On November 9, 2015, the Turkish Sector held a scientific conference " The Era of the Justice and Development Party rule: Interim results and Forecasts (2002-2015)".

In June 2015, the next parliamentary elections were held in Turkey, as a result of which the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has ruled since 2002, failed to win and form a one-party government. In the months since the election, a coalition government has not been formed, which apparently served the interests of both President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who headed the country's government before his election in 2014, and the AKP itself. Unable to accept the fact of defeat, the AKP pinned its hopes for its political future on the snap parliamentary elections held on November 1, 2015. The task of the conference was to analyze the balance of achievements of the ruling party and the remaining unresolved problems that emerged after 13 years of AKP rule and several months after the June elections.

The conference was attended by employees of the Turkey and Information Technology Sector of the Russian Academy of Sciences, ISAA MSU, Russian-Turkish Research Center VGBIL, Kazan Federal University (KFU), RISI.

S. F. Oreshkova's report "The 2015 elections and the problem of national minorities in Turkey" examined some of the painful points of the current political situation in Turkey. In her opinion, the outcome of the Turkish elections in November 2015 could have been easily predicted. The majority of the Turkish people are statesmen in their mentality - adherents of a strong state, which is predetermined by both the Ottoman tradition and Kemalist training. The electorate proceeded from the fact that the country is in a difficult situation, and therefore it is not time to change the leader. Even those who are not very friendly to him voted for R. T. Erdogan. The AKP's victory gives the party some leeway for a while. However, the reasons that gave rise to

Andrey V. BOLDYREV-Candidate of Historical Sciences, Researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, boldirew.andrei2011@yandex.ru.

Natalia ULCHENKO-Candidate of Economic Sciences, Associate Professor of the Moscow State University Institute of Oriental Studies, Leading Researcher of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, ulchenko-n@rambler.ru.

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there is a tense situation in the country, they have not disappeared anywhere and may soon reappear. These include, first, Turkish Islamism, under the slogan of which the ruling party operates. In recent decades, Islam in Turkey has clearly experienced a revival. The government's social policy, which echoes the Islamic ideas of helping the poor, creating an affordable education system, and so on, has been a notable success. As a result, a part of the left-wing electorate switched to the AKP side. Modern Turkish Islamists are not so organizationally strong and authoritative ideologically as to unite all those who sympathize with them. Ideological confusion is growing among the adherents of Islam. Secondly, the confrontation of Islamists with supporters of the secular government and the army continues. Their conflict with the army elite is particularly dangerous. Turkey's authority in NATO is weakening, and the ruling circles cannot allow this to happen. Third, new ethnic conflicts are emerging in the country. In addition to the long-standing and currently aggravated Kurdish problem and difficult relations with Armenians, Greeks and Jews living in Turkey for a long time, there is a question of immigrants from the North Caucasus. They have lived in Turkey for about 150 years, and it was believed that they had long since joined the Turkish nation. However, recently problems have arisen due to the preservation of their national identity.

B. M. Yagudin (KFU) studied the process of transformation of the political system of the Republic of Turkey in the era of AKP rule. The sole rule of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey for 13 years with the prospect of a new four-year term of government has formed a real era in the country's recent history and, undoubtedly, has become a political phenomenon. In the 2000s," New Islamism " took political revenge on the Kemalist secular elite and proved its ability not only to solve the country's urgent problems in the new conditions, but also to form a new agenda for the entire society. The moderate Islamist party has won four completely democratic parliamentary and municipal elections.

During the AKP's rule, the country's political system underwent a major transformation. The party was forced to respond to the challenge thrown at it by the highest circles of the army, who considered themselves defenders of the secular Kemalist heritage and accused it of undermining the secular foundations of the country. The answer was given both in the legal field and at the level of intercepting the initiative in shaping the public opinion of the country and its Western allies. The adopted constitutional amendments and organizational and managerial steps made it possible to completely push back the army from participating in the political process. The army, which under the Constitution of 1982 was the core of the political system of "guardian democracy", has ceased to be such. As a result, the mixed presidential-parliamentary system, which has not yet fully developed, has lost an important stabilizing element.

Under the new conditions, the AKP's natural and logical step is to adopt a new constitution and transition to a presidential republic. It is proposed to remove elements of kemalism from the constitution and create a new system of power distribution in favor of a strong president. So far, the AKP does not have enough opportunities to legitimately replace the constitution, as the 1982 Constitution laid down procedural obstacles that prevent the ruling party from implementing its plans without the support of opposition parties. However, the AKP will insist on its proposals.

An important change that the AKP managed to achieve and change the alignment of the entire political system was the marginalization of opposition political parties and the isolation of political "groups of influence" (F. Gulen's Hizmet and others). The transformation of the AKP into a dominant party strengthened the authoritarian features in the actions of the undisputed de facto leader of the party, R. T. Erdogan. His work was a factor in a number of the party's successes, although it caused discontent among wide circles of society.

Pavel Shlykov (ISAA MSU) touched upon the problems in relations between the authorities and the media in Turkey during the AKP rule. The speaker noted that today the sphere of Turkish media is divided between large media holdings and small-scale independent publications. The information field is subordinate to the authorities due to the current legislation, which makes the media vulnerable to political pressure. The economic interests of newspaper and TV channel owners contribute to the formation of client relations between the media, government and politicians. When interacting with the government, media owners try to enlist the necessary support from the authorities in order to obtain economic preferences, and in the case of current politicians, pressure

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The impact on mass media is exerted through the adoption of special legislative norms regulating the scope of their activities.

The existence of independent publications slightly dilutes the overall picture of the dominance of media loyal to the government, allowing you to get alternative information and a vision of the situation. By providing alternative interpretations and highlighting stories that are inconvenient for other media outlets, these publications have played a role in the pluralization of the information field in Turkey, breaking the established models of nationalist discourse and opening up discussions on previously taboo topics about the role of the military elite in politics, the politicization of the judicial system, institutional corruption or violations in the conclusion of state contracts.

Nevertheless, most of the Turkish media suffer from the same shortcomings, poor quality of materials, bias and political dependence. In part, they can be attributed to the peculiarities of political culture and the split of the media and civil society as a whole along the lines of political identity. However, another root of the problem is the restrictions on freedom of speech and the press, which narrow the field of maneuver for all media outlets without exception. This is not just because of state censorship. Examples of well - known journalists being dismissed from the central media for criticizing the government are a wake-up call about the situation with freedom of speech and an indicator of the weakness of the media as a driver of democratization.

I. G. Saetov (Russian-Turkish Research Center VGBIL) analyzed the electoral marketing of the AKP. He noted that the stages of its development are inextricably linked with the structure of the electorate, the specifics of election cycles and changes in the political technology strategies of the party. In the 2002 general parliamentary elections, the AKP positioned itself as a political association of the "oppressed", who act on behalf of the same" oppressed " strata to restore justice. In 2007, the AKP's strategy was to mobilize additional electorates by promoting its own economic achievements and attracting the" swamp " of voters from other parties who were leaving the political arena. In these elections, the AKP applied a number of political technological innovations-it attracted a significant number of volunteers and used the Internet. In 2007-2010, R. Erdogan's sole leadership in the party was finally formed, and pluralism of opinions was eradicated in it. The electorate became more homogeneous, and Erdogan consolidated the center-right (the traditional Sunni majority), pitting them against" secularists", Alevis, and other opposition groups. After the 2011 election campaign The cult of personality of Prime Minister R. Erdogan rose to a new level, which was a prerequisite for the introduction of the presidential system of government, i.e., the regime of sole rule of Erdogan.

For the first time, the regime "faltered" during the Gezi Park protests in the summer of 2013. The most significant shock for the AKP was the arrests on corruption cases on December 17 and 25, 2013. Government officials and the media controlled by it explained everything with a conspiracy theory and declared themselves a victim.

The election campaigns before the municipal elections in March and the presidential elections in August 2014 were conducted as nationwide campaigns, under the slogan of "a new war for independence" against the "parallel state", i.e. internal enemies of the AKP. The party suffered a major shock in the June 7, 2015 elections. AKP leaders conducted an unremarkable campaign, insisting on the introduction of an unpopular presidential system among the people. As a result, with just over 40% of the vote, the AKP failed to form a majority in Parliament. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan did everything possible to ensure his party's revenge in the snap elections on November 1, 2015. The AKP was able to mobilize all its possible electorate, eventually receiving almost 50% of the vote and regaining its majority in parliament. However, the AKP electorate is currently not held together by a coherent ideology or a constructive agenda, apart from the fear of new terrorist attacks, internal civil conflicts and an economic crisis. All this is not the basis that will allow Turkey to develop steadily.

In the report of N. Y. Ulchenko (IB RAS) " Economic development of Turkey during the AKP rule (2002-2015): achievements and challenges " recognized the AKP government's undoubted success in addressing such long-standing problems of the Turkish economy as the chronic budget deficit, rising public debt, and high inflation. The onset of a period of financial stabilization is confirmed by the fact that the annual inflation rate since 2004 has been-

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It is less than 10%, while in the initial 2002 it exceeded 54%. The creation of an environment of financial stability made it possible to increase and make more even growth rates, especially in the period leading up to the global crisis of 2008-2009.

At the same time, the current account deficit of the balance of payments increased markedly. In other words, the dependence of the national economy on external sources of financing, and hence on fluctuations in the global financial market, has increased. Thus, the most critical macroeconomic imbalances were shifted from one point to another, but they were not eliminated in principle.

The main reason for this process was the model used, which consisted in reducing the saving capacity of the national economy against the background of increased private consumption, eliminating the state's investment activity, and turning private entrepreneurs into major investors who are forced to attract the missing part of funds to finance investments from foreign markets. Such a model, while reducing the ability of the Turkish economy to maintain growth on its own basis, has also allowed the country to delay its approach to sliding into the so - called middle-level development trap-a steady decline in growth rates after a number of years of solid development. Reducing the ability to use international financial market funds for one reason or another is fraught not only with a long-term decline in growth, but also with the loss of financial stability achieved by Turkey.

In the report of E. I. Urazova (IB RAS) "Investment policy of the AKP Government (main trends)", it was noted that after the AKP came to power, as a result of accelerating privatization, reducing the rate of inflation, creating a favorable climate for foreign investment in the country, and deepening the process of economic liberalization, significant changes occurred in the investment sphere. Total investment in fixed assets increased from 16% of GDP in 2002 to 21.9% in 2006 and 24.7% in 2012.Investment growth was accompanied by changes both in the ratio of public and private sectors in favor of the latter, and in the sectoral structure of investment.

After the privatization of most public sector enterprises, the main objects of public investment are infrastructure projects, mainly in transport and energy. A characteristic feature of the AKP government's investment policy is the focus on using the country's transit potential, which contributes to increasing its role in the region, strengthening ties with the European Union, and also provides the state with additional foreign exchange revenues. Turkey is actively involved in the creation of the Southern Transport Corridor initiated by the European Union. During the AKP administration, a 13-kilometer tunnel was built under the Bosphorus, which allowed connecting Turkish railways to European ones; Turkey joined the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars high-speed railway , an important section of the highway that should connect European countries with China. Much attention is paid to the modernization of railway transport through the creation of electrified and high-speed lines.

To strengthen the country's energy base, the country's leadership has signed a number of agreements on laying gas pipelines from Azerbaijan, Iran and the Persian Gulf countries through its territory; part of the gas is intended for Turkey, but the main flow will go to European countries.

As for the private sector, until recently there has been a steady increase in private investment, which was supported by government measures to improve infrastructure and encourage them in the form of full or partial exemption from taxes and duties, concessional lending to enterprises investing in priority industries and backward regions that export their products and use modern technologies. These benefits can be enjoyed by both national and foreign and mixed enterprises.

As a result, many industries in the service sector (trade, banking, tourism) began to grow, and there were noticeable changes in industrial production: new industries were developed, product quality improved, and its competitiveness in foreign markets increased. Exports increased significantly - by 90% due to industrial goods. In 2011, the share of industry in Turkey's GDP reached 33%, compared to 28% in 2000.

However, since 2011-2012, under the influence of the global crisis of 2009 and the subsequent stagnation of Western economies, the private sector has been experiencing increasing difficulties - by 2015.

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many Turkish companies, especially small and medium-sized ones, were on the verge of bankruptcy, there was a reduction in the inflow of foreign direct investment, industrial exports began to decline, inflation and unemployment began to rise again.

A.V. Boldyrev's report "The Istanbul Canal Project: Politics, Economics, ecology" examined various aspects of the construction project, which was planned to be built parallel to the Bosphorus. The construction of the canal was announced in 2011.Only the development of the canal and the creation of the corresponding project documentation took about two years. The canal should be put into operation no earlier than 2023, as this year Turkey will celebrate the centenary of the founding of the Republic of Turkey. The validity, and most importantly, the possibility of implementing this project is doubtful both among its political opponents and among representatives of Turkish environmental science.

The implementation of the Istanbul project may lead to a change in the Montreux Convention, since Turkey is interested in minimizing the influence of the signatory states on the regime of the Straits and establishing new rules for transportation through them for energy carriers of the Black Sea region. The arguments of environmental scientists are as follows. If the Istanbul Canal project is implemented, the water balance in the Black Sea region will be disrupted. This will lead to the fact that through the new channel, water from the Mediterranean Sea will flow into the waters of the Marmara and Black Seas, which threatens to lose the Black Sea of its unique flora and fauna, and the territories populated west of Istanbul will turn into an island that will be deprived of the necessary supplies of drinking water. Finally, construction of such a scale involves the removal of huge masses of soil, which can provoke maximum destruction in the event of an earthquake. Environmentalists, scientists and the opposition believe that large-scale projects, including the Istanbul Canal, will turn the city into a giant construction site, which can lead to irreparable consequences. Despite widespread public criticism, the Government of the Republic of Moldova has recently Erdogan is being revived again by the Istanbul Canal project.

K. V. Vertyaev's report "The Kurdish political opposition in Turkey: before and after the early parliamentary elections" noted that, despite the passage of the left-wing pro-Kurdish Peoples ' Democracy Party (HDP) to the Turkish parliament, its representation has significantly decreased compared to the June 2015 elections. The ruling Justice and Development Party won 317 of the 550 seats in Parliament, enabling it to form a one-party government. At the same time, the number of votes that were cast for the AKP is not enough to change the Turkish constitution, so the issue of adopting a new constitution will be the subject of a long debate with supporters of the HDP.

A new impetus for resolving the Kurdish issue was given as a result of an initiative called the "Imrali process" (after the island where the leader of the Kurdistan Workers ' Party (PKK), Abdullah Ocalan, is located). It was Ocalan who was one of the initiators of the establishment of a new legal pro-Kurdish party in Turkey with the involvement of leftist forces in order to achieve a broader electoral platform and overcome the 10% barrier in the elections. However, the "Kurdish factor" played a cruel joke on the PD in the last elections, since a significant part of the country's population (about 65%) has a rather negative attitude towards the prospects for political cooperation with political representatives of the PKK, which is officially considered a terrorist organization in the country. For this reason, due to the escalation of the inter-ethnic conflict in Turkey after the summer 2015 elections, some of the Turkish left forces refused to support the PD.

According to the charter, the PDN is a left-wing, social-democratic party that unites various political groups and minorities (ethnic, political, religious, working class) who intend to legally seek recognition of their rights and participate in the political administration of the country. The HDP seeks to win over the voters of the center-left Republican People's Party by rejecting Kurdish ethnic particularism in the struggle for votes.

In the run-up to the last election, Kurdish nationalism was the trump card that Erdogan played. The terrorist attacks in Suruc and Ankara (self-detonation of two Islamist brothers) provoked a serious internal conflict, the hostages of which were the Kurdish political forces of Turkey. The "tit-for-tat" or "controlled violence" attitude of the Turkish state against the armed supporters of A. Ocalan was expressed in a series of ground and air missile attacks on the positions of the Kurdish rebels from the PKK in the Qandil Mountains of Iraq. So

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Thus, the situation in the eastern provinces of Turkey remains quite tense, although the space for political dialogue has become disproportionately larger than in the mid-1990s-the time of active clashes between the PKK supporters and the armed forces, police and gendarmerie of Turkey. However, with each round of violence, the chances of resolving the conflict become less and less.

The Kurdish opposition's criticism of moderate Islamists in power boils down to focusing on Erdogan's cooperation with political forces loyal to ISIS, which provide oil supplies from Iraq, and the fact that the city of Adana in southern Turkey has become the main transit point for transporting militants from Europe to the war zone in Syria and Iraq. The formation of a coalition against ISIL forces creates a new hotbed of tension on Turkey's borders.

Irina Svistunova (RISI) touched upon the Turkish-Greek relations during the AKP's rule. The two neighboring countries not only share a common past, but also share a number of intractable contradictions. After the AKP came to power in Turkey at the end of 2002, the Greek direction became one of the areas in which Ankara tried to make a "foreign policy breakthrough" by launching new initiatives to develop relations.

The AKP's policy towards Greece has produced significant results. In particular, in recent years, Ankara has managed to initiate a regular exchange of high-level visits and establish a permanent political dialogue with Athens (including on controversial issues), which is an important achievement given the difficult historical context of Turkish-Greek relations. Economic cooperation between the two countries has expanded, which can serve as an effective way to" mitigate " problematic moments in political relations. Infrastructure and transport projects have been developed, and the mutual tourist flow has significantly increased.

At the same time, Turkish-Greek relations continue to be weighed down by unresolved issues such as the Aegean conflict, the definition of the maritime borders and airspace of the two countries in the Aegean Sea, the Cyprus problem, as well as the situation of the Greek minority in Turkey and the Turkish in Greece. The intensification of dialogue on these issues has not yet led to serious progress, which means that the conflict potential between the two countries remains intact and requires further efforts on both sides.

N. A. Zamaraeva (Institute of International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences) reviewed the Pakistani-Turkish relations in 2002-2015, which developed steadily during this period, increasing their trade, economic, military and cultural potential. According to both capitals, the" fraternal " partnership is based on Islamic traditions and the desire to maintain peace and order in the Muslim Ummah and in the region in the 21st century.

This allowed Islamabad and Ankara to lay the foundation for strategic cooperation by 2015, the main provisions of which are security and joint defense production; cooperation in finance and banking (including insurance, capital market, anti-money laundering); trade and economic cooperation (development of the private sector, simplification of logistics rules in order to speed up the delivery of goodsfurther development of a favorable investment climate; cooperation in the energy sector, maritime transport (joint projects for the construction of seaport infrastructure), civil aviation, agriculture, science and education, and cultural exchanges.

In the field of foreign policy, the positions of both capitals coincide on many issues: UN reforms, strengthening of other international organizations - the Organization for Economic Cooperation, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Turkey and Pakistan have taken a neutral stance towards the 2015 Yemen crisis, refusing to send troops to participate in a ground operation on the side of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia against the Houthis. Today, the issue of reviving the trilateral forum "Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkey"is on the agenda in the politics of the two countries.

There is a partial discrepancy between the positions of Turkey and Pakistan on the issue of the Islamic State (IS) organization, since Islamabad condemns terrorism "in all its forms and manifestations" and declares the absence of IS militants on its territory.

I. I. Ivanova (IB RAS) in the report " Relations between Turkey and Iran: Has there been a reset?" She noted that Turkish-Iranian relations have been an example for many years

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bilateral cooperation and competition for regional leadership. Similar trends were also evident during the rule of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey.

The events of the Arab Spring, which began in 2011, led to major changes in the status quo in the Middle East and intensified competition between Turkey and Iran for regional influence. First of all, this affected the Syrian problem. In order to preserve its strategic partner - the Syrian regime - Iran began to support it, and Turkey, betting on regime change in Damascus, supported the anti-government forces represented by the Free Syrian Army.

We can also talk about the" confessional factor " in Turkish-Iranian relations. Recently, Turkey and Iran have taken opposite positions on Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. However, an important aspect is cooperation in the economic and energy spheres, the deepening of which became possible after President X came to power in Iran. Rouhani. The signing in Vienna in July 2015 of the agreement on Iran's nuclear program between the "big six" and Iran was positively assessed in Turkey, and primarily by the Turkish business community. At the same time, Turkey, given its relations with Iraq and Saudi Arabia, cannot share Iran's positions in the field of security policy and ideology.

In the report of G. V. Lukyanov (Higher School of Economics) " Libyan-Turkish relations in 2002-2015"It was noted that the AKP has a special role in intensifying, expanding and deepening bilateral interstate relations, especially in the field of economy and culture, after the lifting of international sanctions against Libya in 2003-2005. After the AKP came to power in Turkey in 2002, relations between the two countries entered a new phase and gradually acquired a dynamic character and strategic depth. Tripoli's desire to lift the restrictive sanctions regime imposed in 1992 by the UN Security Council and find new markets for the main product of Libyan exports was understood in Turkey, which is interested in entering the Mediterranean oil market and sees Libya as a "gateway to Africa" for Turkish private and state capital. After the lifting of sanctions in 2005, Turkey became the owner of exceptional opportunities for conducting economic activities in the National Security and Defense Council, competing with China and Russia. At the same time, a number of rather unpleasant topics appeared on the agenda of bilateral relations, for example, accusations against the AKP of granting asylum and supporting figures of the Libyan Islamist opposition in Turkey.
Despite the fact that the events of 2011 in Libya caused a mixed reaction in Turkish society as a whole and in the elite in particular, the latter managed to find a certain model of behavior in the face of an internal conflict of economic and political interests. Long before the elections to the General National Congress (GNA) in the summer of 2012 and the formation of new authorities in Libya, the AKP leadership clearly defined its interests and preferences, providing some support to some political parties, associations and politicians, most of whom demonstrated their commitment to the ideas of political Islam and Islamism. By resolutely starting to restore the level of their presence in Libya before 2011, Turkish business and educational organizations relied on the full support of the AKP and the Cabinets of Ministers of R. Erdogan and A. Davutoglu and were able to achieve significant results.

The AKP's support of contacts with the political and economic institutions of the GNA in Tripoli after the formation of the model of two rival parliaments in Libya in 2014 was one of the decisive factors in the economic and foreign policy viability of this political association, which is no longer recognized by anyone but Qatar. The AKP's interest in obtaining Libyan oil at a favorable price and its desire to expand the zone of Turkish cultural and political influence in Africa through the "Libyan gate" persisted in 2015 and became the main engine of Turkey's initiative policy towards a new Libya.

Olga Ledovskaya (Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences) devoted her report to the strategic partnership between Japan and Turkey during the AKP rule. Having put forward the principle of a multi-vector foreign policy in 2002, Ankara intended to establish and maintain diplomatic relations with a large number of global players, so that relations between the countries would not be competitive, but mutually complementary. Japan, declaring "the desire to

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establish win-win relations with the Republic of Turkey", considers Turkey, whose political role in the international arena has significantly increased, as an important strategic partner in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea region and the Middle East.

During the AKP administration, Turkey has seen positive developments in bilateral Japanese-Turkish relations, which was reflected in the signing in 2013 of the "Joint Declaration on the Establishment of Strategic Partnership between Japan and the Republic of Turkey", which aimed to give a new quality to bilateral cooperation in political, economic, scientific, technical, cultural, humanitarian and other areas. other areas. Cooperation is developing in the construction of bridges, nuclear power plants in Turkey, in the aviation and aerospace industries, in the export of defense technologies and in education. However, despite the huge potential for the development of relations between the two countries, there are a number of constraints caused by differences in approaches to a number of international problems of a global and regional nature.

S. L. Volkova (Institute of International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences) considered Turkey's foreign economic relations with the new subject of the Russian Federation - the Republic of Crimea-from the point of view of continuing the country's common export-oriented strategy, aimed, among other things, at expanding the number of partner countries. Since the signing of basic agreements on economic cooperation between Turkey and the Republic of Crimea is legally impossible, cooperation at the level of regions and municipalities is paramount. In addition, the development of relations is facilitated by the creation of specialized non-governmental structures with the subsequent inclusion of leading ministries and departments, enterprises and banks, and associations of the Turkish private sector in this scheme.

In Turkey's mutual cooperation with the Republic of Crimea, relations are focused on the trade and economic aspect. Among the main areas of cooperation, we can highlight the expansion of bilateral trade, development of transport links, construction business, tourism, attracting Turkish investment in various sectors of the economy, modernization and development of the region's infrastructure. We can also talk about the great potential for new investments in the extraction and processing of natural resources in the Crimea.

The Government of the Republic of Crimea is trying to attract foreign partners. For this purpose, the Center for Investment and Economic Development of the Region and the Council for Improving the Investment Climate of the Republic of Crimea were established. However, the low level of competition in the investment market of Crimea due to the sanctions imposed on Russia by European states provides advantages for the Turkish side. Turkey's sphere of interests is very broad. The Turks act in this partnership as the main investors, financial and technological partners. At the moment, there are about 20 investment projects of cooperation between Turkey and Crimea, which are under approval.

At the end of the conference, A. G. Hajiyev (IB RAS) touched upon the peculiarities of the development of relations between Turkey and the EU during the AKP rule. In Europe, discussions are continuing on a common action plan, which involves EU financial assistance in the amount of 3 billion euros, an accelerated process of visa cancellation and the activation of negotiations on Turkey's accession to the European Union. Turkey, in turn, should help protect the joint border, improve the living conditions of refugees in the country, prevent the influx of migrants to the EU from its territory and return illegal immigrants who have entered the European Union from Turkey.

Does this mean the beginning of another stage of rapprochement between Ankara and Brussels? Or is this a common tactic of the Europeans to solve their own problems, which this time are mainly related to the influx of illegal migrants? The current negotiations between Turkey and the EU do not portend anything new that could complete the current stage and bring relations between Turkey and the EU to a new level. The EU countries are frightened by the endless influx of migrants from the Middle East, and therefore began to pay more attention to Turkey, dedicating the last summit to it, hoping to give it the function of a so-called buffer and accumulator of refugees who are now using Turkish territory as a springboard for a massive offensive on "rich Europe". It is obvious that the current promises of concessions to a country that many in Europe consider "non-European" would hardly have been possible if the burden of refugees had not been felt by the leading EU countries, which are now forced to accept not only Syrians.

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