The multi-confessional structure of Lebanese society determines the development of the situation in this country. This article examines the role of the confessional factor in maintaining socio-political stability in Lebanon, as well as the problems of taffy associated with it.

NUMBER OF CONFESSIONAL COMMUNITIES

Currently, there are 18 confessional communities in Lebanese society [Rodionov, 1982, p. 5; Lebanon, 2002, 2004]. Table 1 shows data on the size of the five largest Lebanese confessional communities (numbering more than 50 thousand representatives according to the results of the 1932 census).

Table 1

Share of Lebanon's main religious communities in the population structure (%)

Year

Sunnis

Shiites

Druze

Maronites

Greek Orthodox.

1932

22

20

7

29

10

1944

21

19

7

29

10

1956

20

18

6

30

11

1978

27

18

5

26

11

1982

26

27

8

22

8

2005

27

26

6

22

6

2006

28

28

6

22

8

Sources: [Himadeh, 1936, p. 408-409; Hourani, 1946, p. 121; Zuwiyya-Yamak, 1966, p. 27; The Political Role, 1979, p. 276; Soffer, 1985, p. 6; Farha, 2008; Duwayhi Yu., 2006, p. 14].

Thus, the share of Sunnis and Shiites in the Lebanese population has increased significantly, while the share of Maronites has clearly decreased. The shares of Druze and Greek Orthodox Christians did not change so noticeably. Changes are associated with both emigration processes and differences in the growth rate in communities. In 1977, the total birth rate (average number of children per woman) in Lebanon was 4.0, Druze and Catholic populations, including Maronites, 3.7, non-Catholic Christians 3.3, Sunnis 4.4, and Shiites 5.1 (Chamie, 1980, p. 177). In the 1990s, according to the Lebanese Government's 1996 estimates, there was a tendency for the growth rates of the Shiite and Sunni communities to equalize (Farha, 2008).

Currently, the relationship between the main communities continues to change. The three largest communities - Sunnis, Shiites, and Christians - range from 25 to

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35% of the population of Lebanon every 1. The state of society is determined by the relations between these groups and the social and political satisfaction of their representatives.

For demographic forecasts for various communities in the near future, data from statistical analysis of birth registration can be used [Duwayhi, 2006, p. 14]. According to them, Christians make up only 23.3% of the Lebanese population under the age of 20, while the remaining 76.7% are Muslims.

POLITICAL SYSTEM OF CONFESSIONAL REPRESENTATION

The Lebanese Parliament is based on a system of proportional representation from official faiths. In 1982, the representation of Christians in Parliament was more than 15% higher than their share of the population, while the representation of Muslim deputies was about 16% lower than the share of Muslims among Lebanese citizens [Kliot, 1987, p. 63]. The disparity was partially corrected as a result of the Taif Agreement of 1989, when a decision was made on equal (50/50) representation of Christians and Muslims in Parliament (Farha, 2008).

In the" zero years " of the XXI century, the share of representatives of Sunnis and Shiites (21 and 23%) remained lower than the share of the communities themselves in the population. However, in both cases, there are some factors that compensate for the disproportionality of representation in the legislative body of the country. For example, Sunnis are assigned the post of Prime Minister of Lebanon (Shanahan, 2006). As for the Shiites, who are assigned only the post of Speaker of Parliament, the existence of the Hezbollah party, the only power group of this scale in Lebanon, is a compensating factor for them. Recently, the Hezbollah party has positioned itself in the Shiite community as the sole representative of its interests.2
The stability of the system of confessional representation is also ensured by certain features of the conduct of elections, namely, the features of "slicing" electoral districts, taking into account their confessional structure. Parliamentarians from the same region who belong to different communities usually show relative mutual loyalty [Farha, 2008].

A potential risk factor may be the growth of the Shiite community, which will necessitate another review of the distribution of parliamentary seats between communities.

DISINTEGRATION OF RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES AS A RISK FACTOR FOR LEBANESE STATEHOOD

Confessional communities that maintain high internal cohesion and are minimally exposed to external influences are the most detached from the construction of national identity.

Analysis of the degree of social and clan cohesion of various religious groups makes it possible to distinguish two communities with the closest internal ties - Druze and Shiite. Thus, in 1971, among all Druze couples, 48% of the time the spouses were related; among Shiites, this figure was only slightly lower - 46%. These confessional groups also had the lowest percentage of intercommunal marriages. For example, only 3% of Druze men and 2% of women were married to a representative of the United Arab Emirates.

1 As for the Druze, who throughout the recent history of Lebanon have played a very active role in the political life of the country, they currently make up only about 5-6% of the population [Lebanon..., 2006].

2 This was evident in the winter of 2005/06 during the party leaders ' boycott of the Cabinet, when prominent Shiite religious figure Afif Nabulsi issued a fatwa prohibiting Shiites who were not members of the Amal or Hezbollah parties from participating in and supporting the Government. The fatwa was supported by both Nasrullah and leader Amal Nabih Berri (Saghieh, 2006).

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other communities (5% and 3% for Shiites, respectively)3. For comparison, non-Catholic Christians can be considered the least clannish community - 22% of related marriages and 20% (17% for women) of intercommunal marriages (Chamie, 1980, p. 178).

A recent survey of university students shows that Shiites and Druze feel the most politically alienated communities, while Maronites and Catholics feel the least alienated. More than 77% of all Muslims surveyed said that Lebanese political institutions do not correspond to their social and cultural traditions (as did 58% of Christians) [Nasr and Palmer, 1977, p. 506]. This makes it difficult to form national unity in Lebanon.

SOCIO-PROFESSIONAL RISKS

As noted above, the importance of community ownership complicates the formation of a unified national Lebanese identity. Nevertheless, sociocommunicative networks of intercommunal and supra-confessional nature were actively formed at the household level in the pre-war period. However, the state did not support such networks. Most institutions, such as clubs, youth and sports organizations, and clinics, were most often also controlled by individual communities [Joseph, 1983, p. 15].

During the 1975-1990 civil war, the Lebanese continued to maintain inter-communal relations [Joseph, 1983, p. 1; Joseph, 1997, p. 84]. However, at this time, the policy of segregation of confessional communities became more active. Thus, while in 1975 Muslims accounted for 40% of the population of east Beirut and Christians for 35% of the population of west Beirut, by 1989 these figures had fallen to 5%, respectively, as a result of which east Beirut became predominantly Christian, and west Beirut became Muslim [Nasr, 1993, p. 69]. The unification of communities at the present stage with the help of unified social institutions faces a number of serious problems.

The problem of legislation on personal status. The norms of civil, commercial and criminal legislation are the same for the whole country, while the laws on personal status regulating the procedures for entering into and dissolving marriage, adoption,and inheritance are different for different communities [Lebanon..., 2006]. Disputes over personal status are dealt with in the religious courts of communities that are officially recognized as part of the Lebanese judicial system. In 1951, a decree was issued, according to which the following communities received the right to independently develop their own laws on personal status: Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Armenian Gregorians, Armenian Catholics, Syro-Orthodox (Jacobites), Syro-Catholics, Chaldeans, Nestorians, Catholics, Protestants and Jews. It was assumed that Sunnis, Shiites and Druze still fall under the jurisdiction of the Ottoman legislation in accordance with the 1942 law on the organization of Muslim judicial proceedings [Syukiyainen, 1986, p.116].

The laws of the communities differ significantly from each other, in particular, in matters of divorce (forbidden for Catholics), polygamy (for Sunnis and Shiites it is allowed, for Druze and Christians-not) [Joseph, 1997, p. 82]. In matters of inheritance The Lebanese Civil Code of 1959 makes no distinction between a man and a woman. However, the laws of some communities give a woman the right to only half of the share that a man receives. In some cases, a Sunni daughter cannot be the father's heir, and citizens convert to Shiism in order to secure the right to inheritance for their daughters [Zalzal, 1997, p. 37]. Some of the adopted norms contradict the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which Lebanon acceded in 1997 and 1991, respectively [Barkovskaya, 2006, p.129].

Currently, Sunni and Shia religious courts handle personal status cases based on different interpretations of Sharia law. At the same time, it is noted,

3 Such high rates in this parameter once again confirm the prevalence of generic endogamy as a social phenomenon in the region.

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that a peculiar feature of the Lebanese judicial system is the parallel existence of Sunni and Jafari courts [Syukiyainen, 1986, p. 225]. Christians and Druze are subject to a special set of laws approved by the Lebanese Parliament after consultation with the religious leaders of these communities.

Thus, the religious affiliation of each citizen should be fixed by the state, since in the legislative and legal sphere, every Lebanese person acts in two guises-as a citizen and as a representative of a denomination. Followers of faiths that are not recognized by the state are deprived of their rights. By law, they can own property and freely send religious services. However, when dealing with issues of personal status, they are forced to identify themselves with any of the recognized communities [Lebanon..., 2006].

The problem of secular marriages. The problem of the impossibility of entering into secular (in Lebanon itself, the term "civil" is used) marriages stems from the lack of unified legislation on personal status. According to the current Lebanese marriage legislation, prospective spouses can only enter into a religious marriage. Accordingly, representatives of two different faiths can marry only if one of them accepts the faith of the other. It is known that clergy often discouraged citizens from entering into intercommunal marriages or refused to register them at all [Joseph, 1983, p. 15].

The issue of allowing secular marriages was already relevant in the 1950s. At the official level, it was first raised at the end of 1998 by the country's President I. Hraui. He proposed to introduce a procedure for entering into secular marriages in Lebanon, arguing that more than 20% of Lebanese citizens, including ministers and deputies, are in a civil marriage concluded on the territory of foreign countries. As part of the survey on this issue, about half of the respondents aged 15-24 expressed their support for the legalization of secular marriages, including 52.6% of Maronites, 47.7% of Orthodox Christians, 36.4% of Druze, 25.6% of Shiites and 24.7% of Sunnis. The draft was approved by the Cabinet of Ministers, but met with resistance from the clergy of various faiths, and Prime Minister Hariri vetoed it with a resolution: "Lebanon is not ready for this "(Ajami, 2007).

Civil marriages performed by Lebanese people in other countries (most often in Turkey and Cyprus 4) are recognized by the State. However, if disagreements arise in such marriages, they are resolved according to the legislation on the personal status of the country where the marriage was concluded [Zalzal, 1997, p. 37].

The problem of secularization. For the first time in the recent history of Lebanon, President Shehab tried to implement a policy of partial secularization of the country in the second half of the 1950s. However, his policy did not bring tangible results [Kliot, 1987, p. 66]. During the civil war, everyone was not up to it. It was not until 1980 that Gregoire Haddad (Bishop of the Greek Catholic Church), together with representatives of other communities, founded the Movement for Secularism (Tayyar al-Almani). It is one of the few organizations working to create a unified civil code [Zalzal, 1997, p. 37]. It should be noted that the Taif Agreement, signed in 1989, was controversial: On the one hand, it called for the rejection of political confessionalism in favor of professional competence, on the other hand, it proclaimed equal parliamentary quotas for Christians and Muslims.

Currently, the principle of religious representation is not applied in the armed forces, since conscription is carried out without taking into account religious affiliation [Lebanon..., 2007]. As for the secularization of other spheres of life, according to a survey conducted at the beginning of the "zero years", the majority

4 It is interesting to note that trips to the above-mentioned countries for the purpose of marriage are so frequent that their organization has become an established industry. For example, one of the travel companies offered Lebanese citizens a special day trip to Cyprus for the purpose of marriage (from May 1 to October 31, 2007) at a cost of $ 1,639.

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everything is set up quite critically. The Maronites show some loyalty to the secularization policy, while the Druze are the most strongly opposed to it. At the same time, the same study found that Maronites out of all communities have the least confidence in the state. The survey showed that currently there are no social problems in relation to which any communities take diametrically opposite positions. The results of the survey of 240 respondents from 6 main communities also showed that the majority of respondents do not want to demand any retribution for the damage caused during the civil war [Azar and Mullet, 2002, p. 737].

The social situation at this stage is relatively balanced, but this balance is fragile. Maronites fear more than others for the stability of the modern state and believe that changes are needed. However, they are unlikely to initiate change for fear of disrupting the existing social balance. Muslim communities, on the other hand, generally do not seek social change or secularization.

The problem of disproportions in the social development of confessional communities. The level of social development of communities can be characterized by several parameters. Thus, a significant indicator is the level of literacy. On average, the proportion of Lebanese citizens who did not complete a school education in the late 1970s was 21% for men and 40% for women. The Druze community had the lowest number of illiterates-10% of men and 23% of women; Christians also had an above-average level of education. The percentage of illiterates among Sunnis was lower than the average in Lebanon (29% and 49%, respectively), and finally, the lowest positions in this indicator are occupied by Shiites - 31 and 70% of illiterates, respectively. An important parameter is also the average level of income in different communities. Christians had a higher family income than the Lebanese average. For Druze families, it roughly coincided with the general Lebanese level (6180 Lebanese pounds with an average value of 6247), the Sunni income was slightly lower than the average (5571 pounds), while Shiite families had the lowest income in the country - 4532 [Chamie, 1980, p. 182].

So, Christian religious communities (both Catholic and non-Catholic) were above the average level in all the social parameters considered. Among all Muslim communities, the Druze had the best social conditions (approximately corresponding to the average level). The standard of living of the Sunni masses was relatively low. Shiites represented the least prosperous community in terms of social characteristics.

RELATION TO THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

The past decade was marked by the Second Lebanon War5. Of all the religious communities, Shiites were the most actively involved in military operations, and they also showed the greatest enthusiasm for the actions of the Hezbollah group. During the period of the most active fighting, 96.3% of Shiites, 73.1% of Sunnis, 54.7% of Christians, and 40.1% of Druze declared their support for it (Briefing 2006). It is clear that a significant part of Christians and Druze feared that the surge of enthusiasm among Shiites associated with the actions of Hezbollah would lead to destabilization in the country. Thus, the results of a study conducted immediately after the end of the war show that armed groups are perceived as a primary risk factor by representatives of the Maronite, Greek Orthodox and Catholic communities (all Christians also fear the outbreak of civil war in Lebanon in this regard), as well as Druze [Hourani, Sensenig-Dabbous, 2007, p. 30].

5 The Second Lebanon War (officially known in Israel since March 21, 2007, and in the Arab world as the July War) was an armed conflict in July - August 2006 between the State of Israel, on the one hand, and the radical Shiite group Hezbollah, which actually controlled the southern regions of the State of Lebanon, on the other.

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The presence of such fears among Christians is quite understandable, since the strengthening of the Shiite community served as a factor in the destabilization of the confessional system in the 1970s. At the same time, the main cause of concern among Christians is not the direct damage caused by Hezbollah's actions (cases of Shiite-Christian clashes in the history of Lebanon are quite rare), but the possible damage to the country's economic development [Rubeiz, 2008]. Many Christians see Sunni fundamentalism as the main internal threat, particularly after the Fatah al-Islam uprising in the summer of 2007 (Gambill, 2008). At the same time, 43% of Maronites believe that Hezbollah's weapons are "necessary to confront Israel until the Shebaa farms and hostages are released" (Opinion Poll, 2007). Rather, the Druze's fears stem from a desire to maintain their informal autonomy within the existing order, which could also be threatened by the strengthening of the Shiite community. All communities see the possibility of sectarian war as a threat [Hourani and Sensenig-Dabbous, 2007, p. 39].

EMIGRATION AND ITS CONFESSIONAL ASPECTS

Emigration peaked during the Civil War and the period of devastation that followed. Thus, the districts of Shuf and Aley lost 2/3 of their population, including 95% of Christians between 1982 and 1991 [Chaoul, 1994, p. 3]. In total, more than 900,000 Lebanese emigrated between 1975 and 2001, and approximately 45% of them emigrated in the 1990s, after the end of the civil war [Kasparian, 2003, p. 14]. 23.1% of Armenians, 14.7% of Druze, 23.2% of Greek Orthodox, 22.2% of Sunnis, 21% of Shiites, 23.1% of Greek Catholics, 23.3% of Maronites, and 23.3% of representatives of other religions left Lebanon [Farah, 2001, p. 6].

According to a study conducted by the Lebanese research firm Information International, in the period from 1991 to 2000, the confessional ratio of emigrants was as follows: Shiites-30.4%, Maronites-30%, Sunnis-18.3%, Orthodox-6.6%, Druze-5.3%, Catholics-5.1%, Armenians - 4.3% [Characteristics of Emigrants..., 2001, p. 11]. Thus, most of the emigrants belonged to the Shiite and Maronite communities. As mentioned above, the Shia community has perhaps the worst social and infrastructural development indicators among Lebanese communities. The emigration of Maronites, who have the best social position, should be considered in the general context of mass Christian emigration from the Middle East in recent times.

Table 2

Reasons for emigration of Muslims and Christians, %

Reasons for emigration

Muslims

Christians

Striving to guarantee your future

35.6

42.3

Instability of the country

24.7

26.0

Striving to secure the future of the family

6.8

12.5

Economic situation

6.8

7.7

Political situation

13.7

6.7

Training

2.7

1.9

Public situation

6.8

1

Tourism

0

1

Business development

1.4

0

No response

1.4

1

Source: [Hourani and Sensenig-Dabbous, 2007, p. 27-29].

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A new wave of emigration was associated with the Second Lebanon War in 2006. 61.3% of Christians and 59.7% of Muslims expressed their intention to emigrate [Hourani and Sensenig-Dabbous, 2007, p. 28]. At the same time, respondents justified their desire for a number of reasons.

The table shows that Christian emigrants are more focused on social stability (more than half of all Christian emigrants seek to secure a future for themselves and their families). Only 7% of Christian emigrants cite the social or political situation in Lebanon as the reason, while the Muslim figure is 20%. At the same time, the study explains that social causes imply the possibility of conflicts between different Christian communities, as well as between Sunnis and Shiites [Hourani, Sensenig-Dabbous, 2007, p. 31].

Overall, Lebanese society is in a state of unstable balance. At the domestic level, confessional risks seem rather insignificant. In the social sphere, the most relevant risk factor can be considered pedaling interfaith differences. A significant part of the risks for the political system is associated with the application of the principle of confessionalism in almost all significant political processes to the detriment of the formation of civil society.

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