Based on diplomatic correspondence between the US State Department and the Turkish government regarding the deployment of a Turkish contingent to the Korean Peninsula to participate in combat operations on the side of UN troops, the article traces the connection between this decision of the Turkish government and its intention to achieve NATO membership.

At the turn of the 1940s and 1950s, Turkey experienced a series of changes in its domestic political life. The most important of them was the coming to power of the government of the Democratic Party led by Adnan Menderes, which replaced the previously leading Republican People's Party. This event also affected the country's foreign policy.

U.S. economic assistance under the Marshall Plan was primarily military in nature. With the beginning of the Cold War, the Turkish government sided with the West and with the creation of NATO in 1949, Turkish diplomacy began to make every effort to join this organization. But many of its members, for various reasons, opposed the admission of Turkey to it. Great Britain did not want Turkey to be included, as this could lead to the complete subordination of the latter to the United States, which dominated NATO. The Scandinavian members of the bloc feared being drawn into a conflict over a non-European country, which they considered Turkey, since the latter's relations with the Soviet Union were very difficult.

This situation caused serious concern to the Turkish government, so changing the attitude of Western countries towards it in the first place and, as a result, the country's accession to NATO became the primary goals of Turkish diplomacy. The opportunity to raise its status in the eyes of the United States and Western countries appeared in Turkey with the outbreak of the Korean Peninsula war in June 1950, to this end, the Democratic Party government decided to send a contingent of Turkish troops to the Korean War on the side of the UN forces.

The war on the Korean peninsula began a month after the new government of the Democratic Party came to power in Turkey. On June 25, 1950, North Korean troops crossed the 38th Parallel and invaded the territory of the Republic of Korea. The UN Security Council assessed these actions as a threat to peace on the Korean peninsula and appealed to UN countries to provide military assistance to South Korea. The United Nations Joint Command, led by the United States, was created.

When the second UN Security Council resolution of June 27, 1950 was announced in the Turkish Parliament, the deputies immediately decided to send a military contingent to the Republic of Korea. Kasim Gulek, Turkish President-

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Representative of the UN Commission on Korean Affairs, made a speech in the Mejlis, expressing confidence that " any country, whether it is Turkey, Greece, Iran or some other country that is potentially the object of such aggression on the part of the Soviet Union, cannot remain aloof from the events in Korea and not provide support to the United States." aid to South Korea." Gulek also noted that " each of these countries sees itself in the place of the Republic of Korea and, looking at what is happening there, thinks about its future." [Political Affairs..., June 27,1950, tel. N 330]. On June 29, Turkish Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülu expressed readiness to provide support to South Korea in an interview with US Ambassador to Turkey Wadsworth [Political Affairs..., June 29, 1950, tel. N 343].

In his report to the US State Department, Wadsworth noted that in the Turkish press, all articles on Korean events show the Turks ' fear of such aggression from the Soviet Union. [Political Affairs..., June 29, 1950]. Turkish Ambassador to Moscow Geker sent a message to the State Department on the same day, in which he expressed doubt that "the Soviets will provide assistance to North Korea" and " most likely their target will be Iran, which is also in the sphere of Turkey's interests." [Political Affairs..., June 29, 1950].

The Turkish government's willingness to help South Korea was based not only on the fear of a threat from the USSR. As the German historian Zürcher notes, "Menderes was well aware that some European countries that are members of NATO oppose Turkey's entry into this organization. However, he understood that he had a trump card in his hands: after the outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula, he advocated sending a contingent of Turkish troops there" [Zurcher, 2001, p. 341]. The Prime Minister's decision to send troops to Korea was intended to demonstrate unity with European countries and convince opponents of Turkey's admission to NATO.

Another confirmation that the decision to send troops was purely political in nature and was aimed at achieving rapprochement with the West is the statement of the Turkish Foreign Minister of July 14, when he noted in his regular conversation with Wadsworth that for the Turkish public, the fact of sending troops to Korea is an attempt to "put themselves on a par with countries." western democracy" [Political Affairs..., July 14, 1950, tel. N 31]. According to the American diplomat George McGee, who served as Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East, South Asian and African Affairs during the Korean War and was responsible for coordinating the implementation of Turkey's economic assistance program, the latter was the first country after the United States to respond to the UN appeal. At that time, Menderes stated that only by deciding to send troops to the Korean front, which should be joined by freedom-loving countries, can acts of aggression be prevented and world peace preserved [McGhee, 1997, p. 32].

The official appeal of UN Secretary-General Trygve Lee to the Turkish government with a request to provide military assistance was made on July 24, 1950. [Turk..., 1982, S. 236]. That same night, a cabinet meeting was urgently called. Prime Minister Menderes was concerned about the possible negative reaction from the USSR to the dispatch of Turkish troops to Korea. Erkin, the Turkish Ambassador to the United States, responded: "If we do not help South Korea today, then who will help us tomorrow in the event of a possible attack on us by the Soviet Union" [Zurcher, 2001, p. 340]. Erkin suggested that the issue be brought up for discussion in the Mejlis, to which Menderes agreed. Ambassador Sarper, who at the time served as Turkey's permanent representative to the UN, believed that sending a military contingent to South Korea should be linked to Turkey's accession to NATO. Erkin did not share his point of view and believed that Turkey, on the one hand, should help South Korea, and on the other hand,

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As before, continue to do everything possible to join NATO, but do not link these two issues together [Zurcher, 2001, p.340]. Thus, the question arose whether the requirement to include Turkey in NATO should be a prerequisite for sending a military contingent to Korea or not. Such a demand would be quite reasonable as a payment to Turkey for its participation in military operations on the side of the United States. But in the eyes of opponents of Turkey's inclusion in NATO, this demand would look like a kind of political deal.

On July 25, 1950, the Menderes government announced its decision to send a 4,500-man brigade to the Korean front [Political Affairs..., July 25,1950, tel. N 45]. According to another source, on that day, Ankara announced the end of the formation of the first Turkish brigade, which consisted of the 241st infantry regiment, reinforced with an artillery battalion, an engineering, transport and ambulance company, a signal platoon and an aviation department, based on two L-18 fighters. It is worth paying attention to the fact that, according to American documents, the Turkish government announced the beginning of the formation of the brigade at the end of June, and on July 25 completed its formation. According to Esmer, it was decided to form the brigade only after Trygve Lee appealed directly to the Turkish government, and its formation began on July 25. This seems unlikely, since the brigade was already sent to military exercises on July 26. [History of the Korean War..., 1953, p. 619], and it is practically impossible to form a brigade of 4,500 people within one day. Therefore, we can assume that the formation of the brigade took place during July-this is evidenced by very reliable information from the reports of Ambassador Wadsworth to the US State Department. [Political Affairs..., July 25, 1950, tel. N 343]. Despite its willingness to help South Korea and send its troops as early as the end of June, the Turkish government apparently hesitated, fearing a negative reaction from the USSR. The official appeal of the NATO Secretary General to Turkey on July 24 - when the situation on the Korean front was far from in favor of the Southerners and it was no longer possible to delay the creation of an allied army - prompted the Turkish government to make its final decision, announced on July 25.

On the same day that the Turkish government officially announced the deployment of its troops to Korea, Senator Kane made a statement that " the result of such a proposal by the Turkish government could be Turkey's inclusion in NATO." [Political Affairs..., July 25, 1950, tel. N 57]. US Secretary of State Acheson, in a telegram to the US Ambassador in Ankara, refuted the senator's statement and asked the ambassador to warn the Turkish government and the public against such premature conclusions. From this, it can be concluded that at the beginning of the Korean War, the US government officially still took a negative position towards Turkey's inclusion in NATO [Political Affairs..., July 25, 1950, tel. N 47].

The Turkish government's decision to send troops to Korea provoked a strong reaction in Turkey itself. According to Wadsworth's reports, the opposition Republican People's Party, led by former Turkish President Ismet Ineniu, was against sending troops. He was skeptical that UN troops would support Turkey in the event of a possible attack on it. The opposition pointed out that the government should think more than once before weakening the Turkish army by sending 4,500 people. She also accused the government of not demanding any written guarantees from either the United States or the United Nations to help Turkey if it becomes the target of aggression. [Political Affairs..., August 3,1950, tel. N 78]. Not only the Republican People's Party opposed the government's decision. According to the South Korean historian Oh Eun-gion (2003), the most ardent opponent of sending troops to Korea was the Turkish Peace Defense Society, which was founded in Turkey.-

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The roe demanded that the parliament reverse the decision to send troops. According to Oh Eun-gion, the real reason for the opposition's discontent was not the haste with which the final decision to send troops to Korea was made [Oh Eun-gion, 2003, p.208]. The Turkish government, the Korean author believes, was mainly concerned about the possibility of receiving additional military and economic assistance from the United States. According to Wadsworth, Menderes told the opposition that the Turkish army will not weaken if it sends 4,500 soldiers to Korea, and stressed that " the troops are going there not just to fight, but to help restore peace on the Korean peninsula." [Political Affairs..., August 3, 1950, tel. N 78].

The government's decision to participate in the Korean War was supported by the Turkish public. As Wadsworth reported in his report, "the newspapers were full of headlines like' We are sending troops to Korea!', ' The Turks are coming!', 'Turkey will fulfill its mission' , etc." [Political Affairs..., July 27, 1950, tel. N 64]. This was explained both by the rampant anti-communism and the revival of the historically characteristic Turkish spirit of militarism. The largest school organization, the National Federation of School Students of Turkey, stated that "the Turkish people, who stand for freedom and love for humanity, have had a wonderful opportunity" [O Eun Gion, 2003, p. 208]. Mixed in with this was the influence of Islam. On August 25, 1950, the Minister of Religious Affairs, Ahmet Hamdi Akseki, said at a press conference that Islam, the most important religion in the world, is the only weapon in the fight against communism. He also openly stated that since Turkey's participation in the war will certainly take the form of jihad, then all Turkish soldiers who go to war will certainly be ready to give their lives [O Eun Gion, 2003, p. 209].

Against this background, on August 1, Turkey applied for NATO membership for the second time through the US, French and British ambassadors in Ankara [Turk..., 1982, S. 237]. This was followed by a statement by the Turkish Foreign Minister that without Turkey and Greece, the North Atlantic Alliance cannot be considered complete and from a strategic point of view, it is important not to exclude the Eastern Mediterranean from the overall defense scheme. [Turk..., 1982, S. 237]. But NATO members were still reluctant to accept Turkey into their ranks, concerned that if they did, the alliance would become bordered by the Soviet Union. The Turkish proposal was once again rejected in September 1950. By the Council of Foreign Ministers of NATO Countries [Turk..., 1982, S. 238].

Despite another refusal to accept Turkey into NATO, the decision to send troops has already been made. The day after the Turkish government's official announcement to send troops to Korea, the brigade went to Ankara for intensive eight-week military training, and then to Polathilar for tactical exercises. Training of the brigade for combat operations took place in the period from July 26 to September 13 [History of UN Forces..., 1972, p. 619]. From October 19, 1950, when the first Turkish soldier set foot on Korean soil, to the signing of the armistice on July 27, 1953, about 15 thousand people took part in the battles. soldier. According to this indicator, Turkey ranked fourth after the troops of the Republic of Korea, the United States and the United Kingdom. [History of UN Forces..., 1972, p. 676].

As McGee notes in his memoirs, by mid-1951, the US State Department began to take a fresh look at the question of Greece and Turkey joining NATO. Diplomats came to the conclusion that the Turks were becoming discouraged and were considering alternative options for action in case their accession to NATO is again postponed. The US also took into account the fact that the Turkish army was then larger than the army of any NATO member (with the exception of the US). The UK has changed its position on the admission of Turkey and Greece to NATO. July 18, 1951 The new British Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, was inaugurated-

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to expressed its support and informed the Governments of Greece and Turkey. The issue was included in the agenda of the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, which was to be held in Ottawa at the end of July of the same year. According to McGhee, the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO proved to be an even bigger problem than expected, even despite the preliminary agreement on this issue between the United States, Britain and France, since the Scandinavian members of the alliance, having joined NATO to ensure the protection of the North Atlantic region, did not want to be drawn into a war in the Middle East. After lengthy negotiations, Denmark withdrew its objections. The invitation of Greece and Turkey to join NATO passed unanimously. The protocol on the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO was signed in mid-October. The Turkish Senate approved the ratification of the protocol on January 29, 1952, and the protocol entered into force on February 15, 1952. On February 18, 1952, the decision to join the organization was approved by an overwhelming majority in the Mejlis. According to George McGee, who was appointed U.S. Ambassador to Turkey in 1951."this was not only a recognition of Turkey's strategic importance, but also of its equality with the rest of the world. the Western European Community" [Harris, 1972, p. 44].

Thus, the Korean War gave Turkey an opportunity to raise its status in the eyes of the United States and the West as a whole. Of course, the decision to send troops threatened Turkey with a negative reaction from the USSR and an aggravation of relations with it, which could lead to the resumption of the latter's territorial claims and demands for a review of the regime of passage of ships through the Black Sea Straits. These concerns prevented the final decision to send troops, but the official appeal of the UN Secretary-General at the end of July 1950 put the Turkish government before a choice: to side with the UN or stay on the sidelines and not to aggravate relations with the USSR. The Turkish government chose the first option, thanks to which it could count on the realization of its cherished dream - to achieve membership in NATO. The second attempt to join NATO in August-September 1950 failed not so much because of the opposition of European NATO members. The Turkish government, relying on the support of the United States, made the right political move: after all, in May 1951, it was the United States that took the initiative to consider Turkey's admission to NATO.

Thus, Turkey's expectation to participate in military operations on the Korean front was justified: the US position changed, resulting in the country's accession to NATO. A new stage in the military and political history of Turkey has opened.

list of literature

Oh Eun Gion. Thoki wahanguk jeongchang munhak. Seul: Jung-cheng munhak yeong-gu, 2003. (O Eun gion. Turkey and literature about the Korean War. Seoul: Institute of Military Literature, 2003.)

Harris George. Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945 - 1971.Washing-ton: AEI-Hoover Policy Studies, 1972.

History of the Korean War. Vol. III: 1951 - 1952 / Ed. by Fox W. Washington: US Army Center of Military History, 1953.

History of UN Forces in Korean War. Vol. I, pt 7: The Turkish Brigade in the Korean War. Seoul: the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea, 1972.

McGhee George C. On the Frontline in the Cold War: An Ambassador Reports. L.: Praeger, 1997.

Political Affairs and Conditions: Truce, Cease-Fire, Armistice (1950 - 1953). Vol. VIII / Ed. by Porter W. Washington: US Department of State, 1970 - 1973.

Turk, dis Politikasi. Cift 1 (1919 - 1973) / Ahmet Siikrii Esmer. Ankara: Ankara Basimevi, 1982.

Zurcher Erik Jan. Modernlesen Turkiye' nin tarihi / Ceviren Yasemin Saner Gonen. Istanbul: tletisim, 2001.

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