The history and peculiarities of Turkish expansion in the Arabian Peninsula are almost unknown. This is primarily due to the lack of published documents and the unavailability of archives. Meanwhile, this problem is of considerable interest. The classics of Marxism-Leninism pointed out that even in the pre-capitalist period, the ruling circles of exploitative societies pursued a colonial policy. 1 In the 19th century, this policy was also implemented by such major Asian powers as the Ottoman Empire. V. I. Lenin also mentioned Turkey among the countries that had colonies by the beginning of the twentieth century, when summarizing the books "History of Colonization" by G. Morris and "Imperialism" by D. Hobson .2
Turkey's colonial policy in terms of goals, methods and consequences was significantly different from the policy of capitalist and even more so imperialist states, since the income from the occupied lands went mainly to the feudal-landowner elite. The exploitation of the colonies to a certain extent contributed to the preservation of feudal relations, hindered the socio-economic and political development of Turkey itself and the Arab countries enslaved by it. The aggressive policy in the Arabian Peninsula was carried out by both reactionary representatives of the country's ruling class and supporters of bourgeois reforms - the leaders of the "new Ottomans". Closely associated with the latter and even trying to implement their ideas, the governor-General of the Baghdad Vilayet, and then Grand Vizier Midhat Pasha, was one of the main initiators of these seizures. It is also characteristic that this policy was carried out despite opposition from Great Britain, although the "new Ottomans" and Midhat Pasha adhered to a pro-English orientation. Turkish invasion of Yemen in 1871 It was caused by the desire of the Turkish ruling elite to seize the wealth of this country, to put under their control the export of coffee and tobacco, to cash in on all sorts of levies, taxes and duties, to establish their influence on the sea route to the Persian Gulf. Religious and political considerations were also important: the attempt of the Sunni Sultan-Caliph to subdue the Yemeni imam, who professed Zaydi Shiism3 . The latter circumstance was particularly important, since Yemen bordered on the territory of the rebellious Hejaz.-

1 See K. Marx and F. Engels. Soch. Vol. 25, part 1, p. 364; V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 27, p. 379.

2 See V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 28, pp. 229, 383.

3 Sunnism and Shiism are the two main trends in Islam. The Turkish sultans claimed religious and political sovereignty over all Sunni Muslims. The Zeidites are a Shiite sect strongly hostile to Sunnism and refused to recognize the political and religious authority of the Turkish sultans. The Zaydi imams of North Yemen tried to subdue the population of South Yemen, whose tribes were Shafi'i, that is, they belonged to one of the Sunni trends.

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The holy cities of Mecca and Medina are located on the territory of the city. Turkey's plans in this area are evidenced by the conquest of the western coast of the Persian Gulf by Midhat Pasha in 1871; the Yemeni policy of Great Britain until the end of the 60s of the XIX century was characterized by strengthening its position in Aden and establishing contractual (but not yet protectorate) relations with the rulers of the neighboring principalities. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 radically changed the role and significance of the Red Sea, as well as Yemen and Aden in world politics and economy, and made significant changes in British policy in this area. Major shipping and trading companies (the Peninsula & Oriental Steam Navigation Company, the British India Steam Navigation Company, and the Mackinnon, Mackenzie & Company), which were interested in maintaining a monopoly on trade and transportation operations in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and Western Indian Ocean, vigorously demanded that the British government immediately expand its operations in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and Western Indian Ocean. the British sphere of influence in Southern Arabia, the seizure of Somalia, and active opposition to the colonial and commercial expansion of other powers. Aden was rapidly becoming the mainstay of British politics, not only in South Arabia, but also in East Africa. The board directors of these companies soon became members of the Board of the Suez Canal General Company, an active member of the Coal Supply Association of Transport Companies, which opened its branch in Aden. They were closely associated with the influential Indian Council attached to the Ministry of Indian Affairs in London and the colonial authorities in India. Despite opposition from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and many prominent members of Parliament, these bigwigs of trade and transport companies managed to get a decision declaring Aden and the surrounding territories, as well as the Somali protectorate, part of it... British India. British officials in Aden and residents in Somalia, as well as their "colleagues" in the Persian Gulf, until 1937 (with the exception of Somalia) reported to the Governor of Bombay and the Governor-General of India, and the occupation forces in this area - to the British commander of the West Indian Military District. This made it possible to avoid the control of the British Parliament in carrying out punitive expeditions and even large military operations, to finance the policy of conquest in South Arabia at the expense of the Indian budget and to carry it out with the help of sepoys .4
Considering the interest of influential colonial groups and transport companies in expanding their positions in Southern Arabia, the British political resident in Aden in November 1870 made a proposal to London through the Governor - General of India: not only to expand the British sphere of influence in this area, but also to enter into contractual relations with the sheikh of the most influential of the Zaidi tribes of Yemen, du Muhammad - Khalid bin Hussein and set him an annual subsidy of 5 . This was supposed to put under British control not only the areas adjacent to Aden, but also a significant part of Yemen. However, during the acute political crisis caused by the Franco-Prussian war and the Paris Commune, the British government was not up to it. Meanwhile, the Turkish authorities took advantage of the escalating struggle between the leaders of the Zaydi tribes of the north and the Shafi'i tribes of the coast and began an expansion into Yemen, which ended in 1872 with the occupation of Sanaa and the transformation of this country into an Ottoman vilayet

4 For more information, see G. L. Bondarevsky. English Politics and International Relations in the Persian Gulf Basin, Moscow, 1968, pp. 15-56

5 National Archives of India. Foreign Department (далее - NAI. F. D.). Political A. 1879. Offer of Allegiance to the British Government by Zeydi Tribes near Aden, N 65, p. 2.

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empires. The formal reason for the entry of Turkish troops into Mountainous Yemen was the invitation of Imam Sayyid Mohsin al-Shehari, who hoped to restore his power over the entire country with the help of the Turks.

At first, Mohsin al-Shehari provided considerable support to the new masters of the country, who sought to extend their influence all the way to Aden. In the same year, 1872, at the direction of the Turks, he sent a message to the Sultan of Laheja, an ally of the British, calling on him to recognize Turkish suzerainty .6 Having been refused, Mohsin al-Shehari intervened in the conflict between this sultan and the ruler of Haushabi who had fled under the protection of the Turkish authorities, vigorously supporting the latter's claims. Clashes between local rulers escalated into an Anglo-Turkish conflict. The British authorities in Aden continuously bombarded their Government with telegraphic memoranda seeking agreement to step up policies in the area. The British ambassador in Istanbul demanded the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the principalities whose rulers had ever entered into agreements with the colonial authorities of Aden. However, the government of the Ottoman Empire, and especially the local Turkish authorities in Yemen, put up a stubborn resistance.

In October 1873, the Viceroy of India, Lord Northbrook, who was subordinate to the Aden authorities, proposed to send a large expeditionary force to South Yemen .7 The Liberal government, which was then in power in England, did not dare to take such a measure. Foreign Minister Grenville and his deputy Tenterden pointed out that the implementation of the Northbrook proposal is fraught with serious consequences, including an armed clash between Britain and Turkey, which is dangerous in the context of the European crisis, complications in the Balkans, as well as the aggravation of Anglo - Russian relations in Central Asia. Nevertheless, not only the British authorities in Aden, but also the Ministry of Indian Affairs in London, as well as the leaders of the largest shipping and trading companies-the Peninsula and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, the British India Steam Navigation Company, and the Mackinnon, Mackenzie and Company-strongly supported the idea military expedition to South Yemen. However, Prime Minister Gladstone rejected the proposal to establish a British protectorate over Southern Yemen, saying that such an action would dramatically worsen Britain's relations with Turkey, which, as he stressed, are "so important for maintaining peace in the East." Gladstone also clearly feared resistance from the local tribes. He stated: "It would be inexcusable to make of this (district. - G. B. ) the second Gold Coast " 8 .

The internal history of Yemen in the 70s and 90s of the 19th century is one of the least studied problems. Numerous reports from officials of the British colonial and diplomatic service in the Red Sea basin countries, stored in the National Archives of India, allow us to highlight the features of colonial policy not only in England, but also in Turkey and the situation in Yemen during the period under review. The first stage of Turkish rule (1872-1876) can be described as a kind of Turkish-Zaydi condominium, and not only because Turkish troops entered the country at the invitation of Imam Mohsin al-Shehari, but also because the regions of Yemen to the north,

6 T. Marston. Britain?s Imperial Role in the Red Sea Area 1800 - 1878. Hamden. 1961, p. 400.

7 Ibid., p. 416.

8 NAI. F. D. Secret F. March 1885. Disputes between the Turkish Government and the Amir of Zhali, p. 1; T. Marston. Op. cit. p. 418. Gladstone was referring to the liberation struggle of the Ashanti, who inhabited the Gold Coast, against the British colonialists (see "History of Africa in the XIX-early XX centuries", Moscow 1967, p. 279 - 284). It is known that the Ashanti with their heroic resistance for 20 years delayed the colonial expansion of Great Britain in West Africa.

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north-west and north-east of Sana'a remained under the rule of the Zaydite sheikhs. In addition, a significant part of the Zeidite feudal lords, led by the imam and his numerous relatives, received large pensions from the Turks and took an active part in the government of the country. The Zaydites also controlled such large administrative and craft centers as Bajil, located on the trade routes southwest of Sana'a and included in the "sphere of influence" of Shafi'i tribal leaders rather than Zaydites. Finally, the Zaydite sheikhs also received large revenues from intermediary operations to supply the Turkish troops and administration .9
The desire of the Ottoman colonialists to collude with the Zeidite feudal and tribal elite was explained not only by the difficulties that arose when managing the free - loving highlanders of Yemen. From the first days of the occupation of Sana'a, the Turkish authorities, referring to the fact that the regions of Southern Arabia formed an integral part of Yemeni territory, tried for political and strategic reasons to extend their dominance to the whole of Southern Arabia (with the exception of Aden proper). For this purpose, dynastic, economic and political ties, as well as territorial claims of Zaydite feudal lords, spiritual and secular leaders to the areas adjacent to Aden, were widely used. However, the plans of the Turkish expansionists were by no means limited to the Aden area. Both in Istanbul and at the headquarters of the Turkish Governor-General in Sana'a, projects were being developed for the subordination of Hadramaut and the exit through Oman to the Persian Gulf. To implement all these plans, the Ottoman authorities sought to enlist the assistance of the imam and influential sheikhs of the tribes of Northern and Eastern Yemen, which ultimately was one of the most important foundations of the Turkish-Zaydi condominium in Yemen.

The Porte's offensive policy in Southern Arabia clashed with the aggressive plans of the British colonialists. Only sharp clashes with France in Africa and Russia in Asia somewhat curbed the ardor of the British invaders in the south and southeast of the Arabian Peninsula. But this did not mean that they were willing to hand over these strategically important areas to the Turks. In an effort to avoid an open conflict with Britain in South Arabia, Turkish diplomacy was forced to maneuver, which caused disagreements among the ruling circles of the Ottoman Empire. On December 14, 1873, the Minister of War, Hussein Avni Pasha, accused Grand Vizier Mehmet Ryushtu Pasha and Foreign Minister Reshid Pasha of actually encouraging Britain in its actions in Yemen. At the beginning of 1874, Hussein Avni Pasha himself became Grand Vizier, while retaining the portfolio of the Minister of War. On January 28, 1874, the Turkish ambassador in London presented Grenville with a lengthy note stating that the territories of Lahej and Haushabi were an integral part of Yemen belonging to the Ottoman Empire. The Ambassador stressed that Arabia is the birthplace of Islam, and the Sultan, as the viceroy of the Prophet and head of the Caliphate, is the patron saint of the holy cities of Islam and the lord of the entire Arabian Peninsula .10 In the Foreign Office, this statement was regarded as preparation for making claims not only on the vicinity of Aden, but also on Hadhramaut and part of Oman. In March 1874, Turkish troops unexpectedly occupied the Dalu point located on the main caravan route from Sana'a to Aden, which was therefore of great military and political importance - the main city of the emirate of the same name and the territory of Amiri that is part of it.

9 NAI. F. D. Political A. 1879. Offer by Zeydi Tribes of Allegiance to the British Government, N 69, pp. 2 - 3.

10 T. Marston. Op. cit. pp. 423, 429 - 430.

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After the conservative Disraeli government came to power (February 1874), which was closely associated with the most aggressive colonial circles, the British colonial authorities in Aden and India again proposed declaring a protectorate over Southern Arabia. In May 1875, the British political resident in Aden, General Schneider, presented a detailed plan for the" liberation " of Dala using significant military forces, including infantry, artillery and sappers. Tenterden wrote on this project: "Schneider suggests starting a war against Turkey." 11 However, it didn't come to that. The increase in the number of British troops in the Aden area, pressure from the diplomatic line, as well as the tense internal political situation in Constantinople, where two consecutive sultans were overthrown during May - August 1876, led to the fact that in September 1876, Turkish troops evacuated Dala and the entire surrounding Amiri territory. The plans of the Ottoman Empire, which sought the annexation of South Arabia to Yemen and access to the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, failed. The British colonialists significantly expanded their sphere of influence at the expense of the strategically and economically important territory of Dala, as well as Eastern Yemen.

The failure of the South Arabian plans of the Turkish ruling elite was directly related to the aggravation of the financial and political crisis of the Ottoman Empire in 1873-1876. In October 1875, the Port declared partial bankruptcy. In 1875-1876, the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula rose up against the Turkish oppressors .12 The deterioration of the international and domestic situation of the Ottoman Empire and the vigorous opposition of Great Britain made it impossible to continue an offensive policy in southern Arabia. Thus, there was no need to preserve the Turkish-Zeidite condominium over Yemen. The aggravation of the situation in the Balkans and the preparation of a war with Russia required the strengthening of the spiritual authority of the Sultan-Caliph (Sunni), which made it impractical to further cooperate with the Zaydi heretics. In addition, the financial crisis has led to increased financial and economic exploitation of Yemen by the Turks. The general trend towards centralization of the Ottoman Empire, which was reinforced with the adoption of the Constitution of 1876, also played a significant role. In late 1876 and early 1877, the Turkish-Zaydite condominium in Yemen was liquidated, the Zaydite sheikhs lost their pensions, were expelled from warm places in the local administration, the Turkish authorities took over the management of the main Yemeni cities, including Bajil, and internal trade was subject to high duties .13
Under these conditions, the feudal tribal elite of the 14 main Zaidi tribes, led by Imam Mohsin, supported by merchants and artisans, proceeds to fight the Turkish invaders. The merciless exploitation of the Yemeni population, the inhumane massacre of freedom-loving mountaineers, and the brutal religious persecution that was especially intensified under the new Sultan Abdul Hamid II-all this united the peoples of Yemen. The liberation struggle against the Turkish invaders took place under the slogans of feudal nationalism and was characterized by the inconsistency characteristic of such movements. In particular, the tendency of the feudal-tribal elite to collude with the English colonialists was revealed.

In 1877-1878, serious military clashes took place between Turkish troops and the Yemeni population. Especially a large conf-

11 Ibid., p. 455.

12 A. F. Miller. A brief history of Turkey, Moscow, 1948, pp. 92-94; A.D. Novichev. Turkey. Brief History, Moscow, 1965, pp. 100-104.

13 NAI. F. D. Political A. 1879. Offer by Zeydi Tribes of Allegiance to the British Government, N 69, p. 3.

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The conflict occurred in November-December 1877, when Turkish troops unsuccessfully tried to penetrate the center of the Zaydite possessions - the Saada region. An unstable equilibrium was established. The imam's authority, despite the opposition of the Ottoman administration, extended to all the territories located to the north, northwest and partly northeast of Sana'a. This state of affairs continued in Yemen until the death of Imam Mohsin al-Shehari in July 1878. In the mid-1980s, the Zaydites actively spread the version that the Mohsin transferred his title, rights and privileges to the active preacher of the Zaydite doctrine, Sharaf ed-Din, who was married to his daughter, and left him his property as an inheritance, and the latter was allegedly unanimously elected imam of the Zaydites at the same time .14 This version, in a distorted form, has also penetrated into English historiography .15
In fact, the proclamation of Sharaf ed-Din as Imam in the autumn of 1878 took place in the context of an acute conflict between the local feudal and tribal leaders and the Turks. Apparently, the feudal lords and tribal leaders could not agree among themselves on who would take the post of imam, because it was decided to ask the British colonial authorities in Aden to include all the territory of Yemen north, northwest and northeast of Sanaa in the British possessions. In mid - September 1878, a representative of the Zaidi ruling elite, Qadi Yahya bin Mohammed al-Hashimi, appeared in Aden with a letter signed by the supreme sheikhs and emirs of 14 Zaidi tribes, including the du Muhammad tribe. A letter from the "emirs and sheikhs of the Zaydites to the great British government", dated 17 Sha'ban 1295 (September 1878), stated: "We offer to transfer the ownership of our entire country to you, and as a guarantee of this, we will give you hostages, obey you and obey you. Those of the Arab leaders of our tribes, whom you want to see at home, will come to you. Just give us a hint of what you need from us. We are sending this letter from Kadi Yahya, who is authorized by us to carry out all your instructions. " 16 On September 25, 1878, the English resident in Aden, General Loch, gave the following reply:: "I must explain to you, O friends, that you are now within the borders of Turkey, and that Turkish and other territories lie between your country and the British border, and that the great government has no desire to invade other people's borders, just as it will not allow an invasion of its own. In addition, I believe that the grand government currently has no desire to expand its current borders, and therefore I am confident that the UK Government, to which your petition will be sent, will not accept your proposal at this time. " 17
Having received such an answer, the sheikhs of the Zaydite tribes elected Sharaf ed-Din as imam and began to prepare for the fight against the Turks on their own. In 1881-1882, military operations took place in the entire area between Saada and Sana'a. Pressing the enemy, the Zaydites occupied the entire territory of the Arhat tribe up to Sadan. Active chipping activity-

14 NAI. F. D. 1884. External A. Yemen rebellion, N 264, p. 1.

15 See, for example, H. Ingrams. The Yemen. L. 1963, p. 58.

16 The declaration that accompanied the message stated: "We, whose signatures and seals are attached to this document, announce that we will transfer to the Grand Government in Aden, through the mediation of the esteemed Sultan Fadl bin Ali al-Abdali, all the territories of Yemenia, Marib, Saadia and all the cities located there, Al-Jof, Hashet, Arhat, Nehm, Saada, Shehori, Anumi Sharafi, Marwani, Mashrahi districts. We are ready to comply with all your instructions aimed at ensuring our loyalty, and we are ready to provide hostages. God knows we'll do it all." The document was sealed with the same 14 signatures and seals as the previous one (NAI. F. D. Political A. 1879. Offer by Zeydi Tribes of Allegiance to the British Government, N 67, pp. 1 - 2).

17 Ibid., N 71, p. 4.

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The unit of the anti-Turkish coalition of Yemeni tribes was deployed by an Algerian emigrant, Sayyid Al-Manovar, who lived in Yemen for a long time. His sermons contributed to inciting religious fanaticism 18 . The situation of the Turkish troops in the areas adjacent to Sana'a was particularly complicated in the spring of 1882 due to serious unrest in Hodeida, which served as their main base on the Red Sea coast. There was a large number of wounded Turkish soldiers who were waiting to be sent to Istanbul. Without receiving any monetary support for 40 months, they rebelled, seized the customs building and held it in their hands for 20 days .19
The events in Hodeidah coincided with the revolt of the Asir tribes. The largest tribes of the country - Shamran, Khumran, Banu Nazir - rose up against Turkish rule. United under the leadership of Sheikh Ahmed bin Fazl, the son of the executed ruler of Asir, the tribal militias besieged the port of al-Loheya. In February 1882, they twice broke into the city, and in March, driven out by Turkish reinforcements who arrived in time, they retreated to the mountainous regions in the north-west of the country, cutting off all communications between the coast and the main city of Asira Abha. The terrified Turkish command began to urgently transfer troops from Jeddah and Hodeidah to Asir. A report from the British Vice-Consul in Jeddah stated that "all of Asir was in revolt." 20 For the first time, both the Zaidi and Shafi'i tribes simultaneously opposed the Turkish colonialists. Only by a huge exertion of forces, with the help of artillery and by bribing individual sheikhs, the Turkish command managed to strengthen its position on the coast. However, north of Sana'a, that is, in the Zaydite territory, it was still powerless.

At the end of 1883, military operations in Northern and Northwestern Yemen resumed. On the Yemeni side, in 1884, militias and detachments of those Zaidi tribes came out, whose sheikhs and emirs 6 years earlier proposed to recognize the British protectorate and thus retain at least part of their income and influence, using the Anglo-Turkish contradictions. The Turkish command moved 17 regiments to the area of Hajj and Dafir. Having failed, it tried to organize an assassination attempt on the imam. When this failed, the agents of the Governor-General of Yemen, through the leaders of the Hashid tribe, offered the feudal tribal leaders of the Zaydites to stop the uprising for a huge sum at that time (20 thousand thalers), but this offer was also rejected .21 Military operations continued with varying success.

It is characteristic that in his reports to Bombay and Calcutta, Major Hunter, who was acting as the British resident in Aden (author of the famous work on Aden 22), strongly advised his superiors to avoid any intervention in the Yemeni-Turkish conflict, as this could greatly complicate the situation of the British possessions. At the same time, he was concerned about growing rumors that the Porte was going to appoint the former ruler of Dhofar, Sayyid Fadl, as Governor-General of Yemen. 23 In the court circles of Istanbul, it was believed that only Fadl, known for his anti-British sentiments, who enjoyed the confidence of Sultan Abdul Hamid, was able not only to preserve Turkish rule in Yemen, but also to extend it to other countries.

18 NAI. F. D. Political A. Yemen Affairs, May 1882, N 22 А.

19 Ibid., N 32.

20 Ibid., N 22 A.

21 NAI. F. D. External A. Insurrection in Yemen, 1884, NN 208, 210, 212, pp. 1 - 3.

22 F. M. Hunter. An Account of the British Settlement of Aden in Arabia, L. 1877.

23 NAI. F. D. External A. 1884, N 208, pp. 1 - 2.

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Southeastern Arabia. It was hard to find a more dangerous candidate for the post of governor-general of Yemen for the British, because he received Abdul Hamid's consent to capture Dofar and Hadramaut and annex them to Yemen .24 Therefore, the British took measures to detain Fadl in Istanbul. Meanwhile, the Turkish authorities managed to weaken the onslaught of the Zaydite tribes and force Sharaf al-Din to retreat to Saada.

Prolonged military operations, however, did not contribute to the strengthening of Turkish positions in Yemen, which the British colonialists were quick to take advantage of. In the second half of the 80s, a new stage of their expansion in Yemen began, which was associated with international events of that period, primarily with the improvement of Anglo-German relations, as well as the formation of the Mediterranean Entente and some easing of tension in Anglo-Russian relations. The seizure of Cyprus in 1878, and in particular the occupation of Egypt in 1882, significantly strengthened the political and strategic position of Great Britain in the Middle East and led to a sharp aggravation of Anglo-Turkish relations. All this gave free rein to the supporters of British expansion in the south of the Arabian Peninsula, who as early as 1878, when Bombay, Calcutta, and London were studying the proposals of the Zaydi elite about their readiness to become English subjects, sharply expressed their dissatisfaction with what they considered too hasty actions of the resident, who, as already noted above, refused. Among them was the head of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the British administration in India, A. Liyal, later one of the most influential members of the Indian Council in London. He was particularly outraged that Loh, in his response to the Zaydites, admitted that they were "located within Turkey." In a telegram to Bombay dated April 24, 1879, Liyal demanded that Loh provide an explanation for his rash move. In directives sent to Aden in 1879, the British authorities in India strongly demanded that Loh and his successors should under no circumstances record in writing that the possessions of the Zaydite sheikhs located to the north, northwest and northeast of Sanaa were recognized as part of the Yemeni Vilayet of the Ottoman Empire .25
The intensification of British aggression in the south of the Arabian Peninsula was evidenced by events related to the already mentioned long-running Anglo-Turkish conflict over the Emirate of Dala. In 1872, Ali Mokbil became the ruler of Dala, recognizing Turkish suzerainty over the entire emirate. In 1873, after visiting Aden to establish contact with the British authorities, he was arrested by the Turks, who put his uncle Mohammed Masaad on the throne. Although the Turkish authorities released Ali Mokbil under pressure from British diplomats, they still recognized his uncle as the ruler. A bloody civil war broke out in the emirate, during which Mohammed Masaad was killed. The Turkish authorities offered Ali Mokbil to become the ruler of Dala on condition that he once again recognized Ottoman suzerainty. Under pressure from Aden, Ali Moqbil refused; the Turkish command then confirmed the son of the murdered Emir, Abdullah Masaad, as ruler of Dala and Amiri. A new demarche of the British embassy in Istanbul followed, and since the events described were taking place in the midst of the national liberation movement in the Balkans, the Porte was forced to retreat, and Ali Mokbil again solemnly entered

24 NAI. F. D. Secret. 1880. Syid Fazil. The Moplah Outlaw, NN 59 - 66, pp. 1 - 3; NAI. F. D. External A. 1883, N 22, pp. 2 - 3; J. G. Lorimer. Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf. Vol. I. Calcutta. 1915, pp. 590 - 597.

25 NAI. F. D. Political A. 1879, N 65, p. 3; N 74, p. 5; N 152 - 154, pp. 1 - 21.

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in 1876, as already noted above, the Turkish troops were withdrawn to Dala. However, the civil war in the principality continued, as the Turkish authorities still secretly supported Abdullah Masaad. This was the case until 1879, when, with the support of the British and their allies, Ali Mokbil became master of almost the entire territory of the emirate, with the exception of its northwestern part.

In March 1880, Turkish troops again appeared in the emirate. Ali Mokbil again called for help in Aden, from where a large detachment with artillery was sent to Dala. Taking advantage of the presence of British troops in the principality, the Aden authorities signed an agreement with Ali Mokbil on October 2, 1880, under which he pledged to maintain "friendly relations" with the British and ensure the smooth movement of caravans along the roads of the principality. For this, he was paid an allowance of 50 thalers.

In May 1881, this agreement was ratified by the Viceroy of India. The British colonialists were able to actively intervene in border conflicts between Ali Mokbil and the local Turkish authorities in the Yemeni cities of Kataba and Taizze. With the support of the British, Ali Mokbil's detachments systematically invaded Yemeni territory, attacked caravans, and levied tribute on tribes living outside the emirate during 1883-1885. This greatly inflamed the situation in the entire border zone, but the British authorities continued to support Ali Mokbil. Dala's strategic position was very advantageous. The border issue between Dala and East Yemen remained unresolved. However, in the spring of 1885, due to the aggravation of Russian-British relations in Central Asia and the complication of the situation in the Red Sea basin (due to the Mahdists ' defeat of Anglo-Egyptian troops in the Sudan, as well as the strengthening of French positions in Obok and the Italian occupation of Massaua), it was decided in London to agree with the Turks on a temporary modus vivendi Dalys.

The strengthening of the British position in Dala was widely used for the full expansion of English influence in South Arabia. In 1883-1895, at the suggestion of Viceroy Dufferin of India and despite the protests of Gladstone, an official protectorate was established over those principalities near Aden with which the British authorities had previously had only contractual relations .26 This not only strengthened Britain's position in the south of the Arabian Peninsula, but also contributed to the weakening of Turkish influence in Yemen. In 1890, after the death of Sharaf al - Din, Muhammad ibn Yahya Hamid al-Din became imam, and in 1891 he led a new, more powerful campaign against Turkish rule, in which both the Zaydi and other tribes inhabiting Yemen took an active part. To date, there is no detailed study of this movement in the literature. Some authors mistakenly believe that the uprising did not begin in 1891, but in 1892.27 A French expert on Arab problems, Ye. Jung claims without any justification that this movement was not significant at all .28 The well-known English orientalist G. Philby reduces it almost exclusively to the activities of Imam Muhammad ibn Yahya Hamid ed-Din, restricts the area of the uprising to the mountainous territories of Yemen, and exaggerates the importance of the religious side.-

26 C. U. Aitchison. A Collection of Treaties. Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries. Vol. XI. Delhi. 1929, pp. 5 - 30.

27 F. Stuhlmann. Der Kampf um Arabien zwischen der Turkei und England. B. 1916, S. 73; H. Jacob. Kings of Arabia. L. 1923, p. 75.

28 E. Jung. Powers on the eve of the Arab revolt. "Arabia and the European Powers". Collection, Moscow, 1924, p. 38.

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steps 29 . Only V. B. Lutsky gives a clear description of the causes of the uprising .30
Increased exploitation of Yemen, endless extortion and extortion, greed and corruption of the Turkish administration, colossal abuses in tax collection - all this turned the country into a boiling cauldron in the late 80s. According to a correspondent of The Times who visited Yemen, the militia of the tribes of Eastern Yemen, outraged by the arbitrariness of the Turkish ruler of the city of Damar, broke into the city in 1889 and blew up the Pasha's residence, not sparing the wives and children of the ruler .31 There were many such clashes.

In the spring of 1891, an uprising began in Asir. The news of the first successes of the rebels, who defeated a number of Turkish garrisons on the coast, made a great impression in Istanbul. Sultan Abdul-Hamid II and his immediate entourage were particularly concerned about two things: the possibility of connecting the Asir rebels with the detachments of Imam Muhammad, as well as the close connection that the rebels maintained with the British agency (the Asir rebels were equipped with English weapons). Meanwhile, the uprising has spread to Yemen. In June 1891, in a bloody battle near Shabil, the Turkish detachment of Aarif Bey was completely destroyed. The Ottoman reinforcements that arrived in Hodeidah in early July were unable to reach Sana'a, as communications between Yemen's mountainous regions and the coast were cut off by the rebels. The Turkish garrison in Sana'a was besieged. In mid-July, large reinforcements arrived in Hodeidah, led by the new Governor - General, Hassan Edib Pasha. However, by the beginning of August, the Turkish troops advancing from Hodeidah were stopped by Yemeni detachments near Manah after fierce fighting. Located to the north and east of this city, the settlements of Mafhak, Al-Khamis, Matna were captured by large Yemeni detachments commanded by Sheikh Ahmed el-Shohani. At the same time, rebel actions on the coast intensified. According to the British consuls, tribal militias with a total number of 12 thousand people led by Sheikh Nasir el-Mabhut 32 opposed the Turks in this area .

In August 1891, an uprising of the main Zaydi tribes led by Imam Muhammad ed-Din began. The rebels captured Taizz and the main centers of Eastern Yemen 33 . The situation of the Ottoman command was complicated by the fact that the units and formations of the VII Turkish Corps stationed in Yemen and Asir could not be replenished on the spot, and in the conditions of a general uprising, it would be unsafe to send Arab units from Syria to Yemen. Therefore, reserves and conscripts were sent to Hodeidah mainly from Asia Minor. By the end of September, more than 15 thousand Turkish soldiers and a large number of artillery were concentrated in Hodeidah and on the coast. Ahmed Feizi Pasha was appointed Commander-in-Chief. Istanbul continued to receive reports about the active involvement of the British and their agents in the Yemeni uprising, in particular that they were systematically supplying weapons to the rebels through Lahej. 34 In September, the director of the Yemeni Customs Administration, Mohammed Shukru - effendi, was arrested in Hodeidah on charges of conniving with the illegal transportation of weapons from Aden. The authorities were given strict orders to open all bales of tobacco coming from this English colony .35
29 H. Philby. Arabia. L. 1930, pp. 205 - 207.

30 V. B. Lutsky. New History of Arab Countries, Moscow, 1965, pp. 319-320.

31 "The Times", 23.IV.1892.

32 NAI. F. D. Secret E. February 1892. Revolt in Yemen, NN 256, 262, 266.

33 Ibid., N 266.

34 "The Times", 25.VIII.1891.

35 NAI. F. D. February 1892, Revolt in Yemen, NN 263, 273.

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The British ruling circles hoped that the Yemeni-Asir uprising would not only help strengthen their influence in southern Arabia, but also be a means of influencing the sultan. "Arabia is the nightmare of the Sultan's dreams, the Achilles' heel in his armor, "Prime Minister Salisbury wrote to the British Ambassador in Istanbul, White, on September 14, 1891," because it is in Arabia that the ruler of the faithful may one day appear opposing the Sultan. " 36 The importance of the Arabian question as a lever of pressure on Abdul Hamid was particularly acutely felt in London in the summer and autumn of 1891. In connection with the next aggravation of the situation in the Middle East, the urgent appeals of the Porte to the British government with requests to sign a convention on the terms of evacuation of British troops from Egypt and the Franco-Russian rapprochement complicated the situation of Great Britain in the Middle East and in the Middle East. features in Egypt. This was also facilitated by the resignation on September 3 of Grand Vizier Kamil Pasha, known for his pro-English tendencies. In September and October, pressure on Britain in the Egyptian issue from Turkish diplomacy, supported by France and Russia, " sharply increased." Under these circumstances, the British ruling circles sought to maximize the use of the Yemeni-Asir trump card. The British ambassador in Istanbul, White, deliberately did not deny rumors of British aid to the rebels. In London, it was hoped that the frightened Abdul-Hamid, " in an effort to preserve his Arabian positions, would make concessions on the Egyptian issue.

In October 1891, the troops of Ahmed Feizi Pasha managed to break through to Sana'a and join up with its garrison at the cost of considerable sacrifices. The Imam's detachments were retreating towards Saada. Despite the fact that military operations continued in Asir and east of Hodeidah, the Turkish command hastened to move troops to Eastern Yemen38 in order to occupy Taizz and Kataba and block the British agents from entering the country. At the same time, the new Grand Vizier, Jevad Pasha, recommended that the Sultan send several warships to the Red Sea to make it more difficult for the British to interfere in Yemeni affairs. The Port was convinced that a second conquest of Yemen could be carried out with significantly fewer casualties and faster, if the intrigues of Great Britain, which, as already mentioned, sought to use the Yemeni uprising to strengthen its position in the Middle East, were eliminated.

Victory on the outskirts of Sanaa did not mean the restoration of power over Yemen. A correspondent of The Times, who visited the country in November-December 1891, wrote:: "Even though the Turks have regained the cities they lost, they are currently powerless to do anything about the mountain tribes, who still maintain their independence and don't trust anyone but their beloved Imam Muhammad Hamid al-Din... These mountain tribes make up most of Yemen... As the Turkish Governor - General informed me, his forces are completely insufficient to bring these tribes to submission. " 39 Despite the publication of victory reports, the Ottoman authorities were well aware of the complexity of the situation in Yemen and took appropriate political and ideological measures. In the autumn of 1891, Abdul Hamid sent two delegations to the Imam, including not only prominent Muslim figures in Turkey, but also two Shafi'i sayyids from the coast - from Asir and Beit al-Faqih. The Sultan's representatives were not able to get to Saada, but they forwarded it to the Imam.

36 G. Cecil. Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury. Vol. IV. L. 1932, p. 388.

37 C. Smith. The Embassy of Sir William White at Constantinople. Oxford 1957 pp. 145 - 149.

38 NAI. F. D. Secret E. February 1892, Revolt in Yemen, NN 266, 270, 277.

39 "The Times", 23.IV.1892.

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Abdul Hamid's letters calling for submission. Muhammad Hamid ed-Din's responses were polite in form, but harsh in content. He blamed the conflict on corrupt Turkish officials and stressed that he could not hand over the administration of the Arab country to the Turkish sultan .40 In February 1892, the imam issued a new appeal to the sheikhs and emirs of the Zaydi tribes, calling on them to resume the fight against the Turks, concentrate detachments in the Kaflat Ader area, and prepare for an offensive on Sanaa .41
Throughout 1892, military operations were conducted with varying success. In January-March, the British authorities decided to use the tense situation in Yemen for another act of aggression. For this purpose, an English topographic expedition was sent to the Dala and Haushabi regions bordering Eastern Yemen. Without any coordination with the Turks, she conducted a survey of the area and installed geodetic signs not only in the mountainous regions of Dala, but also in the territory of Chabri, which even the British authorities did not consider their sphere of influence. At that time, the Turkish command was trying to restore its authority in the Kataba area. The actions of the British surveyors provoked sharp protests from Turkish diplomacy. The Port officially accused the British side of invading Ottoman territory and interfering in Yemeni affairs. The British authorities in India and Aden rejected these protests on the "grounds" that the localities mentioned in them are not on the English maps at all .42 Along with direct intervention in Yemeni affairs and the systematic supply of weapons to the rebels, the British colonialists closely monitored the transfer of reinforcements to Turkish troops in Yemen, Asir and Hijaz and the deployment of additional contingents of the Turkish army in these vilayets. This, in particular, is evidenced by the secret report "On the deployment of units of the VII Turkish Corps"compiled in May 1893 by the British military attache in Istanbul, Colonel Chermside .43
In the second half of 1892, military operations in Yemen continued. Using his superiority in infantry and especially in artillery, Ahmed Feizi Pasha tried three times to strike at the main forces of the imam located in the Saada area, but it did not reach serious fighting, as the Turkish command was forced to transfer its forces to Eastern Yemen and the coast, where uprisings against him broke out again and again. Ottoman rule 44 .

Thus, there is every reason to believe that the uprising of 1891 - 1892 was a powerful liberation movement that covered not only the Zaydi districts, but the whole of Yemen and Asir and dealt a heavy blow to the military power of the Ottoman Empire. It is no coincidence that Yemen has been called the "cemetery of the Turks" ever since .45 However, by the end of 1892, hostilities in Yemen began to subside, and the Turkish military administration restored its authority in all the main cities of the country, with the exception of Saada. The mountainous regions were still under the authority of the imam. The weakening of the liberation movement was not only due to the military superiority of the Turks. It was a direct result of the active activity of the Ottoman authorities and in particular of the Ottoman Empire.

40 H. Philby. Op. cit., p. 207; NAI. F. D. Secret E. March 1892, Revolt in Yemen, N. 152.

41 NAI. F. D. Secret E. May 1892, Revolt in Yemen, N 141.

42 NAI. F. D. Secret E. May 1892, Alleged Encroachment by the Aden Authorities on Turkish Territory in Yemen, NN 95 - 107; August 1892, NN 79 - 101.

43 NAI. F. D. Secret E. August 1893, Distribution of the 7 Ordu of the Turkish Army in Yemen and Hedjaz, NN 268 - 271.

44 Ibid., April 1896, Rebellion in Yemen, N 227.

45 H. Jacob. Op. cit., p. 75.

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Abdul-Hamid's personal emissaries, who incited pan-Islamist sentiments in the country, on the one hand, and discord between the Zaydites and Shafi'is on the other.

In February 1893, the former sheriff of Nejd, Abdallah el-Moghiri, came to the British proconsul in Egypt, Kromer. He said that for a number of years, on the Sultan's personal instructions, he traveled to various regions of the Arabian Peninsula, including Yemen, and conducted pan - Islamic propaganda, bribing sheikhs and emirs of tribes, and in every possible way seeking the transition of the feudal tribal leaders to the side of Turkey. Abdallah el-Moghiri presented Kromer with copies of numerous letters and messages exchanged between Abdul-Hamid and the tribal leaders .46 But it wasn't just that. According to Colonel Chermside, the Sultan's full support for the leaders of the notorious "Arab clique" in Istanbul, Sheikhs Abu el - Khuda and Essadu Effendi, was due to the desire to create the appearance of an Arabophile policy and thus influence the sheikhs and rulers of local tribes and principalities .47 The immediate success of this policy in Yemen is evidenced by a copy of the petition of a group of Yemeni sheikhs (mainly Shafi'i) addressed to Abdul Hamid, which fell into the hands of the British ambassador in Istanbul Ford in May 1893, indicating that the sheikhs descended from the ancient Himyarite rulers were ready to recognize the sultan's suzerainty and pay an annual tax to the Port in the amount of 5.5 million piastres, as well as to mobilize an army of 80,000 men to consolidate Turkish rule in Yemen and conquer Hadramaut, provided that all their rights and privileges are preserved .48 However, the transaction did not take place. Apparently, the sheikhs who signed the declaration were not strong enough, and the Ottoman government did not want to preserve all their rights and privileges.

In any case, already in 1894, an uprising broke out again in the country. This time it began in Asir, where in May and June, under the leadership of Sheikh Ali bin Aida, the main tribes that inhabited this territory openly opposed the Turkish conquerors .49 In 1895, Yemen rebelled again. By October, the militia of the largest Zaydi tribal associations Hashed and Bakil, numbering more than 40 thousand people, moved under the leadership of the imam to Sanaa. In several battles on the distant approaches to the capital, the Sultan's troops were defeated. According to English sources, most of the Yemeni soldiers were armed with Martini rifles. A correspondent for The Times reported that the number of firearms that the rebels had at their disposal was 10 times higher than what they had at their disposal in 1891. According to the correspondent, another circumstance is characteristic of the new uprising: "Many Turkish soldiers, exhausted and tired of watching the money intended for their maintenance being squandered on drunkenness and debauchery of officers, deserted and joined the Arabs."50 According to British consular records, Imam Muhammad ed-Din felt so confident that he started minting his own coin in the city of Kaflat Ader 51 .

In an effort to maintain their positions, the Turkish authorities acted in the following directions: large contingents of troops were sent to Hodeidah and other ports on the Arabian coast, mainly in the form of military equipment.-

46 NAI. F. D. Secret E. January 1894, Affairs of Turkish Arabia, Hedjaz, Yemen, N 450.

47 Ibid., N 456.

48 Ibid., N 459.

49 Ibid., August 1894, Revolt in Yemen, N 310.

50 "The Times", 20.XI.1895; NAI. F. D. Secret E. January 1896, Arab Insurrection in Yemen, NN 227 - 228.

51 Ibid., NN 229, 233.

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But from Anatolia; the imam and sheikhs of influential Yemeni tribes were again visited by representative delegations of Muslim clergy with letters and gifts from Abdul Hamid .52 At the same time, the Turkish ambassador in London, on behalf of the Sultan, repeatedly expressed strong protest to the Prime Minister of Salisbury in connection with British interference in Yemeni affairs and, in particular, the ongoing smuggling of British weapons through Aden to Yemen. At Salisbury's direction, an investigation was conducted, which established that these weapons did indeed enter Yemen through the port of Ras al-Ara. However, the Aden and Indian colonial authorities argued that neither they nor the suzerain of this port, the Sultan of Lahej, had the strength and resources to deal with the smuggling that allegedly goes from French possessions to Djibouti .53 Despite the promise to take measures to at least partially curb smuggling, British weapons continued to flow into Yemen.

During the entire time that has passed since the uprising began in 1891, Turkish punishers have exterminated a huge number of civilians, destroyed more than 300 cities and villages. Nevertheless, in the Zaydite tribal area to the north and northwest of Sanaa, Imam Muhammad and his subordinate tribal sheikhs remained the master of the situation.

In 1898, a new stage of the movement began in the country, which ended at the beginning of the XX century with the overthrow of the Ottoman rule. In March 1899, Imam Muhammad approached the British resident in Aden with a proposal for the proclamation of a British protectorate. Unfortunately, no documents about this interesting episode have been found yet. It is only known that the request was rejected 54 . In December 1899, Imam Muhammad repeated his proposal. As in 1878, it was addressed to the Sultan of Lahej, Ahmed Fadl. This document states: "Since you are a friend of the British Government and close to it, I have found that your praise of its activities is indicative of its good intentions. Therefore, I ask you to convey to him our proposal for the partition of Yemen. The whole country should be divided into two parts. The territories from Al-Mohadir and all surrounding areas should belong to me, and the rest of the territories (with the exception of some) should belong to the British government. At the final agreement, full information will be given, and I will receive a certain amount annually (as a subsidy). I want and wish that this agreement be implemented through you and that it include a condition that gives us the necessary protection, as well as a ban on the import of Turkish military equipment and ammunition into Yemen. I'm not afraid of Turkish attacks, and thanks to God they can't beat us. If they try to attack, they will be defeated. " 55 The British resident in Aden, General Craig, declined the offer, citing Britain's friendly relations with the Port. Nevertheless, the British authorities attached great importance to the imam's proposal. This is evidenced by the fact that it was immediately reported not only to the Viceroy of India and the Minister of Indian Affairs, but also to the Prime Minister of Salisbury .56
Imam Muhammad's proposal differs significantly from that of the Zaydi sheikhs of 1878. While the latter were ready to transfer the entire country under the protectorate of the British Empire, Imam Muhammad proposed a partition. It is interesting that the dividing line passes through El-Mohadir, that is, along the border between the possessions of Zeidi-

52 Ibid.

53 NAI. F. D. Secret E. March 1896, Alleged Importation of Arms and Ammunition into Yemen via Aden, NN 56 - 66.

54 NAI. F. D. 1900, Secret E. Desire of the Imam of Sana to come under the Protection of the British Government, N 69 (1 - 26), p. 1.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid., N 127, p. 2.

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Tov and Shafi'i 57 . Imam Muhammad's proposal does not indicate that the Zaydite leaders considered themselves defeated. At the same time, it is obvious that they no longer expected to retain power over the entire country and hoped to maintain their dominance over at least part of Yemen through a deal with the British and cause a conflict between Britain and Turkey, which was supposed to strengthen the position of the Zaydi elite. This was also understood in London. In the autumn of 1899, when the international situation of Great Britain was complicated by the Boer War and the struggle for the partition of China, there was no need to think about a new conflict. However, not wanting to miss the opportunity to expand their possessions and sphere of influence in Arabia, the British authorities in the spring of 1899 developed a project to establish a consulate in Sana'a in order to have direct contact with the Zaydites and systematically receive information about the situation in the country. This plan was leaked to the Austrian press, and then the issue was raised in Parliament 58 . Due to premature publicity and the complex international situation, the plan was not implemented. But it gives a clear picture of the tactics of the British colonial circles in relation to Yemen, who expected a favorable situation for cutting off a significant part of its territory from this country, isolating it from the coast, and then enslaving it.

The Turkish colonialists were only nominal masters of Yemen. The thirty-year history of Ottoman rule in Yemen in the 19th century can be divided into three stages: 1870-1876 - the period of the Turkish-Zaydite condominium over Yemen; 1877-1890, when the Turkish colonialists tried to push back the Zaydite elite and concentrate the rule over Yemen in their hands; and, finally, 1891 - 1899 - the period of widespread expansion of the country. the liberation movement of the peoples of this country against the Sultan's rule, which three times (in 1891 - 1892, 1894 - 1895 and 1898 - 1899) turned into a liberation war of the peoples of Yemen against Turkish rule. Consequently, we are not talking about an episodic uprising of 1891, as Western historiography claims, but about a long struggle of the peoples of Yemen (with the contradictions inherent in the era of feudal nationalism), which laid the foundation for their liberation from the Turkish, and later from the English yoke.

The three-time appeal of the Zaydite sheikhs to Great Britain with a proposal to establish a protectorate and divide the country into spheres of influence helps dispel the legend that the Yemeni royalists and their allies from the reactionary camp were actively spreading that the ancestors and predecessors of the Yemeni Imam Badr, who was deposed in 1962, were always irreconcilable fighters against the British colonialists. On the other hand, there was an influential group in Britain that was interested in immediate broad expansion in Southern Arabia, in using Aden as a springboard for an offensive against Yemen and Hadramaut. This group included the British administration of India and its subordinate Aden authorities, large transport and trading companies, colonial banks - in short, all those who sought to turn the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea into British lakes, and the Middle East into a monopoly sphere of influence of England. Already at the end of the 19th century, this" Middle Eastern " group led by Curzon showed great interest in the partition of Iran and the capture of the Arab regions of the Ottoman Empire. The British ruling circles ' bid for the dismemberment of Turkey, specifically expressed in the proposals made to Germany in 1895. and the tsarist government in 1898, a sharp intensification of the aggressive policy in Southern Arabia at the turn of the XIX century. -

57 H. Ingrams. Op. cit., p. 30.

58 NAI. F. D. Secret E. September 1899, Question of the Appointment of a British Consul in Sana, NN 195, 197, 199.

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The twentieth century, the significant weakening of the Ottoman Empire, which was increasingly turning into a semi-colony, its collusion with the British colonialists (the 1903 agreement, according to which a significant territory was torn away from Yemen in favor of the British protectorate in Aden) - all this testified that in the era of imperialism, the main enemy of the peoples of Yemen is the British colonialists. The national liberation struggle of the peoples of Yemen and the whole of Southern Arabia is increasingly turning against them.

Thus, the British colonial policy in South Arabia took place in the 19th and early 20th centuries. two stages. The first (1839-1869) - from the capture of Aden to the opening of traffic through the Suez Canal-was reduced to the gradual strengthening of positions in Aden, isolation of Yemen from the coast and the establishment of control over the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. The second (1870-1903) was characterized by the full expansion of colonial possessions in Southern Arabia, the use of the anti-Turkish liberation struggle of the peoples of Yemen to dismember the country on the basis of collusion, and in some cases blackmail and threats against Turkey. These stages of British colonial policy were determined by the balance of power in the Middle East, the increasing strategic importance of the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, the progressive weakening of the Ottoman Empire, the international position of Great Britain, and the increasing influence of imperialist forces on the country's domestic and foreign policy. A particular influence in this regard was exerted by the notorious "Middle Eastern" grouping of British imperialists - the main initiator of the division of Arab countries and British aggression in Yemen. It was this group that played a significant role in unleashing the First World War and enslaving many Arab countries and peoples. Today, its successor is the notorious "Suez group", one of the main instigators of the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt in 1956, and still frantically trying to preserve the remnants of the former British colonial rule east of Suez, and in particular in the Indian Ocean basin.

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