LAST ARTICLE

On July 6, 2002, the leading researcher, Doctor of Economics, Professor Moiseev Pyotr Pavlovich would have turned 80 years old.

P. P. Moiseyev was one of the leading scientists in the field of agricultural relations in the Middle East and the theory of economic thought in the Ottoman Empire and Republican Turkey. He was the first in Russian Turkology to study the agrarian problems of the country, studied the situation of peasants and the history of peasant movements. P. P. Moiseev's latest scientific research was related to the study of the model of Turkey's economic recovery, as well as the general and special ones, the limits and possibilities of borrowing this model by the new sovereign countries of Central Asia and Transcaucasia. During his 40 - year career at the Institute of Oriental Studies, he published more than 150 scientific papers, including voluminous monographs. P. P. Moiseev's scientific achievements were appreciated not only by colleagues, but also consistently received positive responses from the world scientific community.

Pyotr Pavlovich led a great scientific and organizational work, was the initiator and active participant of conferences and seminars, including international ones.

Under the scientific guidance and active assistance of P. P. Moiseev, many graduate students and researchers from Russia and abroad have defended their dissertations and are successfully working in the fields of scientific pedagogical and practical activities.

For more than 20 years, P. P. Moiseev patiently and kindly passed on his knowledge to students and postgraduates of the Institute of Asian and African Countries at Moscow State University.

P. P. Moiseev was a participant of the Great Patriotic War, for many years he was active among the veterans of the Institute of Oriental Studies, heading the Council of veterans of the Second World War.

Pyotr Pavlovich was a highly qualified specialist, a friendly leader of a new generation of scientific youth, a wise and sympathetic friend of his colleagues.

Our colleagues at the Institute and our magazine were preparing to celebrate P. P. Moiseev's 80th birthday in a big way. And this article was supposed to be timed to coincide with this anniversary. But on February 24, 2002, P. P. Moiseyev died. The memory of P. P. Moiseyev, a well-rounded expert on Turkey and agricultural problems in the Middle East, a talented orientalist, as well as a wonderful person will always remain in our hearts.

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By the beginning of the 20th century, Turkey and Western countries were in different historical epochs in terms of all indicators of socio-economic progress and quality of life. It is not a question of a quantitative gap in the levels of production and culture, but of Turkey's lagging behind by an entire social epoch. If the West, having passed through the stages of classical development of capitalism (manufacturing and free competition), entered the industrial (monopolistic) phase, then the socio - economic system of the Ottoman Empire was characterized by a multi-structure, in which the dominant role belonged to pre-capitalist forms of management, production and distribution; the capitalist system, due to a number of historical reasons, could not gain full strength and apply for the role of a system-forming, formative 1 .

What are the reasons for the backwardness of the Ottoman Empire? And in general, why are the countries of the East, which in the XV-XVII centuries. not only did not lag behind the European states, but also surpassed them in a number of important indicators 2 , then began to move at a faster pace

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give up your positions on all parameters of socio-political, economic and cultural development?

Many modern Turkish scientists of both the left (D. Avcioglu, I. Cem, O. Kamen, M. Senjer, etc.) and the right orientation (O. L. Barkan, K. Bulutoglu, M. A. Kilicbay, N. Inalcik, T. Tunaya, etc.) persistently strive to prove that the influence of Europe was the main and almost the only reason backwardness and underdevelopment of the productive forces of the Ottoman Empire. In their opinion, capitalism was not a product of internal socio-economic processes, but was introduced from outside, and it was precisely this "capitalism alien to Ottoman society" that contributed not to the country's progress, but to its collapse. The famous scientist and public figure D. Avcioglu, for example, wrote: "The Treaty of 1838 created conditions for free trade, and the tanzimat, through administrative, financial and other reforms, formed the basis of the open market system in the interests of Western capitalism." 3 And further: "If Europe left Turkey out of its influence, then capitalism would develop in Turkey" 4

Another Turkish scholar I. Cem states the following: "The Firmans on the Tanzimat reforms of 1839 and 1856, which in our history are usually presented as a beneficent process of Westernization that saved us, were only one of the means of imperialist expansion" 5

The initiative to negatively assess the influence of the West on Turkey belongs to M. Kemal Ataturk, who in one of the conversations with scientists of his country stated that the initiative of the Tanzimat reforms allegedly came not from local reformers - supporters of progress, but agents of Western powers who sought to further decompose Ottoman society with the help of reforms and weaken its resistance to the increasing onslaught of European capital. In order to substantiate this idea of the "great gazi" in 1940 (after the death of M. Ataturk), a special work "Tanzimat" was even published, which was a collection of articles by leading Turkish historians of those years on various aspects of the topic raised 6

It should be noted that Soviet Orientalists also simplistically interpreted such phenomena as" imperialism "and"colonialism". Therefore, when analyzing the role of foreign capital in the colonies and semi-colonies, for a long time, especially in the 1920s and 1950s, they focused only on the negative aspects, raising to an absolute the fact that the monopolies of the West everywhere took advantage of the pre-capitalist forms of ownership and relations that existed in the colonial East. The absolutization of this generally correct position led to the conclusion that all the pores of the economic organism were supposedly completely "blocked" in the colonies and dependent countries.

The study of the consequences of the penetration of foreign capital into the Ottoman Empire was conducted at that time according to the scheme: national capitalism under the influence of foreign capital developed in the empire, but for the same reasons it could not develop there. At present, it is quite obvious that the struggle between the inhibiting and stimulating factors of social progress in the empire did not always follow the "internal-external"line. It should be noted that the trade agreements concluded by Turkey in the late 1930s played a certain positive role in the genesis of capitalism in the empire, as they inevitably involved its backward economic structure in relations of free competition with the Western powers that were experiencing the industrial revolution at that time, and thus contributed to the elimination of such feudal "reserves of backwardness" as trade monopolies (yed-i wahit) or a system of state regulations and compulsory purchases that are ruinous for manufacturers. All this objectively created prerequisites for the economic reorganization of society on a bourgeois basis 7

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It is equally clear that the tanzimat reforms were not driven by the desire to strengthen the country's subordination to foreign capital, as many Turkish authors still believe, but "were caused mainly by internal socio-economic development needs and political reasons" 8 .

It should be emphasized that although the initial impetus for the formation of the capitalist system in Sultan's Turkey was given from the outside in the first half of the XIX century, the processes that were crucial for the level and nature of its development were: internal economic dynamics 9 External factors have constantly had an ambiguous and contradictory impact on the nature and conditions of internal social processes in the country, including the pace of transformation of traditional structures into modern ones. However, this did not happen directly, but indirectly.

What were these internal conditions? Soviet historians usually replied that the root of the evil should be sought in the extreme backwardness of the social system in a given country, in the absence of a strong state order there. But the natural question is: why did such a situation with the system and law and order arise? When analyzing the system of social relations in the Ottoman Empire, all Russian authors necessarily cited the following, well-known position of F. A. Korotkov. Engels: "Turkish rule, like any other Eastern rule, is incompatible with capitalist society; the surplus value acquired is not guaranteed by anything from the predatory hands of satraps and pashas; the first basic condition of bourgeois entrepreneurial activity - the security of the merchant's personality and his property-is absent." property ownership " 10 (the italics are mine. - P. M. ).

Researchers, quoting this statement by F. Engels, focused on the fact that there is no law and order in this country, completely ignoring the instability of private property. And this is easily explained. As you know, Karl Marx considered private property to be the curse of man and humanity, the bearer of all troubles and adversities. "Property is theft," he repeated the words of the anarchist Proudhon. And this idea of the supposedly inhumane nature of private property was literally drummed into our minds throughout our lives, including our years of study.

Turning to the analysis of the situation in republican Turkey, we note that the principle of the sanctity of private property, proclaimed in the Constitution of 1924 and enshrined in the Civil Code of 1926, was crucial for the success of the social progress of the young republic. Naturally, for the reasons outlined above, not one of our Turkologist researchers focused on this most important moment of socio-political life.

Let us further note that the essence and nature of political power is of great importance for the social progress of any country. Thus, in Turkey, the transition in the early twentieth century from a feudal-theocratic, sultan-like form of government to a parliamentary republic based on secularism - the first and only one in the entire Muslim East until the mid-1930s - represented a qualitative leap that created prerequisites for the comprehensive development of Turkish society. As a result of the conquest of genuine national sovereignty, the country, firstly, ceased to be an object of international economic relations and increasingly became a subject of the historical process. Secondly, it was able to fully manage its natural resources and material and financial capabilities, which created the prerequisites for a purposeful struggle for economic independence.

All the countries and peoples that were liberated from the colonial yoke were characterized by two independent and consistent historical stages: the stage of the struggle for political independence and the stage of the struggle for economic independence. This situation has been observed in developing countries in Asia and Africa, which have become increasingly popular.-

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in the 1920s and in the 1940s and 1960s, when the collapse of the colonial system took on a global character.

The problems of the struggle for economic independence have constantly attracted great attention of Russian Orientalists, sociologists and economists. Almost the first event in this regard was held in 1960 at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences according to the report of R. A. Ulyanovsk 11 a scientific discussion that allowed us to identify points of view and place accents. In 1974, the Moscow State University Publishing House published a book entitled "Developing Countries: Problems of achieving economic independence", the authors of which (N. N. Shmigol, I. P. Faminsky, V. M. Kolosov) We tried to find out the essence of the tasks of achieving economic independence of developing countries on the basis of concrete material and show the role of the national state in solving this cardinal problem. The content, means and methods of solving this problem in the context of the struggle between two social systems were considered in the two-volume book "Foreign East and Modernity "(Moscow, 1974), prepared by the staff of the Institute of Internal Affairs of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and in the collective monograph "Developing Countries: Patterns, Trends, Prospects" (Moscow, 1974), which is a comprehensive theoretical study of a study of the politics, economy, and ideology of the "third world" countries, conducted by researchers of the IMEMO Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Finally, in the second half of the 1980s, the monograph "Developing Countries in the struggle to overcome Backwardness" (Moscow, 1986) was published, written by a team of researchers from research institutions in the socialist countries of Europe and containing an analysis of the interrelationships and contradictions of the economic and social development of the liberated countries. There is also a special publication on this topic related to Turkey 12 .

Methodologically, it is important to distinguish internal and external aspects of economic independence 13 . The internal aspect implies the creation of a developed, multi-industry economy capable of producing use values that can be realized on the world market on the conditions of economic equality of partners. In other words, the existence of a diversified economy in a country does not equate to the need to produce the entire range of necessary means of production and consumer goods within the country 14 . When creating economic sectors, the comparative (traditional and acquired) advantages of a given country should be taken into account, due to the uniqueness of its natural resources, the benefits of its geographical location, and the amount of variable capital expenditures.

As for the external aspect, despite the deep contradictions of the modern world and the fundamental differences of its constituent States, it is now in a state of economic interconnection and interdependence and represents a certain integrity. However, the world economic system currently knows two fundamentally different types of dependence: a) the interdependence of developed countries with equivalent elements of productive forces; b) the asymmetric dependence of developing countries on developed ones, which arises on the basis of the economic inequality of partners.

In the course of the struggle for economic independence, a developing country must overcome the second type of dependence and act as an equal partner in the world market. However, this is achieved by no means on the basis of curtailing the ties of a laggard country with the world market, i.e., striving for economic autarky under the slogan of "self-reliance". At present, there is no doubt that "participation in the international division of labor is a condition not only for achieving, but also for preserving, the economic independence that has already been achieved." 15

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Since economic independence is an objective phenomenon determined by the level of development of the productive forces, its achievement is possible only on the basis of economic decisions, and no foreign policy actions, even the most progressive and uncompromising, can ensure success. In other words, if the establishment of equal economic relations is conceived on the basis of not creating a diversified economy, but only displacing foreign capital in all its forms, then the success of such a policy is not guaranteed by anything 16 After all, the establishment of national sovereignty over the economy solves only a small part of the problems of economic independence of the country.

It should be noted that discussions on the criteria for economic independence, and hence the measures necessary to achieve it, are still incomplete. However, for a long time the very possibility of the liberated countries achieving economic independence by developing the commodity-capitalist system into a formation and formation of national productive forces was also debatable. It is now obvious that the most advanced and liberated countries, using their traditional and acquired advantages, are moving to the economic frontier that allows them to produce use values that can be exchanged on the world market under conditions of economic equality. The example of the "new industrial countries" proves the validity of such a conclusion. Turkey's progress in developing a number of national industries (especially the food and textile industries) suggests the same thing 17 .

Thus, Turkish analysts found that at the end of the 1980s, about 78% of the products of the local industry were able to successfully withstand competition on the world market, and only 22% of industrial goods had insufficient external competitiveness 18

The struggle for economic independence is always political in nature: various social and class forces interested in creating an independent national economy do not put the same meaning in this concept. If for the common people of the city and countryside this social phenomenon is associated with a rapid rise in all sectors of the economy, with a significant increase in the material standard of living of the people, with the granting of democratic rights to them, then for the ruling elite it is primarily an increase in the share of national income controlled by it and

Social roots can be clearly traced in the economic policy of the Turkish authorities from the first years of the republic, regardless of whether this policy was carried out under the flag of economic "liberalism" or statism. After all, in their views and especially practical actions, K. Ataturk and his supporters acted as consistent ideologues of the young Turkish bourgeoisie, which was interested in creating and strengthening the economic base of its political domination. Therefore, their struggle for economic independence by narrowing the sphere of influence of foreign firms and companies set as a priority the goal of creating conditions for the entrepreneurial activity of the local bourgeoisie. But since all the controversial political and foreign economic issues (for example, Mosul, the Ottoman debt, foreign concessions, etc.) were not resolved in Lausanne in 1923, Turkey could not immediately fully focus on the issues of economic revival. Additional difficulties arose in connection with the world economic crisis of 1929-1933.

It should also be taken into account that Turkey was among the few liberated states that began to rebuild their traditional structures.

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economic structures back in the 20s Naturally, they were not able to benefit from the experience of other developing countries. This forced Turkey to look almost independently for ways to move forward and often make mistakes. The intention to carry out the economic revival of a poor semi-feudal country on the path of free private enterprise was one of these mistakes. The detailed program of nurturing Turkey's own millionaires-industrialists, bankers, large farmers - was outlined, as you know, in M. Kemal's speech at the opening of the Izmir Economic Congress in February 1923. 19 The leitmotif of this speech is the necessity and even inevitability of Turkey repeating the Western model of economic development. An economic document prepared by American experts states the following:: "Since its inception, the Republic of Turkey has considered Western Europe as a model for its political and economic development" 20

It is very significant that even the countries that achieved political sovereignty a quarter of a century after Turkey (India, Pakistan, Indonesia) also hoped to base their national development strategy on the experience of highly industrial Western states 21

The ruling circles of Turkey, having repelled attacks from the left and right in the 1920s about the choice of the path of socio-economic development, finally decided in the early 1930s on its forms and methods. Since the economic backwardness of Turkey was deep and versatile, the economic potential is weak (in 1925, GDP per capita was $ 259 in 1978 prices). 22 While freedom of maneuver is limited, the overall socio-economic progress achieved in the first 15 years was negligible. The underdeveloped and diverse Turkish economy, which was dominated by lower orders that mainly produced use values, could not carry out any significant internal savings and at the same time, for a number of reasons, did not have the opportunity to attract external borrowed funds. The positive changes were especially insignificant in the countryside, where traditional forms of life, culture, and social consciousness remained almost untouched. The growth of agricultural production barely kept pace with the dynamics of the population. The introduction of agricultural machinery, the use of mineral fertilizers, irrigation construction - all this was still to come 23 .

Only since the second half of the 1930s have there been encouraging signs of growth. The reforms of the 1920s and 1930s, the appeal to the policy of state capitalism and the gradual ousting of foreign monopolies from the national economy through the purchase of foreign concessions 24 - all this served as an impetus for the growth of material production, the development of industry (the volume of the price industry from 1932 to 1939 increased 2.4 times) and the railway network. These measures laid only the first foundation stones for economic independence. "Nationalization of foreign companies and the policy of statism are steps towards economic independence," Avcioglu wrote 25

Among the external factors that contributed to the growth of the national economy, we should mention cooperation with the Soviet Union. Turkey was the first developing country to try to use Soviet planning experience, as well as Soviet economic and technical assistance, to create the foundations of a national industry back in the 1930s 26

Since the end of the 1940s, and especially after the Democratic Party (DP) government came to power in 1950, which expressed the interests of large commercial and speculative capital and large landowners that had grown stronger during the war, a new model of development was officially proclaimed. Its essence: within the country - a departure from Kemalist ideas of state entrepreneurship and the adoption of CSD as a basis-

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In the external arena, it is a rejection of strict protectionism and a focus on foreign capital in order to increase the rate of accumulation and dynamism of the economy 27 However, economic realities proved to be stronger than programmatic slogans: protectionism, after a short experiment in 1950-1951, still persisted, and the public sector continued to play the role of a leading social structure and the main condition for solving the problems of economic independence 28

After the coup d'etat of 1960 and the adoption of a more liberal constitution in 1961, new trends in the development of national capitalism were clearly identified under the influence of a number of internal and external factors: the growth rate of GNP increased markedly, the size of national income per capita increased, and positive inter-industry (due to an increase in the share of the industrial sector in GNP) and intra-industry shifts were observed (especially in industry and production infrastructure), the structure of national exports has improved due to an increase in the share of industrial products in it, and the processes of concentration and centralization of production and capital have become more active. As a result of the economic leap of the 1960s and 1970s, Turkey went from being a backward agrarian country to an agrarian-industrial country with an average level of development of productive forces. Undoubtedly, the level of its economic independence increased at that time, and in a number of parameters it already came close to the "new industrial countries" 29 .

The leap in the economic base that occurred during the three five-year plans (1963-1977) allowed the Turkish bourgeoisie in the early 1980s to raise the question of changing the strategy of economic development on the basis of turning the " closed "economy into an"open" one 30 Naturally, only a sufficiently powerful bourgeoisie, which has significantly modernized the economic and organizational forms of its activity, can enter the world market and succeed in competitive struggle. In addition, for Turkey, which has long sought to become a full member of the Common Market, the problem of bringing national production to international standards has become particularly urgent.

Published in January 1980 and supplemented later, especially in December 1983-January 1984, the new economic strategy provided for the rejection of the previous model of" catch-up " development based on an import-substituting economy and the transition to a model of deepening interdependence with the world capitalist economy through the orientation of national production towards exports and easing protectionism in import policy 31

In general, the economic stabilization program of 1980, of course, did not solve all the main problems. After all, the reduction and eventual complete abolition of customs duties provided for in the 1980 stabilization program may cause significant damage to the development of the national industry. Even Turkish capitalist" number one "V. Koc admitted:" Due to excessive liberalization... we will have to abandon industrialization." 32

Let us recall that the ideal of economic independence is realized both on the basis of national decisions and collective actions of developing countries. The most striking example of such actions is the program of struggle of developing countries for a new international economic order (IEPO)formulated in May 1974 at the VI Special Session of the UN General Assembly 33 The struggle to restructure international relations is an important part of their movement for genuine economic independence. I would like to make a special note of the following fact: if the international division of labor of the colonial type has existed for more than a century and a half, then in a short period of time

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After about a quarter of a century of sovereign development, the liberated states felt an urgent need to restructure the neocolonial system of international economic relations, which is certainly associated with a certain shift in the economy of the "third world"countries.

Although the main directions of the struggle for the IEPN were developed at conferences of non-aligned States 34, and Turkey, being an active member of the military-political (NATO) and economic organizations (OECD) of the highly developed capitalist powers, as well as an associate member of the EEC, as a rule, took the position of a passive observer in this struggle However, this does not deprive it of the benefits that non-aligned countries have achieved in their efforts to improve the conditions of their foreign economic relations.

In order to show more clearly the peculiarities of Turkey's movement from semi-feudal dependence to economic independence, we will focus on the role of the private and public sectors, their interrelation and interaction. As you know, when analyzing the economic history of the Republic of Turkey, it is customary to distinguish five stages, or periods of social evolution: economic liberalism of the 1920s; kemalist statism of the 1930s and 1940s; liberal statism in the 1950s; the stage of the "mixed economy" of the 1960s and 1970s; and finally, the system of domination that has been forming since the early 1980s along all lines of the commodity-market economy and the deepening interrelationships and relations with the world market 36 . It is important that all these stages are characterized by the presence of private property, the private sector of management; moreover, throughout the entire republican period, it was the private sector that was and is in the first place in terms of quantitative indicators. Even at the peak of statism, the bulk of the national productive potential was in private hands: in the late 1930s, it employed about 85-90% of the economically active population, and created 80-85% of the ECONOMY. The situation was similar in the late 1970s, i.e. on the eve of the transition to the free market stage.

It should be noted, however, that the "market euphoria" that began in 1980 and the sharp increase in the role of commodity farming and private entrepreneurship, in turn, did not mean and does not mean the complete elimination of state regulation from the economic life of the country and the uncompromising denial of the role of the state as the owner of certain material potential, especially in the field of industrial and social infrastructure. Therefore, today we must talk about the synthesis of commodity-market and statistical methods and forms of management with the decisive and determining role of private entrepreneurship.

Of course, neither the level of democratization of social and political life achieved by Turkey, nor the stage of economic maturity should be exaggerated. The gains are only significant when compared to the low baseline. If the situation in Turkey is compared with the situation in highly developed countries, the picture will be much less impressive. Indeed, the formation of democratic norms and traditions in Turkey takes place in an atmosphere of constant political cataclysms, chronic ebbs and flows; discrimination against people on social and, especially, national grounds has not been completely eliminated in the country; Turkey still has a large gap in the level of economic development from Western countries (unemployment rates are very high in the country under consideration the country is constantly shaken by various kinds of crises.

Summing up, we can still say that what was achieved in the outgoing In the twentieth century, world social progress has not spared Turkey, enriching it materially and morally and creating the necessary prerequisites for consolidating political independence and gaining economic independence. First of all, the long - term balanced policy and practice of the state administration is behind all this.

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the authorities ' efforts to create the foundations of civil society, a civilized market and private entrepreneurship; secondly, targeted activities of specific political figures.

notes

1 For more information about the economic structure of the Ottoman Empire, see: Gasratyan M. A., Oreshkova S. F., Petrosyan Yu. A. Essays on the history of Turkey, Moscow, 1983; A. F. Miller A brief History of Turkey, Moscow, 1948; Novichev A.D. History of Turkey. Vol. 1-4. L., 1963-1978; Shabanov F. Sh. State system and legal system of Turkey during the Tanzimat period. Baku, 1967.

2 In this regard, it is enough to recall the Chinese or Indian civilizations, which from ancient times to the industrial revolution of the XIX century were ahead of the European civilization in terms of development. It is believed that in the middle of the 18th century, the average standard of living in Europe was somewhat lower than in other countries of the world, excluding, of course, primitive societies. But in 1875-1980, the gap in living standards between the countries that we now call the "third world" and the developed countries was already in favor of the latter, amounting to 1: 3.3, and a hundred years later, in 1970, it was already 1: 7.2.

3 . Turkiye'nin duzeni (dim, bugun, yarin). C. 1. Istanbul, 1973. P. 116.

4 Ibid. P. 117.

5 . Tilrkiye'de geri kalmisligin tarini. Istanbul, 1973. P. 241.

6 Tanzimat. Pt. 1. Istanbul, 1940. There was no continuation of the publication, and the first volume remained the only one.

7 Cm.: Dulina N. A. Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1838 and its impact on the economic development of the Ottoman Empire / / Peoples of Asia and Africa. 1976, N 3. P. 70.

8 Novichev A.D. Edict. soch. T. 3. Novoe vremya. Ch. II (1839-1853). L. 1973. P. 6.

9 According to the authoritative opinion of a number of Russian Turkologists, the first sprouts of new, i.e. capitalist production relations, began to appear in Sultan's Turkey in the first third of the 19th century. The tanzimat reforms of the 1840s and 1860s accelerated this process.: A. F. Miller Decree of the soch. M., 1948. pp. 39-86; Injikyan O. G. The bourgeoisie of the Ottoman Empire. Yerevan, 1977. pp. 56-142; Petrosyan Yu. A. The Young Turk Movement, Moscow, 1971, pp. 13-27.

10 K. Marx. and F. Engels. Soch. T. 22. P. 33.

11 Ulyanovsk R. A. Some Issues of the Struggle for Economic independence in Non-socialist Countries, Moscow, 1960.

12 Moiseev P. P. The main aspects of the struggle for economic independence / / Politics and Economy of modern Turkey, Moscow, 1977, pp. 109-133.

13 The two-volume book "Foreign East and Modernity" expressed doubts about the legitimacy of dividing the problem of economic independence into internal and external aspects (Vol. 2. Moscow, 1974, p. 476). Of course, in real life, these aspects are closely related to each other, but in scientific research, detailed division is not only permissible, but also simply necessary.

14 Problems of developing and strengthening the economy of developing countries, L., 1968; Nice B. I. Non-Marxist political economy on the problems of backwardness and dependence in the developing world, Moscow, 1982.

15 Zarubezhny Vostok i sovremennost ' [Foreign East and Modernity], vol. 2, p. 485.

16 As an example of the hypertrophy of foreign policy measures to the detriment of economic ones, we can mention Indonesia, where during the period of" directed democracy " (1957-1965), decisive measures were taken to oust foreign capital from the country, but the need for balanced development of national productive forces was ignored. : V. Y. Arkhipov. Economics and Economic Policy of Indonesia (1945-1968), Moscow, 1971, pp. 104-113.

17 Убедительные доказательства содержатся в коллективной монографии российских туркологов. См.: Турция между Европой и Азией. Итоги европеизации на исходе XX века. М. 2001. С. 113-129.

18 Cм: Okcun G. Turkye iktisat kongresi. Izmir, 1923. Haberier-Bergerer-Yorumlar. Ankara, 1968; Report on Developments in External Economic Relations of Turkey, Foreign Trade Association of Turkey. Ankara, 1987.

19 Marketing in Turkey. Overseas Business Report. Wash., 1983. P. 8.

20 The official development strategy of India in the first years of independence was largely based on Western economic theories and proceeded from the relative automatism of the transformation of pre-capitalist forms of production into capitalist ones as economic growth accelerated. See: Traditional structures and economic growth in India. Moscow, 1984. p. 3.

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21 The Turkish Economy 1979. Istanbul, 1979. P. 58.

22 Cm.: Moiseev P. P. Agrarian Relations in modern Turkey, Moscow, 1960.

23 It is estimated that from 1928 to 1944, the Turkish government carried out 25 acts of purchase from foreigners of previously granted concessions for the construction of railway lines, the development of ores and minerals, the operation of municipal enterprises, etc.: Avcioglu D. Op. cit. P. 452-454.

24 Yon. November 12, 1962.

25 See: USSR-Turkey. 1917-1979, Moscow, 1981, pp. 128-132.

26 The main parameters of the PD's economic strategy are reflected in the programs of the Menderes Government, which were read out at the Mejlis meetings in May 1950, March 1951, and May 1957. (in the 1950s and 1960s, Menderes served as the head of five government cabinets.): Ozturk K. Turkiye Cumhuriyeti hukumetleri ve programlari. Istanbul, 1968. P. 347-461.

27 См.: Киреев Н.Г. История этатизма в Турции. М., 1991. С. 126-130.

28 The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Turkey. N.Y.-L., 1980. P. 29.

29 Kilicbay A. Turk ekonomisi. Modeller, politikalar, stratejiler. Ankara, 1984. P. 173-178.

30 Ulagay O. Ozal ekonomisinde paramiz pul olurken kim kazandi kim kaybetti. Ankara, 1987. P. 48-50; Sonmez М. Turkiye ekonomisinde bunalim. 25 ocak kararlari ve sonrasi. Istanbul, 1982. P. 7-9, 11-15.

31 Le Monde. 10 января 1984.

32 См.: Колосов В.П., Комлев Л.И. За равноправные экономические отношения. М., 1978; Моисеев П.П. Борьба за новый мировой экономический порядок и империализм // Вестник Московского университета. Серия 13. Востоковедение. 1981, N 4. С. 3-13.

33 Particularly important in this regard is the Fourth Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (Algeria, 1973), which first developed a comprehensive strategy to fight for the IEPN, against the economic dominance of the monopolies of Western Europe, the United States and Japan.

34 Only later did Turkey join the group of developing countries, which is called the "Group of 77".

35 For more information, see: Capitalism in Turkey. Socio-economic development in the 50s and 80s, Moscow, 1987; Urazova E. I. Turkish economy: from statism to market (internal and external sources of economic growth). Moscow, 1993; Alibekov I. V. State Capitalism in Turkey, Moscow, 1966; Turkey: Modern Problems of Economics and Politics, Moscow, 1997.

36 In 1970, for example, the state sector accumulated only 12% of the economically active population and produced 15% of GNP. See: Features of Modernization in the Muslim East. Experience of Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, Moscow, 1997, P. 77.

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