I. A. SVISTUNOVA

Candidate of Historical Sciences Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS)

Keywords: Turkey, Islamic State, Turkish foreign policy, Turkish-American relations, Middle East

The problem of combating the radical organization "Islamic State" * (IG), which has seized part of the territory of Iraq and Syria, is one of the most pressing issues on the agenda of the Middle East region and the international community as a whole. This problem is particularly difficult for Turkey, which directly borders on the new zone of instability that has emerged as a result of the activities of the Islamic State.

The primary cause of tension in the Turkish-Syrian border area was the war between the Syrian government and armed groups opposing it. The dramatic rise of the Islamic State, which has declared a "caliphate" in the areas under its control and launched a war to expand its territory, has further aggravated the situation. New flows of refugees, which are becoming increasingly difficult for Ankara to cope with, shells periodically flying into Turkish territory, and protests by Turkish Kurds demanding that the government intervene in the conflict to protect their fellow tribesmen in Syria-all this has caused a significant complication of the internal political situation in Turkey.

It should be noted that Ankara took a "special position" within the framework of the international "anti-Isis" coalition created by the United States and did not show readiness to implement the strategy proposed by the Americans. And this is despite the active pressure from the White House and world public opinion. What is behind Turkey's position, and what factors determine Ankara's approach to the problem of fighting IS militants?

INTERNATIONAL COALITION AGAINST ISIS

Washington's direct military involvement in the fight against ISIS began in the summer of 2014, when the current Iraqi government, unable to stop the advancing militants, turned to the United States for help. American aircraft launched a series of strikes on the positions of the radicals, which suspended the group's advance, but did not solve the problem. As a result, on September 11, 2014 (the anniversary of the famous terrorist attack in 2001), President Barack Obama announced a new strategy to combat the terrorist threat. Its main elements were to be the creation of an international coalition and the continuation of airstrikes against the IG in the territory of not only Iraq, but also Syria. On the same day, a meeting was held in Jeddah with the participation of the United States and a number of Middle Eastern states, where the strategy proposed by the White House was discussed. However, Washington's key ally in the region, Turkey, refused to sign the final declaration on joint counteraction to terrorism, including the activities of the Islamic State.

The formal reason for the refusal was the threat to the lives of Turkish hostages captured by IS on June 11, 2014. Then, during the militant offensive on the northern Iraqi city of Mosul, 49 employees of the Turkish Consulate General were captured, including Consul General O. Yilmaz. Turkish citizens remained held hostage for more than three months-until September 20, 2014, when they were released as a result of negotiations between the Turkish special services and the IS. All this time, the Turkish government has been harshly criticized by the opposition, despite a court ban on media coverage of this topic in the interests of the hostages ' safety.

Another deeper motive that determined Ankara's position was the differences in the priorities of Turkish and American policies in the Syrian direction. Turkey continued to consider the fight against the regime of the Syrian president as its main task

* Until June 29, 2014, the group called itself the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

I was disappointed by the shift in the focus of attention of Washington and the international community from Damascus to the Islamic State. Having made a bet on supporting anti-government movements in Syria during the "Arab Spring", Ankara has maintained a firm course towards changing the Syrian regime even against the background of the dangerous strengthening of the radical group.

The new American strategy did not arouse any enthusiasm in Ankara. The Turkish leadership was of the opinion that the problem of IS cannot be solved exclusively by military means and that a comprehensive approach is required, including the political transformation of Iraq and Syria (including by expanding the representation of Sunnis in government structures). Among the Turkish priorities were the coming to power in Syria of opposition forces with which Ankara had close ties (first of all, we are talking about former members of the so-called Syrian National Council, established in Istanbul in 2011), and solving the problem of 1.8 million Syrian refugees. Syrian refugees in Turkey. By 2015, Ankara spent more than $⁵ billion on supporting refugees, while the international community allocated only $265m1 for their needs. Unlike Washington, which solves current problems, Turkey was forced to take into account the long-term consequences of international military intervention and feared direct involvement in a protracted war on the territory of a neighboring state.

Ankara's point of view on the reasons for the rise of the Islamic State was reflected in the program of the new Turkish government published in early September 2014.* In this document, the Turkish leadership fully assigns responsibility for the situation in Iraq and Syria to the governments of these countries. It is claimed that Baghdad and Damascus "did not take into account the legitimate political demands of the people", and this led to the formation of terrorist organizations and radical groups in both countries that promised to meet the political expectations of society.²

All this time, the priorities and approaches of the Turkish government remain unchanged. Ankara continues to seek the removal of President Bashar al-Assad from power and aims to support the groups opposing him.

On October 2, 2014, an event occurred that, at first glance, could be regarded as Ankara's preparation for expanding cooperation with the international coalition. The Turkish parliament has granted the government permission to carry out a ground operation in Syria and Iraq if necessary. The relevant mandate was issued for a period of 1 year. The document also allows foreign troops to use Turkish territory for operations in Syria and Iraq.³

In fact, this measure was rather declarative in nature, including aimed at "calming" Turkish public opinion, and did not mean at all that Ankara was preparing for a ground operation against the IS. The Prime Minister's request to Parliament referred to threats such as terrorist attacks from Iraq and Syria. Along with IS, the possible threat from the Kurdistan Workers ' Party (PKK) was also mentioned, as well as a massive flow of refugees.⁴

The Turkish Parliament has issued such permits to the government for Syria every year since 2012, when the Syrians shot down a Turkish fighter jet. As for the use of force against Iraq, the Government has been requesting parliamentary authorization for such actions every October since 2007. The goal is to counter threats from PKK militants hiding in northern Iraq. In October 2014, the next renewal of the "Syrian and Iraqi mandates" came up, and the two documents were merged.

Nevertheless, active negotiations on Ankara's participation in the international coalition have begun between Turkey and the United States. Washington expected its Turkish partners to assist in organizing military training for fighters of the so-called Free Syrian Army and other armed opposition groups in order to use it against the Islamic State. Judging by the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey M. Cavugoslu after the meeting with the NATO Secretary General. Stoltenberg, it was also about the possibility of participating in the fighting of the Turkish army. According to the Turkish minister, expectations that Turkey alone will carry out a ground operation against IS militants are unrealistic.⁵

Despite intense diplomatic pressure on Ankara, the Turkish-American talks have made difficult progress. General D. Allen, Obama's Special Representative for the fight against ISIS, and US Vice President D. Biden visited Turkey twice.

Differences between the parties were caused by the question of who the Syrian opposition fighters will fight, who were planned to be trained in special camps in Turkey. Ankara insisted that the trained units should be used not only against IS, but also against the army of the Syrian government.

There was also a lack of unity about the composition of participants in the training program. Turkey considers it extremely important that members of the PKK and the Kurdish Self - Defense Forces (KDF), the paramilitary wing of the Syrian Democratic Union Party, which Ankara considers to be closely linked to the PKK, are excluded from their number. Obviously, it was not easy for Washington to accept this approach, since the KSS and PKK detachments were to become the main forces providing support to the United States.-

* In August 2014, presidential elections were held in Turkey, which resulted in the victory of former Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, followed by the formation of a new Government headed by former Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu (Editor's note).

mi IS resistance in northern Syria.

A serious test for Ankara was the "Kobani factor" -the situation in the Kurdish canton adjacent to the Turkish-Syrian border, where for several months there were fierce clashes between Syrian Kurds and IS militants. The Kurdish population of Turkey demanded that the government provide assistance to the Kurds of Syria. Washington, which is interested in solving the problem by the Turkish army, also pushed Turkey to do the same.

However, Ankara refrained from direct military involvement in the conflict. Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, in an interview with Al-Jazeera Turk in October 2014, when asked why Turkey is not intervening in the situation in Kobani, said the following:: "If there is really a need for intervention, then the entire international community should do so, and not only in the events in Kobani, but also in the situation in Syria as a whole."⁶

However, mass protests by Turkish Kurds, accompanied by clashes with police and the death of two dozen protesters, forced Ankara to make adjustments in its position. The Turkish government found a "compromise" solution to the problem and in October 2014 opened a corridor for the transfer of Peshmerga units* of the Kurdish autonomy in Iraq through Turkey to Kobani, which provided assistance to the Syrian Kurds.

Another source of Turkish-American controversy is the question of the possibility of using the Turkish Incirlik airbase to launch airstrikes on IS positions. Fearing a new flow of refugees from Syria or retaliatory attacks from the radicals, Turkey links the decision on the airbase with the creation of a" no-fly zone "and a" security zone " in Syria. In turn, Washington is cautious about this idea, given the complexity of its implementation through the UN Security Council and the need to send troops to Syria to ensure the protection of such a zone.

According to a well-known Turkish political scientist, prof. Tayara Ary, "The United States and other Western countries look at the problem exclusively through the prism of the Islamic State and expect Turkey to take steps that they do not take themselves. Unfortunately, this point of view does not allow them to notice that Turkey has sheltered almost 2 million refugees. Syrian refugees. By demanding that Ankara open military bases or even send troops to fight ISIS, they do not accept refugees themselves and do not send their own troops."⁷

Up to the beginning of 2015. Ankara and Washington have not been able to come close to resolving their differences and reaching a compromise on cooperation within the framework of an international coalition.

"TRAIN AND EQUIP"

February 19, 2015 Ankara and Washington have signed an agreement that provides for the joint implementation of the Train and Equip program. According to the document signed in Ankara by the First Deputy Foreign Minister of Turkey F. Sinirlioglu and the US Ambassador to Turkey Jens Stoltenberg.Training and arming of the so-called Free Syrian Army (FSA) fighters will be carried out in Turkey. In Ankara and in Washington, this armed group, which has been fighting against the government army in Syria for several years, is called the " military force of the moderate Syrian opposition."

The training camp is being set up in the Turkish province of Kır Şehir, located 160 km from Ankara. It is obvious that the province far from the border with Syria was chosen not by chance, in order to create a more calm and controlled atmosphere around the camp. It is planned that during the year, Turkish and American instructors will train 1.5-2 thousand FSA fighters who will go to fight in Syria. The training itself will fall on the shoulders of Turkish specialists, the Americans will supply equipment and send their own instructors to transfer the experience of using it to the Syrian opposition. According to the Turkish authorities, Turkey will control the selection process of candidates for training. The main issue that concerns Ankara in this regard is the prevention of infiltration of PKK militants into the ranks of the program participants.

The signing of the agreement did not remove the issue of the priorities of the parties ' policy towards Syria from the agenda of Turkish-American relations. If Washington considers the agreement with Turkey in the context of solving the tasks of the "anti-ISIS" coalition, then Ankara still adheres to a different approach, believing that the opposition members who have passed special training should fight not only with the IG, but also with the government army.

In particular, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, without even mentioning the IS, defined the goal of creating new armed groups as follows:: "Fight against extremism and terrorism, as well as all elements that threaten the opposition, including the regime"⁸. During the Turkish-American talks, Turkish Foreign Ministry Spokesperson T. Bilgic was even more specific: "The priority is to ensure that our trained and equipped members of the Free Syrian Army fight against ISIS and the regime... In the short term, the fight against ISIS is first and foremost, but the ultimate goal is regime change."⁹

Obviously, Washington cannot ignore these nuances of cooperation with Turkey. Speaking on February 27, 2015 on the American TV channel RT, the Director of National Intelligence of the United States, J. R. R. Tolkien, said:Klepper noted that the fight against ISIS is not a priority for Turkey, which focuses on the Kurdish problem. According to Kleppe-

* Peshmerga (Kurd. - "going to death", "looking in the face of death") - Kurdish paramilitary groups in Iraqi Kurdistan (editor's note).

For example, freedom of movement on the territory of Turkey, including in the direction of Syria, allows foreign fighters to filter through the Turkish-Syrian border. "Public opinion polls indicate that the population of Turkey also does not consider IS a primary threat, but is more concerned about the country's internal problems, including economic development," the US intelligence chief stated.¹⁰

Klepper did not specify which surveys he was referring to. Meanwhile, interesting results were obtained from a public opinion survey conducted by scientists from the Turkish University of Kadir Has in 26 vilayets (provinces) of Turkey. According to data published in January 2015, only 1.8% of Turks believe that the main problem facing their country is related to foreign policy, while 33% consider unemployment to be the main problem.¹¹ This is despite the fact that 93% of respondents called IS a terrorist organization, and 82% of respondents answered in the affirmative when asked whether IS is a threat to Turkey.¹²

The survey also provided evidence of a high level of distrust of the White House among the Turkish population. More than 50% of respondents said that the United States is a threat to Turkey, ¹³ while only 17% supported the need for close cooperation with Washington on foreign policy issues.¹⁴

Turkey is often accused of allowing citizens of foreign countries (in particular, Western Europe) to enter Syria through its territory, who share the ideology of the Islamic State and want to fight on the side of this radical group. Ankara's position on this issue is that other countries are also responsible for these events, since they have the opportunity to tighten control over the movement of their citizens and provide Turkey with the necessary information in a timely manner.

Official Ankara considers itself part of the international coalition to fight IS, which it clearly recognizes as a terrorist organization and rejects accusations of "connivance" against elements sympathetic to IS. According to official Turkish data for the period from 2011 to 2015, for security reasons, Ankara added almost 12 thousand people to the list of persons banned from entering Turkey, and deported ¹⁵ thousand people.

It is worth noting that the difficulties of the Turkish-American negotiations on the "Train and Equip" program did not prevent Ankara from launching a similar program on its own against the Iraqi Kurds, who also face the threat of ISIS. At the end of November 2014, the capital of the autonomous region of Iraqi Kurds, Erbil, was visited by the head of Turkish intelligence, X. Fidan. Shortly after this event, the press reported that Turkish instructors will train Kurdish fighters in a training camp in the territory of Iraqi Kurdistan. It was assumed that special training would help Peshmerga fighters to contain the onslaught of the IS on the Kurdish areas of Iraq.

In February 2015, the Turkish Foreign Ministry confirmed its readiness to provide military training and equipment to the Iraqi Kurds in the confrontation with the Islamic State. It was noted that Turkey supplies the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs only with non-military equipment (binoculars, tents, camouflage equipment, etc.) ¹⁶. In March 2015, official information appeared that 1,511 Peshmerga fighters were trained by Turkish instructors ¹⁷. 15 trucks with ¹⁸ pieces of equipment were delivered to the Kurdish Autonomous Region.

Turkey says it plans to provide assistance under the "Train and Equip" program not only to the Kurds, but also to the Iraqi army, with which cooperation is already underway against the IS in the form of intelligence sharing. Thus, Ankara is taking advantage of the opportunity to strengthen its influence in Iraq and normalize relations with Baghdad, which were damaged during the rule of former Prime Minister N. Maliki.

TOMB OF SULEIMAN SHAH

The problem of the Islamic State has affected Turkey from another completely unexpected side, becoming the cause of an event that caused a wide domestic political resonance.

On the territory of Syria there is a unique object of cultural and historical heritage of Turkey-the tomb of Suleiman Shah, who lived in the early XIII century. He was the grandfather of Sultan Osman I, the legendary founder and first ruler of the Ottoman State, the progenitor of the Ottoman dynasty that ruled Turkey for more than 600 years until the proclamation of the Republic in 1923. According to legend, Suleiman Shah drowned in the Euphrates River and was buried on its bank near the ancient Jaber Castle.

After the First World War, the Ottoman Empire collapsed, and the territory on which the tomb of Suleiman Shah was located was ceded to Syria. According to the Ankara Treaty of 1921 with France (the state-mandate holder in Syria), Turkey retained ownership of the historical site, which was located 80 km from the Turkish-Syrian border. In 1923, the provisions of the Ankara Treaty were confirmed by the Lausanne Peace Treaty, concluded by Turkey with the Entente countries. In 1939, the tomb, near which an honor guard of Turkish soldiers was installed, was moved inside Jaber Castle.

In the 1970s, there was a threat of flooding of the tomb of Suleiman Shah as a result of Syria's construction of a dam on the Euphrates. For this reason, in 1975, the tomb was moved to a new location - upstream of the river and placed on a small island 37 km from the Turkish-Syrian border in the town of Karakozak. Damascus demanded that Ankara take the tomb to the territory of Turkey, od-

However, after lengthy negotiations, the Turkish government managed to insist on preserving the tomb in Syria.

However, Damascus could not help but be annoyed by the presence of the Turkish military on the territory of the country, so the question of moving the grave of Suleiman Shah to Turkey has repeatedly appeared on the agenda of Turkish-Syrian relations. Each time the reason for this was the Syrian projects for creating dams and dams, but Ankara always managed to ensure that the tomb remained in Syria as a Turkish enclave guarded by two dozen soldiers.

The offensive of the radicals in Syria has radically affected the fate of the sacred grave for the Turks. IS militants made threats against Turkish soldiers and tombs back in March 2014, when the group seized the area where the tomb of Suleiman Shah was located. IS's demands to lower the Turkish flag and withdraw its soldiers, and promises to otherwise level the tomb to the ground, looked like a pure provocation to draw the Turkish army into fighting in Syria.

Militant threats have provoked a sharp reaction in Turkey, for which the protection of the tomb of Suleiman Shah is symbolic and considered a "matter of honor". The then Prime Minister, R. T. Erdogan, stated in March 4014 that "any attack on the tomb will be perceived as an attack on Turkish territory." ¹⁹ A crisis headquarters was set up in Ankara, headed by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. A few days later, an audio recording of one of the headquarters meetings was distributed on social networks, where the state was ready to "take all necessary measures to protect the outpost of honor at the tomb of Suleiman Shah from any attacks." The Turkish Foreign Ministry responded to this "leak" with a special statement, which did not refute the authenticity of the audio recording, but only condemned such a leak of classified information. ²⁰ The protection of the tomb was strengthened by sending an additional contingent of special forces to Syria.

Subsequently, official Ankara has repeatedly spoken out strongly about the tomb. In particular, the Minister of Defense of Turkey I. Yilmaz, speaking in parliament during the discussion on granting the government the authority to send armed forces to Iraq and Syria (October 2, 2014), said that the tomb of Suleiman Shah is "an integral part of Turkey, and its protection is the responsibility of the state. The Republic of Turkey will not hesitate to fulfill its obligations"²¹. The text of the government's request to Parliament itself, among other arguments, referred to "an increase in threats to the security of the Outpost of Honor at the tomb of Suleiman Shah, which is Turkish territory in accordance with international law." ²²

Despite renewed threats from the Islamic State, the tomb remained in place until February 2015, when Ankara and Washington signed an agreement on the Train and Equip program, which made Turkey an active member of the anti-ISIS coalition. Two days after this event, on the night of February 22, the Turkish military conducted an operation codenamed " Shah Euphrates "to" evacuate " the tomb. After crossing the border with Syria in the area of the Kurdish canton of Kobani, a column of the Turkish army, accompanied by several dozen armored vehicles, marched in the direction of the tomb. The tomb was quickly dismantled and moved to the village of Eshmeh, which is located in Syria at a distance of 180 meters from the Turkish-Syrian border. Ankara has officially stated that the "temporary evacuation" does not mean a change in the status of the tomb: it continues to be considered Turkish territory within the borders of Syria.²³

Meanwhile, the decision to evacuate the tomb-an event that is quite understandable by the situation in Syria-has caused conflicting assessments in Turkey. The country's leadership at a meeting of the National Security Council solemnly congratulated the armed forces on the successful implementation of Operation Shah Euphrates.

In turn, the leaders of the two leading opposition parties-the Republican People's Party and the Nationalist Action Party-criticized the government, speaking to members of their factions in Parliament. Quoting all the strong statements of the Turkish leadership regarding the tomb of Suleiman Shah, K. Kilicdaroglu and D. Bahceli unanimously accused the government of making concessions in protecting Turkey's national interests.

Turkish National Defense Minister Yilmaz's speech in Parliament, announcing the successful completion of the operation, which he called a "national cause," was repeatedly interrupted by outraged shouts from lawmakers.²⁴ There were also comments in the Turkish press expressing doubts about the correctness of the" retreat "under pressure from the radicals and disappointment that"Turkey was not able to protect a piece of land the size of a football field from ISIS" ^.25 The Turkish newspaper "Vatan" published an interview with the Syrian Bozan Osman, the owner of the plot of land on which the tomb of Suleiman Shah was moved. He stated that no one had approached him about renting or buying a plot of land that his family used for agricultural purposes, growing wheat and barley there, and asked for help from the Turkish state.²⁶

It seems that after the conclusion of the aforementioned agreement with the United States, Ankara could not have made a different decision regarding the tomb of Suleiman Shah. Cooperation with Washington in the fight against the Islamic State, even if it is limited, poses a threat to the Islamic State.-

Turkey's retaliation by the militants. The first object at risk was a tomb located in an area controlled by IS. The capture of Turkish soldiers as hostages or their deaths would put the Turkish leadership in a position to strike back and thus become involved in an open war with the Islamic State, which could take on a protracted character and have unpredictable consequences.

It is noteworthy that the new resting place of Suleiman Shah was the territory under the control of the Syrian Democratic Union Party and the Kurdish Self-Defense Forces, with which Turkey maintained contacts during the operation. It cannot be ruled out that certain changes are planned in Ankara's approach to the Syrian Kurds, which in the future may lead to the establishment of certain forms of cooperation based on the model of relations between Turkey and the Kurdish autonomous region of Iraq.

This is also evidenced by the visit in mid-March 2015 of the tomb of Suleiman Shah by the mayor of the Turkish city of Sanliurfa, the capital of the Turkish vilayet adjacent to the border with Syria. The mayor came to inspect the tomb after the completion of landscaping and laying a concrete road to it from Turkey, carried out by the efforts of his municipality. The mayor's words that Turkish citizens will be comfortable visiting the tomb of Suleiman Shah may mean that transport links and cultural ties are beginning to form between Turkey and the Kurdish regions of Syria, which will be developed by the tomb of the progenitor of the Ottoman dynasty.

* * *

In conclusion, it is important to note once again that for Turkey, the fight against the radical organization of the Islamic State is a multi-factor problem that affects several areas of Ankara's foreign policy (relations with the United States, policy in Syria and Iraq, etc.). Thus, the Turkish-American agreements on training fighters of the Syrian armed opposition are of concern, since Ankara It suggests using them not only against ISIS, but also against Damascus, which may lead to a further escalation of the conflict in Syria. Questions remain as to which country's Government these armed groups will be subordinate to, how much they can be controlled, what their future fate will be, and whether they will become an additional element of destabilization in the Middle East.

¹ Turkiye Disisleri Bakanligi (Data from the Turkish Foreign Ministry)- www.mfa.gov.tr

² 62. Hukumet programs (Program of the 62nd government). Basbakan Ahmet Davutoglu. Ankara. 1 Eylul 2014, s. 171.

³ Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi karari (Decision of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey). No. 1071. 02.10.2014.

⁴ Disisleri Bakani Sayin Mevlut Cavusoglu'nun Nato Genel Sekreteri Jens Stoltenberg ile Ortak Basin Toplantisi (Joint press conference of Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu and NATO Secretary General). Stoltenberg), 9 Ekim 2014, Ankara / / Website of the Turkish Foreign Ministry-www.mfa.gov.tr

⁵ Davutoglu 'Guvenli Bolge'nin sinirlarini acikladi (Davutoglu announced the borders of the "Security Zone") / / Yeni Safak. 16.10.2014 -http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/politika/davutoglu-guvenli-bolgenin-sinirlarini-acikladi-693055

⁶ Tayyar Ari. Suriye Sorunu ve ISID'le Mucadelede Cozum Alternatifleri (Alternatives to solving the Syrian problem and fighting the IS) / / Orta Dogu Analiz. Kasim - Aralik 2014. Ankara, s. 20.

⁷ Disisleri Bakani Sayin Mevlut Cavusoglu'nun Kanal 24 Televizyonuna Verdigi Mulakat (Interview of Foreign Minister M. Cavusoglu to Turkish Television-Channel 24), 17 Kasim 2014 / / Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey - www.mfa.gov.tr

⁸ Disisleri Bakani Sayin Mevlut Cavusoglu'nun Evsahipliginde Duzenlenen Reform Eylem Grubu Ikinci Toplantisi Basin Toplantisi (Press conference of the Minister of Foreign Affairs M. Cavusoglu following the results of the second meeting of the Reform Group), 20 Subat 2015, Ankara Palas / / Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey...

⁹ Disisleri Bakanligi Sozcusu Tanju Bilgic'in Basin Bilgilendirme Toplantisi (Press conference of the Press Secretary of the Turkish Foreign Ministry T. Bilgic), 27 Kasim 2014, Ankara / / Website of the Turkish Foreign Ministry...

¹⁰ USA: 'Fighting IS not a priority for Turkey' - US intelligence chief James Clapper / / Ruptly TV. 28.02.2015 - https://ruptly.tv/vod/view/24833/usa-fighting-is-not-a-priority-for-turkey-us-intelligence-chief -james-clapper

¹¹ Kadir Has Universitesi Turkiye Sosyal-Siyasal Egilimler Arastirmasi (A study of trends in the socio-political development of Turkey conducted by Kadir Has University). Istanbul, 15 Ocak 2015, s. 7.

¹² Ibid., s. 33.

¹³ Ibid., s. 27.

¹⁴ Ibid., s. 28.

¹⁵ Turkiye Disisleri Bakanligi...

¹⁶ Disisleri Bakanligi Sozcusu..., 17 Subat 2015, Ankara / / Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey...

¹⁷ Ibid., 11 Mart 2015, Ankara / / Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey...

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Suleyman Sah Turbesi'nde tahliye operasyonu (Операция по эвакуации Гробницы Сулейман Шаха) // Anadolu Ajansi. 22.02.2015 -http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/haberler/468874-suleyman-sah-turbesinde-tahliye-operasyonu

²⁰ Aciklama No: 98, 27 Mart 2014, Suleyman Sah Saygi Karakoluna Iliskin Olarak Sosyal Medyada Yayinlanan Ses Kaydi Hakkinda (Заявление МИД Турции: About the audio recording that has spread in social networks concerning the honorary outpost at the Tomb of Suleiman Shah) / / Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey...

²¹ ISID tehdidine karsi net konustu (Ясно высказался по поводу угрозы ИГ) // Aksam, 02.10.2014 - http://www.aksam.com.tr/siyaset/ isid-tehdidine-karsi-net-konustu/haber-343146

²² Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi karari...

²³ Aciklama No: 70, 22 Subat 2015, Suleyman Sah Turbesi ve Saygi Karakolunun Gecici Nakli Hakkinda (Заявление МИД Турции: On the temporary relocation of the Tomb of Suleiman Shah and the honorary outpost) / / Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey...

²⁴ TVMM Genel Kurul toplantisi tutanagi (Minutes of the meeting of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey), 23 Subat 2015 / / Website of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey - www.tbmm.gov.tr

²⁵ Cengiz Candar. 180 metrelik "stratejik derinlik" ... (180-meter "strategic depth") / / Radikal, 25.02.2015 - http://www.radikal. com.tr/yazarlar/cengiz_candar/180_metrelik_stratejik_derinlik-1300588b

²⁶ ' Sabah bir baktim Turk askeri benim arazimde '(I look in the morning-Turkish soldiers are on my site) / / Vatan, 24.02.2015 -http://www.gazetevatan.com/-sabah-bir-baktim-turk-askeri-benim-arazimde-743417

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