A. V. GLAZOVA

Candidate of Philological Sciences

Russian Institute for Strategic Studies

Keywords: Turkey, GCC countries, Arab spring, Persian Gulf monarchies, Muslim Brotherhood, Syrian crisis

Over the past decades, Turkey and the Arab monarchies united in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have shown no interest in developing political and economic ties. This was due to a number of reasons, among which the most significant were the foreign policy orientation of the Turkish leadership towards Western countries, the differences in the political systems of secular Turkey and the traditional monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula, as well as the negative impact of the historical experience of the Ottoman heritage.

During the Cold War, Turkey, as a member of NATO and a southeastern buffer of the North Atlantic Alliance, pursued a policy aimed at cooperation with Western countries, and the Arab Middle East was not included in its foreign policy priorities.

The first official visit of Saudi King Faisal al-Saud to Turkey took place in 1966.However, for many years after that, Turkey kept its distance and did not try to develop relations with the countries of the region. Only in 1984, the Turkish President K. Evren and Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah Al-Saud exchanged mutual visits.

The two countries gained some momentum in developing bilateral relations during the 1991 Gulf War. This was due to the fact that the regional policy of both sides was conducted in accordance with the line of NATO and the United States, which increased trust between them. Saudi Arabia even gave Turkey $2 billion. in order to compensate for the economic losses of Ankara due to the anti-Saddam position ¹.

Turkish Prime Minister S. Demirel's visit to the kingdom in 1993 was a manifestation of the improvement in bilateral relations. Then, some warming was observed during the short-lived rule of the pro-Islamic government of N. Erbakan in 1996, but the military coup that took place a year later returned bilateral relations to the traditional channel of distrust and rejection.²

The coming to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002 marked the beginning of a new multi-vector foreign policy strategy for Turkey, known as the "strategic depth"concept³. The highest priority is given to developing cooperation with countries that were once part of the Ottoman Empire, with an emphasis on using "soft power" and building an image of Turkey as a role model.

Based on this strategy, the monarchies of the Persian Gulf are of particular interest to Turkey due to their high level of socio-economic development compared to other Arab states and the presence of large oil and gas fields on their territory, which allow these countries to accumulate significant financial resources.

For their part, the GCC countries perceive Turkey, which is gaining regional influence with its fast-growing economy, as an influential power that is able to balance regional threats, as well as as an important economic partner with which it is beneficial to develop bilateral trade and initiate joint economic projects. Thus, according to Western experts, despite the fact that "Turkey's imperial baggage continues to cast a shadow on Turkish-Arab relations, the expediency of their development in the present seems to have overcome the legacy of the past." ⁴

POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC COOPERATION

An important milestone in the development of Turkey's bilateral ties with the Arabian monarchies was September 2008,when the GCC countries named Turkey a strategic partner. ⁵ In order to institutionalize political and economic dialogue, the Council for Strategic Cooperation at the Highest Level was established in the same year.

The parties also signed an agreement on holding annual joint meetings at the level of foreign ministers, which allowed them to start developing a dialogue on Middle East policy issues. The first such meeting was held in Istanbul in July 2009. As a result, it was decided to coordinate efforts and mutually support positions on such international issues as the Iranian nuclear program, the settlement of the situation in Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. ⁶ It was also decided to look for new opportunities and prospects in the development of economic ties and the creation of a free trade zone as soon as possible.

As part of the work of the Strategic Cooperation Council, an action plan was developed and approved in 2010 to boost ties in such areas as business, investment, agriculture, transport and communications, and energy.

THE IMPACT OF THE ARAB SPRING ON RELATIONS BETWEEN REGIONAL ALLIES

The Arab Spring has led to an even greater intensification of Turkey's political and economic ties with its regional allies in the Arabian Peninsula. Suffice it to say that in 2010-2013, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan made 13 visits to the GCC countries, including 8 to Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

In general, the "Arab Spring" marked a new stage in regional politics, which was characterized by the active involvement of the GCC countries in the political reconstruction of the Greater Middle East, on the one hand, and the non - Arab countries of the region, primarily Turkey, on the other.

Ankara, after some hesitation, has supported opposition movements in countries gripped by revolutionary upheaval, thereby distancing itself from its recent allies in the form of the ruling elites of these countries, with whom it has strengthened relations over the past years. This decision was primarily motivated by Turkey's desire to extend the Turkish political model of "soft" Islam and democracy to the countries affected by the "Arab Spring" and thereby strengthen its position in the region. The emphasis was placed on representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, with whom Turkish leaders maintained close ties long before the Arab Spring.

The Turkish authorities promoted the formation of organizations of opposition forces in Tunisia, Libya and Syria on the territory of the country, and in March 2011, the Turkish parliament approved the participation of the country's army in a military operation in Libya. Although the Turkish military did not participate in combat operations against the Libyan government forces, Turkish warships provided a naval blockade of Libya.

In early 2012, the Persian Gulf monarchies represented by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) actively supported the Syrian opposition and joined forces with Turkey to overthrow the Assad regime. Saudi Arabia was the first country to recognize the Syrian National Council as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people and began to supply the Syrian rebels with weapons and finances through Turkey. Official Qatar in February 2012 called on the international community to arm the Syrian opposition to help it overthrow Bashar al-Assad, and the Turkish parliament in October 2012 gave the government a mandate to conduct cross-border military operations against Syria.

However, some Turkish experts already predicted that if events in Syria did not develop according to the planned scenario, this could drive a wedge between Turkey and the "gulf" monarchies. ⁷

Disagreements between the allies in the anti-Assad coalition were outlined after representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood movement came to power in Egypt with the active political and financial support of Turkey and Qatar. The spread of their influence in the region was perceived in Riyadh as a threat to the existing dynastic regime.

The development of a full-scale military conflict in Syria further intensified the contradictions between the Saudis and the Muslim Brotherhood and eventually led to the formation of two "coalition blocks": Qatar - Turkey, on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia-Jordan-the United Arab Emirates, on the other. Turkey and Saudi Arabia have been particularly divided. Although officials of both countries continue to claim in press statements that their vision of regional problems is completely identical, since it is aimed at creating peace and prosperity in neighboring states, ⁸ in reality, the positions of the parties on regional issues are increasingly diverging.

A turning point in the deterioration of relations between the two countries was the overthrow of Islamist President M. Morsi, supported by Turkey and Qatar, in Egypt. Ankara believes that the military coup in Egypt was carried out with the active financial support of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates "in order to strengthen control over Egypt and create a puppet administration in this country."⁹

The September 2013 policy reversal of US President Boris Johnson. Obama's move to seek political solutions to both the crisis in Syria and relations with Iran has further exacerbated the situation and led to changes in the foreign policy priorities of Turkey and some of the Arabian monarchies.

In Turkey, there is a growing awareness of the need to reset the stalled policy towards Syria. Part of the Turkish leadership is aware that Ankara will not get any benefits even from the defeat of Bashar al-Assad, because in this case, not the Muslim Brotherhood, supported by the current government, but radical Islamists may come to power in Syria. In this regard, some Turkish leaders have started talking about the need to change the Turkish strategy in the Middle East. A. Gul, who served as the country's president until August 2014, has repeatedly stated in his speeches that it is necessary to review Turkish diplomacy and security policy towards Syria and make efforts to find a "mutually beneficial" strategic line in the Middle East. In his opinion, the United States should share responsibility for the fate of the Middle East with other leading powers-Russia and Iran.¹⁰

Official Ankara also fears that radical Islamists controlled by the Saudi special services may step up their activities in Turkey, which poses a threat to the country's security. Therefore, according to reports

Figure 1. Population - to-GDP ratio per capita in Turkey and GCC countries.

Compiled according to the IMF: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/ 2013/02/weodata

The Government of Turkey has decided to close the Syrian jihad control centers in the country, which were run by Saudi intelligence agents.11

Thus, an analysis of the situation in the region shows that after the start of the "Arab revolutions", Turkey, despite its officially declared neutrality in the confrontation between Sunnis and Shiites, in fact, joined the Sunni bloc led by Saudi Arabia and its allies, whose main task is to weaken Iranian influence in the region. However, the Syrian crisis and the military coup in Egypt revealed the existence of contradictions already within the Sunni camp, related to the support of various religious movements and, as a result, to the parties ' different visions of the future political structure of the Arab Spring countries.

TRADE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Turkey's interest in developing economic cooperation with the monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula is determined by the high rates of economic growth of these states, their developed infrastructure, as well as the presence of large reserves of energy resources. According to experts, the GCC countries account for 36% of the world's oil reserves and 22% of the world's gas reserves.¹²

The hydrocarbon resources that underlie the prosperity of the Arabian monarchies have allowed them to make a huge leap in development. From 2000 to 2012, the combined gross domestic product of these countries grew approximately 5 times and exceeded $1.5 trillion. The GCC combined economies rank 14th in the world in terms of GDP, with Saudi Arabia dominating at 42%¹³.

The available financial resources allow the 46 million people of these countries to live in conditions that significantly exceed world standards. GDP per capita in the GCC countries ranges from $23-24 thousand in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia to $105 thousand in Qatar. On average, it is almost $45 thousand, which is significantly higher than the global average of ¹⁴. In Turkey (76 million people) GDP per capita is $10.5 thousand, which can be considered a good indicator for the actively developing Turkish economy, which does not have any significant energy reserves (see figure 1).

The volume of the hydrocarbon sector in the GDP structure of the GCC states is about 43%¹⁵. To reduce the dependence of their economies on energy resources, strengthen their economic potential and increase competitiveness, the Arabian monarchies are pursuing a policy of diversification, investing in the development of industry, education and social infrastructure, as well as actively developing economic integration. This policy makes the GCC market very attractive for Turkish contractors. Turkish firms and construction companies are involved in more than 450 projects in these countries, the total cost of which reaches almost $40 billion.

High rates of economic development in the GCC countries, whose GDP growth in 2012 ranged from 4.4% (UAE) to 6.2% (Qatar and Kuwait) and averaged 5.3%¹⁶, also provided a powerful incentive for the development of economic cooperation between Turkey and the Arabian monarchies. Over the previous decade, trade between the two countries increased from $1.5 billion in 2002 to $22.4 billion in 2012. In 2005, an agreement of understanding was signed to support economic cooperation and initiate negotiations on the establishment of a free trade zone.¹⁷

Within the framework of bilateral trade and economic relations with each of the GCC countries, Turkey has concluded agreements on strengthening economic cooperation in different years, which are the legal framework for further development of economic ties. On the basis of these agreements, bilateral commissions and Business Councils have been formed to facilitate the establishment of business contacts between entrepreneurs.

An important factor for the Turkish economy is that the growth of foreign trade is due to an increase in exports of Turkish goods to the region, thanks to which Turkey has a positive trade balance with almost all GCC countries, with the exception of Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Traditional Turkish exports to the Arabian monarchies are manufactured goods and manufactures, iron and steel, as well as electrical equipment and machinery. Turkey mainly imports from these countries.

Figure 2. Turkey's trade volume with the GCC countries in 2012 ($ million).

Compiled according to the Turkish Ministry of Economy: http://www.economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=countriesandregions&region

countries include oil, natural gas, non-ferrous metals, as well as plastics and products made from it.

As shown in Figure 2, Turkey's main trading partner among the GCC countries in 2012 was the United Arab Emirates. The volume of trade between the two countries totaled $11.8 billion and, according to the Turkish Ministry of Economy, more than doubled compared to 2011*. This growth was achieved due to the fact that Turkey sells gold to the Emirates, which accounts for more than half of Turkish exports ($4.6 billion), while importing gold products from there (in 2012, $3.1 billion). Turkey has become the second largest gold exporter for the Emirates. The UAE has also become an important market for Turkish contractors involved in 99 projects in the country with a total value of $8.4 billion.¹⁸

Traditionally, one of the main trading partners of Turkey among the monarchies of the Persian Gulf is Saudi Arabia. The Turkish-Saudi Business Council started functioning in 2004, and in May 2005, Ankara and Riyadh decided to create an investment fund designed to encourage private and government investment from the Gulf countries in Turkey. Turkish exports to Saudi Arabia totaled $3.7 billion in 2012, while imports totaled $4.4 billion. Compared to 2011, these indicators have increased by about a third. Turkish firms have contracts in 193 projects in Saudi Arabia with a total value of $12.4 billion ¹⁹.

Qatar, with its dynamically developing economy and huge financial resources derived from the sale of hydrocarbons, has become a very promising market for Turkish entrepreneurs in recent years. Due to these factors, trade relations between Turkey and Qatar have grown almost 5-fold over the past decade , from $26 million in 2002 to $1.2 billion in 2012. The Qatari economy is particularly attractive for Turkish contractors. Currently, Turkish companies are developing 108 projects in Qatar with a total cost of $12.2 billion. By this indicator, Qatar is the 7th largest global market for ²⁰ Turkish firms.

Turkey's economic relations with Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman are relatively small. The total volume of trade with these countries in 2012 was $1.2 billion. Turkey exports industrial and electrical equipment, iron and steel, textiles; the main imports are plastics, petroleum, chemicals and non-ferrous metals.

Currently, the question of whether the contradictions that have arisen between some Gulf countries and Turkey can affect economic relations is being hotly debated. Turkish experts express different opinions on this issue.

Thus, the Head of International Relations of the Turkish Middle East Technical University, H. Bagci believes that the criticism of former Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan regarding the policy of Saudi Arabia and its neighboring monarchies that support it can seriously undermine economic ties between the countries.

Figure 3. GCC countries ' investments in the Turkish economy ($ million).

Compiled from data from: Economic Outlook. Breakdown of Foreign Investments by Country - http://www.economy.gov.tr

* Republic of Turkey. Ministry of economy // Countries and Regions - http://economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=countriesandregions&count.ry-SA&region=4

and "lead to an outflow of foreign investment from Turkey, as well as damage the interests of Turkish business in this region" ²¹. In contrast, M. Akgun, director of the Turkish Center for Global Policy Directions, believes that despite the differences between the parties in their approaches to regional changes, including the events in Egypt, the Gulf countries "are unlikely to decide to withdraw their investments from Turkey, since this country occupies a leading position in the region.""²².

A similar point of view is shared by Turkish economists, who believe that politics and business should not be confused. In particular, A. Kayhan, the head of one of the major economic companies, notes that the developing Turkish market is very attractive for investors from the Arabian monarchies, and they are unlikely to leave it because of political disagreements23.

To confirm or refute this point of view, it seems appropriate to follow the dynamics of foreign investment flows from the GCC countries to Turkey in recent years. Over the period from 2011 to 2013, they increased more than 10 times - from $106 million to almost $1.2 billion, while the total volume of foreign investment in Turkey decreased by $5.9 billion during ^the same period24.

This means that the growing Turkish economy continues to be attractive for investors from the GCC countries who are willing to invest in it. So, at the end of 2013, following a visit to Turkey, businessmen from these countries announced that they were ready to invest $200 billion in the Turkish economy, including in the implementation of such major projects as the construction of the Istanbul Canal, which will connect the Marmara Sea and the Black Sea, the third bridge across the Bosphorus Strait and the new airport ²⁵.

Thus, financial flows from Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, which are among the top 20 Turkish investors, have a positive impact on the development of the Turkish economy.

At the same time, the geography of investments seems to be directly related to the dynamics of the development of Turkey's political relations with a particular monarchy. Thus, the volume of foreign investment from Qatar for the period from 2012 to 2013 increased 10-fold - from $46 million. up to $469 million, making Qatar the main investor in the Turkish economy among the GCC countries. During the same period, investment from Saudi Arabia almost doubled, from $439 million. up to $243 million ²⁶.

* * *

As follows from the presented analysis, the contradictory nature of the current relations between Turkey and the monarchies of the Persian Gulf is expressed in the fact that, on the one hand, these countries see significant prospects for the development of economic relations, on the other - Turkey's political ambitions and its desire to strengthen its influence over the Arab Mashriq* with the help of the " Brothers-Muslims " causes discontent of some Arabian monarchies and threatens their political interests.

* Mashriq (from Arabic: "where the sunrise is") is a collective name for Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Palestine, and Lebanon. Egypt is often included in this series.

^{Baskan B.} 1 Turkey-GCC relations: is there a future? // Insight Turkey. 2011. N 1. Vol. 13, p. 9.

^{Ataman M.} 2 Turkish-Saudi Arabian relations during the Arab uprisings: towards a strategic partnership? // Insight Turkey. 2012. N 4. Vol. 14, p. 121 - 136.

^{Davutoglu A.} 3 Turkey's zero-problems foreign policy // Foreign Policy, 20.05.2010 -http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/ 05/20/turkeys_zero_problems_foreign_policy

^{Walker J.} 4 Return of the Turks as Middle East kingmaker // Middle East Foreign Policy, 3.02.2011 - http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/ posts/2011/02/03/return_of_the_turks_as_m iddle_east _kingmaker

^{Mariam Al Hakeem.} 5 GCC names Turkey first strategic partner outside the gulf // Gulfnews.com, 3.09.2008 - http://gulfn.ews. com/news/gulf/uae/general/gcc-names-turkey-first-strategic-partner-outside-the-gulf-1.12963 1.

⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey -http://www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-statement-of- the-joint-ministerial-meeting-of-the-gcc-turkey-high-level-strategic-dialogue-istanbul-_-turke y_-8-july-2009.en.mfa

^{Kardas S.} 7 Turkey and the Gulf dialogue in the Middle East // The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/Publication/ efe57ebc-ca34 - 4e94-a7e0 - 04b6b721e3bb/ Turkey%20and%20Gulf%20Dialogue_Saban% 20Kardas.pdf

⁸ See, for example, the statements made by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu during his meeting with his Saudi counterpart Salman al-Faisal in Riyadh on August 27-28, 2013.- http://www.mfa.gov.tr/foreign-minister-davutoglu-discusses-the-developments-in-egypt-and - syria-with-foreign-minister-of-saudi-arabia. en. mfa

^{Ozerli B.} 9 Tension between Gulf countries and Turkey may harm economic relations // Today's Zaman, 25.08.2013 - http://www.to-dayszaman.com/news-324502-tension-between-gulf-countries-and-turkey-may -harm-economic-relations.html

¹⁰ Gul calls for reset of Turkey's Syria policy // Al Monitor, 15.01.2014 -http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/01/turkey-gul-syria-policy-reset-erdogan-da vutoglu.html

¹¹ Turkey closed Saudi intelligence's headquarters supporting "insurgents" in Syria // Syria is Here - http://syriaishere.com/en/ article/2589/turkey-closed-saudi-intelligence-s-headquarters-supporting.html#ixzz2sQko4Udi

¹² BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2014 - http://www.bp.com/content/dam/ bp/pdf/Energy-economics/statistical-review-2014/BP-statistical-review-of-world-energy-2014 -full-report.pdf

^{Busev A.} 13 Expert opinion: GCC Economic Integration - www.dxb. en/project/pr/detail. php? ID=55303&sphrase_id=405386

¹⁴ Calculated according to the IMF: World Economic Outlook Database - http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata

^{Busev A.} 15 Decree. Op.

¹⁶ Calculated according to the IMF data / / World Economic Outlook Database - http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/i ndex. aspx

¹⁷ A win-win relationship: Recent years have seen a jump in trade with Gulf states -http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.eom/news/w in-win-relationship-recent-years-have-seen-jump-trade-gulf-states

¹⁸ Republic of Turkey. Ministry of economy // Countries and Regions -http://economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=count riesandregions&country=SA&region-4

¹⁹ Ibidem.

²⁰ Ibid.

^{Ozerli B.} 21 Op. cit.

²² Ibidem.

²³ GCC-Turkish tension to "temporarily" hit businesses // Gulf News, 30.09.2013 -http://gulfnews.com/business/investment/gcc -turkish-tension-to-temporarily-hit-businesses-1.1237597

²⁴ Republic of Turkey. Ministry of economy // Economic Outlook - www.eco-nomy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=economicoutlook

²⁵ Gulf countries to invest real estate sector in Turkey, 05.12.2013 http://www.portturkey.com/real-estate/5753-gulf-countries-to-invest-real-estate-sector-in-turk cy

²⁶ Ibidem.

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