The Treaty of Friendship between Russia and Mongolia of November 3 (October 21, old style), 1912, and its significance for the history of Mongolia are interpreted in different ways in the literature, and these interpretations are very different. In this regard, it is advisable to once again consider this problem on the basis of primary sources - diplomatic documents stored in the National Central Archive of Mongolia (NCAM, Ulaanbaatar) and the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI, Moscow).

In the summer of 1911 Dzhebdzundamba-khutukhta 1 and four Khalkha 2 khans decided to appeal to the Russian emperor with a request for help in ridding the Mongols of the Manchu yoke. In a letter addressed to the White Khan (Russian Tsar. - O. B.), signed by Jebzundamba-hutukhta and the rulers of Tushetu-Khan aimag3 Dashnyam, Setsen-Khan aimag Navaanneren, Dzasaktu-Khan aimag Sodnomravdan and Sayn-noyon-Khan aimag Namnansuren, spoke about the new measures that the Chinese government, regardless of Mongolian traditions, began to implement for the colonization of Mongolian lands. The letter ended with a request: "We ask the powerful state to help [us] as a small state to protect our interests... we are waiting for your help like rain during the great drought." A delegation consisting of4 chin-wan5 Handdorj, da-lama6 Tserenchimed and tushmel 7 Haisan was sent to Russia with this letter (Dendev, 1945, pp. 89-90).

On August 15, 1911, the Mongolian delegation arrived in St. Petersburg. The Russian side responded to this request and expressed the possibility of providing its support.

In addition to the official appeal to the Russian Emperor, the Russian Foreign Ministry also received a 21-point petition letter on the internal and external situation of Mongolia. The letter emphasized the mutual benefits of strengthening Mongol relations with Russia. The main part of the letter was filled with complaints about the actions of the Chinese authorities. Thus, paragraph 1 of this letter stated that, in violation of the existing tradition of transferring the rights and positions of Mongol khans and vats, the Government of the Republic of Tatarstan should not be allowed to leave the country.

1 Head of the Buddhist Church in Mongolia.

2 Khalkha is one of the historical names of Outer (Northern) Mongolia.

Aimag 3 is a large territorial and administrative division. At the time described, the territory of Outer Mongolia was divided into four aimags, which were named after the titles of their rulers-khans: Tushetu-khan, Tsetsen-khan (Setsen-khan), Dzasaktu-khan (Tsasaktu-khan) and Sayn-noyon-khan.

4 Zhanjin (janjin) - military commander, commander of troops, commander.

5 Chin-wan ( qin-wan) - princely degree.

6 Da Lama-abbot of the monastery.

7 Tushmel-official.

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8new inheritances Chinese officials constantly force them to pay large bribes of tens of thousands of lans9, and if they are unable to pay large sums of money, many large and small officials will not be able to fill the corresponding positions assigned to them by inheritance for a number of years. In the event of a disputed case between the Chinese and the Mongols, Chinese officials oppress and humiliate the Mongols without any trial or judicial review, illegally sentence them to various punishments, up to the death penalty, and take away their livestock and property. There are many such cases, and the Mongols have nowhere to complain (point 3). Allowing the Chinese to live and farm in the areas bordering Russia, and replacing the Mongolian tsiriks with 10 Chinese soldiers for border service is fraught with negative consequences for Russian-Mongolian relations. The replacement of Mongolian tsiriks by Chinese soldiers at more than 10 border posts in Hulunbuir11 has been ongoing for several years, which is a very dangerous plan aimed at undermining ties between Russia and Mongolia (paragraph 7).

Chinese traders and merchants engage in fraud, sell their goods at very high prices, and buy cattle and other goods from the Mongols at very low prices, charging interest on interest when issuing loans, as a result of which Mongolia has been reduced to extreme poverty. Now the so-called new government has begun to take duties on many goods, increased exploitation, and in every possible way infringes on the Mongols, who have reached the limit of patience (point 11).

The letter went on to say that at a meeting of 12 Bogdo Lamas, four khans and princes, it was decided to revive Mongolia's independence. At the same time, concerns were raised about the possible leakage of information about this meeting due to Manchu and Chinese informants (paragraph 14). These concerns pointed to the strong control established by the Manchurian amban13. The letter also referred to the decision to form an independent Mongolian state with the assistance of Russia: "Our Mongol Khans, Vans and Dzasaks14united, erected Bogdo as Khan, and expressed the wish that Mongolia, relying on the help of the Great State15, would always be on friendly terms with him, sharing both benefits and difficulties" (paragraph 18).

They also discussed the possibility of signing a number of documents in the near future between Mongolia and Russia, including a secret agreement, agreements on trade, railway construction, gold, silver and other mineral extraction, as well as the opening of a military school in Mongolia. The Mongolian side pointed out the possibility of developing Russian trade on the territory of Mongolia (item 20) [Dendev, 1945, p. 97].

The decision of the Provisional Mongolian Government on the proclamation of an independent Mongolian state and the date of the solemn ceremony of the elevation of Bogdo-gegen Dzhebdzundamba-Khutukhta to the Khan's throne was reported to the Russian Consul in Urga on 16. In a letter from the Provisional Government addressed to the Russian Consul

8 Van is a prince.

9 Lan - currency unit in China.

10 Tsirik (Mong. tsereg) - soldier.

11 Khulunbuir is the northeastern part of Inner Mongolia.

12 Bogdo Lama - in this case, we mean Bogdo-gegen, the head of the Buddhist Church in Mongolia, Jebzun damba-hutukhta.

13 Amban-Manchu governor of Mongolia.

14 Dzasak - head of the administration of khoshun, an administrative-territorial unit within the aimag.

15 A great state - in this case, Russia.

16 Urga (Khure, etc.) - capital of Outer Mongolia, now Ulaanbaatar.

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In a letter sent to Ya. P. Shishmarev in December 1911, it was stated in part: "In the summer of this year, the khans, vanas and gunas17 of our four Khalkha aimags, having gathered, decided to declare the independence of their country and spread the Buddhist religion, and to this end, to hold an official ceremony for the elevation of Bogdo-gegen to the khan's throne, in connection with than we ask you to convey to the Government of Imperial Russia the date of the ceremony - on the 9th day of the middle winter month of the year of the White Boar, at the hour of the horse "[Undesny...].

An auspicious day according to the Eastern calendar was chosen for the ceremony. It can be said that all the Mongols were preparing for this important event. From the remote southern and northern outskirts of Khalkha, including Dariganga 18 and Uriankhai 19, Usu received petitions from local authorities to support this event [Magsarzhav, 1994, p. 12]. Representatives of all strata of Mongolian society from the four aimags of Mongolia gathered in Urga, decided to form a government consisting of five ministries - Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Military, Finance and Justice - and prepared five large Mongolian yurts for them [Magsarzhav, 1994, p.12].

On December 29, 1911, at 11: 40 a.m., a solemn ceremony was held for the elevation of Bogdo-gegen VIII Dzhebdzundamba-khutukhta to the throne of the Khan of the State of Mongolia. This act meant the official proclamation of Mongolia's secession from the Qing (Manchu) Empire and the formation of the independent state of Mongolia.

Soviet diplomat and scholar I. M. Maisky noted that not only did Mongolia have good reasons to link its fate with Russia, but Russia also had its own interests in Mongolia [Maisky, 1921, pp. 330-331]. First, Mongolia was of great interest for the supply of livestock products and minerals to Russia. Secondly, it was of great political importance. China at that time was experiencing a revolution, internal disintegration, and a difficult period of perception of European culture. According to I. Maisky, it was extremely important for Russia to use Mongolia as a buffer zone to protect its interests [Maisky, 1921, p. 330-331; International Relations..., 1931, p. 7].

After the Foreign Ministry received a message from its envoy to China, the tsarist government discussed a draft of a future agreement with the Mongols and submitted it to Tsar Nicholas II, who marked it " Urgent." According to the decree of the emperor and on the recommendation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs S. D. Sazonov, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers of August 3, 1912, it was decided to interrupt negotiations with the Chinese side on the Mongolian issue and proceed to sign a secret agreement with Khure 20 [Belov, 1994, p. 176]. In the adopted decision "On signing an agreement with the Hutukhts and noyons of Khure", it was pointed out that"the danger of delaying the Mongolian issue is increasing." Initially, it was decided to call the draft not "an agreement with the Government of Mongolia", but only "an agreement with the Hutukhts and noyons of Urga"21, to give an indefinite interpretation of the declared independence of Mongolia, to call the regime of power established in it "the Khalkha regime", to promise to preserve this regime, "not to mention the inclusion of Inner Mongolia and other regions in the Khalkha Bargi" [International Relations..., 1931, p. 7].

Although the agreement did not recognize Mongolia's independence, the subjects of signing the document were named "Russia and Mongolia", which was extremely important for choosing the future path of Mongolia's development and entering the international arena.

17 Gong-count.

18 Dariganga is a territory in the south-east of Outer Mongolia.

19 Uriankhai (Uriankhai) - currently the Republic of Tuva in Russia.

20 Khure (Niyslel-khure ) is the name of the capital of Mongolia, Urga.

21 European names of the capital of Mongolia.

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Russian statesmen began to maintain contacts with Mongolia. In August 1912, the Russian government notified the Mongolian government of the appointment of an experienced diplomat, full State Councilor I. Ya. Korostovets as its authorized negotiator. The government headed by Bogdo Khan Jebzundamba-hutukhta and Sayn noyon Khan Namnansuren expressed gratitude to the Russian emperor for appointing Ambassador-at-large Korostovets and accepting the proposal to sign a treaty of friendship [Mongolia..., 1982, p.170].

The next step of the Russian side in preparing the signing of the agreement was the instruction of the Russian Foreign Ministry to I. Ya. Korostovets dated August 23, 1912 [Collection of diplomatic documents..., 1914, pp. 1-2]. At the beginning of this instruction, it was stated that "no tangible result has been achieved" in the process of negotiations with the Chinese side on the Mongolian issue, that the Chinese intend to "use military force and destroy the independence of Mongolia", "throw bones among the Mongolian noyons", "prepare military groups to go to Mongolia", and in this regard there is no possibility of holding negotiations with the Chinese who do not recognize "the changing situation in Mongolia" [Collection of diplomatic documents..., 1914, p. 1]. Further, it was said that the government of the Russian Empire took the path of establishing direct contacts with the government of Khure (Urgi) and decided to sign an agreement that "it is necessary to strive for towards the formation of a militarily weak border state with Russia", and "for the implementation of these goals: 1. provide assistance in the national law of Khalkha, 2. prohibit the entry of Chinese soldiers, 3. prevent the colonization of Khalkha by the Chinese."

Russian commercial and industrial groups in Mongolia primarily pursued their own economic interests, including obtaining the right to monopolize the use of minerals and raw materials, providing them with advantages in conducting trade, special rights and conditions. Ultimately, these interests were reflected both in the Friendship Agreement signed on October 21, 1912, and in the Kyakhta Agreement of 1915.

The state of Mongolia after its declaration of independence was well analyzed in his research by the Russian Mongol scholar V. L. Kotvich. He wrote on December 30, 1911, to a Russian merchant in Mongolia, A. V. Burdukov: "You are, of course, well aware that Khalkha has declared itself an independent state under the rule of Bogdo-gegen. Whether they will be able to defend their independence, it is difficult to say yet, but rather - they will not succeed in full. If Russia helps a little, maybe they will win some rights for themselves, but the Khalkhas will probably depend on the Beijing government, at least nominally, and there won't be much trouble if the Chinese really don't interfere in their internal affairs" (Burdukov, 1969, p.265). In the summer of 1912, after arriving in Mongolia, he wrote: "Political changes have not led to changes in the life of the people. They are in extremely serious and poor condition. Although they have declared their independence, they have no support at all, they are like children." The famous Russian scholar and Mongol scholar B. Y. Vladimirtsov wrote to A.V. Burdukov on June 25, 1912: "Our government (of Russia.On the one hand, he seems to want to do something in Mongolia, but on the other hand, he knows nothing, absolutely nothing, and is afraid... And then the government, obviously, is afraid of being accused of starting a new adventure, like the Manchurian one, "and added:" In Russia, absolutely no one knows about Mongolia, no one is interested in it and does not understand how important and necessary it is for Russia and for Siberia in particular. They won't even understand that Mongolia is not Manchuria. Gradually, it seems that sober thoughts are beginning to appear in society" [Burdukov, 1969, p. 334].

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The position of the Russian Empire in relation to Mongolia was determined by secret treaties between Russia and Japan of 1907, 1910 and 1912 on the division of spheres of influence in the Far East. The Russo-Japanese Treaty of July 30, 1907, reflecting the new relations between the powers in the Far East, consisted of official and secret parts. The secret part of the treaty defined the division of the spheres of influence of Russia and Japan in Manchuria, Korea and Mongolia. In particular, paragraph 3 stated: "Recognize the special interest of the Russian Empire in Outer Mongolia and assume the duty to prevent attempts to terminate the terms of this agreement." In 1910, both States confirmed this treaty. In paragraph 2 of the third secret treaty between Russia and Japan of June 25, 1912, it was stated: "Inner Mongolia is divided into eastern and western parts along the Peking meridian (116:27 east of Greenwich). The Russian Government undertakes not to interfere with the special interests of Japan in Inner Mongolia east of the above meridian. The Government of the Emperor of Japan undertakes not to interfere with Russia's special interests in Inner Mongolia west of the meridian mentioned above " (Grimm, 1925, p.180).

In March 1912. Russia sent a note to the Chinese government [Grimm, 1925, p. 180], which, in particular, stated: "If China sends troops from Heilongjiang and enters Mongolia, Russia will not remain indifferent" [International Relations..., 1931, p.227]. The Russian Government consistently adhered to this position when signing the Friendship Agreement with Mongolia of October 21, 1912, the Russian-Chinese Declaration of October 23, 1913, and, finally, the Triple Kyakhta Agreement of 1915.

In September 1912, the plenipotentiary representative of Russia I. Ya. Korostovets arrived in Usu (Khure) to conduct negotiations with the Mongolian government. He brought a draft agreement on the recognition of Mongolia as an autonomous region within China and handed it to the Mongolian side. Representatives of the Mongolian government, after reviewing the draft, expressed their disagreement on the main point-determining the status of Mongolia as an autonomous region within China-and proposed their own amendments. The main meaning of these amendments was as follows: Russia should recognize Mongolia's already declared independence and sovereignty; not allow the country's status to be reduced to the level of autonomy within China; include Inner Mongolia and Barga in Mongolia and accept a permanent representative of Mongolia in Russia.

Great controversy has developed around the amendments. At times, it even seemed that the negotiations would stop. In the course of heated arguments, it became obvious that the tough stance of the Mongolian side would not bring the desired results. Realizing the significance of the fact of signing the treaty with Russia, taking into account the internal and foreign political situation of Mongolia and the possibility of entering into equal relations with all countries of the world after signing the treaty, the Mongolian side made concessions. The Russian side also made some concessions: first, it agreed to remove the word "External "from the name "Outer Mongolia", thereby recognizing the possibility of using the name "Mongolia" in the broad sense of the word in the Russian version and the term "Mongol uls" ("State of Mongolia") Secondly, it did not object to the use of the Mongolian interpretation of the French translation of the word "autonomy" as "eerte togtnoh", "eere ezerkheh" and "ee zhuram" as "self-existence" and "self-government". The Russian Empire officially recognized Mongolia and its Government and thus laid the legal foundation for securing its sovereignty. This agreement was the first legal document that defined the status of Mongolia.

As a result of bilateral concessions, on October 21, 1912, the Plenipotentiary Representative of Russia, Ivan Yakovlevich Korostovets, on the one hand, and the Prime Minister of Mongolia, Sayn-noyon Khan Namnansuren, and five ministers, on the other, concluded an agreement in the Mongolian Chamber of Commerce.

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The capital city of Urga is the 22nd Friendship Agreement that defined relations between new Mongolia and Russia.

The preamble of the Agreement noted the removal of Chinese troops and authorities from the territory of Mongolia, the proclamation of Bogdo-gegen VIII Jebzundamba-hutukhta Khan of Mongolia, the termination of former relations between Mongolia and China, and also stressed the need to expand long-standing friendly relations between Mongolia and Russia, the development of trade and other economic relations between them on a preferential basis. Paragraph 1 of the Agreement stated that the government of the Russian Empire would assist Mongolia in maintaining the autonomous system established in it, creating a national army, preventing the entry of Chinese troops into its territory and colonizing Mongolian lands by the Chinese.

According to paragraph 2 of the Agreement, the Ruler of Mongolia and the Mongolian Government undertook to grant Russian subjects and merchants the rights and benefits listed in the attached protocol, and not to grant other foreigners more rights than those enjoyed by Russian subjects.

Paragraph 3 stated that if the Mongolian Government considers it necessary to conclude a treaty with China or another State, the provisions of this Russian-Mongolian Agreement and the attached Protocol may not be violated or amended without the prior consent of the Russian Government. Paragraph 4 stated that this Agreement comes into force from the date of its signing [Grimm, 1925, p.180].

The Agreement and the Protocol attached to it legalized the special rights of Russian citizens and merchants in Mongolia. They had the right to live and move freely in any part of Mongolia, were allowed to conduct trade, engage in production, service, conclude any contracts, import and export goods without paying customs duties, freely establish private enterprises, open branches of financial and banking organizations, etc.

I. Ya. Korostovets in his book "From Genghis Khan to the Soviet Republic" and in his diary entries left extremely interesting information about the preparation and signing of the Agreement. In particular, he described his impressions of the first meeting with Mongolian leaders as follows: "The first meeting in the consulate was attended by all the princes-rulers, namely the aforementioned Sayn-noyon Khan, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Handa-wan, the Minister of Internal Affairs Da Lama, the Minister of Finance Tushetu Khan, the Minister of Justice Erdeni-Wang Namsarai and Minister of War Dalai Wan. I have already spoken of the Da-lama and Handa-wan, members of the deputation sent to St. Petersburg in 1911. Sayn-noyon became a minister only recently, after the death of Tsasaktu Khan. The princes arrived on horseback, wearing ceremonial kurmas and sable hats for such a solemn occasion. They were accompanied by numerous grooms stationed in the courtyard and hallway.

Consul General Lyuba, Popov, Eltekov, and Buryat Tserempilov, who served as the consulate's interpreter, were also present on our side. I subsequently repeatedly resorted to the services of this Buryat. He was a member of the Khutukhta court, 23 and enjoyed some influence in government, lending money to princes and Taichung, 24 many of whom were enslaved to Chinese moneylenders...

I began by saying that Russia and the White Tsar, who had always been friendly to Mongolia, had decided to come to its aid when they learned of the difficulties that had arisen in connection with secession from China. This task will be made easier if the Mongols conclude an agreement with us that will strengthen Mongolia's connection with Russia and enable it to establish a stable state of affairs.-

22 In the Russian text, the document was called "The Mongolian-Russian Agreement on Friendship", and in the Mongolian - " The Mongolian - Russian Treaty of Friendship "(Mongol: "Mongol-orosyn nairamdalyn geree bichig"). Thus, the international legal status of the document differs in the Mongolian and Russian versions.

23 Bogdo Khan.

24 Taiji ( taiji) is a hereditary princely title of the Mongol nobility.

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sing for Mongolian autonomy. I was assigned to the negotiations because I had become intimately familiar with Mongolian affairs when I was an envoy in Beijing.

On behalf of the princes, the Da Lama-a shaved monk (the other princes with shaggy hair) of an ascetic appearance with sharp features - spoke. He said that the Mongols are ready to conclude an agreement with Russia, but would like to find out first how it will affect their relations with China. The Chinese have also proposed an agreement and want to send the Mongol Prince Nayanta to negotiate. The Mongolian government has so far refused to accept Nayanta in anticipation of Russia's further steps, and it also seeks to unite not only Outer but also Inner Mongolia, which is closely connected with the former.

I explained that I had been assigned to negotiate only about Khalkha and that it was best not to raise the issue of Inner Mongolia for the time being. As far as China is concerned, an agreement with it by the Mongols would probably amount to the abolition of their independence. We want rapprochement with the Mongols for mutual benefit, because we believe that Mongolia, as a buffer state, could serve as a bulwark on our border against Chinese penetration. This move is prompted by the Beijing government's modus operandi, and it will be up to the Mongols to take advantage of our offer.

Sayn-noyon, who remained silent, replied that the Mongols were aware of the importance of this moment in their country. My words and the draft agreement will be reported to Bogdo (Hutukhta) immediately. So ended my first meeting with the Mongolian ministers" [Korostovets, 2004, pp. 211-212].

The greatest interest is caused by the entry of I. Ya. Korostovets on the day of signing the Agreement: "The conclusion of the agreement took place on October 21. This is how this momentous event happened. The princes arrived at the consulate late in the evening, when I no longer expected to see them. The delay was caused by the divination of the court astrologer, who chose a lucky day for signing. The day turned out to be a happy one, as the princes declared to me with apparent pleasure. We immediately started comparing the texts and signing them. The Mongols, who saw this procedure for the first time, took it very seriously. They listened carefully to the reading, and then carefully began to write their names in ink. Then champagne was served, and I proposed a toast to the prosperity of Autonomous Mongolia and to Russian-Mongolian friendship. The princes were moved, shook hands with me and repeated "tsaa". Sayn-noyon even gave a small speech, and the Finance Minister jokingly remarked that since the Mongol invasion of Russia, this event is the first step towards restoring direct relations between Mongolia and Russia. Now the Mongols can be calm about the fate of their country, because Russia and Tsagan-batyr, that is, the White Tsar, will not betray it to anyone.

During our conversation, the princes confessed that their hesitation continued until the last minute, and that the final decision to sign was made at the insistence of Bogdo himself. It turned out that the doubts were caused by conversations with Larson, who had recently arrived from Beijing. The named Larson, a Norwegian by nationality and a representative of the American Bible Society, came to Usu ostensibly on behalf of the society, but in reality was sent by the Beijing government to encourage the Mongols to break off negotiations with Russia. He also received instructions from a group of capitalists who wanted to obtain a concession for the construction of a railway between Kalgan and Urga. However, the Mongols rejected all Larson's proposals, saying that they were ready to negotiate with China only after concluding an Agreement with Russia, and moreover as an equal with an equal" [Korostovets, 2004, p. 233].

The day after the signing of the Agreement, Foreign Minister Handa Van came to the Consulate of the Russian Empire and conveyed congratulations from Bogdo Khan on the signing of the Agreement. Later in the name of I. Ya. Korostovets from the Russian

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The Ministry of Foreign Affairs received a telegram informing about the submission of the Agreement signed by Korostovets to the Emperor. The king drew it with his own hand: "I express my gratitude to Korostovets. By the grace of the King."

Three days after the signing of the Friendship Agreement between Russia and Mongolia, Russian Foreign Minister S. D. Sazonov instructed the Envoy to China V. N. Krupensky to notify the Chinese side about this. Krupensky reported this to the Chinese Foreign Minister in Beijing on October 26, 1912, to which the Chinese minister remarked: "Russia has recognized the Government of Mongolia, but it has not yet recognized the Chinese government" [Grimm, 1925, p. 181-183; Mongol ard shumny..., 1982, p. 174-175]. This indicates that China considered the signing of the Friendship Agreement and Trade protocol as a fact of Russia's recognition of Mongolia's independence, and earlier than Russia recognized the Republic of China.

A few days after this event, the Chinese Foreign Minister paid a visit to St. Petersburg and officially informed the Russian Foreign Minister that the Chinese side does not recognize the Agreement between Russia and Mongolia. To this S. D. Sazonov replied: "Russia has not definitively recognized Mongolia's independence, but we can include China in trilateral negotiations and thus consolidate China's suzerainty" [Collection of diplomatic documents.., 1914, p.32]. The Chinese side denied the possibility of concluding any agreements with Mongolia, considering it part of China, and stated that Russia needs to conclude an agreement with the Chinese government regarding Mongolia, for which it must cancel the agreement with Mongolia. On November 19, 1912, the Chinese Foreign Minister once again appealed to Sazonov to annul the Friendship Agreement with Khure. However, Sazonov and Krupensky responded to this request that "the Chinese proposal was too late" (Tang, 1959, p. 314).

Sazonov's clear position on signing the treaty reflects Russia's support for Mongolia's independence. At the same time, China's repeated requests to cancel the treaty with Mongolia indicate Russia's recognition of Mongolia's independence and an irreversible change in the situation in its favor. Korostovets wrote in his telegram sent to the Russian Foreign Ministry on September 27, 1912: "Although the Mongolian side has not made any changes to the draft given by me, it wants to include a clause on its independence not only from China, but also from other states "[Collection of diplomatic documents.., 1914, p. 5].

After the signing of the Agreement of November 3, 1912, Mongolia became independent, as bilateral relations were maintained, bypassing the Chinese side [Volosovich, 1914, p. 42]. The Russian press noted that if Mongolia had not already been independent, the signing of this document would not have taken place, and the signing of this Agreement denies China's suzerainty over Mongolia.

Foreign experts have adopted this document in different ways: "Russia supported the formation of a new state", "Mongolia, having separated from China and gained its independence, will not become a colony of Russia" , etc. [Collection of diplomatic documents, 1914, p. 5].

After the signing of the Agreement, Russia's influence in Mongolia increased. The agreement has made major changes to the balance of power between Russia and China. There is a need for Russo-Chinese negotiations on the Mongolian issue. Russia's recognition of Mongolia gave it the right to defend its national interests and defend its independence. This was a great achievement, an important result of the wise policy of Bogdo Khan and other leaders of Mongolia.

Russia was ready to enter into negotiations with China, provided that its advantages in Mongolia were maintained in accordance with the 1912 Agreement. After signing the latter, Sazonov sent official messages to the ambassadors of England, France and Japan,

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where I marked it: "If China recognizes this treaty, we will not be opposed to concluding a treaty with Mongolia and suzerainty over Mongolia" [Tang, 1959, p. 313]. Although the Chinese side did not recognize the Friendship Agreements, and considered other documents illegal, the Russian side consistently adhered to its position. The Russian Envoy in Beijing met with the Chinese Foreign Minister, briefed him on the content of the Agreement, Russia's obligations to the Mongolian Government, and demanded that the Chinese Government recognize this fact. Then the adviser of the Russian Embassy addressed the Chinese Foreign Ministry with a message about sending the Mongolian ambassador to St. Petersburg in November 1912. This was a form of pressure on the Chinese side, because in reality no ambassador was sent.

Thus, after exchanging a few notes, both sides came to the conclusion that negotiations were necessary. Although China did not want to recognize the documents signed by Russia with Mongolia, it later recognized the 17-point Trade Protocol ahead of the planned negotiations with Russia. This was noted in paragraph 4 of the Russo-Chinese Declaration of 1913, and was later consolidated in paragraph 21 of the 1915 Kyakhta Agreement between Russia, China and Mongolia.

The Russian draft Agreement originally referred to "Outer Mongolia", but the Mongolian side strongly objected to this term. As a result of negotiations, both sides agreed to use the term "Mongolia" [Collection of treaties..., 1952, p.411]. This term had a twofold meaning: first, it could mean the name of a state, and secondly, it could be the geographical name of a territory - Outer Mongolia (mong. Ar Mongol) or the general name of territories inhabited by Mongolian peoples, as can be seen from the Russian version of the Agreement (Batsaikhan, 2002, p. 38).

The agreement gave the Russians an opportunity to step up their activities in Mongolia. E. M. Darevskaya noted that this led to "full pressure and power of the Russians in Mongolia" [Darevskaya, 1994, p.60]. Russian merchants were engaged in the extraction of gold and other minerals, opened various "Communities", "Partnerships", were engaged in the sale of public and private goods. They even founded the Mongolian National Bank. The Russian ruble gradually began to displace the Chinese yuan from the Mongolian market [Edinarkhova, 2000, p. 62].

Russia's strategy and policy were influenced by such factors as common borders, historical ties, traditions, and mutual economic interests. After 1911 Russia was in competition with other states, and it was strategically important for it not to lose, but to expand its position, which was fixed by the Russian-Japanese treaties on the division of spheres of influence in Mongolia.

This Agreement is often seen as a document that protected the interests of the predominantly Russian side and exerted pressure on the Mongolian side. But for Mongolia, it played a very important role, marking the country's entry into the international arena.

The Friendship Agreement concluded on October 21 / November 3, 1912, and the negotiations held were of great importance for Mongolia. By this Agreement, the Russian Empire officially recognized Mongolia and its Government. Moreover, in the future, the Agreement served as the legal basis for consolidating the state sovereignty of Mongolia. The conclusion of the Agreement was a strong blow to the Chinese colonization policy and led to the need for negotiations between the Chinese government and Russia on the Mongolian issue.

Although the Friendship Agreement and the 1912 Trade Protocol are traditionally considered economic documents, they were of great political significance. The very fact of the Agreement not only put an end to the former relations between Mongolia and China, but also opened up an opportunity for the newly formed Mongolian go-

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states should have equal relations with all countries of the world. After Mongolia declared its independence, the Agreement became the first official legal document that defined Mongolia's status in the international arena [Batsaykhan, 2002, p. 116]. In particular, this document established:

1. Mongolia is a state that has its own ruler and its own government; 2. Mongolia has the right to form its own troops; 3. Mongolia began to exist as a sovereign state; 4.Chinese troops and representatives of the Chinese administration were withdrawn from Mongolia, and it received the right to prevent Chinese troops and Chinese immigrants from entering its territory.

Mongolia has become a legally competent entity that has the full right to conclude any agreements with foreign countries. This right was recognized by the Russian Government, and Russia pledged to provide all possible assistance to its "strict observance". Although during the negotiations the Mongols raised the question of including Inner Mongolia and Barga in Mongolia, the Russian side flatly refused this demand; a negative answer was also received to the question of the stay of the Mongolian ambassador in St. Petersburg. The fate of Inner Mongolia had already been sealed by a secret treaty between Russia and Japan. The issue of accreditation of the Mongolian ambassador to the Russian capital was a sensitive issue in the context of the restriction of Mongolian independence to formal autonomy.

By signing the Friendship Agreement, the Russian Empire officially recognized the Government of Mongolia and considered it a legitimate subject for signing such a document. The announcement of the signing of this document to the whole world was the actual recognition of the state and its name "Mongolia". Thus, Mongolia's signing of a Friendship agreement with one of the strongest powers of the time gave the Mongols a new impetus to continue their struggle for independence.

list of literature

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