The appearance of Russian units on the territory of the Khiva Khanate in February 1920 and the conclusion of a military alliance with Turkmen leaders who were competing for power with their powerful fellow tribesman Junaid Khan led to the overthrow of his Uzbek puppet Seyid Abdullah Khan and the proclamation of the Khorezm Soviet People's Republic in April, led by the leader of the Young Khiva Palvanniyaz Yusupov. But although the defeated Junaid Khan fled to the Karakum sands, and the leaders Kosh-Mamed, Ghulam-Ali, and Shamurad Bakhshi became members of the Council of People's Nazirs, the long-standing feud between the warlike Turkmens and the peaceful Uzbeks, who had long been bullied by them, did not contribute to friendly work. Following the lead of the Young Khiva people, the chairman of the board of the Russian embassy R. Shakirov and the commander of the 2nd Turkestan brigade V. Dubyansky, who was part of it, suspected the leaders of treason and lured Kosh-Mamed and Bakhshi and their people into a trap, allowing them to commit a bloody massacre [Genis (2), 2000]. The September executions and an attempt to forcibly disarm Turkmen tribes plunged the republic into a new violent civil strife, which led to the strengthening of Junaid Khan. Although the members of the board of the plenipotentiary mission were put on trial, and their successor M. V. Safonov, standing in demonstrative opposition to the Young Georgian government, achieved a fragile reconciliation with the Turkmens, at the same time "a course for a socialist revolution" was taken, and in March 1921 power passed to the Revkom. But a political expedition acting as an Extraordinary Embassy of the RSFSR, headed by the commissioner of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs in Turkestan, D. Y. Gopner, considered that the coup in Khiva was carried out "by the hands of Russian workers" who played "the undoubted role of conquerors and Soviet colonizers" [RGASPI, f. 122, op. 2, d. 116, l. 12, 22; Genis, 2004]. Safonov was recalled to Tashkent, and on May 26 another Russian envoy left for Khiva.

A member of the Bund since 1901, who joined the Bolsheviks in 1917, a former epidemiologist and an army political worker who was not experienced in diplomacy, the new plenipotentiary I. M. Byk, like his predecessors, believed that the Khorezm government "is neither in its composition nor in its readiness adapted to independent leadership of the country." But, he assured Tashkent, "all our attention will be focused on pushing forward the local Khorezm authorities and dragging our prompter-conductor role into the shadow" [RGASPI, f. 122, op. 2, d. 143, l. 25; d. 87, l. 28]. Nevertheless, the plenipotentiary began his activity by signing a peace treaty with Ghulam-Ali and authorizing the arrest, followed by the expulsion to Tashkent, of three members of the Nazir Council 1, which the Chairman of the State Duma of the Republic of Uzbekistan approved.-

1 On the night of 22 August, Shakir Sitdykov, Secretary of Khortsik and Nazir of Education, Muhamad-Rahim Nurullayev, Chairman of the Economic Council, and Babajan Yakubov, his deputy, were expelled from Khiva for drunkenness.

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M. P. Tomsky considered the decision of the Turkcomission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR as unacceptable interference in the affairs of the fraternal republic.

Although, in an attempt to correct his mistake, Bull instigated a re-examination of the issue of the exiles, the Khortsik Presidium and the Nazir Council categorically refused to return them to Khiva. Explaining such an unexpected "revolt" of local leaders, a member of the Turkcomission Ya. Z. Surits noted that their complete dependence on Russian envoys, whose frequent changes were usually accompanied by "a transition from bourgeois orientation to socialist experiences and back again", caused an increasing desire "to wrest Khorezm from such direct influence of the RSFSR, to create a more stable environment to ensure the independent development of the country by its own national forces, to introduce it into the family of other eastern Muslim states " [RGASPI, f. 544, op. 4, d. 31, l. 1].

The first battle was given to the plenipotentiary envoy on the candidacy of the military nazir, a former St. Petersburg worker, a member of the RCP(b) Tatar Hasan Mukhamedzhanov, who insisted on closing the Turkish military instructor school. Back in early August, two of its teachers were arrested in the Tashauz district by the local shuro (council) on charges of robbery, and although Bull agreed to their release, on August 18 he stated that he considered the presence of Turkish officers in Khiva "harmful because of pan-Islamic agitation" [RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d. 247, l. 13]. But the expulsion of the instructors to the Turkfront headquarters caused dissatisfaction on the part of the Khorezm "nationalists "led by a smart, intelligent Uzbek Mullah Bekchan Rakhmanov, who, being the nazir of education in the Yusupov government, was sent by him as an envoy to Moscow, and after returning to Khiva edited Izvestia Khortsik.

Under the influence of Rakhmanov, the KHORTSIK session issued a resolution on September 12 to remove Mukhamedzhanov from the post of military nazir, replacing him with a young Uzbek Mirkamil Mirsharapov, who commanded the Khorezm regiment [RGASPI, f. 544, op. 4, d. 33, l. 1; f. 17, op. 84, d. 363, l. 62]. But upon learning of this, Byk suggested that Kazakh Khalimbetov, acting chairman of the Khortsik, declare that the Turkfront command would not agree with the candidacy of "a boy with an unknown past and a definitely bad reputation as a commander." Since Khalimbetov pointed out the awkwardness of making an important personnel decision that affected the military interests of both republics, without taking into account the opinion of the plenipotentiary, at a joint meeting of the KHORTSIK and the Council of Nazirs, the decision on the appointment of Mirsharapov was annulled, but at the same time the dismissal of Mukhamedzhanov was confirmed "on the basis of an illness report" [RGASPI, f. 122, op. 2, d. 85, l. 27].

The Khortsik Presidium recognized the need to preserve the Turkish military instructor school, but the plenipotentiary managed to take revenge. "At the same meeting," Salim Galliulin, the commissioner of the Executive Committee of the Youth Comintern in Khiva, reported to Tashkent, " it was decided to send Rakhmanov to Kungrad, which he very resolutely refused. And soon after Rakhmanov's departure, Khalimbetov was appointed military nazir. These facts - the expulsion of Rakhmanov, the non-election of Mirsharapov-were the immediate impetus that grouped the previously unformed opposition against Russian influence..."[RGASPI, f. 544, op. 4, d. 32, l. 58].

The appointment of the" stranger", a Russian citizen Khalimbetov, as a military nazir, while retaining the post of secretary of the Khortsik, was perceived by the Khorezmians as another humiliation that requires a rebuff [RGASPI, f. 5, op. 1, d. 2208, l. 11]. Therefore, as the plenipotentiary explained, the formed block of " nationalists "(represented by the chairman of the Council of Nazirs of the Kazakh Menglikhodzh Ibeniyaminov, the nazir of Internal Affairs of the Uzbek Hasan Irmatov and the secretary of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Bashkir Usman Teregulov) with mullahs (the nazir of Justice Ata-Maksum Mukhammadrakhimov), " actually led from the outside by Rakhmanov, Abdalov (former secretary of the government of Yusupov. D) and the Turks",

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I decided at all costs to achieve the removal of Khalimbetov. Although Bull, sensing the danger of losing his "agent", called a meeting of the Communist government members at the plenipotentiary two days before the opening of the regular session of the Khortsik, his hopes for party discipline were in vain. Already on October 5, Khalimbetov, who was charged with embezzlement of public funds, drunkenness and sodomy, lost all his posts and was arrested. Mirsharapov again became a military nazir, and Ata-Maksum, whom the plenipotentiary considered a "cunning, without a political face"2 mullah and a " stubborn defender of waqfs", was elected chairman of the Khortsik.

Bull assured Moscow that his non-interference in the session, concessions on the waqf issue and the admission of a representative of the clergy to the post of head of the KHORTSIK showed the complete inconsistency of Junaid Khan's statements about protecting Sharia law from the Russians and only raised the authority of the plenipotentiary mission. But, as Suritz pointed out, Bull's attempts to subdue the government and neutralize the influence of nationalist elements on Khortsik ended in complete failure, and they eliminated the established custom of not discussing any significant issue without a representative. By all their behavior, the Khorezm leaders made it clear to the Bull that they were completely independent in their decisions and did not need his tutelage. The government meetings became closed, and the plenipotentiary representative was not even considered necessary to inform about the decisions taken [RGASPI, f. 544, op. 4, d. 33, l. 2].

In turn, Gopner pointed out that after the expulsion from Khiva on charges of drunkenness of "the most zealous supporters of the Soviet government", Bull's friendship with the "adventurer" Khalimbetov alienated all groups of Khorezm society, including even the communists, who were the main agents of Russian influence. Therefore, the plenipotentiary representative "appeared at the KHORTSIK session alone, in a full negligee, without any connection with any group, and brought there an amazing tenacity in defending Khalimbetov, hated by all Khiva residents without exception" [RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d. 363, l. 56].

Although the Turkmen meeting, convened at the initiative of the plenipotentiary mission, but regarded in Khiva as an attempt by a Bull to copy the anti-Uzbek policy of its predecessor, recognized Junaid as "an enemy of Sharia and all the people", at the same time Ata-Maksum was delivered a message from the leader offering peace-provided that he was given the opportunity to settle with his people in the area the Russian garrison. On October 27, delegates of Junaid Khan arrived in Kunya Urgench, where Bull went with Ata-Maksum and Mirsharapov, confirming his agreement to conclude a peace treaty and even settle in the area chosen by the Khorezm government. "The sending of delegates with a request for peace," Bull noted, " caused a strong joyous upsurge among the population, mainly Turkmen. The Khorezm government is determined to end Junaid peacefully, ensuring its harmlessness " [RGASPI, f. 5, op. 1, d. 2208, l. 18].

On November 6, the RSFSR Plenipotentiary Extraordinary, A. A. Ioffe, who visited Khiva at the same time, reported to V. I. Lenin and G. V. Chicherin that the question of the plenipotentiary's non-interference in the affairs of "the most independent of the Soviet governments" was resolved in a very peculiar way, but that it was "absolutely necessary to direct him, because domestic policy should not be left in the hands of such barbarians and robbers." and, " having some agents, it is possible and should be through them, being completely behind the scenes, to incite one part of the Khorezm public to another to carry out their policy."

Gopner wrote that Ata-Maksum, who was very authoritative among the Khorezm people, was at the head of the liberal clergy and played "an important role in the reconciliation of moderate and religious elements of the Khorezm bourgeoisie with the Soviet government"at the 2nd Kurultai. But, although Ata-Maksum was given the " portfolio of the Sharia department (Nazir of Justice)", his group "was not allowed to enter the presidium of the Khortsik, so as not to make Ata-Maksum the chairman of the republic and the master of the situation" [RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d. 363, l. 55].

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It was in this spirit that Ioffe instructed the Bull: in the instructions left to him, it was stated that since "there is not a single person among the Khorezm political and even party leaders who is completely "our", and the young Khorezm nationalism is especially vigilant about its formal "independence"... The plenipotentiary representative of the RSFSR should carry out his task of external demonstration of complete independence of Khorezm, while actually managing all its foreign and domestic policy, with the greatest care and flexibility, using methods that not only observe the external decorum of independence and all decisions are decisions of the relevant Khorezm state bodies, but so that the leaders themselves do not feel led, but Being guided, they imagined that they themselves were leading" [RGASPI, f. 5, op. 1, d. 2156, l. 57-60, 73-76].

On November 6, the draft peace treaty with Junaid Khan was approved at a meeting of the KHORTSIC with the participation of Bull and members of the negotiation commission consisting of Nazir Irmatov of the Interior (Chairman), Nazir Mukhamedyar Atajanov of Finance, Nazir Issa-Maksum of Justice, Nazir Mirsharapov of the military and Amid Mukhamedzhanov of the KHORTSIC Presidium. The treaty once again announced the decision of both sides to "destroy forever" the enmity between the Turkmen and Uzbeks (paragraph 1), for which they would grant amnesty to Junaid and his entourage, subject to their disarmament or obtaining permission to bear arms (paragraph 2). The leader was allowed to choose a place of residence "at his request with the approval of the Khorezm government"(paragraph 3), and Junaid agreed to "live within the framework of Sharia law" (paragraph 4), and return the captured prisoners and military property (paragraph 5). The Khorezm authorities also swore to release the captured Turkmen and not prevent Junaid and his people from "visiting all the villages of the republic" (item 6). It was stipulated that "in the case of Kaltamanism (Basmachism), the people of Junaid Khan are subjected to the most severe punishment by the Khorpravitelstvo, to which there are no obstacles on the part of Junaid Khan" (item 7) [RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d.363, l. 20].

After the agreement was approved, Mullah Bekchan Rakhmanov left for Junaid and returned to Khiva on November 18. But by this time, relations between the command staff of the Khorezm and Russian units had sharply deteriorated, because, as the head of the special department Mikhalkevich showed, the military nazir was dissatisfied that " everything is done without his knowledge, and often against his will." As a result, two hostile groups were formed: on the one hand, Mirsharapov and Teregulov, supported by the" military leader " of the republic, a former brigade commander, A.V. Yungerov and almost the entire government, on the other-the commander of the 3rd Turkestan Rifle Regiment Sokolov-Skvortsov, his military commissar MK Voloshin and other Russian political workers led by the plenipotentiary.

The atmosphere was further thickened by the Bull's clash with Ata-Maksum, who refused to approve the mandate of an employee of the embassy sent to Kungrad to investigate "Kyrgyz-Khiva relations". Mirsharapov and his colleagues later explained that when they learned about the appearance of a "well-known robber Tupa-Niyaz, from the Aday Kirghiz tribe, wandering around Transcaspia with his armed gang", who carried out robberies and arson, the Khorezm authorities decided to take measures to disarm it, which the Mangyshlak district Revolutionary Committee also asked them to do., f. 17, op. 84, d. 363, l. 90]. But the Bull said that " the Adayevites are armed citizens of the RSFSR, why they have no right to touch them." Fearing "a secret agreement with the reconciled Junaid against the Russians," Bull, according to his opponents, was ready to "incite the Aday people against Junaid Khan, who recognized Soviet power, and thereby rekindle the fire of civil war in Khorezm" [RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d.363, l. 90].

Therefore, seventeen members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of Nazirs signed an appeal to Lenin, Chicherin and the chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Mikhail Kalinin, with a request to replace the plenipotentiary. However, after discussing the "telegram from Khiva about the recall of T. Byk" on November 29, the Turkcomission decided to point out to the Khorezm residents that such a question should not be raised, and at the end of the meeting, the Commission decided to send a message.

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request an explanation from the plenipotentiary representative [RGASPI, f. 122, op. 2, d. 49, l. 181]. Communication with the Bull was established only on December 3, when the events in Khiva could no longer be reversed...

On November 25, Rakhmanov wrote to Junaid Khan: "The bull hates us because we have concluded a peace treaty with you, and looks at us with hostile eyes... He doesn't like the political beliefs of the current government... He says that the real government is a bourgeois one, and the other day he was pasting proclamations against us in the streets. And we, in turn, send a telegram to Moscow to recall the Bull... We work tirelessly day and night. The population does not succumb to the provocation of the Russians... If the Russians want to overthrow the real government and start a riot, then we will only have to fight the Russians, and you are ready for this case. We will write to you as much as possible, and you will write to us. If we die, we'll be in the same grave, and if we live, we'll live together. Maybe things will get really bad between us and the Russians, and <if > war breaks out with the interruption of all relations, then we will go to you with our people and work together with you... "[RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d. 363, l. 82]

At the same time, Ata-Maksum and Ibeniyaminov informed the Afghan ambassador in Bukhara that the Russian envoy "wants to break off friendly relations", as a result of which Khortsik and the Nazirov Council "sent a message by wireless telegraph to Moscow and made a strict proposal that the RSFSR take its representative from Khorezm." The authorities of the republic asked to send the Afghan embassy to Khiva [RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d. 363, l. 81].

The plenipotentiary himself learned about the telegram to Moscow from the former leader of the Young Khiva Yusupov, who was released from prison and now acted as his confidant [Yusupov, p. 237]. This news was probably the last straw that forced Bull to drop all diplomacy.

The plenipotentiary representative presented his version of the situation in Khiva at that time to the acting chairman of the Turkkommission J. H. Peters in a telegram written on November 30, but sent only on December 5: "During the last weeks, the government and the entire population of Khorezm were completely terrorized by a counter-revolutionary gang, whose leaders held the most responsible posts in the government of the Pre-Central Executive Committee, Pre-Special Commanders, military nazir, nazira vnudel. The representative office was completely isolated and under the threat of shootings, expulsions, and arrests, it was forbidden to go there to any of the Muslim employees. In recent days, the arrogance has reached its highest limits. They openly talked, put up pieces of paper, about the need to expel the Russians. It was decided to expel not only the komvoisk, but also the plenipotentiary. The Russian population experienced an alarming state. The Russian garrison at this time consisted of 70 untrained undisciplined recruits who had recently arrived in Khiva. The mission was well aware of all the criminal work of the gang, but it was powerless to take any decisive measures, even against the notorious Russian counter-revolutionaries. The request to recall Yungerov by the Turkfront has not yet been positively resolved, despite my three persistent telegrams. It was hopeless to wrest other Russians who occupied more responsible positions out of the Khorezm counter-revolutionary camp because of their protection by influential accomplices and in the government..."

Further, Bull claimed that" from quite authoritative sources "information was received about a" secret agreement with Junaid against the Russians", which was allegedly concluded by Rakhmanov, who went to the leader. The leaders of the conspiracy, Bull said, "are all members of the 'Committee of National Unification', which has set itself the goal of liquidating the Soviet government with the help of a pan-Islamist union. Close ties were maintained with Bukhara, Afghanistan and other countries. The present moment was considered the time of a decisive offensive, because they interpreted the weakening of Soviet power in connection with the new economic policy and the famine. The boldness and impudence of the actions is explained by the belief that Russia cannot actively respond in connection with the Afghan treaty and our common policy in the East. The immediate task in Khiva was to stage the hatred of the people of Khorezm against the Russian "oppressors of Sharia" and, with the help of the provoked Turkmens, carry out their infernal plan. This explains the sending of a deliberately provocative telegram about the unwillingness of the peace envoy with Junaid in order to blame all the blame for the massacre that should occur on the Russians themselves."

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Since communication with Tashkent was maintained only by radio, it was impossible to delay, according to Bull. "All hope," he explained, " all attention was focused on the organization of healthy elements. The cowardly Eastern masses waited in horror for events, not daring to take any action, knowing full well that they would not escape Turkmen violence after attempts to massacre the Russians. Through hard work, the semi-legally assembled party was organized and it was decided to convene a congress, which was banned and canceled by the government. Nevertheless, representatives of the districts managed to arrive secretly. They, together with the Central Committee of the Party, decided to force all the members of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, with the exception of the four scoundrels, to assemble, declare the four scoundrels and all their Russian accomplices enemies of the people, replace them, arrest them, and bring them to justice. The members of the government, which is characteristic of the psychology of the East, silently obeyed all the orders of the leaders of the counter-revolutionary gang, and were themselves incapable of any decisive opposition other than cowardly whispering around, and only under pressure from the party did they pass this resolution. The party's demand was supported by the communist commander of the Khorezm battalion, the Communists-university students and the head of the garrison " [RGASPI, f. 122, op. 2, d. 153, l. 11-12].

On the night of November 28 and the next day, Russian units called by Bull from Petro-Alexandrovsk and Tashauz disarmed cadets of the military instructor school and arrested all the "enemies of the people", with the exception of Ata-Maksum, who managed to escape and was promised a reward of 5 million rubles for providing information about his whereabouts. Although the most improbable rumors circulated about Ata-Maksum's death, Bull claimed that the former head of Khortsik "died at home almost two months after the November events, according to a doctor's opinion, from severe malaria" [RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d. 536, l. 4]. Those arrested were charged with participating in a counter - revolutionary plot prepared by the Committee of National Unification (KNO), the Khorezm branch of the semi-legal Federation of National Democratic Associations of Central Asian Muslims, headed in Bukhara by the notorious Akhmed Zaki Validov.

Although, as stated by Byk," the Chekist operation was absolutely bloodless, " the detained Mirsharapov, Teregulov, the Yungerov brothers (the younger served as chief of the operational staff), the head of the organizational and information department of the Political Administration (Purkhiva) Gainullin and the head of the administrative department of the Military Nazirata Muratov noted in their statement of December 14 that the shelling of the apartment of the military officer Nazir and the secretary of the Revolutionary Military Council continued for more than two hours " with infantry and cavalry, including 300 men with 6 machine guns, despite the complete absence of any resistance on their part, and only thanks to a simple accident and the absence of direct reasons on the part of the arrested to shoot them during the arrest, all survived. On the other hand, personal insults and bullying of those arrested reached the point of extreme inhumanity, as anyone can confirm... "[RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d. 363, l. 91]

In the minutes of a joint meeting on November 27 of two dozen members of the Khortsik and nazirs who defected to the Bull, it was announced that "the government was actually in the hands of counter-revolutionaries-pre-TSYK Ata-Maksum, pre-sovnazirs Ibeniyaminov, Nazir of Internal Affairs Irmatov and military Nazir Mirsharapov", who were "led from the outside by Rakhmanov and Abdalov, as well as Russians who were in Khiva instructors Teregulov, Yungerov, Muratov, Agaydarov and others." This group "did what they wanted", threatening dissenters with "all executions", because of which they, they say, "were forced to submit", but now it "became clear to them that secret negotiations were being conducted with Junaid Khan against the Russians". Taking into account the above, the meeting decided: "Ata-Maksum, Ibeniyaminov, Irmatov, Mirsharapov, Rakhmanov, Abdalov and others, Russians, Teregulov, Muratov, Yungerov, Agaydarov should be considered enemies of the people, removed from all posts and arrested. If one of them escapes, then order all the authorities to-

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take all measures to catch them as great criminals... All Russian counter-revolutionaries should be handed over to vol. To the bull."

To investigate the crimes of those arrested, a commission was established, which was instructed to immediately notify Moscow of the "falsity" of the charges brought against the Bull by the former Khorezm leadership [RGASPI, f. 5, op. 1, d.2208, l. 24]. At the joint meeting, a new government was also formed, which, according to Surits, changed "in favor of the poor and semi-Peasant elements", but was "extremely weak" in business terms [RGASPI, f. 544, op. 4, d. 33, l. 1]. In addition, having discussed the issue of "Peace with the poor". Junaid Khan", the meeting confirmed the previously concluded agreement with the leader on the condition that he "must be on friendly terms with the revolutionary troops who came from Russia", because only the enemies of the Khorezm people "can think of a secret agreement directed against the Russians.

But since the existence of the KNO in Khiva required proof, all the arrested citizens of the RSFSR were locked up in the plenipotentiary mission, where, as Mikhalkevich testified, they were interrogated by the commissioner of the Amu-Darya Regional cheKA Motskov, the head of the secret operations department of the HORCHK Pitkevich, and Byk himself, who "stamped on the interrogated with his feet and scolded in every possible way." In response, Mirsharapov "shouted that he could be killed, but he feels absolutely right." Former leaders were taken to the cemetery, "where their execution was staged, during which bullets flew over the heads of those arrested. Along with this, Pitkevich, disguised in a fur coat and Khiva hat to avoid being recognized, and posing as a Bukharian, beat the prisoners with the handle of a mauser, and Ibeniyaminov was pierced very deeply in the skull. Despite this, all the defendants strenuously denied their involvement in any organization. Only one Irmatov confessed, but later, however, stated at the trial that he was forced to give false testimony by putting a revolver to his chest " [RGASPI, f. 544, op. 4, d. 33, l. 96].

Hopner, who was again sent to Khiva in July 1922 as head of the Extraordinary Embassy of the RSFSR, also pointed out completely unacceptable methods of investigation.: "There were bullying, beatings, threats of execution during the investigation (people were taken out at night to the steppe, stripped and shot over their heads, extorting testimony). The house of the Russian Embassy was turned into a prison, where some nazirs were held, interrogated, and where they were given statements under threat of death. Byk, his wife Bravaya, Letyshev, Matskov and the boy-beast Pitkevich took part in the interrogations. The Brave woman was especially zealous, visiting the prisoners at night, admonishing them not to bring themselves to be shot, and with a ready list in her hands dictating to Irmatov the names of the YPG members, which he should confirm in his testimony. The fact that among those arrested were citizens of the RSFSR, Uzbeks from Turkestan, Mirsharapovs and Irmats cannot in the least justify the punitive policy of the Bull, since in their person the population knew nazirs (and very good nazirs), as well as the fact that they were Uzbeks and that, of course, they did not impress anyone Russian impressions. In particular, Mirsharapov, who has an autonomist bias characteristic of all Turkestanis, was one of the bravest kraskoms, a favorite of the Khorezm and Russian Red Army soldiers, participated in many battles with Junaid Khan and always set a fighting example" [RGASPI, f. 544, op. 4, d.32, l. 59].

On December 2, a radio message from Bull was sent to Moscow and Tashkent explaining the events in Khiva and the sensational news about the discovery of the" organization of national unification "and its allegedly extensive connections:" The purpose of the organization is to unite Muslims of all countries and revolt against Soviet Russia. In Khiva, it was planned to organize a massacre of Russians in the coming days with the help of Junaid horsemen. Communication was established with the Afghan consul in Bukhara, with Junaid Khan, with Tashkent-Nizametdin Khodjayev. In Bukhara - the main organizer of Valid Meetings with his assistants Imutov (Mutin - V. G.) and Yumagulov; Khodjaev Fayzulla is a member of the organization of Pre-commanders in Bukhara, in Moscow - Allakulov from the Khorezm Representative Office. Enver Pasha is at the head of all the committees. The center is located in Bukhara and Baku. Everything is established by indications and documents. Investigation of Russian prisoners (their majority)-

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production) is being conducted in Khiva predoblChEk. The Khorezm detainees are held by the Supreme Khorezm Tribunal and a special troika appointed by the Central Election Commission " [RGASPI, f. 5, op. 1, d. 2208, l. 21].

But although the envoy claimed that the YPG, led by Enver Pasha, the former leader of the Young Turks and the then leader of the Bukhara rebels, had spread its counter-revolutionary tentacles not only to Khiva and Bukhara, but also to Baku and Tashkent, the indictment obtained by the investigation was based on the confessions of only two people arrested.

The most detailed testimony about the YPG was obtained from the Bashkir Seyid Ali Agaydarov, formerly a "Muslim teacher" who taught in Kungrad before the revolution and returned to his homeland after the evacuation of Russian troops from Khiva. In 1918, Agaydarov, as he testified to investigator Motskov on November 30, lived in the village of Kazatkul in the Upper Ural district of the Orenburg province, where he met Validov, who was hiding from the Bolsheviks. Agaydarov worked for him as" information manager "" until the conclusion of peace between the Soviet authorities and Bashkiria", and after Validov's decision to break with the Bolsheviks, he went with him to Baku, from where, on his own instructions, he returned to Kungrad, where from October 1920 he was head of the Department of public education.

Agaydarov learned that Validov had been elected chief leader of the KNO in Bukhara 3 from Rakhmanov, who visited him, saying that "there are fake communists in the Turkestan region who write one thing and do another, and that they are colonizers..." Rakhmanov assured that the KNO would get them removed from Khiva and send a telegram to Moscow "on behalf of the alleged people, that we want to make peace with Junaid Khan, but the Bull does not want this and writes to Moscow that we are counter-revolutionaries." For this reason, Rakhmanov argued, we ourselves "will make peace with Junaid and take his army from him, so that we can then fight the fake Russian communists", and when asked why Bull prevents the conclusion of the treaty, he explained that he is a "colonizer". Rakhmanov emphasized that " our party is Soviet, but not like the Russian one, and that the program of the Russian party is not suitable for the East, and besides, all the republics of the East are independent."

At the next interrogation, which was conducted by investigator Letishev, when asked: "How many people were in the organization and which of them do you know?", Agaydarov said: "I was told by Mullah Bekchan that there are about 300 people in this organization in Khiva, but I personally know: 1) Ata-Maksuma, 2) Ibeniyaminov, 3) Matyakub, Nazir Finance, 4) Mirsharapova, 5) Irmatova, but they say that Yungerov is also a member of this organization." When asked which of the members of the organization is in Bukhara, Agaydarov named the "leaders" known to him, Validov, Haris Yumagulov and Ilderkhan Mutin, adding that other members of the organization - Turks Mustafa Subhi and Efendiyev - are in Baku, from where money is sent for the organization, and in Moscow-five more people. "According to Bekchan," Agaydarov went on to show, " this organization also includes the commander - in-chief of the Turkish rebels against the British, Mustafa Kemal, who has about 120 thousand troops. In Afghanistan, there is another member of our organization, Jemal Pasha , the commander-in-chief of the Afghan forces, who has 80,000 troops. There is a member of our organization in Hindustan, Barakatullah, who was sent there by Moscow to agitate against the imperialist states."

After the arrest, Agaydarov complained, I asked Rakhmanov: "What have you done that you put me in prison?" But he answered: "Let them kill our five people, but by doing so we will show other states what freedom the Bolsheviks give..." And to the objection that they will not be sentenced to execution by the Russians, but by their own Khorezmians, Rakhmanov remarked that their judges will be " also agents of the Bull, but this is not the whole people." Rakhmanov said that diplomatic missions from the commanders-in-chief of the Afghan and Turkish troops have probably already left for Moscow, who will tell about what happened in Khiva. "Our struggle is not against the Soviet government," Rakhmanov argued, " but against the fake colonialist communists. We, as more knowledgeable Eastern peoples and their living conditions, will be able to prepare them against the imperialists, and all the leaders of our organization adhere to this point of view."

3 Validov wrote that he "assumed the duties of chairman of the Joint Committee of the National Federation of Turkestan", which included two factions - the socialist and liberal (Jadid), on August 2, 1921 [Zaki Validi Togan, 1997, p. 297].

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During a regular interrogation on December 2, Agaydarov, referring to the words of Rakhmanov, stated that the KNO also includes "Chairman of the <Council of Nazirs> of the Bukhara Republic Khodjaev Fayzulla and Usman Khodjaev, whose position I do not know, but is responsible; in Tashkent - Nizametdin Khodjaev, Ryskulov, and there are several others I do not know; in Tashkent-Nizametdin Khodjaev, Ryskulov and others. In Orenburg-Akhmed Baitursunov; in Kazan-two people: Rakhmatullin, I forgot his first name, and another, I forgot his first and last name; in Baku-Mustafa Subhi (Turk), Efendiyev, Fayzulla Seyid." Finally, in another additional protocol, Agaydarov, repeating that Validov, Ryskulov and Baitursunov are members of the organization, added Ilyas Alkin to them and again stated that "Enver Pasha is the main organizer" [RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d. 363, l. 86-88]. It turned out that almost all the most prominent" Muslim " communists are playing a double game and, dreaming of freeing themselves from the dictates of Russia, are connected with the leader of the "Basmachi", which, however, according to Validov's memoirs, seems to be true [Zaki Validi Togan, 1997, pp. 253-254, 296-297].

Another confession, which became the basis for the indictment material against the arrested, belonged to the former nazir of the Interior Khasan Irmatov , a 27-year-old Uzbek worker who, without graduating from the teachers ' seminary, served in Kokand as an assistant cook at a Craft factory and as a clerk for the volost ruler, and later joined the Red Army, studied at the University of Kokand. at the school of military instructors in Tashkent and from 1919 was a member of the Bolshevik Party.

"I've been confused ever since I joined the nazirs," Irmatov explained to investigator Letishev. - The main organizers of the national group are Rakhmanov, Mirsharapov (the son of a merchant who attended military courses in Tashkent, but did not graduate), Teregulov (a former white officer who arrived from Baku), Ibeniyaminov (a Kyrgyz), Ata-Maksum (Predtsika), and Yungerov Sr... During secret meetings, they met in the house of predTSIk Ata-Maksum, Ibeniyaminov and Rakhmanov. There were no written decisions, only verbal ones. There were several resolutions to remove from here the Plenipotentiary Representative of the RSFSR, t. Bull and appoint Allakulov as a representative from the Khorrespublika to Moscow. The national organization had contact with Allakulov through a courier who brought the documents and passed them directly to Rakhmanov, who read and burned them immediately."

As for the YPG, the defendant claimed that "this organization tried to unite Muslims of all countries, and then fight with the RSFSR," because it wanted to " drive the Russians out of Khorezm." When Rakhmanov returned from Junaid Khan's visit, he said that he had told him about the goals of the "national organization" and that the latter had agreed to participate in it. Irmatov also confirmed the close connection of the YPG with Fayzulla Khojayev in Bukhara and Nizametdin Khojayev in Tashkent.

At the next interrogation, on November 29, Irmatov defended himself that he had joined an underground organization under the pressure of threats from Ata-Maksum and Ibeniyaminov, who threatened otherwise to expel him from Khiva. Irmatov went on to point out: "The National organization has a center in Khiva, where Ata-Maksum, Ibeniyaminov, Mirsharapov, Teregulov and Rakhmanov are members of the presidium. In Kungrad there is Bashirov (who works on the orders of the center), in Khojaly-Zia Maksum, in Chimbay there is a former volost whose name I have forgotten, and in Turtkul there is Mullah Tavruk, a teacher... I know the following members in Khiva:: Mat-Kurbanova, Zargarova, Atadzhanova, Yusupova and Atash Khodzhi".

In additional testimony, Irmatov named two other members of the organization - Ferghana Kirghizov and Turk Husain Ismailov, and, referring to Rakhmanov, said that the actual head of the KNO is Validov, but "Enver Pasha is the head of the organization", and its center, in order to avoid suspicion from the Bolsheviks, was transferred to Bukhara, where a month or a month and a half A certain Alikayev, "who also came from Baku together with Teregulov," was sent back for instructions. Irmatov himself, having gone on a trip to the republic on November 19 to distribute money to Shuro for the purchase of ARBs and local audits, returned to Khiva on November 27, and the next day was arrested [RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d. 363, l. 83-85].

Since Agaydarov and Irmatov agreed to give evidence, Byk kept them to himself, handed Rakhmanov and Ibeniyaminov over to the Khortchk, and imprisoned Mirsharapov, Teregulov, the Yungerov brothers, and Muratov in a "correctional home" in Petro-Alexandrovsk. Bull then released Irmatov there, "taking a subscription from him with the obligation to appear in court" [RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d.363, l. 58]. Granted a residence permit in the Amu-Darya region without the right to leave, Irmatov was released from exile only after a year.

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for six months, Agaydarov worked as a translator and technical worker at the embassy and editorial office of the party newspaper in Khiva.

Referring to the fact that "the people (bazar) are in favor of the execution, especially of the hated Rakhmanov," and the danger of escape of those arrested, Byk convinced Moscow and Tashkent of the desirability of "the fastest public trial", because the accusatory materials are quite sufficient, they say. As Galliulin, appointed as the defendants ' defense lawyer, testified, "rehearsals" of the future trial were held in Byk's office for a week, but the execution verdict was already passed in advance by the plenipotentiary, who personally drew up the indictment and wrote all the speeches. Byk himself explained this with great passion by saying that when, almost for the first time in the entire period of the existence of the Khorezm Republic, an open trial is to take place, "where a Dehkan from sokha, sitting at the judge's table, will meet with the defendant Bekchan Rakhmanov, who graduated from the University in Constantinople," what reasonable person will be surprised that "all the party forces were mobilized, among which preparations for the trial, which were usual not only for Khiva, but especially relevant in Khiva, were underway, and the verdict was discussed, as usual, in advance in the Central Committee of the KHCP" [RGASPI, f. 122, op. 2, d. 153, l. 16; f. 17, op. 84, D. 536, L. 9].

On the night before the trial, Bull asked Galliulin what he thought about the verdict. "I replied," he pointed out, "that the indictment was very beautifully and well presented, but as for the opinion of those arrested, I, as I have already told you, <believe> that there is no organized "committee" here, according to the material, but some of them, according to their beliefs, are really nationalistic.>.. As for the penalty, in case of proof of < accusation> as witnesses, I would only give some of them, the "defendants", two years ' imprisonment . He (Bull) looked at me in fright and began to lecture me on the fact that under the communist system, defenders should not justify, but, on the contrary, should play the role of prosecutor, and only Mensheviks and old lawyers argue in this way. a secret paper on my own behalf or the Central Committee of the Communist Party, then I will assume this role, otherwise I refuse." After such a conversation, the attitude towards Galliulin changed and, considering him a hidden nationalist, Bull appointed the chief Purkhiv Svobodin as a defender [RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d. 363, l. 93].

The defendants were accused of high treason, namely, the conclusion of a "secret agreement" with Junaid Khan on the transfer of five cities under his control and a "counter-revolutionary plot" aimed at cutting out the Russians and overthrowing Soviet power in the republic, in confirmation of which Bull referred to the leader's request to release his arrested "friends" [RGASPI, f. 5, op. 1, d. 2208, l. 32]. At the trial held on March 5, 1922, the Supreme Tribunal unanimously, as Byk emphasized not without satisfaction, "found all guilty and decided to shoot, but in relation to two (Abdalov and Atadzhanov) to replace the execution with forced labor. The case of the defendant Allakulov should be singled out and tried on delivery to Khiva. The large crowd present demanded an unconditional execution for everyone."

The court was described differently by Yusupov, who recalled that "the defendants were not allowed to speak" and only Ibeniyaminov, exposing his pierced head, exclaimed:" Is it possible to allow violence to be committed under the Soviet regime, prisoners were tortured and their heads were broken? " [Yusupov, p.242]. But he was interrupted and the verdict was read out. This was also reported by Mikhalkevich, who said that at the trial, during which he settled down ...under the table (!) Pitkevich played the role of prompter, Ibeniyaminov, pointing to his bandaged head, said that he was beaten, as a result of which a "terrible noise"was raised in the hall. The audience was reassured only by the chairman's statement that the fact of the beating will be checked by a special commission, but its members were the same

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Pitkevich 4 and the wife of the plenipotentiary Bravai, who found that "Ibeniyaminov was not beaten, but accidentally injured himself" [RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d. 363, l. 96].

Since the majority of Khorezm residents, including some members of the government, were very dissatisfied with the execution verdict of the court, the Bull reluctantly agreed to take into account Ibeniyaminov's "youth and remorse", but he allowed the possibility of canceling the execution of the "most dangerous counter-revolutionary" Rakhmanov only with "full guarantee of his isolation". Therefore, the KHORTSIK session, which opened on March 12, replaced the death penalty with Rakhmanov's imprisonment for a period "until the consolidation of Soviet power in Khiva". As early as December 1922, Gopner reported that "the only member of the YPG organization, Mullah Bekchan Rahman Berganov, although considered to be serving a sentence, actually works in the political bureau of Horchek" [RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d. 363, l. 62]. But Byk corrected Hopner, noting that Rakhmanov 5 "is interned in the KHORGPU, where he is used for household<government> work, and does not work" [RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d. 536, l. 4]. Only on May 7, 1923, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the KHKP decided to " recall < Rakhmanov> from the GPU and send him to the disposal of Glavpolitprosvet", and a week later included him in the "commission for the publication of textbooks after the alphabet" [RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 13, l. 85, 87].

Meanwhile, Nizametdin Khodjaev, a former member of the Regional Party Committee and a friend of the chairman of the TURKTSIK, who was also a member of the KNO, allegedly stood up for the arrested Mirsharapov. On April 1, he addressed the Executive Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan with a statement in which he recalled the heroic behavior of his comrade during the Osipov uprising in Tashkent in January 1919. Then Khodjaev and Mirsharapov, who was the commander of the Old City's party fighting squad, went on a reconnaissance mission, but were captured by the rebels, who offered the prisoners freedom on condition of going over to their side. 16 people agreed to this, but Mirsharapov chose to "die for the idea of communism", and that same night, Khodjaev recalled ," we were shot by volleys of executioners and lay in the arms of death between the corpses of our dead comrades." Khodjaev requested Mirsharapov's immediate release, promising to personally deliver him for trial "at any convenient time." Therefore, on April 3, 1922, Nazir Tyuryakulov, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and a member of the Turkburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), ordered " the immediate transfer of Mirsharapov to Tashkent and his transfer to the bail of T. V. Mirsharapov." Nizamutdin to Khodjaev."

But the order to release Mirsharapov greatly angered Bull, who on April 5 telegraphed to the deputy commissioner of the NKID in Turkestan V. M. Tsukerman: "I must once again express my categorical protest against the defense of the notorious Basmachian figure Mirsharapov. When our Red Army soldiers lay down their heads in Bukhara and here we barely hold the front against Junaid, with whom Mirsharapov, the military nazir, secretly concluded a treacherous peace, and then conspiracies are discovered in Khorezmarmia..., the defense and the demand to release him before trial are unacceptable. The release of Mirsharapov, as well as the rest of the company and Validov's agents, depends on Turchek. I again categorically protest and ask that my protest be brought to the attention of the Central Committee of the RCP. The fight against Basmachism, which costs thousands of victims, is unthinkable without the merciless destruction of ideological and active leaders." But Zuckerman replied to the Bull: "The heads of the Red Army soldiers are just as dear to us as they are to you, but that's not the point. It is impossible to ignore the petition of prominent Ullman communists to the ICC , especially since such a prolonged investigation does not fit in with the seriousness of the case.

4 Already on July 14, 1923, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the KCP decided: "Propose to the Nazirate of Internal Affairs to prohibit the residence of Pitkevich within the Khorrespublika" [RGASPI, f. 62, op. 3, d. 13, l. 97].

5 Chairman of the Khorezm Revolutionary Tribunal Akhmed Makhmudov opposed the release of Rakhmanov, because he, they say, "together with Ryskulov at the Congress of the peoples of the East in Baku sniffed with Enver Pasha and therefore is a negative element", to which the new plenipotentiary B. G. Gorodetsky objected: "If he and Ryskulov formed an alliance with Enver Pasha, now Ryskulov is the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars in Tashkent. Therefore, Rakhmanov should also be appointed chairman of the Nazir council?" [Yusupov, l. 259-260].

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charges. Finally, Tashkent does not get rid of severe punishment - if only the accusatory material was solid enough..."

But the Bull did not calm down and inspired an appeal to the Turkburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) from the new Khorezm leaders, who expressed "bewilderment and protest" in connection with the Communists ' petition for "the main culprit of the treacherous secret peace with Junaid", because "it was not for nothing that the latter so persistently sought his release". Claiming that "the Khorezm criminals, with the exception of Rakhmanov, were less guilty and were involved in the organization by the Russian White Guards," the authors of the statement "sought to highlight the case of Mirsharapov, Teregulov and other Russian bandits in order to prove to the Khorezm population how they deal with their citizens in Soviet Russia for counterrevolutionary work in the union state republic" [RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 6, l. 78-79, 83-85]. But Bull's efforts were in vain, and on May 9, he complained to the NKID that Mirsharapov's release " would immediately be considered in the circles of his secret and obvious accomplices as a victory and strength of the organization... Under such conditions, the upcoming Kurultai elections will be held it is difficult, because the remaining roots of the organization have been resurrected again " [RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 6, l. 39].

However, in Tashkent, the Bull's information about the Khorezm counter-revolutionary organization was treated with obvious distrust, and already on December 14, Zuckerman telegraphed Chicherin: "All the explanations of the Bull are full of contradictions, because they do not support the version of a broad conspiracy. In the case of the expulsion of the Nazirs, he once proved as convincingly as now that it was impossible to do otherwise, also dealt with the demands of the people and stated the national exultation as a result of the expulsion of the Nazirs, as now as a result of the arrest of those imprisoned by him. Until recently, in a conversation with me, he defended in every possible way the persons who were now arrested by him, considered everyone his proteges and < objected> only to Mirsharapov. Now all those arrested turn out to be scoundrels, and the remaining ones are no better, according to Bull himself. Therefore, there is every reason to fear a new coup in the near future , especially since everyone is now lumped together: both Gulyam and Junaid, reconciliation with whom Bull put at the center of his policy. I supported the Bull all the time, especially went to Khorezm to sort out the situation together with him and outline a course of behavior. But I am now convinced that the Bull is hopeless and its continued presence in Khiva will lead to <new > coups. All his work is pure panic and hysteria, which discredits our entire Eastern policy. Suritz and I insist on replacing the Bull with a more balanced companion."

Zuckerman's telegram, on Lenin's order, was sent to the recall of the former chairman of the Turkkommission, G. Ya. Sokolnikov, who replied: "With t. Bull had a chance to meet. I consider him a man capable of burying himself. It is necessary to thoroughly check his Khiva policy" [RGASPI, f. 5, op. 1, d. 443, l. 1-2] 7.

He was very skeptical about the reports of Bull and Surits, who was entrusted by the Central Committee of the RCP(b) with "general supervision and management of foreign policy affairs"

6 After the liberation, Mirsharapov commanded national units in Ferghana, and in 1924 he again worked as a military nazir in Khorezm and, from the summer, in Bukhara, where he earned the Order of the Golden Star of the 1st degree. In 1926-1929. Mirsharapov studied at the Frunze Military Academy, after which he commanded a separate Uzbek cavalry regiment, reorganized in 1932 into a brigade; in 1935, he served as a military attache in Mongolia. Commander of a Separate cavalry brigade of Mountain nationalities in the North Caucasus, Mirsharapov was arrested on October 28, 1937 and shot on October 10, 1938.

7 Sokolnikov could hardly have imagined at that time that his wife would be the daughter of a Bull, later the famous writer G. I. Serebryakova, who retained the surname of her first husband. She recalled that her father was reputed to be "an enthusiastic and tirelessly active person", but being "stubborn, quick-tempered and always sincere", "could not stand lies and, equating it with slander, considered them a source of meanness" [Serebryakova, 1975, pp. 566-568]. However, in Khiva, according to Hopner, the plenipotentiary was guided primarily by "personal accounts and insults", and "everyone who ever and somewhere spoke badly about the Bull, necessarily went to prison" [RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d. 363, l. 60].

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[RGASPI, f. 122, op. 2, d. 49, l. 162]. As early as February 2, 1922, Suritz reported to Chicherin: "The impression I got at the very first news of the conspiracy was that it was greatly inflated and completely devoid of the 'universality' that the first ciphers of T. V. tried to give it. It was significantly strengthened after a careful study of the materials received by the Cheka and after numerous conversations with eyewitnesses of the events " [RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d. 33, l. 1].

Since the Bull's dispatches left "unclear both the origin of the alleged counter-revolutionary plot and the history of the anti-government coup that took place in Khorezm", it was decided to send Gopner there as an "extraordinary plenipotentiary representative of the RSFSR" [Genis (1), 2000, p. 464; RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d. 363, l. 66]. The instructions of July 15, drawn up for him by Deputy People's Commissar of the Ministry of Internal Affairs L. M. Karakhan, in particular, stated: "The events of the first half of 1922 in Eastern Bukhara, which accompanied Enver Pasha's counterrevolutionary speech, require our intense attention. The presence of the Ferghana and Bukhara fronts, as well as the unclear attitude of the Afghan government towards them, require us to carefully study the political situation in the Central Asian republics and take timely measures to eliminate the existing complications and prevent the possibility of further success of anti-Soviet propaganda. Considering that, among other regions of Central Asia, the Khorezm Soviet Republic may also become the scene of counter-revolutionary or entente intrigues under the banner of nationalism or pan-Islamism, it is essential to check the true state of affairs in Khorezm, instruct the RSFSR Plenipotentiary Mission and have friendly contact with the government of the Khorezm Republic in order to achieve complete unanimity by means of benevolent advice."

Although on June 21, Byk applied to the NKID with a request to dismiss him from the post of plenipotentiary for health reasons, "shaken by a year of being in difficult climatic conditions," new battles unfolded at the 3rd Kurultai between the plenipotentiary and, in his words," revived " nationalist elements led by ...Galliulin, who wanted to transfer power to a pan-Islamic group. "They intended to do this," Bull reported, " with the help of the Khorezmian troops, among whom they conducted appropriate agitation and openly called for the arrest of the government, "which does not care about their needs." Agitation was carried out among the Russian units, exhausted by malaria and homesickness - a promise to release them from Khorezmia if Turk Huseynov, an active pan-Islamic group member, was appointed military commander. Due to Galliulin's exclusion from the Kurultai and his arrest, as well as the friendly bloc of right and left, the provocative work of pan-Islamists failed and Khusseinov's candidacy was not accepted" [RGASPI, f. 5, op. 1, d.2208, l. 42, 49].

However, Yusupov, who left on July 3 at the head of the Khorezm delegation for the Nizhny Novgorod fair, said that Galliulin, who was elected to the presidium of the Kurultai, sharply criticized the activities of the Bull, who in response branded him a traitor and, angry, left the meeting. The next day, Bull suggested that the delegates of the Kurultai who agreed with his policy move to one side, and their opponents - to the other. Those who arrived from the villages, of course, took the side of the authorities, after which the Bull ordered Galliulin to be arrested, and the work of the kurultai took a completely different turn: the delegates implicitly accepted all the instructions of the plenipotentiary and, having chosen the candidates proposed by him for the KHORTSIK, were rewarded for this with scarce calico [Yusupov, l. 252-253].

Immediately after the end of the Kurultai, on July 31, Bull repeated his request for resignation, because the lack of trust in the plenipotentiary makes it impossible for him to work. "Exhausted by malaria," Bull declared, "I and the entire staff of the Representative Office cannot stay here any longer and are waiting for a shift" [RGASPI, f. 5, op. 1, d. 2208, l. 49].

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But on September 1, Gopner arrived in Khiva, who reported: "Those dissatisfied with the Horpra and the policy of our Plenipotentiary, remembering the role of the Diplomatic Mission sent to Khorezm after the famous quasi-communist coup of March 6, 1921, as one might expect, associated with my arrival the supposedly inevitable changes in the composition of the Horpra and the change of the RSFSR Plenipotentiary. On the other hand, the same expectations were shared by our Envoy and Horpra, who were afraid of responsibility for the November "enterprise", were upset and could not hide their excitement at the time of the arrival of the Diplomatic Mission in Khiva. Naturally, Horpra gave me a meeting as dark as a cloud and as cold as ice. Representatives from the population were not allowed to attend the meeting, and a couple of versts outside the city the Trans-mission was met by T. Bull, accompanied by the Pre-Khortsik, Pre-Sovnazirs and Nazir Indel. Several mounted policemen accompanied our sad motorcade. The mourning faces and deathly silence of those who met them involuntarily gave this cortege the character of a funeral procession."

Trying to bring calmness and not disturb the work of the plenipotentiary mission and the government that obeyed him, Gopner tried to show that his visit was caused only by a desire to greet the leaders elected by the Kurultai and thank the Khorezm people for their friendship and loyalty to the union treaty with the RSFSR, especially during Enver Pasha's speech.

"In spite, however," Hopner continued, " of the somewhat exaggerated consideration on my part, the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan has been very careful. The bull was extremely suspicious. For all those who visited me, and for my small staff (secretary T. Syrkin and translator T. Kropotkin). Daudov, absolutely reliable employees and members of the RCP) was observed by three intelligence agencies: a) intelligence Tyunin, employee T. b) predTSIk Haji Bab's intelligence (which T. Byk himself informed me about) and c) Horchek's intelligence. Night and day posts were established, which, after their discovery and after my categorical demand to the Bull, were removed only on September 17 " [RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d. 363, l. 38-40].

Gopner was unequivocal about the envoy: "The trans-mission was able to accurately establish the extraordinary self-will and completely unacceptable cynicism in the activities of the TASS News Agency. This was especially evident in his staging of a counter-revolutionary plot, in which the entire Horpra staff allegedly took part, and in the improvisation (also without the slightest request to the center) of a quasi-revolutionary coup, as a result of which the proletariat and the poorest peasantry were allegedly put in power. Thanks to this outrageous case... in the eyes of the population of Khorezm, both the prestige of the RSFSR and, in particular, the idea of the republic and Soviet power suffered sensitively. Even if you do not touch any other aspects of the company's activities. If the price of a bull is too high, then one November adventure is quite enough to consider the work of t absolutely undesirable. A bull on the eastern outskirts...".

At the same time, Gopner took into account that the Khorezm residents had the impression that the RSFSR government not only recognizes "political manipulations like the November ones" as permissible, but also fully approves of the activities of the plenipotentiary. "The trans - mission," Hopner explained, " could not, of course, be engaged in correcting the mistake made by our center in front of the Khiva residents, just as it could not by any careless actions make the Khiva bazaar a judge in the activities of the RSFSR Plenipotentiary."

In his report of December 20, 1922, Hopner pointed out that there were three political forces in the republic. The first is the Communist Party, which is gradually beginning to express the interests of the poorest peasantry, with the Komsomol and the Dehkan Union adjoining it.

The second is the former Young Khiva residents, who, having failed to resolve the national issue, were "politically crushed by the internecine war they caused," but among whom Baba-Akhun Salimov and Jumaniyaz Sultan-Muradov are still quite popular: the former, being "aloof from political life, teaches at the main madrasa," and the latter is the head of the department land management in the Nazirate of Agriculture. "In Moscow," Gopner observed, " some comrades ascribe great influence

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Palvanniyaz Yusupov (Chairman of the first government and the main culprit of the September massacre). But in reality, Yusupov has a notorious reputation in Khorezm as a cunning khan's official and a thieving merchant. In addition, his name is a symbol of Uzbek pogrom chauvinism." At the same time, Gopner spoke sympathetically about the "counter-revolutionary" Rakhmanov, who was almost shot, whom he described as "a pan-Islamist, a nationalist (from the Validov group) and a mystic, but the most honest person in Khorezm."

The third force, which is completely unformed organizationally, is the reactionary Islamist trend, which relies on "a small part of the higher clergy (ishan), some medieval craft shops and the most conservative part of the bazaar." Branding them for Chauvinism, Russophobia, the desire to preserve feudal relations and establish the hegemony of the Mullahs, Gopner at the same time argued that there is absolutely no pan-Islamism or pan-Turkism in Khiva, and Validov's emissaries could not gain any influence among the population, which remained aloof from Enver Pasha's Basmach experiments. Moreover, in economic terms, the republic is so connected with Russia that even if a stone wall is erected between them, the Khorezm people will surely destroy it. Therefore, if there was a single person, Mullah Bekchan Rakhmanov, who was associated with the KNO, then there is no need to talk about the existence of his organization in Khorezm, and all the Bull's attempts to prove the opposite hung in the air.

At the same time, Hopner explained, there is an "autonomist" mood among the Khwarezm intelligentsia, which "feeds, on the one hand, on the deep conviction that the right of each nationality to self-determination proclaimed by the revolution cannot be interpreted in a separatist spirit, but only means the expediency of internal self-government of the marginal Muslim republics", and on the other hand, the policy of self-determination of the The Turkcomission has launched a campaign to combat "colonization". Hopner believed that the Khorezm "autonomists"are much more moderate and harmless than many Turkestanis or Bukharans in power, and Mirsharapov, Ibeniyaminov, Irmatov and others are much less prone to nationalism than Turar Ryskulov and Nizametdin Khojaev. "Only the tactlessness and cynicism of Comrade Byk," Gopner was indignant, " threw these people into the opposition to the RSFSR representative office, and then into prison, where they were subjected to completely undeserved bullying. The Nazirs who suffered from the Bull deserve not only not to be neglected, not only not to be put in prison, but to be brought closer to us in every possible way and to train them to be useful workers in the East. In the Khorezm Communist Party, such people as Mirsharapov, Irmatov, Galliulin and others formed the best part of it and in no case deserved the repressions they suffered" [RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d. 363, l. 49-54].

But after reading Hopner's report, the envoy accused him of distorting the facts and categorically disagreed with the conclusions.

"One should not come to Khiva," Bull quipped, " to proclaim such truths that there are no economic grounds for pan-Islamism to flourish in Khorezm. In all my reports, I have made the point that the masses have nothing in common with pan-Islamism or pan-Turkism, but one cannot draw conclusions from this, as Hopner did, that pan-Islamist organizations in Khorezm cannot make a front for us. After all, Bashkiria is no less economically connected to the RSFSR than Khorezm, and yet Validov grew up there. Pan-Islamism is a political movement and tries to seize the top of power in its hands, and through it carry out its tasks. The fact that Enver Pasha's adventure did not touch Khiva is not proof that there was no ground for pan-Islamist organizations in Khiva (Gopner), but resulted from the timely removal of the pan-Islamist elite in the November days. This prevented Khorezm and created a fairly stable calm in the country, despite Junaid, while Bukhara was on fire and turned into a front that cost us so many victims."

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Further, Byk stated, according to Hopner's" authoritative "opinion, there were only two members of the KNO in Khiva - Agaydarov and Rakhmanov, but the latter -" a hard man, from whom it is as difficult to extract testimony as from Hopner a word of truth, he himself admitted and signed his signature, and now he can be interrogated a second time, that Validov himself told him that Teregulov is his representative in Khorezm"8. So, the Bull triumphed, there were already three pan-Islamists, and all the others, Ata-Maksum, Mirsharapov, Ibeniyaminov and others, "were under the leadership of this campaign and they themselves admit that they came together almost every day (as if to eat pilaf), but, according to Hopner, preserved their innocence and just in case, they are attributed an autonomous bias." Bull still argued that the Khwarezm organization of the KNO existed, but it turned out to be "relatively detached from its center and had directives only of a general nature, and the characters in it were more primitive and therefore their actions were more crude" [RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d. 536, l. 12-14].

But trying to justify its repressive policy against imaginary or real "conspirators", Bull 9 was not able to document their "counter-revolutionary" plans, which was described in detail in a note compiled by the secretary of the RSFSR Emergency Mission in Khorezm A. Syrkin. When he began to examine the documents of the investigation, he discovered the presence of two not quite identical productions: "the Russian text, which should be a translation from the Muslim original, was submitted to the Mission of T. V. Putin. The original of the case in the Muslim language, which is kept in the archives of the Supreme Tribunal of the Khorrespublika." But although Ata-Maksum's government was accused of an anti-Russian policy and a secret agreement with the head of the Turkmen Basmachi, only unverified copies of letters from the Khorezm leaders to the Afghan consul in Bukhara and Rakhmanov to Junaid Khan, which contained attacks personally against the Bull, appeared as incriminating documents in the case [RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d. 363, l. 76].

Syrkin also noted that the testimony of Irmatov and Agaydarov "clearly follows the same template", and if the former gave the names of the YPG members in his additional testimony dated December 1, then Agaydarov gave the same testimony, and also additionally, the next day. Moreover, both witnesses described Khiva as "almost the center of some world pan-Islamic organization", whose branches are located in almost all Muslim countries, and later Irmatov recanted his testimony, saying that they were snatched from him under threat of death. "Considering and comparing the documentary data on the case and a number of witness statements," Syrkin emphasized, " we have to admit all the charges brought against the government.-

8 Validov described Teregulov as his "former adjutant and closest comrade in military affairs since 1917" (Zaki Validi Togan, 1997, p. 280).

9 In December 1922, Byk was recalled to Moscow and, on charges of "incorrectly pursuing a political line, being the plenipotentiary in Khiva", appeared on May 8, 1923 before the Party Committee of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), which, having proposed to remove him from work in the NKID, decided: "The case is considered liquidated" [RGASPI, f. 613, op. 1, d. 16, l. 17]. The Party Board also recommended that Hopner be removed from diplomatic work, and although it revoked its decision on July 1, he subsequently served as Deputy People's Commissar of Justice and prosecutor of the Turkmen SSR in Poltoratsk, where he died on February 10, 1925 after a serious illness. Moving to economic work, Bull became chairman of the audit commission of the Sakharotrest, but in December 1927, for participating in the left opposition, he was expelled from the ranks of the CPSU(b). Before being reinstated in the party in January 1929, he worked as Deputy Head of the Sugar Trust Sales Department and at the Central Sugar Industry Research Institute, and later as head of the Accounting and Reporting Department of Soyuzsakhar (since 1931), director of the Pushkin Museum of Fine Arts (since 1932), Deputy Chairman of the Committee for the Protection of Monuments of the Revolution Professor of Art and Culture at the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (1934), director of the resort trust of the East Siberian Regional Health Department. Arrested on July 10, 1936 on charges of counter-revolutionary terrorist activities, Bull was executed on October 5. The same fate befell his wife, a doctor of the Irkutsk sanitary and epidemiological station R. M. Bravo, arrested on May 27, 1937 and shot on September 22, 1938.

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From the legal point of view, completely unfounded and unsubstantiated, and the very conduct of the case and the construction of all charges on the basis of copies from non-existent documents are criminal and unacceptable" [RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d.363, l. 79].

Already on September 16, 1923, having considered the application of Ibeniyaminov and other convicts with a request for rehabilitation, the Executive Bureau of the Central Committee of the KCP decided to "review the case against these comrades", after which on September 30 it decided: "To apply to Khortsik for the restoration of the civil rights of tt. Ibniaminov, Abdalov and Rakhmanov, taking into account their proletarian origin and the moral and physical punishment they suffered during three years " [RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 13, l. 65, 102].

Sent to Khiva as a representative of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), G. I. Broido, speaking at a party conference on April 4, 1924, was indignant that "Bulls and other idiots put representatives of the progressive bourgeoisie in prison, performing tasks of hoochers-nepmans", who "were prevented by the Yusupovs and Rakhmanovs from robbing the treasury" [RGASPI, f. 544, op. 4, d. 34, l. 10]. Considering the KPO "invented in the office of the Bull and based on forged "documents"", Broido insisted that the KHORTSIK session adopt the resolution he proposed: "The KPO case is a model of lies and resourcefulness resorted to by various nepmans like Makhmudov, who attached themselves to the state apparatus and committed their dark deeds under left-wing slogans. The Khortsik session decides to consider the case on charges of Rakhmanov 10, Ibniaminov 11 and Abdalov 12 as having arisen on the basis of fictitious and forged materials of criminal people, and therefore the verdict against these persons is considered annulled " [RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 83, l. 42, 105].

However, one question still remains unanswered: if the KNO was invented by the plenipotentiary to justify the violent change of the government of Khorezm that he did not like, then how to explain that the seemingly "forged" materials of the investigation about the participation of prominent "Muslim" communists in the" nationalist " organization of Validov are confirmed by his own memoirs?

list of literature

Genis V. L. (1) Krasnaya Persia. The Bolsheviks in Gilan. 1920 - 1921. Documentary Chronicle, Moscow, 2000.
Genis V. L. (2) "The Fake Revolution", or the Russian embassy in Khiva in 1920 // East (Oriens). 2000. N 2.

Genis V. L. Overthrow of the Young Khiva government in 1921 / / Voprosy istorii. 2004. N 1.

Zaki Validi Togan. Memories. The struggle of Turkestan Muslims and other Eastern Turks for national existence and culture, Moscow, 1997.
RGASPI (Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History).

Serebryakova G. Selected works. In 2 volumes, Moscow, 1975. Vol. 2.

Palvanniyaz Yusupov. Memories. 284 l. - Handwritten fund of the library of the Karakalpak branch of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan / Translated by B. V. Chepurnov.

10 The author of works on the history of music of the Khorezm Uzbeks and a number of textbooks, Rakhmanov worked as a deputy nazir of education of the KHSSR from 1924, after the liquidation of which he was in charge of public education in Khiva, but was killed in the late 1920s.

11 In February 1924, Kerim-Bergen Safaev, a member of the Executive Bureau of the Central Committee of the KCP, wrote to the Central Committee of the RCP (b) that the party leadership did not agree with the proposal of B. G. Gorodetsky to reintroduce Abdalov and Ibniaminov (1898-1938) to the government, since "these people were once accused of narrow nationalism and for their own reasons". according to the verdict of the court, they should have been shot, " but "after one year of imprisonment, they were released, deprived of their civil rights." The plenipotentiary insisted, and Ibniaminov was appointed Deputy Nazir of Internal Affairs [RGASPI, 17, op. 84, d. 536, l. 21]. In 1924, he already worked as a nazir and even chairman of the Khortsik, and from 1925 he was the manager of the Kara-Kalpak regional department of internal trade, but was later repressed.

12 In October 1923, the Central Committee of the KHKP recommended Abdalov to the post of nazir of trade and Industry of the KHSSR, after the liquidation of which he was in charge of the Khorezm Agency of the Agricultural Bank.

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