The article analyzes the background and consequences of the 2010 Turkish-Israeli crisis in the context of Barack Obama's Middle East strategy. The article provides a brief overview of key episodes from the modern history of relations between Turkey and Israel, which had a direct impact on US policy in the Middle East. The confrontation between the two countries has largely determined the current difficult state of relations between Ankara, Tel Aviv and Washington. The long-term diplomatic work of the United States has shown that the parties to the conflict are ready to move closer if there are prerequisites for mutually beneficial cooperation.

Keywords: USA, Turkey, Israel, Turkish-Israeli relations, US foreign policy, diplomacy, Middle East, Barack Obama, "Mavi Marmara", "Freedom Flotilla".

TURKISH-ISRAELI CRISIS (2010) IN THE CONTEXT OF BARACK OBAMA'S MIDDLE EAST STRATEGY

The article analyzes the causes and consequences of the Turkish-Israeli crisis of 2010 in the context of the Middle East policy during the Obama administration. A brief overview of the key episodes of contemporary Turkish-Israeli relations that directly impacted on U.S. policy in the Middle East is presented. The confrontation of the two Middle Eastern countries has created difficulties for the regional strategy of the Obama administration and has determined relationship

Altunay Ilgar kyzy ALIYEVA is a post-graduate student of the Department of International Organizations and World Political Processes, Faculty of World Politics, Lomonosov Moscow State University. alieva_altunay@mail.ru.

Altunay ALIEVA - PhD Candidate, School of World Politics, Lomonosov Moscow State University, alieva_altunay@mail.ru.

The article was prepared under the grant of the President of the Russian Federation for state support of leading scientific schools of the Russian Federation (NSh-2427.2014.6).

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of Ankara, Tel Aviv and Washington. Author estimates the U.S. efforts for reconciliation of the two allies. Particular attention is paid to the diplomatic tools and arguments used by Washington. Continuous efforts of the United States proved that two sides are to move closer if there are conditions for mutually beneficial cooperation.

Keywords: USA, Turkey, Israel, Turkish-Israeli relations, American foreign policy, diplomacy, Middle East, Barack Obama, "Mavi Marmara", 'Gaza Freedom Flotilla'.

In December 2015, the world media spread the news that high-ranking officials of Turkey and Israel signed a framework agreement on laying a pipeline under the Mediterranean Sea and supplying Israeli gas to Turkish markets [Kershner, Arangodec, 2015]. An agreement was reached to normalize interstate relations, which were interrupted after the tragedy on the Mavi Marmara in May 2010.1 Until recently, the consequences of the Turkish-Israeli crisis hindered the implementation of any previously reached agreements. However, after Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet in November 2015, the tension between Moscow and Ankara [Turkish Foreign Ministry..., 2015] made adjustments to the balance of power in the Middle East. The sanctions imposed by Russia on Turkey have pushed Ankara to find new strong regional partners. Against the background of the strengthening of Iran's position in Syria, Tel Aviv also faced the need for rapprochement with other states, including Turkey today.

Turkey and Israel are known to be important components of US Middle East policy. Ever since the Cold War, the Americans have encouraged Ankara's cooperation with Tel Aviv, which provided the latter with a way out of regional isolation. At the same time, the partnership with Israel allowed Turkey to maintain its status as a democratic, secular and pro-Western state. The phase of active cooperation between the two countries occurred in the 1990s [Balci and Kardas, 2012, p. 99-120]. Their cooperation in the military and economic spheres continued into the new millennium, but in May 2010 the long-standing friendship abruptly ended: the consequences of the Turkish-Israeli crisis created certain difficulties for Washington, for example, the White House failed to fully involve Israel and Turkey in the international coalition created in the summer of 2014 to fight the Islamic State Iraq and Libya 2. Today's American policy in the region - especially against the backdrop of Russia's regional activity-looks vaguely articulated. But it was in the Middle East that the Obama administration hoped to strengthen the influence of the United States, which was undermined by the policy of President George W. Bush.

The turning point in relations between Turkey and Israel - the Mavi Marmara incident - was widely covered in the scientific literature and in the press. In particular, some Russian researchers mention it in their scientific works (see [Ivanova, 2012; Glazova, 2012; Koritsky, 2012]). However, there are few works devoted to the issues of reconciliation between Turkey and Israel. The extent to which the United States is involved in this process, as the party most interested in reconciliation between the two countries, remains poorly understood. Not much is known about the diplomatic tools and arguments that Washington used to bring the parties to the conflict to the table

1 On the night of May 30-31, 2010, Israeli border security forces clashed with activists of the Free Gaza Movement in the Mediterranean Sea. The Freedom Flotilla, which was carrying more than 10,000 tons of humanitarian aid, was heading for the Gaza Strip. 72 miles off the coast of Israel, it was stopped by the Israeli Naval Service, but the passengers of the ship "Mavi Marmara" resisted. As a result of the clash, Israeli soldiers killed 9 and wounded more than 30 people.

2 Since the end of July 2015, Turkey has been fighting on two fronts - against the armed formations of the Kurdistan Workers ' Party in Iraq and the Islamic State in Syria. At the end of August, it launched its first airstrikes on IS positions as part of an international coalition.

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negotiations. It is very likely that the crisis in relations between the two countries not only directly affected the regional policy of the White House, but also largely determined the nature of relations between Ankara, Tel Aviv and Washington. This article attempts to substantiate this point of view.

The Democrats who came to power in the United States in 2009 followed the approach of the previous government, focused on actively involving Ankara and Tel Aviv in solving regional problems. The proof of its effectiveness was the negotiations between Israel and Syria held in 2008, at which Turkey acted as a mediator [Press Briefing..., 28.03.2009]. The activity of the Turkish authorities and the prospects for improving the image of the Israeli state fit harmoniously into the strategy of the Democrats, which was based on the principle of resolving regional issues through diplomacy [Transcript..., 2008].

The effectiveness of the US-Turkey-Israel triangle in the American political environment was not in doubt. However, there were changes in the nature of Turkish-Israeli relations that the new Government initially failed to adequately assess. After the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in autumn 2002, Turkey focused on developing relations with neighboring States. The country sought to assert its leadership in the region; Israel's attention was drawn to security concerns. The Palestinian issue, the Middle East peace process, and relations with the Arab and Islamic world have become the determining factors in Turkish-Israeli relations [Ivanova, 2012, p. 110-111]. In the 2000s, the following trend was observed: as long as Israel participated in peace initiatives, Turkey's cooperation with it did not raise any questions; as soon as the process was delayed or the next aggravation of the Palestinian problem followed, relations between the two countries deteriorated [Arbell, 2014, p. 10]. Despite this, the Israeli leadership continued to maintain contacts with Ankara.

Nor did the events of December 2008, when Israel launched Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip, become anything out of the ordinary. The news came as a surprise to Turkey: Israeli officials have repeatedly stated their intention to seek a peaceful solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. AKP leaders regarded Tel Aviv's actions as a blow to their friendship [Erdogan..., 2010]. Anti-Israeli criticism has intensified in Turkey, demanding an end to the blockade of Gaza. The reaction of the US pro-Israel lobby was not long in coming. In January 2009, first the American Jewish Committee and then other groups contacted the Turkish government to express " concern about the growing anti-Semitism in Turkey "[Major..., 2009].

In the White House, tensions between the two countries have not caused much concern. As it seemed to many, the development of events followed a similar scenario, as in previous years. But soon the tone of the Turkish-Israeli dialogue changed dramatically. On January 29, 2009, at the International Economic Forum in Davos (Switzerland), Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated to the President of Israel Sh. To Peres: "You know very well how to kill people." After denouncing the actions of Israeli troops in Gaza, the Turkish politician defiantly left the hall, declaring that "this is the end of Davos for him" [Davos'ta Kriz, 2009]. For the first time in public, and in such a harsh manner, the head of Turkey condemned one of his country's most reliable allies and partners.

However, the "Davos incident" did not force the Obama administration to change its plans. The visit of the US Special Envoy for the Middle East, John Kerry, to Ankara, scheduled for late January, was only postponed. Mitchell. The reason was explained by the diplomat's" too busy schedule". Arriving a month later, Mitchell urged the Turkish authorities to once again" play a unique role in the peace negotiations " between Israel and Syria [ABD..., 2009]. Thus, he tried to get Ankara back to work

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with Tel Aviv. Secretary of State X also spoke about the "very important role" of the country. Clinton in March of the same year. Soon after, Barack Obama himself arrived in Ankara (April 2009), declaring Turkey an "exemplary partner" of the United States.

In Tel Aviv, the rapprochement between Ankara and Washington was viewed with disapproval, and not only because the president "bypassed" Israel. Even during the election campaign, Barack Obama promised to strengthen ties with this country [Remarks..., 2007]. To the chagrin of Israelis, the strategy of the Democrats has developed a slightly different approach to their country than that of the previous government. Since the United States became "too close" to Israel during the George W. Bush administration [Gilboa, 2009, p. 57], it was important for the new government to improve its image in the eyes of Muslim countries, so it decided to distance itself from Tel Aviv. At the same time, Democrats have repeatedly argued that their commitment to ensuring Israel's security will remain "unwavering."

In the first year, the administration preferred, like the Republicans, to involve Ankara and Tel Aviv in working on common issues. But Washington failed to take into account the fact that the idea of rapprochement with a country that publicly criticized Israel's actions was finding fewer supporters in Tel Aviv. Turkey, which is engaged in strengthening its authority in the region, also did not consider the issue of normalizing contacts with Israel as a priority direction of its policy. The crisis character of political relations between the two countries soon affected the military-technical side of the partnership. After in September 2009, the Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Davutoglu was denied access to Gaza, and Turkey removed Israel from the list of participants in the Anatolian Eagle military exercise. In response, the United States withdrew its application to participate in the exercise. Contradictions were already growing inside the triangle.

The Democratic administration urgently needed to rethink the foundations of the faltering partnership. However, the 2010 National Security Strategy does not mention the prospects for Turkish-Israeli cooperation. As it was stated in the document, the United States was drawn closer to Turkey by "striving for stability in the region" [National Security..., 2010, p. 42]. At the same time, the United States remained a "close friend" of Israel on security issues. Obviously, the Democrats themselves distinguished the allies, assigning them different roles. Turkey remained a partner of the United States in the European and transatlantic directions, while Israel remained a partner in the Middle East. Thus, the US has moved away from its original approach to these countries.

Very soon, events began to unfold according to the scenario that Americans least expected: in May 2010, a tragedy occurred at the Mavi Marmara. Turkey recalled its ambassador to Tel Aviv and demanded that the Israeli government make an official apology for the killing of 9 people; pay compensation to the families of the victims; transfer the investigation of the incident to the international commission; return the ships confiscated during the raid; and lift the blockade from the Gaza Strip. In Tel Aviv, the actions of the Israeli special forces were explained as self-defense, and Turkey was accused of organizing a provocation. However, the AKP took a tough stance and defended the activists. The Turkish authorities had several motives. First, there were about 400 Turkish citizens in the Freedom Flotilla, including 8 of the 9 killed 3. Secondly, the accusation of transporting "inhumane" cargo sent to Gaza from the Istanbul port threatened to turn into a big scandal. Third, the incident was justified in the eyes of the world community by the Turkish leadership, which has repeatedly criticized Israel's military actions. Finally, over a year of cooperation with the United States under the slogan of "exemplary partnership", the Turkish authorities have strengthened their thoughts about the increased importance of their country, so Ankara, counting on the support of the White House, went to a confrontation with Tel Aviv.

The US administration preferred to reduce the problem to the issues of delivering humanitarian aid to Gaza and promoting cooperation between the Israeli government and the international community.-

3 One passenger was a U.S. citizen of Turkish origin.

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native NGOs and the UN [Free Gaza Flotilla, 2010]. Interestingly, Turkey was not mentioned in the official statements. The recognition of the fact that two allies collided in the waters of the Mediterranean at once could negatively affect the credibility of the United States itself. The position of the Congress was different. On June 24, the Senate approved a resolution declaring Mavi Marmara passengers "extremists". Res. 548..., 2010], which indicated that there was no consensus in US political circles about the Turkish-Israeli crisis. Soon, the White House tried to resume the dialogue between Ankara and Tel Aviv. At the G20 summit in June 2010, Barack Obama personally urged Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to normalize relations with Israel.

The goodwill of the head of the White House was not enough. A serious obstacle was the unwillingness of some Turkish and Israeli politicians to make concessions to each other. For example, Israeli Foreign Minister A. Lieberman has become a fierce opponent of rapprochement with Turkey. From the point of view of AKP leaders, the state of conflict with its neighbor strengthened their country's authority among other Muslim states in the region. Ankara was clearly in no hurry to reconcile. While its first and foremost demand was for Tel Aviv to issue an official apology, another condition became a serious obstacle - the lifting of the blockade on the Gaza Strip.

Turkey's estrangement from the United States over the conflict with Israel was highly undesirable for Democrats. "The only Muslim country in NATO has long been 'turning its back on the West'," Assistant Secretary of State F. Gordon summed up [Turkey, Israel..., 2010]. The issue of restoring dialogue between the two countries became particularly relevant after Turkey vetoed new UN Security Council sanctions against Iran's nuclear program in June 2010. Ankara's position, which was based on the idea of resolving the problem exclusively through diplomatic means, did not coincide with the opinion of Washington and Tel Aviv, which were inclined to tighten sanctions against Tehran. The White House criticized Turkey for "not acting as a proper ally of the United States" [Obama Warns..., 2010]. According to information published in the Financial Times, Barack Obama even threatened the Turkish authorities to stop supplying weapons purchased from the United States [Dombey, 2010].

Measures to "intimidate" Ankara did not have the desired effect, so the Obama administration resorted to soft influence - through mediation. At the end of June, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and Israeli Minister of Industry, Trade and Employment Ben-Eliezer met in Brussels. They discussed the return of the three ships seized by Israel to Turkey, as well as offering apologies and compensation to the families of the victims [Strauss and Bekker, 2010]. The talks were secret, but it was leaked to the press that R. T. Erdogan and B. Obama discussed the upcoming meeting at the G20 summit [Asian, 2010]. Ankara and Tel Aviv denied that it was the White House that initiated the negotiations. However, it is known that the meeting was attended by the American Ambassador to Turkey, J. R. R. Tolkien. Geoffrey. Later, in an interview with the Turkish newspaper Sabah, he stated that the United States "does not mediate", but only supports countries in their attempts to resolve existing controversial issues [Arabulucu Degiliz, 2010].

The ministerial meeting did not produce any breakthrough results, but only inflamed the situation. After this event, Ankara threatened to break off relations with Tel Aviv if it did not accept its demands. Having made sure that attempts to normalize relations through diplomatic means ran into AKP conditions, the Democrats tried to shift the blame for what was happening to the Turkish leadership, demonstrating this with both rhetoric and practical measures. In September 2010 Washington again refused to participate in the Anatolian Eagle air exercise in the expectation that the AKP will go for reconciliation under pressure from the generals and military commanders who value military-strategic ties with Tel Aviv. But the ruling party's position was firm.

Amid these diplomatic setbacks, Washington has attempted to rethink the nature of Turkish-Israeli relations. Experts of the Center for American Business Development

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progress" suggested resuming dialogue between the two countries by encouraging business contacts, engaging in economic development in the Palestinian territories, and cooperating with the military [Werz, 2010]. However, the new approach has not been fully implemented. The "Arab awakening" that began in late 2010 has shaken the half-century-old order of international relations in the region. The US Middle East strategy began to require urgent adjustments and close attention to developments in the Arab world. The Turkish-Israeli dispute was now becoming an additional obstacle to Washington's involvement in more urgent matters in the Middle East.

His "return" to the agenda of American diplomacy took place in the summer of 2011. Then the US State Department sent a communique to Israeli diplomats in Washington stating that "the breakdown of relations between Israel and Turkey was harmful to American interests in the region" (quoted by Jones, 2011) and related to the issue of regime change in Syria. However, this did not convince the Netanyahu government. A new blow to Turkish-Israeli relations was the results of the investigation of the events at Mavi Marmara, which was presented by the UN International Commission in September 2011 [Report.., 2011]. The report did not meet the expectations of the conflict participants 4. After its publication, Turkey reduced diplomatic relations with Israel to the level of second secretaries of embassies. Agreements in the military sphere were frozen. The AKP announced its readiness to defend the interests of the Freedom Flotilla participants in court and continued to insist on lifting the blockade on Gaza. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said that from now on "Turkey and Israel did not need American mediation" [Obama'nin..., 2011]. The Obama administration's diplomacy was at an impasse. However, soon the Democrats "remembered" the effectiveness of Ankara and Tel Aviv's work on solving common problems. In November 2011, the Vice-President of the United States of America, J. R. R. Tolkien, arrived in Turkey. Biden, who called on the Turkish leadership to resume cooperation with Israel. As evidence, he cited the example of joint efforts of Israelis and Turks to eliminate the consequences of the 2011 earthquake in the Turkish province of Van and the release of the IDF soldier G. Shalit [Background..., 2011]. The Turkish-Israeli confrontation was not expected to weaken.

The Americans once again needed to rethink the foundations of trilateral cooperation, and one of these attempts was made in the 2012 report of the US Council on Foreign Affairs on Turkey.A small but important remark draws attention to itself: "The deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations... It has complicated US policy in the Middle East and increased tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean" [U.S.-Turkey..., 2012, p. 7]. It was about the events that happened just after the incident at "Mavi Marmara". In June 2010, the Leviathan field (500 billion cubic meters of gas) was discovered near the Israeli sea border [Overview..., 2013]. Turkey opposed the intention of regional participants to develop the shelf, demanding that the Cyprus issue be resolved first. A year later, the Aphrodite field (200 billion cubic meters of gas) was explored in the waters of Cyprus, which was a continuation of the Israeli one. Thus, another node of contradictions has appeared.

Convinced of the steadfastness of the Turkish authorities, the White House tried to influence the other side of the conflict. Realizing that the issue of security for Israel was paramount, the Americans began to play the "Iranian" card. In July 2012, at a meeting with Benjamin Netanyahu, Secretary of State X. Clinton stated that the crisis in relations between the two countries "undermines the unity of the international community in its desire to prevent the development of Iran's nuclear program" (Winer and Podolsky, 2012). However, the Secretary of State's words did not have the desired effect: Israel did not rule out a military solution to the problem. The idea of reconciliation with Ankara to solve the Irans-

4 Israel was recommended to apologize to Turkey and pay compensation to its families. Israeli special forces were convicted of ill-treatment of passengers, but the seizure of the ships was recognized as legal.

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the nature of the issue gradually ceased to play a consolidating role. This was also understood in the White House, whose agenda included the Syrian problem.

There is a difference in the positions of Ankara and Tel Aviv. At first, the Netanyahu Government was not particularly concerned about the destabilization of the Arab States. The Syrian civil war was perceived as a "humanitarian problem" rather than a political one. Israel's position began to change after November 2012, when the war reached its borders. The consequences of the conflict were also felt by Turkey, where a flood of refugees poured in. When American and Israeli officials announced the use of chemical weapons in Syria in early 2013, the Turkish authorities were alarmed: a dangerous type of weapon could end up on the territory of Turkey or fall into the hands of militants of the Kurdistan Workers ' Party. The Syrian crisis was becoming a common problem.

The" return " of the issue of Turkish-Israeli relations to the agenda of American diplomacy occurred after the re-election of Barack Obama. According to the White House, there were "suitable" conditions for reconciliation. First, Israeli Foreign Minister A. Lieberman, the main opponent of rapprochement with Ankara, resigned. Secondly, over the past years, the two countries have successfully implemented economic cooperation5, which could lay the foundations for a political solution to the dispute. Third, the threats to security and territorial integrity that have become apparent in connection with the ongoing conflict in Syria have pushed both countries to cooperate. Fourth, during his first term in office, Barack Obama's Middle East strategy yielded relatively modest results, so the Democrats ' efforts to reconcile the allies, as Washington thought, could improve the image of the United States. At one point, it seemed that the Turkish-Israeli conflict would be resolved. This happened during the visit of Barack Obama to Israel. On March 22, 2013, at the end of his trip, the president insisted that Netanyahu call Erdogan and talk with the head of Turkey in his presence. The Israeli leader apologized for the "operational mistakes" made during the interception of ships, expressing " regret for the loss of life." Agreements were reached on the restoration of diplomatic missions and the beginning of work on a draft agreement on compensation for the families of the victims.

The visit of Barack Obama was preceded by a long and hard work of the State Department. For three weeks, Secretary of State J. R. R. Tolkien Kerry negotiated through diplomatic channels in Ankara, Tel Aviv and Washington, discussing the draft official apology. Kerry's text was approved by the AKP leaders shortly before Netanyahu's phone call. Obama later said that "the exchange of views between the two leaders will allow for closer cooperation on a number of issues and initiatives" [Statement..., 2013]. However, he made a reservation, saying that "differences between Turkey and Israel will remain not only on the Palestinian issue, but also on a wide range of issues" [Remarks..., 2013]. Such a remark suggests that the Americans have become convinced that even they will not be able to completely smooth out the sharp corners, thereby proving that they did not intend to interfere in interstate differences and eliminate them at all. In reconciling the two states, the Democrats were guided primarily by regional security issues. This is confirmed by an analytical note from the Center for American Progress, prepared shortly before the visit of Barack Obama. Military operations in Syria, Iran's nuclear program and terrorist activity in the region were listed among the priorities of the Middle East strategy. The Americans saw a way out of this situation in cooperation between Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, and Turkey [DeLeon, Katulis, and Duss, 2013]. Therefore, normalization of relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv became a minimum task for the White House.

5 Only for 2009-2014. The countries ' mutual trade reached 5.6 billion US dollars [Temel Istatistikler; Foreign Trade...].

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At the same time, the key to the "diplomatic success" of the United States was that the Americans managed to find an argument that convinced all parties of the benefits of reconciliation. This can be considered an agreement to start construction of an underwater pipeline through which gas from the Leviathan field will be supplied to Turkey and to world markets. The American Commercial Service reported back in February 2013 that Turkish companies intended to buy Israeli gas and participate in its transportation [Israel's.., 2013, p. 2-3]. In April, Israel officially offered Turkey joint work on the construction of the gas pipeline. It was not without the United States in this case: the American "Energy Noble" was involved in the project. Obama did not publicly announce these plans during his visit to Israel. It is likely that it was the energy factor that pushed all three sides to negotiate, which ended with a call from Netanyahu. Confirmation in favor of this point of view can serve as the words of Vice-President Biden, voiced by him in November 2014: "[Energy. - AA] cooperation between Israel, Turkey, Egypt, Greece, Cyprus... It will ensure the stability and prosperity of the region... " [Remarks..., 2014].

In the spring of 2013, negotiations began on the amount of compensation to the families of the deceased passengers, but soon they reached an impasse. Ankara demanded $ 30 million, while Tel Aviv insisted on half that amount. Almost a year later, in February 2014, the Netanyahu government agreed to pay $ 20 million to the Israeli government. After this news, the American president demanded that Erdogan immediately "conclude an agreement on the normalization of relations with Israel" [Readout..., 2014]. However, his influence was not enough. The issue of lifting the blockade on Gaza has become a major sticking point. This was revealed in the summer of 2014, when Erdogan accused Israel of carrying out a "systematic genocide" in Gaza and killing more than 1.5 thousand civilians.

In conclusion, I would like to draw your attention to the following fact. After the spring of 2013, the issue of normalization of Turkish-Israeli relations became less frequent on the agenda of American diplomacy, but there was a division of issues that the Democrats sought to involve their allies in solving. The sides discussed the Syrian conflict, the activation of terrorist and radical organizations in the region, and the situation in Iraq. In negotiations with the Israelis, the Americans put the Iranian nuclear issue and the settlement of the Middle East process at the forefront. However, in recent years, relations between the White House and these countries have not been smooth. Attempts by the Justice and Development Party to assert its leadership on the political stage are causing discontent among the American establishment [Arslan, 2014]. In relations between the United States and Israel, the main node of contradictions remains the Iranian nuclear program [Karasova, 2015, pp. 416-422].

Against the background of the aggravation of US-Turkish and US-Israeli relations, the search for new allies and partners remains urgent for the Turkish and Israeli authorities. Paradoxically, each of the countries increasingly began to pay attention to its neighbor, with which it was recently in conflict. This is confirmed by periodic contacts between Turkish and Israeli high-ranking officials. For example, in June 2015, the Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, David Gold, had a secret meeting with the Deputy Foreign Minister of Turkey, F. Sinirlioglu [Ravid, 2015]. Probably, the agreements reached in December last year were the result of such negotiations.

Today, the question of full normalization of relations between Turkey and Israel remains open. On the eve of the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2016, the Turkish media wrote about a possible meeting between A. Davutoglu and B. Netanyahu [Davutoglu..., 2016]. However, this information was not confirmed. It is known that on January 29, J. Biden called on Netanyahu to continue efforts to improve Turkish-Israeli relations and strengthen energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean [Readout..., 2016]. This fact again confirms the idea that the interest in

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The American interest in maintaining cooperation between Turkey and Israel has shifted from the Middle East region to the Mediterranean. The review of key episodes in the history of US-Turkish-Israeli relations made in the article suggests that Ankara and Tel Aviv managed to move towards rapprochement only when Washington could offer a common platform for their interaction. However, for the time being, the Democrats can hardly count on the close and full cooperation of their partners. Thus, the long-term diplomatic work of the United States to normalize Turkish-Israeli relations has led to a half-hearted result. Time will tell whether the Obama administration will be able to finish the job.

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