The Ottoman experience of coexistence and cooperation of peoples professing different religions is still poorly understood, and sometimes distorted by the events that accompanied the collapse of the Ottoman imperial entity. However, it, like any other historical experience, whether positive or negative, is instructive, and the coexistence of peoples belonging to different religious confessions is still a topical, painful and extremely significant problem for the destinies of the whole world and the Russian Federation. The Ottoman experience is interesting for the Russian reader also because the Ottoman and Russian Empires developed in many ways synchronously. L. N. Gumilyov explains this by saying that the creation of these state entities occurred as a result of the same passionate explosion (Gumilyov, 1989). One can think differently about Gumilev's theory, accept or not accept his point of view, but the synchronicity and similarity of many problems that faced these states during their formation and development are indisputable and sometimes surprising. Both in the Ottoman Empire and in Russia, peoples of different confessional affiliations were included in the same state body. The main confessional groups in both these countries were the same - Orthodox Christians and Muslims, but different confessions played a leading role. Russia was perceived as an Orthodox country, the successor of Byzantium, the Third Rome. The Ottoman Empire considered itself the land of Islam, the Ottoman soldiers carried Islam to the world of infidels, but at the same time, the empire also adopted many Byzantine traditions, including the experience of building interfaith relations. Each of these empires had to find its own solution to the problem of coexistence of different religions. And if they hadn't found it, they wouldn't have been able to exist as great powers for centuries. It is clear that conquest and violence alone are not enough for State-building. There should have been some positive experience.

The Turkic population became a prominent ethnic group in Asia Minor in the 11th century, creating their own state entities there. One of them, which acted as a unifier, was called the Seljuk state of Rum. The name Rum comes from Rome, the Roman Empire, the Eastern Roman Empire. Rum not only among the Turks, but also in general in the East was called the state, which we usually call Byzantium. The name Rum was also appropriated by the Turkic tribes located in the former Byzantine territories.

The advance of the Turks on Byzantium and their capture of Nicaea were, as is well known, one of the reasons (the other was the onslaught of the Pechenegs, Hungarians and Normans) for the Byzantine emperor's appeal to the Pope for help. The result of this pomo is-

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Then came the Crusades. The first Crusade of 1096 drove the Turks deep into Anatolian territory, but did not destroy their statehood. They lost only the most western possessions, and they were forced to move the capital of their state from Nicaea to Konya. Moreover, it was the Crusades that helped the Turks establish closer ties with the local population. As noted by V. A. Gordlevsky, who studied the Early Anatolian period of Turkic history, "the crusaders' behavior - violence, looting - so irritated the population in Asia Minor that the local princes, forgetting about the gap that the church puts between Christians and Muslims, turn to the Seljukids and united against the Crusaders. Thus, a single anti-Crusader bloc is temporarily formed in the East: when a choice is made between the Crusaders and the Turks, both Armenians and Byzantines often give preference to the Turks" (Gordlevsky, 1960, p. 51).

From the 11th to the 13th century, i.e., until the second mass migration of Eastern peoples to Anatolia, when not only nomads and not only Turks were fleeing from the Mongols, and the migration itself was not as uniform in ethnic and religious terms as in the 11th century, there were two centuries of habituation and coexistence of newcomers and peoples who lived here earlier with different economic, social, cultural and religious traditions. The environment was very syncretic. There were, for example, statesmen who served both the Seljuk state of Rum and the Byzantine Empire (Korobeynikov, (1), 1998). And even later, under the Ottomans, their first detachments appeared in the Balkans at the invitation of one of the pretenders to the Byzantine throne. The rival who fought against him also resorted to Turkic help, only a different beylik (domain) - Aydin (History of Byzantium, 1967; Koprulu, 1935; Zhukov, 1988). Over three centuries, the Turks have become their familiar neighbors in this region, which could be used to solve internal, in this case Byzantine, problems.

In the Western historical literature, there is a discussion about what was the main stimulating factor in the movement of the Turks to the West: Islam with its jihad or the disintegration of the tribal system and the need for new lands, including in connection with the transition to settlement, which was clearly sought by many settlers in the XIII century [Korobeynikov, (2), 1998, pp. 10-11]. In our opinion, this discussion is meaningless. Both factors do not exclude each other, and by focusing on Islam, the debaters, perhaps unconsciously, participate in some kind of political speculation.

Indeed, the Turkic migration flow was inspired by Islam and the honor, according to Muslim canons, of fighting infidels, but the main role was played by the policy of the Great Seljukids, who, since their establishment in Khorasan, tried to direct their nomadic and restless tribesmen away from the local taxpayers who submitted to them. Without the removal of the nomadic hordes, the state they conquered would not have been able to survive. Nomadic freemen went to conquer more and more new lands to the west. This movement continued until they encountered insurmountable obstacles: strong states that could fight back, or natural obstacles. At that time, the mass accumulation of the Turkic ethnic group took place, and therefore the regions most remote from their places of origin (from Central Asia)-Azerbaijan and Asia Minor - became Turkic [Umnyakov and Tumanovich, 1976, pp. 265-269]. The Turkic movement of the XI-XIII centuries was not just nomadic raids, but migration. Another Great migration of peoples. Islam played a major organizing and unifying role in it, but it was not the only one that gave birth to this movement.

The Ottoman beylik emerged as a border possession of the Seljuk state of Rum (this state itself collapsed under the blows of the Mongols). The Ottomans became Rodona-

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the Palniks of the new great state, which absorbed not only the 400 tents of their own tribe, but also a mass of settlers of the XIII century, who were looking for a new homeland from the Mongol invasion. This state was based on Hanifite Islam, but it did not reject the teachings of many preachers and tribal Babas who came in the thirteenth century and held views that were far from the Sunni orthodoxy adopted by the Ottoman Sultans. These preachers became the main propagators of Islam in the non-Islamic environment, generating more than once explosions of militant violent Islamization. At the same time, it was unorthodox Islamic sects, rather than official Islam, that found a common language with the Christian population. At the domestic level, ideas about the closeness of Islam and Christianity were spread. Islam was most often converted by those Christians who, as a result of military operations, were forced to leave their former places of residence and settle in new lands, losing not only their property, but also their old spiritual values and traditions. Followers of heretical Christian teachings, such as the Bogomils, were also willing to convert to Islam. Bosnia and Albania, where the Islamization of the local population was most widespread, were precisely the areas through which the main road of the Ottoman advance to Europe passed and the local population was most discharged, fleeing from military adversity to hard-to-reach or remote areas from the theater of military operations. And although the population, for example, in the area of the main transport artery of South-Eastern Europe - the so-called Constantinople Road and its main part between Belgrade and Sofia, grew rapidly, but it was not necessarily the former inhabitants [Zaroevip, 1970; Todorov, 1976; Zhelyazkova, 1990; Osmanski izvori..., 1990].

The resettlement of local residents, as well as the Turks, became a characteristic feature of the internal policy of the first Ottoman sultans. So, after the capture of Constantinople, in addition to the Turks, Greeks from Kafa, Trebizond, Peloponnese, and the Aegean Islands, Armenians from various regions of Anatolia and the Balkans, and Jews from more than 30 Balkan cities were resettled in the new Ottoman capital. Turks were resettled from Anatolia to cities, especially Istanbul, Soloniki and others, and nomadic tribes were placed in the valleys of Maritsa, Vardar, and the Balkan Black Sea coast. At the same time, the Christian inhabitants of Tarnovo were resettled in Anatolia, and the survivors of Constantinople were resettled in Edirne, Bursa, Gelibola, and Plovdiv (Todorov, 1976: 67-70).

But even after the creation of numerous Ottoman military settlements in the Balkans in the cities, border areas and around the newly created waqf centers, the Turks and Muslims did not become the majority. The wave of Turkish colonization had already exhausted itself in the 15th century and was limited to the eastern and central parts of the Balkans, and the ratio of Muslims to non-Muslims even at the beginning of the 16th century, i.e., during the period of the greatest concentration of Turkish settlements in the Balkans and the still very sparse local population, was approximately 1: 4 (Todorov, 1976, p. 65). The ethnic center for the Turks was still Anatolia, where the formation of the Turkish nationality took place. The formation of a nation under the conditions of victorious conquests, significant migrations and coexistence with other peoples (after all, even in Anatolia there was no ethnic unity) complicated and delayed the maturation of Turkish ethnic identity. The newly formed nation did not even have a single ethnonym or self-name for a long time. The term "Osmanli" (Ottomans, Ottomans) meant citizenship or belonging to the ruling class. As an ethnonym, this term was used only outside the country, and most often in the form - ottoman, which came from the Greek and then French pronunciation of the name Osman. The ethnonym "Turk" also spread primarily abroad and among the non-Turkish population of the Ottoman Empire. Inside the country, the word "Turk" (turk) meant a commoner. And although it was perceived by all Turkic tribes, it remained

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It was alien to the citizen and warrior, whose self-consciousness was dominated by the Muslim religion [Eremeev, 1978; Gordlevsky, (4), 1962, pp. 76-80; Zhukov, 1990].

Turkish colonization and Islamization of a part of the Balkan population were interrelated processes. But the compact ethnic masses that converted to Islam-Bosniaks and Albanians-retained their ethnic identity. Therefore, it was an anachronism to use the names of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims for the opposing peoples of that country at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries during the breakup of Yugoslavia. The latter were thus excluded from the Slavic ethnic community (in relation to Muslim Albanians, the ethnic name, as we know, was preserved) and thrown back to a certain medieval ethno-religious uncertainty.

In the Ottoman Empire, despite the assimilation and Islamization that took place there, the Turks remained an alien population for most parts of the Balkans, but the Ottoman ruling class continued to absorb representatives of non-Turkish ethnic groups. In the first years after the conquest of the Balkans, Ottoman censuses record the preservation of a fairly significant stratum of so-called Christians-Sipakhi (in the Balkans, a distorted term is used - spachii), i.e. local feudal lords who went to the service of the conquerors, became Sipakhi - soldiers of the Ottoman mounted militia, and thanks to this preserved their former land possessions, recognized by the new government as timars (sultan's conditional land grants). Christian timars were usually small in size. (Large Balkan landowners were deprived of their possessions, physically eliminated, or emigrated.) Later, however, sources record that in the XVI-XVII centuries the number of Sipakhi Christians sharply decreased. Many of them accept Islam, which gave them the hope of receiving a larger timar and to some extent guaranteed them from the arbitrariness of the authorities [Tsvetkova, 1958; Inalcik, 1952-1953; Inalcik, 1954].

The adoption of Islam even earlier, before the conquest of the Balkans, allowed some large local feudal lords to become part of the upper part of the Ottoman ruling class. Such families of well-known Bey-conquerors (Gazi) as, for example, Michal-oglu and Evrenos-oglu had Christian roots (Vryonis, 1971, p. 465). Michal-ghazi, the founder of one of the longest-established Bey families, was a commander of the Greek Border Guard service before converting to Islam [Inalcik, 1973, p. 11]. The families of the Bey conquerors concentrated huge land and other riches in their hands, which did not fit into the structure of management and land use on which the Ottoman state eventually established itself. Realizing this, their descendants began to pass on their wealth to various Islamic religious and charitable organizations. As founders of waqfs, they maintained the income from their property and the position of their families in the upper strata of Ottoman society (Demetriades, 1981; Demetriades, 1976). On the other hand, waqfs in the newly conquered territories became the main support objects that confirmed the Islam-Ottoman positions in the Christian environment (Barkan, 1942; Gokbilgin, 1952). Around them, the Muslim population accumulated, and centers of economic activity were created. Without being subject to such strict regulations, which constrained the initiative of farms located on state land - miri, it was the waqf possessions that later became a hotbed of new commodity relations and suppliers of Balkan agricultural products to foreign markets (Moutafchieva, 1981).

The Turks brought to Anatolia and the Balkans many institutions and traditions that were already familiar to the locals. This is explained by the fact that much of the Byzantine practice was adopted by the Arabs during the conquest of Syria and Egypt, and then included in the Islamic prescriptions concerning the social structure. They were perceived by the Turks as unshakable religious attitudes.

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practice sessions. This made it easier for the conquerors to understand the social environment and political culture they encountered in the Byzantine region (Vryonis, 1971, p. 103-105).

After crushing Byzantium and settling in its capital, Mehmed II Fatih did much to develop and legislate the state and social structure of his empire. In relation to the Ottoman state, we usually use the term Empire only after the capture of Constantinople by the Turks. This is explained by the fact that it was then that the Ottoman sultans included in their title the new concept of "Kayser-i Rum "(Roman Emperor) [Abrahamovich, 2006, p. 103-105] and began to develop the status of including various peoples and states in their state.

The Sultan appointed a new Orthodox patriarch - Gennady Scholarii. This is a major religious figure of Byzantium, who took part in the Ferraro-Florentine Council of 1438 - 1439, but then withdrew from supporting the Union of Florence on the unification of the Orthodox and Catholic churches under the supremacy of the pope. The Byzantine Emperor John VIII Palaiologos and Patriarch Joseph not only supported, but also initiated, such a unification of churches, hoping that it would help to get help from the Catholic world in the fight against the Turks. These hopes were not fulfilled, and the population of Constantinople, which still had memories of the Fourth Crusade and its devastating consequences for Byzantium, was ideologically divided, which weakened it in the fight against the Ottoman invasion. Luca Notaru, one of the Byzantine military leaders, famously said that he would rather see a Turkish turban in Constantinople than a papal tiara (Runciman, 1983, p.32,73). Gennady Scholarius, being an opponent of the Union, in protest against the then policy of the Byzantine Church, went to a monastery. Under the Ottomans, however, he was appointed patriarch by the Sultan (Papadakis, 1972; Turner, 1970; Vryonis, 1996). He and the Orthodox Church, under his leadership, cooperated with the Muslim conquerors. This was a forced and reasonable decision, as it saved the Orthodox flock from destruction and created some certainty in the situation of the non-Islamic population within the Islamic state. It should be emphasized that in this case, the other side also cooperated - the Islamic state, which since that time has granted the legal status of residence within its borders to a non-Muslim denomination.

According to Islamic concepts, all Christians were considered " people of the Book "(ahl al-kitab), and if so, then a contract could be concluded with them (zimmet). They will "pay off with their own hands" [Qur'an, 9.29, 1963], after which they can live in the country of Islam (dar al-Islam), where their identity and property will be protected. Such people of the treaty (ahl al-dhimma, or dhimmi) became Orthodox Christians. They could maintain their faith, follow their religious rites, marry, divorce, and inherit property based on their own legal norms. "According to the Islamic doctrine, religion does not consist only of the foundations of faith and worship, but is an integral system that regulates all aspects of personal, family and social life through prescriptions and prohibitions. For this reason, Islamic law recognized the freedom of non-Muslims to organize their lives in accordance with the foundations of their religion, law and tradition, in other words, it granted them legal autonomy" [Istoriya osmanskogo gosudarstva..., 2006, p.357]. Or, as one of the medieval Islamic jurists (Hasan al-Basri) said, "they pay us jizya to live according to their faith" (Istoriya osmanskogo gosudarstva..., 2006, p.357). The rights granted by the Patriarchate were quite broad and, as stated by the Byzantine historian, contemporary of Mehmed II Fatih, Kritovul, gave-

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The powers granted to the Greek Patriarchate were no less than in Byzantine times [Istoriya osmanskogo gosudarstva..., 2006, p. 359].

The situation of the church was very difficult at that time, as there was a general decline in the spiritual life of the Christian population, demoralized by the Union, and then by the Turkish conquest, the fall of church discipline, and mass apostasy. Gennady Scholarius managed to stop these processes by preaching the need for Christians to submit, accept Turkish rule as established by God, and repent, which alone can lead to the fact that the Lord wants to return the lost state to the Byzantines [Lobovikova, 2006, pp. 265-266].

Mehmed II also faced a difficult task, despite the centuries-old traditions of cooperation and its theoretical justification by Islamic canons. The Ottomans operated at a time when the confrontation between religions was aggravated. The migration of the thirteenth century brought with it a more aggressive mood. "Union of Christian churches with Mongols hostile to Islam... it strengthened the Muslim majority in their dislike and contempt for the "people of the Book"" [Grunebaum, 1988, p. 153]. Tribal groups arriving in Asia Minor fled from the Mongols and sought a new place of residence. Many of them, by the time they arrived in Asia Minor, were far from the theories that had developed in Islam, and even more so, as researchers state, they remained "not fully assimilated the Muslim religion" [Melikoff, 2006, p. 271]. Gazavat was perceived by them not as an idea of spreading Islam, but as a kind of search for "justice", creating conditions for continuing their own lives [Ahmedi, 1983, l. 65b-66a, History of the Ottoman State..., 2006, p. 7].

The Ottoman sultans also, despite their official commitment to orthodox Islam, the inclusion in the qanun-nama (code of laws) of articles on the ulema class and its leading role in the structure of the state, and the establishment of many new madrasas, clearly felt the influence of various religious teachers who arrived within their state and continued to rely on the Dervish orders. The most popular and close to the authorities was the Bektashi Order, whose views diverged from both Sunni and Shiite orthodoxy. The dervishes of this order were active participants in the conquest of the Balkans, where they received land and created numerous tekke (Dervish monasteries). They were the most active colonizers of the newly annexed lands, as well as the official patrons of the janissary corps. They were associated with many anti-Christian actions, as well as syncretism of religious ideas, which were undoubtedly Islamic, but also absorbed much of the Christian population and its worldview [Petrushevsky, 1966, p. 34; Faroqhi, 1981; Birge, 1937]. According to researchers, such orders were a convenient "form in which the alien is eventually introduced to Islam" (Yakob, 1909, p.15).

During the reign of Mehmed II, numerous discussions were held on religious issues, in particular, on the views of al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd [History of the Ottoman State..., 2006, p. 198]. In 1455, on the sultan's instructions, the patriarch wrote treatises on the Christian faith, which were translated into Turkish [Lobovikova, 2006, p.261]. Shortly before the reign of Mehmed II, there was an uprising in the country by Bedreddin Simavi and his supporters, whose teachings contained many Christian ideas [Babinger, 1921; Kissling, 1950; Werner, 1974; Zhukov, 1998, Zhukov, 2005].

In these difficult conditions, the system of inter - confessional relations that served as the basis of the imperial structure-the millet system-was formed. The word millet in old Turkish dictionaries translates as religion, faith, nation, community, in Arabic mila - a certain community, people, public, assembly, society. In the Ottoman era, millets were called religious communities that received the right to exist in the empire and a certain internal autonomy.

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The Muslims were the Millet and Hakim, i.e. the dominant community. Representatives of other religions are millet and mahkume, i.e. guided, subordinates. The Orthodox community (Rum Milleti) was the first in terms of time of formation and number. Its religious and administrative center was the Patriarchate of Constantinople, located in the Fanar (Fener) quarter of Istanbul. Although it is often called the Greek Patriarchate, its power extended not only to the Greeks, but also to all other Orthodox empires, i.e. Bulgarians, Serbs, Moldovans, Wallachians, Orthodox Arabs, etc.A little later, Yahudi milleti and Ermeni milleti (Jewish and Armenian) were created. All of them made up the three main non-Muslim millets of the Empire. Millet members enjoyed legal autonomy, while millet heads were millet bashi, were their spiritual and legal leaders, and represented their interests before the state [Gibb and Boven, 1969, p. 212-213; Bilal, 1992; History of the Ottoman State..., 2006, p. 390].

The treaty (zimma) with Gennadius Scholarius on Rum Milleti was signed at the turn of 1453-1454, i.e. immediately after the conquest of Constantinople, but, according to Turkish historians, its text has not come down to us [Istoriya osmanskogo gosudarstva..., 2006, p. 359]. Practice shows that members of the millet, in addition to freedom of faith and belief, observance of rituals, were guaranteed that their churches would not be taken away, and they themselves would not be converted to Islam; judicial autonomy was also granted. Only if there was a dispute between a Christian and a Muslim, the case was referred to the Qadi court. However, everything related to marriages, divorces, inheritance, waqfs (in the sense of church property) was within Millet's competence. The millet leaders, the Millet bashi, resolved all these issues without interference from the state. The Greek patriarchs, like all Millet Bashi, received from the Sultan ferman on appointment to the post. In these farms, it was a provision that the community was subordinate to its head, as well as all the clergy. Clerics were considered assistants to the patriarch in the performance of all those duties that were assigned to him by the Sultan's decree. Consequently, the patriarchs, as well as the heads of other millets, actually became representatives of the imperial administration, and the communities themselves received the right of autonomous existence [Inalcik, 1991, p. 407-436; History of the Ottoman State..., 2006, p. 360-361].

All non-Muslim Dhimmis, as residents of an Islamic State, were required to obey State and Islamic laws in all other respects, in addition to the rights granted to them by millet autonomy. Chief among the provisions of these laws was that instead of military service, Dhimmis were required to pay a poll tax, the jizya. It was believed that he was paid for the fact that the state guarantees them protection and at the same time exempts them from serving in the army. Jizya was collected from healthy men aged 14 to 75 years. The method of collection and the amount of this tax changed several times, but throughout Ottoman history, until the middle of the XIX century, the jizya remained one of the main taxes of the Empire. In addition to jizya, there were other taxes that non-Muslims paid in larger amounts than Muslims [Kabarda, 1969; Inalcik, 1991, p. 421-428; Grozdanova, 1974, p. 161-234; History of the Ottoman State..., 2006, p. 435 - 440]. The first, unsuccessful attempt to equalize Christians and Muslims in taxation and start conscripting non-Muslims into the army was made only in 1847, which caused discontent among the Christian subjects of the empire. The final cancellation of this rule occurred in 1856, although it was still possible to buy off military service after that [Karal, 1947, pp. 179-181].

From the 15th to the 17th centuries, the devshirme system was widely used in the empire-the recruitment of boys from Christian families to serve in the Kapikulu troops (the main one being the janissary corps). Children were separated from their families and converted to Islam. Hence, here we see a departure from the guarantees that xi promised-

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millet stem. From an Islamic legal point of view, these actions are explained by the fact that the Islamic state was allowed to act on the situation if necessary. That is why it could, in need of additional manpower reserves, call Christians to military service, exempting them from paying the jizya. It is interesting that the boys were accompanied to the assembly point by their fathers and priests, who provided a church record of their baptism. Consequently, these children were officially given by the Christian millet to the janissary army for military service and conversion to Islam. The latter was justified by the fact that there was a hadith in which the words of the Prophet are quoted: "Every child is born according to the law of nature, then the parents make him a Jew, a Christian or a pagan." It was believed that the young man had not yet become an adult before the age of 18, and therefore, in relation to him, it is not a question of forcibly changing religion, but of converting to the true faith before his parents make him a Christian [History of the Ottoman State..., 2006, p. 265-269; Georgieva, 1988; Petrosyan, 1987]. From this practice, it follows that the millet system protected the non-Muslim population of the Ottoman Empire, but its protection was, firstly, far from absolute, and secondly, it can be evaluated and interpreted in different ways.

Religious communities lived separately. As the Egyptian historian A. A. M. ash-Shennawi writes in his "Ottoman History", as a result, the Ottoman Turks were alienated from the conquered peoples: "The rulers and the governed did not have the unity of language, thinking, and education. Nor did they have common rituals, holidays, traditions, ideals, and other manifestations of social unity. In other words, there were no civilizational elements that would connect the Ottoman Turks and European peoples. Therefore, the European peoples who submitted to the Ottomans did not have the same feeling of loyalty to the state and the Sultan in common with the Ottomans." As a result of all this, the "Ottoman presence" in Europe was unable to put down roots that would have nurtured elements that could give life by the time "when weakness began to penetrate the body of the empire" (Shannaui, 1986, p.324).

The evaluation of the millet system in the literature is ambiguous. They write that the system has helped to preserve non-Turkish peoples, not to lose their identity, culture, and language. But did it strengthen the unity of the Empire? American historian A. Khurani used Arabic material to analyze the impressions of the Ottoman past that have been preserved in various countries. The warmest memories of the Ottoman Empire are in those countries that were subjected to colonial occupation, and at a time when the Empire was beginning a period of reform and there were hopes for progress and overcoming difficulties [Hurani, 1974, pp. 61-78].

In our literature, it is usually written that the millet system, isolating religious communities into closed groups, contributed to the preservation of society and hindered the growth of national consciousness of individual nationalities. State regulation in the Ottoman Empire was indeed comprehensive [Todorov, 1976, p. 150]. The income of the ruling class, prices, ways of transporting goods to markets, the percentage of usury that existed, although prohibited by Sharia, were regulated [Oreshkova, 1980], and even the amount of bakshi allowed for certain actions of state officials [Miller, 1947, p. 4]. 52]. The Milllets, with their restrictive regulations, were no exception. It was impossible for people to get out of their environment. It is no coincidence that even devshirme-this "blood tax", as it was called-was sometimes used as a legal way to advance to other social strata. The most prominent figure in this regard was Mehmed Sokollu, Grand Vizier of the Sultans Suleiman Qanuni, Selim II and Murad III (1564-1579) [Refik, 1924, Gokbilgin, 1960, pp. 595-605]. This one, one of the most authoritative Ottoman statesmen, was taken by devshirma from Bosnia. He belonged to the noble Slavic Sokolovich family. It is in ve-

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His Christian relatives occupied a prominent position in their region and the independence of the Serbian (Pec) Patriarchate was recognized by the Ottoman authorities. Mehmed Sokollu's brother Makarii was placed at the head of the Serbian church, and then his nephews Antony, Gerasim, and Savvati occupied this post [Osmanskaya Imperiya..., 1984, pp. 223-224]. It is also known about the influence of relatives of another native of devshirme - the Grand Vizier Sinan Pasha from Albania, as well as some other Christians who passed the Devshirme school.

There were also difficulties with intra-millet relations. Thus, the Armenian millet was torn by contradictions from the very beginning. Bishop Joachim of Bursa, appointed in 1461 by Millet Bashi and declared by the Sultan's decree the spiritual and legal leader of all Armenians, did not enjoy sufficient authority among the Armenian communities and churches of Anatolia. There were Catholicoses of Etchmiadzin and Sisa. They remained spiritual leaders, but had no official status. The Sultan's authorities conducted all their business with the Armenian community only through the Istanbul diocese. Later, in the 19th century, new communities appeared: Catholic Armenians (1830) and Protestant Armenians (1848) [Gibb and Bowen, 1969, p. 221; History of the Ottoman State..., 2006, p. 360 - 390]. Observers note the mutual hostility between these Armenian religious communities and their use of the Ottoman administration to fight each other. This led to confiscation of property, executions, and exile, especially among the Armenians of Constantinople. Nevertheless, K. M. Bazili, referring to the Armenians as "East Englishmen", states in the 1930s that they " took over the entire internal trade of Turkey and, it seems, locked up all the capital in their coffers, as in tombs. The Port has long entrusted them with the Mint, and the lure of profit makes them forget all the dangers and terrible examples of executions and exiles "[Bazili, 2006, pp. 184-185]. G. Vambery wrote about the same thing at the end of the XIX century: "All capital, with very few exceptions, is now in the hands of Armenians, from among whom the main stock exchange leaders come" (Vambery, 1877, p. 263).

The Jewish millet was not immediately formed, although the first Khakhambashi Kapsali was very authoritative among the Jewish masses. Later, Millet's power did not always extend to the entire Jewish population of the country [Istoriya osmanskogo gosudarstva..., 2006, p.360]. According to K. M. Bazili, the Jews who fled from Catholic Europe "found protection and tolerance in the kingdom of the Koran. They are here and now more content with their lot than in many European cities, and enjoy the same rights as all the tribes subject to the Turks." The Jewish population of the Ottoman Empire was very zealous about preserving their religion. If any of the Jews converted to Christianity, they were forced to leave the country [Bazili, 2006, pp. 192-193]. Relations with Islam were different. Since the 17th century, there was a special Muslim-Jewish sect - denme. Its members, declaring themselves Muslims, kept their inner isolation, the old Jewish rites and beliefs. It was with denme that such diverse phenomena as the development of the Young Turk movement, the resettlement of part of the Jewish population from the Balkan Peninsula to Turkish territory after the collapse of the empire, and the preservation of the most fundamentalist ideas in Judaism were associated [Gordlevsky, (2), (3), 1962, pp. 432-446].

The most widespread flock was the Orthodox Millet, whose power extended to all the Orthodox peoples of the empire [Inalcik, 1991; Gordlevsky, (1), 1962, pp. 137-141]. However, even here, dissatisfaction with the fact that the top clergy was dominated by Greeks gradually grew. It was they who received the largest deductions from tax levies, were the most humble and compliant before the Ottoman authorities. Before the Greek revolt of 1821, the Phanariote Greeks were the wealthiest segment of the empire's Christian population. They managed deliveries to Istanbul

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food products, served as translators and organizers of foreign policy relations of the Empire, in the XVIII century., after the Prut campaign and the betrayal of the Dm. Their representatives were appointed gospodars of the Danubian principalities. Their habitat, the Fanari quarter, "seemed to extend ancient Byzantium in Istanbul" (Bazili, 2005, p. 183-184). Having lost their former positions after 1821, the Greek Phanariots retained their power over the Orthodox Millet. It was against them, at first even more clearly than against the imperial authorities, that the liberation movement in the Balkans in the nineteenth century was directed. The Serbian Church gained independence, as already mentioned, in the second half of the 16th century, while other Balkan peoples fought for the autocephaly of their churches and considered this struggle as a certain stage on the way to national autonomy, and then liberation from Ottoman rule. The Bulgarian Church became autocephalous only in 1870, and the Romanian Church in 1865 [Istoriya osmanskogo gosudarstva..., 2006, p. 74].

The millet system was the structure that helped the Empire to acquire a certain stability, to organize the coexistence of the Islamic state and non-Islamic peoples. Its creation was the result of the Islamic State's refusal to pursue a policy of Islamization within the country. It should be emphasized that Islamization was underway, but there was no policy of Islamization. There were times when people started talking about such a policy, for example, under Selim I, but state interests always prevailed [Alindag, 1966, pp. 423-434]. Islamization was carried out by both violent and nonviolent methods. Cities in the Balkans have been predominantly Muslim since the 16th century. Local authorities and the Muslim majority sometimes acted as militant Islamizers, as evidenced by the Balkan lives of Christian martyrs. However, voluntary acceptance of Islam was more common, associated with the desire to ease the tax burden, maintain a privileged status, sometimes just to get some material handout [Osmanskaya Imperiya..., 1984, p.219; Osmanski izvori..., 1990]. But these phenomena were not widespread. Throughout its existence, the Empire remained interested in preserving its non-Muslim subjects, the main taxpayers, the "treasury of the padishah" as Ottoman sources called them.

The Ottoman Empire was a military state that strictly regulated the lives of its subjects and dealt harshly with all manifestations of discontent, especially separatism. With the weakening of the Empire and the active intervention of European diplomacy in the so-called Eastern question, relations between Islam and Christianity began to take on a new character. Being interested in increasing the Muslim population, the Ottoman authorities organized and, moreover, provoked mass migrations of the Caucasian peoples to the Empire, pushed the Armenian population to the Russian borders, which began in the 20s of the XIX century. Secretly, this population exchange was also welcomed by the Russian imperial authorities (Burzage, 1996).

With the collapse of the Empire, all the old guarantees for non-Muslims ceased to exist. Tanzimat slogans about the equality of citizens before the law, regardless of their religious affiliation, were not perceived by the majority of the Muslim population. Non-Muslims were allowed to live nearby, observe their own customs, and pray to their own gods, but the command heights, according to their ideas, were supposed to remain with Muslims. European intervention, attempts by the great powers to dictate their will, and the desire of Christian peoples for independence disrupted the former inter-confessional balance and caused a terrible massacre of the Bulgarian population in 1876-1877, and later the famous Armenian tragedy of the late XIX-early XX centuries. Memories of such events for many years to come crossed out everything

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the past, including reasonable, in relations between faiths, developed over the centuries of imperial history.

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