A. V. SULEYMANOV, Candidate of Political Sciences

Lobachevsky State University of Nizhny Novgorod

Keywords: Turkey, Iran, USA, Iran's nuclear program, Turkish-Iranian relations

For many years, the fate of Iran's nuclear program has never been more discussed in world politics. It was considered at all levels and in various formats - at multilateral forums and bilateral summits, in communication between heads of state and foreign ministries. It has become an integral part of the agenda of many countries around the world, primarily Russia, China, the United States, Turkey, Israel and the European Union.

The approach of these countries to nuclear issues is radically different. Some - the United States and the European Union-consider the introduction of tough economic sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) correct; others - Israel - advocate the need for a military solution to the problem; others - Russia, China - indicate the need for diplomatic pressure on Tehran.

The Turkish state also takes its own position on Iran's nuclear ambitions, which was formed due to the historical features of Turkish-Iranian relations, as well as the current geopolitical configuration in the Middle East region.

For a long time, the Iranian nuclear issue has not been the subject of discussion in both Turkish-Iranian and Iranian-American relations. Western countries, led by the United States, began to pay special attention to it from the beginning of the 2000s. However, the first concern of the world community arose much earlier, back in 1974, after the statements of the Iranian Shah M. Pahlavi about the possibility of the country obtaining weapons of mass destruction in response to India's nuclear tests.

At that time, despite some contradictions, relations between Turkey and Iran were at a fairly high level. Both countries were members of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) from 1955 to 1979 and followed a pro-American policy on a number of key regional issues, including their relations with the States of the socialist world.

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, there was a turning point in both Turkish-Iranian and Iranian-American relations. The assistance that the United States had provided to Iran since 1967 in developing its nuclear capabilities was curtailed, and relations were interrupted. This circumstance led to a decrease in the intensity of the development of the Iranian nuclear program until the mid-1980s. ¹

The vector of development of Turkish-Iranian relations is also being radically transformed. The Islamic Revolution, which radically changed the state of affairs in Iran, caused tension in relations between the countries. The Turkish leadership was afraid of the penetration of protest moods into Turkey, which would directly threaten the secular nature of its statehood. Ankara feared that the Islamic revolution could be "exported" to Turkey. Tehran has openly criticized Ataturk and his reforms, claiming that the secular regime in Turkey was established illegally because it was not accepted and supported by the Muslim masses.

Another element of tension was Tehran's support for the Kurds fighting to establish their own nation-state.² Iran, for its part, also had some concerns about possible intervention by Western countries, which could use Turkey as a springboard for attacking it. ³

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the bipolar system in 1991, Turkish-Iranian relations began to take on slightly different forms. In its policy, Ankara has begun to pay more and more attention to the problem of border security and European integration. Both countries began to promote their interests in the regions of Central Asia and Transcaucasia, which gave rise to competition for spheres of influence between them. That is, since the early 1990s, Turkey and Iran have become particularly attentive to each other's actions, and Russia's subsequent assistance to Iran in developing nuclear technologies (since 1992) could not be overlooked in Turkey.

After the signing of a contract between Russia and Iran in January 1995 to complete the construction of the first power unit of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, former Turkish Education Minister and member of the Anawatan party V. Dincherler made loud statements in the Turkish Parliament. The Turkish parliamentarian said that " Iran is quite seriously talking about its intentions to become a nuclear power, and perhaps by 2000 it will already be able to possess an atomic bomb." The deputy noted: "... we knew about Iraq's nuclear projects, which were destroyed during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988-author's note), and also that Israel is developing its nuclear program." Thus, V. Dincherler stated, there was a real threat in the Middle East, before which Turkey remained virtually "naked" and hoped for the US nuclear potential.⁵

Indeed, in 1952, after Turkey officially joined NATO, Ankara was offered formally a NATO, but in fact - an American "nuclear umbrella", which for many years removed the need for Turkey's own developments in this area.

Subsequent years, as a result of the rejection of mainly Turkish or Iranian models of development by the Transcaucasian and Central Asian countries, were marked by a certain reduction in the existing geopolitical confrontation between Ankara and Tehran. However, the influence of the ideological factor-

* The Central Treaty Organization , a military-political grouping that existed between 1955 and 1979. in the Middle East, created on the initiative of Great Britain and the United States in order to counteract the USSR.

ra continued to persist - this became especially clear after the resignation of the Turkish Islamist government headed by N. Erbakan on June 18, 1997, as well as the "Kavakchy case" that followed in May 1999-public debates and court proceedings that broke out after the demonstrative arrival of the deputy from the Fazilet party M. Kavakchy in parliament in a hijab, which led to the fact that It was regarded as a threat to the secular character of the Republic ^of Turke6.

In general, the Turkish ruling elite after 1997 was inclined to believe that rivalry between the two countries was unprofitable, due to the fact that the Kurdish issue remained unresolved. In addition, Turkey considered Iran as an important economic partner with access to the riches of the Caspian Sea, as well as being able to be a transit territory for transporting hydrocarbons from Central Asia. The rise to power in Iran in May 1997 of Mohammad Khatami, who proclaimed the idea of a "dialogue of civilizations", also played a huge role.⁷

Thus, in 2001 - 2002, when the first public statements of Western countries and the United States regarding Iran's development of nuclear weapons began, Turkish-Iranian relations, despite a number of contradictions, began to acquire a progressive character, especially in the sphere of foreign economic relations, which intensified after the Justice and Development Party came to power in Turkey in November 2002. development.

ESCALATION OF THE PROBLEM AND ANKARA'S POSITION

Later, after the creation in 2006 of a group of representatives from six states - the United States, China, Russia, Britain, France and Germany - to review the situation around Iran's nuclear program, Turkey began to take an active part in many negotiations on this issue.

However, the Iranian nuclear program began to gain special attention in modern Turkish-Iranian relations immediately after M. Ahmadinejad came to power in Iran in 2005, openly declaring the right of Iran to create a full nuclear cycle, which also implies the process of uranium enrichment. This circumstance caused a negative reaction from the "six" countries, and after the failed negotiations in 2006, it was decided to refer the situation around the Iranian nuclear program to the UN Security Council, which has so far adopted 8 resolutions.

Despite the seemingly acute situation developing around the Iranian nuclear dossier, Ankara not only refused to impose any sanctions against Iran, but also actively supported the expansion of bilateral relations. This became clear as early as June 2006, when Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan held telephone talks with Ahmadinejad. The Turkish Prime Minister praised Iran's achievements in the peaceful nuclear field and called for further expansion of multifaceted cooperation between the two countries.⁸

At the same time, Ankara has taken a principled position on the Iranian problem, based on the fact that this issue should be resolved exclusively by diplomatic (non-military) methods, and speaking out, in fact, against any possibility of uranium enrichment by the Iranian side for military purposes. In a 2008 interview, Turkish President A. Gul stated that " Turkey has been advocating for a peaceful solution to the problem of Iran's nuclear program for three years now. We help Iran organize meetings with Western countries. And we organized the first of them in Ankara"⁹. Later, in an interview with the Arabic TV channel al-Arabiya, A. Gul noted:: "Iran is an important country in the region, on which trust and calm depend... Nuclear development is Iran's right. But nuclear weapons are another matter. " ¹⁰

Further years were characterized by the intensification of the negotiation process between Turkey and Iran. In August 2008, M. Ahmadinejad paid an official visit to Ankara, arriving, as many analysts claimed, precisely to discuss the situation around the Iranian nuclear program11. Later, in October 2009, R. T. Erdogan arrived in Tehran at the invitation of the Vice-President of Iran, M. R. Rahimi. At a joint press conference, the Turkish Prime Minister reiterated Ankara's previously stated position on the Iranian issue, noting that "Turkey fully supports the diplomatic process to resolve this issue." ¹²

Such a principled position of Ankara was met with great warmth by the Iranian leadership. Thus, the Vice-President of Iran, M. R. Rahimi, has repeatedly thanked Erdogan for his understanding on this issue.¹³ Former President Ahmadinejad also expressed his gratitude, always pointing out that "the so-called nuclear issue does not exist, it is contrived by the great Powers, primarily the United States." ¹⁴ A similar opinion was shared by Iran's Supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei, who made a statement in June 2013 accusing Washington of deliberately delaying the problem around Iran in order to exert constant pressure on it. ¹⁵

The need for Iran to develop a peaceful nuclear industry was due to the shortage of energy resources associated with the rapid and continuous growth of energy consumption to this day. This was also understood by the Iranian Shah Reza Pahlavi, who believed that the development of nuclear energy for Iran is much more profitable and promising than the burning of oil and gas in thermal power plants, which are an irreplaceable source of foreign exchange earnings and a valuable raw material for the national petrochemical industry. ¹⁶ However, the world community has always been concerned that a peaceful nuclear program could it is also reoriented to military needs.

The United States made it clear that America and Western countries will not take the problem of Iran's nuclear weapons calmly, influencing it both politically and economically. ¹⁷

As for the sanctions against Iran, the economic interests of-

Turkey's laws forced it to resist such a decision. In recent years, the trade turnover between the two countries has been steadily growing, mainly due to the development of energy cooperation. It is expected that by 2016, the volume of bilateral trade, which already exceeded the $20 billion mark in 2012, will double ¹⁸. The fact that this indicator is largely formed by purchases of Iranian natural gas gives a strategic character to the trade and economic relations between Ankara and Tehran.

Another factor determining Turkey's position on the Iranian issue is the task of maintaining a favorable image of the country in the eyes of Muslim countries. Ankara has made a lot of efforts to promote a positive perception of Turkey in the Islamic world. After a series of diplomatic demarches against Israel criticizing its actions during Operation Cast Lead in December 2008, as well as in connection with the seizure of the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara and the murder of Turkish citizens in May 2010, carrying humanitarian aid to the Palestinians, the rating of the Turkish government has especially increased. Continuing to follow this line, Prime Minister R. T. Er-dogan, in almost every speech on Middle East issues, stated that the rules should be the same for all States without exception: as long as Israel has nuclear weapons, it is impossible to demand that other countries in the region abandon their intention to obtain them.

In general, the Turkish side has always shown diplomatic skill in communicating with the Iranian leadership. Back in 2010, at a meeting between Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Mottaki, the two sides discussed joint efforts to transform the Middle East into a zone of stability and prosperity and shared responsibility for the fate of the region. Davutoglu noted that Ankara and Tehran are constantly holding consultations on issues related to the Iranian nuclear program. According to Mottaki, Turkey could help other countries to show understanding to the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran. At the same time, Mottaki rejected the use of the term "mediation" in relation to Ankara's diplomatic efforts and stated that Turkey participates "in a constant exchange of views on issues of peace and tranquility in the region."¹⁹

THE TEHRAN AGREEMENT

As you know, an important attempt to resolve the Iranian problem was made in May 2010 with the mediation of Turkey and Brazil. The foreign ministers of the three countries signed an agreement on the project of exchanging Iran's low-enriched (up to 3.5%) uranium for highly enriched (up to 20%) fuel for the Tehran research reactor. The signing ceremony was held in the presence of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Brazilian President Lula da Silva. According to the agreements reached after 18 hours of protracted negotiations, the exchange of uranium between Iran and Western countries was to be carried out on the territory of Turkey. Previously, the territories of such countries as Russia and France were indicated as a place for a possible exchange. However, Tehran made its choice in favor of Ankara. At the same time, Western countries were initially skeptical of this development, pointing out that the agreement solves only the issue of nuclear fuel, but does not contribute to solving the entire problem and only partially meets the requirements of the IAEA. In this regard, already in July 2010. All 27 EU member states at that time adopted sanctions against Iran.²⁰

The Turkish opposition also criticized Erdogan over the signed agreement. A well-known political figure, former ambassador, Dr. Sh. M. Yelekdag, speaking in Parliament on July 1, 2010 on behalf of the Republican People's Party, said that "there is an Iranian adventure in the Turkish government. This gamble leads to hesitation, indecision and danger for our foreign policy. In fact, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, by mediating between Iran and America, hopes to gain credibility and respect in the international arena. He personally acted as a guarantor that Iran will not develop nuclear weapons. This step did not lead to anything good, it only shocked all of Ankara's Western partners. " ²¹

The signing of the agreement brought only two results: Iran gained time, since the document appeared when the issue of putting a resolution on new sanctions against Iran to a vote in the UN Security Council was discussed, and Turkey strengthened its peacemaking image in solving an acute global problem. In June 2010, in the Security Council, Ankara voted "against" resolution No. 1929, which tightened the sanctions regime, and once again declared the need to resolve the problem through diplomatic means, calling it the only possible way to resolve the crisis situation.²²

PROBLEMS OF THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS

In the future, the Turkish side continued to take an active part in solving the Iranian problem. Thus, with its mediation in January 2011, a discussion of the situation around the Iranian nuclear program was held in Istanbul, which ended without success. Representatives of the Iranian delegation claimed that the negotiations had reached an impasse due to the too rigid position of Western states adhering to the principle of unilateral dictate. ²³

Despite the regular round of 5+1 negotiations (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) held in Vienna in July 2014, with the aim of signing a comprehensive agreement on guarantees of the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program in exchange for

the lifting of international sanctions against the country, until now, the problem around Iran's nuclear program remains open.

During the period from 2011 to 2014, about ten high-level meetings were held on this issue. In 2012 alone, representatives of the Six countries and Tehran held three rounds of talks: in Moscow in June, in Istanbul in April, and in Baghdad in May. Like all previous negotiations, they ended without success due to the fact that the parties could not agree both on the degree of intensity of Iran's nuclear development and on the reduction of economic sanctions against it.

An important step in the settlement process was taken in November 2013, when an interim agreement in the form of a joint Action Plan was signed in Geneva with the mediation of Russia between the representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the "six" countries. Iran has pledged to: stop enriching uranium above 5%; destroy existing stocks of nuclear materials with an enrichment level from 5 to 20%, including by depletion below 5%; stop installing any enrichment centrifuges and stop the construction of new uranium enrichment centers, etc. In turn, the United States and Western countries agreed to reduce restrictions on oil exports from Iran, as well as to reduce sanctions on cooperation and foreign investment in the automobile, transport and petrochemical industries of Iran and trade with it in gold and precious metals.

However, this was more of a tactical maneuver, in fact, it was a kind of ultimatum that Iran accepted in order to weaken the extremely painful financial and economic sanctions imposed by the West. By accepting strict requirements, especially regarding monitoring of Iranian nuclear facilities, Tehran was able to defend its legitimate right to enrich uranium as a member State of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)^.24 In April 2014, Tehran again announced its intention to continue the peaceful use of nuclear energy within the framework of the NPT, to which it had joined ^{in 197025}

Progress in resolving the Iranian problem was facilitated by the victory of one of the leaders of the moderate conservative wing, Hassan Rouhani, in the presidential elections in Iran in 2013, who announced the beginning of a new course aimed at significantly improving the country's economic situation by normalizing relations with the West on the basis of a mutually acceptable compromise, including in the nuclear sphere.

THE EFFECT OF GEOPOLITICAL DETERRENCE

The huge interest of Western countries and the United States in the Iranian nuclear program is not accidental. It is primarily aimed at geopolitical and military deterrence of Iran in the Middle East region. The imposition of harsh economic sanctions on Iran and constant international interference in its internal affairs have only one goal -a complete stop to Iran's nuclear research. This can be indirectly confirmed by the position of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who stated during his speech in October 2013 at the 68th session of the UN General Assembly in New York that the only diplomatic solution that will work is one that completely destroys Iran's nuclear program.

Netanyahu noted that "this issue will be settled only under the conditions of Iran's complete cessation of uranium enrichment, the removal of all accumulated materials from the country, the closure of the underground enrichment plant near the city of Qom and the refusal to produce plutonium." Israeli leaders have periodically expressed distrust of the peace-loving policies of Iran's newly elected President. Rouhani, calling it a "smoke screen" for continuing the nuclear program and an attempt to weaken the negative effect of sanctions.²⁶

Turkey's current position also seems rather peculiar. Ankara has always been categorically opposed to turning Iran into a nuclear power, as this prospect is fraught with unprecedented growth of Iranian influence in the region and the formation of an explosive situation near the Turkish border. However, a more dangerous scenario seems to be the use of force by Washington or Israel against Iran. An armed resolution of the conflict will turn Turkey into a frontline territory with all the negative consequences that follow from this. In addition, there will inevitably be friction with the United States caused by the withdrawal of military support, similar to what happened during the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the US army. ²⁷

You didn't change the Tour's position-

Russia's nuclear program and the differences that emerged in the wake of the Syrian civil war that broke out in 2011. Despite the fact that the parties have developed different approaches on the Syrian issue-Turkey has actively advocated the overthrow of the political regime in Syria, and Iran has expressed full support for Bashar al - Assad and the road map announced by him-Ankara aims to continue pursuing a preventive policy in resolving the Iranian nuclear dossier. This became especially clear after A. Gul's statement during the meeting with H. Rouhani during the latter's visit to the Turkish capital in June 2014 ²⁸

However, Turkey's role as a mediator is gradually weakening as Iran is increasingly expressing dissatisfaction with Ankara's foreign policy. In particular, Tehran does not agree with the fact that the Turkish government supports opposition forces and calls for regime change in Syria. In addition, some Turkish experts admit that over time, if necessary, Turkey may go to the development of its own nuclear technologies, including for military purposes.

Some analysts attribute the need to acquire their own nuclear weapons to the deployment of the NATO European missile defense system on Turkish territory. In their opinion, the use of this system can force Turkey to think about creating its own nuclear weapons. This is also stated by a number of Turkish politicians, in particular, some opposition lawmakers.²⁹ However, there are other opinions according to which Turkey does not need and will not need to develop its own nuclear arsenal. This opinion is shared, in particular, by specialists of the Center for International Strategic Studies (USAK)³⁰.

Turkey's position on the Iranian nuclear issue has always been unequivocal. The Turkish side has made considerable efforts to solve this problem for many years and has categorically opposed the use of force. At the same time, the overwhelming majority of officials (including the President and Prime Minister) supported the need for a further diplomatic solution to the existing problem. Despite this, Turkey's desire to resolve the issue through preventive diplomacy is not so much due to" lofty " goals, but rather to the pursuit of its own national interests related to the geopolitical containment of Iran, as well as the negative consequences of the wars in Syria and Iraq and the possible loss of an important supplier of hydrocarbons to the Turkish market.

^{Sandikili A.} 1 Iran nukleer krizinin Turkiyeye olasi etkileri (Possible consequences of the nuclear crisis around Iran for Turkey) / / Bilge Adamlar Stratejik Arastirmalar Merkezi. Rapor N 47, 2012. p. 3.

^{Dicle B.} 2 Factors driving Turkish foreign policy. A Thesis // Louisiana State University. The Department of Political Science. December, 2008, p. 41.

^{Saray M.} 3 Turk-Iran iliskileri (Turkish-Iranian relations. Анкара) // Ataturk Arastirma Merkezi. Ankara, 1999, p. 152.

^{Okutan C., Ereker F.} 4 Turk dis politikasinin belirlemesinde "rejim" unsuru (Элемент силы во внешней политике Турции) // Istanbul Ticaret Universitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Yal:4 Sayi:8. Istanbul, 2005, p. 197.

^{Dincerler V.} 5 Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisinde konusmasi (Speech in the Turkish Parliament). 13.04.1995 - http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/ owa/tutanak_g_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=652&P5=T&pagel=3&page2=3

⁶ O gun neler yasamisti? Iste Merve Kavakci olayi! (How was that day lived? An event around Kavakcha!) - http://haber.stargazete. com/politika/o-gun-iieler-yasamisti-iste-merve-kavakci-olayi/haber-802075

^{Ozcan G.} 7 Turkeys changing neighborhood policy // FES Briefing Paper. 09/ 2004, p. 6.

⁸ Iran and Turkey expressed their support for further expansion and development of bilateral cooperation - http://www.iran.ru/rus/ news iran. php?act=news_by_id&news_id=40900

^{Gul A.} 9 Afak Tv Mulakati (Interview with Afak TV channel). 17.11.2008 - http://www.tccb.gov.tr/mulakatlar/360/56350/afak-tv-irak.html

^{Gul A.} 10 Al Arabia Tv Mulakati (Interview with Al-Arabiya TV channel). 13.02.2009 - http://www.tccb.gov.tr/mulakatlar/360/56332/al-arabia-tv.html

¹¹ Iran Cumhurbaskani Istanbul geliyor (President of Iran arrives in Istanbul) - http://www.aygazete.com/aygazete945728

^{Erdogan R.} 12 Ulusa seslenis (Appeal to the Turkish nation). Ekim 2009 - http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Forms/pDetay.aspx

¹³ Basbakan Erdogan Iranda (Prime Minister Erdogan in Iran) - httpV/yenisafak. com. tr/Dunya/?t-28.10.2009&i=219599

^{Ahmadinejad M.} 14 Reis jomhur dar Press TV mosahebe (Interview of the President of Iran Press TV) - http://www.president.ir/fa

¹⁵ Washington uses nuclear issue to pressure Iran -http://www.iran.ru/news/politics/88499/Hamenei_Vashington_ispolzu et_yadernuyu_temu_dlya_davleniya_na_Iran

^{Golovachev V. A.} 16 Iran's nuclear Program - http://www.nmes.ru/?p=3394

^{Kulagina L. M.} 17 Iran today / / Iran after the parliamentary elections (round table 27.04.2004). Collection of articles, Moscow, 2004, pp. 32-33. (Kulagina L. M. 2004. Iran segodnya / / Iran posle parlamentskikh vyborov. M.) (in Russian)

¹⁸ En cok ihracat ve ithalat yapilan 20 ulke (Turkey's 20 most important exporting and importing countries) - http://www.tuik.gov.tr/ PreHaberBultenleri.do?id-16076

^{Svistunova I. A.} 19 Turkey and the problem of Iran's nuclear program - http://www.iimes.ru/?p=10163

^{Gadzhiev A. G.} 20 The reaction of Western countries to the Turkish-Brazilian mediation in solving the Iranian nuclear problem. 2010 -http://www.iimes.ru/7p-10675

^{Elekdag M.} 21 CHP grubu adina konusmasi (Speech on behalf of the Republican People's Party). TVMM. 127'nci Birlesim 1 Temmuz 2010 -http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem23/yil4/bas/bl27m.htm

^{Koritsky A.} 22 Turkey and the Iranian nuclear program -http://www.rusorient.ru/page.php?vrub=rm&vparid=1926&vid=3479

^{Guryev A. A.} 23 The situation in Turkey: January 2011-http://www.iimes.ru/?p=12107

^{Evseev V.} 24 The role of Europe in resolving the Iranian problem -http://www.iran.ru/news/analytics/92116/Rol_Evropy_v_razreshenii_ iranskoy_problemy

²⁵ Iran will not stop its peaceful nuclear program. 04.2014 - http://www.iran.ru/news/politics/93293/Iran_ne_ostanovit_svoyu _mirnuyu_yadernuyu_programmu

²⁶ Israel demands" complete dismantling " of Iran's nuclear program. 10.2013 - http://www.iran.ru/news/politics/90342/Izrail_ trebuet_polnogo_demontazha_yadernoy_programmy_Irana

^{Svistunova I. A.} 27 Decree. op.

²⁸ http://www.tccb.gov.tr/abdullah-gul-konusmalar/371/90251/ iran-cumhurbaskani-sayin-hasan-ruhani-onuruna-verdikleri-resmi-aksam-yemeginde-yaptikla ri-konusma.html

²⁹ Istanbul bagimsiz milletvekili Sirin TVMM de basin toplantisi duzenledi (Independent MP from Istanbul Shirin organized a press conference in the Parliament) - http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/ develop/owa/haber_portal. aciklama?p1-34274

^{Gadzhiev A. G.} Transition from a mediator to a potential rival: Turkey's role in resolving Iran's nuclear problem - http://www.iimes.ru/?p-14613

Permanent link to this publication: