French foreign policy and, in particular, Russian-French relations in the 1920s were not the subject of special study, although the history of international relations in those years was studied by Soviet and foreign researchers .1 Meanwhile, this problem is of some interest, since it is from this time that the gradual destruction of the Vienna system and the formation of a new balance of power in the international arena begin. The Treatises of 1815, which created a political balance in Europe in the interests of the victorious countries, primarily Russia and Austria, already in the 20s of the XIX century.begin to come into conflict with the state interests of many powers.

The national liberation uprising in Greece, which began in 1821, led to a sharp aggravation of the contradictions between the former allies, dealt a serious blow to the entire Viennese system and was one of the reasons for the collapse of the Holy Alliance as a political organization. The Greek national liberation movement met with the warm sympathy of public circles in Europe. The Turkish authorities ' crackdown on the rebels has only increased these sympathies. A widespread movement in support of the Greek rebels - Philhellinism. It was particularly strong in France, reaching out to the most opposite groups of the public. The attitude of European governments to the Greek uprising, which led to a new escalation of contradictions on Middle Eastern issues and raised the question of the fate of the Ottoman Empire, was far from the same. The Russian government's initial reaction was negative. However, realizing that the refusal to help the Greeks threatened to lose Russian influence among the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula, it took a benevolent position towards the rebels, but sought to preserve the coherence of the actions of the allied powers and try to achieve collective European intervention in the Greek-Turkish conflict in favor of the Greek rebels. However, in the first half of the 1920s, all Russian attempts were met with opposition primarily from England and Austria. An-

1 Debidur A. Diplomatic history of Europe, Vol. I. M. 1947; Fadeev A.V. Russia and the Eastern crisis of the 20s of the XIX century, Moscow 1958; History of Diplomacy, Vol. I. M. 1959; Shparo O. B. Liberation of Greece and Russia, Moscow 1965; Gubiana I. G. Contradictions of European Powers in the first years of the Greek War for national independence 1823-1826-Scientific Notes of the Herzen State Pedagogical Institute, 1966, vol. 288; Driault E. La question d'Orient depuis ses origines jusqua nos jours. P. 1909; Deschanel L.-P. Histoire de la politique exterieure de la France. 1806 - 1936. P. 1936; Histoire des relations internationales. Publ. sous la dir. de P. Renouvin. Vol. 5. P. 1954; Sauvigny G. de B. de. Metternich et la France apres le Congres de Vienne. T. III. P. 1971.

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Glia, seeking to seize the initiative from Russia in resolving Middle Eastern affairs, recognized the Greeks as a belligerent party. At the same time, it did not want to interfere in the Greek-Turkish conflict and took a wait-and-see attitude, thereby giving Turkey time to deal with the Greek rebels. Austria was openly hostile to the Greek uprising.

In the 20s of the XIX century. France has stepped up its policy in the Middle East , the Balkans, Egypt, and Iran. Having lost its position here after the collapse of the Napoleonic Empire, the French government tried to regain its influence in the Middle East markets and achieved significant success in this, which led to an aggravation of economic rivalry between Britain and France. At the same time, France, like Britain, sought to oust Russia from the Middle East and close the Black Sea Straits to Russian ships. In an effort to conquer the rich internal market of the Ottoman Empire, the French government defended the principle of its integrity. At the same time, French diplomacy was playing a difficult game in Egypt. It supported the Egyptian Pasha in his quest to create a large Arab state independent of the Porte, including Syria and Libya, hoping to gain dominant economic influence in the region for such support. Despite the ardent support of the Greek rebels by the French public, official France could not determine its attitude to the Greek uprising for a long time, and opposed the use of "forced force" against Turkey.

France's weight in international affairs at that time was still very small, and European diplomacy did not consider it capable of playing a significant role in resolving affairs in the East. In this respect, the memorial on the state of Eastern affairs, compiled by the Austrian Chancellor K. Metternich in 1826, is very revealing. There is practically no talk about the policy of the French government, and all attention is focused on the position of England and Russia .2
The courageous struggle of the Greek people for their liberation, the aggravation of Russian-Turkish relations, the threat of a Russian-Turkish war and the strengthening of Russia's position in the Middle East forced the European powers in the second half of the 1920s to deal closely with the Greek problem, and this was demanded by the unfolding social movement in Europe in defense of the Greek uprising. However, the conference of ambassadors of the European powers that met in St. Petersburg in 1825 once again showed that the latter did not want Russia to interfere in the Greek-Turkish conflict. After the St. Petersburg Conference, Russia decided to take independent actions, beginning to concentrate its troops on the border with Turkey. In order to prevent Russia's sole intervention in the Greek-Turkish war and prevent its growing influence in the Middle East, Britain agreed to conclude a bilateral agreement with Russia on the Greek issue. The British government hoped to tie Russia's hands in the East and prevent it from solving the Greek problem on its own. In addition, England sought to strengthen its position in Greece in case the Greek people still achieved independence. It persistently sought the conclusion of a bilateral agreement in order to complicate Russian-French relations by excluding France from the negotiations.

At the same time, the agreement with the government headed by D. Canning was of great importance for Russia, as it helped prevent the defeat of the rebels, whose situation was critical by this time. Russian-English Agreement-St. Petersburg

2 Memoires documenis et ecrits divers Metternich. Deuxieme partie. L'Ere de paix (1816 - 1848) (далее - Memoires). T. 4. P. 1881.

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Protocol - on the Greek question, concluded on April 4, 1826, was an undoubted success of Russian diplomacy. This document marked the beginning of the liberation of Greece. According to this agreement, Greece was to receive a certain independence from the Porte ("ruled by the authorities, or by the (Greeks - E. F. ) chosen"), although its dependence on Turkey and the payment of an annual tribute to it still remained. The Greeks were given complete freedom of conscience. Russia agreed to British mediation in the Greek-Turkish conflict. In the event that mediation was not accepted and Turkey refused to make concessions, the possibility of a "general or individual" action in favor of Greece was envisaged. The St. Petersburg Protocol emphasized that neither Russia nor England "will seek any increase in their possessions, any exclusive influence, and no commercial benefits for their subjects." The last article of the protocol was supposed to bring its contents "to the attention of the Courts of Vienna, Paris and Berlin" and invite them to "guarantee the final agreement on reconciliation between Turkey and Greece, together with Russia, for the impossibility for His Britannic Majesty to participate in this guarantee"3 . In this way, British diplomacy sought to keep its hands free for the future.

The Russian government understood that a separate agreement with England would cause discontent in France. The latter's position on the Greek question was beginning to shift in favor of the Greek rebels. This, in part, was already evident in the instructions given to the French Ambassador to Austria, V. Karaman, in October 1825. "It is necessary," it was noted, "that Europe either renounce the Greeks completely, or the Union (the Holy Union - E. F. ) must protect them in full agreement." 4 France, which had long opposed coercive measures in relation to Turkey, somewhat changed its attitude towards the Greek uprising, fearing to be sidelined in eastern affairs. Head of the French Government Jean-Claude Juncker Villel, in a conversation with the Russian Ambassador to Paris, K. O. Pozzo di Borgo, said that the Metternich system, which consisted in beating the Greeks by the Turks, was exhausted. 5
Upon assuming the throne, Nicholas I commissioned Pozzo di Borgo to draw up a report on Russia's relations with foreign powers and, most importantly, with France. Such a report was submitted in early February 1826. Pozzo di Borgo was an ardent advocate of rapprochement with France, so he tried to show its foreign policy course in the most favorable light. He wrote with alarm about the policy of England, which, in his words, does not stop inciting France to " throw off the yoke of the Holy Alliance." However, he concluded," the nature of things " unites France and Russia. With particular satisfaction, Pozzo di Borgo dwelt on changes in French foreign policy on the "most sensitive issue"-the eastern 6 . On February 17, 1826, he reported to St. Petersburg: "France reasonably insists that if the allies want to avoid the possibility of a break in relations between Russia and the Ottoman Port, they must unite with the former in order to force the other party to come to a fair agreement with the Greeks. " 7 The French government assured the Russian ambassador that it does not support Metternich's position on the eastern issue, considering it completely "illusory" 8 . On March 15, Pozzo di Borgo wrote that Fran-

3 Martene F. F. Collected treatises and Conventions, vol. XI, St. Petersburg, 1895, pp. 341-343.

4 Sauvigny G. de B. de. Op. cit., p. 1074.

5 Martene F. F. Uk. soch. T. XV. SPb, 1909, p. 44.

6 AVPR, f. Chancellery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9147, l. 57.

7 Ibid., l. 129.

8 Ibid., ll. 208-208 vol.

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Turkey recognizes the right of Russia to take coercive measures against Turkey, unless Russia is pursuing the goal of increasing its territory and power .9 However, Charles X categorically refused to openly interfere in Eastern affairs, fearing to undermine his relations with Austria, as well as cause internal political complications. Pozzo di Borgo saw the reasons for the weakness of France's foreign policy in the internal state of affairs in the country, which he painted with rather gloomy colors.

On March 29, 1826, the Russian government sent instructions to Pozzo di Borgo outlining its position in relation to the Ottoman Empire and the Greek rebels (this document K. V. Nesselrode asked to show the French government). In a confidential instruction to Pozzo di Borgo dated the same date, Nesselrode reported on the protocol being prepared with England on the Greek question. He believed that it would be possible to avoid serious complications in relations with France if, immediately after signing the agreement with England, the French government was assured that Russia was not seeking to deprive any power of participation "in the cause of peace." Nesselrode believed that "this would be enough to appease the Tuileries Cabinet." 10
France was not invited to participate in the negotiations in St. Petersburg, as this could lead to their delay. But after signing the Russian-English protocol, the Russian government immediately rushed to inform the French government about it, which caused discontent in England. On April 24, Pozzo di Borgo received a dispatch from St. Petersburg with a copy of the protocol attached. The ambassador was supposed to bring it to the attention of the French government, expressing the hope that France would participate in this agreement, which would "put an end to the misery of Greece".11 The dispatch went on to emphasize that the Russian emperor very much hoped that this "friendly offer would not be rejected by the French king," and that relations of friendship and trust between Russia and France would be strengthened .12
Thus, the Russian government did not seek to ignore France in solving the Greek problem .13 It insisted on holding joint negotiations with European powers on the future of Greece. Soviet historical literature has repeatedly stressed that it was to England's advantage to draw France into the protocol in order to create a diplomatic counterbalance to Russian actions in the Middle East; at the same time, the position of Russian diplomacy was either completely ignored or considered as passive consent, "support" for the initiative of the British government .14 It seems to us that at this stage it was much more necessary for Russia than for England to enlist the support of France in Eastern affairs, and, as noted, Russia took the initiative. For the diplomatic circles in St. Petersburg, it was clear that it would not be possible to avoid a confrontation with England in the future. In addition, an important task of Russian diplomacy was to try to tear France away from Metternich's policy on the eastern question. Thus, for the first time since 1815, the involvement of France in the solution of the pan-European question becomes, in fact, an important international problem.

Russian-English protocol in French official circles

9 Ibid., l. 262.

10 Ibid., f. Embassy in Paris, 62, l. 83 ob.

11 Ibid., l. 106 vol.

12 Ibid.

13 See. History of Diplomacy, vol. I, p. 541.

14 Dostyan I. S. Russia and the Balkan Question, Moscow, 1972, p. 249; Shparo O. B. Uk. soch., p. 171; Fadeev A.V. Uk. soch., p. 168.

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April 4, 1826, signed without the participation of France, was met with a negative response. Ignoring the French government was seen as a new insult and humiliation to France. Head of Government Zh. Villel and the Minister of Foreign Affairs M. Dama even considered that this agreement annulled the Holy Alliance, which, according to the French government, was the most important guarantee of France's internal peace, and the destruction of the alliance threatened France with new riots and revolutionary actions .15 Villel believed that by signing the St. Petersburg Protocol, England "surpassed itself": to weaken France, to make it "less interesting for Russia" - this, according to the head of the French government, is the goal of the St. Petersburg Protocol .16
Pozzo di Borgo, in a report to Nesselrode on April 28, 1826, reported that France's attitude to the protocol was very complex: on the one hand, there was official support for its main provisions, on the other - resentment and fear of being left out of the solution of eastern affairs. Villel, he said, even warned Russia that it "should not allow France's role in the international arena to decline, as it would render its position useless when its assistance is needed." 17
In turn, Foreign Minister Dama instructed the French Ambassador to Russia, Pierre Laferronet, to convey to the Russian government that the King of France is extremely upset by the separate negotiations between Russia and the London cabinet on the issue of appeasement of Greece. An unfavorable impression was made by the fact that the entire preparation of the negotiations and their progress were kept secret from the French government. France warned Russia that such a move could lead to the collapse of the Holy Alliance, "which for a long time united European courts" and served to "preserve calm in Europe." The Tuileries Cabinet attached particular importance to preserving the unity of action of the great European Powers, which the French Cabinet saw as a guarantee of peace and security .18
Nesselrode instructed Pozzo di Borgo to remind the French government that Russia has long been trying to achieve unity of action of the European powers in the Greek issue, but all its efforts since the beginning of the 1920s have not been crowned with success, although even now, Nesselrode stressed, hopes for unity of action are not abandoned. He pointed out that Eastern affairs were "strictly speaking" not the domain of the Holy Alliance, and the protocol did not weaken it in any way. In conclusion, Nesselrode asked for assurances that Russia's only desire was for peace and friendship with France, for its welfare, in which no other power was more interested than Russia .19 The ministerial report of 1826 noted that the Ottoman Empire or parts of its territory were never mentioned in the agreements of 1814, 1815, and 1818, and no document obligated Russia to consult with its allies on Russian-Turkish relations .20
In this situation, the Austrian government once again hoped to win France over to its side in the eastern issue, as the protocol allegedly led to the isolation of France. The French government was playing a difficult game: on the one hand, it expressed satisfaction with the situation.-

15 Sauvigny G. de B. de. Op. cit., p. 1083.

16 Martene F. F. Uk. soch. T. XV, p. 53.

17 AVPR F. Chancellery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9147, l. 384.

18 Ibid., f. Embassy in Paris, 62, ll. 157-160 vol., copy of the instructions of Dame Laferronet dated April 29, 1826.

19 Ibid., pp. 156-162.

20 Ibid., f. Chancellery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2999, l. 67 vol.

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On the one hand, it was concerned that the actions of Britain and Russia would finally lead to the pacification of the East, but on the other hand, it did not want to worsen its relations with Austria. All this time there were ongoing consultations on all issues of international policy with the Austrian Government's Ambassador in Paris, and through him with Metternich.

After Russia and England signed the St. Petersburg Protocol, European states were invited to join this agreement. The Austrian government refused, saying it saw it as the collapse of the Holy Alliance. In Berlin and Paris, the Russian Foreign Ministry's 1826 report noted, this document also "did not receive the reception it would seem to deserve." 21 The Paris cabinet took a long time to respond. England, as soon as it signed the agreement, immediately began to prevent its implementation in every possible way, realizing that it had not achieved its goal and that the St. Petersburg protocol did not bind Russia to the policy of England,but rather the opposite. British diplomacy, which until recently had opposed a pan-European settlement of the conflict, now sought to involve France in this agreement.

In September 1826, the head of the British government, Canning, went to Paris and held lengthy negotiations there. At the end of September 1826, he had an audience with Charles X, who expressed his approval of the protocol and agreed to join it. "I am ready," declared Charles X, "to go faster than you." 22 Pozzo di Borgo gave a detailed account of Canning's stay in Paris. He noted that France had promised to join the agreement in principle, but had not yet determined its position definitively .23
However, Canning went to Paris not only to coordinate positions on the Eastern issue. There was another acute issue in the Anglo-French relations of that time. Britain insisted on the withdrawal of French troops from Spain, which had been sent there in 1823 to stifle the Spanish revolution. The French government, on the other hand, considered that the state of affairs in this country did not allow it to do so. This circumstance greatly complicated relations between France and England, as Pozzo di Borgo repeatedly noted in his reports.

During the negotiations with Canning, Villel expressed a desire to turn the protocol of April 4, 1826, into a treaty of the great Powers participating in the Holy Land of the Union. This motive became the main line of French diplomacy in the near future.

In early December, Dama, in a conversation with the Russian and British ambassadors in Paris, again expressed the idea of concluding a treaty and the need for Austria and Prussia to join it. Thus, the French government has essentially adopted Russia's idea of a collective solution to the Eastern question. By putting forward this proposal and making it a matter of principle, France sought to strengthen its position in resolving the Middle East crisis. As the initiator of the pan-European treaty, French diplomacy has made strenuous efforts to ensure its implementation. The English ambassador in Paris, Grenville, and Pozzo di Borgo, in this conversation, tried to find out what position France would take if Austria and Prussia refused to join the new treaty, which no one doubted. However, they did not receive a direct response 24 . On December 8, 1826, Dama sent a note to Pozzo di Borgo, which declared France's readiness to join the protocol, but put forward

21 Ibid., l. 66 vol.

22 Sauvigny G. de B. de. Op. cit., p. 1088.

23 AVPR, f. Chancellery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, d. 9152, ll. 156-187.

24 Ibid., d. 9150, ll. 17-17 vol.

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the condition is the conclusion of a treaty between the five great European powers, since only their union "will be able to overcome all the difficulties that are associated with the pacification of the East" 25.

At the same time, French diplomacy persistently sought to achieve Austria's accession to the treaty. Dama, in a conversation with the Austrian ambassador, hinted that if Austria refused, France would be forced to act independently .26 The Austrian cabinet reacted extremely negatively to the very idea of France - a five-power treaty. For some time, Metternich simply did not respond to repeated requests from Willel and Dahm, who were busy preparing the draft text of the treaty. In the end, however, he gave the idea a negative characterization, calling it an "indigestible idea." 27
Then there was a new proposal - to settle the disputed issues at the conference of ambassadors of the five powers in London. The center of gravity of all negotiations immediately shifted to London, where Russia was represented by H. A. Lieven, Ambassador to England, and France by J. P. Blavatsky. Polignac. However, the position taken by the French ambassador in London confirmed the desire of French diplomacy to delay the convening of the conference, as evidenced by Polignac's repeated consultations with the Austrian Ambassador to England, P. Esterhazy. As early as the end of December 1826, the French ambassador announced to Canning that he was authorized to put forward two conditions for France's accession to the protocol: the first - the conclusion of a five-power treaty on the pacification of Greece; the second-a guarantee of the status quo of territories in the East. 28
The British and Russian Governments demanded that their ambassadors in Paris clarify the situation. Pozzo di Borgo and Granville had a long conversation with Dama, who assured them that no specific instructions had been given to Polignac on the matter. He attributed the behavior of his diplomatic representative to the great influence of the Austrian ambassador on him .29 Polignac later explained the reason for these misunderstandings: indeed, there were no special instructions, but from numerous messages from Paris, he made this opinion about the position of his government30 (generally correct!). Metternich, referring to the protocol of April 4, 1826, wrote irritably to the ambassador in Paris, R. Appogny, on January 29, 1827, that the two governments had firmly decided to "increase the dangers", while France's position lacked "firmness", "wisdom" and "foresight" 31.

The French proposal to convert the protocol into a treaty was approved by the Russian government, which, in order to speed up the conclusion of the negotiations, tried to make it clear to the British government that it was in friendship and agreement with the French cabinet .32 At the same time, the Russian government insisted that the future treaty should be supplemented with articles providing for increased international pressure on the Port, if all the demarches of the European powers do not achieve the desired result. It rightly considered that it was not enough "to conclude a treatise under such circumstances, but also to ensure its execution"33 .

25 Ibid., l. 21 vol.

26 См. Sauvigny G. de B. de. Op. cit., p. 1091. Appogny to Metternich on December 22, 1826.

27 Ibid. Metternich-Appogny on February 12, 1827.

28 AVPR, f. Chancellery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9150, l. 22.

29 Ibid., l. 23.

30 Ibid., d. 9154, l. 45.

31 Memoires, p. 351.

32 AVPR, f. Embassy in Paris, 70, l. 96.

33 Martens F. F. Uk. soch., vol. XI, p. 348.

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At the end of January 1827, France submitted its draft treaty 34 . Analyzing this document, Pozzo di Borgo noted that in general it does not contain anything fundamentally new in comparison with the Anglo-Russian protocol and basically satisfies Russia. 35 At the same time, the treaty's preamble drew criticism from both the Russian and British Governments. First, it made absolutely no mention of the fact that the idea of the treaty originated long ago and was partially implemented as a result of the conclusion of an agreement between England and Russia, i.e. the French government tried to ignore the fact that the St. Petersburg Protocol was essentially the basis for the new treaty, and thereby take the initiative in their own hands. But the main thing was different. The preamble began with the words "Allied Powers", i.e. the French draft once again emphasized that a necessary condition for a treaty on Greek affairs is the unity of action of all the participants in the Holy Alliance. Thus, the success of the negotiations depended on Austria's position. Knowing Metternich's irreconcilable position on the question of the Greek insurrection and his extremely negative assessment of the very idea of the treaty of five, the French government, in essence, by proposing the need to involve all the great European powers in the treaty, caused new complications, endless and fruitless negotiations, diplomatic correspondence, in a word, once again delayed the decision on the question of supporting the Greek insurrection, thus dooming him to defeat. Looking ahead, it was only the final refusal of the Austrian Government to make any compromise that led to the consent of the Tuileries Cabinet to change the preamble.

Metternich's correspondence at that time clearly shows what hopes Austria had for France's benevolent position on the eastern question. Austrian diplomats sought to convince the French government that it was not in the interests of its domestic and foreign policy to support the Russo-British agreement, which allegedly leads to the collapse of the Holy Alliance. Up to a certain time, this pressure bore fruit, because the intimidation of the collapse of the Holy Alliance, which Metternich resorted to, was extremely painful for the ruling dynasty in France. Up to the day of the treaty between Russia, England and France (and in some respects even after), the French government sought to build its tactics in the eastern question, taking into account the position of Austria. Dame and Villel repeatedly approached Metternich with proposals to join the agreement, hoping that the annexation of Austria would lead to the strengthening of the Holy Alliance .36 In a conversation with the Austrian ambassador, Villel even offered his services in order to obtain certain concessions from the British and Russian cabinets .37
Negotiations progressed with great difficulty and slowly. In January 1827, Pozzo di Borgo wrote to Lieven that Dama had agreed to the first amendment ( meaning that it was necessary to mention the protocol of April 4, 1826). As for the second point, Dama stated that he was not yet ready for a conversation on this issue. Both Pozzo di Borgo and Granville were interested in whether France would sign a treaty with Russia and England immediately or after agreeing on all issues with other European courts, inviting them to join the treaty. Perhaps, they thought, France would seek their participation in any other form acceptable to them .38
34 Published in Prokesch-Osten A. Geschichte des Abfalles der Griechen vom Tгrkischen Reich. Bd. 5. Wien. 1867.

35 AVPR, f. Chancellery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, d. 9154, l. 74 ob.

36 Memoires, pp. 373 - 374.

37 Sauvigny G. de B. de. Op. cit, p. 1095.

38 AVPR, f. Chancellery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9154, ll. 79 ob. - 80.

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Differences in Russian-French relations were caused by the problem of the future of the Ottoman Empire. Villel and Dama, in their conversations with Pozzo di Borgo, expressed their fears that a move against Turkey would call into question the existence of the entire empire .39 It became clear that "empty" and, according to F. Engels '"never - actually-implemented theory of preserving the status quo" 40 in the East, despite the French government's assurances that it had nothing to do with Polignac's demarches in London, was an important goal of French foreign policy in the Middle East. This position was also dictated by the beginning of France's economic expansion in the Mediterranean region. But for the Greek rebels, delaying the negotiations meant defeat, and for Russia, it meant weakening its influence and authority among the Balkan peoples enslaved by Turkey, and weakening its position in the Middle East.

At the beginning of 1827, Lieven received instructions from St. Petersburg, which stated: "As for the proposal of the French government to guarantee the inviolability of the Ottoman Empire and the exact execution of the treaty designed for the benefit of Greece, Russia will never agree to such a proposal. Russia has no interest in wishing for the fall of the Ottoman Empire. If this state, due to its internal impotence, has to fall, then no international treatises will stop it. " 41 The firm position of Russia forced the French government to abandon this plan, although the problem of the status quo was raised more than once in the future in conversations between members of the government and Pozzo di Borgo.

In March 1827, the French government agreed to join Russia and England in negotiating and finalizing the final text of the treaty, even if Austria did not join it. On March 12, 1827, the Russian ambassador in Paris reported that Dama had made an official statement that France would take part in the negotiations that were to begin in London. At the same time, he reiterated the French Government's concerns about the use of coercive force against Porte 42 . On this issue, there is a convergence of positions between England and France.

The Russian government was also concerned about another question: would France sign the treaty if Austria refused to do so (which no one doubted)? To this the Lady replied to Pozzo di Borgo: "Yes, but I ask you not to demand it." 43 The Russian ambassador rightly attributed all these fluctuations, instability, and inconsistencies in France's foreign policy to the internal situation in France and the instability of the regime itself. He concluded his report of March 12, 1827, with the following words:: "It is absolutely clear that France is governed weakly and thoughtlessly. The nation feels it, but it has the wisdom to endure it. " 44 However, Pozzo di Borgo was unable to understand the real reasons for the divergence of Russia and France on the Eastern question and the rapprochement of France first with Austria, and later with England on these issues. He was unable to admit that the "nature of things" did not always contribute to Russian - French rapprochement, and therefore shifted all the blame to the "machinations" of certain political figures. The main culprit for Pozzo di Borgo at that time was Polignac, which was allegedly influenced to the detriment and in opposition to the position of the French government itself

39 Ibid., p. 194.

40 K. Marx and F. Engels Soch. T. E., p. 31.

41 Martene F. F. Uk. soch., vol. XI, pp. 350-351.

42 AVPR, f. Chancellery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, d. 9154, l. 198 vol.

43 Ibid., l. 199 vol.

44 Ibid., l. 230.

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first, the Austrian ambassador in London Esterhazy, and after the signing of the treaty and during the Russo-Turkish war-the head of the British government A. Wellington, who took up this post in August 1827 after Canning's death.

From May 1827, negotiations between representatives of England, Russia and France (Canning, Lieven and Polignac) began in London. Prussia and Austria declined to participate. The texts of the draft treaty were presented, and the final text of the treaty was drawn up. The greatest difficulties arose from the position of the French ambassador. Moreover, officials in Paris expressed full support for all Russian proposals, while in London Polignac created one obstacle after another. Lieven wrote to Pozzo di Borgo that the behavior of the French ambassador in England and "deliberately close relations with Prince Esterhazy" indicate his unfavorable position for Russia .45 Lieven stressed that it was absolutely necessary for the French cabinet to clearly define its position, since Polignac uses any formality to delay the signing of the treaty.

On May 30, 1827, the French government again appealed to the Austrian cabinet to join the negotiations and again received a negative response from Metternich .46 On the same day, Pozzo di Borgo reported to St. Petersburg that France had agreed to join the draft treaty drawn up by England and Russia .47 However, after agreeing to join the treaty, Dama, in an interview with the Russian and British ambassadors, noted that the French government had promised Austria and Prussia not to sign the treaty without informing them of its decision. Therefore, before proceeding to final negotiations, France sent couriers to Vienna and Berlin. Russia and Britain categorically objected to this, arguing that new negotiations delayed the resolution of such an important matter. However, Dama said that the French government could not fail to keep its word, although he assured that there would be no new negotiations on this issue .48
By June 1827, the situation of the Greek rebels had deteriorated dramatically. Turkish troops, overcoming the resistance of poorly armed Greek detachments, captured most of the Seas. Greece turned to St. Petersburg for help. In these circumstances, Russia had to take a decisive position. Sending instructions to Paris in early June 1827, Nesselrode wrote that Nicholas I would not agree to any further delay. If France was the instigator of further complications at the London Conference, Lieven was ordered to sign a treaty with England alone .49
However, the Russian government could not help but realize that this was almost impossible. The British government, considering the dangers that the St. Petersburg Protocol concealed for it, did not intend to enter into a new separate agreement with Russia. Moreover, under these conditions, the treaty made sense for British diplomacy only if France was involved in it, since this created a counterbalance to Russian diplomacy in the East. The fear that the rejection of all agreements on the Eastern question may lead to an independent Russian action in support of Greece and untie Russia's hands in the Middle East, only encourages both England and France to a new agreement.

At the same time, France did not cease to demonstrate to the Austrian government its desire to delay the intervention of European powers in Greek affairs. From this point of view, it is interesting to compare

45 Ibid., d. 9155, l. 29 vol.

46 Sauvigny G. de B. de. Op. cit., p. 1097.

47 AVPR, Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9155, l. 78.

48 Ibid., ll. 87 vol. -88.

49 Ibid., f. Embassy in Paris, 70, l, 325 vol.

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reports of Pozzo di Borgo and the report of the Austrian Ambassador in Paris to Vienna for June 1827. While the Tuileries cabinet assured the Russian ambassador of France's full determination to defend the Greek rebels and sign the treaty (although it expressed its displeasure with the wording of the preamble), Appogny's reports are full of completely different information: according to him, France wants to preserve the Ottoman Empire, it seeks to avoid a military clash with it, opposes the political liberation of Greece and finds Anglo-Russian politics "monstrous" and "dangerous" 50 .

Having finally decided to conclude a treaty with England and Russia, the French government in the future more than once through Polignac in London made various proposals to change the text of the treaty. So, for example, on June 26, Pozzo di Borgo reported to St. Petersburg: The Lady again proposed a new version of the preamble. In particular, he suggested that the envoys of Russia, England and France in Constantinople make a statement to the Port not only "simultaneously", but also "collectively". This formula, according to the French government, would give more strength to the" demarche " of the three powers .51 As Martenet pointed out, in this case, the expectation was that England does not like collective action, and negotiations will again be delayed. 52 However, after seeing the reaction of the Russian and English ambassadors, the French minister hastened to assure that this is only a wish of France, which will not affect its decision to sign the treaty in any way .53 Much more serious was Polignac's position on the secret article prohibiting the supply of weapons to Turkey. Polignac said that under French law, only after declaring war does the French government have the right to prohibit its citizens from trading in military goods. This article was eventually deleted. Lieven managed to get it included only in the instructions to the admirals of the three allied squadrons that were sent in the autumn of 1827 to the coast of Greece .54 The French Cabinet also tried to sow discord in Russian-English relations by using the Greek question .55 Lieven wrote that from the very beginning of the negotiations to the very end of them, "I did not cease to meet with deaf opposition from him (Polignac - E. F.)."56 The Russian government even turned to the French cabinet with a question: how to understand the actions of Polignac? Dama tried to soften the impression made by Polignac's behavior in London by assuring Pozzo di Borgo that the French ambassador had received orders from the government to sign the treaty, whatever the results of his demarches .57
On July 6, 1827, the treaty between England, Russia, and France was signed, despite what Nesselrode called "Polignac's efforts." The Russian government viewed the behavior of the French ambassador in London as an attempt to "paralyze" the attempts of Russia and Britain to resolve the Greek question .58 Pozzo di Borgo wrote that it was only the fear of being left out of eastern affairs that led France to join the treaty .59 The London Treaty was based on

50 Prokesch-Osten A. Op. cit., s. 83.

51 AVPR, f. Chancellery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9155, l. 165.

52 Martene F. F. Uk. soch. T. XI, p. 351.

53 AVPR, f. Chancellery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9155, l. 165 ob.

54 Martene F. F. Uk. soch. Vol. IX, p. 353.

55 AVPR, f. Chancellery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, d. 9155, ll. 267-269. Lieven-Pozzo di Borgo, June 20, 1827.

56 Ibid., d. 9155, l. 270 vol.

57 Ibid., l. 279 vol.

58 Ibid., d. 9158, ll. 166 vol. -167. Copy of Nesselrode's instructions of July 20, 1827.

59 Ibid., d. 9155, ll. 280-280 vol.

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St. Petersburg Protocol. The principle of Greek autonomy was preserved. At the suggestion of Russia, a secret article was included that provided for the possibility of launching Allied Mediterranean squadrons to blockade the Morean coast.

The Russian Government was aware that the hard-won agreement in London did not mean that a single agreed position of the European powers in resolving the Eastern crisis would be finalized. Understanding that the contradictions between Britain and Russia on the eastern issue would escalate, he sought not formal French participation, but strengthening Russian-French relations and French support for Russia's actions in the East. Attempts at closer rapprochement with France were particularly pronounced from 1828 to 1829. Immediately after the signing of the treaty, the Russian government set its ambassador the task of strengthening relations with France in every possible way. 60
But it was not until the end of 1827 that we can speak of a certain turning point in French policy towards the Greek uprising-from procrastination and inaction to the implementation of the treaty of July 6, 1827, in which the French government began to see an opportunity to strengthen its influence in Greece. At the same time, France tried in every possible way to get closer to England, which was gradually moving away from the treaty. "There is no doubt," Lieven wrote to Nesselrode on November 25, 1828, "that an alliance with Russia is a means for France to play an honorable role in the present crisis, but her pride and honor also find satisfaction in the opposite combination." 61
The policy of France at different stages of the Eastern crisis of the 20s of the XIX century changed. Fears of Russia's excessive strengthening in the Middle East led already in the 1920s to the beginning of the formation of the anti-Russian position of the European powers led by Britain. On this basis, even before the revolution of 1830, Russian-French relations were cooling and the rapprochement between France and England began. However, the contradictions between France and England on various problems of international politics forced it to speak out sometimes in support of Russia's demands. This policy of maneuvering between Russia, Austria and England was dictated, on the one hand, by the weakness of its foreign policy positions and the internal instability of the Restoration regime, and on the other, by the desire to develop an independent political line in the eastern question and take the role of a great power in solving international problems.

60 Ibid., f. Embassy in Paris, 71, l. 51.

61 Martene F. F. Uk. soch. T. XI, p. 390.

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