N. Y. ULCHENKO

Candidate of Economic Sciences

Key words: Turkey, economic model, Arab Spring. Middle East, financial stability, social policy

Recently, the attention of international analysts has been increasingly attracted by Turkey's economic success. Sometimes the concept of a Turkish "economic miracle"is even used in their assessment. So does it really exist? The answer to this question is important for predicting the future socio-political development of the entire vast region of the Near and Middle East: after all, to a large extent, maintaining a shaky balance depends on the stability of such a major player as Turkey. If we take into account that the catalyst of the "Arab Spring" was acute problems in the socio-economic development of countries, then the economic well-being of Turkey turns out to be the most important prerequisite for its political stability and the possibility of fulfilling the mission of a regional leader that is so desirable for the current Turkish elite in establishing a dialogue with the new elites of Arab countries and searching for ways to develop the Middle East.

The answer to this question is also important for analyzing the prospects for political stabilization and socio-economic development in the Arab world experiencing revolutions and their ambiguous consequences*, including the possible borrowing of the experience of the Turkish "economic miracle".

FACETS OF AN "ECONOMIC MIRACLE"

What is an" economic miracle " ** in relation to Turkey?

First, we need to find out how unusual the country's economic development has been in recent years. Several features that significantly differ its course from the period of the 1990s-early 2000s were undoubtedly traced. And here we are talking not only and not so much about the growth rates, which in some years of the previous period were also very high, but also about the onset of a period of fairly strong financial stabilization, which gave growth stability (see Table

Secondly, the question of financial stabilization mechanisms is fundamentally important: is it the result of extraordinary, but relatively short-term efforts to curb inflation, or is it a question of changing the development model, which will really allow Turkey to say goodbye to a period of uneven growth, periodically interrupted by crises?

A significant third aspect is the question of the unavoidable costs of changing the model, if it really happened, and its potential vulnerabilities.

POPULIST BUMPS

What were the main characteristics of Turkey's economic development model in the 1990s and early 2000s?

To a large extent, they were predetermined by populist-infused economic policies. This was the result of an extremely fierce struggle for votes in the context of Turkey's transition to a multi-party system after World War II, while the overall weak development of democracy, especially mechanisms to limit the severity of inter-party confrontation, remained. As noted by the Turkish researcher Z. "From the point of view of the political regime, Turkey is a moderate player that has already experienced a democratic transition, but still has not met the expectations for democratic consolidation." Such countries, in his opinion, have more difficulties in achieving economic and political stability than countries with deep-rooted authoritarian regimes (for example, China), or countries with a more established democratic ^system1. Russian turkologist V. I. Danilov explains Onish's idea:"...The painful introduction of Western political norms and institutions into the local soil led to the fact that from the very beginning of the introduction of political pluralism, the struggle of the main political opponents within its framework was, as they say, on the verge of a foul."²

Following the results of the 1983 parliamentary elections - the first after the military coup of 1980 - the Fatherland Party led by Turgut Ozal came to power. Her inability, or rather unwillingness

* For more information, see: Vasiliev A.M. Tsunami revolyutsii // Aziya i Afrika segodnya, 2011, N 3; Tsunami revolyutsii ne spadaet // Asia and Africa Today, 2011, No. 6 (ed. ed.).

** "Economic miracle" - the figurative name of a fast-growing economy of a country or region for quite a long time. Originally applied to the definition of rapid recovery of the World War II-ravaged economies of France, Italy, Germany, Japan, and other countries. In the future, this "title" passed to new industrial countries, primarily East Asian ones (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, etc.). Now it is often called fast-growing emerging economies, primarily China and India. Among such economies, Turkey constantly appears (editor's note).

Table 1

Key indicators of Turkey's macroeconomic development in 1993-2010 (%)

* For 1993, 1994, and 1995, the base prices for calculating GDP growth are those of 1987.

** The ratio of budget revenues and expenditures excluding payments for servicing public debt. Thus, the surplus forms a real source of public debt repayment, that is, not related to new loans.

Compiled and calculated by: TUIK. Istatistik gostergeler 1923 - 2008. Ankara, 2009, p. 599, 644, 646, 693, 753; TOBB. Ekonomik Rapor 2005. Ankara, 2006, p. 79; TOBB. Ekonomik Rapor 2006. Ankara, 2007, p. 78; TOBB. Ekonomik Rapor 2009. Ankara, 2010, p. 78, 135; TOBB. Ekonomik Rapor 2010. Ankara, 2011, p. 89, 144.

The drastic restriction of public spending and thus the solution to the problem of chronic inflation was one of the main reasons for the decline in the popularity of the ruling party in the 1987 elections. Nevertheless, Ozal once again managed to head the Cabinet of Ministers.

But prices continued to rise. Therefore, the Government was forced to take measures to limit public spending. However, its efforts to reduce the growth rate of the money supply led to a contraction of the domestic market and a reduction in growth from 9.8% in 1987 to 1.5% in 1988.3 While the anti-inflationary effect of economic policy was not achieved: in the first quarter of 1988, monthly price growth was 6-7%4.

The country's economy has entered a period of stagflation (stagnation accompanied by further price increases). Its main "culprit" was distrust of the authorities ' anti-inflationary efforts on the part of economic agents. Their robust inflation expectations continued to drag prices up even after measures were taken to limit the growth of the money supply.

Getting out of the state of stagflation required the authorities to resort to a stimulating fiscal policy, which implies a conscious increase in public spending in order to expand the capacity of the domestic market and revive the economy. And since the second half of 1988, the government has taken the path of increasing real wages. At the same time, the imbalance in the state financial system began to increase, but the desire to overcome economic stagnation pushed the task of reducing inflation into the background: it was no longer so much about a reasonable balance between growth rates and macroeconomic stability, but rather about the government's unconditional choice in favor of the former.

At the end of 1989, T. Ozal became the President of the Republic of Turkey. And, apparently, it is no coincidence that his departure from the post of prime Minister coincided with a change in the very style and essence of economic policy: the art of the former prime minister's virtuoso compromise, which combined populist concessions with a strategic course to modernize the economy, was replaced by the unconditional and dangerous economic populism of the late 1980s and early 1990s.

The new prime ministers, who were inferior in political sophistication to Ozal, responded to the aggravation of contradictions between society and the authorities only with erroneous concessions from the point of view of a long-term economic strategy, which made it impossible to reduce the imbalance in the public finance system. The relatively more complete restoration of democracy, including the resumption of strong trade unions, also forced compliance.

The budget deficit, which was 3% of GDP in 1988, reached 6.7%^by 1993.5 As a result, the state increasingly resorted to loans. In the face of a growing deficit of more than

only high-yield government debt securities with short maturities were in demand, which made servicing the national debt very burdensome. As interest expenses increased, less and less of them were covered by budget revenues, and the state's borrowing activities were increasingly based on the principles of a financial pyramid, which in the long run meant inevitable bankruptcy.

In 1989, Turkey completed the liberalization of the national financial market, aimed, among other things, at the free use of any form of foreign loans by national banks. In the face of a growing shortage of state finances, banks have become the main borrowers in the foreign market for subsequent lending to the state.

"The state deficit was financed through internal agents, who received more and more loans abroad. Their indirect loans have replaced the direct loans of the state on the international capital market",-Z. wrote about the situation in Turkey in the early 1990s. Onish ⁶. At the same time, the well-being of public finances themselves, as well as Turkish banks, has become dependent on the influx of speculative "hot money", which is characterized by high mobility and sensitivity to the deterioration of the economic situation of the national market.

At the end of 1993, the government of the Right Path Party, which came to power, made an attempt, though it turned out to be unnecessarily harsh, to reverse the growing negative trends in the Turkish economy by announcing a decrease in the yield on government securities. As a result, a rapid withdrawal of short-term foreign capital from the Turkish economy began: its outflow in 1994 amounted to about $7 billion. The forced shift in the focus of deficit financing from external loans to Central Bank advances has increased the inevitable level of devaluation of the Turkish lira in the current situation: compared to the average annual exchange rate for 1993, the lira fell by 170% in 1994.7

The crisis of 1994 can be attributed to populist budget crises that were not uncommon in the 20th century. "The Turkish government has decided to make large-scale inflows of foreign capital a key mechanism for restoring economic growth, ignoring the basic structural shortcomings of the Turkish economy, first of all, a significant financial imbalance... The liberalization of investment transactions did contribute to economic growth in the early 1990s, but it was a type of growth that contributed more to exacerbating than overcoming the underlying structural weakness of the Turkish economy. Onish ⁸.

In order to get the country out of the currency and financial crisis, the government has developed a stabilization program. Stabilization of state finances was supposed to be ensured by reducing expenditures and increasing revenues. At the same time, the Government emphasized its determination to "put an end to the vicious circle when loans are spent to cover the budget deficit, and then new loans are required to pay interest on previous loans"⁹.

But already in 1995, Prime Minister T. Chiller, by increasing the salaries of some categories of employees in the public sector, ensured her party's repeated victory in the 1995 parliamentary elections. In the following years, the return to the popular among voters stimulating fiscal policy continued.

As a result, the decline in the economic growth rate, which was 5.5% in 1994, was replaced in 1995 by a noticeable economic recovery of about 7% (see Table 1). The Turkish economy also showed quite high growth rates in 1996 and 1997 - 7.1% and 8.3%, respectively. But at the same time, the annual rate of inflation was only slightly less than 100%, and the problem of servicing public debt again worsened: interest payments in the structure of consolidated budget expenditures remained at an alarmingly high level -30% and above ¹⁰.

FAILED U-TURN ATTEMPT

The government that came to power in July 1997, headed by the leader of the Motherland Party M. Yilmaz, found itself faced with the need to implement a tough fiscal policy. The Turkish press wrote that "M. Yilmaz's popularity is so low that the only way for him to win the next election is to really reduce inflation." ¹¹ Apparently, this circumstance forced the government to make some progress in this direction: as of January 1999, retail prices increased by 50% compared to ^January 199812.

The anti-inflationary measures of the Turkish authorities were positively evaluated by the West, which was critical of the use of inflation as a kind of way to stimulate business activity in Turkey. At the same time, awareness of the negative aspects of economic development, in which periods of growth alternate with crises, has occurred in the country itself.

Since 2000. The IMF has started lending support to the Turkish government's stabilization measures. In the first half of the 2000s, Turkey made significant progress in combating inflation: wholesale price growth from January to April was 16.2%, which was the lowest level in the same period for the previous 13 years.¹³

But since the second half of the 2000s, the rate of decline in inflation has lagged behind the planned rate. Under the conditions of a fixed exchange rate chosen as a stabilizer,-

This meant that the price of the Turkish lira rose, which led to an increase in demand for imported goods. As a result, foreign financial investors, whose role in the country's economy, given the extremely impressive scale of previously accumulated public debt and its servicing costs, remained very significant, questioned the government's ability to firmly adhere to the planned policy of maintaining the exchange rate. To normalize the situation, in November 2000, the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CSTD) conducted currency interventions in the amount of $6 billion ¹⁴. In the late 2000s, attempts were made to accelerate the implementation of structural reforms. In addition, an important role was played by reaching an agreement with the IMF on the allocation of $7.5 billion. to increase official foreign exchange reserves ¹⁵.

The partially achieved stabilization of the financial market was disrupted by disagreements in government structures, which again caused the public to lose confidence in the ongoing stabilization program, and the Turkish lira began to be subjected to massive attacks. As a result, in February 2001, the Central Bank of Russia announced the transition to a floating exchange rate, which was equivalent to declaring uncontrolled devaluation.

The monetary and financial crisis of 2001 was caused by the same reasons as the crisis of 1994: the continued unbalance in the sphere of state finances, the attraction of short-term foreign investment to finance the deficit, and the dependence of the national economy on fluctuations in the receipts of external sources of financing. "Under considerable pressure from the distribution sector (populist economic policy), which failed to manage adequately in a fragmented party system with weak institutions, the lack of fiscal discipline acted as a constant source of instability, leading to the crises of 1994 and 2001," notes Onish16.

FACES OF THE "ECONOMIC MIRACLE"

The implementation of Turkey's Strong Economy Program, which began after the 2001 crisis, provided the first signs of recovery, but a number of key macroeconomic indicators continued to indicate a difficult economic situation that persisted by the end of 2002: inflation at the end of the year was 45%, the rate on long-term loans exceeded 63%, the budget deficit exceeded 14% of GDP, and the national debt reached almost 80% of the country's GDP ¹⁷.

In November 2002, the pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) won its first parliamentary election victory. To a large extent, the party's success was ensured by its rather critical attitude towards the stabilization measures proposed by the IMF, which contradicted the very essence of the Republic of Turkey, which the country's constitution defines as a social state.

The essence of the AKP's economic policy was to reach a compromise between the implementation of the stabilization program agreed with the IMF and a more or less active social policy, which should at least partially ensure the preservation of the party's identity in the process of continuing cooperation with the Fund. At the same time, the relative size of the primary budget surplus, budget deficit, and inflation agreed with the IMF formed the basis for its restrictive fiscal and monetary policies.

The AKP presented the achievements of its government in the field of economic policy in the declaration with which the party entered the next parliamentary elections in pre-crisis 2007, which remains the most successful in implementing this policy so far. In the declaration, the period 2003-2007 was declared the most outstanding in the economic history of the republic, which allowed Turkey to become recognized as a "rising star" among developing countries and a "successful role model".

These statements were supported by very convincing facts that indicate serious changes in the stabilization of the macroeconomic situation.

The average level of primary budget surplus in 2003-2006 reached 6.5% of GDP, compared with 0.4% in 1993-2002. The national debt fell almost twice in relation to GDP-to 45%. As a result, for the first time in 34 years, it was possible to reduce the annual rate of inflation to the single-digit figures: in 2007. it was slightly more than 8%. Macroeconomic stabilization has allowed us to maintain stable and at the same time sufficiently high growth rates: if in the period from 1997 to 2001. they averaged 0.3%, then in 2003 - 2006 - 7.3%.

Since 2002, the country's national income has grown 2.2 times from $181 billion. up to $400 billion, which allowed Turkey to take the 17th place in the world economic ranking. The conversion of national income by purchasing power parity gave Turkey the 6th place in Europe. The national income per capita at the current exchange rate was $5,477 in 2006, compared to $2,598 in 2002.**

Under the influence of the global financial and economic crisis in 2009 Turkey's GDP shrank by 4.7%. But unlike many other countries, the economy recovered quickly: in 2010, its growth reached 8.9% (see Table 1).

To mitigate the negative consequences of the global crisis in Turkey, the successful reform of the banking sector, which made it possible to avoid bankruptcy and fully preserve it, largely contributed. In addition, according to Onish, the preservation of the image

Table 2 Share of some items in government expenditures (%) *

* Total government expenditures include, in addition to the budget, revenues and expenditures of some other parts of the public finance system.

** Calculated the share of budget expenditures.

Compiled and calculated by: UCCET. Economic Report 1997. Ankara, 1998, p. 68, 74; TOBB. Ekonomik Rapor 2003. Ankara, 2004, p. 78, 86; UCCET. Economic Report 2004, Ankara, 2005, p. 79, 85; TOBB. Ekonomik Rapor 2005. Ankara, 2006, p. 78, 84; TOBB. Ekonomik Rapor 2007. Ankara, 2008, p. 83, 88; TOBB. Ekonomik Rapor 2009. Ankara, 20010, p. 77, 82; TOBB. Ekonomik Rapor 2010. Ankara, 2011, p. 88, 92.

The AKP was encouraged by the successful interpretation of the crisis as "a phenomenon that has an entirely external origin", although tensions have been growing in the Turkish economy since the beginning of 2007 due to increased spending on financing the parliamentary elections (July 2007) and then the local government elections (March 2009)^.19

At the end of 2010, the deficit was 3.3% of GDP, although the permissible size was assumed at 4.9%. In addition, although in 2010 The primary budget surplus was not planned, but it was still achieved - 1.2% of GDP (see Table 1).

The Government considered it possible to refuse to continue credit cooperation with the IMF. According to Onish, the systematic delay in signing the agreement with the Fund, and then the complete rejection of it, "was presented as a manifestation of the strength of the Turkish economy and growing national independence." ²⁰ The Government announced its intention to independently control the size of the budget deficit and inflation.

The current economic policy is determined by the Medium - term Development Program of Turkey for 2010-2012. ²¹ The Government is actively developing long-term forecasts for the country's development, focusing, among other things, on 2023, when the centenary of the republic will be celebrated. By this date, Turkey aims to become one of the ¹⁰ largest economies in the world22.

THE KEY TO SUCCESS?

So, what mechanisms allow the AKP government to achieve economic success?

The Government maintains a relative balance between public revenues and expenditures by consistently reducing investment expenditures: while in 2003 public investment in fixed assets accounted for 7.2% of GDP, in 2009 it was only 3.2%, and in 2010 it was 3.9% ^.23 At the same time, unlike in the 1990s and early 2000s, when reducing and keeping low capital expenditures was inevitable due to the pressure of interest payments on public debt servicing, now the success of stabilization theoretically allows the government to resume active investment activities. But it does not consciously do this (see Table 2).

As a result, the share of the state in the total volume of investment in the national economy decreased from 32% in 2002 to less than 20% by the end of the first decade of the 2000s. ²⁴ The decline in government investment activity during the AKP administration probably fits into the definition of the party's economic policy as having a neoliberal character with its characteristic emphasis on privatization freedom, reducing the role of state economic regulation, reducing the role of the state ²⁵.

At the same time, the authorities do not seek to significantly increase the cost of salaries of civil servants, as was the case in the 1990s, consistently keeping it at about 20% of total budget expenditures (see Table 2).

At the same time, the "current transfers" item, which includes various types of social expenditures, has become a priority in budget expenditures. If in 2004 they accounted for about 20%, while in 2009-2010 the same share was accounted for only health care, pension payments and social support, while the total expenditure under the item "current transfers" exceeded 30% of the total budget expenditures.

If for a long time the main item of expenditure of the unbalanced budget remained interest payments on the national debt, then as a result of the efforts of the government, the Government of the Russian Federation has not been able to pay off the national debt.-

the share of expenditures under the item "health care, pension provision and social assistance" in 2009 came very close to interest payments - 19.6% and 19.8%, and in 2010 exceeded them - 18.7% and 16.4, respectively ²⁶.

With a wide variety of government social programs, most of them are aimed at supporting the poor and near-marginal strata. According to Turkish researchers, the AKP's innovation in the field of social policy is to transform it from a "tool for weakening the influence of the poor" to a way to expand its support by significantly increasing the volume of aid and the number of its recipients. As a result, the government has secured the reliable support of "its" voters and guarantees against the development of a scenario in the image and likeness of Egypt and other Arab states that have fallen under the roller of popular discontent.

Thus, during the AKP's rule, economic policy has not lost its populist character, but, firstly, it was possible to reduce its macroeconomic costs by including social expenditures that are important for the struggle for the electorate in a more balanced budget due to a decrease in state investment activity, and secondly, it was possible to increase the political effectiveness of populism by making it targeted and using the advantages of such a course for "your" voter.

In other words, the party managed to combine a "Westernized" economic restructuring with a significant increase in social spending, including through the use of such Islamist tools as the Social Assistance and Solidarity Support Fund*. This course allowed it to maintain its Islamist "face" in the socio-economic sphere as well.

THE REVERSE SIDE OF THE COIN

The investment process has been delegated to the private sector, and the incentives for economic growth, which were based on growing consumer demand during the budget deficits of the 1990s, have shifted towards capital investment. However, although the rate of investment has thus been raised from 16.5% of GDP in 2002 to 25.2^% in 2007.2, external sources have played ^a significant role in the process of financing them.

In 2002, the current account deficit of the balance of payments was more than modest - about $1.5 billion.²⁸ Steadily rising throughout the 2000s, it reached $42 billion in 2008. After falling to $14 billion in the 2009 crisis, it exceeded the pre-crisis level in 2010, reaching $49 billion.²⁹

On the one hand, a shift in the focus on obtaining external loans to the private sector can potentially ensure the structural adjustment of the Turkish economy, which has recently become extremely urgent-its transition to a new level of export-oriented development, the goal of which is to switch to the production of more high-tech products. If successful, the problem of reducing the current account deficit can also be expected to be solved. So far, the share of high-tech products in Turkey's production and exports is no more than 6%³⁰.

On the other hand, Turkey, like most countries with fast-growing emerging markets, largely depends on the interest of "global money" to invest in its economy, as well as on the level of their confidence in such markets in general.

The country's external debt rose from $144 billion in 2003 to $290 billion. in 2010, however, relative to GDP, this indicator still decreased from 47% to 39% ³¹.

The share of the private sector in long-term external debt, which was 24% in 2003, reached 55% in 2010, which, by the way, is not the highest indicator in recent years. In 2008 and 2009. it was 62% and 58%, respectively. In the structure of short-term debt, the private sector dominated throughout the period under review with a share of 80% -90% of its total volume.³²

A large, including stabilizing, role in the development of Turkey in the pre-crisis period was played by sharply increased foreign direct investment: in 2007, Turkey managed to attract a record over $22 billion. However, due to the global financial and economic crisis in 2010, their volume fell to $9 billion.³³ According to forecasts, Turkey will be able to reach the pre-crisis level by 2013.

In the balance of payments of the country during the AKP administration, the debt of "other sectors" (non-state and non-bank, i.e. related to the production of goods and non-financial services) significantly increased in the structure of so-called "other investments", i.e. various types of loans and other loans from abroad that do not relate to direct or portfolio investments: in 2003, this figure was $4.7 billion, and in 2008 it peaked at$33.8 billion ³⁴.

On the one hand, this trend is quite consistent with the above-mentioned increase in the role of the private sector in external loans.

On the other hand, such a significant increase in external financial support for the Turkish business sector, which significantly exceeds both the net inflow of foreign direct investment and the volume of foreign loans attracted by Turkish banks, cannot be surprising.

Political Economy of modern Islam: the experience of Turkey / / Asia and Africa Today, 2011, N4 (editor's note).

The changes in quantity can probably be attributed to changes in quality - increased financial cooperation between Turkey and the Middle East. According to some analysts, as a result of the activation of Turkey's foreign policy in the Middle East, " AKP-friendly businesses, managers and politicians have a chance to take advantage of their "Islamist" reputation in the Arab world, which has significant volumes of liquidity due to higher oil prices and is actively looking for investment opportunities in the neighboring region."³⁵

* * *

Thus, having achieved macroeconomic stability and provided a fairly stable growth against this background, the AKP government still failed to solve the main problem of the Turkish economy - to overcome the dependence of the economic development process on external sources of financing. Moreover, during the AKP's rule, this dependence has noticeably increased.

The main innovation in the field of economic policy is to move the problem of external loans, and hence the associated risks, from the sphere of public finances to the real sector of the economy. By limiting its spending and interference in production, the government has not been without success focused on solving the social problems of the most active part of its electorate.

Turkish private companies are becoming the main entity engaged in production activities and using external loans to finance them. In this situation, the issue of their financial stability becomes extremely important, which is important both from the point of view of the availability of new loans and the repayment of old ones.

The stable development of the Turkish economy has proved to be an important prerequisite for increasing the flow of external financing through a channel such as foreign direct investment. At the same time, the high level of debt dependence, as well as the geographical origin of a significant part of loans, generate a certain level of economic uncertainty, including those associated with possible restrictions on the freedom of foreign policy choice for the country.

The resilience of the Turkish business sector to the challenges of the global economic environment also depends on its ability to renew and modernize, which could solve the debt problem in the long term. Therefore, Z. Onish rightly sees the Government's main objectives in implementing large-scale tax and education reforms in order to "mobilize national resources for investment and significantly improve the quality of the labor force" ³⁶.

The AKP has managed to combine neoliberal recipes for modern modernization with Islamist principles. However, while achieving some success, the Turkish economy is following a very tortuous path, which does not guarantee it a "bright future". Thus, it is not easy to give an unambiguous answer to the question of the extent to which the Turkish experience can be useful for the economies of other countries in the Middle East.

^{Onis Z.} 1 Crises and Transformations in Turkish Political Economy // Turkish Policy Quarterly, Istanbul, 2010, N 3, p. 47 -http://www.turkishpolicy.com/dosyalar/files/45 - 61.pdf

^{Danilov V. I.} 2 Turkey: the struggle to create a westernized democratic society // Evolution of Political systems in the East, Moscow, 1999, p. 189.

^{Ulchenko N. Yu} 3 Ekonomika Turkii v usloviyakh liberalizatsii [Turkish economy in the context of liberalization]. Moscow, 2002, pp. 7-8.

⁴ UCCET. Economic Report 1990. Ankara, 1990, p. 222.

⁵ TUIK. Dstatistik gostergeler 1923 - 2008, p. 644.

^{Aysan A.F.} 6 and Onis Z. Neoliberal Globalization, The Nation State and Financial Crises in The Semi-periphery: a Comparative Analysis, p. 17 - htpp://www.econ.boun.edu.tr/pager/search.aspx&key-aysan.

⁷ UCCET. Economic Report 1998. Ankara, 1999, p. 92.

^{Aysan A.F.} 8 and Onis Z. Op. cit., p. 15 - 16.

^{Ulchenko N. Yu} 9 Edict. soch., p. 14.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 16.

¹¹ Para, 5 - 11.07.1998.

¹² Capital, Kasim, 1999, p. 45.

¹³ Capital, Haziran, 2000, p. 22.

¹⁴ Turkiyenin guclu ekonomiye gecis programi - htpp.//www.tcmb.gov.tr

¹⁵ Ibidem.

^{Onis Z.} 16 Op. cit., p. 60.

¹⁷ Guven ve Istikrar icinde durmak yok yola devam, Haziran 2007, p. 25 - 59 - www. akparti.org.tr

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 25 - 59.

^{Onis Z.} 19 Op. cit., p. 60.

²⁰ Ibidem.

²¹ Orta Vadeli Program (2010 - 2012). 16 Eylul 2009, Ankara, p. 22, 27, 28 - www.hazine.gov.tr

²² Devlet Bakan ve Basbakan Yardmcs Sayn Ali Babacann Konusma Metni/ Bahcesehir Universitesi D2013: Turkiyenin Yuzuncu Yl Vzyonu Konferans, 26 Mart 2011 - www.hazine.gov.tr

²³ TOBB. Ekonomik Rapor 2005. Ankara, 2006, p. 78; TOBB. Ekonomik Rapor 2009. Ankara, 2010, p. 77.

²⁴ TUIK. Ostatistik gostergeler 1923 - 2008. Ankara, 2009, p. 746.

²⁵ Подробнее, см., напр.: Onur M. Sosyal Politika Acsndan АКР Donemi: Sosyal Yardm Alannda Yaananlar// Calisma ve Toplum, 2011, N 1, p. 193.

²⁶ TOBB. Ekonomik Rapor 2005.., p. 84; TOBB. Ekonomik Rapor

2009, Ankara, 2010, p. 82; TOBB. Ekonomik Rapor 2010, Ankara, 2011, p. 92.

²⁷ TUIK. Dstatistik gostergeler 1923 - 2008. Ankara, 2009, p. 746; TOBB. Ekonomik Rapor 2008. Ankara, 2009, p. 34.

²⁸ TOBB. Ekonomik Rapor 2003. Ankara, 2004, p. 109;

²⁹ TOBB. Ekonomik Rapor 2010.., p. 145.

³⁰ Nineth Development Plan (2007 - 2013), 2008 Annual Programme, p. 159 - http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/program/2008i.pdf

³¹ TOBB. Ekonomik Rapor 2009, p. 136; TOBB. Ekonomik Rapor 2010, p. 145.

³² Counted by: TOBB. Ekonomik Rapor 2009, p. 113; TOBB. Ekonomik Rapor 2010, p. 121.

³³ TOBB. Ekonomik Rapor 2009, p. 109; TOBB. Ekonomik Rapor 2010, p. 118.

³⁴ TOBB. Ekonomik Rapor 2009, p. 107.

^{Grigoriadis I. N.} 35 and Kamaras A. Foreign Direct Investment in Turkey: Historical Constrains and АКР Success Story // Middle Eastern Studies, January 2008, N 1, p. 62.

^{Onis Z.} 36 Op. cit., p. 61.

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