A. V. SULEYMANOV

Candidate of Political Sciences

Lobachevsky State University of Nizhny Novgorod

Keywords: Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Hatay, Euphrates, Turkish-Syrian relations, Kurdish problem, civil war

After a period of some normalization, relations between the two neighboring states - Turkey and the Syrian Arab Republic (SAR) - are currently going through hard times. The "Arab revolution" that broke out in early 2011 was a new challenge.

In the context of the Syrian civil war, relations between Ankara and Damascus took the form of mutual reproaches and local armed provocations, and this despite the fact that in the period from 2003 to 2011, the countries sought to develop good-neighborly relations and pursue an active trade and economic policy.

Indeed, after the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in Turkey in November 2002, Ankara set out to develop multifaceted cooperation with the countries of the Middle East region and, above all, with neighboring countries. Then the question rightly arises: what caused the emergence of a new round of the Turkish-Syrian confrontation? Was it a consequence of structural changes in the Middle East caused by the Arab revolutions that broke out, or was it a signal of a change in the foreign policy strategy of the Turkish state?

Perhaps the answer to this question also lies in the historical development of Turkish-Syrian relations, which at the end of the 20th century were burdened by four problems: territorial, related to the disputed province of Hatay (Alexandrette Sanjak); the problem of the distribution of the waters of the Euphrates River; the Kurdish issue and Syria's support for the Kurdistan Workers ' Party (PKK); the Cyprus problem the problem related to the provision of assistance by Damascus to Greek Cypriots. In addition, the policy of the State of Israel1 was an important factor influencing relations between the two countries.

Throughout the 20th century, in Syria and other Arab states, Turkey was perceived as the legal successor of the Ottoman Empire, which for many centuries colonized these countries and hindered their normal development. And in Turkey, they perceived Syria and other Arab countries as their former territories, which, with external support, gained independence.

Since the second half of the 20th century, and especially in the 1980s and 1990s, Turkey and Syria have been engaged in a serious struggle for influence in the region. The struggle was aggravated by the fact that both states were located in the zones of two opposing poles. Turkey, which had been pursuing Westernization since the time of Ataturk, became a member of NATO in 1952, thus pitting itself against the leader of another bloc, the USSR, with which Syria occasionally established semi - allied relations. The active anti-communist position of the Turkish leadership and the Soviet policy in the region played a role in shaping Turkey's policy towards Syria. Syria, in turn, considered Turkey the US gendarme in the Middle East region.

ALEXANDRETTA'S PROBLEM

Throughout the twentieth century, one of the main problems in Turkish-Syrian relations was the annexation of the Alexandrette Sanjak by the Turkish Republic in 1939, which was carried out with the support of France, which thus wanted to prevent Turkey from entering into an alliance with Germany and Italy. The problem remains relevant today, as Syria de jure did not recognize the Sanjak for Turkey. Even on the latest Syrian maps, the territory of Alexandretta (now Hatay province*) is colored the same color as the rest of the SAR, and the current Syrian-Turkish border is marked with a dotted line as temporary.

The unresolved question of the ownership of Alexandretta negatively affected the general nature of relations between the two countries. However, over the past decades, Syria has avoided openly raising the issue of the need for an early settlement of the territorial problem with Turkey, as it has an even more important issue on its agenda related to the return of the Golan Heights, captured by Israel during the 1967 "Six-Day War".

However, after the exchange of visits of R. Erdogan and B. Assad in 2004, there was a decrease in tension around this issue. The Syrian government has said it has no claim to territorial sovereignty.

Hatay is a province in southern Turkey that has long caused tension between Turkey and Syria, which until 2005 did not de facto recognize Turkish sovereignty over it.

regions. On the other hand, these declarations and the renunciation of rights to the Territory were not legally established in any way. ²

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE EUPHRATES

Another important issue in relations between the two countries was the issue of water distribution in the Euphrates River.

The "water" differences between Turkey and Syria began to escalate in the 1970s and 1980s, when Turkey began to build and put into operation hydroelectric and irrigation facilities and implement the South-eastern Anatolia project, known by the abbreviation GAP (Guney Dogu Anadolu Projesi). During the construction of dams, Turkey usually kept the flow of Euphrates waters to Syria within 500 cubic meters. m per second, further reducing it when it was time to fill reservoirs with water. So, on January 13, 1990, Turkish hydraulic engineers to fill the reservoir at the im. Ataturk stopped the flow of Euphrates waters to Syria for a month. The riverbed from the southern borders of Turkey to the artificial lake Al-Asad near Aleppo has become completely dry.

Ankara demonstrated its powerful "water weapon". Inter-state relations between Turkey and Syria were strained to the limit. Although Turkey claimed that it had taken all necessary measures to minimize the damage to Syria and Iraq caused by the "technical necessity" of building the hydraulic system, in the Arab world, these actions of Turkey were clearly assessed as deliberate depriving Arab countries of the waters of the Euphrates. However, earlier unilateral actions of the Turkish side on the use of water resources have repeatedly caused crises in relations between Turkey, on the one hand, and Syria and Iraq, on the other (for example, in 1974 and 1981 during the construction of the Keban and Karakaya dams), also causing friction between these countries.

The Syrian official position is that the Euphrates River is an international waterway and requires an even distribution of its water resources. Official Damascus has repeatedly tried to raise this issue in the international arena, offering to resolve differences in the International Court of Justice and the International Legal Commission. On the contrary, Ankara describes the Euphrates River as "transboundary waters" that are transported in sufficient quantities to the countries located further down the riverbed-Syria and Iraq. Several times the parties tried to come to an agreement on the water issue, but the trilateral meetings often ended only by agreeing on technical issues. Moreover, Iraq and Syria have often boycotted Ankara's meetings on water issues.³

THE KURDISH FACTOR

In turn, Syria, seeking to put pressure on Turkey, supported the Kurds in their struggle against the Turkish state. In the 1990s, the Syrian Arab Republic turned into a kind of springboard for the development and implementation of rebel activities by Kurdish militant organizations, whose leader A. Ocalan lived in Syria until 1998.

The apogee of the confrontation between Turkey and Syria over the Kurdish issue was the crisis of autumn 1998. Back in early 1998, articles about a possible military conflict between the two countries began to appear in the Turkish press. Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem and Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit issued a warning to Syria. The latter, in particular, said that his country is going to take a number of diplomatic, political, economic and, if necessary, military measures to put pressure on Syria. After the return of Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz from Israel on September 9, 1998, accusations against Syria from high-ranking military and civilian officials did not stop. In late September, Yilmaz said that Syria faces "serious consequences for supporting the PKK." ⁴

There were reports in the media that troops were being drawn to the border from both the Syrian and Turkish sides. The region was on the verge of a full-scale military conflict. Libya, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, and Lebanon expressed their support for Syria, and the top leadership of Iran also expressed its solidarity with this country.

However, thanks to the huge efforts and shuttle diplomacy of Egyptian President H. Mubarak and Iranian Foreign Minister K. Harazi, a military conflict was avoided. On October 21, 1998, Turkey announced that it had reached agreement with Syria on the main issues.⁵

Ankara and Damascus agreed and signed the Adana Agreement. The document was named after the place of its signing-the Turkish city of Adana. In accordance with this agreement, several PKK bases and training camps were closed on Syrian territory, and the accounts of its functionaries were blocked, which caused a positive reaction in Turkish public, political and business circles.

Certain changes in bilateral relations after the events of 1998 took place in the middle of 2000. Then, after the long-term and permanent rule of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, his son, Bashar al - Assad, ascended to the "throne", bringing pragmatism to the country's domestic and foreign policy.

At that time, many media outlets called the presence of Turkish President Ahmed Sezer at the funeral of X. Al-Assad is one of the indicators of rapprochement between Syria and Turkey. They noted that " the Syrian leadership was very flattered by such a high presence of the Turkish leadership."⁶. At the same time, it should be noted that the Turkish-Syrian rapprochement began as early as May 2000, when the Deputy Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Syria were appointed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

The foreign ministers of the two countries tried to come to an agreement on the main problems between the two countries - water and Kurdish. Although no concrete result was achieved, the parties continued negotiations in the future.

In the same year 2000, Syrian Prime Minister A. H. Haddad and Interior Minister M. Harbayi paid an official visit to Turkey. Both visits were organized at the highest level and showed serious intentions of the parties. In November of the same year, the Presidents of Syria and Turkey met briefly at the summit of Muslim leaders in Doha. From the point of view of the development of bilateral relations, it is also necessary to highlight the meeting of the head of the Syrian officer Corps H. Turkmani and his Turkish counterpart H. Turkmani. Oglu in Ankara on June 19, 2002 During the meeting, a number of issues were discussed, including the fight against terrorism, mine clearance of the entire border between the two countries, and the possible holding of joint military exercises.⁷

THE"THAW" PERIOD

A new milestone in relations between the two countries was the coming to power of the moderate Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP)in Turkey led by Recep Erdogan. To some extent, this may have been "facilitated" by the US military campaign in Iraq that began in March 2003. It was then that Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Gul made a trip to the Middle East to discuss the situation around Iraq.⁸

In January 2004, for the first time in history, the Syrian President paid an official visit to Ankara. Against the background of cooling relations between Israel and Turkey, analysts assessed Bashar al-Assad's visit as an attempt to finally resolve the main problems between Ankara and Damascus. At the same time, it became clear that the positions of the parties on the Kurdish issue were very close: in his interviews, Bashar al-Assad stated that it was unacceptable to create a Kurdish or any other entity on an ethnic basis in Iraq, calling it overstepping the "red line". The Turkish Prime Minister expressed himself in the same spirit. The long-standing cold war had a negative impact on the economy of the two countries, and the signing by Bashar al-Assad and Recep Tayyip Erdogan of the agreement on the prevention of double taxation and mutual promotion of investment became an incentive for expanding economic cooperation between Syria and Turkey, and the agreement on opening a trade mission in Hatay de facto recognized the existing borders.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan paid a return visit to Damascus in December 2004. The visit, which ended with the signing of the free trade agreement between the two countries and the agreement on the distribution of water resources, was assessed as a success by both sides. At a press conference after the talks, the Prime Ministers of the two countries, R. Erdogan and M. Autry, announced that they had signed an agreement on the creation of a free trade zone between Syria and Turkey, which should become the basis for the development of trade and economic ties between the two countries in the future. ⁹ In addition, during the visit of the Turkish Prime Minister, a protocol was also signed on the construction of a joint hydroelectric power station in the Turkish border vilayet of Iskenderun. The man-made reservoir has allowed thousands of hectares of land to be watered on both sides of the border, made them suitable for agriculture and created thousands of additional jobs.¹⁰

However, these "political developments" between the two countries did not remove the contradictions regarding the distribution of the Euphrates River waters from the agenda. In July 2007, a meeting of the Joint Technical Committee on the Tigris and Euphrates River was held in Damascus, which was suspended in 1992. Syria and Iraq again expressed concerns about a new project (dam) Turkey's "Ylysu", which threatens to flood the historic city of Hasankeyf, inhabited mainly by Kurds ¹¹.

In December 2009, Erdogan paid a visit to Damascus. During his stay in Syria, he took part in a meeting of the Turkish-Syrian Council for Strategic Cooperation and met with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. During the meeting, the Turkish Prime Minister expressed confidence that the level of development of bilateral relations between their countries will become an example for other countries in the region. Erdogan also noted that " Syria for Turkey is the gateway to the Middle East, and Turkey for Syria is the gateway to Europe." The Turkish Prime Minister, stressing that Turkey's foreign policy activity in the region is not related to the position of Israel, said: "We have created this council on a bilateral basis, and we will work bilaterally. Nothing prevents this. Only mutual trust is needed." Referring to the South-Eastern Anatolia Project (GAP), R. Erdogan then made it clear that the water disputes between Turkey and Syria will soon be resolved ¹².

After the May 31, 2010 attack by the Israeli military on the Freedom Flotilla ship carrying humanitarian aid for Palestinians and the killing of about 20 people (9 of them, according to various sources, were Turkish citizens), the heads of the parliaments of Syria, Turkey and Iran expressed their intention to jointly coordinate efforts to counter Israeli aggression in the occupied Arab territories. territories. On June 8, 2010, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad met with his Turkish counterpart Abdullah Gul. Bashar al-Assad expressed his condolences to the families of the victims. Both sides stressed the importance of establishing stability in the region and making joint efforts against acts of aggression by Israel.¹³

CIVIL WAR AND ANKARA'S POSITION

The civil war in Si that broke out in early 2011-

The rii has become a new test for Turkish-Syrian relations. On February 6, 2011, President Bashar al-Assad held talks with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Aleppo, northern Syria. The two leaders reaffirmed the importance of continuing to work together and coordinate the positions of the two countries through a transparent high-level dialogue on all issues facing the Middle East, in order to strengthen its security and stability, as well as develop bilateral economic cooperation for the benefit of the peoples of both countries and the entire region.¹⁴

The Syrian opposition demonstrations that began in mid-March 2011 in the southern city of Deraa soon spread to the central and northern cities of the country - Banias, Idlib, Homs, Hama, Latakia, Douma. During mass demonstrations in March and April 2011, the opposition clashed with security and government forces, killing hundreds of protesters and dozens of soldiers and officers of the Syrian police and armed forces. President Bashar al-Assad reacted to the worsening situation in the country: at the end of March, the government of M. N. Autry was dismissed. The new government was formed by Adel Safar ¹⁵.

At the end of April 2011 The National Security Council of Turkey, at a meeting chaired by President A. Gul, in a special statement called on Syria " to immediately implement reforms aimed at ensuring the legitimate political, social and economic demands of the Syrian people." The statement also confirmed Turkey's support for the Syrian leadership's reform efforts.¹⁶

However, in early May, R. Erdogan's rhetoric regarding the situation in Syria changed significantly. So, on May 2, 2011, he noted that " incidents like the mass killings in Hama should not be repeated in Syria. In this regard, you need to be careful. We have conveyed our views in this regard to the Syrian authorities. I believe that in the event of a repeat of such situations, it will be very difficult for Syria to cope with the consequences, since the international community will express its opinion on this issue. " ¹⁷

It should be noted that official Ankara has always paid close attention to Syria, which is historically part of the sphere of Turkey's geopolitical interests. Thus, the current Prime Minister A. Davutoglu believed that, despite the existence of various problems in relations between the two countries (primarily the problem of water resources), there is a huge potential for cooperation between ^them18. At the same time, Davutoglu's position on the Syrian crisis was extremely simple. He believed that the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria is dictatorial, which has long lost its legitimacy. At one of the meetings of the Turkish-Syrian Friendship Group in April 2013, the Turkish minister said :" We will continue to support the Syrian people (opposition. - A. S.) and we hope that soon a new political system will be created in Syria. " ¹⁹

In general, Turkey's policy towards the Arab revolutions had some specifics. Since the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, Ankara has supported the aspirations of the peoples who rose up to fight for change. In other words, Turkey believed that the young Arab population had the right to demand the realization of their rights and social guarantees.

Thus, by supporting the revolutionary events in the Middle East, the Turkish government took a serious step in its foreign policy, as it threatened to disrupt diplomatic relations with some Arab countries. A. Davutoglu explained this as follows: "We developed warm relations with the existing regimes when they were not at war with their own peoples. But when they chose to suppress the demands of citizens, we joined these people, remaining committed to the principles of democracy. We have stated that we will stand up to any oppression of people in our region, regardless of the identity of the oppressors, who see their country exclusively as their personal property and ignore universal values and fundamental human rights, especially the right to life. We told the Arab leaders only one thing: we must listen to the voices of our citizens and do what they want. We advised regimes to no longer ignore democratic values and asked that they strike a balance between freedom and security. " ²⁰

So, if in Tunisia and Egypt the rulers left their posts, then in Libya and Syria the situation was completely different. In this regard, Davutoglu noted: "We have repeatedly appealed to Bashar al-Assad and Muammar Gaddafi with a proposal for a peaceful transfer of power, since both leaders were not able to hear the calls of their citizens for political reforms. Unfortunately, democratic reform in Libya was possible only through armed conflict and international intervention... In Syria, President Assad promised to implement reforms, but instead of implementing them, he began to use force against his citizens... Unfortunately, we were unable to persuade the Syrian administration to stop the violence and start implementing reforms, so we severed our relationship with the Ba'ath Party. " ²¹

Accusations against B. R. Erdogan has repeatedly expressed his opinion about the current situation in Syria, claiming that it was his fault that the country was destroyed, all kinds of weapons were used, historical monuments were destroyed, people were brutally killed (including 17 thousand children), 7 million people were in the situation of refugees. At the same time sharply stood up

humanitarian issue-first of all, for Turkey ²².

Erdogan noted: "We simply have to ignore the leadership of Assad, because otherwise we will not be able to resolve this conflict. As you know, about 140 countries in the world support the Syrian opposition, and all sectors of Syrian society should participate in the new leadership of Syria so that the people can participate in the elections in a peaceful environment... This is our position on the Syrian issue. " ²³

However, a well-known Turkish political analyst Emin Chelashan sharply criticized Ankara's position on Syria, who wrote in one of the articles in the Sezcu newspaper:: "The Turkish government has unjustifiably and without any real reason taken a hostile stance towards Syria. This has led to a deterioration of bilateral Turkish-Syrian relations." He also noted that the responsibility for the deterioration of relations with Syria is borne not only by the government of R. Erdogan, but also personally by the Turkish Foreign Minister A. Davutoglu, who "positions himself as a great expert in the field of international relations, but in fact does not even have an idea of what is happening in the world" ²⁴.

Ankara's policy of supporting the Syrian opposition has also attracted increasing criticism from neighboring states. The then Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki, said that the fact of external interference in the internal affairs of Syria is no longer in doubt: "Turkey is trying to use the Syrian conflict to spread its influence in the region." ²⁵ Nouri al-Maliki suggested that the crisis would spread beyond Syria and spread to other countries, and recalled that Iraq had repeatedly warned Turkey about the possible negative consequences of such a policy, emphasizing that "the crisis in Syria and the events in Iraq and Egypt serve the interests of the United States and Israel."²⁶

N. al-Maliki noted that the government of R. Erdogan, obsessed with the idea of reviving the Ottoman Empire, seeks to establish its hegemony over the region, which is opposed by Iraq, Syria, Iran, Jordan and even Saudi Arabia. Turkey, he said, tops the list of top human rights violators. Official Ankara daily harasses and arrests objectionable journalists, human rights activists, members of the public and national minorities. ²⁷

Turkey's position in the Syrian conflict initially cooled relations with Iran, which provided unprecedented support to the Assad regime by opening a $⁴ billion credit line in early 2012.28 Iran sold oil to Syria at a reduced price, for which the Syrian regime paid out of loans provided by Tehran. Iran's elite Al-Qods units, led by corps commander General Qassem Soleimani, who personally led the defense of Damascus and the military operations of the IRGC and Hezbollah units that fought on the side of Assad since 2012, were fighting on the side of Assad.²⁹

However, on the basis of resolving the Syrian crisis, Turkey sought to get closer to Iran. Trade turnover between the two countries in 2014 It made about $14 billion, despite sanctions against Iran. The visit of Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu to Iran in November 2013 resulted in a joint statement on the need for a ceasefire in Syria on the eve of Geneva ^2.30

There have been accusations against Ankara regarding its possible support for the extremist organization "Islamic State" (IS), which has joined the civil war in Syria and occupied vast territories in Iraq. A number of Turkish analysts noted Ankara's inaction in the process of increasing the immediate threat to national security. The Turkish periodical was full of headlines like: Why is Turkey tolerant of ISIS? Why is Turkey not conducting operations against ISIL ³¹? Moreover, as the Zaman newspaper noted with reference to the Washington Post, "some IS fighters are being treated in Turkey." ³²

In fact, the Turkish-Syrian border was opened for the entry of Islamist militants from all over the world into Syria. However, Ankara officially denied any support for the Islamic State. : "The Islamic State is the same for us as the Kurdistan Workers 'Party." ³³

BORDER CONFLICT

In the context of increasing tensions in bilateral relations, due to Ankara's rather tough stance, as well as its support for the Syrian opposition, the first incidents occurred on the Turkish-Syrian border. So, on June 22, 2012, the Syrian air defense forces shot down a Turkish F4 Phantom fighter over their territory, and a few days later, the Syrian air defense fired at a Turkish plane searching for the fighter shot down earlier. Two weeks later, on July 5, in the Azez quarter of the Syrian city of Aleppo, an airstrike by the Syrian Air Force destroyed 5 Turkish trucks that crossed the Turkish border to support the Syrian opposition.

Further developments were disappointing. On October 3, 2012, the Turkish army launched strikes on the territory of Syria in response to a mortar attack on the town of Akcakale. A Syrian shell hit a residential building, killing 5 people and wounding 9 others. Turkish artillery shelled targets on Syrian territory. Immediately after the retaliatory shelling, the Turkish government called for an urgent NATO summit to discuss the situation. In turn, the NATO Council on the night of October 4 supported the Turkish authorities, and blamed the Syrian military for the shelling.

The consequences of the October border conflict were Turkey's deployment of the Patriot air defense system to strengthen its position on the border with Syria. On November 19, 2012, Ankara addressed the NATO leadership with a request on this issue. On December 4, 2012, the NATO Council decided to allocate six batteries to Turkey - two each from the United States, Germany and the Netherlands. ³⁴

However, despite the installation of air defense systems in Adana, Kahramanmarash and Gaziantep, the situation on the Turkish-Syrian border did not improve. Moreover, the mutual provocations and reproaches of Ankara and Damascus continued. In February 2013, a powerful explosion occurred at the Gilvegezu checkpoint on the Turkish-Syrian border controlled by the opposition Free Syrian Army (FSA), killing 12 people. The next double terrorist attack occurred in May 2013 near the border in Reyhanli, in which 51 people were killed and 155 were injured. If during the terrorist attack in Gilvegezu, the majority of those killed (9 people)were Syrians, then in Reyhanli, the overwhelming majority of those killed were Turks. ³⁵

Further aggravation of Turkish-Syrian relations followed the destruction by the Turkish military of the Syrian MI-17 helicopter and MIG-29 aircraft in September 2013 and March 2014, respectively. At the same time, on the occasion of the downed Syrian military plane, R. Erdogan said:: "If our territory is hit, then our slap in the face will be very heavy." ³⁶

JOINING THE WAR

At the end of February 2015, due to the approach of the IS armed forces to the Turkish-Syrian border, Turkey conducted a military operation on Syrian territory. Turkish tanks and infantry entered Syria via the Kurdish town of Ain al-Arab to evacuate Turkish troops and the tomb of Suleiman Shah. The Syrian-Turkish border was crossed by 573 Turkish soldiers, 39 tanks, about 20 armored personnel carriers and 40 trucks. On the night of February 22, an operation was carried out to evacuate the honor guard and additional security of the Turkish special forces (44 soldiers), as well as the remains of Suleiman Shah himself from the mausoleum (Kara Kozak district on the Euphrates)³⁷.

The approach of the IS armed forces to the borders of Turkey, as well as the implementation of a number of terrorist acts in July 2015 (the explosion in Suruc and the shelling of Turkish border guards), forced the Ankara government to decide to bomb IS positions in Syria and Iraq. On July 24, 2015, the Presidents of Turkey and the United States agreed to use the Turkish Incirlik base to fight Islamists. Later, Turkey joined the international coalition against IS and launched its first airstrikes on ISIL positions on August 28.38 But at the same time, the Turkish air force also used force against the Syrian Kurds, because, according to Ankara, their armed formations also began to pose a threat to the internal political stability of Turkey due to their support for the PKK. In turn, the PKK announced the end of a multi-year truce with Turkey.³⁹ Turkish aircraft began to strike PKK bases in northern Iraq.

The aggravation of the situation on the Turkish-Syrian border, as well as the actual entry of Ankara into military operations in Syria and Iraq, caused a sharp aggravation of internal political stability in Turkey, both due to numerous terrorist acts committed by Islamic and Kurdish radicals, and the flow of countless Syrian immigrants to Turkey. In Turkey itself, after the unsuccessful parliamentary elections for the ruling party, internal political uncertainty has increased. At the same time, Ankara is trying to stabilize the situation inside the country by conducting mass detentions of alleged extremists associated with the IS and PKK.⁴⁰ In the new elections in November this year, the AKP again won a parliamentary majority and formed the government on its own.

THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

The problem of refugees has become acute due to the ongoing armed clashes, which are clearly ethnic and religious in nature. According to the UN, more than 280 thousand people have already been killed in the conflict in Syria. More than a million were injured. 7.6 million rubles. Syrians have been displaced inside Syria, and about ⁴ million have fled to neighboring countries41.

The total number of Syrian refugees in Turkey as of August 2015, according to the Turkish Government's Office for Emergency Prevention and Response, has already exceeded 1.5 million people, and according to unofficial data, it has reached 2 million. Of these, almost 285,000 live in 19 tent camps and 9 container-type towns located in 10 border provinces - Hatay, Gaziantep, Kilis, Sanliurfa, Kahramanmarash, Mardin, Osmaniye, Adana, Malatya and Adiyaman ⁴².

The problem of maintaining Syrian refugees has imposed heavy financial costs on Turkey - as of the beginning of 2015, as R. Erdogan said, " we have already spent about $ 5 billion. We do not give out any coupons, we provide education, food, hygiene, health and clothing for all these people here. " ⁴³ But either by chance or organized, the mass resettlement of Syrian refugees to the EU countries began.

But this is a special topic.

* Suleiman Shah (1178-1227)-grandfather of the founder of the Ottoman Empire Osman I, whose tomb and burial place, in accordance with the Ankara Agreement of 1921 and the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, were located in Syria and de jure considered Turkish territory.

* * *

Summing up, it should be noted that Turkish-Syrian relations have passed a difficult path. For a long time, the existence of a whole range of problems (the territorial dispute over Hatay, the Kurdish issue, water disputes) has periodically reduced cooperation between the two countries to nothing. After the AKP came to power in Turkey, a qualitatively new stage of bilateral relations was marked, characterized by the desire to resolve these controversial issues.

However, the outbreak of the civil war in Syria has become a turning point in Turkish-Syrian relations. Ankara, pursuing the goals of strengthening its own influence in the region, as well as observing the general policy of NATO, has taken a tough pro-Western position in the conflict. However, unlike other countries in the Middle East, where most of the leaders left their posts under the pressure of revolutionary events, the Assad regime turned out to be more stable, which, of course, neither Western countries nor the Turkish leadership expected.

By supporting the Syrian opposition and subsequently actually entering the civil war in Syria, Ankara not only moved away from its "zero problems with neighbors" policy, but also jeopardized its own national security, while also cooling relations with Iran, which supports the Assad regime. In addition, the protracted Syrian conflict has taken on a threatening scale for Turkey, not only because of the huge number of Syrian refugees, but also due to the military clash with the IG and the obvious increase in terrorist activity inside the country.

^{Bahadir K.} 1 Turkiye-Suriye iliskilerinde yeniden yapilanma sureci (The process of restructuring in Turkish-Syrian relations)- http://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.aspx7ID-770

² Hatay Province. Turkish-Syrian dispute - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hatay_Provinee#Turkish.E2.80.93Syrian_dispute

³ Suriye-Turkiye Iliskileri (Турецко-сирийские отношения) -http://www.stratejikanaliz.com/suriye/suriye_turkiye_iliskileri.htm

⁴ Suriye'ye son uyari (Syria's Last Warning) (in Turkish) - http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/1998/10/07/70603.asp

^{Arutyunyan A. E.} 5 On the issue of mutual relations between Turkey and Syria in the late XX-early XXI centuries. Sovremennaya Turkiya: problemy I resheniya [Modern Turkey: Problems and Solutions]. Collection of articles, Moscow, 2006, p. 153.

⁶ Hafiz Esad'in vefati (Смерть Хафеза Асада) http://www.tccb.gov.tr/basin-aciklamalari-ahmet-necdet-sezer/1720/4193/hafiz-esadin-vefati- hk.html

^{Guryev A. A.} 7 On Turkish-Syrian relations http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2005/17 - 05 - 05.htm

^{Yesiltas M.} 8 Soft balancing in Turkish foreign policy the case of the 2003 Iraq war // Perceptions. Spring-Summer 2009. P. 25.

^{Arutyunyan A. E.} 9 Decree. Op. p. 154.

^{Guryev A. A.} 10 The American factor in Turkish-Syrian Relations - http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2005/31 - 03 - 05.htm

^{Mosaki N. Z.} 11 The problem of the Ylysu project in Turkish-Iraqi-Syrian relations - http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2007/10 - 07 - 07b.htm

^{Gadzhiev A. G.} 12 Ways to Middle East integration: Development of Turkish-Syrian relations - http://www.iimes.ru/rus/frame_stat.html

¹³ Al-mubahasat beina Bashar al-Assad wa Abdullah Gul (Talks between B. Assad and A. Gul) - http://www.moi.gov.sy/ar/aidll592.html

¹⁴ Erdogan-Esad gorusmesi sona erdi (The meeting between Erdogan and Assad has come to an end) - http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/sondakika/16952690.asp

¹⁵ "Sifir sorun" politikasi ekseninde Turkiye-Suriye iliskileri ("Zero problems" policy in Turkish-Syrian relations)- http://www.sinifmucadelesi.net/spip.php7article549

¹⁶ Turkiye milli guvenlik konseyi, Suriye ve Irak gelismelerini inceledi (The National Security Council of Turkey analyzed developments in Syria and Iraq) - http://turkish.irib.ir/

^{Volovin A. A.} 17 Turkey and the "Arab Revolutions" of 2011-http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2011/26 - 05 - 11a.htm

^{Davutoglu A.} 18 Stratejik Derinlik. Turkiyenin uluslararasi konumu (Strategic depth. International position of Turkey) / / Yetmisikinci basim. Kure yayinlari. Istanbul. 2011. S. 402 - 403.

¹⁹ Davutoglu'ndan kritik Suriye aciklamasi (Davutoglu's harsh statement on Syria) (in Turkish) - http://www.sabah.com.tr/Dunya/2013/04/21/davutoglundan-kritik-suriye-aciklamasi

^{Davutoglu A.} 20 Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring // Turkey Policy Brief Series. 2012, N 3. P. 5 - 6.

²¹ Ibidem.

²² Birlesmis Milletler 69'uncu Genel Kurulu Genel Gorusmelerinde Yaptiklari Konusma (Речь P.Эрдогана на 69-й сессии ГА ООН) -http://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/1037/91139/birlesmis-milletler-69uncu-genel-kurulu-gen el-gorusmelerinde-yaptiklari-konusma.html

²³ Joint press conference between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan - http://interaffairs.ru/read ^ hp?item=12198

^{Guryev A. A.} 24 Situation in Turkey: November 2012 - http://www.iimes.ru/9p-16259

^{Guryev A. A.} 25 The situation in Turkey: January 2013 - http://www.iimes.ru/7p-16849

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Iran'dan Suriy'e 4 milyar dolarlik kredi (Iran's $ 4 billion loan to Syria) (in Turkish) - http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/planet/23379228.asp

²⁹ Iran Devrim Muhafizlari Ordusu'nun Suriye'deki Faaliyetleri (Деятельность КСИР в Сирии) (на тур. яз.) - http://tr.abna24.com/service/important/archive/2015/01/14/664706/story.html

^{Akhmedov V., Kulagina L. M.} 30 Syria and Iran in the New regional situation in the Middle East - http://www.iimes.ru/7p-20454

³¹ Turkiye ISID'e neden operasyon yapmiyor? (Why doesn't Turkey conduct operations against ISIS?) - http://www.taraf.com.tr/yazarlar/turkiye-iside-neden-operasyon-yapmiyor/

³² ISID komutani: Yaralilarimizi Turkiyede tedavi ettirdik, silahlari sinirdan gecirdik (IS commander: our wounded were treated in Turkey, and weapons came from the Turkish border) - http://www.zaman.com.tr/dunya_isid-komutani-yaralilarimizi-turkiyede-tedavi-ettirdik-silahl ari-sinirdan-gecirdik_2237472.html

³³ Cumhurbaskani Erdogan: "Bizim icin ISID neyse PKK da odur "(President Erdogan: "For us, IS is the same as PKK")- http://www.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/politika/192025.aspx

³⁴ Turkiye-Suriye iliskileri: Inisler ve cikislar (Турецко-сирийские отношения: подъемы и падения) - http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/dosya/turkiye-suriye-iliskileri-inisler-ve-cikislar

³⁵ The death toll from an explosion on the Turkish-Syrian border has reached 12 people - http://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/kolichestvo-pogibshih-v-rezultate-vzryva-na-turetsko-siriyskoy-1 1022013194400

³⁶ Suriye-Turkiye iliskileri (Турецко-сирийские отношения) -http//tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suriye-T%C3%BCrkiye_ili%C5%9Fkileri

³⁷ Suleyman Sah saygi karakolundaki askerler tahliye edildi (The tomb of Suleyman Shah with the honor guard was evacuated by the military) - http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/28266610.asp

³⁸ Turkiye, ISID'le savasin artik tarafi (Turkey is already a participant in the war against ISIS) - http://www.zaman.com.tr/yazarlar/lale-kemal/turkiye-isidle-savasin-artik-tarafi_2307094.htm l

³⁹ Turkiye'nin ISID ile PKK catismasi (Turkey's clash with IS and PKK) - http://www.milliyet.com.tr/turkiye-isid-ve-pkk-yi-vuruyor-gundem-2092419/

⁴⁰ Kurds announce end of multi-year truce with Turkey - http://www.newsru.com/world/25jul2015/turkurd.html

⁴¹ The Security Council discussed the humanitarian situation in Syria - http://www.un.org/russian/news/story.asp7NewsID-23598#.VW258UmGj4g

⁴² Barinma Merkezlerinde Son Durum (Latest data on refugee camps) - https://www.afad.gov.tr/TR/IcerikDetayl.aspx?ID-16&IcerikID-848

⁴³ Joint press conference of Russian President Vladimir Putin...

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