ON SOME ASPECTS OF COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR SOUTHERN NEIGHBOR AND THE YOUNG STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AND RUSSIA

Central Asia (CA) and the Caucasus - two regional systems located in the depths of the Eurasian continent - have recently attracted increasing attention from Turkish politicians, who see these regions as a zone of their diverse interests. At the suggestion of the Turkish media, these two regions are even united into one whole, which they call " Central Eurasia "or even just" Eurasia " - a term that is geographically and politically incorrect, but understandable to everyone and very convenient for the general designation of these two territories.

In the struggle for influence in Central Eurasia, the interests of a number of states, primarily Russia, Turkey and Iran, are clashing. But a certain interest in it is shown primarily by the United States, as well as Germany, France, Great Britain, Israel, China, India, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. However, the interests of Russia, Turkey and Iran clearly prevail, since these states - natural geographical neighbors of Central Eurasia - are particularly interested in stability and security in this region, because the situation in it directly affects the situation in these three states.

The former Soviet Caucasus is of particular strategic importance to Turkey. First, as a kind of "window" to Central Asia, with which Turkey has no common borders. And, secondly, as a region with which the country's energy security is connected. As you know, Turkey has few energy resources of its own, and the vital activity of the entire economy of this country is closely connected with the construction of the Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and its access to the Central Asian market of oil and gas products. This project is a priority for Turkey, as it opens up opportunities for obtaining energy resources from the Transcaspian states not only in the near but also in the long term, ensuring the country's economic growth. Construction of the pipeline, which seems to "skirt" Russia, passing through Azerbaijan and Georgia, began in 2002 and may be completed in 2004.1

Turkey's bilateral military ties with the states of the Caucasus and Central Asia are developing particularly intensively. Turkish intelligence officials have flooded the former Soviet republics from Georgia and Azerbaijan to Uzbekistan. Turkish special forces take part in the training of their counterparts from similar structures in Kazakhstan, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. It is interesting that the issues of Euro-Atlantic partnership with the Central Asian states at the NATO headquarters in Mons, Belgium, are overseen by the Turk Osman Yavuzali2 . All of this is done with the blessing of the United States, which also operates through Ankara to gain access to Central Asian oil and gas.

DON'T MISS YOUR CHANCE!

However, in the complex political game that is unfolding with the participation of Russia, the United States, Turkey, Iran and China, the Central Asian countries feel themselves hostages of the current circumstances. While they are willing to accept Turkey's economic, military, and humanitarian assistance, these states generally reject its political dictates and stop its attempts to impose a "little brother" role in bilateral relations, with the exception of Azerbaijan. Turkey's influence over Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia, which are members of the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty (CSTO), is generally very limited, since Ankara has little to oppose Moscow here. But as far as Azerbaijan, Georgia, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are concerned, Turkey is definitely trying not to miss its chance.

This country wants to expand its influence beyond the Central Eurasian region. Ankara's previous attempts to create a kind of "Turkic Commonwealth" are known, which, in addition to Turkey, would include the Turkic regions of Russia, in particular Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. It was assumed that Azerbaijan and the states of Central Asia (CA) would also become members of the "commonwealth" .3 However, the utopian nature of this project was evident from the very beginning - Turkey failed to make any serious progress towards its implementation. At the time, it was unable to provide the Central Asian States with sufficient financial, economic and political assistance that they expected, which also limited its presence in the region. Turkish claims (though not particularly advertised at the official level) for leadership

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In the region, the ethno-ideological slogans of pan-Turkism also did not find a response in the Central Asian states. Although the hope of turning the country into a business and political crossroads of Asia, Europe and the Middle East still remains in Turkey, the main hope here is pinned on the implementation of projects of the Trans-Caucasus transport corridor, primarily its oil and gas component.

Ankara also has another foreign policy problem that significantly distracts it from solving issues of further penetration into Central Asia and the Caucasus - so far fruitless attempts to join the European Union (EU) 4 . At the same time, Turkey clearly expects to use its influence on the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus as an additional argument for its accession to the EU - after all, through it, this Union will have the opportunity to influence a number of countries. Once again, the" fuel and energy arguments "are crucial: Turkish politicians argue that their country may eventually become the" fuel terminal of Europe", because it is through it that Central Asian oil and gas can transit to European countries .5 However, these arguments do not yet make a proper impression on European politicians.

Many Russian analysts believe that Turkey's desire to get cheap oil and gas from Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states, both for its own interests and "for Europe", is not the main goal of this country. The main thing is the desire to have a geopolitical and strategic advantage over Russia and Iran in this region and, above all, in the Caucasus, to control the trade and transport routes passing through the region, which will ensure undisputed primacy in the region6 . This aspiration of Turkey, which is important, is understood and supported in the United States.

Let us now consider the question of how Turkey "works" in different countries of the region.

PEACEFULNESS IS NOT A WEAKNESS

First of all, let us turn to Russia, which is certainly a full-fledged member of the Caucasus region. There are 10 constituent entities of the Russian Federation located in the Caucasus. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey's relations with Moscow did not develop in the best way: mutual accusations followed one after another. Taking the peace-loving policy of our country as a weakness and considering itself the only authorized representative of the West and NATO in this part of Asia, Ankara launched a campaign of criticism of Russia, which, by the way, although somewhat weakened, continues to this day.

The then head of the Turkish government, Bulent Ejevit, said that Russia "... is unlikely to be able to neutralize Turkey's role in Central Asia " (which Russia did not intend to do). In the same context, its Foreign Minister Ismail Cem said that Ankara intends to "fight" with Moscow for primacy in the region. Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Devlet Bahceli accused our country of destabilizing the situation in Central Asia and the Caucasus. A well-known Turkish scholar of Russian studies, Professor Haki Karimli, who is authoritative in government circles, said:: "Every step forward that Russia has taken in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Black Sea basin is a step backward for Turkey." 7

Russian policy in Central Asia and the Caucasus has taken on an offensive tone since the election of Vladimir Putin as President. This policy of Moscow, however, did not come as a surprise to Ankara, which became clear that hopes for leadership in the region will have to say goodbye. By strengthening cooperation with Iran, Russia has knocked out the "Islamic trump card" from Ankara, and Ankara really has nothing to oppose to the Russian-Iranian tandem. Hence the painful reaction to the current situation in the region and the emotional statements of its statesmen, which are not typical of Ankara in principle. Turkey feared that further strengthening of Russian and, to some extent, Iranian influence in the former Soviet republics of Transcaucasia and Central Asia could lead to the failure of ambitious projects for the construction of the Trans - Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCG) and the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which would mean a complete fiasco of Ankara's regional policy. In this regard, the number of opponents of the Blue Stream project, which provides for the export of Russian gas to the republic, has been growing in Turkey. The director of the Turkish state oil pipeline Company Botash, Hayrettin Uzun, said at the time: "Blue Stream threatens Turkey's geopolitical interests and poses an immediate danger to the Turkic world."

In turn, Moscow has repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with Istanbul's position, especially on the "Chechen issue", in connection with the seizure of the Avrasya ferry and the Svissotel hotel, as well as attempts to hold conferences on Chechnya in Turkey and other provocative actions .8

RUSSIA AS A STRATEGIC ALLY

After the terrorist attacks in New York and the creation of a global anti-terrorist coalition, Turkey's policy towards Russia has changed. In November 2001, Russian and Turkish diplomats agreed to continue bilateral consultations on cooperation in the fight against international terrorism and to work closely on "the economic dimension of Russian-Turkish cooperation in Eurasia." On January 24, 2002, Russian-Turkish consultations on anti-terrorist issues were held in Moscow. The delegations of the two countries, headed by the Acting Director of the Department for New Challenges and Threats, Ambassador-at-Large of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs A.V. Zmeevsky and the Director General of the Department of Analysis and Research of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador J. Duatepe, discussed a wide range of issues related to countering the threat of international terrorism 9 . Contacts of Russian and Turkish politicians

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discussions on this issue continued in the future. On the Turkish side, Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Tuigane, who has repeatedly visited our country, took an active part in the negotiations on this issue .10

On September 11, 2002, an international conference "Prospects for the coexistence of different Civilizations after September 11, 2001" was held in Moscow. Turkish speakers emphasized the closeness of Turkey's and Russia's positions in the Eurasian space, and suggested various forms of rapprochement with Turkey to the Russian leadership in a veiled form. Professor-political scientist I. Ortayli said that Russia and Turkey are the leading powers in the Eurasian space, "mediators" between the West and the East, Europe and Asia. This function was performed initially, from the moment of the emergence of both states, which are equally cultural and political heirs of the Byzantine Empire. In this regard, I. Ortaily subjected Russia's position to "soft criticism", as it, according to the scientist, allows too much mixing of its own culture with the "Protestant"culture. By the latter, the professor meant the cultures and political systems of Western European states (he named France, Germany, and the Netherlands), which negatively affect Russia's policy and hinder the development of traditional good-neighborly relations with Turkey. This is, as emphasized by AND. Ortayly, which separates Russia from the Turkic origins of its culture, leads to the development of "Russian chauvinism", which the political scientist compared to Islamic fundamentalism in terms of its degree of danger. 11

These ideas were developed in his speech by former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey I. Turkman. He stressed that relations between Turkey and Russia "have never been too bad", and now they have improved even more. Russia and Turkey are equal partners in the Eurasian space, and they have no rivals here. But now the United States is actively interfering in Eurasian affairs, which, because of its aggressive position, has distanced itself from the rest of the world" and everywhere considers itself entitled to do business at its own discretion. However, now the situation in the world has changed. US actions in Asia can lead, and in some cases have already led to negative consequences for this country.

I. Turkman offered Russia assistance in solving its problems in Central Asia and the Caucasus. He said that without Turkey, Russia is simply not able to solve them. Moreover, the two countries should cooperate on this issue without regard to the United States, which is present in Central Asia only economically, i.e. with its own money. If we talk about a "real presence", i.e. people, ideas, culture, then only Russia and Turkey have such a presence - they should solve the Caucasian and Central Asian problems on their own, without attracting external helpers.

Turkish Ambassador to Russia Nabi Shensoy said: "Russia and Turkey are two great Eurasian powers, in fact empires; they determine the political weather on the mainland. Their political and economic ties are developing intensively, which is mutually beneficial." Professor N. Oktem continued: "Russian and Turkish cultures are a bridge between the West and the East. Here (in the East) Turkey is the only democratic country in Asia, and the Arab governments are totalitarian regimes. Therefore, Turkey is the only ally of Russia."

Turkish political scientists developed the same ideas later, in particular, at the international conference "The Middle East: Relations with Russia and current Problems of our time", held in Moscow on November 26-28, 2002.12 The report of the head of the delegation of the Turkish University "Yeditepe", Professor K. Kevanc, was particularly striking in this regard. "It should be noted," the professor said, " that of the five-hundred-year relations between Russia and Turkey, the Russo-Turkish wars were fought for only 50 years, and almost always they began under pressure from Western European states, and the remaining 450 years both countries maintained normal relations, conducted mutually beneficial trade, and cooperated in many areas. In fact, it was not Russia and Turkey that were at war as countries and peoples, but the Russian and Ottoman Empires, which were bound by strict relations with the empires of European countries.

Especially warm and diverse relations between Turkey and Russia have developed now, in a new time for the Russian Federation. Hundreds of thousands of Russian tourists and shuttle traders visit Turkey - in 2002, the number reached almost one million 13 . Turkish builders and businessmen successfully conduct business in Moscow; as an example, a large number of construction projects are carried out in the Russian capital by Turkish engineers and workers, 14 as well as the network of Turkish superuniversaries Ramstor , which is popular among Muscovites .15 A few weeks after the end of the "Middle East: Relations with Russia" conference, the construction of the Blue Stream gas pipeline connecting Russia and Turkey was completed; Russia will supply its southern neighbor with 16 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually .16

Professor K. Kevanc stressed that Russia and Turkey also have many common interests in the political sphere. In particular, Turkey and Russia could pursue a coordinated policy in the Caspian region. Turkey could cooperate more successfully with the Turkic - speaking countries of Central Asia-Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan-but Turkish penetration there is impossible without the participation of Russia and Iran. So far, Iran is countering such penetration, and the current friendship between Russia and Iran, alas, contributes to this... 17

Thus, it should be noted with satisfaction that in recent years, Turkey's policy towards Russia has changed in a positive direction. The initial euphoria caused by hopes for the complete collapse of Russia, attempts to create a pan-Turkic union from Turkey to Yakutia, as well as the desire to subdue all the countries and peoples of the Turkic-speaking world have passed. Ankara has become more realistic

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It has not yet given up trying to become the sole leader in the south of the former Soviet Union and in the Turkic regions of Russia. The process of mutual integration of the two countries ' economies has been going on for several years and is gradually gaining momentum. As Russian President Vladimir Putin noted during the visit of Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul to Moscow in February 2004, " the official trade turnover between the Russian Federation and Turkey is growing by 15-20% annually and now amounts to about $ 6.5 billion." "the total volume of our trade will approach about $ 12 billion." He stressed that " Russia consistently ranks second in Turkey's trade turnover after Germany." In addition to trade, other areas of Russian-Turkish business relations are developing intensively. The most significant of them are projects in the areas of military-technical cooperation and the fuel and energy complex. According to observers, A. Gul's visit will help bring relations between the two countries to a new stage of development.

It is probably premature to name specific regions of Russia in which Turkish businessmen intend to make large investments before signing official agreements, but it can be pointed out that the" investment belt "stretches from the far north to the far south, and traditional" Turkic "regions do not play the"first fiddle" in these projects. Turkish entrepreneurs constantly and persistently raise the question of the need for legislative measures to protect foreign investment in Russia. There is every reason to hope that the development and implementation of such measures is a matter of the near future.

THE MAIN ALLY IS AZERBAIJAN

Turkey's most solid and consistent ally in the Caucasus is, of course, Azerbaijan. The main "headache" of this country is the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh and, as a result, a tough confrontation with Armenia. To counter Yerevan, Baku is trying to form a strategic alliance with Turkey and Georgia. For this purpose, the Azerbaijani leadership deliberately seeks to impose a Turkish identity on the people. The direct proposal to join Azerbaijan to Turkey was first voiced by the State Adviser to the President of Azerbaijan on foreign policy Issues V. Guluzade, which could not but sound like an official opinion of the country's leadership. According to the authors of the proposal, it is necessary to do this in order to protect yourself from Russia. From time to time, there are high-level conversations in Azerbaijan about the need to conclude a military treaty with Turkey, as well as about the creation of a NATO or US military base on the territory of Azerbaijan. In 2001, impressive - scale Turkish-Azerbaijani maneuvers took place, aimed at Tehran, with which Baku cannot share the Caspian Sea, as well as at Yerevan, an eternal opponent of Baku .18

Ankara initially intended to build rapprochement with Azerbaijan at the expense of deteriorating relations with Moscow, but this path was soon recognized as unpromising. After all, the deterioration of relations with the great northern neighbor would certainly complicate the economic situation in Turkey, and it is possible that this would lead to a reduction in Ankara's assistance to Azerbaijan, which neither the leadership of this republic nor Turkey, which continues to rely on strengthening a comprehensive alliance with this country, are interested in.

However, this union is far from developing cloudlessly. Thus, Azerbaijan had very high hopes for the development of a large gas field in the Caspian Sea, Shah Deniz, with gas reserves of 1 trillion cubic meters, and it expected that the main financial and organizational burden would be borne by "fraternal Turkey". However, the " Turkic unity "did not work in this case due to the economic dubiousness of the project. The estimated cost of developing the field is growing, and the Turkish company Botas does not guarantee that gas will be exported at the stipulated prices .19 The economic situation in Turkey itself is not very good right now, and it is possible that Turkey will postpone the "patronage" of Azerbaijani gas until better times. And although Baku is making a lot of efforts to save the project, the shareholders are already leaving it 20 . The Azerbaijani authorities go out of their way to prove to the Turks their technical and economic competence and ability to prepare a project for the development of the field and the field itself to the point where it can be invested in it. But so far, they are not doing very well, although the progress of work on this project, including the timing of the start of gas supplies to Turkey, was repeatedly discussed at meetings with the late President of the country, Heydar Aliyev .21

"THORN" OF NAGORNO-KARABAKH IN THE "TURKISH EYE"

Turkey's relations with Armenia are developing differently. The two countries have not had diplomatic relations for about 10 years, and the border between them is closed . 22 Turkey and Azerbaijan are pursuing a policy of complete blockade of Armenia. Even after the latter joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) on September 6, 2003,23 Turkey continued its blockade, which it officially notified the Organization of 24 . This clearly abnormal situation is based on two problems: the well-known Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire in 1915 and the situation with Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey has closed its border with Armenia, thereby expressing support for Azerbaijan, 20% of whose territory is occupied by armed groups of ethnic Armenians - the Army of Nagorno-Karabakh .25 In addition, Turkey is afraid of territorial claims from Armenia and considers Armenia as a state that has committed illegal actions against it and the Turkish people. In the Turkish version (supported by a number of European researchers), during the First World War, Armenian separatists massacred Turks-men, women, and children.

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The Turkish government has taken measures to deport 26 Armenians .

In a word, we are talking about an old and extremely painful conflict. The fact that the three - hundred-kilometer Turkish-Armenian border is guarded by Russian border guards, and a Russian military base is located in Armenia itself, in Gyumri, adds to its sharpness. 27 Turkey has a negative attitude to this, although, according to the Armenian side, there is no threat to Turkey from the presence of Russian military personnel in the neighboring country28 . According to the President of the Republic of Armenia (RA) R. Kocharyan, "... Russia's presence in Armenia and the Caucasus in general is a stabilizing factor in the region and a serious element of security. " 29

Since the mid-1990s, Armenia has been actively developing cooperation with countries that are Turkey's historical rivals, such as Syria and Greece. Yerevan's foreign policy, which is associated with the name of Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanian, is aimed at forming an Armenian "center of power" 30 . Raffi Hovhannisyan, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia and now Founding Director of the Yerevan Center for Strategic and National Studies, believes that Armenia currently plays the role of a factor of regional balance between Russia and Turkey. Taking into account the growing relations with Russia and Western countries, Armenia is able to influence the preservation of stability in the region.

The settlement of relations between Armenia and Turkey is impossible without resolving the problem of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR). Turkey, of course, unequivocally and categorically supports Azerbaijan in this issue, which does not agree to a different solution to this issue than the return of the rebel enclave to the Azerbaijani state. 31 The leaders of the unrecognized Armenian state are no less persistent in defending their position. "Nagorno-Karabakh is a self-sufficient state and does not need confirmation of its existence from third countries," one of the advisers to the Foreign Minister of Nagorno - Karabakh recently said. "The Karabakh army has proved the viability of its state with weapons in its hands and, if necessary, will be able to do so again." 32 According to him, despite the high birth rate in Azerbaijan and the large migration of ethnic Armenians from the region, the mobilization resources of the Armenian side are higher than the Azerbaijani side. In the event of a military conflict, the Karabakh army (obviously not without the support of Armenia) will easily be able to repel the attacks of the Azerbaijani armed forces .33

Can Turkey take the side of Azerbaijan in the event of a conflict between it and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh? Now this is absolutely impossible, because in this case it will have to put an end to its intentions to join the EU. In addition, Turkey's direct intervention in Karabakh affairs will inevitably force Russia to take adequate measures, which Turkey simply cannot decide on.

Due to the unsettled relations, Armenia and Turkey maintain diplomatic contacts through the embassies of third countries, mainly through France, the United States and Russia. At the same time, Yerevan does not exclude the possibility of direct cooperation with Turkey under certain conditions. Armenia has repeatedly thrown all sorts of "test balls" at Turkey in this regard. Here is what, for example, the Armenian Defense Minister S. Sargsyan said recently: "Suppose, God forbid, an armed unit of bandits and terrorists who pose a threat to both Armenia and Turkey will appear in our region. Do you think we will not cooperate with Turkey? I, for example, will be very happy to cooperate." Both Russian diplomacy and the Council of Europe have repeatedly tried to" reconcile " Armenia and Turkey. So far, these efforts have yielded no results ... 34

A fierce information and propaganda war continues between the two countries.

Here is one of the episodes of this war: the Armenian newspaper "Noah's Ark" published a map of "Historical Armenia", which, in addition to Armenia itself, includes all of Azerbaijan, part of Georgia, a significant part of eastern and southeastern Turkey and Kurdistan. In general, today's landlocked Armenia would have access to three seas at once: the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea .35 Naive, but true.

Is it appropriate to say that such actions do not contribute either to the" reconciliation " of Armenia with its neighbors, or to the strengthening of peace, tranquility and security in the region?..

TO GEORGIA- "QUIET SAPA"

Turkey builds its policy in Georgia on the basis of the Georgian-Russian contradictions. In its policy towards Georgia, Ankara openly focuses on ousting Russia and the Armenian population from the country and strengthening Azerbaijani influence in it. Here it relies on the support of Azerbaijanis living compactly in six districts of the republic. The share of Azerbaijanis in the population of Georgia is estimated at 5.7%, i.e. it is a fairly large diaspora .36

Turkish politicians had a rather cool attitude towards the Shevardnadze regime. As you know, the former leader of the country did not care much about Russia, especially in connection with the position of the Russian Federation in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, and repeatedly proposed to replace Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia with units of the armies of other countries - the United States, Ukraine, and Turkey. They, according to Shevardnadze, could solve the problem of returning Georgian refugees to Abkhazia and force Sukhumi to be more accommodating .37 However, the leadership of Turkey (as well as other countries) did not express a desire to provide its troops to protect Georgian interests. 38

Turkey carries out its expansion into Georgia "quietly". The number of Turks in the republic reaches many thousands of people, and they occupy prominent positions in business, service, and education.-

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research institutes. According to reliable sources, most canteens and restaurants along the entire highway leading from Turkey to Tbilisi are owned by Turks, although their nominal owners are Georgians. Most billboards in Tbilisi and other places in Georgia are "products" of Turkish advertising firms. Portraits of Kemal Ataturk hang in the windows of many shops in the center of Tbilisi 39 . Turkish fishing seiners freely conduct illegal fishing in the territorial waters of Georgia, and the authorities ignore this 40 .

Turkish youth also study at English and French colleges opened in Georgia. There are also Turkish colleges themselves. Not all of them are legally open. New Turkish colleges are also being built. It is also planned to open a Turkish university in Georgia. Many ethnic Turks are accepted into paid faculties and departments of Tbilisi State University with direct financial support from Ankara. For wealthy Turkish students, expensive apartments are rented or bought so that they can later become firmly established in the country .41 The Turkish authorities conduct active propaganda activities in the country, paying, among other things, black ingratitude to Georgians for their trustfulness and hospitality: recently in Turkey," at the suggestion " of the Ministry of Education of the country, they stopped recognizing Georgian higher education diplomas .42

A number of political parties and factions of the former Georgian parliament, rightly unwilling to excessively increase Turkish influence in the country, expressed their concerns .43 However, it is not known that the authorities have taken any action in connection with these protests.

"MAGNETISM" OF KAZAKH OIL

Turkey's interests in Kazakhstan are based on two circumstances. First, it is based on the presence of large oil reserves in the country, which Turkey has "set its eyes on", that is, it expects to buy it on favorable terms over time. And, secondly, on an attractive investment climate and fairly tolerable conditions for foreign capital investments in the country's economy. It is also important that in the early 1990s, Turkey was the first country to recognize Kazakhstan as an independent state and establish diplomatic ties with it. 44 Since then, Turkey has made significant investments in Kazakhstan, but considers this volume insufficient .45

Both sides are not satisfied with the volume of mutual trade, which is growing very rapidly. In 2000, it amounted to about $ 210 million, in 2002-about $ 300 million, 46 but the leaders of the two countries stated that it should have reached the level of at least $ 500 million long ago. 47 There are at least 300 joint Kazakh-Turkish enterprises operating in the country48 . Turkey ranks fifth in the list of Kazakhstan's investor countries 49 . Turkish entrepreneurs are actively developing the oil-producing industry, banking and construction sectors, as well as the service and telecommunications sectors .50

However, the two countries are linked not only by economic interests. Turkey has expressed its desire to help Kazakhstan train its army specialists .51 It is known that Ankara has sent its proposals to the Kazakh leadership in this regard, but it is not known whether they are being implemented. In 2001, Turkey promised to provide Kazakhstan with major military assistance, but it did not fulfill its promises, and Kazakhstan did not receive the full amount of these funds .52

"SLUGGISH UNION" WITH UZBEKISTAN

From the very beginning, the newly established cooperation between Turkey and Uzbekistan was overshadowed by the events of Ferghana in 1989, when tens of thousands of Meskhetian Turks and Azerbaijanis, despite the protests of the world community, became victims of attacks by Uzbek extremists and were deported to other countries, mainly to Russia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan53 . However, the grievances of the Turkish side were forgotten quite quickly: the head of the young state, Islam Karimov, did not focus on Russia for long and rather by inertia for some time, and then abruptly tried to" reorient " to the Islamic world, primarily to Turkey and the Arab states.

The two countries established diplomatic relations in April 1992.54 From then until 1998, Turkish firms, along with Pakistani and Arab firms, received large preferences in Uzbekistan .55 The Turks focused mainly on the development of light industry enterprises, organized the production of sheepskin coats, leather jackets, fabrics, packaging materials, polyethylene film, and food products .56 In November 1997, President Islam Karimov visited Turkey, where important intergovernmental agreements were signed .57 The well-off part of Uzbek students went to Turkey to study 58 . Employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, special services, prosecutor's offices, Uzbek diplomats, and army officers were trained and retrained in Turkey .59

In February 1998, Tashkent was rocked by terrorist attacks blamed on some Turkish politicians and security services .60 As a result, the activities of recently thriving Turkish, as well as Pakistani and Afghan firms, began to curtail 61 . Despite intensive political contacts at the highest level - in 1998-2000, Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz, former President Suleiman Demirel and the new president Ahmet Nezhet Sezer visited Uzbekistan, and Uzbek President Islam Karimov visited Turkey62 - Uzbek-Turkish relations did not develop economically , 63 and the country's former president, Suleiman Demirel, visited Turkey. the agreements concluded mainly concerned military and political issues .64 It soon became clear that in the ten years from 1992 to 2001, Turkish investment in Uzbekistan's economy was much lower than in Kazakhstan. The situation has changed little since then. Of the significant shares, we can only mention the dogo-

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agreements on combating international terrorism reached during the visit of the then Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem to Uzbekistan 65 .

Today, economic relations between Uzbekistan and Turkey are developing sluggishly. Among the major interstate projects, we can only mention the creation of a transport corridor from Uzbekistan to Turkey on the Termez (Uzbekistan) - Dogharun (Afghanistan) section 66 . Now cargo from Uzbekistan can be transported to Turkey and Iran via Afghanistan, bypassing Turkmenistan and Russia. Turkish firms are interested in exporting cheap Uzbek tractors from Uzbekistan, for example, which are in demand both in Turkey and in neighboring cotton-growing countries. It is planned that the Turkish trading house will participate in the development of exports of this and other Uzbek agricultural machinery. However, transportation of Uzbek tractors to Turkey by heavy-duty vehicles is quite expensive - 2 thousand dollars for every three tractors loaded into the trailer. Therefore, it is planned to arrange additional assembly of tractors in Turkey itself, which will reduce transport costs by about half. To implement these tasks, a joint venture Promindustriz was established in Turkey with Uzbekistan .67

Turkish entrepreneurs are developing their traditional hotel business in Uzbekistan. The national company Uzbektourism and the Turkish firm Emsash have agreed to establish a joint venture Chorsu Hotel. A similar joint venture was also created on the basis of the Dustlik Hotel 68 . At the same time, Turkish partners provide reconstruction and re-equipment of hotels built in the Soviet era, while the Uzbek side contributes directly to the hotel buildings and adjacent land plots.

Opposition from local authorities and corruption prevent Turkish entrepreneurs from implementing large-scale projects in Uzbekistan; recently, they have been trying to open mainly small and medium-sized businesses here, whose turnover is low. Thus, with the country's urgent need for plastic pipes for irrigation of fields, only one relatively small Uzbek-Turkish joint venture "John Plast" was opened in the republic, and even then most of its products go to Russia and Uzbekistan .69 The head of a Turkish construction company in a private conversation with the author of this article noted with regret that after the events of 1998, the authorities of the republic see the Turks as potential enemies and in every possible way hinder the development of their business. Another Turkish businessman claimed that the Uzbek partners "are all scammers." According to him, the usual practice of such partners of any level is to promise "golden mountains", get investments and bribes, and then "throw"...

Unlike the economic ones, Uzbek-Turkish relations in the military and military-political fields are developing quite steadily, although not without problems. In recent years, President Karimov has met with the leadership of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces on several occasions. During the meetings, issues related to the state and prospects of military and military-technical relations between Uzbekistan and Turkey, as well as regional security issues were discussed .70 Since 2002, in accordance with the signed treaty, Turkey has provided Uzbekistan with gratuitous military assistance .71 As a "humanitarian aid", the Uzbek army receives NATO-style camouflage uniforms from Turkey .72 However, contacts between the military of the two countries noticeably weakened, and relations cooled after in May 2001, Uzbek special services allegedly offered a group of Chechens for $ 1 million to kill the leader of the opposition Erk party hiding in Turkey, Muhammad Salih (real name-Salai Mamadinov), who collected 12.45% of the vote in the 1991 presidential election. Moreover, the Chechens were paid $ 135 thousand in advance. 73 Turks were allegedly extremely outraged by the attempt of the Uzbek special services to organize a terrorist attack in their country. However, the cool relations did not last long: already in 2002, Uzbek media reported that Turkey had begun to assist Uzbekistan in training special forces to fight terrorists .74

Currently, the annual trade turnover between the two countries is approximately $ 320 million. 75 Despite the ongoing political differences, Turkey still remains one of the main investors in the Uzbek economy, along with the United States, Great Britain, Germany, the Republic of Korea, China, Russia, and Ukraine. 245 Uzbek-Turkish joint ventures have been established in Uzbekistan, and 35 Turkish companies operate there .76 Among the next rather large projects - the creation of enterprises for drying and packaging peanuts, the production of vegetable oil 77 . However, the authorities strongly do not allow Turkish entrepreneurs to participate in the development of the country's fuel and energy complex. In 2002, several Turkish entrepreneurs were arrested by Uzbek security services on charges of illegal entrepreneurship in the fuel and energy sector.

In general, there is a certain tension in the business sphere between the two countries, mainly due to the fact that both countries claim leadership in the "Turkic world". At one time, many Turkish entrepreneurs, due to the uncertainty of their situation, were generally going to curtail their economic presence in Uzbekistan and "relocate" to Russia and Kazakhstan. At the unofficial level, the intention to oust the Turks from the country is almost not hidden. But officially, the Uzbek government says that it does not refuse to cooperate with Turkey.

In order to stay in the Uzbek markets, Turkish businessmen have recently begun to use a new tactic: to create joint ventures with the participation of a third party, with the participation of entrepreneurs from countries that are in favor of I. Karimov - the United States, Japan, and Western Europe. So, on the basis of the Bagat Textile Mill, a joint venture was organized, among the co-founders of which is a Turkish company

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Sesli and Japan's Marubeni Corporation. The loan for the new enterprise in the amount of $ 11 million was provided by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation. In addition to the Turkish companies Hantextil and Sunmaz, the American company BRI and the Swiss companies MPS and Toldstex78 are co-founders of several new joint ventures based on Surkhantextil JSC .

"FOOTHOLD OF PENETRATION" IN CENTRAL ASIA

Turkey's relations with Kyrgyzstan are developing quite successfully. This is partly due to the fact that both countries are somewhat strained relations with the most powerful state in the region - Uzbekistan. Turkey is one of the largest creditors of the Kyrgyz economy. Mostly Turkish money is invested in objects where you can get a quick return - hotels, cafes, shops, tourism 79 . However, the Kyrgyz side is not satisfied with the volume of Turkish investments in the country's economy . Turkish businessmen are wary of investing large amounts of money here, firstly, because of the political instability in the country and, secondly, because of the threat of attacks by groups of Islamic extremist movements and parties from the south of the country .

Turkish-Kyrgyz relations received a new impetus after the deployment of NATO military contingents in Central Asia, after which Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev began to feel much more confident in the international arena .82 In February 2002, he paid an official visit to the Republic of Turkey, during which he repeatedly noted that since the first days of gaining independence, Kyrgyzstan has given priority to maintaining and deepening comprehensive relations with Turkey .83 This statement was further supported by a number of diplomatic events that were intended to emphasize the historical and cultural closeness of both countries. So, in April 2002, a presentation of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's book "Nutuk", published in Turkey in the Kyrgyz language, was held in Bishkek. As a

President of the Kyrgyz Republic A. Akayev and State Minister of the Republic of Turkey Resh Dogru attended the presentation. In June of the same year, at the Manas airport, A. Akayev met with Turkish President A. Sezer, who made a short stop on his way to Mongolia. Soon after, the foundation stone and capsules with a message to posterity in Kyrgyz and Turkish were laid under the foundation of the future campus of the Kyrgyz-Turkish University "Manas"; the ceremony was attended by President A. Akayev and State Minister of Turkey R. Dogru.

The results of these meetings and events were immediately reflected: Turkey began to change its investment policy in Kyrgyzstan. Turkish businessmen began to invest in production facilities, take on the construction of not only hotels, shops, cafes, but also factories for processing agricultural products, livestock complexes .84 With the active participation of Turkish companies, the Bishkek - Osh 85 road, which is vital for the country, is being reconstructed . Shortly after A. Sezer's visit to Kyrgyzstan, a representative delegation of a large company Impash-Holding arrived in the republic and offered to invest $ 100 million in the construction of a large shopping center, a hotel and a livestock complex .86

"CORDIAL RELATIONS" DO NOT EXCLUDE QUARRELS AND SCANDALS

Of all the Central Asian states, Turkey has the most cordial relations with Turkmenistan. The trade turnover between these countries is approaching $ 0.5 billion a year87, and the share of Turkish capital in the economy of the republic reaches about $ 4 billion 88 There are about 400 Turkish firms and companies operating in the country, more than 15 thousand Turkish entrepreneurs work 89 . They occupy a dominant position in the construction, pharmaceutical, and processing industries and have effectively "captured" the textile industry, controlling 90% of enterprises and 90% of jobs . Turkish businessmen are granted unprecedented privileges in taxation, granting loans, renting real estate, etc. 91 Thousand Turks receive Turkmen passports 92 . According to Niyazov's decrees, many Turkish citizens are appointed to high state posts, up to deputy ministers .93 The Ambassador of Turkmenistan to the United States for a long time was a citizen of Turkey, Khalil Ugur 94 .

Close cooperation has been established between the military departments and special services of both countries, and training of personnel of the Turkmen army in many military specialties is being conducted in Turkey. The senior and middle-level leadership of Turkmenistan's security agencies has been trained and retrained almost entirely in Turkish military centers. According to the Turkish model, the Turkmen militia was reorganized 95 .

However, Turkmen-Turkish relations are not entirely cloudless, and from time to time all sorts of excesses and complications arise in them. Back in December 1997, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between Turkmenistan and Turkey on the construction of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCG), which is extremely important for Turkey. 96 However, not all the necessary formalities were completed before the start of construction, and the project was frozen at the initiative of the Turkmen side, which naturally causes Turkey's extreme displeasure .97 In early 2002, a Turkmen airliner flying from Istanbul to Ashgabat was detained at Istanbul airport; the decision to seize Turkmen state property was issued by the Turkish judicial authorities .98 Even earlier, the accounts of the Turkmen Embassy in Ankara and the consulate in Istanbul were frozen .99 In early 2003, the Turkmenbashi regime effectively accused Turkey of complicity in the terrorist attack on the Turkmen president's motorcade; it was announced that 6 of the nearly 60 people arrested in this case were Turkish. 100 However, a few days later, Turkmenbashi came to his senses, and the arrested ... -

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ki were released, and then they were allowed to return to their homeland altogether. According to some media outlets, this decision was made at the request of R. Erdogan, who visited Turkmenistan 101 these days .

Erdogan's visit was largely connected with negotiations on the possible supply of Turkmen electricity to Turkey .102 Turkmenistan is an energy-surplus state, which not only provides itself with electricity, but can also send a significant part of it for export. Iran is considered an important export destination here, and in the future - Turkey. The Turkmen-Iranian "energy bridge" -power transmission line-400 Balkanabad-Ali-Abad has already been built. Further, the transmission line should extend to Turkey and Armenia, about which preliminary negotiations have already been held 103 .

SO FAR, ONLY GENERAL WORDS...

But in Tajikistan, Turkey's interests are extremely limited, as this country is closely linked to Russia and is strongly influenced by Iran, which significantly narrows the possibilities of Turkish diplomacy. At rare meetings between the leaders of the two countries, both sides limit themselves to low - binding general political statements, for example, about "commitment to democracy" or "joint fight against terrorism", but as a rule, they do not talk about the development of trade and economic relations. Thus, during a meeting in November 2002 with the head of Tajikistan, Turkish President Ahmed Necet Sezer stated that " ... there can be no place for the Taliban in the future government of Afghanistan." In response, Emomali Rakhmonov said that he fully shares this point of view .104

THERE ARE PROBLEMS, BUT THEY ARE SOLVABLE

Summing up, it can be argued that Turkey's activities in the post-Soviet space created many problems for the Russian Federation and, in any case, did not contribute to improving relations between our country and most of the young states of the Caucasus and Central Asia.

A few years ago, the Islamist Welfare Party, led by then-Prime Minister Erbakan, received $ 70 million in voluntary donations from foreign Caucasian communities from Saudi funds and raised $ 15 million in Turkey itself for Chechnya, but only $ 15 million reached the addressee, and the rest disappeared. Some time later, the same thing was repeated with $ 10 million received from Libya - only $ 2 million of this amount was received in Chechnya. The investigation, however, revealed that this money did not settle with either Erbakan or the Welfare Party. They were paid to some leaders of Chechen groups to prevent the pumping of Azerbaijani oil through Chechnya to Russia. Chechen envoys periodically visit Ankara to receive regular "charity tranches" of money spent on the purchase of weapons and the commission of terrorist acts in our country .105 There were arrests and detentions in Russia of Turkish citizens who were exposed as intelligence agents.

Turkey spends a lot of money on the deployment of Turkish schools and cultural centers throughout Russia, and not always with good intentions. For example, in May 2001, in Rostov-on-Don, the activity of such a center was suspended, as local counterintelligence officers found out that its visitors were studying the ideas of the radical Islamic organization Nurjular, which advocates the creation of a single Turkic state - Great Turan, whose borders should include several regions of Southern Russia. One of the leaders of this center, a Turkish citizen Adyrmaz Nejati, who, according to the FSB, collected information for Turkish and other foreign intelligence services, was expelled from Russia .106

Of course, neighbors are not chosen, and Turkey is our long-standing natural southern neighbor, whose good relations should be cherished, and these relations should be strengthened and developed. The geographical position of our countries and the natural interests of our states in the neighboring CIS countries create both a complex of contradictions and opportunities for cooperation.

1 "Kazakhstan Today", 13.12.2003.

2 " Hulk suzi "(Tashkent) N 24, 01.02.2002.

3 See: Nezavisimaya Gazeta from 21.01.2000 and 08.04.2000; also: Kireev N. G. Turkey-the way to Europe or return to Central Asia? // East. 1996. N 5, pp. 62-68/ S. Olimova, M. Olimov. Influence of the anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan on the neighboring countries of Central Asia / / "Central Asia and the Caucasus" (CaiC) N 4 (22), 2002, p.48.

4 Turkey between Europe and Asia. Results of Europeanization at the end of the XX century. Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Kraft+, 2001, pp. 429-430.

Katic M. 5 Despite the risk, the construction of the Ba - ku-Ceyhan pipeline continues. 02.XII.2003(c) Eurasianet

Akimbekov S. 6 Our older brother is from Istanbul. "Continent", 28.11.2002.

7. Jilavyan A. 7" Golubiy potok " pod menace derzhda [The Blue Stream under threat of disruption]. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 02.06.2000.

J. 8 Chechen issue complicates Turkish-Russian relations/ / Eurasianet, 08.11.2002.

9 Information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

10 Press release of the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in the Russian Federation dated 25.01.2001.

11 Transcript of the scientific conference in the Central Library named after V. I. Lenin (from the author's archive).

12 Transcript of the scientific conference at MGIMO (from the author's archive).

13 Kommersant, 15.01.03; Kommersant, 03.02.2003.

14 Reference from the Russian Foreign Ministry (from the author's archive).

15 Transcript of the MGIMO conference (from the author's archive).

16 "Promotion", No. 3 (9), 23.01.1999.

17 "Echo" No. 241, 20.12.2003.

18 The Armenians are marching east //"Vremya novostei " //GazetaSNG.ru, 29.08.2001.

19 Turkey demands to reduce the price of Russian gas flowing through the Blue Stream/ / OLO.RU, 17.4.2003.

20 Uzbekistan cannot connect to the Baku-Erzurum gas pipeline / / MEDIA-PRESS, 03.10.2003.

21 Loans for further construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline will be granted in January. If given... / / Kazakhstan today, 13.12.2003.

Khachatryan A. 22 Ankara's peace proposals raise hopes and create problems for Armenia / / Eurasianet, 25. VI. 2003.

Yerkanyan. 23 Armenia is ahead of Russia / / TKS.RU, 11.12.2002.

24 Voice of Armenia, N12, December 2002.

Araz V., Karakash-Kelesh X. 25 Armenian-Turkish relations: a critical analysis / / CaiC N4(22), pp. 124-127. In contrast to the previous one-

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According to these figures, experts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nagorno-Karabakh say that 8% of the territory of Azerbaijan is under the control of the NKR army. Dartmouth Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh and prospects for conflict Resolution// Garabagh Courier, N7, August-September 2003, pp. 6-7.

Hocaoglu M. 26 Arsiv Vesikalanila Tarihte Ermeni Mezalimi ve Ermeniler. Istanbul: Anda, 1976. P. 654 - 646.

E. Baykova 27 Armenian march throw. Sergey Ivanov seeks permanent residence permit in Gyumri for the Russian Army / / Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 17.11.2003. Korotchenko I., Khodarenok M., Useynov A. Spies are yours, bases are ours. // Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 24.12.2002.

28 R. Kocheryan's interview with the TV program "Mirror" / / Archive rtr-zerkalo.ru, 18.01.2003.

29 Message from RIA-Novosti, 05.02.03.

Hovhannisyan R. 30 Armenia as a factor of regional equilibrium/ / Central Asia-Caucasus analyst, 2001.

31 Statement of the NKR MFA / / "Karabakh Courier" N1 (8), 2004.

32 From the author's personal conversation with an expert.

33 This opinion is confirmed by the conclusions of A. Arsenyev. See: A large-scale war in the South Caucasus is unlikely / / "Karabakh Courier", N7, pp. 16-17.

Araz B., Karakash-Kelesh H. 34 Decree. soch., p. 129; Gorvett J. Turkey and Armenia are considering the possibility of restoring friendly relations / / Eurasianet, 17.7.2003.

35 "Noah's Ark", December 2002.

Brzezinski Z. 36 Grand chessboard. American Domination and its Geostrategic Imperatives, Moscow, 1998, p. 153.

Katic M. 37 Will Turkey accept the strategic challenge posed by the situation in Georgia? // Eurasianet, 11.12.2003; A. Leonov. Turkish trace of the Georgian Corridor/ / Russian Business Bulletin, May 2002.

Muradyan I. 38 Military presence of Turkey in the South Caucasus and Central Asia / / Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh), with reference to CENTRAL ASIA-CAUCASUS ANALYST - A Publication of the P.Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, DC, 29. 2003, ISSUE 3 By Ariel Cohen.

39 "Turkey seizes Georgia without weapons" - Voice of Armenia, N12, December 2002.

40 "Noah's Ark", December 2002.

41 "Turkey seizes Georgia without weapons" - Voice of Armenia, N12, December 2002.

42 "Noah's Ark", December 2002.

43 "Turkey seizes Georgia without weapons" - Voice of Armenia, N12, December 2002.

44 Press conference of the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Turkey Mr. Kurtulush Tashkent. Press release dated March 3, 1999

45 "Kazinform", 12.01.03.

46 "Kazakhstan Today", 22.06.2003.

47 Erdogan in Kazakhstan // Interfax, 11.01.2003.

48 "Kazinform", 12.01.03.

49 "Kazakhstan Today", 21.03.2002.

50 On the US long-term strategy in the Caspian region and practical steps to implement it. Analytical report / / "Journal of Theory and Practice of Eurasianism", N22.

Belova E. 51 Kazakhstan-Turkey: the scale of military cooperation is expanding // Warrior of Kazakhstan, Almaty, 21.03.2002, pp. 1-2.

R. McDermott 52 Crisis of the Armed forces of Kazakhstan. - CaiC, N4 (22), 2002, p. 87.

53 Interview with Fuad Pepinov, Deputy Chairman of the International Society of Meskhetian Turks "Vatan "//" Russian Thought", Paris, N 4343, 30.11.2000.

54 Republic of Uzbekistan. One hundred questions and answers / / Tashkent, 1998 p. 158-167.

Katic M. 55 Turkey: the ruling party hopes for the development of trade with the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus / / Eurasianet, 26. II. 2003.

56 According to Uzbek media reports.

57 Official message of the press service of the President of Uzbekistan / / InfoCentre OPRUz. Tashkent.

Gibelgaus L. 58 "Religion of peace and good" or the ideology of extremists?// German Wave, 23.04.2003.

Taksonov A. 59 Turkish aid to the Uzbek military. Center - Asia. 19.12.2003.

Fang S. 60 B. "Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan": chronicle of crimes.

Shekhar A. 61 On the joint press conference of I. Karimov and R. Erdogan (details) / / Centraziya, 20.12.2003.

62 Official message of the press service of the President of Uzbekistan-TaHa/ / InfoCentre OPRUz. Tashkent.

63 Pravda Vostoka, N53, 19.03.02.

64 "Vremya i my", N13 (74), 2.11.01; Yuldashev M. Interview of Turkish political scientist, Professor Aydin Mustafa.<url>, 18.12.2003.

65 Official message of the press service of the President of Uzbekistan / / InfoCentre OPRUz. Tashkent.

66 "Uzbekistan will get access to the North-South corridor through Afghanistan" / / IRNA, 19.01.2003.

67 "Uzbek investments came to Turkey in the form of a tractor" / / Business Bulletin of Uzbekistan, 16.01.03.

68 "News of Uzbekistan", 17.01.03.

69 "Business Bulletin of Uzbekistan", 16.01.03.

70 Pravda Vostoka, N53, 19.03.02.

Taksanov A. 71 Turkish aid to the Uzbek military / / Center-Asia, 19.12.2003.

72 According to independent observers in Uzbekistan.

73 A ruthless neighbor. Dossier on the special services of Uzbekistan//A joint project of Versii and Agentury.<url>", "Version", 05.08.2002.

74 "Evening Tashkent" N145, 11.12.02.

Zhukov T. 75 The "cold snap" between Turkey and Uzbekistan has ended. Zamon.info 18.12.2003.

76 Ibid.

77 "Vremya i us" N3, 18.01.02.

78 According to independent observers in Uzbekistan.

79 "Time and we", N4, 24.01.03.

80 Turks want to invest in the construction of 5-star hotels in Issyk-Kul/ / AKHpress, 02.06.2004.

81 Message from the Press service of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic dated 21.02.2002.

Bogatyrev A. 82 Yuzhny rubezh, Krasnaya Zvezda, 05.12.2002.

83 "Time and we", N2, 11.01.02, with reference to the newspaper "USA Today".

84 Message from the Press service of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic dated 20.02.2002.

85 The Union of Chambers of Commerce and Stock Exchanges of Turkey will send up to five hundred Turkish companies to Kyrgyzstan / / Centran, May 15, 2003.

Turdalieva T. 86 Construction of the China - Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway is planned for 2005 Kyrgyz News Agency " Ka6ap&q, 26.02.2003.

87 Meanwhile, Impash Holding, a company operating in Kyrgyzstan, was included in the list of 33 firms suspected of supporting and financing extremist Islamist organizations. Message of The Interregional Business Cooperation Center, 10.02.2004.

Bogdanov A. 88 Turkey is changing its investment policy in Kyrgyzstan.

89 Turkish companies have already spent $5 billion in Turkmenistan / / Turkmenistan.<url>, 30.10.2003.

90 Niyazov held talks with Recep Erdogan // Turkmenistan.<url>, 01.11.2003.

Cherkez Atpyly. 91 Who owns the textile industry of Turkmenistan / / "Erkin Turkmenistan" - Official website of the United Opposition of Turkmenistan, 2002.

Kuliyev A. 92 The Turkmen elite-a view from the inside part I. http://www.eurasia.org.ru/200l/analitica/03_20_Elita.htm.

Esenov A. 93 Turkish businessman Akhmed Chalyk - "grey cardinal" of Turkmen politics. Centasia.ru, 29.09.2003.

94 "Russian News", 15.01.03.

Kamenev S. 95 Foreign Policy of Turkmenistan-CaiC, N4 (22), 2002, pp. 91-101.

McDermott R. 96 Reorganization of the Turkmen special services indicates an impending crisis in Turkmenistan/ / Eurasianet, 01. X. 2002.

97 Turkey refuses to buy Iranian (Turkmen) gas. Expensive... / / Iran.<url>, 28.10.2003.

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