Among the candidates for joining the European Union (EU), Turkey is a well-deserved veteran. Its associate membership first in the European Economic Community (EEC)* , then in the European Community, and now in the European Union, has been going on for more than 40 years. Moreover, at the very beginning of the path to the EU, Turkey had a fairly good chance of rapid success: in the Cold War, this country chose the western camp - adopted the "Marshall Plan", the "Truman doctrine", joined NATO in 1952, sent its soldiers to fight in Korea, etc.

The period after the end of the Cold War was a kind of test of the strength of relations between Turkey and the EU. According to the provisions of the Ankara Association Agreement with the EEC (entered into force on December 1, 1964), Turkey, after fulfilling a number of conditions, was supposed to become a full member by 1995. But while the Turkish government was trying to fulfill its obligations under the agreement by the scheduled date, it turned out that in the new conditions influential circles in the European Union did not we intend to turn a blind eye to the previous "anti-democratic sins" of our loyal and tried-and-tested ally, and began to demand that it take more and more steps to achieve a certain level of socio-economic development, as well as eliminate legal flaws in the legislation, primarily in the Constitution, adopted, by the way, in 1982 under the military regime. With this approach, it was only by 1999 that Turkey was able - and then with the active support of the United States and Germany - to achieve recognition of its status as a candidate country for the European Union.

The first set of claims made by the European Union to Turkey concerns the discrepancy between its main socio-economic indicators-the rate of inflation (in some years-over 70-80%) and unemployment (up to 10%), the volume of external debt (in 2004 - over 140 billion US dollars) ¹, the average annual income per capita (just over $ 3,000) - the level of development of the EU member states. In addition, Ankara is pointed out that there are still sharp imbalances in the economic development of the coastal and inland, as well as western and south-eastern regions of Turkey.

In the 1990s, along with its economic backwardness, the EU criticized the political situation in the country, in particular, the unsatisfactory situation with respect for human rights and fundamental democratic freedoms. First of all, this concerned respect for the rights of the Kurdish minority and non-Muslim denominations, the practice of torture in prisons, and the preservation of the special role of the army in the political life of the country. In addition, until recently, the favorite topic of opponents of Turkey's entry into the European Union was its conflict with Greece over Cyprus.

Among the main reasons put forward in the West by opponents of Turkey's accession to the European Union, it is impossible not to mention the rapid growth of its population, as a result of which, in their opinion, Turkey, becoming an EU member, will have the largest representation in the European Parliament, the influx of Turkish migrants to EU countries will significantly increase (and today the Turkish diaspora person). Europeans are also concerned about Turkey's proximity to the" problematic " countries of the Middle East and Transcaucasia.

Finally, it is widely believed that the crucial role in the rejection of Turkey by the West is played by the fact that the EU is supposedly a "Christian club" that does not want to join its ranks at the expense of Muslims, "because all the cultural, political and other traditions of Turkey run counter to the spirit of Europe, which is based on Christianity"² .

The rejection of a foreign culture, the fear of losing one's identity in the stream of Muslim immigrants, of course, is objectively present in the European environment, partly confirming the current fashionable thesis about the "clash of civilizations", but this, as it seems, is only one aspect of the problem. A much more serious obstacle to Turkey's path to the European Union than its "Muslim status", researchers recently called the entry into the forefront in the country of forces "for which Turkey's accession to the EU is by no means a priority" ³. In this case, we are talking about the victory in the parliamentary elections in 1995 of the Islamists (the Party of Prosperity of N. Erbakan - "Refah") and in 1999 of the right and left nationalists (the block of the Democratic Left Party of B. Ecevit and the Party of the Nationalist Movement of D. Bahceli). It has been suggested that Turkey's futile attempts to integrate into European structures, the frustration of the Turkish public, and the lack of support for the European Union.-

* The European Economic Community (EEC, "Common Market") was formed on the basis of the so-called Treaty of Rome, first signed by six Western European countries in 1957 (entered into force in 1958). In connection with the deepening of European integration, in particular, the unification of the governing bodies of the EEC, ECSC and Euratom, the European Community emerged The European Union (EU), which, in turn, in 1993, in accordance with the Maastricht Treaty, was transformed into the European Union (EU), which now includes 25 countries. (Editor's note)

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political parties that support pro-European kemalism contribute to the popularity of marginal forces that play on xenophobia, politicization of religion, etc.And these forces, in turn, can offer society external guidelines that are alternative to joining the EU, such as blocking with some countries of the Muslim region or with the Turkic - speaking republics of Central Asia.

It seemed that the victory of the current ruling Justice and Development Party led by R. T. Erdogan in November 2002 in the parliamentary elections, and with an absolute majority, confirmed such forecasts. The AKP was formed in 2001 as the "moderate wing" of the pro-Islamic movement "Milli Geryush" ("National View"), which until then was essentially one political party, periodically closed by the judicial authorities and each time recreated under new names, but under the old slogans led by the former leaders. Its last name is the Party of Virtue ("Fazilet"); it was banned in 2001, and one of the reasons for the ban was the pro-Islamic statements of the then popular R. T. Erdogan.

Supporters of" Milli Geryush", while condemning the country's secular leadership's desire to integrate into the European Union, emphasized the need for close cooperation with the Muslim East. A practical attempt to implement this idea was made by the government of the Welfare Party (another incarnation of "Milli Geryush") in 1996, when the Prime Minister and leader of the PB N. Erbakan proposed the formation of the "Islamic eight", conceived as an alternative to the (then) "seven" of industrially developed countries of the West, which included Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Egypt, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia and Nigeria. Since before the split in 2001 into "moderate" Islamists led by R. T. Erdogan and "conservatives" led by N. Erbakan, both represented the same trend, it was natural to expect Erdogan to pursue a foreign policy in the spirit of the "national vision"ideology.

The first results of the Erdogan government's tenure in power, however, demonstrated the inconsistency of such stereotypes. Thanks in large part to the AKP's policies, the current report of the Commission of the European Communities (CEC, European Commission) of 6 October 2004, on the implementation of concrete steps by the Turkish Government towards integration, finally recommended, albeit with some reservations, that negotiations on the country's full membership in the organization should begin in 2005 and, more importantly, that the Turkish government should At the EU summit in Brussels on December 16-17, 2004, the leaders of the EU countries took into account the recommendations of the CES and confirmed their intention to start preliminary negotiations with Turkey.

COURSE FOR ADAPTATION

Even before the last parliamentary elections, the AKP leaders stressed that joining the EU is their main task. After coming to power, R. T. Erdogan and Foreign Minister A. Gul made a series of "European tours" in order to convince the EU leadership of the expediency of Turkey's admission to this organization. At the same time, they stressed that their country has done a lot to adapt to the demands put forward by the European Union not only in the economic, but also in the political and social spheres. The main step in this direction was the adaptation of Turkish legislation to the legal norms of the European Union. In 2003-2004, the Government approved the next ⁵ out of 8 "packages" of legislative amendments to the fundamental laws of the country, including amendments to the Criminal Code, the Constitution4, etc.

The judicial system has undergone significant changes. State security courts, whose sentences were not subject to appeal, were gradually eliminated, and article 143 of the Constitution, which regulated their work, was repealed. A procedure has been introduced to appeal a court verdict to the European Court of Human Rights if it contradicts fundamental European principles.

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conventions. This measure has already made it possible for political prisoners such as former member of the Turkish Parliament, Kurdish activist Leyla Zana and her associates to appeal to the European Court of Justice and obtain release in July 2004. Earlier, in May 2004, the priority of international conventions over local legislation was enshrined in article 90 of the Constitution.

According to the amendment to the current Law on Judicial Practice, the criminal record has ceased to be registered for the offender for life. The age of responsibility for child crime has been raised from 15 to 18 years. If any actions do not constitute offenses from the point of view of European law, then they should be removed from the personal file altogether.

The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNST) has lifted the state of emergency in a number of regions and taken measures to eliminate judicial arbitrariness. The infamous malaise of the Turkish police system - torture-is currently classified as a crime that must be investigated immediately and as soon as possible, even during judicial leave.

The Anti-Terrorism Law removed article 8, which provided for a three-year prison sentence for propaganda threatening the integrity of the State (a common charge leveled against Kurdish nationalists). The very concept of terror is revised, which means any actions that threaten the basic republican principles, the existing system, the authority of the authorities, "the inviolable integrity of the state, country and people", democratic freedoms, internal and external security of the country, etc., but with an important reservation - "when using violent methods". In accordance with this, the definition of a terrorist organization has also been clarified.

Amendments to the Law on Societies and the Law on Foundations not only legitimized the actual rules in force, but also significantly expanded the freedom of assembly and association. Public organizations are now officially allowed to use foreign languages in their international contacts and private correspondence, make public statements without prior approval, and open branches abroad. Turkish public and political entities can also participate in international organizations of their own profile (in agreement with the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the Turkish Interior Ministry), as well as foreign associations - in Turkish ones. However, in this case, their activities are subject to local laws, just as Turkish organizations are subject to the laws of the country in which they operate.

Foundations of non-Muslim religious denominations have acquired the right to buy up and register real estate in their own name. Non-Muslim places of worship have been indirectly recognized; now, according to the urban planning regulation, it is recommended to allocate space not just for mosques, as stated in the previous version of the law, but for religious buildings in general.

The liberalization also affected the provisions on the press and mass media. Media outlets are no longer required to disclose the sources of information they report. According to article 30 of the Constitution of the country "On the Protection of Press Media", the building and outbuildings of a publishing house cannot be closed or confiscated (under the old law, they could be seized as a "tool of crime" if the publishing house is accused of anti-government activities).

The regulation on censorship in relation to film, video and music products has been relaxed. The impressive list of prohibitions in this area has been replaced by a much more concise one, which prescribes checking these products for compliance with "the basic constitutional principles of the republic, the inviolable unity of the nation, country and people, common morals, interests and health of the nation." In addition, literary and scientific works and works of art are no longer subject to censorship, and other printed materials rejected by censors can be withdrawn, but not destroyed, as previously prescribed by law.

Public insults and "contemptuous remarks" against the State and its main bodies are still prosecuted by law. At the same time, it is recognized that statements with the aim of criticism that do not contain offensive expressions are not subject to punishment.

Among the whole mass of legislative innovations, the provisions on the rights of citizens of a country of non-Turkish origin are most hotly discussed. Back in the early 1990s, the Turkish authorities tried to prove to the international community that they respected the identity of non-Turkish peoples, for example, by legalizing the Kurdish language as a means of communication in 1991.

Today, private and state-owned channels are allowed to broadcast in other languages and dialects besides Turkish. Turkish central TV channel TRT-1 broadcasts programs in Kurdish and some other languages of ethnic minorities living in the country during the allotted hours. Although Turkish, as the state language, still continues to be the only acceptable language of instruction and instruction in public schools, the Parliament has allowed the opening of private courses to study the languages used by citizens of the country in everyday life, as well as to include them in the programs of private schools. The law removed the ban on the use of certain names, except for those that, according to the law, " contradict general morality and are offensive to society." According to some observers, in this way, Kurdish names were "rehabilitated".

The picture would have been almost perfect if it hadn't been for the fact that the government of R. T. Er-

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dogan often used the process of modifying Turkish legislation to solve personal and partisan problems. In particular, immediately after the victory in the 2002 elections, the rules for citizens ' participation in political activities were revised, clearly in order to protect the AKP from encroachments by the military.

While under the old legislation there was a ban on joining a political party for those guilty of "openly inciting class, national, religious, confessional and regional discord among the population", now the only obstacle to this is participation in terrorist activities. Such an initiative is not surprising, because during the change of power, some current leaders could be reminded of their past statements at any time. In addition, persons guilty of various financial crimes, terrorism, and abuse of religious feelings of citizens are now facing excommunication from public life for two years (previously - for life), and members and leaders of banned organizations-for a year (instead of the previous five years). First of all, it made possible the election of a former Prime Minister, R. T. Erdogan, to the Turkish Parliament for the post of Prime Minister.

The procedure for closing political parties has been significantly complicated. If earlier the Prosecutor General's initiative was enough to initiate a case for the termination of the party's activities in the Constitutional Court (in Turkey, "reconciliation" of the activities of a political organization with the norms of the Constitution is the responsibility of the Prosecutor General), now it will require a presidential decree, a resolution of the Council of Ministers, as well as an appeal to the court by the Minister of Justice or a representative of a certain political organization.either from a batch. Moreover, like any sentence, the decision to close a political party can be appealed to the same Constitutional Court.

The Government has done a lot to modernize family law: it has abolished the most odious articles that are more in keeping with the spirit of traditional morality, such as punishment for adultery, constitutionally enshrined the provision on equal rights of men and women (article 10), and banned medical checks for virginity without a court decision. At the same time, the AKP's" special " attitude to Islam and its norms is evidenced by the government's attempt in September 2004 to introduce amendments to the National Tax Code for inclusion in the Criminal Code of Turkey, providing for punishments for... marital infidelity. Under pressure from the Western public, this initiative was withdrawn from discussion, although it managed to make a lot of noise.

The most active advocates of preserving secular norms in the socio-political life of Turkey also fear the desire of both the leaders of the European Union and the adherents of Islamism in the country to weaken the influence of the Turkish army, which, represented by its leadership-the General Staff, using a significant representation in the National Security Council of the country (NSC, the constitutional body of Turkey), It also takes the toughest stance against clerics. At the same time, more and more supporters are gaining the view that reducing the role of the army will not lead to the loss of Turkish Islam's "moderate" character, since the principles of Laicism are firmly rooted in Turkish society, and most of the population opposes replacing the secular legal system with Sharia.

In any case, in accordance with the requirements of the European Union, the VNST reduced the duties of the National Security Service to providing recommendations in the field of defense policy, removed members of the National Security Service from the Council for Censorship of Film, Video and Music Production, and also, by amending Article 131 of the Constitution of the country "On Higher Education", removed them from the The Council for Higher Education (CBE), created by the military after the 1980 coup d'etat to regulate the activities of higher education institutions. The ratio of military and civilian representatives in the National Security Service has also been changed. According to the new regulations, the Secretary General of the National Security Service is appointed by the Prime Minister from among civilians in coordination with the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces (previously appointed by the head of the General Staff from among the highest army ranks, and then approved by the government). In October

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In 2004, the former Turkish Ambassador to Greece assumed these duties. Finally, the Turkish Parliament has given itself the right to control budget expenditures, including expenditures on the needs of the army and the defense industry (the latter-in strict secrecy). Approximately 1/5 of government appropriations are spent annually on military expenditures, and so far the military has been immune from financial audits.

PROS AND CONS

As the publication of the above-mentioned CES report approached, which was supposed to provide a preliminary conclusion on the readiness of EU member states to see Turkey in their ranks, the situation around this topic at both poles of the countries concerned became more and more tense. A rather frank assessment of the situation was given by the Danish newspaper "Information": "Things are going so well in Turkey that European commissioners are going out of their way to come up with new delays, obstacles and tests...". At the same time, the newspaper noted that if the Commission's negative conclusion is "in the person of Turkey, we will lose a strategic partner in relations with the Arab and Muslim world. The EU simply cannot afford to say no to Turkey. " ⁵

So in the end it turned out. Report prepared by the then head of the European Commission for EU Enlargement, H. Verheugen, and another European Commissioner, R. Verheugen. The Prodi, released on 6 October 2004, acknowledges that Turkey has "sufficiently" met the required political criteria, and therefore recommends that negotiations on its membership be initiated ^.6 The report contains many positive statements for her: changes in the Turkish judicial system are welcomed, there are practically no complaints about the imperfection of the economic sphere, progress in solving the Cyprus problem is noted. At the same time, the authors of the report again drew attention to certain specific shortcomings of the judicial and legal system (in particular, the need to form lower-level appeal courts; calls for "zero tolerance" for ill-treatment of prisoners and torture). It is particularly noted that the Turkish army continues to retain the right to interfere in political life (certain articles of the Constitution were previously used by the military as a legislative justification for their interference in politics). The report calls for the elimination of restrictions on the activities of non-Muslim denominations in the field of training clergymen, creating foundations, schools, and owning real estate, and notes violations of the rights of women, trade unions, and national minorities.

As for the negotiation procedure itself, as the report notes, this process will be lengthy, the result is expected no earlier than in 10 to 15 years, and not necessarily positive. A complex structure of negotiations is being established: the annual reports of the CES on the political situation in Turkey (the first one - in December 2005), then the preparatory stage for the negotiations, then the discussion of each problem separately with summing up the results in the format of an Intergovernmental Conference. In addition, measures should be taken to strengthen the political and cultural dialogue at the mass level (how will be discussed later). As for Turkish politicians, they were particularly alarmed by the human rights clause laid down in the CES report, which allows the EU, in case of gross non-compliance with human rights requirements, to suspend and even stop the process of conducting pre-offensive negotiations with Ankara. The rejection of the Turkish side also caused the EU's intention to impose permanent restrictions on the free movement of Turkish labor during the pre-negotiation period and even if they are successfully completed.

The CES report also caused heated debates in the EU countries about the expediency of Muslim Turkey's participation in a different, from a civilizational point of view, integration association. As the Brussels summit approached, the initiative of the Christian Democrats and Christian Socialists of Germany on a "third way" for Turkey - a "privileged partnership", an alternative to both Ankara's unequivocal refusal of membership and its accession to the EU on the basis of the same requirements that are imposed on other candidate countries, gained more and more support among Europeans.

A serious reason for the Turks ' headaches during the summit promised to be the Cyprus problem. Divided Cyprus does not participate in the EU customs union with Turkey due to the lack of diplomatic relations between Nicosia and Ankara. Taking advantage of the latter circumstance, the Greek Cypriots have already imposed restrictions on the circulation of Turkish goods in the Greek part of Cyprus, which contradicts the EU customs policy with respect to Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus. The leadership of Cyprus threatened to condition its consent to the start of the negotiation process by demanding that Turkey withdraw its troops from the island and recognize Cyprus. A day before the Brussels summit, the President of the Cyprus Parliament, D. Christofias, who was in Athens on a visit, expressed doubt whether " it is legitimate for the EU to start such negotiations with a country that knocks on the EU's doors and at the same time refuses to recognize one of the EU member states (the Republic of Cyprus), not wanting enlargement Of the Customs Union to this EU member." Christofias stressed that this issue should concern not only Athens and Nicosia, but also the European Union as a whole, which should step in and "tell Ankara to recognize the Republic of Cyprus, an equal EU member state."⁷ In turn, Turkish Foreign Minister A. Gul in an interview with the Turkish NTV channel assessed the prospects of relations with the South-

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The head of the EU Delegation to Cyprus said: "Preparations for the conclusion of the Union are in full swing. This step is not intended to establish official diplomatic relations. Only common economic interests " ⁸ .

The Turkish leadership did everything possible to ensure positive consideration of the recommendations of the European Commission at the December summit and to neutralize such discriminatory provisions of the report as the "non-guaranteed" outcome of negotiations, etc. The Brussels summit was of fundamental importance for Turkey. After all, the procedure of negotiations with the EU is such that, once started, it, as practice has repeatedly shown, sooner or later ends with joining the Union. Turkish politicians did not miss the opportunity to demonstrate their position to the EU, often in a rather categorical form. Thus, R. T. Erdogan, in an interview with the Times and Independent newspapers, said that " negotiations will end either with full membership or with nothing." He summed up Turkey's expectations from the Brussels summit as follows: pre-start negotiations without any conditions; a specific date for the start of negotiations; no additional political requirements other than those fixed at the Copenhagen summit in 2002 (i.e., such as diplomatic recognition of the Republic of Cyprus). According to Erdogan, " the rules should not change during the game." In the same interview, he quite unexpectedly justified Turkey's belonging to European culture: "In the last years of its existence, the Ottoman Empire was called the" sick man " of Europe, not Asia. Even in the worst of times, we were considered Europeans." As proof of the possibility of a successful combination of very different, sometimes contradictory systems of values, Erdogan gave an unconventional example, defining himself as "a Muslim, a Turk and a democrat at the head of a secular government"⁹ .

EVEN INCOMPLETE, BUT A VICTORY

The results of the EU summit in Brussels are being touted in Turkey, and rightly so, as a major diplomatic victory. The most positive and long-awaited outcome for it was the consent of the European Union to launch the negotiation process on October 3, 2005. At a press conference organized after returning to Ankara by the head of the Turkish delegation at the summit, Erdogan, it was declared "not one hundred percent, but a victory." "The goal is full membership, and this is witnessed in a form that leaves no room for doubt. Although the road ahead is much longer and more thorny, Turkey, with God's help and thanks to its dynamic population, will overcome all obstacles. We are at the point where we have finally started to reap the benefits of our 41-year efforts, " ^the Prime Minister is convinced.

Turkish delegates managed to achieve some easing of the European Commission's proposed restrictions on the movement of Turkish labor: Instead of permanent restrictions, the Brussels Declaration uses categories such as "long-term", "temporary" and "if necessary" ¹¹ . Otherwise, the section of the Declaration devoted to the prospects of Turkey's membership almost completely duplicates the main provisions of the CES report. It welcomes changes in Turkish legislation and the development of good-neighborly relations with the EU states bordering Turkey. However, most of the provisions of the CES report that were rejected by the Turkish side, such as the complex procedure and duration of negotiations, the point about the "uncertainty" of their outcome, as well as the possible termination in the event of " serious and systematic violations by the candidate of the principles of freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, which the Union was built for, " was still included in the Declaration. It is indicated that the budget designed for potential membership of Turkey can be formed no earlier than 2014 (apparently, the costs associated with the expansion of the European Union in May 2004 do not yet allow it to take on an additional financial burden in the form of support for Turkey). Moreover, it seems that the option of a "privileged partnership" for Turkey is also not excluded, which is hidden behind the vague wording: "If the candidate country is not able to fully take advantage of the situation in the region, then it is not impossible to do so."

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It will assume the responsibilities associated with membership, and it will be guaranteed close ties with European structures."

The main" bone of contention " between the parties during the summit was, as expected, the Cyprus problem. After a heated debate, the text of the Summit Declaration included a paragraph on the readiness of the Turkish leadership to sign an additional protocol to the Ankara Treaty, recognizing the terms of the customs agreement between Turkey and the EU as fair for the 10 new member states that joined the European Union on May 1, 2004, including Cyprus. Based on the text of the Declaration, the signing of the protocol should take place before the start of negotiations and, therefore, is a necessary condition for launching the negotiation process. In fact, according to international observers, this paves the way for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey, which is tantamount to Turkey's rejection of its non-recognition policy.

In Turkey itself, some politicians believe that the final wording of the article on Cyprus in the Brussels Declaration gives it time to find a form of customs union that is acceptable to all parties.

EUROPEAN HOPES AND DOUBTS

In the EU countries, the range of opinions on the expediency of accepting Turkey is very wide. Proponents of accepting Turkey justify their position by saying that this will make a significant contribution to ensuring the harmony of sharply different civilizations, and most importantly, significantly increase the geopolitical weight of the European Union. Such and similar views are shared by some reputable political and state figures. For example, shortly before the Brussels summit, German Chancellor Heinrich Schroeder spoke about the possible consequences of Turkey's accession to the EU as follows: "A democratic Turkey that corresponds to the values of Europe would be a clear proof that there are no contradictions between the Islamic faith and the modern enlightened society. In this sense, Turkey would become a model for other Muslim neighboring countries of Europe. Therefore, with Turkey's accession to the EU, there is hope for peace and security-including far beyond Europe. A country that fulfils the criteria of democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights should not be hindered from joining the EU " ¹² . As if in response to this, the opposition, represented by the Christian Democrats led by Angela Merkel and the Christian Socialists led by Edmund Steuber, again advised Ankara to abandon its claims to full membership in a united Europe in exchange for the status of an "honorary partner".

The United Kingdom is among the supporters of Turkey's admission to the EU; Prime Minister Tony Blair is firm: "By accepting Turkey, we will build a bridge to the Islamic world, and such bridges are now more important than ever" ¹³ .

Perhaps the most vivid contradictions in society regarding the "European court" of Turkey are manifested in France. Just a day before the opening of the EU summit in Brussels, speaking to compatriots on TF-1 TV channel, President Jacques Chirac convinced them that Turkey's admission to this organization is more likely in the national interests of France, but at the same time stressed that "negotiations do not mean membership yet. Turkey must make certain efforts to comply with our norms, values, and way of life, both in the field of human rights and in the field of a market economy."

Turkey, Chirac continued, has a booming economy, and it is better if it functions for the benefit of Europe, not against it. In this case, Europe will be able to strengthen its position in front of such global power poles as the United States, China and India. Referring to the issue of "honorary membership" in the EU as an alternative path for Turkey, Chirac said: "The Turks will never do that. They are a proud people who consciously make tremendous efforts to move in our direction. " ¹⁴

The opposition on the right regarded Chirac's speech as "inappropriate moralizing". The leader of the Union for French Democracy party, F. Bayrou, referring to another phrase dropped by the President of France-

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According to a recent poll, about half of the population is against accepting Turkey) - "leaders are not guided by public polls" - accused him of monarchism. French Economy, Finance and Industry Minister Nicolas Sarkozy, one of Chirac's most serious rivals in the upcoming 2007 presidential election, has warned that European leaders ' support for Turkey will add to French society's problems. Only the Greens and Socialists supported Chirac, calling the decision of the Brussels summit "a step towards peace" (head of the French Socialists P. Moscovici). However, the "left" was skeptical about the likelihood that the president will soon be able to convince public opinion about Turkey, and even with the help of edification ^.15

However, admission to the EU of Turkey and any other countries directly depends on the opinion expressed by the average resident of the European continent. The European Union has long had the practice of holding national referendums on the admission of new members. As for France, on January 28, 2005, deputies of the National Assembly of that country constitutionally approved the mandatory nature of this practice. They are also preparing another amendment, according to which this provision will not apply to Bulgaria and Romania, whose accession to the EU is scheduled for 2007, and to Croatia, with which negotiations will begin this year. Turkey seems to have no reason to count on such advantages ^.16

The Mediterranean European states of Spain, Italy, and Portugal are mostly pro-Turkish, despite strong opposition from the Catholic Church. Portuguese Prime Minister Pedro Santana Lopez said during the summit that membership of a multi-ethnic country with a population of 70 million, somewhat similar to Portugal itself, will enrich Europe. In Italy, public opinion is mostly favorable to Turkey, with the exception of the small Northern League parliamentary group, whose representatives declared December 17 a "day of mourning" for the EU on the grounds that "a step towards Muslim Turkey turned Christian values into nothing" ¹⁷ .

The Scandinavian countries are mostly in favor of a low-key "yes" to Turkey.

One of the most determined opponents of Turkey's EU membership among European countries is Austria. Austrian Chancellor W. Schussel even spoke out at the summit in favor of holding a referendum in his country on pre-offensive negotiations with Turkey. Minister of Finance K.-H. Grasser publicly opposed Turkey's accession to the European Union on December 19, 2004: "I think that Turkey's membership in the EU will not be beneficial for us. I am surprised that in the debates that are currently taking place within the European Union, almost no one has the courage to openly state this." In an interview with reporters before the meeting of finance ministers of the EU member states, Grasser said:: "Turkey is not ready to join the EU. The problem is that if you have promised to negotiate EU membership, it means that the door is open for that country to join the bloc, and it will only be a matter of time before it does."¹⁸

* * *

There is no doubt that Turkey still has a long and difficult way to go before (and if) it becomes a full member of the European Union. Its preparations for EU membership may, according to some estimates, stretch at least until the middle of this century. Progress in the negotiations will depend entirely on the ability of the Turkish leadership to translate legislative reforms, especially in the field of human rights, into practical matters, the main ones of which are ensuring the rights of women and national minorities, especially Kurds, ending torture in Turkish prisons, guaranteeing freedom of speech and religion, as well as real changes in the political system. the judicial and prosecutorial systems of Turkey.

Apparently, before the date set by the EU - October 3, 2005 - the Turkish leadership will have to choose between negotiations with the European Union, which will not necessarily be crowned with success, and support for the previous line on Cyprus. It seems that the Prime Minister and the pragmatic leaders of the AKP will not risk what they call the "project of the century". This assumption is also supported by the statement made by R. T. Erdogan at the last international economic meeting in Davos about Turkey's determination to seek Turkey's accession to the European Union.

-----

¹ http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/ turkey/trends.htm, comparative data for 1998-2003

² Islam in the Modern East, Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Kraft+, 2004, p. 306, with reference to www.liberation.fr

³ Turkey between Europe and Asia, Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Kraft+, 2001, p. 351.

⁴ Hereafter, the texts of amendments are given by www.belgenet.com.tr; on the 6th and 7th "legislative packages". See also www.hurriyetim.com.tr and www.bigpara.com. Amended text of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey. www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/main.htm

⁵ http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/press/ newsid_3718000/3718992.stm

⁶ The text of the report was used for www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=130457

⁷ http://www.hellas.ru/news/?id=2751&type=Greece

⁸ www.greek.ru, 03.09.2004.

⁹ www.hurriyet.com.tr, 13.12.2004.

¹⁰ www.hurriyet.com.tr, 17.12.2004.

¹¹ The text of the Declaration signed on 17.12.2004 at the Brussels Summit can be found at www.abhaber.com.tr

¹² www.turtsia.ru, 29.11.2004.

¹³ Ibid., 3.05.2004.

¹⁴ www.liberation.fr, 16.12.2004.

¹⁵ Ibid., 17.12.2004.

¹⁶ http://www.vremya.ru, 28.01.2005.

¹⁷ www.hurriyet.com.tr, 17.12.2004.

¹⁸ http://www.gazeta.ru/lenta/2004/09/10/news_170322.shtml

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