point of view of their evolution. All that is known is that it is a complex of elements, factors, conditions, etc. that can potentially or realistically affect the security and stable functioning of the regional subsystem 6. The negative potential of destructive complexes develops in time and space. As applied to this topic, a destructive complex is a collective category that denotes a cluster of such concepts as" threat"," danger"," challenge "and"risk" 7 in their dynamics.

By their nature, destructive complexes are not random anti-system phenomena, but trends that have arisen as a result of the loss of the subsystem of its properties and functions. It is enough to change the regime to a more radical one in a particular state - and the first echoes of instability around it appear. Initially, certain regional subsystems that have lost their properties or functions create risks for the further development of subsystems, and over time they turn into dangerous and even threatening factors. Thus, the signal about the weakening of the political regime in Kyrgyzstan (2005) subsequently led not only to its change, but also to other political cataclysms in the region. Then the domino effect was suspended, the processes became latent, and their explosive potential was preserved.

The global financial crisis is intensifying destructive complexes in Central Asia 8. IMF experts predict that the CIS countries from all regions of the global economy will face the most difficult challenges in the short term. The reason is that their economies are suffering heavy losses as a result of financial shocks that have significantly reduced access to external financing, reduced demand from advanced economies and the associated drop in commodity prices, especially energy resources [Prospects for Development..., p. 86].

Systemic mechanisms of regional security. Depending on the internal organization, regional subsystems of international relations react differently to destructive complexes. Most often, they are eliminated or weakened. Adapting to the new conditions, the regional subsystem of international relations itself is transformed with the help of formal and informal institutions. When there is a constant threat of disruption of the balance in the regional subsystem, they strive to preserve it. The concept of "equilibrium" has many controversial definitions, the most adequate and exhaustive, in our opinion, is the definition of A.D. Vos-

6 Within the framework of the Russian project "Political Atlas of Our Time", which aims at a comprehensive comparative analysis of all 192 countries of the world, developing their multidimensional classification, and analyzing the dynamics of world politics structures, the authors developed an interesting rating of countries on the index of external and internal threats [http://worldpolities.org/].

7 Unfortunately, many experts, without any scientific or practical restrictions, point out the threatening or dangerous nature of a particular phenomenon in international relations. See the article by M. Gatsko [Gatsko, 1997].

8 The global crisis has affected Central Asian countries mainly through the fall in global commodity prices. Experts believe that " the high growth observed in the Central Asian countries in previous years (on average, the region showed growth of 8.8 % in 2003-2007) was not the result of a healthy physical increase, but of the value of exports and investment growth, and therefore proved to be unstable to fluctuations in the external market." A return to the state of socio-economic instability in the 1990s is fraught with the emergence of a new round of political instability in the Central Asian states [Ekonomicheskie strategii..., 2008].

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Kresensky, who believes that it "can be understood as the relative balance of selected variables (or factors) of the system operating within a given range over a certain period of time. Theoretically, variables can be constant in nature; in reality, they are in the process of constant evolutionary change, and because of this, the equilibrium can be considered not as "static", i.e. as a self-sufficient process of automatic compensating reactions to disturbances, which restores the initial state, but rather as a constant process of replacing the previous equilibrium with a new temporary equilibrium." [Voskresensky, 2000, p. 427].

Security mechanisms are the result of fruitful interaction of actors in the subsystem of international relations 9 and structure the system of regional security. They are based on the concept of international security, international security regimes and international security structures. Usually, states within such a regional subsystem coordinate and develop a system of views on mutual security in a given space. In fact, the state, as a social system, has one goal-to survive and develop, and the ways to achieve it are different. A mutually agreed concept of security is necessary for States to form common norms, principles, decision-making procedures and formats for long-term interaction in the future.

Currently, the most widely recognized 10 concepts covering such areas as collective defense, collective security, cooperative security; general/general security, human security, presenting models of response to destructive complexes [Shokhzoda, 2005]. Depending on their interests, subjects of international relations 11 prefer to choose and implement either one concept or several at the same time.

The persistence of the format and" survivability " of a concept depends on how consistent, predictable, trusting each other and how much it meets their interests. The security concept itself, by definition, is not a "road map" and regulates not the behavior of subjects, but general approaches. If the concept as a whole is accepted (sometimes under pressure) by its participants, they develop and agree on certain norms, response principles, and decision-making procedures within their community. In other words, they create international security regimes that are based on sets of mutual expectations, rules, plans, organizational and financial regulations (Petrovsky, 1998). International security regimes generally arise as a result of the coordination of goals, values and interests of various players, based on a unanimous decision-making procedure and concepts [Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 2004, p.57].

Security concepts involve to some extent the harmonization of axiological and target settings of participants in the field of security, and international regimes-their practical implementation. In order to maintain the functioning of the regimes, States create permanent inter-governmental organizations.-

9 In this case, we do not delve into the discussion of representatives of political realism and liberalism about the interaction of small and large actors and their interdependence in the international environment.

10 Russian expert V. N. Fedorov notes that since the end of the Cold War, there has been a feverish search for ways and means by which States can actively contribute to the revival and strengthening of the collective security system provided for in the UN Charter. There are a large number of theories, doctrines and concepts that have the main goal of adapting the general principles and provisions of the UN to the new trends and needs of the changed international situation at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries [Fedorov, 2005, p. 775].

11 States and international organizations.

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basic security structures. International security regimes are not static; variability is their weak point. Of particular importance are the informal 12 components of the security regime, which include traditional ethical or other norms in the Ministry of Defense, the violation of which is considered unacceptable or immoral from the point of view of religion, culture, etc.

International regional security systems (and organizations), as already noted, are volatile constructs, and under the influence of the external or internal environment, such systems can be reformed/reorganized or completely disbanded. A change in the concept occurs if the fundamental views and conditions of interaction of subjects (states) in the regional subsystem change 13.

State actors in the regional security system of Central Asia. To varying degrees, Russia, China, the United States, India, the EU, the Middle and Middle East, and South Asia are involved in the process of forming the concept and establishing regimes and structures in Central Asia. Building relations between non-regional actors and regional countries takes place in different formats and depends on their national interests and capabilities. At the same time, most effective security formats in Central Asia are based on bilateral relations with non-regional actors. The most active initiators and agents of regional transformation in the region are the Russian Federation, the United States, China, and the EU.

The Russian Federation continues to view the region as part of a single geopolitical space, the loss of influence in which can directly threaten its security. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's foreign policy towards its former republics was largely based on domestic policy. Despite the fact that all key documents of the Russian Federation note the inviolability of the provision on preserving the unity of the post-Soviet space, there is no long-term program containing clear deadlines, tools for implementing foreign policy, and so on in this direction. Unfortunately, even now it remains uncertain, inconsistent and uncoordinated at the level of interaction between various departments. It is no secret that "tough" (military) security is the imperative of Russia's relations with the region. At the same time, Central Asian states expect Russia to intensify the "non-military" aspects of security.

Unlike its competitors, Russia has more natural advantages in Central Asia (common history, common humanitarian and migration space, economic structure and ties), but it does not make much use of the existing opportunities for cooperation with the region. In part, Russia's position in the region is shaped by spontaneous circumstances. In some situations, it becomes a hostage to the inter-state contradictions of the countries of the region, randomly taking the position of one or the other side. In institutional terms, Russia is a relatively "advanced" entity, but its organizational products-the CIS, EurAsEC, and CSTO - are still operating at low capacity.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States, without certain strategic guidelines, looked at the region for quite a long time. Approaches used in foreign policy in the 1990s-2000s (for example, the Lake doctrine, the concept of "humanitarianism").-

12 The formalized institutions of regional security are permanent international forums, conferences, structures, etc. The history and theory of international organizations is quite widely studied and therefore is not included in the tasks of this study.

13 Thus, during the era of block confrontation, the countries of the Near and Middle East and non-regional actors signed the Baghdad Pact (1950s-1960s), which later turned into the SENTO international organization, which later collapsed. It is a different matter if an international organization finds a use for itself and adapts to new conditions (NATO).

14 Until 2002-DKB.

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foreign policy, the principle of one-sidedness in foreign policy, etc.), mostly discredited it in the eyes of the regional public. The futility of such a policy was later realized in American scientific circles. They proposed a new intellectual product-the formation of a macro-region-Greater Central Asia, aimed at creating new regimes and institutions in the region related to the United States [Starr, 2005; Starr, 2008]. This concept is based on the historical pillars that once connected and united the regions and peoples of Central Asia and the Middle East with each other.

Despite the equidistant and equidistant interregional ties between Central Asia and the Middle East, in fact, the economic component of the Greater Central Asia concept opens up new practical contours for the region and is therefore attractive for Central Asian states. 15 The implementation of this strategy mainly depends on the success of the United States and its allies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Currently, there is a slow growth of Russia's interest in an unprecedented format of relations (Russia, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan). [Statement..., 2009] covering the participants of the Greater Central Asia project.

China is slowly, consistently and cautiously building its relations with the countries of the region. By combining institutional and functional capabilities and solutions to problems, China first finally closed border issues with the Central Asian states, and then moved to activate economic relations with them. This is exactly how the Sino-Russian SCO project has developed and continues to develop. If anti-Russian and anti-American sentiments alternated in the region with respect to the Russian Federation or the United States, then anti-Chinese sentiments can be considered episodic against this background. China's policy is aimed at building close ties that are slowly forming the macro-region of Greater East Asia (Voskresensky, 2006).

The European Union in Central Asia is trying to use its own, more independent approach. In the 1990s, its relations with the States of the region as a whole developed "in unison" with the American approach. At the same time, Europeans, unlike others, have always worked in the region in a more organized manner, with detailed action programs. In 2007, the Strategy of the New Partnership between the European Union and Central Asian countries for 2007-2013 was developed. [delkaz.ec.europa.eu/joomla/images/...]. On the basis of this document, the EU simultaneously develops bilateral and multilateral formats in various fields, and takes as strategic tasks ensuring security and stability in the region. in the region, development of the Institute for Human Rights and energy issues. The EU approach is notable for recognizing and taking into account alternative ways of regional development and security institutions. Thus, in order to avoid additional risks, Europeans initially adapt their approaches to the realities of Central Asia.

Problems and prospects of regional security in Central Asia. Contrary to the prevailing opinion about the extremely unstable and explosive situation in Central Asia, the states of the region have never entered into direct military conflict with each other due to security mechanisms. The mechanisms for shaping regional security are contradictory, but they make a tangible contribution to ensuring it.

There are many conceptual contradictions in approaches to ensuring regional security. The Central Asian States act in a non-transparent manner, and sometimes even contrary to the interests of their neighbors, and, guided by their own vision, reject the principle of indivisibility of security. Each country and external participants proceed from their own interests. The countries of the region attach little importance to the study of

15 The Russian academic community is skeptical about the implementation of this project [Zvyagelskaya, 2005, pp. 88-92].

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and substantiation of the actualization of national interests from a long-term perspective. The "here and now" factor under the influence of classical geopolitical schemes is quite deeply rooted in the minds of foreign policy decision-makers. In these circumstances, in the 1990s, a galaxy of specialists appeared who fully considered foreign policy in the spirit of the instructions of the classics of foreign vulgar geopolitics. In practice, some politicians with an emphasis on traditional geopolitical schemes were quick to declare the key issues of national interests of the Central Asian countries mutually exclusive, i.e. potentially conflicting. Security issues (energy, water, etc.) have always been at the forefront of inter-State contradictions in the region.Given the current development of the situation, the potential for such contradictions, unfortunately, is long-term and not weakening. Due to the severity of inter-State tensions, collective and institutional approaches to solving security problems in Central Asia are often ignored.

Depending on the target setting, various international organizations in Central Asia are structured mechanisms for ensuring security. According to their functional features, they are divided into those that provide "soft" security, and those that provide "hard" security. Since the 1990s, the evolution of regional security mechanisms has taken on an interesting dynamic. Each country in the region had its own views on regional security, different from its neighbors, and there are many examples of this. Thus, while most Central Asian countries perceived the medieval-style Taliban regime in Afghanistan before 2001 as a threat to the region's security, the Government of Turkmenistan established trade relations with it. Or Uzbekistan was a member of GUAAM, and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan were members of the CSTO and EurAsEC.16 However, after some time there was a reconfiguration, which later also changed. Sharp fluctuations in the geopolitical space for participants to search for new strategic ties weaken the temporary security structures in Central Asia. Naturally, this hinders the formation of a security community in Central Asia.

The institutionalized mechanism of the" hard " aspect of security in the region is represented by the CSTO. Its very existence has an important stabilizing character for Central Asia, but for all its positive aspects, the organization also has weaknesses. The participating States have practically failed to establish a broad-based international security regime in force. They have created a defensive structure that operates within the framework of the concept of collective defence17, not security. It can reflect hypothetical external threats (military opponents), but not internal threats (religious and political extremism that threaten political regimes). For the countries of the region, since 2001, there is no direct threat of military conflict from the Taliban regime, but there are internal radical groups that seek to change the state structure and political regimes in Central Asia. The situation related to the Batken and Surkhandarya events of 1999-2000 and the violent regime change in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, when the CSTO did not take concrete steps to resolve the conflict, is well known. It is noteworthy that the Collective Security Concept of the CSTO Member States of February 10, 1995 specifies the principle of indivisibility of security only in the context of interaction with third countries. Members of the organization have not yet been able to make the CSTO more effective and, raising their bilateral disputes on the agenda from time to time, weaken the interaction of its participants.

16 In 2008, Uzbekistan withdrew from the EurAsEC and in 2009 refused to participate in the CSTO CRRF.

17 Article 4 of the CSTO states: if one of the States parties is subjected to aggression by any State or group of States, this will be considered as aggression against all States parties to the Treaty.

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Differences at the level of the security concept between States, on the one hand, and non - regional factors, on the other, have led to the fact that the formation of security regimes is practically in its infancy, or they are absent altogether in a number of areas. Thus, it is probably only on the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in Central Asia that the position of regional and non-regional states coincided. 18 The countries of the region continue to pay little attention to the root causes of various destructive complexes of extremism, ranging from religious to water and energy issues.

On many security issues, there are no uniform norms and principles that give an idea of further actions in the foreign policy of the States of the region or do not work well. Given the current stability in Central Asia, the prospect of adhering to the principle of non-use of force in relations, as set out in bilateral and multilateral documents signed between the Central Asian states, remains unpredictable. Regular armed clashes on the borders, their mining and support of rebel and radical groups (in the past) show that the countries of the region are ready to use virtually any methods of influencing each other, except for direct military confrontation.

The divergence of views and the absence of generally accepted norms and principles in the field of ensuring regional security leads to foreign policy inconsistents19, when participation in certain international organizations and agreements by certain countries is alternately suspended and resumed. This style has become almost a form of behavior, a kind of tradition. Therefore, the development of international security structures in Central Asia is inconsistent and abrupt.

The established collective security institutions in Central Asia are mainly formed by the Russian Federation. It is fair to note here that the Central Asian countries would hardly have acted in this direction alone and without the participation of an external arbiter. The long struggle within the framework of the Central Asian Organization (in different years it was called differently) has led to disillusionment and cooling of political elites to the idea of genuine regional integration.

Thus, if there are conflicting security concepts, regimes, and structures at the regional level, security in Central Asia becomes vague and prone to unpredictable transformations.

In conclusion, it should be noted that in Central Asia, as in other regions, negative and unpredictable external and internal challenges and threats are constant sources of instability. The situation does not go out of balance due to formal and informal mechanisms-security stabilizers, which are poorly organized, but allow maintaining regional balance within a given framework. The reasons for the underdevelopment of these mechanisms can be:

a) mismatch of understanding of national interests, lack of desire and desire to bring them closer together;

b) the absence of attempts to really fill in and bring together the norms, principles, rules, plans, organizational and financial regulations adopted by a group of States in the region, sets of mutual expectations that are currently more declarative in nature;

c) the lack of a political strategy and policy of institutionalization of interstate relations, which is manifested in the process of interaction within the existing interstate security structures.

18 See the text of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty: [http://pircenter.org/kosdata/page doc/p1513_1. pdf].

19 Has nothing to do with a multi-vector policy.

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The destructive complexes that emerged in 2008 initially in the foreign economic sphere (the global economic crisis, the situation around Iran, the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan) will negatively affect the situation in the region as a whole and in individual countries. This will create new economic barriers and strengthen existing ones. The forced curtailment of programs to improve the well-being of the population will increase poverty and strengthen radical sentiments and groups in the region. The economic crisis will increase the risk of escalating intra-elite struggles in the countries of the region that are still more or less under the control of political regimes.

Thus, the economic crisis (in the medium term) and the rivalry of major powers for influence on the formation of complexly interconnected macro-regions (in the long term) become complex destructive complexes. The global financial crisis will almost devalue the achievements of the Central Asian countries in recent years. Internally unorganized Central Asia, which borders directly on major powers, can become an object of active external manipulation in such a situation. Therefore, in order to avoid negative consequences of external influences, a step-by-step work is necessary, including a joint (rather than unilateral) assessment of real (rather than imaginary) challenges and threats. Based on this, it is desirable to develop a joint fundamental document that will allow creating conditions for controlled development of the situation in the region under different scenarios and coordinated actions in the medium and long term. This requires, first of all, the political will of the heads of State.20
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Voskresenskiy A.D. [Multifactorial equilibrium in the Ministry of Defense]. Politicheskaya nauka v Rossii [Political Science in Russia], Moscow, 2000.

Gatsko, M. F., On the correlation between the concepts of "threat" and "danger", Obozrevatel, No. 7 (90), 1997.

Delyagin M. G. Basic crises of modern humanity: the great transition / http://delyagin.ru/position/6668.html

Statement of the Presidents of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan dated July 30, 2009 I http://www.kremlin.ru/events/articles/2009/07/220328/220359.shtml

Zvyagelskaya I. D. Klyuchi ot shchastya, ili Bolshaya TSA [Keys from Happiness, or Greater Central Asia].

Izvestia. 22.09.2009.

Sergey Lavrov Speech at MGIMO on September 1, 2009 / www.mgimo.ru/news/.../document119842.phtml

International relations/ www.intertrends.ru

Global economic development prospects / www.imf.org/external/russian/index.htm

Petrovsky V. E. Asia-Pacific Security Regimes after the "Cold War": Evolution, Prospects of Russian Participation, Moscow, 1998.
Starr, F. Bolshaya TSA / / Rossiya v global'noi politike [Russia in Global Politics], Moscow, 2005, no. 3-4.

Starr. F. In defense of Greater Central Asia // Economic strategies. 2008. N 4 (http://www.inesnet.kz/karkas/256-frederik-star-v-zashhitu-bolshojj.html)

Fedorov V. N. UN, other international organizations and their Role in the XXI century Moscow, 2005.

Shokhzoda S. Institutionalized international security regimes in Central Asia // East (Oriens). 2005. N 5.

Economic strategies - Central Asia. 2008. N 4.

Buzan B., O. Weaver Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security. Cambridge, 2003.

Hettne B. Beyond the "New" Regionalism // New Political Economy. December, 2005.

delkaz.ec.europa.eu/joomla/images/.../eu-centralasia-strategy_ru.doc

http://pircenter.Org/kosdata/page_doc/p1513_1.pdf

http://worldpolities.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=15&Itemid=309

20 In this regard, some optimism is inspired by the discourse proposed in September 2009 by the President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev in his article "The Fifth Way" [Izvestiya, 22.09.2009].

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